Chapter 7: Select Case Study Findings On Interstate Conflicts: Asia - Afghanistan/Pakistan Conflict (PDF)

CHAPTER 7 Select Case Study Findings On Interstate Con icts: Asia afghanistan/Pakistan con ict (unresolved) Historical Roots The roots of this unresolved con ict in the borderland of South Asia- Central Asia can be traced to the mid-eighteenth century, to the Durrani era of Afghanistan’s imperial ex...

CHAPTER 7 Select Case Study Findings On Interstate Con icts: Asia afghanistan/Pakistan con ict (unresolved) Historical Roots The roots of this unresolved con ict in the borderland of South Asia- Central Asia can be traced to the mid-eighteenth century, to the Durrani era of Afghanistan’s imperial expansion into northwest India, early in the period of British rule over the sub-continent. As an inter- state con ict, it began with the creation of Pakistan and India on August 14– 15, 1947, when the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) was allo- cated to Pakistan by the British Parliament’s India Independence Act. An impending con ict between Afghanistan and Pakistan was already evident in July 1947, during a British Government of India-supervised referendum among the overwhelming Pushtun ethnic majority in the NWFP: the options for its electorate were integration into Pakistan or India. Conspicuously absent were two other options, urged by the Government of Afghanistan— integration into Afghanistan, where the Pushtuns formed the largest ethnic community, or independence for the North West Frontier Province, widely known by its population as Pakhtunkhwa. [In 2010, Pakistan formally accepted the name change, adding the preceding word, Khyber]. The outcome of the 1947 refer- endum, boycotted by the largest socio-political organization in the NWFP, the Khudai Khidmatgars [Servants of God]—a very close ally of the Gandhi- and Nehru-led Indian National Congress until the 1947 © The Author(s) 2018 179 M. Brecher, A Century of Crisis and Con ict in the International System, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57156-0_7 180 M. BRECHER Partition of India—was a very large majority, of those who voted, in favor of integration into Pakistan. The referendum and its outcome were immediately rejected by Afghanistan as illegal, leading, inter alia, to its decisive rejection of Pakistan’s initial application for membership in the United Nations, and they have never been accepted by Afghanistan as the legitimate expression of the NWFP’s Pushtun population. That eth- nic-territorial dispute has been the core of this interstate con ict since its onset in 1948. Behavior fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi Afghanistan Decisions The rst of many strategic and important tactical decisions by Afghanistan in this unresolved, though long-dormant con ict was its repudiation of the results of a referendum conducted in mid-1947 under the terms of the UK Government’s formal decision leading to the partition of India: the referendum, among the residents of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), offered two options for their future association— legal integra- tion into the Dominion of India or the Dominion of Pakistan, scheduled to come into existence on August 14–15 of that year. As soon as news of this impending referendum became known, Afghanistan made the strategic decision to challenge its legitimacy and legality. In March 1947, Afghanistan’s decision was implemented in an of cial dissenting letter to the UK Government: as noted it emphasized the overwhelming Pushtun majority of NWFP residents and declared that two other crucial options should therefore be included in the referendum—integration of the NWFP territory and residents into Afghanistan, in which Pushtuns were the larg- est ethnic community, and independence for the NWFP. Both the UK and the leadership of the soon-to-beinaugurated Dominion of Pakistan remained rm in the narrow choice of referendum options. After the results of the two-option referendum were announced—a large majority favored integration into Pakistan—Afghanistan vigorously reaf rmed its rejection of the outcome as a denial of a fundamental right of the NWFP Pushtuns to genuine selfdetermination. A second strategic decision by Afghanistan was to disavow, formally, its long-time acquiescence in the 1893 Durand Line Agreement between British India and a weakened Afghan monarchy: although it had infor- mally rejected the Durand Line as the legitimate border with Pakistan, 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 181 both before and at the time of Pakistan’s independence (August 15, 1947), Afghanistan’s decision no longer to recognize the Durand Line as their border was announced in July 1949. The unconcealed hostility of Afghanistan toward its southern neighbor was expressed frequently: an early expression of this attitude was its tacti- cal decision to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the UN on September 30, 1947, the only negative vote on this issue in the UN General Assembly. Aware of the adverse fall-out of this act led Afghanistan to withdraw its vote on October 20, 1947 and to establish diplomatic relations with Pakistan in 1948. Yet the Afghanistan commitment to reversing the outcome of the 1947 referendum in the NWFP and its inte- gration into Pakistan, continued to rankle. Among the important tactical decisions that re ected this commitment was Afghanistan’s sponsorship of a Pashtunistan Government in the border city of Tirah in 1951. fi fl fl fi fi fi fi Much more signi cant, in terms of this South Asia-Central Asia con- ict, was Afghanistan’s strategic decision to oppose vigorously Pakistan’s ‘One Unit’ plan in 1954 and 1955 to merge all four western prov- inces in this geographically divided state into one unit, to be called West Pakistan (East Bengal was to remain the sole province of East Pakistan). Afghanistan was enraged by what it deplored as the second phase of a conscious Pakistan denial of the NWFP Pashtuns’ right to self-determi- nation; the rst phase was their imposed integration into the new state of Pakistan via the 1947 referendum that deprived the NWFP Pashtuns of their natural right to choose integration with their ethnic kin in Afghanistan or independence. A strategic Afghanistan foreign policy decision, with roots in this con- ict and belated far-reaching consequences, was to seek aid from the USSR, when Pakistan suspended its cross-border trade on May 14, 1955: as a land-locked state, Afghanistan was heavily dependent on Pakistan for most of its foreign trade, both imports and exports. The implementa- tion of this decision took the form of Soviet economic and military aid that began immediately and grew considerably over time. In August 1955, Afghanistan signed a barter protocol with the USSR, assuring it of a regular supply of vital imports. In December 1955, the Soviet Union provided a $100 million development loan. The following August, Afghanistan received the rst small supply of Soviet arms ($25 million). By 1960, the Soviet Union accounted for half of Afghanistan’s total trade, including 90% of its oil and all of its military imports. The next year, when Pakistan once more suspended Afghanistan’s cross-border 182 M. BRECHER trade and access to the Arabian Sea, the USSR further increased the ow of economic and military aid, which continued through the 1960s and 1970s. More than two decades after Afghanistan’s initial 1955 deci- sion, the alignment between Afghanistan and the USSR culminated in a Treaty of Friendship (December 5, 1978). This, in turn, provided a legal basis for the Soviet Union’s disastrous military intervention-occupation of Afghanistan the next year that lasted a decade (1979–1989). For the Soviet Union, it proved to be a superpower model of very high geopo- litical costs with no visible bene ts that was emulated by the other super- power, the U.S., for an even longer period (2001–2014). Afghanistan: Decision-Makers The key decision-makers in Afghanistan during the most active period of its con ict with Pakistan (1947–1978) were members of the Musahiban royal family. Speci cally, they were as follows: Muhammad Hashim and Shah Mahmud, two uncles of the young King Zahir Shah, who alternated as Prime Minister (1947–1953); Muhammad Daoud Khan, cousin of the King and Prime Minister, and his brother who served as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (1953–1963) for King Zahir Shah (1963– 1973); and Muhammad Daoud Khan, as President of Afghanistan, after a coup that overthrew the monarchy (1973–1978). Other than the rst two decisions noted above, acquiescence in the results of the 1947 NWFP referendum and renunciation of the 1893 Durand Line agreement with British India, the most in uential gure in shaping Afghanistan’s policy toward Pakistan and key decisions for 15 years was Daoud Khan. Since 1978 this con ict has been dormant, rst, when Afghanistan was under communist rule, with Soviet occupation (1979– 1989), later, under the Taliban (1996–2001) and, since then, the U.S.supported Afghanistan Government in the Afghanistan-Taliban War. Afghanistan: Decision Process fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fi fi fl fi fi The political structure of Afghanistan during the active period of this unresolved con ict (1947–1978) combined two systems—organized, centralized government in the relatively few urban centers and autonomy in the provinces and tribal areas. A national legislature existed with 120 members, acting as a consultative body at the discretion of the mon- arch, later, of the president or the prime minister. In the autonomous Tribal Areas, the basic governing unit was the Jirga or Assembly, with a higher assembly, Loe Jirga, that met infrequently. During the period 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 183 of Soviet occupation, an Afghan Communist structure was introduced but its institutions exercised little actual decision-making power vis- à-vis Pakistan. The Taliban introduced a highly authoritarian political structure during its 5 years in power (1996–2001); it was replaced by a formally democratic system, under U.S. in uence. In sum, when the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ict was active (1947–1978), the Afghanistan decision process on major issues related to the con ict was concentrated in the small number of political leaders noted above, with informal con- sultation involving provincial and tribal leaders on matters of local con- cern, but not on matters of general national policy toward the long-time adversary, Pakistan. Pakistan: Decisions The other principal adversary in this interstate con ict made even more strategic and important tactical decisions. The rst two major Pakistan decisions in this con ict were the obverse of Afghanistan’s two earliest decisions, noted above. Both were passive decisions that had long-term strategic consequences for the adversaries and the durability of their con ict. However, they did not involve a complex decision process for Pakistan or indeed any problem of choice: there was only one perceived option for the two closely related issues. One Pakistan decision was to welcome, with relief, the result of the NWFP referendum—a large majority in favor of integration into Pakistan, not India. The other decision was to acquiesce, comfortably, in the implicit con rmation of Pakistan’s claim that the 1893 Afghanistan–British India Agreement on the Durand Line as their common border applied as well to the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, by virtue of the formal inclusion of the NWFP in the terri- tory of the new state. In the early 1950s, Pakistan made a major foreign policy decision, not directly related to, but with far-reaching consequences for, its con- ict with Afghanistan—to seek a close military alignment with the United States. This decision was implemented in three highpro le national security agreements: a Mutual Defense Assistance Act with the United States in May 1954, which mushroomed into a half-century of valu- able military aid from a superpower, greatly enhancing Pakistan’s mili- tary capability in its primary national security pre-occupation, its long, acrimonious unresolved con ict with India; and membership in two U.S.- sponsored regional alliances, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954, and the Central Treaty Organization 184 M. BRECHER fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fi (CENTO), better known as the ‘Baghdad Pact,’ in September 1955. This military alignment with the U.S., especially the rst of these three pacts, which was renewed continuously except for a brief suspension of U.S. military aid, greatly enhanced Pakistan’s military capability, pri- marily related not only to its con ict with India but also in its con ict with a much weaker Afghanistan in all the dimensions of national power, despite the latter’s (much smaller) military aid from the USSR. Another major (domestic political) decision by Pakistan in the mid- 1950s had a direct and signi cant strategic impact on the con ict with Afghanistan: it was to merge the four provinces in the western part of Pakistan—West Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the disputed territory of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)—into ‘One Unit,’ West Pakistan. The plan was approved by the NWFP Assembly on November 25, 1954 and was inaugurated on October 14, 1955. As noted in the above discussion of Afghanistan’s decisions, this act was perceived by Pakistan’s adversary as an even more demeaning act than the 1947 two- option NWFP referendum, for it further submerged the Pushtun ethnic identity of the decisive majority of the NWFP’s population in one of Pakistan’s two regions. Afghanistan expressed its dismay and unalter- able opposition to the ‘One Unit’ merger but lacked the power to undo what it perceived as the violation of a fundamental Pushtun right to self-determination by a Punjab-dominated Government of Pakistan. For Afghanistan, the ‘One Unit’ scheme was destined to perpetuate its con- ict with Pakistan until the merger was rescinded. On two notable occasions—there were many during this unresolved interstate con ict— Pakistan decided to cut off transit trade from, and deny access to, its port on the Arabian Sea, to land-locked Afghanistan, once in mid-1956 and again in 1961, the latter in retaliation against Afghanistan’s closure of its border with Pakistan in 1960. Both cases had strategic consequences: the rst, as noted above, led to Afghanistan’s request for Soviet aid and the second deepened the relationship between Afghanistan and the USSR. Another Pakistan decision, with long-term strategic consequences, was made in 1973 by Prime Minister Zul qar Ali Bhutto, newly appointed after a lengthy period of rule by Pakistan’s politically powerful Military establishment: it was to adopt a more aggressive policy toward Afghanistan, including support for Afghan Islamists against the regime of Mohammad Daoud Khan, a long-term foe of Pakistan, who had returned to power that year after a successful coup against King Zahir Shah, his cousin, who had 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 185 ousted Daoud in 1963 from his position as Afghanistan’s leader from 1953 to 1963, as noted. Bhutto’s anti-Daoud policy became entangled with—and was perceived as—a hostile policy directed at Afghanistan and Pushtuns generally. There was strong evidence supporting this per- ception, especially Bhutto’s decisions in 1973 to dissolve the Pushtun and Baluchi National Awami(People’s) Party governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan and in 1975 to ban the National Awami Party, on the grounds that they were disloyal to Pakistan. Moreover, between 1973 and 1977, when Bhutto was in power, Pakistan provided military train- ing to an estimated 5000 young Islamist dissidents, whose goal was to overthrow the Daoud regime in favor of a pro-Islamist government in Afghanistan. fl fl fl fl fi fi fi fl This Bhutto introduction of the ‘Islamist’ factor into Pakistan’s rela- tions with Afghanistan was to re-occur later in their con ict as a valued technique to secure a regime in Kabul more sympathetic to Pakistan. Soon after the USSR invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, a deci- sion was made by Pakistan to oppose the Soviet occupation and the newly installed Afghan Communist regime. This was implemented by active military support for the Mujahuddin [Islamist freedom ghters] in their struggle against the Soviet occupation, as well as sanctuary to Afghan opponents of its proxy regime. That support, including weapons and the opportunity to establish bases in Pakistan’s tribal areas, continued throughout the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). During that decade and beyond the Taliban emerged as a steadily growing force in the strug- gle for control over Afghanistan, with Pakistan as a major source of eco- nomic and military aid, until ‘9/11’ and the beginning of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. What began in the early 1970s within the Afghanistan/ Pakistan con ict became a major fact in the continuing struggle over the future of Afghanistan four decades later. Pakistan: Decision-Makers In its rst 4 years of independence (1947–1951), Pakistan’s principal decision-makers were its ‘founding father,’ Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who served as Governor-General (1947–1948), and Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister (1947–1951), his principal aide in the decisive last phase of the tense, bitter, and complex tripartite negotiations (British Government of India, Indian National Congress, and All-India Muslim League, 1946 and 1947) that led to the Partition of India on August 14–15, 1947 into the Dominions of the British Commonwealth, India and Pakistan. 186 M. BRECHER They, particularly Jinnah, were crucial in the framing of the NWFP Referendum as a twooption choice—merger with Pakistan or India. Jinnah died in 1948, leaving Liaquat Ali as the decisive Pakistani deci- sion-maker for Pakistan, with consultative inputs by senior members of the Muslim League leadership. Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in October 1951. There were many in uential decision-makers in the near-three decades after 1951, when the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ict was active. One was the person who served as Prime Minister of Pakistan. There were ve prime ministers as Head of Government during that period: Liaquat Ali Khan, as noted; Khwaja Nazimuddin (1951–1953); Mohammad Ali Bogra (1953– 1955); Chaudhri Mohammad Ali (1955–1956); and Zul qar Ali Bhutto (1973–1977). Other than Liaquat Ali, the only pre-eminent prime min- ister was Bhutto, whose decisions related to the Pakistan/Afghanistan con ict were noted above. From 1947 to 1956, Pakistan’s Head of State was known as Governor-General, formally, the representative of the British monarch; Jinnah was the towering gure. Among the seven presi- dents from 1956 to 1988, the pre-eminent leaders were Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan (1958–1969), General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (1969–1971), Bhutto (1973–1977), and General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, most of whose presidency (1978–1988) occurred after the con ict with Afghanistan became dormant. fl fi fi fi fl fl fl fi fi fl fl Other in uential decision-makers throughout those three decades were the persons occupying the position of Army Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army (1947–1972), known as Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan Army (COAS) since 1972. The longest-serving and most in uential military leader in decision-making on all national security issues during his tenure, including relations with Afghanistan, was Ayub Khan (1951– 1958), who then served as President of Pakistan (1958–1969). Other prominent commanders in chief were Yahya Khan (1966–1971), who was also President (1969–1971) and General Tikka Khan (1972–1976), both of whom were crucial decision-makers in the disastrous decision process during the crisis-war over Bangladesh in 1971, and General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1976–1988), who served simultaneously as president (1978–1988). Other important Pakistan decision-makers dur- ing the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ict, as well as on all other national security issues, were the Director of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s powerful military intelligence agency, of whom there were only three (1959– 1978) during the three-decade active period of the 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 187 Afghanistan/Pakistan con ict, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. There were only two notable decision-makers in that position: Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan’s rst, most accomplished, and long duration (1947–1954) voice to the world, and the talented, politically controver- sial Bhutto, who served even longer (1963–1966 and 1971–1977), as well as Prime Minister, simultaneously (1973–1977). As in most states, the institutions that they headed were active participants in the decision- making process relating to this interstate con ict (see below). However, as evident, the large majority of in uential Pakistan decision-makers dur- ing the active period of this con ict, as in the more crucial con ict for Pakistan, the India/Pakistan con ict, were military leaders. Notable civil- ians were Jinnah, Liaquat Ali, Zafrullah, and Bhutto, and the rst three of these four were active in the early years of Pakistan’s independence and of these protracted con icts. Pakistan: Decision Process The political structure of Pakistan at its creation was that of a parliamen- tary democracy, modeled on Westminster. The Head of State was the UK monarch, whose representative was the Governor-General of Pakistan, appointed, formally, by the king to a symbolic position lacking in politi- cal power and partiality. However, the reality of Pakistan’s politics was profoundly different from its formal structure. The rst Governor- General was ‘the father of the nation,’ undisputed leader of the Muslim League, the dominant, virtually unrivalled political party. Moreover, Jinnah was the self-conscious leader of the new nation and state, not a passive representative of the British monarch. He was also an authori- tarian politician, who did not take kindly to opposition. With his pass- ing a year after independence, the mantle of leadership passed to Liaquat Ali Khan, who lacked Jinnah’s charisma. He was also more tolerant of diversity in political outlook, more comfortable with an environment in which competition among politicians and political parties was the norm. His character and personality facilitated ‘the rules of the game’ that char- acterized the British model. fi fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl Not all Pakistani politicians shared this outlook. The massive upheaval that accompanied the creation of Pakistan (and independent India)—the migration of approximately 15 million people, including the death of one million or more, combined with the widespread fear that the adversary, India, was an irreconcilable enemy that would not accept the perma- nent bifurcation of India, in both the west and east, and the magnitude 188 M. BRECHER of the tasks confronting a new nation and leadership—was not condu- cive to governing in accord with the niceties of a British parliamentary democracy. The result, over time, was pre-occupation with survival and an easy move to more authoritarian behavior in politics. The rst of four wars with India (1947–1948), for Pakistan an irredentist war it initiated to gain control of a Muslim majority part of the sub-continent, Kashmir, occurred within 2 months of Partition and an almost unimaginable human tragedy. National insecurity was rampant, hardly an atmosphere conducive to political democracy and its accompanying decision-making environment. In perspective, the descent to authoritarian politics, with a central role for the Military, the institution that was perceived as the most reliable guardian of Pakistan’s survival, in a con ict that was likely to pose frequent, often grave, threats to Pakistan, seemed inevitable, though it was not an abrupt process, from the creation of Pakistan. As evident from the above discussion of Pakistan’s decision-makers on issues relating to the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ict, as on all issues of national security, Pakistan’s democratic structure generated a decision- making process that relied heavily on decisionmakers primarily associated with national security, not with political parties (though the structure bred many parties). The pivotal institutions that shaped Pakistan’s deci- sionmaking process for all disputed issues in interstate con icts, with Afghanistan and India, have been the armed forces—all branches, with enormous power concentrated in the Intelligence community, the ISI. Civilian leaders of political parties have always been consulted. The skills of civil servants in the foreign ministry and occasionally other ministries are utilized. However, as the list of senior decision-makers after the early years of Pakistan’s statehood indicates, the primacy of the Military in Pakistan’s decision-making process dates to the beginning of the 1950s—Ayub Khan, the longest-serving Chief of the Army Staff and the longest-serving president, began his career as Pakistan’s leader at the summit of military and political power in 1951 and held these positions for 18 years. Generals dominated the presidency for most of the time from 1958 to 1988. And the ISI, dominated by the Military, has been ever-present in the decision process since its known creation in 1959. Afghanistan/Pakistan: Conict-Sustaining Acts Violence—compared with later outbreaks of violence in which Afghanistan was directly involved, notably the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1989 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 189 fl fl fl fl fi fi and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, there was very little vio- lence in the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ict, all of low intensity and short duration during its three interstate crises. The rst of these episodes took the form of an Afghan military intrusion into Pakistan’s territory on September 30, 1950 and its forced withdrawal 5 days later by Pakistani troops and aircraft, terminating their Pushtunistan I crisis. Another lowintensity outburst of violence occurred on March 29, 1955, 2 days after Pakistan announced its intention to incorporate its North West Frontier Province (NWFP) [known locally as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa], with an over- whelming Pushtun majority, into a merger of all provinces and tribal ter- ritories in the western half of the State into West Pakistan, its ‘One Unit’ Scheme, which triggered the second Pushtunistan crisis. Outraged Afghans caused serious damage to the Pakistan embassy in Kabul and to Pakistan consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar. Pakistanis retaliated by attacking the Afghan consulate in Peshawar, capital of the NWFP, and Pakistan sev- ered diplomatic and trade relations with Afghanistan. The crisis escalated with mobilization of forces by both adversaries, but no further violence erupted. The third episode of violence erupted on May 19, 1961, when 1000 Afghan troops in ltrated into Pakistan’s territory, triggering the Pushtunistan III crisis. Two days later, Pakistan responded with air attacks on border areas. The crisis escalated on August 23 when Pakistan ordered the closure of all Afghan consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan, but there was no further violence between the two adversaries in this crisis or in their dormant but still-unresolved con ict. Political Hostility—this type of con ict-sustaining act occurred more frequently than violence. As noted above, Afghanistan challenged the provision of the British plan for the partition of India that allocated the NWFP to Pakistan, one of the two successor states to the British Raj in 1947, as well as the options given the voters in a NWFP referendum on its future status—integration into Pakistan or India. Afghanistan formally demanded additional options—independence for the NWFP or merger with Afghanistan, to no avail. In 1949, the Afghan National Assembly passed a resolution nullifying all treaties signed between Afghanistan and British India, which included the designation of the Durand Line in 1893 as the formal border between Afghanistan and British India, which Afghanistan has rejected ever since the agreement was signed—it was forcibly imposed, according to Afghanistan. In July 1949, Afghanistan appointed a Pushtun notable, the Faqir of Ipi, leader of the independent 190 M. BRECHER fl fi fl fl fi fl fi fi state of Pakhtunistan. The next month, a youth group, the Young Afridi Party, proclaimed the formation of the Pakhtunistan Assembly in the independent state of Pakhtunistan within Pakistan’s NWFP, a political act recognized by the Afghan Government. A much higher-pro le act of political hostility was Afghanistan’s vote against the admission of Pakistan to the UN in 1947, though it was successfully pressed by the U.S. and the UK to relent in 1948. Pakistan, too, contributed political acts that sustained and, at times, intensi ed this con ict: the most important was the ‘One Unit’ plan announced on November 22, 1954. Its formal inau- guration, on October 14, 1955, including the NWFP, generated a sharp response by Afghanistan at the highest level: in November, at the end of the Pushtunistan II Crisis, the Afghanistan National Assembly formally reaf rmed its non-recognition of the integration of the NWFP into West Pakistan. Another con ictsustaining act by Pakistan was the disband- ment of the Awami National Party in February 1973, triggering anti- government demonstrations in the NWFP and Baluchistan, where that party had very strong support. 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 191 movement that was to play a crucial role in Afghanistan during the past two decades. Economic Discrimination—in terms of con ict persistence, Pakistan has been—and continues to be—able to shape the economic ‘rules of the game’ in this con ict. Afghanistan, a land-locked state, is totally depend- ent on Pakistan for imports from, and exports to, virtually the rest of the world. Its access to the Arabian Sea is controlled by Pakistan, which can, almost at will, assist or retard economic growth in Afghanistan. Among the con ict-sustaining acts by Pakistan have been border closures, for example, lasting 5 months in 1955, during the Pushtunistan II crisis. Moreover, in the 1960s, many construction projects in Afghanistan were halted for lengthy periods because Pakistan controlled the ow of vital materials for the building and renovation of roads, factories, dams, and schools throughout Afghanistan and was prepared to exploit that struc- tural advantage to achieve other goals; this made Afghanistan economi- cally dependent on Pakistan. Other states, notably the USSR, especially interested in access to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, and Iran, seeking to enlarge its in uence in the Middle East and Central Asia, pro- vided alternative sources of economic aid—trade with the USSR, possi- ble access to the Arabian Sea via a rail connection to the Iran border and the Persian Gulf. Overall, however, Pakistan possessed and frequently utilized geo-economic advantages, thereby contributing to con ict per- sistence. Afghanistan/Pakistan Conict: Crisis Management and Attempts at Conict Resolution fi fl fi fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl As in many interstate con icts, crisis management within the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ict, via bilateral negotiations and third-party mediation, has focused on the reduction fl fi Verbal Hostility—at many points during the lengthy dispute over the NWFP and its Pushtun majority, especially during the three interstate crises in this con ict, both adversaries declared and reaf rmed their unshakeable views on the validity of their claim —in radio, press and, later, television statements by of cials and at international conferences, whenever an opportunity arose to in uence other states in favor of their case; each time they did so, the renewal of their claim served to sustain and, often, to intensify their con ict. The primary target for Afghan propaganda was the legality and, especially, the legitimacy of the 1893 Durand Line agreement, viewed by Afghanistan as a blatant imposition by a superior power and totally lacking in moral justi cation because it denied the right of a massive ethnic majority—Pakhtuns—to the exercise of a right to self-determination. The propaganda dimension of con ict- sustaining behavior included a battle in the late 1970s and, especially, in the 1980s between an increasingly secular, proSoviet Afghan regime and Pakistan’s support for traditional Muslim education, including the creation of madrassas (Muslim religious schools) and the provision of teachers for the vast in ux of refugees from Afghanistan attending these religious schools, as well as nancing the activities of Muslim cler- ics in the tribal regions of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan: these were to provide the leadership and the bulk of the rank-and- le in the Taliban of modest acts of violence between the principal adversaries during their three interstate crises. Crisis 1 (mid-March 1949–October 5, 1950) unfolded in two stages a year apart. It began in mid-March 1949 when Pakistan arrested Afghan in ltrators into its North West Frontier Province and rejected once more any Afghanistan claim to the disputed territory —on the ground of ethnic identity: the vast majority of the NWFP population and the largest sin- gle ethnic community in Afghanistan are Pushtuns. On March 27, there 192 M. BRECHER were reports of a substantial hostile Afghanistan non-violent military act, the dispatch of two divisions and part of its air force to the frontier with Pakistan. Six days later, Afghanistan recalled its diplomats from Pakistan. Violent escalation occurred on June 12, in the form of Pakistan’s bombing of an Afghan village close to the border with Pakistan. Crisis management was swift and successful—investigation by a joint AfghanistanPakistan commission, Pakistan’s acceptance of responsibility for an “unintentional ight,” and its agreement on July 31 to pay compensation. Political escala- tion occurred on August 12, 1949, with the formation of a Pushtunistan Assembly in Pakistan’s NWFP territory, its proclamation of Pushtunistan independence, and recognition by Afghanistan, but without a discernible Pakistan response. Propaganda and agitation for a separate Pushtunistan state maintained a moderate level of tension during most of 1950, until a brief violent skirmish in the second stage of this lengthy crisis: Afghan troops invaded Pakistani territory on September 30, 1950 and were repulsed by Pakistani forces on October 5, the ultimate effective crisis management technique in this low-severity crisis. Crisis 2 (March 27–November 1955) was caused by a high-pro le, controversial Government of Pakistan political act, a merger of its four western provinces, Baluchistan, North West Frontier Province, (West) Punjab and Sind, into a uni ed West Pakistan: the crisis trigger was Afghanistan’s receipt of information on March 27, 1955 of Pakistan’s “One Unit Scheme.” It responded with rm protests, verbally by Prime Minister Daoud and in a formal government-to-government Note, which triggered a crisis for Pakistan. The crisis escalated on March 30, with an attack on Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul. Pakistan’s initial, imme- diate response was an unde ned threat of retaliation. A month later, on 1 May, Pakistan responded with several severe hostile acts: the break- ing of diplomatic relations; closing of the border with Afghanistan; and termination of economic relations, including the closing of all Afghan trade agencies in Pakistan. Threatened with grave economic conse- quences, because of its dependence on the use of Pakistan’s ports for imports and exports, Afghanistan declared a state of emergency and a mobilization of forces. Pakistan dispatched troops to the border. However, successful con ict-crisis management was achieved, primar- ily by the role of several Middle East mediators (see below). An agree- ment was signed on September 9, 1955, in which Afghanistan pledged amends for an insult to Pakistan’s ag. West Pakistan was inaugurated fl fl fi fi fi fi fi fl 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 193 on October 14—without any further of cial Afghanistan protests against the “One Unit Scheme.” And Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul was re-opened in November, ending the crisis. Crisis 3 (May 19, 1961–January 29, 1962) was triggered by reports on May 19, 1961 of the in ltration of 1000 Afghan troops into Pakistan’s territory. Pakistan responded on the 21st by bombing areas along the border it claimed belonged to Pakistan. Three months later, on August 23, Pakistan demanded the closure of all Afghan consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan, triggering a crisis for Afghanistan, which responded with a threat to break diplomatic relations unless the Pakistan closure order was rescinded. Pakistan, in turn, issued a formal White Paper accusing its neighbor of “expansionism” and broke diplomatic relations with Afghanistan on September 6. Initial attempts at third-party crisis management—by the UK and the U.S. in October 1961—failed. However, President Kennedy’s offer of good of ces and his special envoy, L.T. Merchant, a rare foray in this con ict by the U.S. at the presidential level until after “9–11” , succeeded on January 29, 1962 in mediating a temporary agree- ment between the adversaries: goods were delivered from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and the border was re-opened, for 2 months, ending this interstate crisis. However, diplomatic relations were not re-established until May 28, 1963, facilitated by Iran’s mediation role. The USSR pro- vided economic aid and weapons to Afghanistan during this crisis, a then unrecognized prelude to the extension of the Cold War to this regional con ict almost two decades later—with the USSR invasion and occupa- tion of Afghanistan in December 1979, lasting a decade. Along with effective con ict management in these three Afghanistan/ Pakistan crises, there were various attempts by the principal adversaries to achieve con ict resolution by direct negotiations, none fully successful. Some of these efforts are noted here. Early 1948: A personal envoy of Afghanistan’s king sought to negoti- ate a treaty of friendship with Pakistan, to include border, commerce and transit issues, and a commitment by each party to neutrality if ‘the other’ were attacked; unsuccessful. 1954–1955: There were lengthy negotiations by the two principal adversaries for trade agreements to remove existing bottlenecks, with the goal of a later replacement of the 1921 Afghanistan-UK treaty, with implications for revision of the status of the Durand Line, the long-term 194 M. BRECHER major bone of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as noted earlier. Negotiations ended without agreement once Pakistan’s contro- versial “One Unit Scheme” was announced in late March 1955. fl fl fi fi fl fl fi 1956: Tension eased with reciprocal visits by the two Heads of Government in August 1956 and mutual declarations of intent to improve their relations; no further development. 1957–1958: There was an exchange of goodwill visits by Pakistan’s prime minister to Kabul in June 1957, welcoming the full resumption of diplomatic relations, and by King Zahir Shah to Karachi in January 1958; and the signing of an agreement in May 1958, calling for an improvement in relations; unful lled. May 1970, and other years earlier and later: delegations were initi- ated by both governments and non-governmental organizations to seek expanded economic cooperation; they were occasionally successful, but without a consistent pattern. May 1980: An Afghanistan-proposed negotiation for improved rela- tions, based on mutual acceptance of the principle of non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs, was aborted by the transformation of Afghanistan’s political regime following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Afghanistan/Pakistan Conict: Third-Party Conict Management and Attempts at Conict Resolution November 6, 1950—After aloofness from this interstate con ict during its early years (1948–1950), the U.S. offered its good of ces to the princi- pal adversaries, in an attempt to overcome their unwillingness to discuss the Pushtunistan issue in direct negotiations until ‘the other’ changed its position on the status of the 1893 Durand Line, which had allocated the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to British India. The rst U.S. mediation offer focused on the value of an agreement to cease hostile propaganda, to persuade their supporters in the con ict zone to prevent tension-creating incidents, to exchange ambassadors, and to meet within 3 months for informal discussions of their con icting positions. Pakistan demanded a prior U.S. statement supporting the validity of the Durand Line. Afghanistan demurred, and the attempt at mediation failed. May–September 1955—Several Arab leaders and senior of cials—Egypt’s President Nasser, acting through his personal envoy and, later, succes- sor, Anwar al-Sadat, Iraq ministers dispatched to Kabul and Karachi, 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 195 fi fi fl fi fi fi fl fl fl fl Saudi Prince Musaid Rahman, who was also sent to both cities—and of cials from Iran and Turkey engaged in complementary mediation efforts between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the ‘ ag’ controversy during their second crisis, noted above. The primary mediators in that crisis, Egypt’s Sadat and Saudi Arabia’s Musaid Rahman, succeeded in persuading the Afghanistan and Pakistan delegates to the Afro-Asian Summit Conference at Bandung in 1955 to express support for the Non- Aligned Movement’s ideological mantra, the “Five Principles of Peaceful Existence.” However, both adversaries renewed their commitment— Pakistan, to the “One Unit Scheme,” which transformed the structure of Pakistan’s political system, and Afghanistan, to non-recognition of the legality of the Durand Line and of the NWFP as an integral part of Pakistan. After months of uncertainty about the outcome of the “ ag controversy,” the lingering issue during Crisis 2, noted above, an agree- ment by the adversaries was signed on September 9. This outcome elic- ited Pakistan’s thanks to the ve Middle East mediating states but did not move this con ict closer to con ict resolution. September 1961—When Afghanistan and Pakistan severed their dip- lomatic relations, after further border clashes and Pakistan’s renewed blocking of economic traf c to and from Afghanistan, two Arab states assumed responsibility for their diplomatic interests— the United Arab Republic [Egypt], for Afghanistan’s interests in Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, for Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. Late September 1961–January 1962—As noted above, President Kennedy offered U.S. good of ces in letters to the Head of Government in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and he sent L.T Merchant as his personal envoy in October to attempt mediation. This mediation effort succeeded in producing a temporary solution to their third crisis—a reopening of their closed border for 1 month in January 1962. 1962–1963—The Shah of Iran attempted personal mediation of the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ict by visiting both states for 6 days in July 1962. His initial effort was unsuccessful. However, after the Afghan royal family ousted Afghanistan’s Prime Minister Daoud in March 1963, Iran’s Foreign Minister succeeded in mediating a resumption of Afghanistan/Pakistan diplomatic relations in May 1963, via the Teheran Agreement. 196 M. BRECHER 1976–1978 Whether or not because of Iran’s complex dual policy toward the Afghanistan/ Pakistan con ict—support for Pakistan’s claim to the disputed NWFP territory, along with support for Afghanistan’s economic dependence on a reliable outlet for its external trade, both imports and exports—the Shah of Iran frequently sought to persuade these con ict adversaries to normalize their relations and resolve their protracted con ict. In 1976, 3 years after Daoud’s return to power as President of a Republic, following his successful anti-monarchy coup in Afghanistan, he accepted an economic plan from Iran that was accom- panied by a 2-billion-dollar aid package. Moreover, with the Shah of Iran’s mediation, the adversaries seemed close to an agreement on Pushtunistan—that remains elusive. fl fi fi fl fi fi fl fl fl fi fl fl fi 1976–1979—Afghanistan’s Daoud and Pakistan’s President Bhutto held promising direct talks in 1976 and agreed to continue their nego- tiations toward a mutually acceptable resolution of their con ict. Apart from the direct bene t of a tranquil relationship between hostile neigh- bors in a volatile region, both perceived other geo-political gains: for Daoud, less dependence by Afghanistan on USSR military and politi- cal aid; for Bhutto, a weakening of the longstanding informal align- ment between Afghanistan and India, always a nightmare scenario for Pakistan’s leadership. However, Daoud could not muster suf cient sup- port for his plan within Afghanistan’s political elite, and Bhutto was assassinated. Although Bhutto’s successor as Pakistan’s leader, Gen. Zia- ul-Haq, supported the plan—they had an amicable meeting in March 1977—the plan proved premature. The quid pro quo was Daoud’s pledge to forbid Pushtun and Baluchi ghters for Pushtunistan’s independ- ence from treating Afghanistan as a safe haven, and Bhutto’s pledge to grant administrative autonomy to the Pushtuns in the NWFP, as well as the release from detention of leaders of the pro-Pushtunistan National Awami Party, notably their dominant gure, Wali Khan. However, Daoud too was assassinated. With the death of the two leading advocates for an amicable resolution of their con ict, the peace process dissipated. The following year, in December 1979, Afghanistan was occupied by the USSR for a decade; and its Communist governments, headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki and then Ha zullah Amin, who supported an inde- pendent Pushtunistan, lacked any incentive to normalize Afghanistan’s relations with U.S.-allied Pakistan. So too did the Islamist Taliban, the 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 197 hostile ideological successor to Afghanistan’s Communist regime during the early and mid-1990s. The UN has rarely performed the role of mediator in the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ict. An inconclusive exception was its spon- sorship of proximity talks between the adversaries that began in June 1982, led by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Diego Cordovez. They met infrequently during the 1980s, with no progress until the USSR’s decision in February 1988 to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan within 9 months, beginning on May 15, 1988. The impend- ing collapse of the Communist regime in Afghanistan re-activated the long-dormant talks between the two principal adversaries in this con- ict. The result was another variation of the oftdesignated “Geneva Accords,” signed on April 14, 1988, with the U.S. and the USSR as guarantors. However, the agreement contained only oral expressions of good will and an intention to abide by the principle of non-intervention in each other’s affairs, and a provision for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees. The core issue, control over the disputed territory of the North-West Frontier Province, was not included in the UNsponsored agreement, and the con ict remains unresolved, though dormant for more than two decades. Afghanistan/Pakistan: Causes of Non-Resolution The relevant research question about the causes of non-resolution of the Afghanistan/ Pakistan con ict, as for all unresolved interstate protracted con icts, is the extent to which its most likely conditions for con ict resolution were-are absent in this con ict: speci cally, were any, some or all of the six postulated conditions of resolution set out in the Con ict Resolution Model above absent from this on-going con ict? Exhaustion—Neither of the principal adversaries has revealed acute fatigue, let alone exhaustion, as an intolerable collective pain created by their con ict. For Afghanistan, the historical record reveals an ability to withstand all foreign attempts by much greater Powers to conquer this land-locked state and subjugate its myriad of tribes—from Alexander the Great to Tsarist Russia and Great Britain in the nineteenth century ‘Great Game,’ to the Cold War and beyond, to one superpower, the USSR, in the twentieth century, and to the other superpower, the U.S., fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fi 198 M. BRECHER in the early twenty- rst century: exhaustion does not seem to be part of the Afghan collective experience. For Pakistan, the historical record is much shorter. While it did reveal collective exhaustion as a result of the 1971 Bangladesh War against India and its consequence, the bifurcation of its territory, there is no evidence of exhaustion during, and as a conse- quence of, the 70-year-old con ict with Afghanistan. Moreover, for both principal adversaries, there have been few interstate crises and minimal violence, with few casualties. In sum, exhaustion has been absent from this con ict and from the behavior of the two neighbor-adversaries: this absence has facilitated their con ict being sustained at a low level of hos- tility and violence. Changes in the Balance of Capability—In terms of a narrow-gauge bilateral calculus, Pakistan’s military capability has long been markedly superior to that of Afghanistan. In 2013, the estimated size of their armed forces reveals a disparity of more than 3:1 in favor of Pakistan, 642,000–190,000. Moreover, Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998 signi cantly enhanced the quantitative and qualitative difference in military power —but Pakistan has not threatened to use its ‘absolute weapon’ against Afghanistan, and the absence of large urban centers in Afghanistan, other than Kabul, would render a nuclear attack massive, counter-productive ‘over-kill,’ In any event, this bilateral calculus of mili- tary capability is misleading. Both adversaries have been the recipients of substantial weapons and funds to enhance their power to wage war. The U.S. has been Pakistan’s generous provider of conventional military aid since their initial arms agreement in 1954, and the USSR was the pri- mary source of military assistance for Afghanistan until the late 1980s. Moreover, India’s longstanding role as a Pakistanperceived reliable ally and protector of Afghanistan, confronting Pakistan with the high prob- ability of a two-front war, has seriously diminished Pakistan’s effective manpower and weapons superiority. So too has Afghanistan’s reputation for effective defense against foreign invasion, noted above, and the pres- ence of a very large Pushtun component from the disputed NWFP in Pakistan’s army. Overall, the limited resort to violence by both of the principal adversaries in their three international crises has rendered an accurate balance of capability at any point in the lengthy con ict dif cult to measure, except to note Pakistan’s overall superiority in military man- power and conventional and unconventional weapons over the decades of this interstate con ict, along with a reluctance, for several reasons, to 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 199 employ that superior military power against a weaker neighbor. Thus the consistent imbalance of capability cannot be identi ed as a cause of con- ict persistence or a likely condition for resolution. fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fi fi fi fl Domestic Pressures—There is no discernible evidence of internally gener- ated pressure within Afghanistan or Pakistan to resolve their interstate protracted con ict. For most of this con ict, Afghanistan’s political sys- tem was that of an authoritarian state— monarchical from 1948 until 1963, and long before, then Republican, with power concentrated in the presidency, 1963–1978, a Communist system modeled on that of the USSR (1978–1989) and Islamist rule by the Taliban (1992–2001). A Western-type democratic system, with elections for a president, a leg- islature, and local councils, has been in place since the U.S. invasion in 2001. The Pakistan political system was not uniformly authoritarian: there were several blocks of time in which democracy ourished, with decisional authority vested in elected of cials and pivotal institutions— presidents, legislatures, and local councils. However, authoritarian rule by military leaders was widespread in Pakistan: Generals Ayub Khan, (October 1958–March 1969), Yahya Khan (March 1969–December 1971), Zia-ul-Haq (September 1978–August 1988), and Musharraf (June 2001–August 2008), all but Yahya Khan assumed power by means of a coup d’état. Moreover, even when civilian Governments were in place, the Pakistan Army was the dominant decision-making institution. Throughout this protracted con ict, since 1949, the media were a vital part of the political process in Pakistan. However, pressure on Pakistan’s Government from its elites, non-governmental organizations, the media, intellectuals, and the attentive public to pursue a policy aimed at resolu- tion of the con ict with Afghanistan was non-existent. As in the more traditional, civil authoritarian political system of Afghanistan, but more likely in Pakistan’s quasi-democratic system part of the time, advocates of attempts to resolve this con ict may have existed in either or both of the con ict adversaries. However, they are not discernible as sources of in uence on their rulers’ behavior toward ‘the other’ on the core issue of the disputed NWFP territory, with one notable exception noted above, President Daoud’s conciliatory meetings with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zul kar Ali Bhutto in 1976 and with Bhutto’s successor, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, in 1977. There is no evidence to indicate that Daoud or his Pakistani counterparts in the late 1970s adopted the conciliatory path in response to domestic pressure. If those pressures existed, they were 200 M. BRECHER marginal in the decisions of the authoritarian leaders of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. External Pressures—Unlike domestic pressures to seek resolution of this con ict, which, if they existed, were hardly, if ever, known and did not exert in uence on the behavior of Afghanistan and Pakistan, exter- nal pressures in this protracted con ict were frequently exerted and, at times, in uenced the behavior of both adversaries. Suf ce it to note the major sources of such pressure. The most persistent and in uen- tial external source was Iran, speci cally the Shah of Iran in the mid- 1970s. Several Arab states and Turkey, especially the delegates from the UAR (Egypt) and Saudi Arabia, played an important role in resolving the 1955 Afghanistan/Pakistan crisis over the latter’s integration of its four western provinces into one unit, ‘West Pakistan’. Neither the USSR nor the U.S., despite their lengthy occupation of Afghanistan, each more than a decade, contributed to the resolution of this con ict. fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fl fl fi fl fl Reduction in Discordance of Objectives—There is no evidence of a reduc- tion in Discord between Afghanistan and Pakistan over their con icting Objectives. For Afghanistan, their fundamental disagreement over con- icting claims to the territory of the North-West Frontier Province dates to 1947, during the months leading to the partition of India, culminat- ing in the UK’s allocation of the NWFP to Pakistan after a referendum that Afghanistan considered blatant discrimination: the predominantly Pushtun voters in the NWFP were given two options—integration with Pakistan or India. This was interpreted by Afghanistan as uncon- cealed UK bias because both of the Afghanistan-favored options, inte- gration with Afghanistan or independence for the NWFP, were ignored. Afghanistan has never recognized the outcome of the 1947 referendum, and Pakistan has dismissed Afghanistan’s claim to the disputed terri- tory as totally lacking in substance and a rejection of a referendum in the NWFP prescribed by the UK as an integral part of the Partition of India. Neither adversary has manifested any change from their diametrically opposed, publicly declared objectives regarding the disputed terri- tory since 1947. Decline in Con ict-Sustaining Acts—The use of violence in this unre- solved con ict, as noted, was moderate in the rst and modest in the sec- ond and third international crises between Afghanistan and Pakistan, in 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 201 1950, 1955, and 1961. Moreover, while verbal hostility was frequently displayed by the leaders of the principal adversaries, there was no physi- cal violence between them since their last crisis more than half a century ago. There was extensive violence in Afghanistan between Mujahuddin and the Soviet occupation forces from 1979 to 1989 and during the struggle for power between the Taliban and U.S. forces during the 1990s, continuing into the rst decade of the twenty- rst century; but these lengthy periods of violence did not derive from, or impinge upon, the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ict. In sum, only one of the six conditions postulated in the Con ict Resolution Model as likely to lead to resolution of an interstate pro- tracted con ict, external pressures, was present during the Afghanistan/ Pakistan con ict, spasmodically. The other ve likely conditions— exhaustion, changes in the balance of capability, domestic pressures, reduction in discordance of objectives, and decline in con ict-sustaining acts were absent from this unresolved con ict, thereby supporting the nega- tive causal link between the absence of these conditions and non-resolu- tion, that is, long-term persistence of this interstate con ict. fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fl fi fl Although the two principal adversaries in this Con ict share the belief system of virtually their entire population, Islam, substantively there are many sources of con ict between Afghanistan and Pakistan. One is History: the once pre-eminent Afghanistan Durrani empire over most of the residual territory of Pakistan, that is, the western half of Pakistan until 1971 and the entire state of Pakistan since the 1971 Bangladesh War; and the Durand Line, 1893,which, throughout this con ict, has provided the legal foundation of Pakistan’s claim to the North West Frontier Province, a claim which Afghanistan has always rejected as ille- gal and illegitimate. Another source, the most crucial obstacle to con- ict resolution, is Territory—the unresolved dispute over the NWFP, controlled by Pakistan since the onset of this protracted con ict in 1949 but claimed persistently by Afghanistan. A third source is Ethnicity, the fundamental ethnic differences between the multiple tribes and ethnic communities that constitute Afghanistan and the diverse ethnic groups in Pakistan—Baluchis, Punjabis, and Sindhis, an ethnic differentiation compounded by the ethnic identity of most of the population of one of the four initial provinces of West Pakistan, the NWFP, Pushtuns, with the largest ethnic community in Afghanistan. These profound differ- ences continue to outweigh the shared belief system, Islam, in shaping the attitudes, perceptions, and behavior of the two adversaries in this 202 M. BRECHER con ict. Those differences, concentrated in the combined ethnic and ter- ritorial con ict over the North West Frontier Province, their incompatible core objective, have sustained this interstate con ict for seven decades. Although this con ict has long been dormant— their last interstate crisis ended early in 1962—it has not been resolved and is unlikely to attain resolution until one or both adversaries change(s) their rigid commit- ment to control over this disputed territory. china/vietnaM con ict (unresolved) Behavior Both of the principal adversaries in this age-old con ict, more than two millennia, made— and implemented—many strategic and important tacti- cal decisions. China: Decisions Long before the onset of the post-World War II interstate con ict phase between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), there was unmistakable evidence of ten- sion and mistrust between these two ideologically kin Communist states. As early as 1954, PRC Premier Zhou en-Lai had taken the lead, at the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, in implementing the PRC decision, following North Vietnam’s decisive victory over France’s military forces in the transforming Battle of Dien Bien Phu, to press the DRV not to insist on the immediate uni cation of North and South Vietnam and to accept a temporary two-state solution for 2 years; it lasted 21 years, until the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Ho Chi Minh, the charismatic DRV leader, did not conceal his and the Communist DRV’s anger at the Communist PRC’s pressure to deny its ideologically kin, the DRV, the fruits of its dra- matic, history-shaping military triumph. Moreover, China made a strate- gic decision—the date is unknown, probably in the early 1970s, possibly earlier—to support the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea (Cambodia), rather than to accede to Vietnam’s request to assist in crushing that Far-Left revo- lutionary movement. That slow-to-evolve China decision was formalized, secretly, by an agreement with the Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, in 1975. The earliest known PRC decision in the post-WW II China/Vietnam con ict took the form of a hostile verbal act by China’s Communist Party (CCP) Chairman, Hua Guofeng, around November 20, 1977—accusing 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 203 fl fl fi fl fl fl fi fl fl fl Vietnam, at a high-pro le Beijing banquet for the visiting DRV leader, Le Duan, successor to Ho Chi Minh, of bullying Cambodia and trying to dom- inate it. In another decision that was implemented as a verbal act, China’s ambassador to Cambodia-Kampuchea publicly expressed the PRC’s “full support” for the weaker state in the Vietnam/Cambodia con ict, on January 21 1978. On May 12, 1978, in a tangible material decision, China suspended (part or all of) its foreign aid to Vietnam because of Vietnam’s alleged mal- treatment of its ethnic Chinese minority, followed by a severe public criti- cism on 24 May. The two principal adversaries, the PRC and DRV, held unsuccessful talks on this issue from August 8 to September 24, 1978. Nonetheless, China declined a Cambodia request in the autumn of 1978 for a ‘volunteer’ PRC force to enhance Cambodia’s security in the face of Vietnam’s unconcealed hostility. A crucial strategic decision by China, ‘to teach its little brother a les- son’ was implemented by the invasion of the DRV, Vietnam, on February 17, 1979. Eight days after its invasion, China publicly announced its deci- sion not to “extend its attack on Vietnam to the lowlands around Hanoi,” Vietnam’s capital, though it was “still in the process of teaching Vietnam a good lesson.” On March 5, 1979, the PRC announced that it had achieved the goals of its invasion and began to implement its decision to withdraw from northern Vietnam. China: Decision-Makers In the most violent phase of this post-WW II interstate con ict—Viet- nam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979—the two dominant leaders of the PRC were Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping. Hua was Mao’s designated successor and held the three most important titles in China—Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party [CCP], Chairman of the Central Military Commission [CMC] (October 1976–June 1981), and Premier [Head of the State Council] (October 1976–1980). Deng re-emerged from a long period outside the PRC inner circle of decision-makers until after Mao’s death in September 1976, serving as Vice-Chairman of the Communist Party and Chief of the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] General Staff from July 1977 to 204 M. BRECHER June 1981. In a December 1978 contest for the role of Leader, more important than all those formal titles, Deng, the advocate of a market- oriented economy, ousted Hua, the advocate of a revival of Soviet-style governmental economic planning. Thereafter, on the crucial PRC deci- sions to invade Vietnam (February 17, 1979) and to withdraw its forces from Vietnam (March 5, 1979), in fact, until his death in 1992, Deng was the highly respected ‘paramount leader’ of China, that is, the pre- eminent decision-maker on all important policy issues. fl fl China: Decision Process Unlike the Mao era of charismatic leadership and absolute ultimate deci- sion-making power, Deng was more than ‘ rst among equals’ but a leader who consulted his colleagues in China’s pivotal decision-making institution since the PRC attained power in Mainland China in 1949, the Standing Committee of the Communist Party Politburo. The decision process in the Deng era was not transparent in the sense that decision-making in demo- cratic political systems aspires to project and, may, on occasion, achieve. However, while Deng was China’s pre-eminent decision-maker during more than a decade of this con ict with Vietnam (1978–1992), deci- sion-making was not the sole prerogative of the ‘paramount leader’: the views of powerful interest groups—political, economic, bureaucratic, and military—were expressed, directly or indirectly, not entirely without in u- ence, on important decisions on many issues of public policy, including Vietnam’s behavior toward Cambodia and China. Moreover, in the post- Deng era, the concentration of decision-making power in an individual diminished during the presidency of both Jiang Zemin (1993–2003) and Hu Jintao (2003–2013), with a more important role for the most in u- ential political institution, the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, than the ‘paramount leader.’ The preeminence of the current PRC leader, Xi Jinping (2013– 2017), appears to be reversing this trend. Vietnam: Decisions Like the PRC, the other principal adversary in this interstate con ict, Vietnam, made— and implemented—many strategic and tactical deci- sions directed to the PRC leadership in 1977–1979. Immediately after a Cambodia attack against its border villages on April 30, 1977, Vietnam responded with retaliatory bombing raids. On 12 May, in a move perceived by China as hostile, Vietnam imple- mented a strategic decision to proclaim an enlargement of its maritime border to 200 km. 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 205 In May–June, Vietnam implemented another strategic decision per- ceived by China as extremely hostile, namely, to increase ties with the USSR, by joining two international organizations of Soviet bloc mem- ber-states, dominated by the Soviet Union—the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC) and the International Investment Bank (IIB), both international nancial organizations controlled by the USSR- dominated Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). At the same time, and later, Vietnam decided in favor of a peaceful resolution of disputes with its neighbors: it proposed talks with Cambodia on June 7, 1977 and held meetings with China from October 3 to 7, 1977 to achieve this goal, but neither initiative was successful. fl fi fi fl fl fl Two months later, Vietnam exhibited another fundamental shift in policy toward Cambodia and, indirectly, China: it invaded the Fish Hook Parrot’s Beak in southeast Cambodia on December 5, 1977, severely defeating Cambodia’s forces and occupying considerable territory on the road to Phnom Penh. Even though Vietnam’s forces stopped short of Cambodia’s capital, its invasion was condemned by both Cambodia and China. Vietnam also made and implemented major decisions during this con- ict in 1978 and 1979. At the beginning of January 1978, again on January 13, and on February 5 Vietnam offered to negotiate its differences with Cambodia, without success. In the midst of these accommodating gestures, on January 6, Vietnam withdrew its combat forces, either entirely from Cambodia or part of the distance to their border. At two meetings of its Communist Party Politburo from late January to mid-February, Vietnam made the strategic decision to overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia and began to arm and train anti- Khmer Rouge insurgents. On March 24, Vietnam began to implement its decisions [date unknown] to deport ethnic Chinese residents of Vietnam and to increase its con scations of their property. On June 6, Vietnam revised its February 5, 1978 proposal for nego- tiations with Cambodia, calling for a mutual withdrawal of forces 5 km from their border and joint determination of a location for negotiations. On June 29, Vietnam formalized its alignment with the USSR by becoming a full member of COMECON, the Soviet bloc’s over-arching organizational integration of Communist states. 206 M. BRECHER From August 8 to September 26, Vietnam and China held informal talks about their differences—without success. On November 3, 1978, in a strategic decision, the growing bonds between Vietnam and the Soviet Union crystallized into a treaty of friendship. On December 25, forti ed by the security provision of its recent treaty of friendship with the USSR, Vietnam invaded Cambodia. On March 4, 1979, Vietnam responded to China’s invasion of its ter- ritory by mobilizing its population to assist in the defense of their homeland, but decided not to withdraw its forces from Cambodia. On March 16, Vietnam proposed peace talks with China in Hanoi, con- ditional on total withdrawal of China’s forces from Vietnam. The same day, China announced its withdrawal from Vietnam. On April 4, Vietnam agreed to negotiations without complete with- drawal of PRC forces. fl fi fi On April 6, China agreed to talks in Hanoi. The withdrawal of China’s forces from Vietnam did not resolve their con ict—it continues 38 years later (2017). Rather, attention of the two principal adversaries in this interstate con ict shifted to another major discordant issue, their dispute over territory in the South China Sea, the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Vietnam: Decision-Makers There were three key Vietnam decision-makers during the formative initial phase of this interstate con ict, continuing for almost a decade (1977– 1986): Le Duan, who became First Secretary, later Secretary-General, of the Vietnam Workers Party in 1969, upon the death of the founder of that Communist Party, Ho Chi Minh, and held that position until his death in 1986; Pham Van Dong, who held the position of Premier as long as Le Duan was Party leader, and Truong Chinh, another long- serving DRV leader as Chairman of the State Council. Institutionally, the most in uential body in Vietnam’s decision-making process was the Politburo of Vietnam’s Workers Party, though a consensus among the three leaders ensured institutional approval. Vietnam: Decision Process Other than the Ho Chi Minh era of charismatic leadership of Vietnam’s Communist movement, even before he founded the Vietnam Workers Party in 1935, decision-making in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 207 (DRV) has always been a collective process. Le Duan, who was Ho’s principal aide for decades, lacked charisma and favored collective leader- ship, which he shared throughout his tenure with Van Dong and Chinh. Moreover, the most in uential decision-making institution in the DRV was the Workers Party Politburo, with a remarkably stable composi- tion: 8 of its 14 members at the onset of the twentieth-century China/ Vietnam con ict (1977) had served on this pre-eminent body since 1960 and 3 others since 1953. Le Duan was a respected ‘ rst among equals’ throughout his years of party leadership. The Workers Party Central Committee, which was a much-larger group in 1977—101 full members and 32 temporary members, one-third of whom had been elected the preceding year—had limited in uence on decision-making related to this interstate con ict. The bureaucracy’s in uence was limited to the imple- mentation of decisions. In sum, longtime association and mutual respect among the Politburo’s members, Le Duan’s preference for collective leadership, and the legacy of Ho Chi Minh’s disposition to consultation with his much younger Politburo colleagues, unlike Mao’s decision-mak- ing behavior in the PRC’s Politburo, ensured genuine collective par- ticipation in the framing of Vietnam’s strategic and important tactical decisions aimed at China. China/Vietnam Conict-Sustaining Acts fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl Three of the four con ict-sustaining techniques (CST)—violence, politi- cal hostility, and verbal hostility-propaganda—have been used by both of the principal adversaries in this unresolved interstate con ict. Violence had the greatest impact on the persistence of this con ict but violent acts were of relatively short duration, from its Onset in 1979 until 1988. The most important of three occurrences of substantial vio- lence was the China/Vietnam Border War in 1979. The catalyst was Vietnam’s successful 1978 invasion and occupation of Cambodia, which compelled the China-supported Khmer Rouge regime to seek asylum in neighboring Thailand and installed a pro-Vietnam regime in Cambodia. China responded with a largescale invasion of Vietnam on February 17, 1979, declaring its intention ‘to teach Vietnam a lesson’ it would not soon forget. The war between the two Communist states, that had been allies against the U.S. from the France-Viet Cong War (1950–1954) until the end of the Vietnam War (1975), was very intense, with an 208 M. BRECHER estimated China invasion force of 320,000, the largest People’s Republic of China (PRC) military operation since its involvement in the Korean War (1950–1953) , and a Vietnam defending force of 75,000–100,000. Although a short war, from February 17 to March 16, 1979, there were very high casualties—an estimated 25,000 Chinese soldiers killed and 37,000 wounded, and 39,000 Vietnamese killed and wounded. Both adversaries claimed victory, but there was no victor, only the Chinese brief capture of 3 Vietnamese provincial capitals and several border villages in Vietnam before what appeared to observers an ignomini- ous withdrawal of Chinese forces from Vietnam 28 days later. Vietnam remained in control of Cambodia, despite China’s resort to minor vio- lent clashes along the China/Vietnam border, from 1980 to 1984, and a second major incursion by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from April 28 to July 12, 1984, in another failed effort to compel Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia. The third phase of resort to violence relates to a longstanding competition between the claims of China and Vietnam, among others, to disputed territories in the South China Sea, dating to the mid-1970s. A notable instance of naval violence as a con- ict-sustaining act was the controversial patrolling of waters surrounding the contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea by the naval arm of China’s PLA in May 1987, to which Vietnam objected. This resulted in a low-intensity naval battle between the two principal adversaries in this interstate con ict in March 1988, a precedent for threatening acts of violence in what has become the most active contentious issue in the China/Vietnam con ict in the second decade of the twenty- rst century. fl fi fl fl fl fl fi fl Political hostility has been evident throughout this interstate con ict. One type of hostile political act was the attempts by the PRC to maintain the exiled Khmer Rouge regime’s retention of Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations, long after its ouster from power. Two recent incidents highlight the political hostility dimension of the China/Vietnam con ict. In February 1992, China passed a Territorial Waters Law declaring its suzerainty over the South China Sea, reputed to contain very large natu- ral gas and oil resources. And in May 2003, Vietnam belatedly responded by of cially proclaiming its sovereignty over the two largest island clus- ters in the South China Sea, the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Moreover, both adversaries were accused of committing hostile acts with political implications: China was accused in May 2011 of severing the cables of a Vietnam vessel that was conducting a seismic survey in the South China 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 209 Sea, and, a month later, Vietnam ordered live- re drills in the South China Sea, beyond its disputed territories. This territorial con ict is com- plicated by the competing claims of four other states with territory in the South China Sea. In 2013, a near-physical clash between China’s and the Philippines’ patrol boats near the Spratly Islands indicated that this mul- tilateral con ict, of which competing claims by China and Vietnam are a part, might escalate in the future. fi fi fl fi fl Verbal Hostility served to reinforce violent and politically hostile acts by both of the principal adversaries, mainly through of cially sanctioned articles and editorials in the ruling party’s newspaper, the People’s Daily in China, and “the voice of the Party” in North Vietnam. Thus, in July 1979, a few months after the end of the China/Vietnam Border War, a PRC Vice-Premier threatened to teach Vietnam “a second lesson,” a threat frequently uttered by senior China of cials over the years, as in January 1985, in a message conveyed indirectly to Vietnam. Moreover, each of the adversaries accused ‘the other’ of hostile acts. For example, China, in a Beijing radio broadcast, accused Vietnam of ‘ethnic cleans- ing,’ in the expulsion of the Hoa minority, without using the highly charged term, and Vietnam accused “the Peking ruling circles,” on the tenth anniversary of their naval clash in 1974—when China occupied several islands in the Paracel chain, then occupied by South Vietnam— of mobilizing large forces “to launch a massive attack” (on the Spratly Islands) and occupy it (article in Vietnam Communist Party newspaper, Nhan Dan, January 19, 1984).