Select Case Study Findings On Interstate Conflicts: Africa & Americas PDF

CHAPTER 6 Select Case Study Findings On Interstate Con icts: Africa & Americas The most salient ndings on Historical Roots; Con ict Behavior such as Decisions, Decision-Maker(s), Decision Process; Con ict-Sustaining Acts such as Violence, Political Hostility, Propaganda, Economic Discrimination; and...

CHAPTER 6 Select Case Study Findings On Interstate Con icts: Africa & Americas The most salient ndings on Historical Roots; Con ict Behavior such as Decisions, Decision-Maker(s), Decision Process; Con ict-Sustaining Acts such as Violence, Political Hostility, Propaganda, Economic Discrimination; and Crisis Management and Con ict Resolution, from an illustrative group of thirteen protracted interstate con icts in six regional clusters—Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, and Inter-Region— will be presented over the course of the next four chapters (6–9). Case studies include the following: Africa Americas Asia Europe Middle East Inter-Region Chad/Libya, Ethiopia/Somalia, Western Sahara Costa Rica/Nicaragua Afghanistan/Pakistan, China/Vietnam Finland/Russia-USSR, Poland/Russia-USSR Iran/ Iraq Georgia/Russia-USSR, Inter-Korea North Vietnam/USA, Taiwan Strait This chapter focuses on African and American cases © The Author(s) 2018 147 M. Brecher, A Century of Crisis and Con ict in the International System, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57156-0_6 148 M. BRECHER Behavior Decisions africa Chad/Libya Conict (Resolved) Many of the major decisions and implementing acts by the two principal adversaries in this 23-year African sub-system, interstate con ict (1971– 1994) were inter-linked in a direct cause–effect relationship, mostly Chad’s reaction to Libya’s hostile initiatives. Thus, their decisions will be presented together, noting the linkage wherever relevant. fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fl fl f fi fl The onset of this con ict, in 1971, was triggered by Libya’s rst strategic decision—to support an attempted coup by the pro-Libya Front Liberation Nationale de Tchad (FROLINAT) to overthrow Chad President Tombalbaye. The decision (precise date unknown) was made by a group of young Libyan military of cers, headed by Col. Muammar Gadha , sometime after they had seized power in Libya in 1969, over- throwing King Idris, and was implemented on August 27, 1971. The attempted coup and Libya’s concealed intervention failed to achieve Libya’s objective—bringing the friendly FROLINAT to power in Chad, with expected bene ts to Libya, namely, virtually unlimited access to the reputed valuable material resources such as uranium, oil, iron, etc., in the northern part of Chad, the Aouzou Strip, long a disputed territory, to which Libya aspired and laid claim. Libya’s rst major decision triggered a foreign policy crisis for Chad and its rst responsive decision—to sever diplomatic relations with Libya. That act, in turn, generated a responsive decision by Libya, which took the form of recognizing FROLINAT as Chad’s legitimate government, on September 17, 1971. External pressure by France on both of the principal adversaries led to an initially shared conciliatory decision by Chad and Libya: they resumed diplomatic relations in mid-April 1972. The next episode of serious hostility between these Africa neighbors occurred 6 years later, when FROLINAT forces, supported by Libya, advanced to within 100 miles of Chad’s capital, N’Djamena. France, long the pre-eminent colonial power in the Saharan region, responded to an urgent decision by Chad’s President Malloumto request immediate French military aid, dispatched 1700 troops in an airlift from near-by 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 149 French bases in other former French colonies and created a defense perimeter around Chad’s capital. In this Libya-generated crisis, Libya decided to intervene directly, with indirect bene t to FROLINAT: it invaded parts of northern and central Chad with 800 troops. Confronted by French military pressure, both FROLINAT and Libyan forces withdrew, and the Chad state survived once more. In a variation of Libya’s 1971 decision to recognize FROLINAT as Chad’s legitimate government, Gadha and the FROLINAT leader, Goukouni Oueddei, announced a plan in January 1981 to merge Chad and Libya. This was greeted with strong public opposition by many African states and, especially, France, which increased its military pres- ence in Chad. Once more, Libya responded with an announced deci- sion to withdraw its large military contingent in Chad, estimated at 7000–12,000 troops. However, only a few were withdrawn, leading to a schism between Libya and FROLINAT. Eventually, Libya’s forces were withdrawn by agreement in late 1981. fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi fi During the 5 years that followed, several political and military develop- ments in Chad set in motion profound changes in the behavior of the two principal adversaries. One was a split in the Goukouni–Gadha alliance, largely due to the former’s discontent with Gadha ’s initial refusal to with- draw Libya’s forces from Chad in early 1981. This led to a split within the FROLINAT–Goukouni-led forces and FAP; clashes between Goukouni’s splinter from PAP and the forces of another Libya ally in Chad; and cooperation between Goukouni’s post-PAP forces and those of the Chad government. Together, this enlarged, merged Chad government army suc- ceeded, for the rst time, in mounting a counter-offensive north of the long-established informal line between Libya’s and Chad’s in uence, the 16th Parallel. France’s forces, long established in Chad, provided valuable forms of military aid, notably an air defense system, bombing Libyan air- strips in Chad, and a ow of weapons for Chad’s forces. The Chad counter- offensive was surprisingly successful, culminating in the rst Chad military invasion of Libya. The capital of the disputed Aouzou Strip, the town of Aouzou, was captured, along with a Libyan airbase within Libya proper. This successful Chad military offensive, late in their interstate-intrastate con ict, led to attempted mediation of the Chad/Libya con ict. When that failed, the two adversaries made a shared decision in 1990—to seek a judicial ruling on their con icting claims to the long-disputed Aouzou Strip: the shared decision was implemented by the submission of their dispute to the International Court of Justice for a binding ruling. The ICJ ruled 150 M. BRECHER in 1994 in favor of Chad almost unanimously: the vote was 16-1. Libya accepted the Court’s decision and withdrew all of its forces from the Aouzou Strip within a few months, a rare example of protracted con ict termination generated by an international judicial ruling. Chad and Libya: Decision-Makers Throughout this post-World War II Africa con ict, the dominant deci- sion-maker for Libya was the charismatic Muammar Gadha : he retained that role for the entire period of his authoritarian rule (1969–2011). For Chad, too, there was one commanding gure in decision-mak- ing on issues related to this con ict—but only for the period in of ce as President of Chad. Notable among them were Francois Tombalbaye, the rst Chad president, who was assassinated in 1975, Felix Malloum, and Hissené Habré. There were other in uential Chad leaders, notably Goukouni Oueddei, commander of the PAP forces in Chad, long an ally of Gadha , until 1981, but he did not have direct power in the making of Chad’s decisions. Moreover, none of the presidents of Chad possessed the power exercised by Gadha as dominant decision-maker for Libya in all major issues relating to its con ict with Chad. Chad and Libya: Decision Process Although hard evidence is lacking on the making of Libya’s decisions, it is likely that, for the major decisions in the early years of this con ict, members of the military junta that assumed power in 1969 were involved; this was before Gadha eliminated all rivals to his power in the junta. By the mid-1970s, he had succeeded in establishing undisputed control over every aspect of Libya’s public policy, in which the on-going con ict with Chad ranked high for Gadha , as it would have for any leader—and did for King Idris, his predecessor as Libya’s ruler (1951–1969). fi fi fl fl fi fl fi fi fl fi fl fl fi fl fl fi fi fi fl fl fl While little is known about the Chad decision process, beyond the primacy of its presidents during their tenure, the lack of a commanding gure and the existence of multiple Chad ethnic communities suggests that, on some issues, notably the disputed Aouzou Strip, Chad’s presi- dents consulted with leaders of some of these communities 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 151 Conict-Sustaining Acts Among the four con ict-sustaining techniques (CST) and acts that con- tribute to the persistence of interstate con icts, political hostility and violence were of relatively equal frequency and impact in this con ict, political hostility in Phase I (1971–1978) and violence in Phase II (1978– 1987). Both verbal hostility and economic discrimination were inconse- quential, the former more so. Political Hostility: It was manifested in the behavior of both princi- pal adversaries, primarily by Libya, in three distinct forms—attempted Libyan coups in Chad, nancial and military backing by Libya for Chad rebel groups, and the severance of diplomatic relations. The rst, highly visible, hostile political act, the catalyst to Chad/Libya I, the rst of eight interstate crises in their protracted con ict, was Libya’s active support for a (failed) coup against Chad President Tombalbaye on August 27, 1971, by the most prominent Chad rebel group, FROLINAT which, throughout this interstate–intrastate con ict, served as Gadha ’s instru- ment for penetration of Chad’s political system and society. As noted, Chad responded by breaking diplomatic relations with Libya, and Libya retaliated by recognizing the FROLINAT as the legitimate government of Chad. Relations between Chad and Libya were restored in April 1972, as a result of material incentives to both adversaries by France, the pre- eminent power in Saharan and much of North Africa during the last half of the nineteenth and the pre-World War II part of the twentieth century. Libya occupied the disputed mineral-rich border area of Chad, the Aouzou Strip, in April 1972. Chad ceded the territory to Libya in November 1972, and Libya again occupied the Aouzou Strip in 1973 (retaining control until Chad’s brief successful invasion of Libya in September 1987—see below). Chad’s President Tombalbaye was over- thrown in a coup by Malloum in April 1975. He, in turn, was the target of another Gadha failed assassination attempt, in 1976. Violence: There were renewed FROLINAT attacks on Chad’s gov- ernment in 1977. And in January 1978 Libya provided active support for a FROLINAT attack on the crucial administrative center of north- ern Chad, Faya-Largeau, one of several such attacks by Libya’s proxy in Chad. This triggered the Chad/Libya II crisis and set the tone and pattern of continuous hostile military attacks, mostly by Libya, during six 152 M. BRECHER fi fl fl fi fl fl fi fl fi fi fi fi fl subsequent Chad/Libya crises from 1979 to 1987. During that period, there were three major occurrences of violence. The rst was an inva- sion of northern Chad by 2500 fl fi for possible bene ts enhancing their power or costs of ignoring all but those sharing power and its bene ts in highly restricted political elites. Notable among Chad’s communities were the Sara, the most populous and in uential ethnic group in Chad, and the Tebu, the most populous ethnic group in the pivotal disputed region within this con ict, the Aouzou Strip. Ethiopia/Somalia Conict (Dormant) Behavior Somalia: Decisions and Decision-Makers Viewed in terms of decisional behavior by Somalia, one of the two princi- pal adversaries in this unresolved Horn of Africa con ict, there were four 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 153 phases: Phase I Independence (1960–1969); Phase II Regime Change, War, and Instability (1969–1991); Phase III Collapse (1991–2004), and Phase IV Islamist War. (In the last two phases, as will be evident below, this unresolved con ict was dormant because Somalia descended into chaos, disintegration, and civil strife.) fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fi fi fi There was one strategic decision by Somalia in Phase I, the pre-con- dition for any relations between Somalia and Ethiopia: after a 10-year UN trusteeship by the UK and Italy over former British and Italian Somaliland (1950–1960), the two Trust Territories held elections, and 5 days after independence they decided to form the United Republic of Somalia. Among several tactical decisions soon after the creation of a new state, the founders decided to send an unequivocal irredentist mes- sage to Ethiopia (and Kenya), the most directly affected neighbors of Somalia, by issuing a ve-star national ag, identifying ve territories in the Horn of Africa that Somalia asserted, in 1960 and since fl fi Libyan troops in June 1979, directed at the strategic center, Faya-Largeau. Chad responded with a counter- offensive which, with the military aid of France, notably bombers and reconnaissance planes, the rst use of aircraft in this con ict, com- pelled Libya to withdraw its forces (Chad/Libya IV). The second vio- lent episode occurred in June 1983, the onset of Chad/LibyaVI, when Libya-supported forces of the Goukouni-led Chad faction occupied Faya-Largeau on June 24. Military aid to the Habré regime in Chad from France, Zaire, and the USA led to the recapture of the prized city in northern Chad on July 30. Libya attacked the contested city the next day, and France countered by sending troops from the neighboring Central African Republic. France and Libya terminated this violent epi- sode by agreeing to withdraw their forces from Chad. The nal phase of violence began in December 1986, when Libyan forces attacked Chad troops in northern Chad who, surprisingly, recaptured Libya-occupied cities north of the 16th Parallel, the de facto boundary between Chad and Libya agreed-to by France and Libya in 1984. The violence persisted for 6 months, with the Aouzou Strip captured by Chad troops in August 1987 and then recaptured by Libya the same month. In early September, for the rst time, Chad troops invaded Libya and occupied a major air base. A cease re, initiated by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), terminated the third and last intense episode of violence and Chad/ Libya VIII on September 11, 1987. Their con ict was resolved on May 30, 1994 when Libya formally transferred the Aouzou Strip to Chad, in accordance with an ICJ near-unanimous ruling 4 months earlier, on February 3, 1994, supporting Chad’s claim to the disputed territory. (The eight interstate crises in the Chad/Libya con ict, like all crises dis- cussed in this book, are summarized in the ICB Data Viewer). then, right- fully belonged to Somalia by virtue of the Somali ethnicity of its pasto- ral population. The largest of these Somalia-claimed territories was the Ogaden, a vast desert frequented mainly by Somali pastoralists, which had been recognized as an integral part of Ethiopia, in an 1897 treaty between Ethiopia and the UK, the then-leading Great Power in Africa and the world. From the onset of the Ethiopia/Somalia con ict, this dis- puted territory has been the core discordant issue of their still-unresolved con ict. The Ogaden, one of the ve stars in Somalia’s ag, was never remote from the concern and aspiration of Somalia’s political and military elites, but it was not a source of of cially directed hostile activity toward Ethiopia by either of Somalia’s presidents during the rst phase of this con ict, Aden Abdullah Osman Daar (1960–1967) or Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke, who was elected president in 1967 but was overthrown in a 1969 coup. However, hostile activity was not wanting: the most visible manifestation of Somalia’s persistent claim was the visible role among Somalis in the disputed Ogaden territory by a state-supported interest group, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). Somalia’s state behavior toward Ethiopia changed only after a coup d’état brought Muhammad Siad Barré to power in 1969, but the change did not occur immediately. In Phase II of Somalia’s behavior during this interstate con ict, the authoritarian regime headed by Barré made the second Somalia strategic decision, in 1977—to issue a formal declaration of war against Ethiopia and to invade the Ogaden region. 154 M. BRECHER It was ill-advised: in 1978, Somali forces were expelled from the dis- puted territory, and within a few years, domestic opposition to Barré’s rule became evident. A third Somalia strategic decision in this phase, part of the political fall-out of its severe defeat in the war with Ethiopia, was to sever its longstanding alignment with the USSR, expelling Soviet advis- ers, and seeking support from the United States. Another consequence of that military defeat was a fourth Somalia strategic decision, by an increasingly weaker Barréled regime—to sign a formal peace treaty with Ethiopia in 1988. Ironically, the mutual obligation undertaken by the principal adver- saries in that treaty, to respect their existing borders, became a catalyst for escalating political instability in Somalia. The provision calling for Somalia’s cooperation with Ethiopia to eliminate rebellious factions in the Ogaden, notably the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), further undermined the Barré-led regime. fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fi Its descent into state collapse, Phase III, began in 1991, with Barré’s ouster after two decades at the helm of Somalia’s functioning govern- ment. Civil strife was rampant for 13 years, highlighted by territorial fragmentation within Somalia—the 1991 Declaration of Somaliland Independence from Somalia and the 1998 Declaration of Puntland Independence, leading, in turn, to a territorial dispute between them over northern regions of Somalia. As a consequence of Somalia’s dete- rioration into the status of a ‘failed state,’ the Somalia/Ethiopia con ict became dormant during Phase III: there were no strategic decisions, while Somali factions were immersed in a struggle over the succession to the defunct Barré regime. Attempts to restore a semblance of unity to the Somali state characterized Phase IV of Somalia’s woes (2004–2015); however, since 1991 the Ethiopia/Somalia con ict was dormant. Somalia: Decision Process Throughout the three decades (1960–1991) and two phases (1960–1969, 1969–1991), in which Somalia was an active principal adversary in this con ict, its decision process was dominated by inter-clan relations. Presidents of Somalia were, rst and foremost, clan leaders, depend- ent upon support by the members of their clan, and engaged in inter- clan relations, designed to maximize support from within one’s clan, to weaken competing clans, and to attain and sustain political power by constructing alliances or effective coalitions with friendly clans. 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 155 Overall, such an inter-clan political system functioned like inter-party sys- tems in Western democracies. During the two decades in which Siad Barré was Somalia’s authoritarian political leader, he retained power by an adept skill in mobilizing intra-clan support and loose alignments with one or more other clans, with ties of kinship and/or shared interests and political goals. During that long Phase II (1969–1991), notwithstanding his seri- ous error in waging war against a more powerful Ethiopia in 1977–1978, his clan-based political regime was a viable, generally effective principal adversary against a more powerful foe. Ethiopia: Decisions The pattern of Ethiopia’s behavior in this con ict was similar to that of the other principal adversary. As in Somalia, there were two phases. The rst phase (1960–1974) was dominated by Ethiopia’s twentieth- century long-time ruler, Haile Selassie, who was restored to his throne by the UK in 1941, after it defeated Italy in an early World War II East Africa military campaign. Ethiopia’s Phase II began with the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974 by a military coup and lasted until 1991: as in Somalia, it too was dominated by an authoritarian ruler for 14 years (1977–1991), Mengistu Haile Mariam, the counterpart of Siad Barré in Somalia: Mengistu was head of the Military Junta, known as the ‘Derg,’ the Coordinating Committee of Ethiopia’s regular army, police, and territorial army. fl fi fl fl fi fi fl fi fl As the stronger regional power, in occupation of the Ogaden with the UK’s sanction since 1897 and long before, Ethiopia’s policy throughout this con ict was defensive, aimed at maintaining the status quo; it was the counterpart of Somalia’s revisionist policy toward the disputed territory. Thus the two major decisions by Ethiopia in its Phase I (Haile Selassie) were only indirectly relevant to the Ogaden. In 1962, it enlarged the image and reality of its primacy in the Horn of Africa by annexing the neighboring territory of Eritrea. Two years later, Ethiopia formed an alliance with Kenya, whose North West District was explicitly identi ed as one of the ve stars in Somalia’s ag, that is, an irreden- tist territory rightfully belonging to Somalia because of its Somali ethnic majority. Phase II for Ethiopia began with another decision and act indirectly relevant to the protracted con ict with Somalia: having triumphed in its 1974 coup, the Derg re-af rmed the federalist character of Ethiopia, including the annexed territory of Eritrea. Three years later, Ethiopia 156 M. BRECHER made the most important strategic decision in this phase—to engage in full-scale defensive warfare against Somalia’s invasion of the Ogaden. The result was a decisive Ethiopia military victory in 1978, leading to the expulsion of all Somalia forces from the disputed territory. In perspective, that decision and act marked the de facto end of the Ethiopia/Somalia con ict. However, it took another decade for that outcome to be sealed in the decision of Ethiopia (and Somalia) to sign a peace treaty that formalized the pre-war existing border. Although Somalia’s ve-star ag, including the explicit identi cation of the Ogaden as ‘lost’ territory remained unchanged, the 1988 treaty con- stituted Somalia’s recognition of Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the entire disputed territory by imposing an obligation on the two signatories, essentially, Somalia, as noted, to cooperate in eradicating insurgent proSomalia forces from the Ogaden Desert. Even before the signing of the 1988 border treaty, Ethiopia had reinforced its primacy in the Horn of Africa and Somalia’s relative weakness by renewing, in 1984, its 1964 alliance with Kenya, the location of another irredentist star in Somalia’s national ag. Ethiopia: Decision-Makers and Decision Process The similarity in the behavioral structure of the two principal adversar- ies in this interstate con ict extends to their decision-making process. In Somalia, it was characterized by a highly authoritarian structure, led by General Siad Barré, from 1969– 1991. In Ethiopia, the decision process was also highly authoritarian, both in Phase I, with the Emperor as the dominant decision-maker from 1960 (and long before) to 1974, and in Phase II, with General Mengistu as the dominant decision-maker from 1974 to 1991. Both Barré and Mengistu also espoused a Left-Socialist ideology though it was never clear whether this was an ideological com- mitment or a tactical choice to ensure the very substantial military assis- tance provided by the USSR for most of their tenure in power. The authoritarian leaders in both adversarial states also operated under struc- tural and personal constraints: in Somalia, inter-clan relations and pres- sures limited Barré’s freedom of choice, and in Ethiopia, Haile Selassie often experienced dissent, even opposition, from lesser kings in Ethiopia’s regions, while Mengistu operated within the constraints of a military junta. In sum, there were many similarities in the decision process of the two principal adversaries in this Horn of Africa interstate con ict. 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 157 fi fl fi fl fl fi fl fl fl Ethiopia/Somalia: Conict-Sustaining Acts Violence—Ethiopia was the status quo adversary throughout this con- ict, with the primary goal of retaining control and sovereignty over the disputed Ogaden Desert. Somalia has been the revisionist adversary since this con ict’s inception in 1960. However, the initiation of wars and military-security crises was almost equally divided between the adversar- ies. Somalia precipitated one of the two wars (Ogaden II, July 22, 1977– March 14, 1978), via its proxy, the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), which launched an attack on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in its on-going quest to wrest control of this territory. Soviet and Cuban aid to Ethiopia led to Somalia’s withdrawal from the Ogaden. In October 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia, defeating the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had declared a holy war against (Christian) Ethiopia. Of the three violent interstate crises, Somalia initiated the brief Ogaden I crisis (February 7– March 30, 1964), with an attack on an Ethiopian frontier post. A cease re seven weeks later led to the with- drawal of Somali forces to the original frontier. Ethiopia triggered the other two violent crises: Ogaden III (June 30–August 1982), when Ethiopian troops invaded the Hiran region and threatened commu- nication between the two parts of Somalia, and USA military and eco- nomic aid to Somalia led to an inconclusive fading of the crisis, and the Todghere Incident (February 12–April 1987), when Ethiopiansupported irregulars attacked half a dozen Somali villages. Ethiopia apologized to Somalia, and the violence ended with a cease re in early April. A year later, the two con ict adversaries agreed to demilitarize their border and to resume diplomatic relations. Political Hostility—Frequent hostile political acts were initiated by both adversaries. Notable among Somalia’s con ict-sustaining political acts was the formal approval of its constitution, which proclaimed the goal of uni cation of all ethnic Somali majority territory and the authorization of Somalia’s provision of weapons to achieve that objective. Moreover, Somalia became a member of the Arab League, to secure aid and sup- port for this most fundamental of its goals, generating an Ethiopian per- ception of ‘enemies at [most of] the gates.’ Ethiopia, too, contributed several high-pro le con ictsustaining political acts, all of them perceived by Somalia as gravely threatening: Ethiopia succeeded in securing formal approval of the ‘inviolability of state frontiers’ as a basic principle of the 158 M. BRECHER fl fi fl fi fl fl fi fi fl fl Organization of African Unity (OAU), thereby pre-empting Somalia’s claims to ethnicmajority territories in several neighboring states. It formed a military alliance with Kenya in 1963, another unfriendly neigh- bor of Somalia, which Somalia perceived as a thinly disguised hostile act by its ‘common enemy’ [Somalia has long claimed Kenya’s North West District because of its large ethnic Somali population]. Moreover, the rul- ers of Ethiopia and Kenya publicly called on Somalia, at an ‘East Africa Confrontation,’ to renounce all of its territorial claims against Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, a former French colony, and Tanzania, and to pay rep- arations to Ethiopia for damage caused by Somalia during their 1977– 1978 Ogaden War. Finally, both Ethiopia and Somalia, as noted above, drew the two superpowers into their protracted con ict by securing from them military equipment and political support to their African proxy— the USA as patron of Ethiopia from 1953 to 1977, with the USSR play- ing that role for Somalia in the 1960s and most of the 1970s, including a Treaty of Friendship, followed by a reversal of both superpower Horn of Africa alignments in 1977. Verbal Hostility (propaganda)—this type of con ict-sustaining activity was subsumed within the most relevant acts of political hostility by both adversaries, discussed above. Economic discrimination—the paucity of economic relations between the two adversaries in this con ict meant a virtually non-existent role for this type of con ict-sustaining acts, except for Somalia’s empha- sis throughout the unresolved con ict on the economic deprivation of the pastoral Somali majority in the Ogaden Desert caused by Ethiopia’s denial of unhindered access to land and water in the disputed territory. Western Sahara Conict (Unresolved) Behavior Morocco and Polisario-SADR: Decisions Both of the principal adversaries in this unresolved con ict made and implemented three strategic decisions during their four decade-long con- ict (1975). In all of these, the adversaries adopted directly con icting positions on the contending issues; thus their decisions will be examined together. 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 159 The rst strategic decision by Morocco, in the late 1970s, was designed to deny the Polisario Front, its non-state adversary in the early years of their con ict, direct physical access to large parts of Western Sahara, including ve of the six largest and most important cities in this disputed territory: the implementation of this decision took the form of an unusual, controver- sial series of high-pro le acts from 1980 to 1986, the building of six mas- sive sand walls in the Western Sahara’s southern provinces, surrounded by mine elds and guarded by Moroccan troops. [An earlier, important tactical decision, Moroccan March (1975–1976), in which Spain, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania were crisis actors, did not involve the Polisario]. fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fl fi fl fl fi fl The sand wall decision and its dramatic implementing project expressed the determination of Morocco to achieve sovereignty and permanent physical control over the colonial territory that Spain had vacated in 1975, transferring two-thirds of the territory to Morocco, the rest to Mauritania which, soon after, yielded its part to Morocco. The sand wall project also re ected the basic defensive strategy of Morocco during Phase I of this con ict (1975–1991): the sand walls would, it was hoped, defend the population and whatever centers of economic activity existed in Western Sahara and limit the physical damage that could be created by Polisario raids. Moreover, the defensive strategy had the merit of minimizing the attention paid to the con ict over Western Sahara by international organizations, notably the UN and some of its functional agencies, and states inimical to Morocco’s interests, in the Islamic and African worlds. By contrast, a ‘forward’ policy by Morocco, including attacks on refugee camps, where many Polisario guerrillas live, even more so, Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, would have brought the wrath of world public opinion down on Morocco; a low-pro le strategy was safer. By contrast, the Polisario movement (and its formal state succes- sor, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic [SADR]), proclaimed in February 1976, adopted an offensive strategy, with the aim of causing suf cient physical damage and personal insecurity among the people protected by the sand walls that Morocco would yield the disputed terri- tory to an aspiring nationalist movement. That movement was endowed with a determined, effective leadership and widespread support among the Sahrawi, and it enjoyed the bene t of nancial and military sup- port from Algeria, long Morocco’s rival for primacy in the Maghreb, Arab West Africa. Evidence of the Polisario-SADR offensive strategy was most clearly expressed in its initiative in precipitating all but one of the 10 crises that erupted within this con ict, most of them (6 of 9) 160 M. BRECHER by military raids against Morocco: Tan Tan 1979; Goulimime-Tarfaya Road 1979; Operation Iman 1980; Galtat Zemmour I 1981; Sand Wall 1987; and Galtat Zemmour II 1989. The rst three crises in this con- ict—Nouakchott I 1976, Nouakchott II 1977, and French Hostages in Mauritania 1977—were triggered by Polisario attacks against Mauritania, when it was occupying part of the former Spain colony of Western Sahara. A second strategic decision by both of the principal adversaries in this con ict was their acceptance of the 1991 UN Settlement Plan, devised by former US Secretary of State James Baker (Baker Plan I). This included a cease re agreement between Morocco and the Polisario-SADR, still in force more than two decades later. Even more signi cant, in terms of a potential political solution, was a provision for a referendum the next year that would include the option of independence for Western Sahara. However, disagreement between the con ict adversaries about the cri- teria for voter eligibility led to continuing delays in its implementation: Morocco insisted that recently arrived Moroccan settlers in Western Sahara be allowed to vote, while Polisario-SADR refused. This persis- tent disagreement rendered Baker Plan I obsolete. An attempt by the Houston Plan in 1997 to restore the referendum idea also failed. fi fl fl fl fi fi fl fi fl fi fi fi fl fi The third strategic decision by the principal adversaries in this con- ict formalized the impasse early in the twenty- rst century. In 2003, Baker Plan II proposed 4–5 years of transitional autonomy for Western Sahara—under Morocco’s supervision, to be followed by a referendum on “self-determination,” that is, independence. The eligible voter list was enlarged, to include persons, almost all Moroccans, who had resided in Western Sahara since the end of 1999, that is, 4 years. Despite this Plan’s conspicuous pro-Morocco bias on several crucial issues—Western Sahara autonomy for several years, under its supervision, and the granting of voter rights to recent Moroccan settlers—Morocco rejected the Baker Plan II referendum proposal, indicating that independence was not an acceptable option under any conditions; the Polisario-SADR accepted the Plan. There has not been any further progress toward a political solution of this con ict, despite further negotiations by Morocco and Polisario-SADR under UN auspices, in 2007–2008, to be summarized later in this report. The impasse in this protracted con ict continues. Morocco: Decision-Makers There were very few key decision-makers in Morocco’s con ict behavior, as with most states engaged in a protracted con ict. Notwithstanding its 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 161 formal governmental structure, a constitutional monarchy (see below), major decisions on all issues of public policy have been the monopoly of the Sultan (King) of Morocco. The two persons who have held this position during the 43 years of the most contentious issue in Morocco’s foreign policy, the con ict over Western Sahara, with far-reaching implications for Morocco’s status and role in northwest Africa, have been Hassan II, a highly authoritarian and amboyant ruler for almost 4 decades (1961–1999) during most of the protracted con ict with Polisario-SADR, and his son, Mohammed VI (since 1999), Morocco’s decision-maker on the Baker II Plan (2003) and the subsequent negotiations under UN auspices. To the extent that Morocco’s ruler solicits advice on important issues, the most visible role is associated with his Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs: it was this body that proposed the status of auton- omy for Western Sahara, rather than independence, at the negotiations with Polisario-SADR in 2007–2008—at the urging of Morocco’s princi- pal allies, France, Spain, and the USA. One or more senior political gures, notably the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, were also probably consulted as well. However, the ultimate Morocco decision-maker on all major issues of public policy was/is the reigning monarch. Polisario-SADR: Decision-Makers The most important Polisario-SADR decision-maker for the entire period of this con ict, since 1975, except the rst year, has been its Secretary- General since 1976, Mohammed Abdul-Aziz. There were three others who held this highest-ranking position in Polisario brie y since it was founded in 1973. It can be presumed that other decision-makers— names not known—were senior members of the highest decision-making organ of Polisario, the National Secretariat. Given the character of this nation- alist organization, it is also assumed that decision-making authority- power was not concentrated in one person, as in Morocco’s monarchy. Morocco: Decision Process Formally, Morocco is a constitutional monarchy, with a British type of political structure, notably a government headed by a Prime Minister that possesses executive power and shares legislative authority with a bicameral legislature. Since 1996, there has been an Assembly of Representatives of Morocco, with 325 members, 295 elected for 5-year terms in multi-seat constituencies, 30 from national lists of women, and an Assembly of 270 fi fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl 162 M. BRECHER Councilors, elected by local councils and professional organizations for nine-year terms. Formally, the legislature has the authority to approve bills, including the annual budgets, and can dissolve a government by a vote of no con dence. However, built into the 1996 constitution is a set of formi- dable royal powers long exercised by Morocco’s monarchs: to appoint the Prime Minister and members of the government; to dismiss any minister; to dissolve any government; and to suspend the constitution or rule by decree. In sum, authority and power are concentrated in the monarch. He can, and undoubtedly does, consult select persons in government, and it is reasonable to assume that he consults the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs on all matters related to this unresolved con ict. However, this is his choice, not an obligation. He is not bound ever to accept advice. Thus, while Morocco’s decision process may, and probably does, involve inputs from political aides at the request of the monarch, the ultimate decisions are at the discretion of Morocco’s Sultan-King. Polisario: Decision Process The decision process of Polisario-SADR would seem to be more com- plex than in Morocco, with authority and power more widely dis- tributed in the Polisario-SADR context. At the apex of the decision pyramid, power is exercised by the Secretary-General and a 41-member National Secretariat, both elected by the General Popular Congress (GPC) every 4 years. The GPC, in turn, consists of delegates from the Popular Congresses of the residents of refugee camps and members of multiple organizations—for women, youth, workers, and soldiers, the last belonging to the Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), later headed by the SADR Defense Minister, with elections at the base level. Ultimate choices in the decision-making process on important issues that may affect the survival of Polisario and, since 1976, the SADR, and the achievement of their goal of independence undoubtedly rest with the Secretariat and the Secretary-General and, probably, with the SPLA military commanders as well before the 1991 cease re. However, the multiple layers of political participation, from the base-level cells of the refugee camps to the Popular Congresses and refugee camp administra- tions, to the General Popular Congress, and the ‘top tiers’ of Polisario and SADR, the National Secretariat and Secretary-General would seem to have led to a much wider actual participation in the Polisario-SADR decision process than in the narrow process that characterized decision- making in Morocco. 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 163 Western Sahara Conict: Crisis Management fi fl fi fl In this currently dormant, 43-year-old interstate-intra-state Africa con ict, with three principal adversaries—Morocco, Polisario (since 1976, also known as the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) [SAHRAWI]), and in the early years, Mauritania—crisis management took the form of winding down the ten crises between Morocco and Polisario-SADR from 1975 to 1989. The evidence on crisis management is presented here. Moroccan March (October 16, 1975–April 14, 1976) The UN was active in attempted multilateral crisis management from the onset of this con- ict. The Security Council, responding to Spain’s appeal, passed a res- olution on October 22, 1975, calling for restraint and requesting the UN Secretary-General to initiate negotiations. They were conducted on October 26–28. The Security Council met twice in November. And mediation was attempted by the Secretary-General and his Representative in March–April 1976. The Arab League [formally, League of Arab States (LAS)] sent its SecretaryGeneral to the region, at the request of the Organization of African Union (OAU) [later, African Union (AU)]. All failed to manage the crisis because of the refusal of Morocco and Polisario to compromise. The crisis was managed bilaterally by two of the three principal adversaries, a Morocco-Mauritania jointly initiated succes- sion agreement on April 14, 1976: Morocco annexed the northern two- thirds of the territory of Western Sahara, and Mauritania, the other third of the territory ruled by Spain as a colony from 1885 to 1975. Nouakchott I (June 8, 1976): This one-day crisis was caused by a Polisario attack on Mauritania’s capital. It was managed by a successful Mauritanian counter-attack that forced an immediate Polisario withdrawal. Nouakchott II (July 3–late July 1977): Another Polisario attack on Mauritania’s capital, on July 3, led to an airlift of 600 Moroccan troops on July 18–19 to assist Mauritania. That intervention and the comple- tion of the reorganization of Mauritania’s army by the end of July served to manage this crisis. French Hostages in Mauritania (October 25–December 23, 1977): Two French engineers, working on the Mauritania railway, were abducted by 164 M. BRECHER Polisario guerrillas on October 25, creating a crisis for France and Algeria. Crisis management was successful, via several techniques employed by cri- sis actors and the UN. One was a meeting of the UN General Assembly at France’s request, on October 31. Another was an offer of good of ces by the UN Secretary-General. A third was the dispatch of additional French troops to Senegal at the beginning of November. Still another was talks between French Foreign Ministry of cials and Polisario leaders in Algiers from November 1 to 7. There was also a UN General Assembly resolution, adopted on November 9 calling upon UN members to respect Western Sahara’s right to self-determination, an important inter- est for Polisario and Algeria, rejected by Morocco if the options included Western Sahara’s independence. Ultimately, the crisis was managed by a violent act—the stra ng of Polisario columns in Mauritania by French warplanes from 12–18 December, which led to the freeing of the two hostages on 23 December, ending this crisis. fl fi fi fi Tan Tan (January 28–March 1979): A crisis for Morocco was trig- gered on January 28, 1979 by a Polisario attack on the Moroccan gar- rison town and air force base, Tan Tan. Effective crisis management was achieved by reciprocal conciliatory acts by the two principal adversar- ies: Morocco’s Foreign Minister informed his Algeria counterpart that Morocco would not exercise its “right of pursuit” against Polisario, and Polisario forces suspended their attack, leading to a faded crisis in March. Goulimime-Tarfaya Road (June 1–25, 1979): Another crisis for Morocco was triggered on June 1 by a large-scale Polisario military attack within Morocco proper. King Hassan’s public announcement on 6 June of Morocco’s intention to exercise its “right of pursuit” in future attacks on Moroccan citizens and territory catalyzed a reciprocal crisis for Algeria. Both North African states appealed to the OAU and sought UN intervention by summoning ambassadors of the ve permanent Security Council members to their Foreign Ministry to publicize their future policy response to attacks on their territory. On June 15, Morocco requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council, which sought to manage the crisis by discussions at meetings from June 15 to 25, with- out passing a resolution. On the 25th, Morocco requested the inde nite suspension of the Security Council debate on this issue, on the grounds of a lowering of tensions, since Polisario attacks in June had ceased. 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 165 This atypical behavior by a principal crisis actor constituted negative crisis management in this case. Operation Iman (March 1–mid-May 1980): Another crisis for Morocco, within the Western Sahara con ict, was precipitated by a major victory of Polisario forces over a column of Moroccan troops that had been dispatched to clear an area in the north of Morocco, in the direction of Western Sahara. Both adversaries sought external support. Polisario did so by submitting documents to the UN, the OAU, and the Non- Aligned Movement, charging collusion between Morocco and South Africa, the former seeking weapons to enable Morocco to take posses- sion of Western Sahara; there was no response. Similarly, Morocco criti- cized Algeria and Libya for allegedly providing Polisario with North Korean weapons, with no bene t. By mid-May 1980, the clashes related to Morocco’s Operation Iman had wound down, ending this crisis, without any attempt at crisis management by the UN or either of the two superpowers. fi fi fl fi fl Galtat Zemmour I (October 13–November 9, 1981): A further crisis for Morocco was triggered by a large Polisario attack on its garrison at Galtat Zemmour on October 13, 1981, with 3000 troops, tanks and armored personnel carriers. King Hassan sought support from the presi- dents of France and the USA, the UN, and the OAU, accusing Algeria and Libya of providing weapons to Polisario. There were no positive attempts at external crisis management. Rather, on November 5, Soviet President Brezhnev denied that the USSR had provided SAM missiles to Polisario, and the USA dispatched a military delegation to Morocco during the crisis, conveying symbolic support for a valued ally in North Africa. Negative crisis management took the form of unilateral Morocco acts—withdrawal from Galtat Zemmour and another military base on November 7 and 9, a severe defeat in this protracted con ict. Sand Wall (February 25–May 4, 1987): This complex crisis was set in motion by an outbreak of heavy ghting between Morocco and Polisario-SADR armed forces on February 25. In mid-April, Mauritania became a third crisis actor because the newly completed Moroccan sand wall, designed to prevent the entry of Polisario forces into a part of Western Sahara, posed a potential threat to Mauritanian territory and its economy, because of that sand wall’s proximity to a vital Mauritanian 166 M. BRECHER railway line—a few hundred meters—that transported iron ore, a vital Mauritanian raw material, to its commercial capital, for export. The crisis became more complex when the president of Algeria, the primary rival of Morocco for in uence primacy in northwest Africa, visited Mauritania and pledged support for its territorial integrity. In this crisis, too, an atypical form of crisis management was utilized—a summit meeting between the leaders of Algeria and Morocco at their border on 4 May 1987, arranged by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. Although a formal agree- ment was not reached, the meeting reduced the tension level between the two Maghreb regional powers suf ciently to end the international cri- sis that day for all three crisis actors, Mauritania, Morocco, and Polisario. Galtat Zemmour II (October 7–late November 1989): Notwithstanding a peace-seeking atmosphere in the Western Sahara con ict during the summer of 1988, following the acceptance by Morocco and Polisario- SADR of a UN-OAU peace plan on August 30, 1988 [to be elaborated below in the analysis of attempts at con ict resolution], the absence of progress in negotiations during the next 13 months led Polisario to break the UN-OAU-engineered truce: on October 7, 1989, it attacked Moroccan forces at Galtat Zemmour a second time. Two days later, Morocco threatened military intervention in Mauritania if Polisario attacks from that neighboring state continued. Crisis management efforts began on October 13, 1989, when the UN Secretary-General urged a resumption of meetings between King Hassan and Polisario leaders, to re-activate the UN-OAU peace plan. Moreover, on November 7, SADR, the formal quasi-state framework of Polisario, called for a dialogue with Morocco to achieve peace in Western Sahara. Nonetheless, a day later, Polisario launched another attack on Moroccan forces. However, despite further clashes on November 16, serious ghting ended in the second half of November, and the Galtat Zemmour II crisis faded. [In response to a request by the UN Secretary-General, Polisario-SADR agreed to a truce on February 21, 1990, to the end of March.] Successful management of the last recorded military-security crisis in the Western Sahara con ict—before serious attempts at con ict reso- lution began in 1991 (see below)—was achieved largely by the persis- tent efforts of the UN Secretary-General. In that context, the behavior of the principal adversaries in this con ict, Morocco and Polisario- SADR, and of all other participants in the winding down of these cri- ses did not extend to efforts at con ict resolution: they were con ned to fl fi fl fl fl fl fi fi fi fl fl 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 167 Western Sahara: Failed Attempts at Conict Resolution The quest for resolution of the Western Sahara con ict—by Spain, its colonial ruler since 1885, by the principal adversaries, Morocco and Polisario-SADR, and by international organizations, the UN, the OAU— began even before the recognized onset of this protracted con ict in October 1975, which was the result of half a dozen inter-related devel- opments about the uncertain future status of Western Sahara. The rst was Spain’s proclamation of the internal autonomy of its then-existing colony in August 1974, as the rst step toward decolonization. The sec- ond was Morocco’s and Mauritania’s submission of their claims to sover- eignty over Western Sahara to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in early October. In September 1975, Spain announced that a referendum would be held among the residents of Western Sahara in the rst half of 1976, with the options of independence or continued association with Spain. Morocco and Mauritania responded on October 1, 1975 with an agreement to partition the disputed territory between them, the former declaring its rejection of the option of independence in a referendum, as it was to do repeatedly during the next four decades. On October 15, 1975, a UN mission reported sentiment in Western Sahara favor- ing independence. On October 16, in a crucial decision, the ICJ ruled that, despite some historical links and legal ties between the claimants and Western Sahara, neither Morocco nor Mauritania had a valid claim to sovereignty over the disputed territory. The same day, King Hassan declared that the “links” cited by the ICJ validated Morocco’s claim to sovereignty and that he would lead a march of 350,000 Moroccan civil- ians into Western Sahara to secure its integration into Morocco. The result was the Moroccan March crisis, summarized in the discussion of cri- sis management above, marking the onset of this protracted con ict and the failure of the rst attempt at con ict resolution of this con ict. The rst, abortive attempt to resolve this con ict peacefully occurred in July 1981. The OAU had been oating the idea of direct negotiations 168 M. BRECHER since 1979 as the only likely successful path to con ict resolution. Algeria, the patron of Polisario from the outset, concurred, as did the UN. Polisario consistently favored an UNsupervised referendum, including the option of independence. King Hassan of Morocco, as noted, consistently rejected any reference to an independence option. In July 1981, he offered to hold a referendum. However, when Polisario accepted, conditional on the inclusion of the independence option, Morocco withdrew the offer, ending this attempt at con ict resolution. fl fi fl fi fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fi A promising episode in the search for a mutually acceptable resolu- tion formula occurred on August 30, 1988, when both Morocco and Polisario-SADR accepted a UN-OAU peace fl fi the narrower realm and the more limited task of winding down speci c episodes of threats of violence, threats of escalation to more intense vio- lence, and of the challenge to terminate violence in these limited time episodes, that is, the realm of crisis management. In the absence of suc- cessful con ict resolution (see below), the formal stage of con ict termi- nation has not begun. plan, which called for a cease re and a referendum on self-determination among the people of Western Sahara. However, there was no progress in the further negotia- tions, and, in early October 1989, as noted, Polisario broke the truce and launched its second attack on the Morocco base, Galtat Zemmour. UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar publicly urged a resumption of direct negotiations on October 13; and the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the political entity that represented Polisario to the world, urged a dialogue with Morocco on November 7, 1989, but Polisario ignored these urgings from the UN and its own colleagues. However, following another request by the UN Secretary-General, Polisario relented and agreed to a truce on February 21, 1990 until the end of March. A breakthrough seemed likely with another UN-mediated cease re in 1991 and a rare substantive political agreement by the principal adversar- ies—the Settlement Plan, essentially the 1988 OAU plan, endorsed by Security Council Resolution 658, signed in 1991. It called for a cease re, which took effect on September 6, 1991, a selfdetermination referen- dum, set for 1992, an exchange of prisoners, the repatriation of refu- gees, and the total withdrawal of Morocco’s forces from Western Sahara. However, only the cease re was implemented—and has been sustained ever since, with few violations. All the other provisions of the Settlement Plan oundered over one contentious issue—who was to be included in the voter list? Polisario urged acceptance of the original voter list, based upon Spain’s 1974 census, 74,000 Sahrawi. Morocco insisted on expansion of the list to include Sahrawi residents who ed into Morocco in the 1950s. After 2 years of deadlocked negotiations over this issue, the UN accepted Morocco’s demands. The UN mission in Western Sahara, MINURSO, 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 169 received 244,643 applications for Sahrawi status. From 1994 to 2000, mostly after 1998, it interviewed 198,649 applicants for the right to participate in the referendum. There were 131,036 appeals by rejected applicants, almost all from Morocco-nominated candidates. UN Secretary-General Ko Annan, doubting that the referendum would ever be held, urged a resolution to seek an alternative. The Council accepted his advice and passed Resolution 1292 on February 29, 2000, calling for an “early, durable and agreed solution.” Almost certainly, this was done at the advice of the Secretary-General’s Personal Representative on the Western Sahara dispute, former US Secretary of State, James Baker III, in 1997. Polisario strongly opposed the abandonment of the Settlement Plan; Morocco was relieved because of its unquali ed rejection of any plan that included the independence option. fl fi fl fi fi fi fi fi fl There were two Baker plans for resolution of this protracted con ict, one in May 2001, the other in May 2003. Baker Plan I provided for a referendum, to be held 5 years after the beginning of the Plan’s imple- mentation. The voter list was to include all persons who had been full- time residents of Western Sahara for the preceding year. A dual system of authority was advocated by Baker for the 5-year transition period: responsibility for most internal affairs was to be granted to an assem- bly and executive elected by persons on the MINURSO list, including the 1-year residence proviso; all external issues and some internal affairs would be under the control of Morocco. Polisario opposed the 1-year residence criterion, viewing it as the gateway to a large number of per- sons from Morocco without primary allegiance to the SADR, and it was less than enthusiastic about the division of external and internal authority, and the 5-year waiting period for the referendum. Morocco seemed satis- ed with Baker Plan I, which was widely perceived beyond the region, including the UN, as strongly biased in favor of Morocco. The Security Council, in its Resolution 1429, reaf rmed that any solution must “pro- vide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.” The result was a more balanced Baker Plan II. The time frame for the transition was made more exible, 4–5 years. The voter list was made more rigid: it would comprise persons on the MINURSO voter list from December 30, 1999, that is, before the appeals from persons denied inclusion in the Settlement Plan-proposed voter list had been addressed; the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriation list from October 31, 2000, and persons who had lived in Western Sahara since December 30, 1999. Moreover, the list of subjects granted to the 170 M. BRECHER Western Saharan autonomous government was enlarged. However, the reaction of the principal adversaries was negative. Morocco rejected the inclusion of the independence option in the proposed referendum, even though it had approved Baker Plan I, which included this option. Polisario initially rejected Baker Plan II in its entirety, noting the lack of guarantees of its control over the subjects to be placed under the juris- diction of Western Sahara’s autonomous government, and the inclu- sion of Moroccan settlers in the referendum voting list. Later, on July 11, 2003, Spain’s UN Representative announced that Polisario accepted Baker Plan II. This induced an initiative by the USA, supported by the UK and Spain, to request the UN Security Council to endorse Baker Plan II; China, France, and Russia opposed an act injurious to Morocco. The Security Council did pass a resolution, strongly supporting, but not endorsing, this Plan; and the resolution was not a prelude to UN action—for another 4 years. The most recent attempt to resolve the Western Sahara protracted con ict occurred in 2007–2008, in response to UN pressure: Security Council Resolution 1754, passed in April 2007, called on the two prin- cipal adversaries “to enter direct negotiations without preconditions, in good faith.” Morocco and Polisario held four rounds of negotiations, the Manhasset negotiations, in June and August 2007, and January and March 2008, over Morocco’s persistent plan for regional autonomy and Polisario’s persistent commitment to independence for Western Sahara. There was no compromise and no progress, then or since. fl fi fi fl Western Sahara: Causes of Non-Resolution Viewed in terms of the Con ict Resolution Model set out above, three of the six postulated conditions of the high likelihood of con ict resolution were evident in the Western Sahara con ict. Exhaustion Neither adversary has exhibited exhaustion. Both Sultan Hassan and his son, the current ruler of Morocco, Muhammad VI, have been steadfast in their opposition to independence for Western Sahara. This rejection extended to the inclusion of independence as a legiti- mate option for voters in a referendum on the future status of Western Sahara—even after the large expansion of the voter list to the bene t of Morocco —except in one instance of attempted mediation, Morocco’s formal acceptance of Baker Plan I (2001), which provided for this option 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 171 in a proposed referendum on Sahrawi self-determination after 4 or 5 years of Western Sahara’s autonomy. Moreover, that Morocco concession was nulli ed by Hassan’s insistence on a large expansion of the voting list, far beyond the 74,000 Sahrawi identi ed in the 1974 Spanish census of Western Africa’s population, in an attempt to ensure a majority against independence by Moroccan settlers in Western Sahara. Polisario-SADR leaders remained committed to the goal of independence for Western Sahara, though they displayed some exibility on an expansion of the voter list for the referendum, indicating an optimism regarding a major- ity in favor of independence, even in a referendum with the inclusion of many Moroccan settlers in Western Sahara as voters. Furthermore, the steady growth of Polisario’s military capability and its successful ‘for- ward’ policy of attacks on Moroccan military bases, and Morocco’s con- struction of six massive sand walls in Western Sahara, in an effort to seal much of the disputed territory against invasion by Polisario guerillas, sug- gest the opposite of exhaustion by either adversary. Changes in the Balance of Capability were conducive to con ict reso- lution. In the early years of this con ict, the qualitative and quantitative superiority of Morocco’s armed forces and weapons was not successfully exploited by the kingdom in imposing a resolution of the con ict on Morocco’s terms. Later, when the balance between Morocco’s conven- tional forces and Polisario’s guerrilla forces moved toward relative equal- ity, this condition contributed to a greater likelihood of con ict resolution but was not suf cient to ensure termination. Domestic Pressures There is virtually no available evidence of domestic pressures for compromise in the behavior of either principal adversary. The sole known exception was the urging by the SADR of a dialogue between its activist wing, Polisario, and Morocco, on November 7, 1989, when the fate of the OAU’s 1988 con ict resolution plan hung in the balance. As noted, Polisario ignored the pressure from its political colleagues and launched a fresh attack on a Moroccan base 1 day after the pressure by the SADR. fi fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl External Pressures Among the six conditions that were postulated as likely to contribute to con ict resolution, the most visible in the Western Sahara con ict was foreign pressures, one of three favorable conditions of termina- tion. These pressures were present in abundance since 1988: the OAU 172 M. BRECHER Plan, supported by the UN in 1988–1989; frequent UN-initiated cease- re and truce agreements, notably in 1991; an active role by two UN Secretaries-General, Perez de Cuellar and Ko Annan, the former strongly supporting the OAU plan, the latter strongly supporting Baker Plan II; several UN Security Council resolutions calling for a fresh initiative in February 2000—urging the parties in 2000 to seek an alternative to the 1991 Settlement Plan that had reached an impasse, which led to Baker Plan I; a Security Council request for changes in the 2001 Baker Plan, leading to Baker Plan II in 2003; Security Council pressure for changes in Baker Plan II, which failed; and its 2007 resolution, calling for a renewal of direct negotiations between Morocco and Polisario, which were con- ducted in 2007–2008 but concluded with another impasse. There is no evidence of active external pressures on the principal adversaries in the Western Sahara con ict since 2008 to pursue other possible paths to de nitive con ict resolution. Reduction in Discordant Objective Both of the principal adversaries in the Western Sahara con ict have remained committed to their primary objective throughout this con ict—formal integration into Morocco or unquali ed control over the disputed territory, for Morocco, and inde- pendence, for Polisario-SADR: there has never been any reduction of dis- cordance in their diametrically opposed core objective. Decline in Con ict-Sustaining Acts During the rst 15 years of this unre- solved con ict (1975–1990), there was a steady ow of con ict-sustain- ing acts in Western Sahara, as evident in the 10 crises between Morocco and the Polisario-SADR, most of them characterized by moderate vio- lence. However, since 1990, this protracted con ict has been dormant, with no military-security crises between the principal adversaries. This decline in hostile acts, especially for an extended period, did facilitate sev- eral attempts by the adversaries to achieve con ict resolution by third- party mediation efforts, e.g., the two Baker Plans in 2001 and 2003, and by direct negotiations in 2007–2008. As such, it supported the postulate that a decline in con ict-sustaining acts would enhance the likelihood of con ict resolution. However, that goal remains elusive. In sum, three of the six conditions postulated in the Con ict Resolution Model as most likely to lead to resolution of interstate protracted con icts—Changes in the Balance of Capability, in the direction of relative equality in the military dimension of Capability, Behavior Decisions 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 173 fl fl fi fl fl fl fi fl fi fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl External Pressures on the adversaries, and a Decline in Con ict- sustaining Acts—have been present in the Western Sahara con ict. However, thus far, the presence of three conditions acting as likely causes of con ict resolution, including one as highly visible and intense as foreign pressures from the late 1980s to 2008, have not been suf- cient to attain that goal. Their presence, acting as Basic Causes, is no guarantee that con ict resolution will occur. The enduring obstacles to resolution of the Western Sahara con ict remain—rigidly incompat- ible objectives by the principal adversaries, especially Morocco, and the absence of collective exhaustion by both adversaries. Thus, this con ict remains unresolved. In the absence of con ict resolution, there is no evidence of Reconciliation between the political regimes and/or societies of Morocco and Polisario-SADR. aMericas Costa Rica/Nicaragua Conict (Resolved) There were several inter-related major decisions by the two principal adversaries in the early and late phases of this protracted con ict. The rst was an initiative by Costa Rica’s military dictator, General Federico Tinoco (1917–1919), designed to achieve three goals simultaneously: to assert Costa Rica’s independence from Nicaragua, its perennial rival in Central America, and from the United States, the long-time patron of Nicaragua; to prevent an anticipated rebellion, and to achieve international recognition for his regime. The decision took the form of a pre-emptive dispatch of troops to the Nicaragua border on 25 May 1918. However, it proved to be ill- conceived, for this provocative act aroused the active hostility of the USA, which had earlier precipitated Tinoco’s overthrow and enforced exile. Nicaragua responded with a similar provocative decision—to recognize and support the anti-Tinoco Costa Rican rebellion against his regime, led by Julio Acosta. That Nicaragua decision was implemented by an iden- tical act, moving troops to the Costa Rica border. The USA, as always in these tit-for-tat non-violent military exchanges, adopted a passive 174 M. BRECHER non-interventionist attitude that both adversaries correctly perceived as tacit support for Nicaragua’s hostile act. Three decades later, another successful military coup in Costa Rica brought General José Figueres and a 10-man junta to power in April 1948. Nicaragua, as always, seeking a submissive ‘friendly’ regime in Costa Rica, made the strategic decision to seek regime change. This was implemented in the form of a Nicaraguan invasion of Costa Rica in December 1948, with a sizeable armed force in Central America’s inter- state crises, 1000. Figueres responded with mobilization of all available Costa Rica manpower and the dispatch of troops to the Nicaragua bor- der. fl fl fi fl fi fl fl The bitterly disputed presidential election in Costa Rica between pro- and anti-Figueres candidates spawned a 44-day civil war, with 2000 killed, the bloodiest event in twentiethcentury Central America. The victor in this civil war, Figueres and his military junta, drafted a new constitution providing for a democratically elected assembly and abol- ished the Military in Costa Rica, a unique condition in the Americas to the present day and virtually in the rest of the world. Soon after a peace treaty between Costa Rica and Nicaragua was mediated by the Organization of American States (OAS) in February 1949, Figueres and his junta relinquished power to the newly elected Costa Rica government, in November 1949, another unique act. The last of the three interstate crises during this con ict (January 8–20, 1955) was a replay of the rst two crises and con icting decisions. Nicaragua once more made a decision to support Costa Rican rebels, with the aim of overthrowing Figueres (He had been elected president of Costa Rica in 1953—in the rst of 13 peaceful and transparent presi- dential elections in Costa Rica in more than half a century, until 2010). Nicaragua implemented its decision with the dispatch of troops and aer- ial bombings, but the OAS called on its members to provide aircraft to Costa Rica. It also succeeded in ending the crisis and mini-war and cre- ated a demilitarized zone between the two adversaries in 1955, marking the end of their protracted con ict. Decision-Makers The key decision-makers of Costa Rica during this interstate con ict were noted above in the discussion of decisions. They emerged during each of the crises in which Costa Rica’s strategic and important tacti- cal decisions were made and implemented: Federico Tinoco in the rst 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 175 major decision during the 1918 crisis, and Jose Figueres in the major decisions during the 1948 and 1955 crises. The decision-makers of Nicaragua during this con ict can be traced to two sources. One was the Somoza family dynasty that exercised dictato- rial power in Nicaragua for more than half a century (1927–1979), that is, during the second and third phases of this Central America con ict, 1948–1949 and 1955. The founder of this dynasty, Anastasia Somoza, commanded Nicaragua’s National Guard from 1927 to 1937, and then as president from 1937 until his death in 1956. He was succeeded by his two sons from 1956 until 1979, when the family dynasty was over- thrown by the Left-wing Sandinista Party, whose veperson junta ruled Nicaragua from 1979 to 1984 and whose acknowledged leader since 1981, Daniel Ortega, was elected president for 1985–1990 (and again, for 2006–2011 and 2011–2016). fi fl fi fi fl fl fi fl fl fl fi fl fi Throughout their 52 years of absolute power over all decisions of any consequence in Nicaragua, including economic policy and the attempts to generate regime change in Costa Rica, the Somoza family had the unquali ed backing of the United States. Moreover, the USA intervened frequently in the two adversarial states and their relations from 1909 to 1933, with occupation of one or the other by Marines from 1912 to 1933, except for 9 months in 1925. Thus senior American of cials in Washington throughout this con ict, notably all who served as Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Deputy Secretary, Under-Secretary, and Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, all the US ambassadors and consuls to Costa Rica and Nicaragua from 1918 to 1955, were decision-makers during their tenure in that period, with particular in uence during the three crises between the adversaries in this con ict. (Unlike the 1965 Dominican Republic crisis, in which President Johnson was the active, pre-eminent US decision-maker, and several presidents who were directly involved in decisions relating to the Panama Canal, from Theodore Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter, the US president was not involved in the Costa Rica/Nicaragua con ict.) Decision Process The decision process in the two principal adversarial states, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, was primarily authoritarian, with decision-making power concentrated in an individual (Tinoco in the 1918 decision), a junta (led by Figueres in the 1948 decision), a family (Somoza throughout this con ict), and probably, an input from the Costa Rica Assembly in its 176 M. BRECHER 1955 decision. As for the decision process during this con ict in Central America, it replicated the US decision process in other con icts in which the USA was highly involved as a con ict actor, with US diplomatic rep- resentatives in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and at OAS meetings deliberat- ing an issue related to their con ict— generally, diplomats and consuls in the eld—acting under instructions from the US State Department. Con ict-Sustaining Acts During the shortest of the three Americas’ post-World War I interstate con icts—Costa Rica/Nicaragua, 37 years (1918–1955), compared to Ecuador/ Peru, 80 years (1918–1998), and Honduras/Nicaragua, 89 years (1918–2007), political hostility was the most frequent con ict-sustaining technique (CST), with the great- est impact. Violence occurred during two interstate crises between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, as did verbal hostility, but they were secondary in frequency and impact. fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl Political Hostility was evident throughout this con ict but was conspicu- ously intense at its onset and during its last decade. Although Costa Rica and Nicaragua were the principal adversaries, they were heavily depend- ent on the longstanding self-appointed hegemon of the Americas, the United States, since its proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine (1823). Thus their politically hostile relationship was intertwined with US goals, policy, and behavior in Central America since both became formally independent of Spain in 1821. At the onset of this con ict, Nicaragua was a virtual protectorate of the USA, which dominated its govern- ment and political leaders and continued this role informally long after it voluntarily ceased its direct control of Nicaragua in 1933. By con- trast, Costa Rica, like the hegemon of the Americas, proudly retained its image as an ‘exceptional’ state and society. This incurred the hostility of the USA, which did not recognize the regime of Costa Rica’s president, General Federico Tinoco, in 1917–1918. He responded with a pre-emp- tive military strike against Nicaragua in 1918. Tinoco was deposed in August 1919, as was his successor in 1919, because the USA refused to recognize him as Costa Rica’s president. Nicaragua exhibited its politi- cal hostility to Costa Rica by supporting a rebel force that invaded Costa Rica and proclaimed a provisional government. The new regime, led by Julio Acosta, was recognized by Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala. After a lengthy period of calm between the principal adversar- ies (1919–1943), the con ict was renewed between Costa Rica’s 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 177 military-political leader, José Figueres, and Nicaragua’s long-time, US-supported dictator of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza. When Somoza, coping with a domestic political crisis, supported a left-wing Costa Rican president in 1947, the USA intervened once more and secured Nicaragua’s withdrawal of forces from Costa Rica in exchange for renewed American support for Somoza. Toward the end of this con ict, Costa Rica’s President Figueros was accused by Nicaragua in 1954 of supporting a plan by Nicaragua revolutionary, Chamorro, to assassinate Somoza, reinforcing the animosity generated by acts of political hostility. Violence was used in two of the three military-security crises during this interstate protracted con ict. An invasion of Costa Rica by 1000 Nicaraguan National Guardsmen in December 1948 led to the movement of Costa Rican troops to its border with Nicaragua and to minor clashes in January–February 1949; their second crisis was resolved by an OAS inquiry commission and a military commission to supervise activity on their border. Minor clashes in Central America also occurred in the third Costa Rica/ Nicaragua crisis, from January 8 to 20, 1955: 500 Costa Rica rebels, supported by the Somoza government, crossed the frontier from Nicaragua and captured a town near Costa Rica’s capital. Once more the OAS sent a fact- nding mission. The rebels were forced by Costa Rican forces to withdraw from captured Costa Rican territory, ending this cri- sis, with the adversaries agreeing to an OAS plan for demilitarized zones along the border. As in several other interstate con icts, violence, during a military-security crisis, in January 1955, became the catalyst for con ict resolution, soon after termination of an interstate crisis. Verbal hostility was employed by both of the principal Central America adversaries, especially from 1944 to 1955. It was highly per- sonalized propaganda by the two leaders, Figueres in Costa Rica and Somoza in Nicaragua, who viewed their neighboring head of govern- ment as an enemy and strongly encouraged the overthrow of ‘the other.’ These frequent acts of verbal hostility contributed to the persistence of this con ict but were essentially reinforcement of a deeply rooted political hostility and rivalry between two neighbors with very differ- ent societies, incompatible outlooks, and con icting interests since their independence after two centuries of colonial rule by Spain. fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl Economic discrimination was not apparent in this Central America interstate con ict.