Causes of Interstate Conflicts PDF

CHAPTER 10 What Have We Learned About Interstate Con icts? What have we learned from this inquiry into the phenomenon of inter- state protracted con icts? Why do some con icts among states emerge as, or develop into, protracted con icts that is, their Onset phase? Why do some protracted con icts per...

CHAPTER 10 What Have We Learned About Interstate Con icts? What have we learned from this inquiry into the phenomenon of inter- state protracted con icts? Why do some con icts among states emerge as, or develop into, protracted con icts that is, their Onset phase? Why do some protracted con icts persist and escalate beyond the onset phase to their second, Persistence phase, in fully developed interstate con icts, while others do not—they atrophy or are aborted? Why are many interstate con icts Resolved, but some only after almost a cen- tury, since the end of World War I, their Resolution phase, while other protracted con icts persist into the twenty- rst century, even a millen- nium or more from the beginning of their historical roots, e.g., China/ Vietnam, more than two millennia? Two distinct but related paths have been pursued in this inquiry, in search for answers to these questions. One is theory construction, in the form of models—on con ict onset, persistence, and resolution. The other is extensive empirical research into interstate protracted con icts that were-are active in world politics since the end of World War I. The answers to the three questions posed above are based upon ndings from the testing of hypotheses on Onset, Persistence, and Resolution for all 33 con icts that were active during the near-century, since the end of World War I. © The Author(s) 2018 315 M. Brecher, A Century of Crisis and Con ict in the International System, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57156-0_10 316 M. BRECHER Protracted con ict onset Model, hyPotheses and evidence The hypotheses on con ict Onset [Phase I of an interstate protracted con ict] derive from the Model on Onset and the concept, Basic Causes of a Protracted Con ict. This model postulates the existence of six Basic Causes of Onset. Three are tangible causal Conditions—Disputed Territory, Power Rivalry, and competition for Economic Access. Three are intangible causal Conditions—competing Ideologies, Identity Con ict, and Rivalry among Political Leaders [all six causal Conditions among con ict principal adversaries]. The central proposition of the theory of con ict Onset is captured by Hypothesis 1 [hereafter H1]: the presence of one or more of the six Basic Causes of con ict Onset contributes to—and is suf cient to explain—the onset of an interstate protracted con ict. This hypothesis is very strongly supported: more than one of the six Basic Causes were present in 31 of the 33 analyzed con icts, the full dataset; the two cases in which these Basic Causes were absent were sin- gle-cause phenomena. fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl H3 which postulates that disputed Territory is the most likely Basic Cause of the Onset of an interstate protracted con ict, is strongly sup- ported by empirical research in this inquiry: disputed territory was a Basic Cause in 25 of the 33 active post-World War I con icts—and the most important Basic Cause in 16 of the 25 con icts. H4 postulating that the most likely cluster of Basic Causes of con ict Onset is one in which disputed Territory is the primary cause, is also strongly supported. Among the 31 con icts with more than one Basic Cause, Territory ranked rst in 16 con icts. The other Basic Causes occurred much less frequently: Identity, Ideology, Political and Economic Systems, 5 con icts each. H5 postulates that the trigger to an interstate con ict is most likely to be a hostile physical and/or verbal Military or Political Acts. This hypoth- esis is very strongly supported: Political Act(s), 8 cases, e.g., North Korean Nuclear; Military Act(s), 8 cases, e.g., Greece/Turkey; Political and Military Act(s), 15 cases, e.g., Ethiopia/Somalia. 10 WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT INTERSTATE CONFLICTS? 317 H6 postulates that an Identity con ict, accompanying a territorial dis- pute, will occur at both intrastate and interstate levels simultaneously. This hypothesis is modestly supported: there were 18 con icts in which both identity and territorial disputes occurred; among these, 7 cases operated at both levels simultaneously, e.g., Yugoslavia. In sum, two hypotheses on the Onset phase of a con ict (H5) is very strongly sup- ported by the evidence; two others (H3 and H4) are strongly supported, and H6 is modestly supported. Hypothesis 1 and 2 was not testable. Protracted con ict Persistence Model, hyPotheses and evidence The intermediate phase of an interstate protracted con ict, following con ict Onset and, often, followed by con ict Resolution, was elabo- rated in the Model on con ict Persistence. Three Basic Causes of con ict Persistence, postulated as the Independent Variables of this Model, are as follows: Discordant Objectives [disputes among the con ict princi- pal adversaries] over Territory, Power, Ideology, and/or Material Bene ts; the Balance of Capability among the principal adversaries; and Con ict- Sustaining Acts, the third Basic Cause serving as the Intervening Variable, unfolding as acts of violence, political hostility, economic dis- crimination, and verbal hostility. What does the evidence from the full dataset of 33 con icts reveal about the extent of support for/rejection of hypotheses on the Basic Causes of con ict Persistence? H7 Persistence of interstate protracted con icts is the consequence of one or more causal Conditions in the relations between adversarial states within a con ict and one or more types of Con ict-sustaining Acts. The presence of any one or more of these causal Conditions in the Onset phase of a con ict is suf cient to cause its persistence. fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl All 33 interstate con icts persisted beyond the onset phase [and 20 of the 33 con icts have been resolved]. In sum, the extensive evidence provides very strong support for the hypothesis that all three independent variables in the con ict Persistence Model served as Basic Causes (causal Conditions) of the persistence of the 33 con icts in the full dataset set beyond their Onset phase. H8 Among the two clusters of sources of con ict Persistence—causal Conditions and types of Con ict-Sustaining Acts—the most frequent 318 M. BRECHER in generating persistence beyond the Onset phase is on-going disputes over Territory, involving Violence between the principal con ict adver- saries. A set of indicators, designed to compare the impact of con icts over Territory and Power generates the postulate that violent con ict over Territory will be the most signi cant Discordant Objective (D.O.) and the most frequent source of Persistence of con icts. Territory was a persistent, highly visible and signi cant discordant objective in 21 of the 33 active protracted con icts during the years since the end of World War I. Moreover, it was-is the exclusive, more important or most important discordant objective in 17 protracted con icts, that is, in 80.9% of those 21 con icts. Its primacy as a cause of con ict persis- tence is further evident in the fact that, among the 33 con icts in the full dataset for this project, Territory was the sole discordant objective in 3 of 5 con icts with one discordant objective (60%), a discordant objec- tive (D.O.) in 11 of 18 cases with two D.Os. (61%), and ranked rst in importance in 8 of those 11 con icts (72.7%). It was also a D.O. in 7 of the 10 con icts with 3 discordant objectives (70%), and ranked rst in 6 of those 7 cases (85.7%). In sum, disputes over territory were pervasively present in interstate protracted con icts during a near-century (late 1918–2017). H9 Discordance over Power, too, was prominent as a contributor to the Persistence of interstate con icts: it was a discordant objective in 26 of the 33 con icts, 5 more than Territory. However, Power was the exclusive, most important or more important discordant objective in only 9 of those 26 con icts (34.6%), compared with 17 of 21 con icts for Territory (80.9%). As with Territory, disputes over Power were visible in all categories of con icts to which they contributed to persistence: in 2 of 5 con icts with one discordant objective (D.O.); in 14 of 18 con- icts with two D.O.s, but the more important discordant objective in only 6 con icts of that cluster (42.8%), compared to 72.7% of D.O.s with two discordant objectives in which Territory was a more important Discordant Objective. A similar difference in scope of impact by disputes over Territory and Power is evident in con icts with three discordant Objectives. Thus, on this dimension of interstate protracted con icts— their contribution to con ict Persistence, as with many others, Territory ranks rst and Power, second, in signi cance-impact. fl fl fi fl fl fl fi fl fl fi fi fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl The same indicators were employed to assess the contribution of the two other discordant objectives to con ict Persistence, namely, Ideology and Material Bene ts-Economic Discrimination. 10 WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT INTERSTATE CONFLICTS? 319 Both were-are much less visible than Territory and Power, with a much more limited presence and impact. Material Bene ts have been very slightly more visible than Ideology in the Persistence phase of post- World War I interstate protracted con icts; they were present in 11 con- icts and 10 con icts, overall, respectively. However, the evidence on impact points to Ideology as more signi cant: it was the most important Discordant Objective in 5 of the 10 con icts in which it occurred, com- pared to 2 of 11 cases in which Material Bene ts served as a discordant objective. Moreover, the ve con icts in which Ideology ranked rst in importance exhibit a much broader scope than the 2 con icts in which Material Bene ts ranked as most important. The USA and the USSR were the principal adversaries in 2 of the 5 con icts—Russia-USSR in Iran/ Russia-USSR, and the USA in Iraq Regime Change. No less note- worthy, middle powers in the global system were principal adversaries in all ve of the con icts in which Ideology ranked rst in importance. The evidence, though limited, indicates that Ideology had a greater impact on con ict Persistence than Material Bene ts. In sum, the empirical ndings reveal a rank order for presence and impact, as anticipated in the Model on con ict Persistence—two clusters of Discordant Objectives, Territory and Power, followed by Ideology and Material Bene ts. H10 The larger the number of Discordant Objectives in the relations between–among principal adversaries in the Persistence phase of an inter- state con ict, the more likely it is that a con ict will persist beyond that phase. Further, any addition to the number of Discordant Objectives dur- ing that phase will exacerbate the tension between the principal adversar- ies which, in turn, will extend the duration of an existing con ict. The evidence on Discordant Objectives among 13 con icts (a subset of a total of 33 postWorld War I active interstate con icts explored for this hypothesis) that continue to elude con ict resolution is instructive in assessing this hypothesis. Only one persisting con ict, Western Sahara (since 1975), exhibited a single Discordant Objective between its principal adversaries, Morocco and Polisario-SADR, the independence move- ment of Western Sahara’s African Arab Muslim majority population—the contested control over governmental Power in the former colony of Spain and, through governmental power, control over the territory of Western Sahara. There are eight persisting con icts with two Discordant Objectives: two con icts in Africa., e.g., DRC/Rwanda over Power and 320 M. BRECHER fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fi fi fi fl fl fi fi fi fl fl fi fl fl fi fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl Material Bene ts (since 1996, with deep historical roots); two in Asia, e.g., India/ Pakistan, a con ict over Territory (Kashmir) and competi- tion over Ideology (since 1947); one in the Middle East, Iran/Iraq, over Material Bene ts and Power in the Gulf region (since 1934, with deep historical roots); and three Inter-Region con icts, e.g., Inter-Korea, over Ideology and Power (since 1945). There are also four persisting con icts with three Discordant Objectives, e.g., Arab/Israel, over Territory, Power, and National Identity. In sum, all but one of the 13 persisting unresolved con icts, among the full dataset of 33 post-World War I cases, exhibited two or three Discordant Objectives, indicating substantial support for the postulated link between the number of discordant objectives in a con ict and the likelihood of a con ict’s continuing persistence. H11 Whether an interstate protracted con ict will follow the path lead- ing to resolution or extended persistence also depends, in part, on the Volume and Impact of Con ictSustaining Acts (CSAs) by a con ict’s principal adversaries. The evidence on the distribution of Con ict-Sustaining Acts among the four types, Violence, Political Hostility, Material Bene ts-Economic Discrimination, and Verbal Hostility-Propaganda, is instructive. Violence exhibited the highest frequency of Con ict Sustaining Acts, with the greatest impact, in 21 of the 33 Post-World War I con icts. In 5 of these cases, Violence shared frequency and impact with Political Hostility, e.g., Ethiopia/Somalia (persisting), Ecuador/Peru (resolved 1998). Among the 21 cases, Violence was the primary Con ictSustaining Technique (CST) in 13 resolved con icts and 8 cases that persist. Political Hostility was the second most-frequently employed and con- sequential CST— in 15 of the 33 interstate protracted con icts, includ- ing 5 con icts shared with Violence. Among the 15, Political Hostility was the most frequent and consequential CST in 10 cases, e.g., Costa Rica/Nicaragua (resolved 1955) and Greece/Turkey (unresolved) and among the ve shared cases of primary CST role of Violence and Political Hostility, e.g., Chad/Libya (resolved) and Western Sahara (unresolved). Material Bene ts-Economic Discrimination was the primary CST—fre- quency and impact—in only two con icts, Iraq/Kuwait (resolved 1994) and Afghanistan/Pakistan (unresolved). 10 WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT INTERSTATE CONFLICTS? 321 Verbal Hostility-Propaganda was not frequently employed and did not achieve highest frequency or greatest impact on the Persistence of any protracted con ict since the end of WWI. In sum, the evidence on the two most frequent and consequential types of CSA and the prospect of con ict resolution or persistence points to a strong association: the larger the number of acts of Violence and of Political Hostility, the greater the likelihood that a con ict will continue to persist beyond the Onset and Persistence phases of a con ict, rather than achieve Resolution. H12 The Balance of Capability between/among con ict principal adversaries, notably military power, constitutes another causal Condition that contributes to decision-makers’ choice of a preferred outcome— extended persistence or resolution of a con ict. fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fl fl Findings on the relationship between the Balance of Capability among con ict adversaries and the outcome of an interstate protracted con ict reveal a strong association between four Balance of Capability clusters of con ict adversaries, assessed in global system terms, and con ict out- comes during the past near-century: Equality or near-equality of middle powers— ve persisting con icts, two in Asia (India/ Pakistan, Inter-Korea), two in the Middle East (Arab/Israel, Iran/Iraq), and one InterRegion (Greece/Turkey); Equality or near-equality of power between small powers—a less clear pattern, with an outcome of ve resolved con icts and three persisting cases; the three persisting con icts are located in Africa (DRC/Rwanda, Ethiopia/Somalia, and Western Sahara); the ve resolved cases were-are located in three regions—Africa (Angola and Rhodesia), America (Costa Rica/Nicaragua, Honduras/Nicaragua), and Middle East (Yemen); Unequal or Mixed Powers: Super Powers-Middle Powers—a clear major- ity of con icts in this cluster (4-1) led to resolution; the USA was the super- power in three of these con icts (Iraq Regime Change, North Korean Nuclear, and North Vietnam/USA); the USSR was the superpower in the other two cases (Iran/Russia-USSR, Poland/RussiaUSSR); Middle Power-Small Power—this cluster too reveals a clear major- ity (6-1), leading to resolution (Chad/Libya, Ecuador/Peru, Indonesia, Lithuania/Poland, Iraq/Kuwait, and Yugoslavia); the sole unresolved con ict in this cluster is Afghanistan/Pakistan). In sum, three of the 10 clusters of con icts, classi ed in terms of changes in the Balance of Capability and con ict Outcome among 322 M. BRECHER principal adversaries, comprise one con ict or none. Thus, the pairs in the four meaningful clusters comprise a large proportion of the full data- set, 25 of the 33 con icts (75.8% of all Post-World War I cases). While association does not constitute cause–effect linkage between changes in capability of adversaries and con ict outcome, continued persistence, or resolution, this nding, combined with ndings on discordant objectives and con ict-sustaining acts reported above, facilitates probabilistic pre- diction on three important dimensions of interstate protracted con ict. hyPotheses and findings on con ict resolution As with the Con ict Onset and Persistence Models, six Basic Causes— Conditions likely to contribute to con ict resolution–were postulated as the Independent Variables in the Resolution Model: they are Changes in the Balance of Capability, Decline in Con ictSustaining Acts, Domestic Pressures on decision-makers to pursue Resolution, Exhaustion, External Pressures for Resolution, and Reduction in Discordant Objectives [by the principal adversaries]. fl fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl H13 According to the underlying theory of con ict resolution, devel- oped in the Resolution Model, the presence of one or more of the six causal Conditions is suf cient to generate a causal chain leading to con- ict resolution. Moreover, when more Basic Causes of resolution are pre- sent in a con ict, the likelihood of con ict resolution will increase; and when all six causal conditions are present in a con ict, con ict resolution will be virtually certain. The rst general observation in a test of this hypothesis is that all of the six postulated Causes of Resolution, discussed earlier, have been present in one or more stages of the process shaping the Outcome of 13 protracted con icts, the matching subset of the full dataset of 33 con icts for this part of the inquiry into “International Crises and Interstate Con icts.” More precisely, the six postulated causes were present 42 times [of a theoretically possible 78 times] among 13 con icts in this part of the inquiry, providing moderate support (53.8%) of H13, which postulates that con ict resolution is likely to occur when one or more of the six causal Conditions characterize at least one of the principal adversaries in a protracted con ict. The frequency of occurrence of the six Conditions varies considerably. Two Conditions (Basic Causes) occurred very frequently in the cluster 10 WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT INTERSTATE CONFLICTS? 323 of 13 con icts—External Pressures on con ict principal adversaries to seek con ict resolution, in 11 of 13 post-World War I protracted con- icts and Changes in the Balance of Capability in 10 con icts. At the other extreme, Domestic Pressures occurred in 4 con icts and the other 3 conditions, Reduction in Discordance of Objectives, Decline in Con ict- Sustaining Acts, and Exhaustion are discernible in 5, 6, and 6 con icts, respectively. Thus, overall presence of the postulated Basic Causes of Resolution is evident in these 13 con icts but the frequency distribution among the six causal Conditions is unequal. H14 The larger the number of Basic Causes [causal Conditions] that are present in a protracted con ict, the more likely is a con ict to be resolved—the most relevant evidence is the number of Basic Causes expe- rienced by resolved and persisting interstate protracted con icts. fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl Among the 8 resolved con icts in the matching subset of 13 pro- tracted con icts explored for this phase of the inquiry, two con icts experienced all six postulated Basic Causes of Resolution, Ecuador/Peru and USA/USSR; and two con icts experienced ve Basic Causes, Angola and Yugoslavia. Moreover, there were no resolved con icts with only one Basic Cause, and only two resolved con icts with two Basic Causes, China/ Japan and Iraq Regime Change. By contrast, among the ve of 13 persisting con icts, two experienced one Basic Cause, e.g., North Korean Nuclear, one experienced two Basic Causes, India/Pakistan, and two experienced three Basic Causes, e.g., Arab/Israel. There were no persisting con icts with more than three Basic Causes of Resolution, that is, with a majority of causal conditions. Thus, the ndings on the very different distribution of the number of Basic Causes of Resolution among resolved and persisting con icts in a matching subset of con icts support Hypothesis 14. H15 and H16 focus on the role of External Pressure on con ict prin- cipal adversaries to seek con ict resolution. H15 postulated that for- eign pressure on at least one principal adversary in a con ict is the most likely single Basic Cause of interstate con ict resolution. This hypothesis is strongly supported by several strands of evidence: External Pressure was present in 7 of the 8 resolved con icts (87.5%), among a total of 11 resolved and persisting con icts that experienced External Pressures. As evident below, Changes in the Balance of Capability occurred in all 8 resolved con icts, that is, with a higher proportional frequency than 324 M. BRECHER External Pressures; however, it ranked lower than External Pressure in impact on the outcome of resolution. The ndings on the presence of the other four postulated likely Basic Causes of Resolution in the Resolution Model supplement the nd- ing on the presence of the two noted high-frequency Basic Causes. Exhaustion and Domestic Pressure were experienced only in resolved con- icts, in 6 and 4 cases, respectively. Reduction in Discordance of Objectives is evident in 4 (of 5) resolved con icts (80%). Decline in Con ict- Sustaining Acts occurred in 3 (of 6) resolved con icts (50%). The ndings on H16, which postulates the primacy of External Pressure in the most likely cluster of Basic Causes of con ict Resolution, also illuminate the presence and relative importance of the six postu- lated Basic Causes of con ict Resolution. The operational indicator of importance is the rank order of the Basic Causes that were evident in the resolution of the 8 resolved con icts among the subset of 13 cases that were explored for this assessment, with a focus on Rank 1 and Rank 2 in resolved con icts, as follows: Changes in Balance of Military Capability—Rank 1 in 4 of 8 resolved con icts, Rank 2 in 3 resolved con icts, together in 7 of 8 resolved con icts (87.5%). External Pressures—Rank 1 in 2 of 8 resolved con icts, Rank 2 in 4 resolved con icts, together in 6 of 8 resolved con icts (75%). Exhaustion—Rank 1 in 2 of 8 resolved con icts, Rank 2 in 0 resolved con ict, together in 2 of 8 resolved con icts (25%). Domestic Pressures—Rank 1 in 0 of 4 resolved con icts, Rank 2 in 0 resolved con ict, together 0 in 4 con icts (0%). Decline in Con ict-sustaining Acts—Rank 1 in none of 3 resolved con icts, Rank 2 in none of 3 resolved con ict, together 0%. fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fi Reduction in Discordant Objectives—Rank 1 in none of 4 resolved con icts, rank 2 in none, rank 1 + 2, 0%. The results of this probe reinforce the earlier nding on the presence and signi cance of the six postulated Basic Causes of interstate protracted con ict resolution since the end of World War I. In sum, Changes in the Balance of Military Capability of, and External Pressure on, the con ict principal adversaries clearly constitute the apex of this assessment. They rank rst and a very close second overall as con- tributors to con ict resolution of a matching subset of the full dataset of 33 con icts active during the near-century since the end of World War I: 10 WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT INTERSTATE CONFLICTS? 325 a difference of only 1 con ict in the number of cases in which they rank 1 or 2 overall—7 of 8 and 6 of 8 resolved con icts, respectively. Collective Exhaustion ranks a distant third in both presence and impor- tance of contribution to con ict resolution—only 2 of 8 resolved con icts in which it ranked 1 or 2 in importance of contribution. In terms of contribution to con ict resolution, the other three postulated causal conditions did not rank 1 or 2 in the contribution to resolution in any of the 8 resolved con icts (among the 13 in the matching subset). One further aspect of the ndings is the light that they cast on the most frequent combination of causal Conditions most likely to lead to the resolution of interstate protracted con icts. The most frequent formula is the presence of three of the postulated six Conditions in the Model on Resolution: External Pressures, Changes in the Balance of Military Capability, and collective Exhaustion in at least one of the prin- cipal adversaries. In four of six cases of successful con ict resolution, in the matching subset since the end of World War I, these conditions rank 1, 2, and 3, though the ranking varies within the 1–2–3 combination. Ecuador/Peru con ict: Exhaustion Rank 1, External Pressures Rank 2, Changes in Military Capability Rank 3. France/Germany con ict: Exhaustion Rank 1, Changes in Military Capability Rank 2, External Pressures Rank 3. Iraq/Kuwait con ict: Changes in Military Capability Rank 1, External Pressures Rank 2, Exhaustion Rank 3. Yugoslavia con ict: External Pressures Rank 1, Changes in Military Capability Rank 2, Exhaustion Rank 3. fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl The other two resolved con icts, in which this combination of condi- tions appears, with a different ranking, are as follows: Angola con ict: Changes in Military Capability Rank 1, External Pressures Rank 2, Exhaustion, present but unranked. USA/USSR con ict: Changes in Military Capability Rank 1, External Pressures Rank 2, and Exhaustion, present but unranked. H17 postulates the predominance of two of the six Basic Causes identi- ed in the Resolution Model as most likely contributors to the resolu- tion of interstate protracted con icts. The evidence presented here is far from de nitive, because of the unavailability of most primary sources on 326 M. BRECHER a complex process that often succeeded, but also failed, in the quest for con ict resolution. However, the evidence provides persuasive support for this hypothesis on the crucial roles of External Pressures on con ict princi- pal adversaries to seek con ict resolution and on the more elusive changes in the Balance of Military Capability between principal adversaries. fl fl fl fi fl fi fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl In sum, the evidence presented here indicates that the presence of three of the six postulated Basic Causes in the Con ict Resolution Model—External Pressures, Changes in the Balance of Capability, and with notably less frequency of occurrence, Exhaustion —were-are most likely to lead to the resolution of interstate protracted con icts. Domestic Pressures for con ict resolution, Decline in Con ict-Sustaining Acts, and Reduction in Discordant Objectives of a con ict’s principal adver- saries merit continuing attention but no longer merit recognition as ‘most likely conditions’ to generate con ict resolution. Their reduced explanatory status would enhance the parsimony of the Resolution Model, without detracting from its explanatory power regarding a complex phe- nomenon in world politics during, and possibly beyond, the rest of the twenty- rst century.