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CHAPTER 5 Theory III: Interstate Con icts The ICB concept, Protracted Con ict, was introduced 25 years ago, in Brecher, Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality (1993, 5, 7–8, 59, 71–73, 145–146, 543–545), building on a pioneering de nition by Azar (1978). [The con ict concept was further develo...

CHAPTER 5 Theory III: Interstate Con icts The ICB concept, Protracted Con ict, was introduced 25 years ago, in Brecher, Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality (1993, 5, 7–8, 59, 71–73, 145–146, 543–545), building on a pioneering de nition by Azar (1978). [The con ict concept was further developed in Brecher and Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (1997, 5–6, 34–35, 65–66, 659– 660, 788–792. 820–834, 837–838), and in Brecher, International Political Earthquakes (2008, 6–7, 13–18, 28–35, 40–41, 264–267). It was treated most extensively in Brecher, The World of Protracted Con icts (2016 L, passim)]. In terms of geographic scope, con ict is one of ve lev- els of the concept, CONFLICT, in descending order: global system con- ict, regional sub-system con ict, interstate protracted con ict, non-state ethnic, religious, racial, tribal group con ict, and domestic-internal con- ict. As indicated most recently, “there are three necessary conditions of a protracted con ict: at least three interstate crises between the same principal con ict adversaries; perceptions by their decision-makers of a higher-than-normal threat to one or more basic values, nite time for response, and the higher-than-normal likelihood of involvement in mili- tary hostilities before the value threat is overcome; and minimal duration of ten years” (Brecher 2016 L. 7). “All protracted con icts are lengthy, some of them several decades or more. All have uctuated in intensity: many have moved from war to partial accommodation and back to vio- lence (e.g., India and Pakistan since 1947); others have been charac- terized by continuous war, but of varying severity (e.g., Vietnam War 1946– 1975). All have aroused intense animosities, with spillover to a © The Author(s) 2018 131 M. Brecher, A Century of Crisis and Con ict in the International System, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57156-0_5 132 M. BRECHER broad spectrum of issues. And con ict termination has yet to occur in many of them” (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997, 5) Fig. 5.1. con ict resolution Model fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fl Among the 33 protracted con icts that have been active during most or part of the past century [late 1918–2017], 20 have been resolved, while 13 persist, as noted above. Why did some end and others persist well into the twenty- rst century? More generally, can one identify, a priori, the conditions most likely to lead to con ict resolution, the conceptual counterpart to the conditions most likely to generate onset and persistence of an interstate con ict? Other related dimensions of these con icts demand attention, notably which Condition(s) or cluster of Conditions can be identi ed as the most signi cant Basic Cause(s) of con ict Termination? Formally, the answer is to be found in a Model designed to explain the most likely conditions for resolution of inter- state con icts, of which 60% since the end of World War I have been characterized by violence that ranges from minor clashes to serious clashes to full-scale war. Basic causes of con ict resolution This model postulates that there are six basic causes of Con ict Resolution. One is a collective feeling of Exhaustion by a substantial proportion of the population of at least one of the con ict principal adversaries. Another is a qualitative change in the Balance of Capability, human and material, between-among the principal adversaries. A third Basic Cause is Domestic Pressure(s) on the principal adversaries in favor of con ict termination. A fourth is External Pressure(s) on the principal adversaries to pursue the objective of con ict resolution in good faith. A fth Basic Cause is a discernible Reduction in Discordant Objectives of the principal adversaries. And a sixth is a qualitative Decline in Con ict- Sustaining Acts by the principal adversaries. All of these Conditions (Basic Causes) constitute the Independent Variables of the Con ict Resolution Model. An additional cause—most likely Condition—of con ict resolu- tion, acting as an Intervening Variable in the Con ict Resolution Model, is a Perceptual Calculus by the decision-maker(s) of the principal 5 THEORY III: INTERSTATE CONFLICTS 133 Fig. 5.1 Con ict Resolution Model fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl adversaries of some, most or all of these Conditions: intolerable exhaus- tion; an unfavorable capability balance at the time con ict resolution is being assessed, along with negative future prospects of that balance; awareness of strong domestic and external pressures in favor of con- ict termination; of substantive reduction in discordant objectives by the adversaries; and of a substantive decline in their Con ict-Sustaining Acts. Each of these Causes is a suf cient condition for con ict resolution. None is a necessary condition. The model also postulates that the like- lihood of con ict resolution increases with an increase in the number of favorable conditions present at the time the con ict termination option is evaluated by decision-makers of the con ict’s principal adversaries. When many of these causal conditions are present, termination of an interstate protracted con ict is highly likely, and when all favorable conditions are present, con ict resolution is virtually certain to occur. The causal links between likely Conditions and likelihood of con ict resolution are pre- sented in Fig. 5.1. The rationale of this causal chain is presented in the following discussion. 134 M. BRECHER exhaustion Two types of exhaustion may be experienced by the population of pro- tracted con ict actors, physical and psychological. The former derives from intolerable high casualties and/or insufferable material destruction caused by enemy bombing or shelling, or by weapons of mass destruc- tion, in long duration wars or massive single occurrences of violence. Physical exhaustion may also result from deprivation—shortage of edible food and potable water, damage to living quarters and schools, and/or the cumulative effects of long-term, high unemployment, notably the drastic reduction in income. The second type, psychological exhaustion, may result from a con ict of uncertain duration, with no assurance of relief in a lengthy con ict, accentuated by frequent or persistent out- bursts of violence between the principal adversaries. Exhaustion may derive from either source or from both. It may be experienced by the mass public of one or more con ict adversaries or by their political and military elites and/or attentive publics, or by their entire population. Exhaustion may penetrate only one or both, possibly multiple, adversaries in an interstate protracted con ict. fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl A quantitative measurement of the effect of collective exhaustion is elu- sive. However, a qualitative assessment of the cause–effect linkage between exhaustion and the likelihood of protracted con ict resolution is logically plausible: the higher the casualties, the greater the material damage, and/ or the longer the period of collective and individual pain experienced by the population of principal adversaries during an interstate protracted con ict, the more likely will con ict termination occur. Moreover, when both types of exhaustion, physical and psychological, are operating to gener- ate collective fatigue in one adversary, the impact of exhaustion on the likelihood of con ict resolution will be great. It will be greater when both the mass public and elites of one principal adversary are affected by exhaustion, and greatest when all principal adversaries are experiencing acute exhaustion. In the broadest formulation of this cause–effect link- age, the likelihood of interstate protracted con ict resolution will be great when all types and sources of 5 THEORY III: INTERSTATE CONFLICTS 135 caPaBility Balance In quest of a priori explanatory power regarding the conditions most likely to lead to resolution of an interstate protracted con ict, a second basic cause is the Balance of Capability between-among the principal con ict adversaries. In performing the role of an independent [causal] variable, Capability comprises several dimensions. One is effective or ineffective political leadership by a state’s decision-maker(s), that is, the ability or inability of leaders to mobilize strong support from their elites and attentive and mass publics for their choice of one or more policy options that can cope successfully with the challenge(s) and/or threat(s) posed by a competing principal adversary or adversaries during a pro- tracted con ict. Political leaders, who are endowed with strong support by their elites and attentive and mass publics, and who perceive that their state will be unlikely to achieve core goals by prolonging a protracted con ict—because of a high level of collective exhaustion among its popu- lation, higher than that of its principal adversary, and/or because of a qualitative decline in their state’s material capability, relative to that of its adversary—would be able, nonetheless, to initiate or participate in a process of accommodation with their principal adversary(ies) designed to attain mutually acceptable resolution. Conversely, a weak political leadership, which recognizes or perceives a deeper exhaustion among its population than that of its principal adversary, and an adverse balance of capability with that adversary, with little or no prospect of reversing these basic conditions within their con ict, will be more likely to accept conict resolution, even with imposed major concessions to the adversary. In essence, the presence of effective or ineffective, strong or weak political leadership in one or both (all) of the principal adversaries is an important component of the causal variable, Balance of Capability, in explaining if, when—and what type of—con ict resolution is most likely to occur. This proposition, too, will be tested against the evidence on con ict resolu- tion to be presented in the following chapter. The same reasoning applies to the military component of the Capability variable. This refers to the ability–inability of political and military leaders to mobilize a state’s human and material resources, nota- bly the size, level of preparedness, and commitment of its armed forces, and the volume and quality of its military technology and weapon systems, that 136 M. BRECHER fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl would be able to achieve basic objectives and defend core interests if vio- lence erupts in the relationship with one or more principal adversaries. The military dimension of Capability also includes the alliance poten- tial of state actors during a protracted con ict; that is, the presence or absence of a reliable ally (allies) and/or national security patron(s), fl fl exhaustion are experienced by all principal adversaries, simultaneously. These propositions will be tested by the evi- dence from selective interstate con icts that have been active during the past century. for one or both (or all) principal adversaries, would also be incorporated into an assessment of the Capability Balance in a speci c interstate con ict. This reasoning also applies to the economic dimension of Capability, which combines material and human aspects: the availability of, or reli- able access to, ample natural resources, and a developed economic struc- ture, or lack thereof; the presence or absence of a well-trained labor force capable of utilizing the technology of a twentieth and twenty- rst century industrial and agricultural economy; with or without a skilled economic leadership able to manage a state’s economy effectively, to sus- tain its material capability, and thereby contribute to a state’s security in both peace and war phases of an interstate con ict. Here too the con ict resolution model postulates that successful leadership in the economic domain will be more likely to achieve a favorable resolution of its exter- nal con ict than an ineffective display of economic management. For all three components of a state’s Capability—political, military, and economic—there are two relevant aspects for an analysis of the most likely conditions of con ict resolution. One is the presence of relative equality or inequality between the principal adversaries in a speci c pro- tracted con ict, not the absolute level of sophistication in the human and material elements of Capability in one con ict, that is, symmetric or asymmetric conditions within a speci c con ict, not its Balance of Capability compared with the Capability Balance in other protracted con icts. For example, the relevant comparison in exploring the conditions that made con ict resolution likely in the Chad/Libya con ict (1971–1994) was the Balance of Capability between the two principal adversaries in that protracted con ict, Chad and Libya, in 1994, not the overall level of Capability— political, military and economic—in the Chad/Libya con- ict, compared with the overall level of Capability in the USA/USSR con ict or the India/Pakistan con ict. The second relevant aspect of Capability as a causal variable that can lead to, or delay, or in uence the type and content of, con ict resolu- tion is the presence or absence of deterioration in the Capability Balance between the principal adversaries during a speci c con ict. States that are adversaries in an interstate protracted con ict, like other political, 5 THEORY III: INTERSTATE CONFLICTS 137 fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fi fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fl military, and economic organizations, experience change, including deterioration in the quality and effectiveness of their political, military, and/or economic leaders, and/or the volume, technological quality and productivity of their civilian and military economies. When one con ict principal adversary experiences a qualitative relative decline in one or more dimensions of Capability, the resolution of its protracted con ict, whether or not accompanied by violence, will most likely occur in the form of a victory-defeat outcome. By contrast, the absence of a qualita- tive decline in Capability, including leadership of any principal adversary and its material productivity, will most likely lead to con ict persistence or a shared-bene t con ict termination for the adversaries; that is, if con- ict resolution occurs in a condition of stable leadership in all the prin- cipal adversaries and relative equality in their material component of Capability, the basic cause(s) of con ict doMestic Pressures In all states, persons and/or institutions that are authorized to frame and conduct policy toward all other members of the global system are the object of pressures emanating from their domestic political system, among many other sources. The volume, form, intensity, and impact of domestic pressures will vary greatly, from the minimal number of transparent acts of pressure, of low intensity, and modest impact, in states with authoritarian regimes, both Left (e.g., USSR) and Right (e.g., Nazi Germany), to a large, continuing ow of mostly unconcealed transparent acts from a multitude of interest groups, many of high intensity, with con- siderable impact on decision-makers, in states with democratic regimes (e.g., UK and USA). In no state among the 110 states that played a role as a principal adversary in one or more interstate protracted con icts during the time frame of this inquiry (late 1918–2017), were decision- makers on issues relating to an interstate protracted con ict immune from domestic system pressures. The forms of domestic pressure range from oral and written commu- nications by respected individuals and organizations, and governmental 138 M. BRECHER leaders and institutions [polite pressure], to public, often angry and vio- lent, demonstrations by dissenting individuals, groups and institutions, designed to thwart a decision or act on a divisive issue by persons or gov- ernmental bodies [drastic pressure], or designed to prevent or at least undermine the legitimacy of an act by the demonstrators as a violation of some national or international norm. Some dramatic acts of domestic pressure exerted a profound in uence on policy and decisions relating to, and generating, the behavior of a principal adversary during an inter- state protracted con ict: a notable example was the effect of cumulative anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in the United States, in the mid-late 1960s, on the Johnson Administration’s fundamental shift in policy in 1968, replacing the goal of total military victory over North Vietnam to a serious attempt to negotiate a compromise peace. fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi A thorough discussion of domestic system pressures is beyond the scope of this presentation of the Con ict Resolution Model. Further exam- ples of the effect of these pressures were cited in case studies, testing this model with the evidence from a selection of con icts that were active during the near-century, late 1918–2016 (Brecher 2016 L). Suf ce it for this conceptual exploration of the conditions most likely to lead to resolution of interstate protracted con icts to note that pressures ema- nating from a principal adversary’s domestic political system tend to be spasmodic and highly visible only in con icts in which at least one of the principal adversaries epitomizes a democratic political system, and even within this context, only when the mass public within states fl fl resolution will be one or more of the other independent (causal) variables speci ed in the con ict resolu- tion model, namely, collective exhaustion, domestic, and/or external pressures on the adversaries to seek a peaceful resolution of their protracted con ict, or a reduction in discordant objectives, or a decline in con ict- sustaining acts by the principal adversaries. attached to this political system becomes aroused and angry over a highly contro- versial speci c decision or policy by their political leaders that stimulates an act of ‘drastic pressure.’ Thus the in uence of Domestic Pressures as a causal variable in the con ict resolution model is much less evident and less signi cant than the role of Collective Exhaustion and the Balance of Capability in contributing to a ‘state of mind’ among principal con ict adversaries that, at certain points during a protracted con ict, take an ini- tiative to pursue con ict resolution or to accept such a proposal, emanat- ing from the hostile adversary, a well-wishing patron, ally, or empathetic intermediary, as a welcome outcome. [The proposition that Collective Exhaustion and a favorable Balance of Capability will be more signi cant than Domestic Pressures in a decision process whether or not to initiate, or to welcome, a proposal to pursue the path of con ict resolution, will also be tested against the evidence of con icts that have been active since the end of World War I.] 5 THEORY III: INTERSTATE CONFLICTS 139 external Pressures Principal adversaries in interstate protracted con icts, like all states, are members of the global system and, most of them, one or more regional and sub-regional systems. These interactions—economic, political, mili- tary, cultural, and other—provide both opportunities and settings for in uencing the behavior of one or more con ict adversaries, through an array of forms of external pressures. They may be active or passive, or both. They may be communicated verbally or by tangible acts, supportive or hos- tile. They may be directed to government institutions and/or of cials, or to one or more economic, political, cultural, religious, or social groups within a neighboring state or a more distant member of a sub-system in which the initiator of pressure and its target state(s) share membership. Pressure may or may not be effective in in uencing policy choices and actions by the target(s), that is, one or more principal con ict adversaries. Pressures on con ict adversaries exist in all interstate systems, as an integral part of the relations among their members. However, the volume and scope of external pressures on con ict adversaries in the twentieth and early twenty- rst centuries have been more extensive than in earlier historical eras because of the technological and communications trans- formations from antiquity and early modern epochs to the contempo- rary global system. To the traditional means of communication among states—visits by of cials from State A to their counterpart in a target state and written documents laboriously transported, sometimes for days or longer—have been added an array of techniques, via telephone, telegram and fax, instant internet communication, and for non-govern- mental sources of pressure, daily, weekly, monthly newspapers, social net- works, blogs, videos and photographs of public demonstrations, in favor of, or hostile to, proposed legislation or acts by a con ict adversary. In the inter-World War era, and especially since the end of WWII, the fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fi fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fi fl multiple sources of external pressures on con ict adversaries have been, and continue to be, vast, a myriad of institutions and societal groups, and states that generate and transmit, often instantly, pressure on con ict adversaries, including (often unequivocal) demands for conciliatory acts designed to facilitate con ict resolution. Notable, among a formidable list of inter- national institutions at the global system level which have attempted to exert pressure on protracted con ict adversaries, are the League of Nations Council and Assembly (1920–1939, formally, to 1946); the United Nations (since 1946), with an array of institutions—the Security 140 M. BRECHER Council, General Assembly, and a myriad of specialized agencies—the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (IBRD), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and economic commissions for all regions; military organizations, e.g., NATO; multi-purpose regional organizations, e.g., the European Union (EU), cultural, and educational organizations, e.g., UNESCO; and judicial bodies, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Many states, too, have exerted pressure on con- ict adversaries, especially two inter-World War major powers, France and the UK, and the major powers during most of the period since the end of WWII, the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China. Such pressure has not always been successful, but con ict adversaries have often been unable to resist these external attempts by international organizations, more powerful states and the media in those states, to achieve resolution of con icts by less powerful states. Because of the unequal distribution of power within the global and regional systems, it is hypothesized that, among external sources of pressure for con ict resolution, major powers that attempt to in uence con ict adversaries to pursue con ict resolu- tion will be more successful than pressure emanating from international organizations or non-state interest groups. reduction in discordant oBjectives In the Con ict Resolution Model, the continued presence of one or more of the four major Discordant Objectives of adversarial states—over Territory, Power, Ideology, and/ or Material (Economic) Bene t—would be a serious obstacle to Con ict Resolution; that is, the continuance of dis- putes over any of these discordant issue-areas and issues, and even more an increase in the scope and intensity of disagreements among con ict adversaries makes the task of con ict resolution more dif cult and more distant, for both adversaries and third-party mediators. Conversely, the reduction of discordant objectives by the principal adversaries is a likely condition of Con ict Resolution: the reason for this crucial causal role of the reduction in discordant objectives among states for the attainment of interstate con- ict resolution is the centrality of these four issues and issueareas. fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl Among these discordant issues, the preoccupation with Territory, in its multiple manifestations, looms very large in the behavior of virtu- ally all states in the post-World War I global system, as in all known past interstate systems. The overall reason is that Territory is the indispen- sable pre-condition of statehood. There are several strands of interstate 5 THEORY III: INTERSTATE CONFLICTS 141 discordance, including active disputes over territory. One is that the acquisition of territory is necessary for the attainment of integrity by a state. Another is the substantive and symbolic value attached to regain- ing ownership and control over ‘lost territory’: when both, more so, all, principal adversaries identify the same territory as ‘lost,’ the impact of that discordance is intensi ed to the point that the reduction of that discordance is essential, though not necessarily suf cient for con ict resolution by states. Moreover, the possession of territory is the founda- tion of a state’s quest for national security. Territory is also vital because it is necessary for access to raw materials, many of which are essential for economic development. Thus, the acquisition of territory, including additional territory, is justi ed by states on several grounds, including historical links, the quest to regain ‘lost’ territory, shared ethnicity with the population of disputed territory, and the needs of national security. Not all disputes and claims over territory generate violence, though it often accompanies such discord. Interstate competition for more power to achieve a state’s goals, including the struggle for in uence on the behavior of other states, also generates discordant objectives, contributing further obstacles to con- ict resolution. Speci cally, the attempt to change an existing balance of power with a rival state serves as an obstacle to con ict reduction or resolution. Moreover, the quest for more power by a state, whether by its own efforts to enlarge its military capability, both its armed forces and its weapon systems, is often rationalized as necessary to cope with grave threats by rivals, including threats to existence of both statehood and populations. As with discord over territory, the reduction of power rivalries, especially attempts to change an existing power balance between states, is an important requisite for con ict resolution. The same pattern of dispute, tension, con ict, and often, violence is evident in situations of discordant objectives between adversaries arising from competing Ideologies, notably among Communism, Democracy, Fascism, Islamism, Nationalisms, etc. Discord driven by competing ideas on optimal economic and political systems may be important sources of discordant objectives on their own, or they reinforce discords on objec- tives driven by rivalries over territory, power, or material bene ts. They may be modest sources of discord, but they are unlikely to be irrelevant. As such, the reduction of interstate discord over territory or the distribu- tion of power among states is a vital task in the pursuit of paths to con ict resolution. 142 M. BRECHER fi fi fl fi fi fi fl fi fl fi fl fl fi fi fl fl fl fl This observation applies to discordant objectives over Material Bene ts as well. Discordance may occur on the terms for direct mate- rial bene ts, notably nancial aid by af uent to needy states and foreign investment in developing economies, access to valuable natural resources in developing economies, or for long-term bene ts related to economic development—technological and organizational, including access to vital interstate waterways. Although economic disputes are less prone to violence, it is not unknown in con icts which include competition over material issues. reduction in con ict-sustaining acts (csas) Hostile acts by principal adversaries in a protracted con ict have been grouped into four types, namely political hostility, violence, economic discrim- ination, and verbal hostilitypropaganda. They all share the same attribute of hostility to the rival adversary(ies). Moreover, as with discordant objectives, con ict-sustaining acts (CSAs) are part of the causal chain in the Resolution Model. The continuance of con ict-sustaining acts, whether political, vio- lent, economic, or verbal, are all hostile acts, directed at the adversary(ies), that implement hostile decisions, thereby helping to sustain their con ict. In sharp contrast, a reduction in con ict-sustaining acts by a con ict actor toward its adversary would be perceived by ‘the other’ as a positive signal, thereby contributing to a process of accommodation between adversaries, which is likely to enhance the likelihood of con ict resolution. To recall the role of CSAs in the Resolution Model causal chain, six Basic Causes were speci ed as the Independent or Causal Variables. The content of these Basic Causes is ltered through a Perceptual Calculus by decision-makers of the principal adversaries, one of two Intervening Variables in this Model. That Calculus proceeds to the Catalyst, the second intervening variable, which takes the crucial form of a qualita- tive reduction in the volume and intensity of the four types of Con ict- Sustaining Acts speci ed above. Performing the function of a trigger 5 THEORY III: INTERSTATE CONFLICTS 143 mechanism, that decline in CSAs is expected to increase signi cantly the process of accommodation by the principal adversaries that will more likely culminate in Con ict Resolution. PercePtual calculus Policy toward a con ict adversary and decisions on a core issue of poten- tially great signi cance for both (all) of the principal adversaries—to sustain, even to intensify, their con ict, or to welcome an opportunity for con ict termination, even actively to encourage a process designed to culminate in con ict resolution—will also be in uenced by the Perceptual Calculus of decision-makers, an intervening variable in the Con ict Resolution Model. fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fi fi fl What do they perceive to be the optimal conditions for a decision to initiate, or to respond af rmatively to, an adversary’s proposal of a ter- mination of their con ict? One is a dual image of exhaustion—its intoler- ability for their own population and/or, closely related, fi fi In sum, the signi cance of reduced discordant objectives among states for the resolution of interstate con icts derives from the reality that, not- withstanding the impressive growth in the institutions, rules and norms designed to regulate the relations among states in the twentieth and early twenty- rst centuries, states retain a decisive degree of autonomy in their behavior, especially in the military-security issue-area of international relations, where interstate protracted con icts are located. In addition to changes in core conditions that generated con ict onset and persistence, a principal adversary’s decision whether or not to pursue the goal of con ict resolution will be in uenced by a formal or informal Cost–Bene t analysis. Decision-makers will assess their and their adver- sary’s security, material, and status costs of pursuing con ict resolution as a high priority goal, and they will seek to weigh the maximal and minimal 144 M. BRECHER bene ts to be derived from a decision to initiate or to respond favorably to an offer of con ict termination by their principal adversary(ies). If their Perceptual Calculus of core conditions and their cost–bene t analysis gen- erate a negative outcome vis-à-vis their principal adversary, that is, costs exceeding estimated bene ts and an unfavorable balance of capability, decision-makers are likely to accept con ict resolution as an unavoidable, less burdensome outcome of a protracted con ict, even if the calculated cost is signi cantly larger than any possible bene t of con ict termination. Did these changes in the six Basic Conditions and the Perceptual Calculus, postulated by the Resolution Model as conducive to con ict resolution, exist in all or many or few or any of the 20 post-WWI resolved con icts, and were these conditions absent in all or many or few or none of the 13 con icts that persist in the second decade of the twentyrst century? Stated in terms of the Model on Resolution presented above, is a pattern of postulated favorable conditions for con ict resolution discern- ible during two-thirds of the interstate con icts that were active during the near-century since the end of WWI and have been resolved? catalyst fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fi fi The Catalyst in the Resolution Model is the conceptual counter- part of Precipitating Cause in a model designed to explain the Onset of Protracted Con ict, discussed elsewhere (Brecher 2016 L, Chap. 4). Both are closely related to Basic Causes but are analytically distinct. In both models, concepts are characterized by three differences. fl fi greater exhaustion among its people than for the populace of their principal adversary. Another condition is a calculus of an unfavorable balance of political, military, and economic capability, relative to that of its adversary(ies), especially in the military domain. A third is awareness of domestic pressures for con- ict resolution, supported by elites in their society, as well as their atten- tive public and mass public opinion. A fourth condition is unmistakeable evidence of external pressures for termination, emanating from a patron, ally, major power, international organization, and/or the media, or from several of these sources. There is also a realization by decision-makers of a substantive reduction in discordant objectives with its principal adversary(ies) as their con ict unfolded. Finally, there is a recognition of a decline in con ict-sustaining acts by its principal adversary(ies), lead- ing to doubt about the wisdom of perpetuating a con ict with primarily negative consequences—persisting casualties, continuing material damage, and likely symbolic costs relating to its status in the global system and relevant international sub-systems. One is duration. Basic Causes of Resolution, as of Onset, refer to long- term, underlying determinants of the termination (and beginning) of interstate protracted con icts. Catalyst, like Precipitating Cause of Onset, is a short-term concept that identi es the mechanism leading to termi- nation (resolution) of a con ict; however, though the latter is a nite- speci c causal event, a Catalyst may comprise several related events that crystallize in Resolution. A second difference is their conceptual role in the models of Resolution and Onset. Basic Causes are the independent variables in both models, the conditions that are most likely to lead to the termination (and outbreak) of a protracted con ict. As evident in Figure 5.1, above, those fundamental causes are different, but their role in explaining why a con ict ends is decisive in understanding the phenomenon of protracted con ict and the processes that culminate in resolution. The Catalyst 5 THEORY III: INTERSTATE CONFLICTS 145 (and Precipitating Cause, in the Onset model) serves as an intervening variable, in the causal ow from Basic Cause to crystallization as Con ict Resolution, the dependent variable in the Resolution Model. The third difference between these concepts, Basic Causes and Catalyst (or Precipitating Cause), relates to time sequence. The former precedes the latter. In the protracted con ict causal chain, Basic Causes are the indis- pensable Step 1: without them a protracted con ict cannot occur. The Catalyst, like the Precipitating Cause, is an intermediate Step 2 that trans- forms the causal process to Step 3, Resolution or Persistence at the end of the causal chain. Thus, both Basic Causes and Catalyst-Precipitating Cause are integral parts of the resolution (and persistence) models. The evidence on crisis management within, and con ict resolution of, protracted con icts, to be presented in the following chapter, will focus on the causal conditions, along with the perceptual calculus, likely to lead to decisions to respond favorably to a proposal for con ict resolution. It will also address the important question of generalizability: is a cost– bene t calculus by con ict adversaries generalizable or ad hoc and unique, varying with decision-makers’ diverse assessments of optimal conditions, costs, bene ts, and opportunities for shared outcomes? Moreover, the evidence will present the ndings on alternative paths to con ict resolu- tion; that is, if the goal of con ict resolution was to be pursued, was it sought, and the bene ts pursued, by direct negotiation with the principal adversary(ies) or by indirect negotiations via a third party? If a third party was preferred, what type was sought by the principal adversaries: a state friendly to both (all) principal adversaries; a high-pro le person trusted by both (all) principal adversaries; an appointee by an international organiza- tion, global or regional; one person or a small-n committee? What role and powers were granted to a mediator? Finally, the evidence will enable the testing of the following nine hypotheses, implied at the beginning of this chapter and derived from the Resolution Model. fl fl fl fi fi fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi ict resolution fl fl fi fl fi fi fl fl fl fi hyPotheses on con H.1 Resolution of an Interstate Protracted Con ict is likely to occur when one or more of the following Conditions characterize at least one of the principal adversaries: Collective Exhaustion, Unfavorable Balance of Capability, Domestic Pressures, External Pressures, Reduction in Discordant Objectives, Decline in Con ict-Sustaining Acts, and an unfavorable Perceptual Calculus of these Basic Causes of Resolution. 146 M. BRECHER H.2 The larger the number of Basic Causes, that is, Conditions favorable to Con ict Resolution, that are present, the more likely is an interstate protracted con ict to be resolved. H.3 The most likely single Basic Cause of (condition favorable to) inter- state con ict resolution is Collective Exhaustion by at least one principal adversar y. H.4 The most likely cluster of Basic Causes of con ict resolution is one in which Collective Exhaustion is the primary cause. H.5 The higher the casualties, the greater the material damage and the longer the period of collective pain experienced by one or more principal adversaries during a con ict, the more likely will con ict resolution occur. H.6 The likelihood of protracted con ict resolution will be greatest when all typesof exhaustion (physical and psychological) and all sourcesof exhaustion (high casualties, widespread material damage, lengthy period of collective pain) are experienced by all principal adversaries. H.7 Political leaders endowed with strong support by their elites and attentive and mass publics are able to initiate or participate in a pro- cess of accommodation with their principal adversary, designed to attain mutually acceptable con ict termination, whereas a weak political leader- ship, which recognizes an adverse balance of capability with its principal adversary, is likely to accept con ict termination with major concessions imposed by the adversary. H.8 A principal adversary, whose leadership possesses an ability to mobi- lize effectively its human and material resources in the military domain, will be more likely to pursue and achieve a favorable con ict resolution outcome than an ineffective political-military leadership. H.9 Collective Exhaustion and an unfavorable Balance of Capability will be more signi cant than Domestic or External Pressures in a decision whether or not to initiate, or to welcome, a proposal to pursue the path of con ict resolution. fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi (Brecher, The World of Protracted Con icts, 2016 L, Chapter 12).