Chapter 8: Interstate Conflicts in Europe and the Middle East Case Study Findings PDF

CHAPTER 8 Select Case Study Findings on Interstate Con icts: Europe and the Middle East Behavior euroPe Finland/Russia-USSR Conict (Resolved) Finland: Decisions Finland made several strategic and important tactical decisions during this con ict with its great power, later superpower, neighbor, Russia- USSR (1919–1961). The rst two Finland decisions occurred within the rst year of this interstate con ict (1919). One was to participate in the Western Powers’ military intervention in Northern Russia, in support of the ‘White Russian’ opponents of the Bolshevik regime. The second, nearsimultaneous, decision was to dispatch Finnish ‘Volunteers’ to ‘liber- ate’ Eastern Karelia, a predominantly ethnic Finnish majority population that was an integral part of Tsarist Russia and its Communist succes- sor. The rst decision was only partly implemented because its primary advocate, then General, later Marshal, Mannerheim, acting as Regent of Finland in 1918–1919, was replaced by a moderate elected president, and because the ‘White Russians’, the intended bene ciary of that inter- vention, refused to recognize Finland’s independence. The second deci- sion, like all subsequent attempts to secure control of East Karelia, failed; © The Author(s) 2018 211 M. Brecher, A Century of Crisis and Con ict in the International System, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57156-0_8 212 M. BRECHER in fact, Finland was compelled to abandon its claim to that disputed terri- tory in the 1920 Soviet Union-imposed Peace of Tartu, the third Finland decision in that initial phase of their con ict. There were no Finland decisions in the inter-World War period, the second peaceful phase (end 1920–beginning 1939). fl fi fl fl fl fi fi fl fi fl fl The third phase of this protracted con ict (November 1939–1944) witnessed another cluster of important Finland decisions. One was to accept the terms of the Soviet-initiated Peace of Moscow in 1940 that ended their ‘Winter War’: it was less onerous for Finland than the preceding peace agreement (Tartu in 1920), as noted, because of the tenacious Finnish defense against vastly superior Soviet military power. The next Finland decision, in the autumn of 1940, was to permit passage through its territory to German troops and their permission to establish supply bases, in exchange for military equipment. This sharpened the hostility and mis- trust of the USSR for its northern neighbor and led to the second major act of violence in their con ict, the ‘Continuation War’ (1940–1944), and the more demanding Moscow Armistice in 1944, because of the more emphatic Soviet military victory than during their ‘Winter War’. Moreover, Finland had no alternative to accepting the severe terms of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty which incorporated the harsh terms of the 1944 Moscow Armistice, for Finland was merely one of a group of lesser European enemy states that had supported Germany during WWII. The nal, strategic, decision by Finland was to change drastically its tradi- tional attitude and policy to Soviet Russia: in light of the transformation of world politics, especially, the emergence of the USSR as a superpower. Finland gradually decided to transform its historic image of the USSR as inveterate enemy to an overwhelmingly powerful peaceful neighbor that required of Finland a basic change of policy to that of a trusting, friendly neighbor. This found expression in the accommodative 1948 Finland- Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA). [See below.] Finland: Decision-Makers There were three principal Finland decision-makers during this Northern Europe interstate con ict. The rst was Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, the commanding gure in Finland’s political and military leadership during the rst half of this con ict. He was the military leader of the ‘Whites’ in Finland’s civil war (1918) and the Regent of Finland in 1918–1919. Then, after a 12-year semi-retirement, he served as Chairman of 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 213 Finland’s Defense Council from 1931 to 1945 and, most important, was Commander-inChief of Finland’s Defense Forces from 1939 to 1944, during the two Finland/USSR wars. He was elected President in 1944 and resigned in 1946 because of ill-health. Throughout his active pub- lic life, he was the most in uential member of Finland’s decision-mak- ing elite. Mannerheim adhered to the Realist paradigm until the end of WWII. However, he then became a primary and effective advocate of a fundamental change in Finland’s attitude and policy toward the USSR during the formative years of the transition on that core issue of Finland’s foreign and national security policy (1945– 1948). The second important Finnish decision-maker was Juho Kusti Paasikivi. He was Finland’s representative in the crucial, unsuccess- ful negotiations with Stalin in 1939, leading to the ‘Winter War’ (1939–1940). After a withdrawal from the public arena during most of WWII, he served as President Mannerheim’s Prime Minister (1944– 1946) and was President from 1946 to 1956. He too advocated a positive change in Finland’s policy toward the USSR, which became known as the ‘Paasikivi Doctrine of Finlandization.’ fi fl fi fl fi fi fl The third and longest-serving Finland leader was Urho Kekkonen, who headed several Finnish governments as Prime Minister from 1950–1953 and 1954–1956 and then served as President from 1956 to 1982. He shared the Paasikivi policy of ‘active neutrality’, which became known as the ‘Paasikivi-Kekkonen line’, and forged friendly relations with the Soviet leader, Khrushchev (1955–1964), as well as with Western and NATO leaders. All three senior decision-makers for Finland contributed to the profound change in Finnish attitudes and policy toward its super- power neighbor from the mid–late 1940s. Finland: Decision Process The political system in which Finland’s decisions in this interstate con ict were made and implemented was a Western-type democracy that com- bined a strong president, with some independent decisional powers, and a strong parliament: presidential decisions that were not rati ed by parlia- ment did not bind later governments or presidents. At the same time, the electoral principle of proportional representation made coalition govern- ment the norm, thereby introducing an obstacle to an ef cient and stable decision process in all aspects of public policy. Another constraint was the deep-rooted and widespread antipathy of the Finnish nation to all aspects of Russian culture and politics from the period of Finland’s colonial 214 M. BRECHER status vis-à-vis Tsarist Russia (1809–1918) until the end of WWII. Notwithstanding these constraints, Finland’s respected and politically astute decision-makers succeeded in transforming a collective negative per- ception of Finland’s powerful neighbor and people into a recognition that respect and accommodation were essential for the welfare of a small nation dependent on the goodwill of a major power for its survival in a complex, con ict-prone international system. Russia-USSR: Decisions fl fl fl fi fl fl fi fl fl The important decisions of Russia-USSR in this con ict can be pre- sented more brie y, since almost all were the antithesis of Finland’s core decisions. One, a strategic decision, was to respond to the challenge and threat posed by Finnish ‘Volunteers’ to USSR control over East Karelia in 1919. This took the initial form of successful military defense of Soviet territory against an intruding neighbor, followed by a demand- ing peace agreement (Tartu 1920), in which, as noted, Finland was compelled to yield its claim to rightful sovereignty over East Karelia (The Finnish 1919 decision to participate in Western military interven- tion in Northern Russia did not require a response because it was not fully implemented). The second important decision was to resort to force in late 1939, the ‘Winter War’, after negotiation with Finland failed to secure its political goals. The third, closely related decision was to initi- ate a peace proposal in 1940, in order to end a very costly war, which led to the Peace of Moscow that year. The fourth major USSR decision was a replication of the third, namely, to present a peace proposal in 1943, in an attempt to end the long, drawn-out ‘Continuation War’: this produced the 1944 Armistice, which effectively terminated that war; and its terms were formalized in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, the terms of which the USSR was a principal framer. The only major Soviet decision in this con- ict that re ected a more cooperative than con ictive relationship was to initiate the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948, which denoted a transformation of their longstanding hostile relationship. Russia-USSR: Decision-Makers The dominant gure among Russia’s decision-makers in the rst phase of this con ict (1918–1919) was Lenin, who often consulted two other senior members of the Communist Party Politburo, Trotsky and Stalin. In the second phase (1939–1945), Stalin stood alone as the most 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 215 powerful gure in the USSR regarding decisions on war and peace with Finland during the ‘Winter War’ (1939–1940) and the ‘Continuation War’ (1940–1944). The only other person who played an important role was Molotov, who held the USSR positions of Prime Minister or Foreign Minister during most of the period of Stalin’s unfettered dominance after Lenin’s death in 1922, Trotsky’s banishment from the Soviet Union in 1929 and decimation of the Bolshevik ‘Old Guard’ by Stalin in the ‘show trials’ of the 1930s. Stalin remained the supreme decision-maker of the Soviet Union in all important aspects of its relations with Finland, as with all major USSR decisions in foreign policy and national security everywhere in the global system, until his death in 1953. For 2 years thereafter, the intra-party struggle for power, among the contenders for the succession to Stalin, generated instability and decisional uncertainty until the triumph of Khrushchev in 1955. His power was superior to that of his Politburo colleagues but less than absolute as in the brief tenure of Lenin and the much longer period of Stalin’s pre-eminence as the unchallenged decision-maker in all issues of public policy, foreign and domestic, that he chose to address. The second phase of the protracted con ict with Finland (1939–1944), with both wars during this con ict, was one of those issues. Russia-USSR: Decision Process The political system in which decisions by Russia-USSR in this interstate con ict were made was a marked contrast to the democratic, parliamen- tary system of competing parties that characterized Finland. From the Onset of this con ict until its Termination and for 30 years beyond its resolution, the pivotal institution for authorizing decisions on all aspects of public policy was the Communist Party and, especially, its princi- pal executive organ, the Politburo. For some decisions of lesser impor- tance, an issue might be decided by the larger Party body to which, in theory, the Politburo was responsible, the Central Committee. In real- ity, however, all important decisions, strategic and tactical‚ were made by the General Secretary, later, the First Secretary of the Party. During the brief Lenin era, the decision process was largely con ned to Lenin and a few senior members of the Politburo, notably Trotsky and Stalin, and sometimes the entire Politburo. During the rst phase of the Finland/ Russia-USSR con ict, the two major decisions in 1919 noted above were made by Lenin, in consultation with Trotsky and Stalin, as noted. In the crucial second phase (1939–1944), as well as on the crucial decision 216 M. BRECHER fl fl fl fi fl fl fi fl fi fi fi leading to the 1948 bilateral Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Stalin acted alone or in consultation with his subordinate Foreign Minister, Molotov. In sum, the decision process in Finland was more complex, involving more institutions, interest groups, and parties in a coalition government. The decision process in Russia-USSR was con ned to the Communist Party elite decision-making body, the Politburo, but even narrower, to the incumbent Party leader for most of the important decisions in the Finland/Russia-USSR interstate con ict. Finland/Russia-USSR: Con ict-Sustaining Acts Violence was the most consequential, but not the most frequent, con- ict-sustaining technique utilized by both of the principal adversar- ies. The rst notable threat of violence was Finland’s informal military intervention via the dispatch of ‘Volunteers’ to the southern part of East Karelia on April 20, 1919, in support of its attempt to secede from Russia and integrate into Finland. This dispatch of ‘Volunteers’ contin- ued in 1921, despite Finland’s formal renunciation of its claims to pre- dominantly Finnish-speaking East Karelia in the 1920 Peace of Tartu (East Karelia had never been part of Finland). After almost two dec- ades of non-violent hostility between the two principal adversaries, the USSR initiated a border incident on November 26, 1939, alleging the ring by Finnish artillery on Soviet forces across their frontier: this was accompanied by the USSR’s renewed severance of diplomatic relations with Finland and renunciation of their 1932 non-aggression treaty, cul- minating in the invasion of Finland on November 30, the beginning of their 1940 ‘Winter War’, which lasted for 3 months. Finland initi- ated another important non-violent military act in June 1941, granting free passage of German troops through its territory, thereby enabling Germany to launch the northern front of its ‘Operation Barbarossa’ on 22 June. During the following 6 months, Finland took advantage of the Soviet Union’s pre-occupation with the siege of Leningrad and re-gained all of the territory that it had been forced to cede in the 1940 Peace of Moscow, after the ‘Winter War’. Then Finland shifted to a defensive pos- ture, until the massive Red Army attack on the Karelian front on June 9, 1944, which restored Soviet territorial gains at the end of the ‘Winter War’ (1939–1940), but had lost to Finland during the early months of Germany’s attack on the USSR, that is, in the second half of 1941. Following a cease re in early September 1944, the Moscow Armistice agreement on September 19 ended the ‘Continuation War’, the second 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 217 major violent con ict-sustaining act during the Finland/Russia-USSR interstate con ict. As in 1920 (Peace of Tartu) and 1940 (Peace of Moscow), Finland was compelled to make territorial concessions in 1944—to cede parts of Finnish Karelia and several islands in the Gulf of Finland, as well as the northern Petsamo region, to the USSR. It also undertook to expel German forces from Finland, achieved in April 1945, near the close of WWII in Europe, to legalize the Communist Party in Finland, and to ban fascist, proGermany, organizations. There were no other violent con ict-sustaining acts in this con ict from 1944 to con ict termination in 1961. fi fl fl fi fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl Political Hostility—the second important con ict-sustaining technique in this Northern Europe con ict, with Finland its more frequent ini- tiator, though sustaining the con ict was more often the consequence of its acts than their intent. Always insecure during its 218 M. BRECHER Verbal Hostility mostly in the form of propaganda attacks on Finland by the of cial Soviet media, and the disparaging images of Communism and Russian society, culture, politics and its economic system by Western- type private media and senior of cials in Finland, from 1919 to 1944, reinforced the more signi cant and tangible negative consequences of violent and political con ict-sustaining acts. Whatever acts of Economic Discrimination occurred between the adver- saries did not contribute to the persistence of this con ict. Finland/Russia-USSR: Con ict Management Evidence Con ict management in this Northern Europe protracted con ict was virtually unique among post-World War I interstate con icts, in the form in which it was manifested: three of the four major hostile epi- sodes during the Finland/Russia-USSR 42-year interstate con ict (1919–1961) were characterized by violence, usually intense, serious clashes or full-scale war. All were ended by formal peace agreements, none of which led to lasting peace, or a resolution of their con ict. Rather, con ict management in this con ict generated nite periods of the suspension of violence between the two principal adversaries, each lasting for years; they were similar to periods of a lengthy truce, each of which was followed by a resumption of violence; and the third episode of violence was followed by 17 years without violence, until con ict res- olution was achieved in 1961. fi fi fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fl The rst hostile episode in this con ict began on April 20, 1919, when Finnish soldiers, posing as “volunteers,” backed by Finland’s gov- ernment, entered Russia-controlled East Karelia and seized a border town; this occurred even before Finland’s independence was fl fi rst 25 years as an independent state, Finland sought allies, sympathizers, and patrons to help compensate for its adversary’s vastly superior military capabil- ity. At rst, in the early 1920s, Finland sought the friendship and sup- port of the Soviet Union’s nearest neighbors—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and Poland. Given their geographic location and complex relations with the USSR, their embrace by Finland was perceived by Moscow as hostile political acts. Then, Finland sought alignment with Scandinavia states, acts that also generated Soviet mistrust. Of greater concern to the Communist regime in the USSR were several domestic political acts by its Finnish adversary. One was the election of conserva- tive, pro-German and anti-Communist presidents during the 1920s and 1930s, notably Svinhufsud (1931–1939), whose hostile attitude to the Soviet Union was unconcealed. Another related politically hostile act was Finland’s ban on its Communist party in 1930. The USSR’s most hostile political acts were its creation of a puppet regime in Finland at the beginning of their ‘Winter War’ (1939–1940) and its withdrawal of formal recognition of the internationally recognized, politically hos- tile Government of Finland, followed by the Soviet Union’s attempt to interfere in Finland’s domestic politics during the early months of WWII. This, in turn, contributed to Finland’s unconcealed support for Germany’s invasion of Northern Russia in 1941. Although less con- sequential than direct violent acts by both adversaries, acts of political hostility further enhanced mutual distrust of the other’s intentions and objectives. recognized by the UK and the USA, on 6 May; Russia’s recognition came 11⁄2 years later. There was sporadic ghting in May and through the summer and September. Finland/ Russia negotiations began in June 1920, and the rst peace agreement, the Treaty of Tartu, was signed on October 14. Con ict management was devoted to establishing a border between the two adversaries, in the form of a binding peace treaty. In essence, newly independent Finland ceded to Bolshevik Russia [the USSR was formal- ized in 1922] the eastern part of the Karelian Isthmus and two border districts, along with demilitarizing and neutralizing some islands in the Gulf of Finland, which Russia deemed vital for the defense of Leningrad; in return, Russia recognized Western Karelia and the northern region of 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 219 Petsamo as integral parts of Finland. An informal promise by Russia of a referendum in East Karelia, with the option of secession, which Finland believed would lead to integration with Finland, was never held. The Treaty of Tartu maintained a ‘cold peace’ between mutually dis- trustful neighbors, accentuated by unconcealed hostility by Finland to every dimension of its giant neighbor —its political and economic system, ideology, culture, national behavior—until the outbreak of World War II. The cleavage was accentuated by Soviet Russia’s creation of a rival, pro- Communist government, headed by Kuusinen, in the near-proximity of Finland, and the reluctance of Finland’s recognized Ryti-Tanner govern- ment to respond favorably to the Soviet Union’s offer of negotiations. The USSR, suspecting possible Western Powers’ direct support to Finland, launched an offensive almost two decades later, designed to annex the rest of the Karelian Isthmus. The result was the high casualty, 3-month, full-scale, bitter Winter War from December 1939 to early March 1940. As the much stronger power, the USSR emerged the victor, but Finland’s defense against over- whelming odds evoked admiration from many Western and European states and respect from the Soviet Union. Once more, con ict management occurred in the form of a peace agreement, the Peace of Moscow, signed on March 13, 1940, which entailed even more far-reaching ter- ritorial concessions by Finland to the Soviet Union than the Peace of Tartu: the entire Karelian Isthmus, restoring the border set by Peter the Great; some islands coveted by the USSR in the Gulf of Finland, along with a 30-year lease of Hanko Cape and surrounding islands and water. It also prohibited either party from entering into an alliance with a third party to attack the other signatory. Like the Peace of Tartu, it produced a ‘cold peace’, along with intense grievances among the Finns, but for a much shorter period, 4 years. fl fi fl fl fi The third phase of war and con ict management replicated the Winter War and the Peace of Moscow (1939–1940), with the Continuation War and its Armistice. By August 24, 1944, following another success- ful Soviet Union offensive in the Karelian Isthmus, and the awareness by Finland’s leaders that their longstanding patron, Germany, would suffer defeat in WWII and, therefore, could not serve any longer as Finland’s defender against further Soviet Union encroachments on its territory and, ultimately, its sovereignty, Finland decided to accept a harsh Soviet offer of peace. As conditions for negotiations, the USSR demanded a complete termination of Finland’s relations with Germany and the withdrawal of all 220 M. BRECHER German troops from its territory. Surprisingly, the Soviet Union’s armi- stice terms were mild—no occupation of Finland’s territory, a modest imposition of reparations, and a commitment by Finland not to enter an alliance with, or permit the transit of armed forces through its territory by, any potential Soviet enemy. The Armistice in the Continuation War was signed on September 19, 1944 and served as a prelude to a formal peace agreement—the Paris Peace Treaty (September 15, 1947) between the victorious Four Powers in the European theatre of World War II (the UK, USA, USSR, and France) and the ve allies or satellites of Germany (Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Romania). Finland and the other four defeated states had no role in the drafting of this European Theatre peace treaty, unlike its formally equal role as a negotiator of the Peace of Tartu, the Peace of Moscow, and the Armistice in the Continuation War; they were invited to address the Paris Conference, attended by 21 states, but they were not permitted to participate in its discussions. Several provi- sions of the 1947 Peace Treaty related directly to Finland, though some were stated in terms applicable to the ve defeated states. Two replicated provisions in the 1940 Peace of Moscow: an obligation to refrain from any attack on, or participation in an alliance directed against, another signatory; and a speci c admonition against participation in the rearma- ment of Germany or in its military industries. Moreover, the Finland/ USSR boundaries stipulated in the 1944 Armistice were re-af rmed; and the size of Finland’s armed forces seriously limited, notably an army of 34,000 soldiers and 60 military planes. As for its contribution to con- ict termination, the Paris Peace Treaty ended a War, World War II and Finland’s participation in that war. However, it did not constitute resolu- tion of the Finland/Russia-USSR interstate con ict. That did not occur until 14 years after the Paris Peace Treaty. Finland/Russia-USSR: Con ict Resolution The above discussion of con ict management in this con ict noted a unique trait—in three of the four major con ict episodes, management took the form of peace treaties between Finland and Russia-USSR, but lasting peace and con ict resolution were not achieved by any of their peace agreements! A second unique feature of this protracted con ict is that the path to con ict resolution was a de facto alliance between the principal adversaries, one year after the last of their peace treaties, the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty which, like its predecessors, did not constitute 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 221 fl fl fi fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl con ict resolution: their alliance was entitled “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” (FCMA), signed in April 1948. A third unique characteristic of the Finland/Russia-USSR con ict and rela- tionship is that, while the formal wording of this treaty was identical to that used in other treaties that de ned the relations between the Soviet Union and the East European states which became members of the Warsaw Pact, the USSR determined when the commitments of the alli- ance, affecting all signatories to FCMA treaties, took effect for all. By con- trast, the activation of all FCMA commitments by Finland and the USSR required the approval of both signatories. Moreover, the Soviet Union accepted the proposed Finland wording, which signi cantly circumscribed the alliance commitments: in the Soviet proposal, Finland would have been committed to assist the USSR in defending its territory whenever necessary; the Finland counterproposal would restrict military coopera- tion to a speci c situation, an attack on the Soviet Union by Germany or its allies through Finnish territory; and Finland wished to include a clear statement of its desire not to be involved in great Power disputes. The USSR accepted the Finland formulation, as evident in Article 1 of their FCMA treaty: its terms were to apply only to an armed attack on the Soviet Union through Finland’s territory, and determination of the need for Finland’s assistance was subject “to mutual agreement between the Contracting Parties.” Article 2 reinforced the content of the rst article by calling on the signatories to confer with each other on a course of action if the threat of an armed attack was considered genu- ine. This conciliatory Soviet behavior on the wording of their FCMA treaty, unique in the relations between the USSR and its other small- state neighbors, re ected the qualitative change in the Finland/Russia USSR con ict; and it contributed to a fundamental change in Finnish attitudes to its superpower neighbor, from hostility, mistrust, and hatred in the earlier decades of their con ict to growing mutual trust by the leaders of both adversaries, Stalin and Molotov for the USSR, Paasikivi and Kekkonen, who set the tone for an accommodation with the Soviet Union during their long tenure as presidents of Finland. In essence, the former had achieved its primary goal, an assurance about Finland’s future behavior in case of war between the USSR and one or more Western Powers, always a pre-occupation for Soviet lead- ers: Finland would not be a willing party to a military attack on the Soviet Union from its territory, land or sea, and Finland would pro- vide military assistance to the USSR, however, limited it might be. 222 M. BRECHER fi fl fi fi fi fi fl fi fl The Finnish leaders, in turn, felt reasonably secure that the Soviets would not attempt to occupy part or all of its territory and would not attempt to coerce it into accepting the demeaning status of the East European Communist-ruled states vis-à-vis the USSR, even before its dominance was formalized by the Warsaw Pact in 1955 and reaf rmed in 1956 by its suppression of the Hungarian Uprising, and by crushing the Prague Spring in 1968. Stated schematically, their Finland/USSR 1948 treaty, the FCMA, was a trade-off with high-value bene ts for the principal adversaries: for Finland, a USSR commitment to accept Finland’s inde- pendence and its neutrality regarding the Cold War between the super- powers; for the USSR, a Finland commitment to attempt to prevent a re-occurrence of an attack on Leningrad through its territory. Nonetheless, in light of more than a century of Tsarist Russia rule over Finland and three decades of mistrust and hostility between Communist Russia and independent Finland, reinforced by four con- ict episodes, three of them with violence, including one bitter and costly full-scale war, the 1939–1940 ‘Winter War’, con ict resolution of the Finland/ Russia-USSR con ict needed more time and more tests. One was a 1958 domestic political crisis in Finland, which aroused sus- picion by Soviet leaders: they feared an abandonment of ‘the Paasikivi- Kekkonen foreign policy Line’, a conciliatory posture toward the USSR that had been sustained by two Finnish presidents. The Soviets made known their displeasure; and Finland’s parliament attempted to form an alternative government. Finally, Kekkonen’s Agrarian Party formed a minority government, terminating that crisis without a negative fall-out for Finland-USSR relations. The second test of the authenticity of the mutual trust and concilia- tory attitude of the two adversaries came in the form of their 1961 Note Crisis. The Soviet Union, concerned as always about Germany’s re- emergence as a major power, was disquieted by its entry into NATO, re-armament, and the 1961 Berlin Crisis, along with the integration of Norway and Denmark into NATO’s northern Europe command struc- ture, perceiving these developments as possibly portending another Western attack on the USSR, via Finland. On October 30, re ecting these concerns and the possibility that, as in the 1958 crisis, Finland might discard the conciliatory ‘Paasikivi–Kekkonen Line’, the USSR sent a diplomatic Note to Finland, requesting consultations, in accord- ance with Article 2 of their 1948 FCMA Treaty. Finland responded a week later by sending its Foreign Minister to Moscow for consultations 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 223 with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. When that proved inconclusive, President Kekkonen met with Soviet leader Khrushchev on November 24 and convinced him that consultations on a declared military threat would cause fear in Norway and Denmark, leading to their military prep- arations; further, that by cancelling the request for consultations, the Soviet Union would indicate that it had no belligerent plans regarding its neighbors; and, perhaps most important, whoever won the pending Finland presidential election, Finland would remain committed to the 1948 Treaty. The Soviet leader was persuaded, and the military consulta- tions were waived. This outcome of the 1961 Note Crisis crystallized the long-developing change from mistrust to trust by both adversaries and de facto resolution of their four-decade long con ict. Finland/Russia-USSR Con ict: Causes of Resolution Does the evidence on con ict-crisis management and con ict resolu- tion of the Finland/ Russia-USSR con ict support any, some or all of the likely basic causes of—favorable conditions for—con ict resolution pos- tulated in the Resolution Model presented earlier? fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl Exhaustion—While the con ict episodes in this 42-year resolved con ict (1919–1961) were relatively few and scattered (1919–1920, 1939–1940, 1944, and 1958), the persistence of intense hostility and mistrust by both principal adversaries for ‘the other’ generated cumulative fatigue by both: it reached the level off exhaustion during the ‘Winter War’ (1939– 1940) and the ‘Continuation War’ (1944). For Finland, the smaller, weaker state, a series of national challenges led to sustained collective fatigue, which escalated to exhaustion on several occasions. These devel- opments began with a collective memory of Russian colonial rule (1809– 1918). This was followed by a Communist-anti-Communist civil war in 1918, the former supported by Soviet Russian aid; military confrontation between Finnish and Soviet Union forces in three military campaigns; and the longstanding uncertainty about Soviet intentions. Uncertainty ranged from possible occupation and re-integration of Finland into a Russian state, to the frequent risk of unwanted involvement in major power con icts and wars, notably between Western Powers and Communist Russia, as in the latter’s civil war (1918–1921), and the war between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (1941–1945). The Finnish nation also confronted the geographic reality of permanent proximity to a major power, linked to a hostile historical relationship that continued as 224 M. BRECHER an interstate protracted con ict (1919–1961). All of these developments undoubtedly generated a desire for con ict termination, especially after the ‘Winter War’ and the ‘Continuation War’. Although the available evidence is sparse, and Finnish culture is not favorably disposed to com- plaints about exhaustion, it is reasonable to assume that national fatigue- exhaustion made Finland aspire to a measure of tranquility and security that con ict resolution would provide. While the combined pressures on Finland from con ict, war, and uncertainty about Soviet intentions were not shared to the same extent by Soviet forces beyond those engaged in battle with Finnish forces, or by Soviet society, which suffered from other sources of fatigue-exhaus- tion, the exhaustion of the Soviet defenders of Leningrad during a monumental 3-year siege, in a region where Soviet Russian and Finnish national interests collided directly, the Gulf of Finland, made the Finland dimension of con ict and war an important source of overall Soviet exhaustion. In sum, the role of exhaustion as a cumulative inducement to con ict resolution was more signi cant in Finland’s behavior, espe- cially after 1944, but it was not marginal as an inducement to the Soviet Union’s wish for con ict resolution, especially because of the vulnera- bility of Leningrad to the in uence of Finland in permitting or denying transit rights through its territory; this Soviet perception was evident in the USSR’s conciliatory acts toward Finland on several occasions during their interstate con ict. fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl Changes in the Balance of Capability—For the leaders of Russia-USSR, the discovery that a small, weak state was capable of extraordinary feats in a military campaign against an enemy with overwhelming superior- ity in manpower and weapons, as displayed in the ‘Winter War’ and the ‘Continuation War,’ had a profound effect on their subsequent behav- ior. At the time, Western observers from afar expressed admiration for the tenacity and bravery of Finnish armed forces. During World War II, Stalin was reported as reluctant to expend more Soviet military power against the Finns in the 1944 ‘Continuation War’ because of his respect for the quality of Finnish soldiers who might slow the advance of Soviet forces in ‘the race for Berlin.’ While the material balance of military capability clearly favored the USSR throughout this interstate con ict, the nonmaterial change in the balance of capability—the display of an impressive Finnish defense capability in their two wars—and the vulner- ability of Leningrad to invasion via the Gulf of Finland, if Finland were 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 225 disposed to assist one or more major powers in an invasion of the Soviet Union, remained a pre-occupation of Soviet behavior in the protracted con ict with Finland. This link is most clearly evident in the wording of the two articles in the 1948 Finland-USSR FCMA Treaty, noted above, and in the Soviet decision to initiate its 1961 Note Crisis by attempting to persuade Finland to hold consultations about a Soviet-perceived military threat, referring to the danger of hostile, anti-Soviet, states try- ing to secure permission to use the Gulf of Finland as the path to an attack on the USSR. Thus, while the unequal military balance, per se, was not a condition to induce a USSR preference for con ict resolution, the profound concern for the security of Leningrad was a strong induce- ment to resolution, including a willingness to ‘pay the price,’ that is, to manifest a conciliatory, ‘good neighbor’ policy to the small state in geo- political command of physical access to the Soviet Union’s metropolis in the north. Domestic Pressures—Within Finland’s society the main source of pres- sure for a resolution of this con ict was the Communist Party and non-Party supporters of the Soviet Union. During the early years of Finland independence, the Communist movement was a substantial political force, which persistently advocated con ict resolution as a step toward closer relations with the USSR, to culminate in member- ship of USSR-led institutions. The Communist Party never achieved that ultimate goal but it remained a vocal, articulate exponent of peace and cooperation with the Soviet Union. More generally, support for con ict resolution in Finland emanated from national fatigue with a con ict, the bene t of which was virtually nil, politically, economi- cally, socially, and culturally. Given this negative consequence, Finnish public opinion was favorably inclined to con ict resolution, after the ‘Continuation War’ (1944), as long as the most fundamental Finnish values were ensured—sovereignty, political independence, a democratic system of government, an economy free from external constraints or control, and guaranteed individual freedoms. Because of innate uncer- tainty as to the ability of any Finland Government to safeguard all of these values, the attitude to con ict resolution, while supportive, was more passive than active. Apart from exhaustion, as an independent cause, the presence of domestic pressures to induce a policy directed to con ict resolution was not strongly supported by the evidence—until after the end of World War II. 226 M. BRECHER fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl External Pressures—All of the available evidence on con ict-reducing acts in the Finland/Russia-USSR con ict, that is, successful con ict-crisis management, and on con ict-resolving acts, that is, successful con ict resolution, point to primarily bilateral processes. The three peace trea- ties, Tartu (October 1920), Moscow (March 1940), and the Armistice in the Continuation War (September 1944)—evidence of con ict man- agement—resulted from direct negotiations between Finland and Russia- USSR; so too with the major acts leading to con ict resolution, notably the FCMA treaty (April 1948) and the termination of the Note Crisis (November 1961). Major Powers and a regional power were involved in some of these but none with a profound in uence. In the 1919– 1920 Karelia episode, Germany tried to mediate; France, the USA, and the UK issued statements supporting Finland, and the UK sent naval vessels to the Baltic at Finland’s request to enhance Finland’s bargaining position in the negotiations. During the ‘Winter War,’ Sweden’s king refused to aid Finland; the UK and France pressed Finland to accept Allied armies in its territory, but Finland refused and negotiated an armistice with the USSR via Sweden. There was no external involvement in the Finland-USSR negotiations culminating in their 1948 ‘friendship’ treaty or in the 1961 Note Crisis that led to con ict resolution of this con ict. Thus, external pressures for con ict resolution were minimal and insigni cant. Decline in Con ict-sustaining Acts—Interstate violence was intermit- tent in the Finland/ Russia-USSR con ict, with three major episodes: the struggle over territory, East Karelia, in 1919–1920, with serious clashes between Finland Government-supported “volunteers” and Soviet forces, and two full-scale wars, the “Winter War” in 1939–1940 and the “Continuation War” in 1944, their last violent episode. While hostile Finnish attitudes and mutual mistrust continued, non-violent episodes of verbal hostility declined steadily from their April 1948 Treaty of Mutual Friendship, Cooperation, and Non-Aggression (MFCN), until the end of their con ict. Con ict resolution, without a formal document, emerged from successful negotiations between Finland’s President Kekkonen and Soviet leader Khrushchev in November 1961 terminating the second “Soviet Note to Finland” crisis, which was treated by the two neighbors then and later as the end of their protracted con ict. Reduction in Discordance of Objectives—The change from Finland-USSR acute discordance over objectives to mutual toleration of different social, 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 227 fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl economic, and political systems, and values, was the result of a slow pro- cess of changing perceptions of intentions of the adversary, mainly from Finland’s political leaders, elites and mass public, from the end of the Continuation War in 1944 until 1961. After two costly wars, without any compensating bene ts, along with a more compelling awareness of the massive difference in military power between the USSR and Finland, further enlarged by the USSR’s emergence as a superpower, and possibly by a recognition of greater Russia-USSR security as a result of victory in World War II, the Finns began to view their former ruler as a poten- tial ‘good neighbor’ which, despite their profound differences in ideol- ogy, system of government, economy, and values, no longer feared an invasion by a Western great power, via the traditional source of Russian and Soviet insecurity, the Gulf of Finland, with direct access to the highly vulnerable Soviet metropolis in the North, Leningrad. Thus, while ideo- logical discordance over objectives (and values) remained, Finland’s lead- ers made a choice to attempt to foster a ‘good neighbor’ relationship with the Soviet Union. For their part, the USSR leaders began to view Finland no longer as an agent of a hostile West determined to destroy their Communist rival but, rather, as a potential model of peaceful co- existence in a new conciliatory relationship. Whatever the reasons that prompted the leaders of both former adversaries to create a more posi- tive, friendly, mutually bene cial relationship, the reduction in discord- ance of objectives became evident in the 13 years after the signing of their 1948 treaty of friendship, which differed fundamentally from trea- ties of friendship between the Soviet Union and other Communist states. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, that reduction in discordance over objectives continued long beyond resolution of the Finland/USSR con ict in 1961, and beyond the disintegration of the Communist Bloc and the USSR, in 1989 and 1991. In sum, four of the six conditions that were postulated in the Con ict Resolution Model as most likely to lead to con ict resolution were pre- sent in the Finland/Russia-USSR protracted con ict. The most impor- tant condition—basic cause—of con ict resolution was collective exhaustion, especially in explaining Finland’s behavior. Change in the balance of capability was relevant but only because the strategic vulner- ability of Leningrad to grave damage if the Gulf of Finland were made available by Finland to potential invaders of the Soviet Union declined in relevance for Soviet attitudes to con ict resolution. Moreover, there was a marked decline in con ict-sustaining acts, speci cally in state-organized 228 M. BRECHER and implemented violence from the end of the ‘Continuation’ War in 1944 to resolution of the Finland/USSR con ict in 1961. No less evi- dent was the reduction in discordance over objectives by the two adversar- ies: both, especially Finland, made a conscious choice to build a ‘good neighbor’ relationship with its former ruler which, in turn, perceived the bene ts of a positive relationship with a neighbor whose prevailing ideology, economic and political system differed fundamentally from that of the Soviet Union. Overall, the four basic causes of con ict resolution in this con- ict acquired policy signi cance by generating a fundamental shift in Finland’s perceptual calculus. This was expressed in the change in its attitude to the Soviet Union, from an extremely negative perception of Communist Russia as Finland’s hereditary enemy, a widely held view propagated by the nationalist wing of its political spectrum, toward a Realist view of Finland’s need to adapt to a new con guration of power, speci cally, to seek to transform Soviet mistrust of Finland’s behavior to a relationship of mutual trust. This fundamental change in Finland’s foreign policy was advocated by Finland’s charismatic leader from the beginning of independence, Field Marshal Mannerheim, and his succes- sor as Finland’s President, Paasikivi. The change began at the end of the 1944 ‘Continuation War’ and acquired widespread support, from the 1948 friendship (FCMA) treaty with the Soviet Union onwards. Poland/Russia-USSR Conict (Resolved) fl fi fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fl fi fl fl fi fl fi Behavior Poland: Decisions and Decision-Makers Viewed in terms of Poland’s behavior during this East European inter- state con ict (1918–1981), there were six discernible phases, of unequal duration and frequency of decisions. In Phase I (1918–1922), Poland made two major decisions. The rst was a strategic decision to initiate a war against Communist Russia in 1920, designed to restore Poland’s pre-1772 border with Tsarist Russia, prior to the rst partition of Poland by Hapsburg Austria, Prussia, and Russia that year. The second was an important tactical decision in 1920—to recognize Ukraine’s independ- ence, in exchange for a military alliance between these two neighbors against Bolshevik Russia. The military victory by Poland and Ukraine 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 229 was re ected in the geopolitical outcome for Poland. The March 1921 Peace of Riga substantially enlarged Poland’s territory by moving the frontier between Poland and Russia further to the east than the Curzon Line, which had been imposed as their border by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. It was a major political achievement for Poland’s dominant and authoritarian decision-maker during the rst phase of this con ict, President Josef Pilsudski. There were no major decisions by Poland related to this protracted con ict during Phase II (1922–1926), following Pilsudski’s electoral defeat in 1922. However, soon after his return to power in 1926 via a coup d’état, Poland was actively engaged in the rivalry with Soviet Russia in Phase III (1926–1935). During that phase, another strategic deci- sion by Poland was to weaken the USSR via its Promethean program— supporting independence movements of non-Russian nations in East Europe. This decision was implemented by a major tactical decision—to foster good relations with Poland’s neighbors, a policy that was re ected in two non-aggression pacts with its two most powerful neighbors, Stalin’s USSR in 1932 and Hitler’s Germany in 1934. The Pilsudski era of decision-making domination in Poland and Phase III of the Poland/ USSR con ict ended with Pilsudski’s death in 1935. Phase IV (1935–1939) was dominated by a power-sharing agree- ment between General Felicjan and SlawojSkladkowski, who continued Pilsudski’s quest for alliances in attempts to counter Nazi Germany’s mil- itary superiority. The most visible expression of this policy was Poland’s strategic decision to form military alliances with the two major powers in Western Europe, both in May 1939—the Convention with France and the Defense Pact with the UK, in which the signatories pledged mili- tary assistance to each other in case of a military invasion of either party. Three months later Poland was engulfed by the German Army, followed by the partition and occupation of all of Poland by Germany and the USSR during most of World War II; that is, Poland ceased to exist as an independent state during the moribund Phase V of this con ict (1939– 1944). fl fl fl fi fl fi fi fi fl fl fl fl Its formal independence was restored in 1944, but throughout Phase VI of this con ict (1944–1981), Poland was under the control of a Communist regime, rst by the Sovietsupported Polish Committee of National Liberation, the Lublin regime, and from the end of WWII until 1981 by a government dominated by the Polish Workers Party. While tensions existed between the USSR and Poland’s Communist regime, 230 M. BRECHER the presence of a substantial Soviet military force in Poland and, since 1955, Poland’s membership in the USSR-dominated Warsaw Pact deprived Poland of autonomous decision-making power vis-à-vis its prin- cipal adversary in their protracted con ict, the Soviet Union. During most of this lengthy nal con ict phase, decisions and acts by Poland took the form of non-governmental civil protests and demonstrations hostile to the Polish Government’s submissiveness vis-à-vis the decisions imposed by the Soviet Communist Party on the Polish Workers Party and by the dictates of the USSR regime on Poland’s subservient govern- ment. To the extent that decisions by Poland relating to its con ict with the USSR were made, they were generated by non-governmental organizations hostile to Poland’s Communist regime and the USSR, and took the form of popular movements and demonstrations. The Poland/USSR interstate con ict was substantively renewed only in its last 2 years, 1980 and 1981, when a new powerful Polish non-state actor, the Solidarity trade union, successfully challenged USSR domination of Poland’s eco- nomic, political and military systems of power, leading to the termina- tion of USSR control of Poland and the end of their con ict. Poland: Decision Process As indicated above, Poland’s decision-making on issues relating to this lengthy con ict was highly authoritarian. For most of the pre-1944 years, 1918–1922 and 1926–1935, decisional power was concentrated in, and exercised by, President Pilsudski, virtually alone except for a small group of technical aides. From 1935 to 1939, decisional authority was shared by General Felicjan and Slawoj-Skladkowski, whose pow- ers as president were greatly increased in a new constitution imposed by Pilsudski before his death in 1935. It was only in Phase II (1922–1926), after Pilsudski’s electoral defeat by the National Democratic Party that decision-making approached the democratic model; but most decisions in that phase focused on the growing problem of domestic con ict, not the con ict with the USSR. With the coming to power of Polish Communists in 1944, the decision process in Poland resumed its author- itarian character—from the Left, not the Right, as in the Pilsudski era. In reality, the decision process on issues related to the USSR and Poland- Soviet Union relations moved to Moscow, with Poland’s Communist regime acting primarily as the implementer of decisions made by the Soviet leader— Stalin (1944–1953), Khrushchev (1955–1964), and a Brezhnev-led ‘troika’ from 1964 to the end of the Poland/USSR 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 231 con ict—with Moscow decisions, especially from 1955 to 1981, author- ized by the Soviet Communist Party Politburo. fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl Russia-USSR: Decisions, Decision-Makers, and Decision Process As in other protracted con icts in which Russia (from 1922 the USSR) was a principal adversary (Finland/Russia-USSR, Iran/Russia-USSR, Georgia/ Russia-USSR, and USA/ Russia-USSR), the Russia/USSR phases in this con ict re ected the changes in the composition of its key decision-makers, caused by death, expulsion, or dismissal: Phase I, 1920–1922, ending with the death of Lenin; Phase II, 1929–1953, ending with the death of Stalin; Phase III, 1955–1964, ending with the dismissal of Khrushchev; Phase IV, 1964–1972, ending with the illness of Brezhnev; and 1972–1981, ending with the termination of Brezhnev’s tenure as First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. In Phase I of this con ict, Russia made two major decisions. The rst was an important negative tactical decision: to accept its inability to avoid a war with Poland in 1920, because Poland’s President Pilsudski was determined to take advantage of Russia’s preoccupation with its civil war against the ‘Whites’ in 1919–1920, who were supported by military contingents from major powers—France, Japan, the UK, and the USA, providing him a unique opportunity to re-gain Poland’s east- ern frontier as it existed before the rst Partition of Poland in 1772. The second important tactical decision by the Bolshevik regime in this phase—by Lenin, in consultation with his two most likely con- tenders for the succession to leader of the Bolshevik regime, Trotsky and Stalin—was to make a signi cant territorial concession to Poland in their March 1921 Peace of Riga: Poland’s eastern border was extended 200 km east of the 1919 Versailles Treaty-sanctioned Curzon Line, ena- bling the Bolshevik regime to cope more effectively with the growing ‘White Russian’ threat. In the rst 7 years of Phase II of its con ict with Poland (1922–1929), the struggle for power between Stalin and Trotsky, the key rivals for suc- cession to Lenin, was the major focus of attention within the Bolshevik leadership. Partly, perhaps, because of this preoccupation, there were no major decisions by the USSR relating to the con ict with Poland during that interregnum. Then, having triumphed in the battle for succession to Lenin and, ideologically, in imposing his doctrine of ‘Socialism in one Country’, rejecting Trotsky’s doctrine of ‘Permanent Revolution’, Stalin concentrated on domestic economic and political goals in the 1930s and 232 M. BRECHER fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fi the elimination of all other possible rivals to his leadership, via the ‘Great Purge’ trials in the mid- and late 1930s. In foreign policy, he sought alli- ances to cope with the emerging threat from a rising Germany. In that context, the Soviet Union (Stalin) made two major decisions relating to this con ict in the 1930s. One, already noted in the discussion of Poland’s behavior, was to prevent a feared Germany–Poland alliance by signing a nonaggression pact with Poland in 1932. The other decision, with far-reaching consequences, including erasing the treaty with Poland, was to sign an agreement with Germany in August 1939, the Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact, which committed the two great powers in Central and Eastern Europe, hitherto unconcealed enemies in the international politics of the 1930s, to the partition of Poland, the 4th partition since 1772. The USSR (Stalin) made two other strategic decisions relating to the con ict with Poland in the closing months of World War II. One was to assert USSR hegemony over Poland, which had long been, and was cor- rectly perceived by Tsarist and Communist leaders of Russia to be, the gateway to invasion of Russia by West European and Central European Great Powers—Napoleonic France in the early nineteenth century, and Germany twice in the twentieth century. That decision was imple- mented by providing total support for the claim to primacy of the Polish Communist Lublin regime in 1944 and 1945, during its intense rivalry with the UK and US-supported London Polish Government-in- Exile, the successor to Poland’s pre-WWII Government of Poland. This USSR policy was persistent in the negotiations among the leaders of the UK, the USA, and the USSR prior to and culminating at the Yalta Conference of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin in February 1945. The stakes were very high for the USSR—control over the historic gateway to invasion from the West; and the outcome was a major triumph for the Soviet Union. The second USSR strategic decision in 1945, more directly related to the Poland/RussiaUSSR con ict, was the Soviet Union’s insistence on territorial revision of the 1921 Peace of Riga award to Poland of substan- tial territory east of the Curzon Line, noted above. On this issue too, the outcome was a triumph for the USSR, a roll-back to the Curzon Line border between Poland and the USSR, with compensation to Poland of territory in the eastern part of Germany. There were no other strategic or important tactical USSR deci- sions relating to this East Europe con ict during the last eight years of the Stalin era (1945–1953). During Phase III, 1955–1964, when 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 233 fl fl fl fl Khrushchev was the primary Soviet decision-maker, and for most of Phase IV, when Brezhnev was the leading USSR decision-maker (1964– 1972) and the rest of this phase (1972–1981), when major decisions in foreign policy, including intra-Soviet bloc decisions, were made by the ‘troika’—Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny—or small commissions acting as agents of the Communist Party Politburo, the Communist leaders of Poland role in the decision process was to implement major decisions on issues relating to Poland taken by the Soviet Communist Party leadership. It was only in the last year of Phase IV that the USSR Communist Party leadership was compelled to make another strategic decision—how to respond to the accumulating turmoil and mass criti- cism of both the Communist political system in Poland and the con- tinuing pervasive Soviet domination of Poland, sustained by a USSR military presence and a compliant Communist government in Poland? The options were to suppress the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet Union upheaval, as the USSR had responded to comparable turmoil in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968), or to yield to the unmistakable expression of a widespread demand for the end of the Soviet Union’s commanding presence. In 1981, the Soviet Communist Politburo correctly interpreted the national mood in Poland and chose the latter option, leading to the termination of this protracted con ict. In sum, despite the fundamental differences in the political system and ideology-belief system of the two principal adversaries and their leaders, the decision process in both Poland and the USSR on issues relating to their protracted con ict, as distinct from the content of their decisions, reveal two shared characteristics: a very small number of decision-makers, for many decisions a single person and a shared authoritarian style of decision- making. Poland/Russia-USSR: Con ict-Sustaining Acts Violence there was one full-scale war in this protracted con ict (April– October 1920), initiated by an attack on Soviet-ruled Ukraine by Poland, which had been revived as an independent state in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles. There were substantial casualties, killed and wounded, by both adversaries, approximately 60,000 Poles and 150,000 Russians. The next two decades were virtually without state-to-state violence. Then, following the partition of Poland by Germany and the USSR (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, August 1939), an estimated 234 M. BRECHER half million Poles were forcibly transported to Soviet Central Asia and Siberia, with largescale mass killings (21,000) of Polish military of c- ers, police, and civil servants in 1940–1941, highlighted by the later- discovered Katyn Massacre, and frequent clashes between Poland’s ‘Home Army’ and Soviet forces during this transition from the outbreak of World War II (September 1939) to Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. There were further deportations of thousands of Polish members of the ‘Underground’ during WWII, and minor clashes between the Soviet-dominated Communist regime in Poland and anti- Communist anti-Soviet groups in Poland from the end of WWII (1945) to the end of this protracted con ict in 1981. The cumulative effect of Soviet occupation, deportations, and mass killings was to reinforce the hostility and mistrust that resulted from more than a century of Russia’s occupation of large parts of Poland (1772–1919) and the profound reli- gious and cultural divide between Roman Catholic Poland and Eastern Orthodox Russia. Political Hostility was rampant in Poland during the years of Soviet occupation of the eastern part of Poland (1939–1941), during WWII, when Poland was a continuous battleground between German and Soviet armies (1941–1944), and throughout the period of a Soviet- created and -sustained Polish Communist regime (1944–1981). From 1920 onwards, the pre-eminent theme of Poland’s acts of political hos- tility toward the USSR was the demand for the restoration of its east- ern border before the rst partition of Poland (1772): this demand was raised in March 1920, soon after the state of Poland was restored by the Treaty of Versailles, and weeks before the onset of the Poland/Bolshevik Russia War in April 1920; and it remained the primary goal of Poland until vindication in the aftermath of WWII. fl fi fl fl fi fl fl Among the many acts of political hostility during the Poland/Russia con ict, a dramatic illustration was the USSR’s decision to halt the advance of the Red Army across the Vistula River, opposite Warsaw, in 1944 or to provide any material assistance to the Warsaw Uprising, which was then attempting to expel German forces from Poland’s capital. Acts of political hostility during the long period of Communist rule in Poland reinforced the animosity between Poland and Russia, includ- ing frequent detentions of Poles critical of the Communist regime, the dissolution of Poland’s Catholic Church in 1953, the cessation of reli- gious instruction in the schools of an overwhelmingly Roman Catholic 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 235 nation in 1961, and, in response, the creation of a large, well-organized trade union, Solidarity, which became the focus of strident opposition to Poland’s Communist regime and its dominating patron, the Soviet Union, in 1981, The growth of political opposition within Poland, rein- forced by acts of political and military hostility to the Polish Communist regime and its patron, the Soviet Union, generated violent outbreaks in Poland in 1970, 1976, and 1981, the last leading to the proclamation of martial law in Poland in December 1981 and the concentration of Warsaw Pact forces on Poland’s borders. The 1981 upheaval was to lead, in turn, to the fall of Poland’s Communist regime and the termination of the Poland/Russia interstate protracted con ict. Verbal Hostility—was a secondary con ict-sustaining technique, as in many interstate con icts. In the Poland/Russia-USSR con ict, propa- ganda in various forms (print, radio, later, TV) was utilized by both adversaries to reinforce national unity by emphasizing the ties that bind members of the nation and the differences, notably ideology (Poland’s antiCommunism vs. Soviet Communism) and religious belief (Poland’s Roman Catholicism vs. Russia’s orthodoxy or the USSR’s atheism) that separate each state from its adversary, often by demonizing the adver- sary’s values and/or behavior. Economic Discrimination—as in most aspects of public policy, the eco- nomic goals of Poland and Russia-USSR differed sharply, each attempt- ing to retain and strengthen its economic system. Poland, primarily agricultural, and based upon private landholding until the USSR’s impo- sition of its Communist regime (1944 ff.), opposed pressure by the USSR during the period of the Communist regime in Poland (1944– 1981) to transform the foundations of Poland’s economic system: this con ict became evident soon after WWII, when the USSR compelled Poland (and other East European states, recently absorbed into the Soviet Union’s sphere of in uence) to reject the US-offered membership in the Marshall Plan and to adopt the Soviet model of collectiv- ized agriculture and state-planned economic growth generally. Poland’s resistance to Soviet pressure was unsuccessful; but their con ict over economic policy and the economic consequences for a largely anti- Communist population in Poland reinforced the mistrust and hostility between the two adversaries that had been generated by the other types 236 M. BRECHER of con ict-sustaining acts during their protracted con ict—military, political, and propaganda. fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl Historical Roots Middle east Iran-Iraq Conict (Unresolved) As with many other protracted con icts that have been active since the end of World War I, the roots of the Iran/Iraq con ict are deep. Hostilities began as early as 632 Common Era (C.E.), the rst phase culminating in 638 C.E., when Muslim Arab forces vanquished the Sassanian [Sassanid] Neo-Persian Empire. Violence between Arabs and Persians occurred periodically during the next millennium. Then, in the sixteenth century C.E., the Shiite Safavid dynasty emerged in Persia as a rival of the Turkish Ottoman Empire, which held sway over most of the Arab world in the Middle East and North Africa. The Safavid Shah, Ismail, conquered Iraq in 1510 but was defeated by the Ottoman Sultan in 1514. Several other wars between the two Middle East empires occurred soon after, in 1533– 1535, 1548, and 1553, until the Treaty of Amasya in 1555 served as a peace settlement and de ned the borders between the two rival major powers in the Middle East. Their most signi cant agreement in the pre-modern era was the Treaty of Zuhab (1639), which “became the basis of all later treaties negotiated between the Ottoman and Persian states”; and, of special rel- evance to the later Iran/Iraq con ict, “formally incorporated Iraq into the Ottoman Empire and committed both nations not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the other” (Abdulghani 1984, p. 5). With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI and the introduction of the League of Nations Mandates system, the UK became the Mandatory Power for Iraq, along with Trans-Jordan and Palestine. Britain formally withdrew from Iraq in 1932 and transferred power to King Faisal, a member of the Hashemite royal family who had been placed on the Iraqi throne by the UK in 1920. Faisal died in 1933. In this context of domestic Iraq instability, Iran made demands the follow- ing year for changes in the informal rules governing the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway, which had long served as the de facto border between Iraq and Persia. Iraq appealed to the League of Nations in 1934 to resolve 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 237 the boundary dispute. A coup d’état by Bakr Sidqi in Iraq, in 1936, dur- ing the negotiations, led to further instability and enabled Persia (Iran) to extract concessions from Iraq. These were incorporated in the 1937 Iraq-Persia treaty governing the Shatt-alArab. The dispute over this waterway, beginning in 1934, marked the onset of the Iran/ Iraq con- ict. The historical roots of the Iran/Iraq con ict can be traced to the Islamic Arab military triumph over the Sassanian (Neo-Persian) Empire in 638 C.E., 1296 years before the onset of this post-WWII interstate protracted con ict—the eruption, in 1934, of disputed claims by Iran and Iraq to the Shatt-al-Arab (Arab Waterway), which links/separates the two longstanding rival states, nations, belief systems, and contiguous neighbors. fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fl fi Basic Causes There were three basic causes of the onset of this modern Middle East protracted con ict —territory, identity-religious and ethnic, and ideology. The overriding source of con ict between Iran and Iraq has been the territorial dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab, which dates to the sixteenth century. For Iraq, this Waterway has been its only viable access to the Persian/Arab Gulf, both during its long-imposed dependent status within the Ottoman Empire and since it acquired formal statehood in 1932, under a UK Mandate from the League of Nations in 1920. Thus sovereignty over the Shatt, which is crucial for the marketing of Iraq’s oil, the most valuable element of its national economy and the primary source of its foreign exchange, has also been vital to Iraq’s national secu- rity. For Iran, control over the Shatt was/is the key to its strategy for achieving hegemony in the Persian Gulf. In fact, territorial rivalry has long been closely linked to the struggle for its control. This Waterway also served as an important part of the boundary between the two com- petitors for primacy in the Gulf region. Their 1937 treaty, as noted, framed a mutually accepted boundary in the middle of the Shatt for its entire length, an agreement that was in force for three decades. It was abrogated by both parties in 1968–1969 and then revived in their Treaty of Algiers in 1975. The Waterway then became ‘fair game’ for both Iran and Iraq in their high-casualty (one mil- lion killed), long war of attrition (1980–1988). From 1990 to the pre- sent, the Gulf region and the Shatt became enmeshed in the two wars between the US-led Coalition and Iraq (1991 and 2003). The years 238 M. BRECHER since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 have witnessed a renewed rap- prochement between Iran and Iraq, with restored diplomatic and trade relations: the process was facilitated by the coming to power in Iraq of Shia parties, religiously akin to Iran, after decades of Sunni domination in Iraq’s politics. The territorial dispute, as a basic cause of the Iran/Iraq con ict, has long been reinforced by two powerful intangible identity forces— differences in ethnicity and religion. The con ict between Persian and Arab civilization dates to antiquity. Within Islam, the con ict between Sunni and Shia began soon after the passing of the founder of the Muslim belief system in the seventh century C.E. Together, these potent intangible cultural identities have been the sources of deep-rooted hos- tility, which strengthened their con ict over territory: “real and imag- ined history, and traditional Iran-Arab and Shi’a-Sunni animosities,” have been integral parts of their con ict relationship (Balkash et al. 2004, 22.). The fact that the Shia was an oppressed majority in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq further embittered Shia Iran, as did frequent denial of access by Iranian Shia to some of their holiest sites in Iraq—in Najaf, Karbala, and Samarra. fl fl fl fl fl fl fl During the last third of the twentieth century (CE), ethnic and religious differences were further reinforced by ideology. The political systems of Iraq and Iran were highly authoritarian. Saddam Hussein and Ba’ath Arab nationalism clashed with Ayatollah Khomeini and Iranian Islamism from 1979 onward. This ideological component of their con ict contributed “to its intensity and its prolongation, to its destructive force and to its terrible cost in human life,” as evident in the savage Iran/Iraq War (ibid., 23). The setting for the onset of their post-WWI interstate protracted con- ict, in 1934, was twofold. One was the death in 1933 of Iraq’s King Faisal, who was a source of stability in a highly factional society, with a Shia majority and a Sunni minority. The other was the decline of UK in uence in the Gulf region, especially the port of Basra, after its transfer of de facto independence to Iraq’s government in 1932. These events provided Iran with an opportunity to change their boundary in the Shatt al-Arab, and it pressed Iraq to agree. Precipitating Cause The precipitating cause of the onset of the post-WWI Iran/Iraq con- ict was Iraq’s appeal to the League of Nations in 1934 to resolve its boundary dispute with Iran. It took 3 years for the two adversaries to 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 239 conclude a basic and long-lasting agreement on their maritime boundary. However, their con ict was re-ignited in 1955, when the Shah of Iran proclaimed its sovereignty over the Shatt, and both parties sent troops to their land frontier. Dormant since 2003, the Iran/Iraq con ict remains unresolved. However, in a marked shift from a con ict to a cooperative relation- ship after the departure of the last contingent of US troops from Iraq in 2011, the two Shia Muslim states began to move toward a potential alignment. In 2014, Iran expressed a willingness to provide military assistance to Iraq, if requested: Iraq was then confronted with an existen- tial rebellion by an extremist Sunni movement, the Islamic State of Iran and Syria (ISIS). Discordant Objectives Iran’s feeling of inequity in the division of the Shatt al-Arab (Waterway) can be traced to their agreement of 1937. With the increasing impor- tance of Middle East oil to its economy, Iran’s speci c objective over the subsequent decades was the revision of what it regarded as an imposed agreement, in order to right the wrong by granting Iran a larger part of the Waterway, vital to both its exports of oil and imports of essentials for its economic development. Underpinning this objective was Iran’s self- image as the preeminent Middle East civilization since antiquity, deserv- ing of its recognition by neighbors, notably Iraq, of its claim to regional primacy. Iran’s pursuit of hegemony in the Gulf seemed within its grasp following the UK withdrawal from the Middle East in 1971: only Iraq— continuing to experience political instability, generated by military coups and an on-going Kurdish secessionist movement confronting a newly emergent Ba’ath Party regime in Baghdad—was a potential weaker rival for dominance. fl fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fl fl Iraq’s objectives during the early years of this interstate con ict were to maintain the favorable status quo in the Shatt-al-Arab (Waterway), as embodied in the 1937 agreement with Iran; to enhance its claim to Pan- Arab leadership; and to establish its dominance in the Gulf region. The rst and third of these goals, related to its rivalry with Iran, remained unchanged until the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party regime in Iraq in 2003, and its claim to leadership of the Arab world was over- taken by the coming to power in 1953 of a charismatic leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, in Egypt, the largest, most populous and long recognized leader of the Arab world. 240 M. BRECHER Perceptions From the onset of their modern interstate con ict in the 1930s, the issues in contention between Iran and Iraq were the location of their maritime border in the Shatt-al-Arab (Waterway) and, more generally, their competing goal of primacy in the Arab/Persian Gulf. Iran perceived itself as stronger than Iraq until their devastating long war (1980–1988): the heavy casualties and enormous material costs changed revolutionary Iran’s perception in the direction of respect for Iraq’s military capability. Iran’s monarchy (to 1979) viewed Iraq’s post- monarchical regime (1958 ff.), especially under the Ba’ath Party, as driven by a radical ideology and expansionist aims. However, it also rec- ognized the growing military capability of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, with its strong ties to the USSR, the major supplier of modern weapons to Iraq. Iraq perceived Iran’s superior power until its military alliance with the USSR in 1972, and the consequent ow of arms enhanced Iraq’s self-image regarding its military capability vis-à-vis Iran. The profound mistrust and rivalry between these Middle East powers shaped Iraq’s view that Iran’s primary goal was hegemony in the Gulf and, as such, the major obstacle to Iraq’s claim to dominance in that region. Saddam Hussein’s decision to initiate the Iran/Iraq War in 1980 represented an attempt by Iraq to establish its primacy in the Gulf against a new, vulner- able Islamist revolutionary regime in Iran. The effort failed, with enor- mous human and material losses suffered by both adversaries. Within 3 years of the end of the Iran/Iraq War, Iraq was further weakened in the rst Gulf War (1991), a prelude to the collapse of the Ba’ath Party regime in the second Gulf War (2003) and years of instability and civil strife thereafter. The zero-sum perceptions by the adversaries in this con- ict wreaked havoc for Iraq and severely weakened the Islamic Republic of Iran. Behavior Both of the principal adversaries in this currently dormant con ict made many strategic and important tactical decisions during several post-WWI periods of their longstanding con ict. Iraq Decisions and Decision-Makers There were four periods of Iraq’s decisions and decision-makers in this con ict. In Period I (1921–1933), the two key decision-makers of Iraq fi fl fl fl fl fl fl 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 241 were King Faisal and the UK Representative to the British-created mod- ern state of Iraq, which had long been part of the Ottoman Empire. (Another son of Hussein, a Hashemite ruler of Hejaz, part of what later became Saudi Arabia, was the rst ruler of another British-created Middle East state, Abdullah, the Emir of Trans-Jordan, later, the King of Jordan.) While Faisal was the ultimate constitutional authority in Iraq, decisional in uence was shared with the UK Pro-Consul. As noted, Iraq and Iran had long disagreed about governance of the Shatt-al-Arab. This rst period of their post-WWI con ict was characterized by diplo- matic engagement, not with frequent military clashes. Iraq made one strategic decision on this core territorial dispute. With an escalation of tension in 1934, Iraq decided to submit a formal complaint to the League of Nations, alleging Iran’s violation of existing treaty commitments on the Water way. During a transition, following the death of King Faisal in 1933 and the succession of his weak son, King Ghazali, decision-making power shifted from Iraq’s monarch to its Cabinet and, after a military coup, to the Iraq Army. However, the successor Iraq leadership abandoned Faisal’s Pan-Arabism in favor of Iraqi national goals and domestic unity, leading to a policy of détente with Iraq’s neighbors. This change found expression in two important 1937 Iraq decisions: to sign a boundary agreement with Iran that granted it control of a larger share of the dis- puted Shatt-al-Arab Waterway; and to form a mutual defense pact with three other Middle East states, Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey, with com- mitments to non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs, their territo- rial integrity, and the renunciation of force in their relations. The long Period II of Iraq’s decision-making (1939–1958) began after two unrelated dramatic events—another military coup and the acci- dental death of King Ghazi. For nearly two decades, decision-making power was shared by a newly appointed prime minister, Nuri al-Sa’id, and the Regent Prince Abd al-Ilah, acting for Ghazi’s infant son. Iraq’s policy toward Iran continued to be moderate, pro-British, reverting to King Faisal’s pro-Arab posture. The result was relative tranquility in rela- tions between Iraq and Iran, with one strategic decision by both principal adversaries—to sign a regional defense pact, with Turkey, Pakistan and the UK, the Baghdad Pact, in 1955; Iraq perceived this pact as enhancing the in uence of Arab nationalism. Iraq’s Period III (1958–1968) witnessed two military coups and several notable decisions that re ected a more intense Iraq (Arab) 242 M. BRECHER fl fi fi fi fl fl fl nationalism which, in turn, reinforced its distrust of, and hostility toward, Iran. It began with a military coup that overthrew the con- stitutional monarchy in July 1958 and struggles for power among the Army of cers during the following 6 months, leading to the triumph of General Abd al-Karim Qasim, who served as president until February 1963. He, in turn, was ousted in another military coup, led by Colonel Abdal Salam Aref, who was even more committed to Pan-Arab national- ism than his military predecessor. It was during Aref’s presidency that Iraq made three strategic decisions that sharply escalated the tension with its historic rival for domination of the Gulf region: (1) to For Iraq, Period IV of Decisions and Decision-Makers was marked by the coming to power of the Ba’ath Party and Saddam Hussein in 1968–1969, and the overthrow of the Ba’ath, along with the capture of Saddam, by the USA in the second Gulf War, in 2003. This period represented a fundamental change from both its predecessors—the Constitutional Monarchy (1921–1958), especially the King Faisal era (1921–1933), and the decade of military coups and military authoritari- anism (1958–1968). In Period IV, Iraq was governed by an ideologically committed Party, with clearly de ned objectives and policies, and a much stronger attachment to Arab nationalism than King Faisal or any other Iraq ruler before 1968. This was evident in its aggressive posture on all matters related to the con ict with Iran: the call for ‘liberation’ of Arab Khuzestan; the evocative rhetoric about ‘the Arab Gulf” and its maxi- malist position on Iraq’s maximum claim to total control of Shatt-al- Arab. However, the Ba’ath regime and Saddam Hussein in power shared with Qasim and Aref an authoritarian structure of government, with one dominant decision-maker, though Saddam’s variant of authoritarian rule was more absolute than that of Iraq’s military rulers. Moreover, he relied primarily on the Ba’ath Party elite, compared to their reliance on the support of military of cers (Saddam did not assume Iraq’s presidency until 1979 but dominated the major institutions of Ba’ath power —the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the Party, and Iraq’s Cabinet as early as 1969). 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 243 Among the myriad of Iraq decisions during the Ba’ath-Saddam era, ve were strategically signi cant. x The rst was a 1971 decision to sever all diplomatic relations with Iran and the UK, in reaction to Iran’s occupation of three Gulf islands claimed by Iraq—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. This act was accompanied by the expulsion of Iranian diplo- mats and thousands of Iranians from Iraq. x The second strategic Iraq decision, not directly related to this con- ict, was to sign a Treaty of Friendship with the USSR in 1972; this decision and act intensi ed the Iraq/Iran protracted con ict, since the latter perceived Iraq’s alignment with the Soviet Union as gravely threatening to Iran’s vital interests in the Gulf region. fi fi fl fi fl fi fi fi fl fl xThe third strategic decision by Iraq in this phase of their con ict conveyed a contradictory message to its principal adversary in 1975: Iraq decided to sign the Algiers Agreement which, for the rst time, granted Iran its longstanding goal in the dispute over the Shatt-al- Arab, namely, acceptance of the thalweg principle, which accorded equal control to Iran and Iraq in the Waterway. fi fi withdraw from the Baghdad Pact in 1959, highlighting the growing chasm between Iraq’s Arab nationalism and Iran’s Western (Anglo-American) attach- ment; (2) to reject the 1937 boundary agreement with Iran, by re-af rm- ing Iraq’s ownership of the entire Shatt-al-Arab Waterway, along with the expulsion of thousands of Iranians from Iraq; and (3) to claim the entire Gulf by renaming it the ‘Arabian Gulf’. xThe fourth of these strategic Iraq decisions was to embark on a full-scale war with Iran in 1980; the devastating destruction of the Iran/Iraq War, with at least a million dead, lasted until 1988. xThe nal strategic decision in this phase, shared with Iran, was to sign the armistice in 1988 that effectively ended this war in a stale- mate. During the next 30 years, this con ict remained unresolved but without a recurrence of war or even lesser degrees of military hostilities between the principal adversaries. Iraq: Decision Process The structure of Iraq’s decision process during this interstate Middle East con ict underwent substantial changes since its onset. During Period I (1921–1958), the formal structure was constitutional democracy, with decisional power shared, initially (1921– 1933) by the Monarch and the UK Pro-Consul; then, in the transition following King Faisal’s death (1934–1938), by the Cabinet, followed by the Military; and there- after (1939–1958), by a duumvirate, Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa’id and the Regent, acting for an infant monarch. In Period II (1958–1968), the structure was military dictatorship, dominated by two Army of c- ers, Qasim (1959–1963) and Aref (1963–1968). The structure was civil 244 M. BRECHER authoritarian in Period III (1968–2003), dominated by the Ba’ath Party, with Saddam Hussein as the charismatic leader. The US occupation con- trolled Iraq during a transition (2003–2007), followed by a Western-type democracy. In sum, the structure of the decision process varied—consti- tutional democracy, military dictatorship, and civilian dictatorship, but decisional power related to the con ict with Iran was highly concentrated until 2007, from one to a few decision-makers. Iran: Decisions and Decision-Makers Like Iraq, its arch-rival for primacy in the Persian/Arab Gulf region, Iran has made many decisions relating to their protracted con ict; ten of these were strategic or signi cantly tactical in content, scope, and or impact. These decisions occurred in three periods: the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1921–1941); the reign of his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (1941–1979); and the Islamic Republic (since 1979). Some were ‘the other side of the coin’; that is, they addressed the same issue as Iraq, though from a diametrically contrasting perspective, sometimes with totally incompatible perceived objectives and/or consequences. fi fl fl fl fl fi fi fi fl The rst tangible evidence of modern Iran’s hostile and condescend- ing attitude to its smaller (in population and territorial size) and then less powerful state occurred before the Onset of their post-WWI pro- tracted con ict in 1934: when the UK-created state of Iraq emerged from the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, soon after the end of World War I, Iran withheld recognition of Iraq in 1921, on the grounds that the existing boundaries with Iraq were unfair and did not accord with Iran’s national interest. This unconcealed snub by Iran was not quickly forgotten by Iraq’s political elite. Iran’s second hostile act 5 years later also preceded the Onset of this con ict: in 1926, Iran decided to estab- lish a military presence in the Shatt-al-Arab, thereby violating the extant 1914 Protocols, which recognized Iraq’s exclusive ownership of this vital Waterway. A decade later, Reza Shah Pahlavi participated with Iraq in the formation of a four-state Middle East Defense alliance—the 1937 Sa’adabad Defense Pact among Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey; in terms of the Iran/Iraq con ict, it reinforced the positive atmosphere generated by the Iran/Iraq boundary agreement earlier the same year, as discussed above. The rst major Iran decision by Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was also shared with Iraq’s decision—to join the US-inspired, Cold War-oriented Baghdad Pact, along with Pakistan, Turkey and the UK, in 1955. This 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 245 further act of cooperation between long-term principal adversaries was facilitated by their shared political structure, a constitutional monarchy in both Iran and Iraq, and their alignment with the USA and the UK in the on-going Cold War with the Communist superpower, whose ideol- ogy and perceived hostility both Middle East monarchies, neighbor and near-neighbor, feared. Four years later, the cooperative Baghdad Pact spirit gave way to another, initially verbal, deterioration in Iran/Iraq relations: Iraq’s pub- licly expressed hostility to the construction of an Iranian port in what was deemed Iraq’s sovereign territory led Iran’s parliament, in 1959, to accuse Iraq of violating treaty commitments on the disputed Waterway and aggressive behavior towards its neighbor. This, in turn, led to an esca- lation of verbal hostility from Iran and its growing pressure to replace their 1937 boundary agreement with an equal division of rights in the Water way. Two strategic decisions by Iran in the 1960s accentuated the tension and rivalry with Iraq. One was to activate the ‘Kurdish card’: in 1966, Iran signed an agreement with the Kurds to enlarge its supply of weap- ons and intelligence assistance to Iraq’s Kurdish community, which was engaged in a long-term struggle for greater autonomy in Iraq. The other decision, in response to an Iraqi rule in April 1969 that obliged Iranian ships to lower their ags and their crews to disembark before entering the Waterway, was to abrogate their 1937 boundary treaty, unilaterally. Nevertheless, the pendulum in Iran/Iraq relations swung to the coop- erative dimension once more, in 1975: Iran and Iraq made a strategic decision, the Algiers Agreement, to apply the thalweg principle to the Shatt-alArab, thereby granting Iran’s long-sought goal of equal division of the Waterway. The quid pro quo was an Iran commitment to cease mili- tary aid to Iraq’s Kurds. fl fl fl fi Cooperation was short-lived. In 1980, Saddam Hussein, miscal- culating the likely impact of the turmoil in Iran created by the Islamic Revolution a year before, launched the Iran/ Iraq War: it caused enor- mous material damage and very high casualties for both of the princi- pal adversaries, until exhaustion and stalemate led to termination of the human slaughter in 1988. One of the many consequences was pre-occu- pation of both Iran and Iraq with reconstruction of shattered economies and societies for a decade or more, leading to diversion of attention away from their protracted con ict. By then, Iraq became immersed in a con ict relationship with Kuwait and, more dangerous, an unresolved 246 M. BRECHER con ict with the sole superpower and the coalition arraigned against Iraq in the rst Gulf War, 1991; persistence of the con ict with the USA and the UK in the 1990s, and then Gulf War II in 2003; the destruc- tion of the Ba’ath regime and the capture of Saddam Hussein; and the long US occupation of Iraq. In Iran, the highest priorities of the Islamist regime were rehabilitation of a wounded society and econ- omy, and the transformation of a secular society, under Pahlavi rule for almost 90 years, into the goal to which the Islamic Revolution aspired, an Islamist society, governed by Sharia law and re-shaped by Koranic principles. The protracted con ict with Iran was not resolved but it was dormant. Then, unexpectedly, perhaps wondrously for Iran, the long- suppressed Shiite majority in Iraq attained political power in Baghdad. The shared belief system by the overwhelmingly Shiite Iranian nation and the Shiite majority in Iraq, now politically empowered, created a new constellation of power and potential friendship between the two long-time adversaries. National interests and cultures were not easy to reconcile, and the scope of Islamist in uence on the behavior of the two states differed. However, the core issues of their interstate protracted con ict did not generate hostile decisions or crises, with frequent esca- lating tension, as they did during the post-World War I era as independ- ent states. Iran: Decision Process The political structure and decision-making process in Iran was highly authoritarian during the three periods in which its protracted con ict with Iraq unfolded. From 1921 to 1941, the structure and the process were dominated by the rst Pahlavi Shah: the ultimate power of deci- sion on all aspects of public policy, including the overriding domain of national security and foreign policy, rested with the Shah. Given his mili- tary background before he achieved the power of a Shah, his advisors, to the extent that, as an absolute ruler, he consulted specialists, were drawn from the Military. His son and successor as Shah, Mohammed Reza, was no less authori- tarian. However, he was more constrained by external and internal forces in the exercise of ultimate authority in Iran. Indebted to the USA and the UK for his assumption of the Persian throne in 1941, he relied heav- ily on Western advice on policy and government throughout the 38 years of his reign. The most dramatic illustration of that dependence relation- ship occurred in a context in which his authority was challenged by a 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 247 fi fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl popular prime minister, Mossadegh, who had the support of Iran’s leg- islature, the Majlis, in 1953 and was challenging the Shah’s economic, speci cally petroleum policy, in which the Western Powers had a vital interest; the Shah survived the challenge only by the effective interven- tion of the US and UK Intelligence agencies. In Period III of Iran’s involvement in the con ict with Iraq, the polit- ical structure and decision process were dominated by Islamic authoritar- ianism, initially with Ayatollah Khomeini as the ultimate authority in all issues of public policy, from 1979 until his death in 1989, and thereafter, Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme Ruler. Islamist Iran has an elaborate set of institutions that perform governmental functions—a president, a legislature, the Military, the bureaucracy. However, on any major sub- stantive issue of domestic and foreign policy, requiring a decision by Iran since 1979, authority and power have been concentrated in the Supreme Leader. Discordant Objectives: Material Bene ts and Power The core issue of discord between these Gulf region rivals was control over their shared international waterway, the Shatt-al-Arab. Iran’s objec- tive for almost 40 years (1937– 1975) was the revision of their formal 1937 agreement, which allocated most of the waterway to Iraq: Iran regarded the agreement as an inequitable imposition that led to dispro- portionate material bene ts to Iraq because of the steadily increasing ow of oilcarrying ships through this waterway, which was indispensa- ble for economic growth in many regions and states. Thus, the objective of Iraq, by far the main bene ciary of the constantly escalating world- wide export of oil from the Middle East, was to maintain the status quo embodied in the 1937 agreement on the Shatt-al-Arab. Iran bene ted from the moderate revision of the 1937 agreement in 1975 (the Algiers Agreement), but this was short-lived: Saddam Hussein disavowed Iraq’s commitment to the 1975 revised agreement on the Shatt (Waterway) in 1980, precipitating the mutually devastating carnage of the Iran/Iraq War (1980–1988). The second persistent discordant objective of the two long-time Persian Gulf region and Middle East adversaries in this unresolved but dormant con ict was the closely related competing goal of power. For both Iran and Iraq, the extent of their control of the Shattal-Arab was not only a valued source of material bene t: it also enhanced Iraq’s claim to leadership in the Arab world; and it was inextricably related to the 248 M. BRECHER Iran/Iraq competition for primacy in the Gulf region and the Middle East as a whole. fl fi fi fl fl fl fi fl fl fi fi fl fl fl Con ict Management and Con ict Resolution The historical roots of this interstate protracted con ict date to 638 C.E., as noted, when the Muslim Arabs destroyed the four-century Sassanid (Neo-Persian) Empire. However, the modern, post-World War I phase of this unresolved con ict began in the second decade of the inter-world war period (1919–1939). Iraq accused Iran in 1930 of building dams that, it declared, illegally diverted water from the Iraq-controlled Shatt-al- Arab— their longstanding maritime con ict over the ‘Arab Waterway’— which separated, and joined, the two regional major power Gulf rivals. This led to military incidents and the initial internationalization of a multi-faceted interstate con ict over territory (the ShattWaterway) and power (primacy in the Gulf region), superimposed on profound differences in culture and ethnicity (Persian-Iranian vs. Arab), religion (Shia vs. Sunni Islam), and the historic rivalry between Middle East empires (Mesopotamia vs. Persia). In 1934, Iraq complained to the League of Nations, whose Council attempted to mediate a seemingly minor mate- rial dispute. Iran, then the stronger Gulf power, made its acceptance of mediation conditional on Iraq’s cession of territory—three miles of anchorage area, in accord with several earlier Iran/Iraq treaties, to enable Iran’s use of the port of Abadan in the Shatt. Iraq rejected the demand, and the rst of many mediation efforts by the global organization failed. Despite this inauspicious attempt at multilateral con ict management, Iran and Iraq succeeded in reaching a bilateral agreement via direct nego- tiations three years later: the adversaries re-af rmed their adherence to the 1913 Constantinople Protocols in their 1937 Boundary Treaty, re- con rming Iraq’s ownership of the Shatt, which had been established in several earlier treaties between the Ottoman Empire, of which Iraq was a part until 1920, and Persia, as well as the results of the 1914 Border Delimitation Commission. Moreover, reversing its rejection of Persia’s minor territorial demand in 1934, Iraq ceded a four-mile anchorage area to Iran in the Waterway and agreed to establish a joint Iraq-Persia administrative commission to supervise all practical matters related to the Shatt. They also signed a symbolically relevant Treaty of Good Neighbor Relations in 1949. While disagreements about the Shatt administrative body caused tensions, the protracted con ict was relatively quiescent 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 249 for three decades, except for a minor crisis over competing claims to the Waterway, with minimal border clashes (November 28, 1959–January 4, 1960). A re-escalation of their protracted con ict was triggered in 1968 by the Ba’ath Party’s assumption of power in Iraq and its imposition of stringent, humiliating rules for any Iran ship traversing the Waterway, e.g., the requirement that it lower its ag when entering the Waterway. This led to a sharp Persian response: on April 19, 1969, it abrogated the 1937 boundary agreement and demanded its re-negotiation. Iraq again sought mediation by the successor to the League of Nations, the UN, and proposed a joint Iran–Iraq submission of the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) [World Court]. Iran, knowing Iraq’s much stronger legal claims to the Waterway, refused both submission to the World Court and direct negotiations. Both adversaries sought UN support, to no avail. The crisis lasted 6 months (April 15–October 30, 1969). In that hopeful atmosphere, four

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