Chapter 9 Select Case Study Findings on Interstate Conflicts: Inter-Region PDF

CHAPTER 9 Select Case Study Findings on Interstate Con icts: Inter-Region georgia/russia-ussr con ict (unresolved) Historical Roots The principal adversaries in this interstate con ict experienced a very close, unequal relationship for more than two centuries. Georgia was annexed by Tsarist Russia in 1800, at the request of Georgia’s last mon- arch, who appealed for support against Persia, and it was an integral part of Russia until November 1917. In the turmoil attending the Bolshevik Revolution, Georgia became an independent state for 3 years (April 1918– February 1921). Along with Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia was merged into the TransCaucasian Soviet Socialist Republic, within the Soviet Union, from 1922 until 1936, when the three Caucasian entities became formally independent republics of the USSR until its dissolu- tion at the end of 1991. Georgia, as well as its Caucasian neighbors, then resumed their independent statehood. Behavior Georgia and Russia-USSR: Decisions and Decision-Makers This unresolved con ict between a major power, Russia, and Georgia, a former integral part of the Tsarist Empire, was preceded by a short-lived period of Georgia’s independence soon after the Bolshevik attainment of © The Author(s) 2018 261 M. Brecher, A Century of Crisis and Con ict in the International System, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57156-0_9 262 M. BRECHER power in Russia in November 1917. Because that prelude to the current con ict, which began in 1991, remains a crucial element in the ‘histori- cal memory’ of one of the principal adversaries, Georgia, it merits brief attention in an analysis of their behavior seven decades later and beyond. fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl The prelude began with a declaration of independence by Georgia in May 1918, at rst with Lenin’s promise to respect Georgia’s right to independence, incorporated in the Georgia–Russia 1920 Moscow Treaty. The next year, the Bolshevik leader reversed course authorizing the Red Army to invade Georgia and re-integrate its territory into Russia. This volte face and the prelude to their interstate protracted con ict seven decades later ended with Russia’s invasion and reincorporation of Georgia into Russia in February 1921, compelling the Georgian Menshevik gov- ernment to depart for self-exile in France. This interstate con ict began with Georgia’s renewed declaration of independence from the recently dissolved USSR and the Russian Federation via a referendum in March 1991. However, it was not until 17 years later, highlighted by the successful Georgia ‘Rose Revolution’ in late 2003, that its new, youthful leader, Saakashvili, displayed an unconcealed bravado by mobilizing Georgia’s army and attacking one of the two disputed Caucasian enclaves, South Ossetia, on August 7, 2008. Russia decided immediately to expel the Georgian force from its short- lived advance into South Ossetia, which was overwhelmingly successful in the four-day War that followed. Georgia and Russia-USSR: Decision Process The political system in which Georgia’s two major decisions were taken was a Westerntype democracy, in marked contrast to the authoritar- ian ‘democratic centralism’ that pervaded the Bolshevik regime, with Lenin as its unchallenged, commanding gure during the regime’s rst 4+ years. However, Lenin adhered to the Marxist-Leninist principle that important decisions, especially strategic decisions, required Communist Party authorization, acting through the Party’s ulti- mate decision-authorizing body, the Politburo. In Period II, Georgia’s regime continued to be a democracy of the Western type. However, all three of its early presidents—Gamsakhurdia, a respected Georgian nationalist leader, Shevardnadze, a former USSR Foreign Minister, and Saakashvili— displayed a considerable bent to authoritarianism, the rst, of the traditional Caucasian ruler, the second, of the Gorbachev type, and the third, of a Western populist. The Georgia decision to attack 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 263 South Ossetia was made by President Saakashvili, with a small group of military advisors. The Russian decision-making process in Phase II was also authoritar- ian, as in Georgia, without the veneer of participation by any democratic institutions. The principal decisionmaker was President Putin, with a supporting role for Prime Minister Medvedev and some Russian military advisers. Conict-Sustaining Techniques fl fi fi fi fi fl fl Violence several low-intensity violent incidents erupted between Georgia and two enclaves in the Caucuses, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which had been claimed by Georgia since it regained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, as well as by Russia-supported seces- sionists in these disputed territories. The rst, in August 1992, was an Abkhaz attack on Georgian government buildings in Abkhazia’s capital, Sukhumi. Russia terminated arms supplies to Georgia and, soon after, began arms shipments to Abkhaz separatists; strangely, it also facilitated a peace agreement and encouraged negotiations between Georgia and the Abkhaz rebels in December 1993, but these quickly led to stale- mate. In May 1998, an attempt by Georgian guerillas to raise Georgia’s ag on Abkhaz government buildings led to low-intensity violence for months and the forced withdrawal of the Georgians from the Abkhaz capital. Then, after several years of relative quiet, a plane ying Georgia’s Defense Minister over South Ossetia in September 2006 was attacked by unknown assailants. In April 2008, a Russian jet ghter destroyed a Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in Abkhazian airspace. Then, unex- pectedly, Georgia attacked South Ossetia on August 7–8‚ 2008. Russia responded at once, forced the much weaker Georgian invaders to with- draw and occupied considerable Georgian territory. The four-day full- scale war ended with a France-arranged cease- re on the 12th, and 2 weeks later, Russia recognized the independence of the two contested enclaves. Since then the adversaries avoided another round of violence, but the uneasy calm masks Georgian hostility and fear and Russia’s dis- dain. Political Hostility—Con ict-sustaining political acts, too, began soon after Georgia regained its independence. Russia began to issue Russian passports to Abkhazia residents soon after a peace agreement was 264 M. BRECHER concluded between Georgia and the Abkhaz secessionists in 1993. After a long period of relative tranquility, Russia was reported by the BBC to have threatened in 2002 to bomb Al-Qaeda and Chechen bases in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge and to have threatened Georgia for not coop- erating with Russia. In August 2004, Georgia’s Premier warned Russian tourists not to travel to Abkhazia and threatened to re on Russian ships bringing Russian tourists to Sukhumi. In the autumn of 2006, Russia began to deport ethnic Georgians illegally residing in Russia. After Kosovo’s declaration of independence, in March 2008, recognized by many Western states, Russia lifted then-existing sanctions on Abkhazia, and in April it began to recognize documents issued by the local authori- ties in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although little-noticed elsewhere, the slow escalation of hostile political acts by both Georgia and Russia prepared the ground for the full-scale war 4 months later. Verbal Hostility—Propaganda, too, was employed by the principal adver- saries in this unresolved con ict, mostly in defense of their actions lead- ing to, and during, the August 2008 War. In essence, Russia’s arguments were as follows: rst, Georgia, by its attack on South Ossetia, was the aggressor in this con ict; second, Russia had no alternative but to retali- ate against Georgia’s aggression; and third, Russia’s actions in support of the enclaves were no different than NATO’s actions in defense of Kosovo, an enclave of Serbia. Georgia’s attempts to persuade onlookers from afar also focused on three arguments: rst, its decision to dispatch troops to South Ossetia was legitimate and legal because the enclave had long been recognized by the USSR as an integral part of Georgia; sec- ond, Russia’s hostile acts, challenging Georgia’s sovereignty over the two enclaves, violated international law; and third, Russia’s analogy between its behavior and NATO’s UN-sanctioned behavior toward Kosovo was basically awed. The arguments of neither adversary were convincing among a generally disinterested external audience. fl fi fi fi fl fi fl fl fl fi Economic Discrimination—There were few openly hostile economic acts in this con ict, all by Russia, upon whose economy Georgia was almost totally dependent. One was its threat in 2006 to cut off Russia’s monopoly supply of gas to Georgia, entirely; it did not resort to this draconian act, but Gazprom doubled the price of gas that it supplied to 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 265 of its bottled water, Georgia’s two largest exports. While a serious blow to Georgia’s economy, this was the least important in sustaining the Georgia/Russia con ict. Acts of political hostility were the most frequent, but acts of violence, and the key security lessons for Georgia, reinforced by the August 2008 War, namely, the enormous difference in military power between the two adversaries, and the non-involvement of all the other major powers, especially the USA, had the greatest impact on sus- taining this con ict, though without violence, in the future. Conict Management and Attempts at Conict Resolution During this unresolved con ict between a major power, Russia, and its small neighbor, Georgia, there have been several episodes of con ict management, especially during their rst, year-long crisis, Georgia– Abkhazia Civil War (September 25, 1992–October 8, 1993) and their brief full-scale crisis-war (August 7–11, 2008). The other two crises were Pankisi Gorge (July 27–October 7, 2002) and South Ossetia-Abkhazia (June 10– November 5, 2004). All four crises within the on-going Georgia/Russia con ict focused on competing claims to territory, nota- bly over two enclaves in the South Caucasus, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Georgia claimed sovereignty over both entities, which aspired to independent statehood or merger with Russia, actively supported by Russia. Georgia-Abkhazia Civil War (September 25, 1992–October 8, 1993): Fighting between Abkhaz separatists and Georgian troops began in August 1992—the anti-Georgia movement for separate status began in 1977 but had been suppressed by Soviet forces. It escalated to a Georgia–Russia crisis on September 25, when Russia’s parliament, the Duma, condemned Georgia’s resort to violence and suspended the delivery of weapons and equipment to its neighbor, triggering a cri- sis for Georgia. Despite its denial, Russia provided arms, humanitar- ian aid, and logistical support to the Abkhaz separatists. Serious clashes between Georgia and the Abkhaz separatists occurred periodically during the next year. Tension between Russia and Georgia escalated, with Georgia threatening to take control of all Russian weapons and equip- ment on Georgian territory —it seized a Russian arms depot in south- ern Georgia on November 2—and accusing Russia of bombing Georgian military positions in Sukhumi, the Abkhaz capital. In midDecember 266 M. BRECHER fl fl fl fl 1992 and again in mid-March 1993, during an Abkhaz separatist attack on Georgian forces then controlling the Abkhaz capital, Sukhumi, Georgia’s President Shevardnadze, former Foreign Minister of Russia during Gorbachev’s tenure as Russia’s leader, and Georgia’s parliament demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Abkhazia, while Russia denied involvement in the civil war. fl fi Georgia. The other hostile Russian economic act was to halt the import of Georgia’s wine, accounting for 90% of Georgia’s wine exports, and On September 16, an unexpected attack by Abkhaz separatists, fol- lowing the withdrawal of Georgian forces after the cease- re, led to their take-over of Sukhumi. A few days later, accused by Georgia’s president of continuing to behave like ‘an evil empire,’ Russia imposed sanctions on Abkhazia. The crisis formally ended on October 8, 1993, when Georgia’s President Shevardnadze agreed to join the Russia-created Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose successor to the USSR. In continuation of its active role in con ict management, Russia sent a peacekeeping force of 500 marines, formally from the CIS, to Georgia on November 4, 1993, to protect railway lines and main roads. On December 1, a fresh cease- re agreement, mediated by the UN, was signed by Georgia and the Abkhaz separatists, who also agreed on the deployment of more international observers. In early February 1994, the presidents of Russia and Georgia signed a (symbolic) treaty of friendship 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 267 and cooperation. Con ict management of the most important crisis in Phase 1 of this protracted con ict was consummated by the Moscow Agreement, signed by all the parties to this crisis on May 14, 1994 and formalized in a Security Council Resolution, extending the mandate of UNOMIG and calling for the deployment of more (Russian) observers. fl fl fl fi fl fl fi fi fl fi fi fl fi fl fl fl A similar pattern of active con ict management is evident in the con ict over South Ossetia, the second disputed enclave in the South Caucasus. Violence began on January 5, 1991, when 6000 Georgian troops entered South Ossetia, and continued for several months in a stalemate. The presidents of Russia and Georgia, Yeltsin and Gamsakhurdia, held talks in March and signed an agreement in April aimed at stabilizing the situation in South Ossetia—via a newly cre- ated joint commission to inquire into the sources of the con ict, and the creation of a joint police unit to disarm illegally armed groups and to facilitate the return of refugees to their original homes. Russia also sent peacekeepers to wind down the ghting. A year later, in March 1992, a coup in Georgia led to the fl fi Notwithstanding this ‘war of words’ between the two principal adver- saries in this con ict, the major power in the con ict region also engaged in active mediation during the intermittent Abkhaz–Georgian violent clashes. Talks between Russia and Georgia were held in Georgia’s capi- tal in January 1993, aimed at a friendship and cooperation agreement, including the status of Russian troops in Georgia. Russia’s foreign min- ister held talks in Moscow with Georgian and Abkhaz delegations from June 16 to 22, 1993. This led, on July 27‚ to a cease- re agreement signed by Abkhaz separatists and Georgia, mediated by Russia, which agreed to provide peacekeepers; the con icting parties agreed on the need for UN observers to monitor the cease- re. The UN too became deeply involved. Georgia’s president requested a UN peacekeeping force in January 1993. In April, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali appointed a German diplomat as his Special Representative to assist in the quest for con ict resolution. Tangibly, following the ceasere agreement, the Security Council decided on August 25 to send a UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), with 88 military observers, to the area of con ict. The next day, Georgia con rmed its withdrawal of all its heavy military equipment and some troops from the front line. replacement of Gamsakhurdia by Shevardnadze, as noted. On June 10, Georgia’s new leader and the leader of North Ossetia signed a protocol that included a cease- re agreement. Two weeks later, the presidents of Georgia and Russia signed the Sochi Agreement, also known as the Treaty of Dagomys, which indi- cated the steps to end the Georgia/South Ossetia War, notably the entry of Georgian, Ossetian, and Russian troops into South Ossetia, which occurred in July 1992, ending that violent crisis-war. The two ‘peace’ agreements, Sochi (1992) and Moscow (1994), marked the end of Phase I of the Georgia/Russia interstate con ict, setting in motion a period of 8 years of tranquility; however, their con ict was far from resolved. There were two additional Georgia/Russia crises early in the twenty- rst century, both marked by considerable verbal threats and modest violence. One was Pankisi Gorge (July 27–October 7, 2002), without any attempted mediation; it ended with a meeting between the two pres- idents at a CIS summit conference, an announced agreement on October 7 to create joint patrols of their common border, and a formal agreement on October 17. The other crisis, South Ossetia-Abkhazia (June 10–November 5) was characterized by frequent verbal threats and little violence. It too ended without any third-party mediation: only Russia was present at the Georgia–South Ossetia negotiations that culminated in their crisis-end- ing demilitarization agreement on November 5. 268 M. BRECHER The peak of con ict management in this interstate con ict occurred during and soon after the four-day Georgia–Russia War (August 7–11‚ 2008). Tensions between the two contenders for control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia increased steadily after the Rose Revolution in Georgia in November 2003, when Shevardnadze was ousted from the presidency by the young, openly declared pro-American Saakashvili. Early in 2008, a concerned European Union dispatched its foreign policy leader, Javier Solana, to Abkhazia with an offer to mediate the con ict between Abkhazia and Georgia—and implicitly Russia as well—to pre- vent escalation to war; the Russian president—by then, Medvedev had succeeded Putin—declined. fl fi fi fi fl fl fi fl fl fi fl fl The outbreak of full-scale war between Georgia and Russia, initi- ated by the former late at night on August 7, 2008, generated immedi- ate attempts at con ict management, with the goal of an early cease- re. The USA was the rst to call for a cease- re, with increasing intensity as Georgian troops were compelled to retreat from Georgia and Russian troops were advancing in Georgia’s territory. However, the most active con ict manager was France’s President Sarkozy, who was also head of the European Union in 2008. France’s Prime Minister Kouchner was dispatched to Georgia and Abkhazia on August 10, accompanied by the head of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Finland’s Foreign Minister Stubb, with an EU six-point plan to wind down the war: no further use of force; cessation of all military acts; complete access to humanitarian aid; immediate return of Georgia’s troops to their bases; withdrawal of Russian troops to their pre-August 7 line; and to begin a discussion of the future status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their lasting security. Sarkozy carried the plan to Moscow and Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi on the 11th. Georgia’s President Saakashvili insisted—and Russia accepted—a meaningful change in the last point: “The territorial integrity of Georgia is not subject to discussion...and the future status of the disputed regions should be determined with help of an international process.” This vague phrasing on future attempts to resolve this protracted con ict ensured a lengthy, continuing delay in resolution. Georgia/Russia Conict: Causes of Non-resolution Does the absence of any, some or all of the six postulated conditions conducive to con ict resolution, noted in the Con ict Resolution Model 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 269 earlier in this book, explain the absence of resolution of this dormant interstate con ict? Exhaustion—Georgia experienced a severe defeat in the 2008 war, including Russia’s occupation of much of its territory and high casual- ties, as well as the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the ostensible cause of its con ict with Russia. This undoubtedly led to exhaustion at the mass public level. Yet its leadership, notably President Saakashvili, insisted upon—and achieved—a signi cant change in the wording of the crucial last point in the EU Six Point Plan for a Cease-Fire in August 1998, cited above; that is, for Georgia, national exhaustion was not con- ducive to concessions on the future formal resolution of the con ict. As for Russia, there is no evidence of exhaustion as a result of the August 2008 war with Georgia or throughout this interstate con ict, in which it was the victor, achieving control over the two disputed enclaves. Balance of Capability—The huge disparity in the military and economic capability of the two principal adversaries was not conducive to con- ict resolution, and neither Georgia nor Russia pressed for resolution, though they were receptive to con ict management of speci c episodes of crisis and war during their interstate con ict. Domestic Pressures—These were present in Georgia’s society, deriving from both the frequent eruption of threats of military incursions, includ- ing occasional occupation of Georgian territory, and economic pres- sure, including Russia’s boycott or discrimination against vital Georgian exports. Yet these pressures did not lead George to make concessions for peace when issues considered vital national interests, such as the disputed enclaves, were at risk. There were no evident domestic pressures in Russia for an end to its con ict with Georgia except on terms that would bene t Russia’s national interests. fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fi External Pressures—As indicated above, there were abundant foreign pressures, in the form of attempted con ict management in both phases of this con ict, 1991–1994 and 2002–2008, manifested in efforts by individual states and international organizations to wind down threats, crises, and war. Pressures were directed to both of the principal adver- saries, Georgia and Russia, and were conducive to termination of crises and war. In sum, foreign pressure was the sole postulated condition that 270 M. BRECHER was conducive to, and often effective, in con ict-crisis management, but not con ict resolution. This nding supports the basic thesis of the Resolution Model in negative terms, that is when all (or most) of the postulated conditions conducive to con ict resolution are absent, resolu- tion is unlikely to occur. In substantive terms, resolution of the Georgia/Russia con ict remains elusive because one of the principal adversaries, Russia, having triumphed in war, has no interest in further negotiations to resolve the con ict formally, which might involve Russian concessions, and the prin- cipal mediators, the EU, the UN, and France lacked the ability to impose negotiations for con ict resolution on either of the principal adversaries. Ironically, only Russia was a persistent and usually successful mediator— in violent and non-violent crises between Georgia and the two enclaves; in the interstate con ict with Georgia, it was a principal adversary, not a mediator. Reconciliation In the absence of formal con ict resolution, reconciliation between Georgia and Russia has not occurred. The immediate cause is that, since August 2008, Russia has steadily increased its de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Russian passports have been provided to the inhabitants of the two enclaves, as have economic and nancial aid to impoverished dependents, and physical security against a possible attempt by Georgia to re-assert its control of these enclaves by violence. Moreover, Georgia lacks the ability to undermine or reverse this pro- cess. A more fundamental obstacle to reconciliation is the lengthy period of Russian domination—control over Georgia by Tsarist Russia and Communist Russia for more than two centuries, alluded to earlier. This historical reality, which ended only two decades ago, overrides a potential conciliatory attribute, their shared belief system, Orthodox Christianity. inter-korea con ict (unresolved) Behavior Decisions The rst signi cant decision in this Northeast Asia combined civil war and interstate con ict for mastery of the Korean Peninsula was the 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 271 fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fi fi fl launching of the Korean War by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) [North Korea] on June 25, 1950. The war, in which a very large contingent of People’s Republic of China (PRC) ‘Volunteers’ later fought alongside North Korea, and the USA served as the main actively engaged ally of the Republic of Korea (ROK) (South Korea), ended in July 1953. Both Koreas, supported by their principal patrons, decided to end the North Korea: Decisions and Decision-Makers The DPRK made several major decisions following the end of the Korean War. Its most important post-war strategic decision was a general policy change, not a choice on a speci c con ict issue: in the mid-1960s, North Korea decided to shift the emphasis in the allocation of its national resources from economic development to defense, a policy change with pro- found consequences for its foreign policy, economic development, and the Inter-Korea con ict, because it remained in effect until recently. The next two North Korea major decisions related to the highly controversial issue of nuclear weapons, with implications for the persistence of both the Inter-Korea and North Korean Nuclear interstate con icts. One deci- sion occurred early in the Inter-Korea con ict: the DPRK decided in 1959 to launch a nuclear weapons program by signing a nuclear coopera- tion treaty with the USSR, following the USA–South Korea decision to introduce nuclear weapons into the Korean Peninsula in 1957. The other major decision by North Korea on nuclear weapons occurred 36 years later: in 1993, it declared that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, which it had signed largely under Soviet pressure. This decision was a catalyst to the unresolved North Korean Nuclear con ict but it was also an important con ict-sustaining act in the Inter- Korea Con ict. In sum, North Korea’s behavior toward its South Korea adversary and rival since their formation as independent states in 1948, largely at the behest of their patrons, the USSR and the USA, re ected a general, though not often proclaimed, decision to manifest hostility to, and mistrust of, its South Korea rival, though not without brief periods of cooperation in the shared goal of a re-united Korean Peninsula. The principal North Korean decision-makers throughout this pro- tracted con ict were the three members of the politically dominant 272 M. BRECHER family in the DPRK: Kim Il Sung, the founder and rst ruler of this Communist state, 1948–1994; his son and successor, Kim Jong Il, 1994–2011, and his son, Kim Jong-un, the leader since 2011. Each had a small coterie of advisers, but only the rst of the three Kim rul- ers was known to have rivals within the Korea Workers Party until the late 1960s. While their formal authority derived from their multiple roles as the central gure in all the key state institutions, the ruling Party, the military establishment, and the governmental regime, their power owed, and continues, from an institutionalized threegeneration family dynastic system of succession. North Korea: Decision Process fl fi fl fi fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fi Like most authoritarian, as well as democratic regimes, the governmental structure of North Korea comprises an executive branch headed by the President of the DPRK, a legislature, the Supreme People’s Assembly, and a judiciary. However, power is fl fi ghting via an armistice that has been sustained and largely respected by the two Koreas for 64 years, though the DPRK verbally renounced the armistice on several occasions, most recently in March 2013. concentrated in the ruling Workers Party of Korea (WPK) and, within it, the Politburo, as was the case in all ruling Communist parties. Ultimately, power has resided in the Supreme Leader, as enshrined in the DPRK 1972 constitution. Although little is known of its actual decision-making process, it is generally assumed that Kim Il Sung, his son, Kim Jong Il and, currently, his grandson, Kim Jong-un, is the supreme decision-maker on all important issues of pub- lic policy. Formally, this is legitimized by the Supreme Leader’s multiple of cial roles: president of the DPRK, chairman of the People’s National Assembly, First Secretary of the WPK Central Committee and Politburo, head of the Central Military Commission, etc. There are consultations with other Party leaders, military commanders, and technical special- ists, including Foreign Ministry of cials; but substantive decisions on all aspects of inter-Korea relations, as in all major policy issues, are made by the incumbent Supreme Leader. South Korea: Decisions and Decision-Makers Like the DPRK, the ROK made many strategic decisions relating to their con ict, some of great importance. The rst was the decision of its rst President, Syngman Rhee, on the day of North Korea’s attack, June 25, 1950, to seek instant USA military aid, both American forces and weapons. The response was immediate, in the form of a USA-led UN Command, with a predominance of American troops and, over time, the contribution of military aid by many states. The ROK decision and the 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 273 USA response escalated during the next three years, generating an alli- ance between the two states that has been a crucial element in the power con guration of East Asia during the past six decades. The next strategic South Korea decision, also made by President Rhee (1948–1961), was to accept President Eisenhower’s recommendation to introduce USA-controlled nuclear weapons into South Korea, even though such an act violated a provision of the Korean War Armistice Agreement that prohibited the dispatch of new arms into the Korean Peninsula. The nuclear weapons were dispatched in January 1958 and remained in South Korea until 1991, long before the rst DPRK nuclear test in 2006. (In light of the successful DPRK third nuclear test in February 2013 and further tests in 2014–2017, there has been a modest revival of South Korea interest in the re-acquisition of nuclear weapons to offset North Korea’s impressive achievements in nuclear weapons technology.) fi fl fi fi fi fi fl fi A third major decision by South Korea, with profound consequences for the DPRK/ROK rivalry and con ict, occurred soon after the ouster of President Rhee in a 1961 coup that brought General Park Chung Hee to power: the decision was to concentrate South Korea’s mate- rial resources on economic development, especially industrialization, the opposite of North Korea’s policy decision later in the 1960s to shift resources from economic development to national security. Among the consequences of this dual policy shift has been South Korea’s impres- sive economic growth, achieving the status of a world-class economy, while North Korea became increasingly dependent on economic aid from China while vastly increasing its military power. A notable conse- quence for the inter-Korea con ict was an increasingly active debate in South Korea on the wisdom of persisting with the long-established gov- ernmental concentration on economic development, captured by the motto of South Korea’s long-serving second president, Park Chung Hee, ‘economic construction rst, reuni cation later.’ The growing evidence of North Korea’s burgeoning nuclear weapons capability by 2017 rein- forced this debate in South Korea, but without any decision. Nonetheless, there were several attempts by South Korean political lead- ers to initiate a dialogue with North Korea on reuni cation, in 1972, 1992, 2000, and 2007. The most notable was South Korea’s President Kim Dae Jung’s policy initiative, the ‘Sunshine Policy.’ His decision—to reach out to Kim Jong Il, then the DPRK Supreme Leader, in 1998—was the tangible expression of a general policy decision by South Korea’s president, to change South Korea’s long-established ‘hard line’ of persistent con ict to a ‘softer 274 M. BRECHER line’ of cooperation and persuasion. It had limited success: summit meet- ings between the two Koreas in June 2000 and October 2007, along with modest cross-border trade, a small number of family reuni cations, and the opening of a tourist area in the southern part of North Korea. The ROK initiative ended abruptly in 2008, with the election of President Lee Myung- bak, who restored the long-standing hardline prior to Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy.” A reversion to the softer line was announced by the newly elected President of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, in 2017. South Korea: Decision Process The ROK [South Korea] political structure and its decision process were more complex than its counterparts in the DPRK [North Korea]. Three phases are evident in the changing character of South Korea’s political system: Phase I, civil authoritarian rule, First and Second Republics (1948–1961); Phase II, Military rule (1961–1987); Phase III, Western- style democracy since 1987. fl fl fi fl fi fi fi fi fi fl fl Syngman Rhee, who dominated the rst phase as President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) , was a domineering religious-political leader who was actively engaged in foreign policy decision-making, including all issues relating to the inter-Korea con ict. No other ROK politician in that phase could rival or effectively challenge Rhee’s control of decision-making on issues in which he had de nite views. During the second phase, Park Chung Hee was the pre-eminent leader, no less authoritarian than Rhee, but more inclined to seek expert advice. The Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and the Korean National Security Council (KNSC), both organizations modeled on their USA counterparts, were in uential in the decision-making process on all for- eign policy and Inter-Korean issues. Phase III witnessed a broadening of the decision-making group and process, with the bureaucracy, inter- est groups, the media and public opinion often active participants in shaping decisions on a wide range of issues, including those relating to, and impinging on, the Inter-Korean con ict. In sum, economic devel- opment, modernization, and urbanization transformed South Korea’s economy, society, and political system in the 1990s and beyond, chang- ing the decision process from a narrow, individual ruler-based process to a much broader, typical Western democratic political process. However, on major issues, among them, relations with the DPRK and the InterKorea con ict, the in uence of an activist president has remained sig- ni cant, as evident in the ‘Sunshine Policy’ initiative of President Kim 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 275 Dae Jung (1998–2003), continued by his successor, Roh Moo-Hyun (2004–2008), and the reversal of that policy by President Lee Myung- bak (2008–2013), in turn reversed by Moon Jae-in (2017). Inter-Korea Conict: Conict-Sustaining Acts Political Hostility This was the most frequent type of con ict-sustaining acts in the interKorea con ict. They began very soon after the inde- pendence of the two Korean states, the Republic of Korea (ROK), South Korea, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea, in 1948. The ROK, under its long-time authoritarian, antiCommunist president, Syngman Rhee (August 1948–April 1960), denied recognition to North Korea (the DPRK) and, with USA sup- port, secured UN recognition of the ROK as the sole Korea state. From November 1949 until June 1950, there were frequent ROK (President Rhee) statements of its intention to invade North Korea. Since the end of the Korean War (1953), the ROK refused formal relations with the DPRK and, in October 1953, it signed a Mutual Defense treaty with the USA, clearly aimed at North Korea. In 1968, during the North Korea/ USA crisis created by the DPRK naval capture of the USS Pueblo, Rhee’s successor-president, General Park Chung Hee, reiterated the ROK’s longstanding commitment to unilateral military acts to overthrow the DPRK regime. From 1976 to 1992, and resumed after a 1-year suspen- sion, the ROK engaged in an annual, high-pro le, non-violent military act that contributed much to sustaining the interKorea con ict, the (often large-scale) joint ‘Team Spirit’ military exercise with USA forces stationed in South Korea. This ROK con ict-sustaining policy toward its North Korea Communist neighbor continued, with varying intensity of politically hostile statements, until 1998. A decade of ‘Sunshine Policy’ (1998–2008), introduced by President Kim Dae Jung (1998–2003) and continued by his successor, Roh Moo-Hyun (2003–2008), aimed at peaceful reconciliation with the DPRK. This accommodation policy was reversed by President Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013). The DPRK reciprocated the ROK’s (South Korea’s) politically hos- tile acts, beginning with the assertion of its sole legitimacy as the cus- todian of Korea statehood, in 1948 and during the next 68 years. Like the ROK, it secured great power patrons, but somewhat later— Mutual Assistance treaties with the USSR and Mainland China (PRC) in 1961. In 1962, North Korea (DPRK) publicly abandoned the goal fi fl fl fl fi fl fl fl 276 M. BRECHER of peaceful uni cation with South Korea and reverted to violence as the DPRK preferred strategy to achieve Korean unity. Its long-time leader, Kim Il Sung, frequently contributed con ict-sustaining acts by pro- claiming that revolutionary forces in both Koreas would achieve uni - cation, without excluding the resort to violence. During the ‘Poplar Tree’ crisis with the USA in 1976, he termed war inevitable and placed DPRK armed forces on high alert. Moreover, North Korea frequently attempted to incite anti-government uprisings in South Korea. Long before the ROK’s ‘Sunshine Policy,’ it rejected South Korea’s proposals for summit meetings to pursue the goal of peaceful uni cation, to which both Koreas paid lip service. During the decade of ‘Sunshine Policy’ (1998–2008), a summit meeting of the leaders of the two Koreas was held in Pyongyang, the DPRK capital, in 2000, and economic aid from the much richer and economically developed South Korea to North Korea visibly increased. However, the accommodation was shortlived. Lee Myung-bak became the ROK president in 2008 and reversed the ‘Sunshine Policy’ of his two predecessors. In 2009, the DPRK con- ducted its second nuclear test (the rst was in 2006). Two North Korea- related military incidents in 2010, the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, with 46 casualties, and artillery re on a South Korean island near North Korea’s coast, contributed to the re-escalation of the hostile environment in the Inter-Korea con ict. As noted above, the election of a conciliatory president in South Korea indicated a return to the ‘Sunshine Policy’, vis-a-vis North Korea. Violence—This dominated the con ict-sustaining activity in the early years of the InterKorea con ict, with enormous casualties by all of the participants in the 1950–1953 Korean War: According to the data from the US Department of Defense, the United States suffered 33,686 battle deaths, along with 2830 non-battle deaths dur- ing the Korean War and 8176 missing in action. Western sources estimate the PVA (PRC) had suffered between 100,000 to 1,500,000 deaths (most estimate some 400,000 killed); while the KPA (DPRK) had suffered between 214,000 and 520,000 deaths (most estimate some 500,000). Between some 245,000 to 415,000 South Korean civilian deaths were also suggested, and the entire civilian casualties during the war were estimated from 1,500,000 to 3,000,000 (most sources estimate some 2,000,000 killed). Data from of cial Chinese sources, on the other hand, reported that the PVA had suffered 114,000 battle deaths, 34,000 non-battle deaths, 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 277 fi fi fi fl fl fi fi fi fi fl fi fl 340,000 wounded, 7600 missing and 21,400 captured during the war. Among those captured, about 14,000 defected to Taiwan, while the other 7110 were repatriated to China. Chinese sources also reported that North Korea had suffered 290,000 casualties, 90,000 captured, and a “large” number of civilian deaths. In return, the Chinese and North Koreans estimated that about 390,000 soldiers from the United States, 660,000 soldiers from South Korea, and 29,000 other UN soldiers were “eliminated” from the battle eld. (Reported from multiple of cial sources by Wikipedia) There were no other full-scale wars in the Korean Peninsula during this lengthy unresolved protracted con ict. Rather, frequent incidents of low intensity and short duration were the norm since 1953, for example, the attempted DPRK assassination of ROK President Park Chung Hee, modeled on January 21, 1968, the shooting-down of a USA reconnais- sance plane in 1969 (EC-121 crisis), the axe-murder of two USA soldiers in 1976 (the Poplar Tree Crisis), and the 2010 DPRK ring on a ROK military installation near its border, noted earlier. The exception was the sinking of a ROK warship in 2010, with the death of 46 ROK sailors, but the immense human losses and material damage of the Korean War remained a profound memory and in uence for the peoples of the two Koreas for a very long period. Verbal Hostility—As in the unresolved North Korean Nuclear con ict, the two principal adversaries in this closely related con ict between the two Koreas engaged in a frequent and, often, intense exchange of hos- tile invective during almost all of the Inter-Korea con ict as well—anti- communism, on the part of the ROK, anti-capitalism and the ROK alliance with the USA, on the part of the DPRK. Propaganda from both sides was shrill, harsh, and condemnatory of ‘the other,’ each blaming its adversary for all of the failures to achieve a genuine accommodation and to facilitate the shared goal of uni cation of the Korean peninsula, along with intense hostility to the ideology and the economic and politi- cal systems of its irreconcilable enemy. However, notwithstanding the frequency and intensity of the verbal diatribes, the impact of an array of verbal hostility acts, while undoubtedly sustaining the con ict, was less in uential than acts of political hostility and the traumatic memory of the Korean War. The latter intensi ed the consciousness of the havoc that would be wreaked by another Korean War, with the DPRK in possession 278 M. BRECHER of a growing stockpile of nuclear weapons, and both adversaries con- fronting an existential threat, with dif cult-to-imagine consequences. fi fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl Economic Discrimination—In the absence of substantive inter-Korean economic relations during most of this Korean con ict, the scope for con- ict-sustaining acts was very limited. It was non-existent as a technique for the DPRK to cause, or threaten to cause, economic damage to the ROK. However, the reverse ow, that is, the ability of the ROK to sustain—or reduce the intensity of—their Con ict with the DPRK was very considerable. On some crucial occasions, it did facilitate the temporary accommo- dation process between the two Koreas by meaningful economic gestures. A notable illustration was South Korea’s offer to construct low-enrich- ment nuclear reactors that would provide North Korea with vitally needed electricity that would enable it to suspend its rapidly expanding nuclear enrichment program that was causing consternation for the USA and other Western states, as well as the ROK, thereby contributing to a rare agreement between the DPRK and its primary enemies, the USA and the ROK—the 1994 Agreed Framework (AF). Another notable example of economic cooperation as a means of achieving con ict reduction has been the ROK provision of food aid during periods of near or actual famine in North Korea. Still another illustration was the ow of ROK economic assistance to the DPRK during the decade of the former’s ‘Sunshine Policy’ (1998–2008). And nally, the creation of a very large economic cooperation zone at the border between the two Koreas, facilitating employment for a large number of North Koreans, has assisted the ten- sion reduction process. By contrast, an implied threat by the South Korea president to suspend the ow of food and to close the border economic zone at the height of the 2010 crisis over the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel with heavy loss of life, though not implemented, proved to be a sharp con ictsustaining act in the economic domain. However, this type of con ict-sustaining acts has been the least important of the four techniques available to the Inter-Korea adversaries. Inter-Korea: Conict Management and Attempts at Conict Resolution Korean War There have been many attempts to manage and resolve this Northeast Asia protracted con ict since its onset in 1948, when the two states in 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 279 the Korean Peninsula, the DPRK, North Korea, and the ROK, South Korea, were created by agreement between the USA and the USSR. The rst major effort at con ict management took the form of a cease- re and armistice negotiations and agreements, and battle eld outcomes, dur- ing the three lengthy phases of the Korean War (1950–1953), leading to temporary reductions of violence and, ultimately, virtual elimination of major violence between the two Koreas during the past 6 decades. Korean War, Phase I (June 25–September 30, 1950): There were four con ict actors during this phase, the two Koreas (principal adversaries), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the United States. The war began on June 25, when large-scale North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, the unof cial border between the two Koreas since 1948. By the end of September, UN forces, commanded by USA General Macarthur, restored control of South Korea south of the 38th Parallel to the ROK government. Korean War, Phase II (September 30, 1950–July 10, 1951): There were ve con ict actors in this phase, the two Koreas, the PRC, the USA, and the USSR. This phase began with the crossing of the 38th Parallel by South Korea and USA forces. By June 1951, the battle eld stabilized around the 38th Parallel, and a cease- re and armistice negotiations began on July 10. fl fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fi fi fl fi fi fi fi fi fi fl Korean War, Phase III (April 16–July 27, 1953): There were four con ict actors in the third and last phase of the Korean War—the two Koreas, the PRC and the USA. This phase began with a new offensive by PRC-North Korean forces, in the midst of discussions about a cease- re taking place at Panmunjom, in the Demilitarized Zone. An Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953, terminating the Korean War. That Agreement, despite frequent violations over the decades, continues to de ne the formal legal status of relations between North and South Korea 64 years later. Inter-Korea Conict: Further Attempts at Conict Management and Conict Resolution Many of the efforts to manage and resolve the Inter-Korea con ict since the end of the Korean War were initiated in bilateral negotiations 280 M. BRECHER by the two Koreas. Among the agreements between the two principal adversaries in this protracted con ict, some oral, others followed by cooperative behavior, six merit attention for their promise and outcome: their July 4 Joint Communiqué, 1972–1973; their Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation, 1991–1993; their Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 1992–1993; their Summit Meeting and June 15 Joint Declaration, 2000; their Summit Meeting and October 4 North-South Declaration, 2007; and South Korea’s ‘Sunshine Policy,’ 1998–2008. 1972 Joint Communiqué—Talks by the dominant Korean leaders in 1971, Kim Il Sung (DPRK) and Park Chung Hee (ROK), who rarely met face-to-face and reportedly loathed each other, led to their Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972. This formalized their verbal agreement on three principles designed to achieve their goals—peaceful uni cation, tension reduction, and reconciliation of their different ideologies and polit- ical systems. The guiding principles were as follows: independent achieve- ment of uni cation, without any foreign involvement or constraints; its attainment by peaceful means; and the shared objective of national unity as one people. However, this attempt at con ict resolution, like all its suc- cessors, was aborted: North Korea withdrew from the follow-up nego- tiations on August 23, 1973, apparently because the two leaders held different interpretations of the Communiqué’s three principles and were unwilling to make commitments to their implementation (Chang 1996, 246–247). 1991–1992 North-South Korea Basic Agreement—The prelude to this agreement was a declaration by South Korean President Roh Tae Woo in July 1988, at the beginning of South Korea’s transition from an authoritarian to a democratic political system: he enunciated a more speci c six-point Korean uni cation policy than the 1972 Communiqué which, after extensive negotiations, became the core of the Basic Agreement. Signed on December 13, 1991, with effect from February 19, 1992, this agreement re-af rmed the three principles set out in the 1972 Joint Communiqué; declared the intent of the two Koreas to end political and military confrontation and attain national recon- ciliation; agreed to reject armed aggression, to reduce tensions between them and to establish peace; and renewed their oft-stated commitment to the reuni cation of families separated by the Korean War, and the 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 281 fi fi fl fl fi fi fi fl fi promotion of common interests and the prosperity of the Korean peo- ple. Implementation of the Basic Agreement began but faltered and later failed, for several reasons. One was the revival of the annual South Korea–USA “Team Spirit” military exercises, always anathema to North Korea’s leadership. Another reason was its timing: implementation of the Basic Agreement became enmeshed with the rst North Korea Nuclear Crisis in 1993–1994, when the DPRK declared its intent to withdraw from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). The third and most basic obstacle was the starkly different DPRK and ROK ideologies and their divergent conceptions of a desired outcome: for South Korea, the goals were a single and complete re-uni ed Korean state, with a democratic political system and a market economy; for North Korea, the objectives were a lower-stage federation of the two Korean states, in which the DPRK would retain its Communist political system and com- mand economy. Thus, like most verbal agreements between the two Koreas, the ambitious Basic Agreement was aborted. 1992–1993 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula—Issued on January 20, 1992, with effect from February 19, it speci ed a commitment by the two Koreas not to manufac- ture, receive, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons and not to possess nuclear re-processing and uranium enrichment facilities. Veri cation of the implementation of these commitments and, more generally, denu- clearization was to be achieved by a North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission. However, this attempt at inter-Korea con ict management via a bilateral inspection regime was thwarted in 1993 by several devel- opments: failed meetings between the two Koreas on the implementation of their Joint Declaration on Denuclearization the previous year; North Korea’s refusal in 1993 to grant a request by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for inspection of its suspected nuclear facilities; and North Korea’s threat the same year to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime, to which it was committed since it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, under USSR pressure—the Soviet Union no longer existed in 1993. 2000 North Korea–South Korea Summit Meeting and Their June 15 Joint Declaration—The DPRK (North Korea) leader, Kim Jong Il and the ROK (South Korea) president, Kim Dae Jung, held a Summit meeting in Pyongyang on June 13–15, 2000. In a Joint Declaration, 282 M. BRECHER fl fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fl they declared their agreement: to resolve the issue of reuni cation of the two Koreas on their own initiative; to permit an exchange of visits by members of Korean families that had been separated by the Korean War, on August 15, 2000; and to arrange an exchange of long-term prison- ers in the two states. They also indicated a mutual recognition that both of their preferred constitutional-political solutions for a reuni ed Korean Peninsula —a lower-stage federation [najundangueuiyonbangje-an], for the DPRK, and a federation [yonhapje-an], for the ROK—contained common features and agreed to promote the shared goal of reuni ca- tion that would be based on those common elements. The Declaration also called for greater economic cooperation between the two Koreas and proposed a dialogue among of cials to implement the terms of their Declaration without delay. As with virtually all the preceding bilateral attempts at con ict management and con ict resolution noted above, the Joint Declaration of 2000 remained a conciliatory, vague verbal commit- ment by the two principal adversaries. More signi cant, Kim Jong Il’s acceptance of Kim Dae Jung’s reciprocal invitation in June 2000 to visit Seoul “at an appropriate time” was never implemented. 2007 North KoreaSouth Korea Summit Meeting and Their October 4 Joint Declaration This Joint Declaration by Korea’s then-leaders, Kim Jong Il (DPRK) and President Roh Moo-hyun (ROK), repeated the general verbal commit- ments expressed in the Joint Declaration 7 years earlier by Kim Jong Il and the then-President of South Korea, Kim Dae Jung, initiator of the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy” in 1998, notably their shared goals— reuni- cation, on their own initiative, greater economic cooperation, and an end to military hostilities. However, this Joint Declaration went beyond, with several speci c commitments by the two Korea leaders. One was “to work together to advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned [the two Koreas, the PRC and the USA] to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war,” that is, to transform the Armistice regime since the end of the Korean War in 1953 to a formal peace agreement. This politically and symbolically signi cant provision of the Joint Declaration was not implemented. Nor were other commitments in the 2007 Joint Declaration: “to create a special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea,” in Haeju, a port town in south- western North Korea, along with a joint shing zone, maritime peace 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 283 zone, and a special economic zone, and “to work together to implement smoothly” two verbal agreements on the signi cant controversial issue of nuclear weapons in North Korea, their Joint Statement of September 19, 2005 and the February 13, 2007 Agreement framed at the Six Party Talks on North Korea’s active nuclear weapons program. There were also verbal commitments on the construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, freight rail services between Munsan and Bongdong, ship- building facilities, and projects in agriculture, medical services, and envi- ronmental protection. Since South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” was still intact, optimism about a new era of cooperation between the two Koreas was re ected in the 2007 Joint Declaration. However, the optimism was short-lived—the election of Lee Myung-bak as South Korea President in 2008 led to the abandonment of its “Sunshine Policy,” which made pro- visions of the 2007 Declaration irrelevant. fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fl fi fi 2000–2008 South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” The one partial suc- cess in Korean efforts to achieve con ict resolution was a South Korean (ROK) unilateral initiative to attain the positive goals expressed in the several agreements and declarations by leaders and regimes noted above. The tangible, innovative, high-pro le “Sunshine Policy” by South Korea’s President Kim Dae Jung (1998–2003) took the form of a dra- matic ‘opening’ to the DPRK), with two dimensions—vitally needed economic aid to North Korea from South Korea, including the Hyundai Project of investment, and closer political relations. Kim Dae Jung’s visit to Pyongyang in 2000 for a summit conference with the DPRK leader, Kim Jong Il, was an important symbolic element of the “Sunshine Policy,” aimed at reconciliation and, ultimately, peaceful reuni cation of the two Koreas. Leaders of the DPRK and the ROK were long commit- ted to these objectives, though they held fundamentally different con- ceptions of the preferred type of political system, economic system, and ideology that should prevail in a reunited Korean Peninsula. Although South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” toward North Korea proved to be of limited duration, it demonstrated promise and substantial ful llment for a decade (1998–2008): this policy was sustained by Kim Dae Jung’s successor, Roh Moo-Hyun (2003–2008). The policy led to four nota- ble achievements. One was the initiation of a successful summit meeting between the leaders of the Korean adversarial states in 2000. Another was the beginning of limited trade between the DPRK and the ROK, after a half-century of economic isolation. A third was the opening of 284 M. BRECHER the Mt. Kumgang tourist area to South Korean visitors. And the fourth, which resonated among the aged segment of both North and South Korean populations, was the beginning of a limited reuni cation of fami- lies that had been separated by the Korean War. In 2008, South Korea’s policy toward the DPRK reverted to the pre- dominant ‘hard line’ espoused and practiced by the Republic of Korea (ROK)’s political leaders during the rst half-century of this protracted con ict (1948–1998), notably by its rst two long-term authoritarian presidents—Syngman Rhee (1948–1960) and Park Chung Hee (1962– 1979). The reversal from the “Sunshine Policy” to a hard-line policy occurred in 2008, with the election of a conservative political leader, Lee Myung-bak as President of the Republic of Korea (2008–2013), partly in response to the vigorous nuclear weapons program of the DPRK, high- lighted by its rst nuclear weapon test in 2006, followed by much more sophisticated nuclear weapon tests in 2009, 2013, 2014, 2016, and 2017. A return to the soft-line policy was pledged by the newly elected South Korean President in 2017. In sum, the negative record of bilateral and unilateral attempts at con- ict management and con ict resolution in the Inter-Korea con ict, with the partial exception of the “Sunshine Policy,” was deeply rooted in the ideological con ict that dated to the creation of two Korean states in 1948. That enduring con ict between the two parts of a homogeneous nation re- escalated from 1993 onward primarily because of the DPRK’s initially cov- ert entry into the select group of nine nuclear weapon states—the USA, the USSR-Russia, the UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and the DPRK— intensifying the longstanding rivalry between the two Koreas. Inter-Korea: Third-Party Attempts at Conict Management and Resolution fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fi fi fl fl There have also been several notable third-party attempts at con ict management and con ict resolution focused on the Korean Peninsula, mainly by the two patrons of the principal adversaries in this con ict, the United States, patron of South Korea, and China, patron of North Korea. One of these efforts was ultimately successful—the lengthy process that led to the termination of the Korean War (1950–1953), noted above. The USA indicated its wish for a cease- re in December 1950, six months after the outbreak of full- 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 285 DPRK, did so six months later. The USA and China, the two major patrons of the two Korea belligerents, played the decisive role in sustain- ing the Korean War; but they were also instrumental in initiating and persisting in its de-escalation, culminating in the July 1953 Armistice Agreement, which ended the longest and most violent phase of this unresolved con ict. While many hostile acts—violent and non-violent— have occurred in the relations between North and South Korea during the past 6 decades, noted in the analysis of con ict-sustaining acts, the Armistice regime has been, and continues to be, an effective deterrent to a recurrence of major inter-Korea violence since 1953. As such, the third-party-engineered Armistice Agreement has been a highly successful achievement in con ict management. A promising but only partly ful lled development, four decades after the Korean War, combined third party and bilateral attempts at both con ict management and con ict resolution in the two unresolved con- icts that currently co-exist and reinforce each other, the Inter-Korea and the North Korean Nuclear con icts: this was the October 1994 Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the USA, with other partici- pants, the ROK and Japan, initiated and sustained by the USA (Clinton Administration) and North Korea (during Kim Il Sung’s lengthy leader- ship). Like all the bilateral agreements between the two Koreas between 1972 and 2000 noted above, aimed at resolution of the Inter-Korea con- ict, the 1994 Agreed Framework, multilateral in form but essentially a bilateral agreement in content between North Korea and the United States, became a terminal victim of escalating distrust between these two adversaries, consigned to ‘what might have been’ in 2002. Like the 1994 Agreed Framework, noted above, the primary focus at its ‘on-again-off- again’ high-pro le successor in attempted con ict management and conict resolution, the Six Party Talks, which unfolded in six Rounds from late August 2003 to mid-April 2009, when the DPRK announced that it would no longer participate in this forum and would not be bound by its previous agreements, was the controversial issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, not the Inter-Korea con ict. Inter-Korea Conict: Causes of Non-Resolution The Inter-Korea con ict, like its close conceptual and empirical con- ict relative, the North Korean Nuclear Con ict, has not been resolved. The Model on Con ict Resolution will be tested here by focusing on the 286 M. BRECHER fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fl fl fl fl following question: have any, some or all of the six postulated ‘most likely’ causes of interstate protracted con ict resolution been present in the Inter-Korean con ict during the 70 years since its onset in 1948? fl fl scale war. The USSR, not a direct participant in that war but the major initial supplier of arms to the Exhaustion—Although there was abundant evidence of acute exhaustion by the population of both the DPRK and the ROK at the end of the Korean War in 1953, that condition was suf cient for partial resolution only, in the form of the Armistice Agreement—which remains in force 64 years later, though occasionally under severe threat to its persistence, not complete resolution of their interstate con ict. Moreover, inter-Korean violence since 1953 has been episodic, mostly high-pro le incidents initiated by North Korea, but minimal in intensity and casualties, except for the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, with the loss of 46 South Korean naval personnel in 2010, the cause of, and responsibility for, that incident which remains formally unclear. The people of North Korea have endured several periods of exhaustion, but all resulted from famines and general economic privation resulting from governmental economic policy and foreign-imposed sanctions, not from the enduring con ict with South Korea. By contrast, the ROK, South Korea, enjoyed a ‘quali- tative leap’ in economic development and prosperity from the 1970s onward. While its population has been subject to periodic increases in stress, especially since the DPRK demonstration of a nuclear weapons capability in its many nuclear tests (2006, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2016, and 2017) the largest test in September 2016, that triggered stiffer UN Security Council economic sanctions 2 months later), and other evidence of a missile capability superior to that of its South Korea rival (though vastly inferior to the nuclear weapon and missile capability of South Korea’s patron, the USA), there is no evidence of collective exhaustion among the population of South Korea, deriving from a threat to survival or of grave damage from its adversary in this con ict. In sum, the absence of collective exhaustion by North or South Korea since the end of the Korean War contributed to its non-resolution thus far. Changes in the Capability Balance—Throughout the Inter-Korea con- ict, the principal adversaries have been relatively equally matched in war-making capability. The DPRK’s armed forces were larger than those of the ROK, but the latter possessed superior conventional weapons, in both quantity and quality, provided consistently by its patron, the United States, since the beginning of the Korean War. During the last 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 287 fi fl fl fi fl fi fl fi fi fi fl decade, since its rst nuclear weapon test in 2006, North Korea acquired a modest nuclear weapon capability. However, in this domain, too, the longstanding USA ‘boots on the ground’ military presence in South Korea and the near-permanent military alliance between the USA and the ROK, with the signi cantly larger USA nuclear weapons capability, served as an effective deterrent thus far against North Korea’s resort to nuclear weapons in a foreseeable future war with South Korea. This rela- tive balance of military power on the Korean Peninsula made a full-scale war designed to unify the two Korean states by force since 1953 highly unlikely. Moreover, the ROK has possessed a vastly superior economic capability to sustain a war against its rival since the 1970s; and, as the more satis ed Korean state, the ROK is less likely to initiate a war of re- uni cation. In sum, the absence of a decisive superiority in overall acces- sible military capability by the two Korean states also contributes to the persistence, that is, non-resolution, of the InterKorea con ict. Domestic Pressures —There is no reliable evidence within the civil authoritarian Kim family political regime in the DPRK of internal pres- sures for a mutually acceptable resolution of the Inter-Korea con ict. The promise of several high-pro le verbal agreements with the ROK, in favor of peaceful con ict resolution and re-uni cation—the 1972 Joint Communiqué, the 1992 Basic Agreement, and the 2000 Joint Declaration— was not ful lled, as noted above. The sole indicator of a conceivable DPRK interest in a shared con ict resolution agreement was the reputed offer in 1980, by North Korea’s ‘founding father’ and supreme leader from 1948 to 1994, Kim Il Sung, for a federation between the two independent Korean states. This would have been essentially a verbal, not a substantive, change, for it would permit both North Korea and South Korea to retain their distinctive political and economic systems, ideologies, and armed forces. In South Korea, as noted above, there was one highly visible mani- festation of domestic pressure in favor of genuine con ict resolution, a policy goal that was expressed in the ‘Sunshine Policy’ and implemented by two ROK presidents (1998–2008). Moreover, South Korea’s political leaders frequently advocated re-uni cation in the form of a uni ed “one nation, one state, one system, and one government” in the nal stage, a Korea federal state, with substantial autonomy for its two parts. This advocacy has long been the primary purpose of the ROK Government’s Ministry of Reuni cation, accompanied by the expectation that the 288 M. BRECHER uni ed state would adopt the political system of democracy and a market economy, modeled on the United States, which have always been anath- ema to the DPRK leadership. In sum, the only signi cant manifestation of domestic pressure for peaceful con ict resolution was South Korea’s ‘Sunshine Policy,’ pursued for a decade in a 70-year unresolved con ict. The absence of such pressures was an additional cause of its persistence. fi fi fl fi fi fi fi fl fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fl External Pressures —There is considerable evidence of foreign pres- sures on the principal adversaries—the DPRK and ROK, North and South Korea—by the USA, China, and the UN, and by a group of states with diverse but substantive interests in con ict resolution in the Korean Peninsula, Japan and Russia, along with China and the USA. As indicated above, in the discussion of Third-Party Efforts at Con ict Management and Resolution, the most tangible expression of pressure by the patrons of the DPRK (China) and the ROK (United States) was their role in generating the Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War in July 1953 and their role in initiating and sustaining the Six Party Talks from 2003 to 2009. Since 1993, most external pressures for con- ict resolution of Korea-related con icts have focused on the resolution of the North Korean Nuclear con ict, not the con ict between the two Koreas. This is evident in the UN–USA response to the rst interstate crisis related to the North Korean nuclear weapons program (1993), culminating in the DPRK-USA Agreed Framework (1994), discussed above, as well as the Six Party Talks from 2003 to 2009, and the UN and US condemnation of North Korea’s reported nuclear weapons tests thus far (2006, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2016, and 2017), joined by China’s infrequent public criticism of the DPRK’s third and fth nuclear tests. Only one of these manifestations of external pressure, the 1994 Agreed Framework, registered (short-term) progress on the elusive path to con ict resolution of the North Korean Nuclear con ict (from 1994 to 2002); had this been sustained, it would have greatly assisted, but would not have been synonymous with, the resolution of the wider, multi-issue Inter-Korea con ict. Together, resolution of both Korea-based interstate con icts would have brought peace to the Korean Peninsula. Reduction in Discordance of Objectives—Notwithstanding several accom- modative initiatives that led to cooperation by the principal adversar- ies in the Inter-Korea con ict for considerable periods—the USA role in the process that generated the Agreed Framework (1994–2002), that 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 289 included cooperation between North and South Korea on the crucial issue of energy, the cooperative USA–China role, with the active partici- pation of the two Koreas, in creating the Six Party Talks (2003–2009), and South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” toward North Korea (1998–2008), the two principal adversaries in the Inter-Korea con ict have been consist- ently rigid on their core objectives. For the DPRK, the primary goal has been the reuni cation of the two Koreas in a centralized Communist state modeled on the pre-1990 Soviet Union, with all aspects of public policy monopolized by the Communist Party, except for a brief indication by the DPRK’s ‘founding father,’ Kim Il Sung, of a willingness to consider a federation [more accurately, a confederation] of two independent Korean states which would retain ultimate control over their economic and politi- cal systems, with a symbolic transfer of functions and authority to the confederation. This idea was never fully developed or seriously considered by either of the Korean states. For South Korea, both during its lengthy period of an authoritarian anti-Communist political system (1948–1987), and throughout its democratic phase, during the past 30 years, the objec- tive has been uni cation of the two Koreas into a democratic political system, with a limited autonomy for its two constituents, and a market economy. There has been no reduction in discord on this core issue. Decline in Con ict-Sustaining Acts—Despite infrequent gestures of con- cern for human rights, notably occasional episodes of limited family re- uni cation visits, the norm in relations between North and South Korea has been deep-rooted mutual distrust of the other Korea’s intentions and frequent displays of verbal and physical threatening acts. That norm clearly indicates the absence of a decline in con ict-sustaining behavior of the two Korea adversaries toward their rival for mastery of the Korean Peninsula. The con ict has been—and continues to be—profound 70 years after its onset. fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fi fi In sum, only one of the six ‘most likely’ causal conditions favorable to con ict resolution of the Inter-Korea con ict, postulated in the Con ict Resolution Model, namely, External Pressures, was evident in the quest for resolution of that interstate protracted con ict. The absence of ve of the six ‘most likely’ conditions for resolution of the Inter-Korea con ict — Exhaustion by the principal adversaries, the two Korea states, since the end of the Korean War, the lack of qualitative change in their Balance of Capability, Domestic Pressures for resolution, Reduction in Discordance of 290 M. BRECHER their Objectives, and Decline in Con ict-Sustaining Acts—indicates strong negative support for the theoretical rationale of the Resolution Model. Substantively, three long-term signi cant incompatibilities for the principal adversaries, the DPRK and the ROK, have reinforced the absence of ve ‘most likely’ conditions for con ict resolution as causes of the continuing persistence of this con ict. One is the profound differences in their ideological moorings, Communism and Juché (self-reliance) in North Korea, anti-Communism and Democracy in South Korea. Another source is the fundamental differences in their political and economic systems, an authoritarian political structure, dominated by a de facto monarchical family and an overwhelmingly state-controlled economy in North Korea, contrasting with a traditional authoritarian political regime during the rst four decades of South Korea’s statehood (1948–1987), transformed to a Western-type dem- ocratic political regime, and a USA-type market economy in South Korea. While the leadership in both Koreas has been committed to reuni cation from the onset of their con ict in 1948, both have con- sistently envisaged a united Korea in which their ideology, political structure, and economic system would prevail. These ideological and institutional incompatibilities have been reinforced by personal enmity between some of the pre-eminent leaders of the two Koreas, espe- cially the rst dominant North Korea leader, Kim Il Sung, who ruled the DPRK from 1948 to 1994, and Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee, the ROK presidents from 1948 to 1960, and 1961–1979: their personal enmity, accentuated by ideological hostility and political rivalry, dated to the later years of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea from 1910 to 1945. Although impossible to verify, it is hypothesized here that, if all six ‘most likely’ conditions for protracted con ict resolution—collective exhaustion, changes in the capability balance, domestic pressures for reso- lution, external pressures for resolution, reduction in discordance of objec- tives, and a decline in con ict-sustaining acts—along with the three substantive incompatibilities—ideology, political structure, and economic system, discussed above—had obtained for the two principal state adver- saries, the presence of the ‘most likely’ conditions would have triumphed over the incompatibilities, and con ict resolution would have been achieved. This hypothesis could be tested for the Inter-Korea con ict (and other interstate con icts manifesting these or similar incompatibili- ties), if and when the six ‘most likely’ conditions existed simultaneously 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 291 fl fl fi fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fi fi in a protracted con ict, along with the three incompatibilities. The likeli- hood of this pattern occurring is currently remote. Reconciliation Logically, reconciliation between-among adversaries in an interstate con- ict follows con ict resolution, just as resolution follows successful con ict management. This threestage process—con ict management—of speci c hostile episodes, crises, or issues, followed by con ict resolution—of all the basic disputes—and then by con ict reconciliation—is discernible in very few post-World War I protracted con icts, notably France/Germany, Ecuador/Peru, and, to some extent, Egypt/Israel and Israel/Jordan. As evident in the discussion of these cases elsewhere (Brecher 2016 L), these con icts experienced con ict management of several crises and wars, notably: ve interstate crises in the 1920s and 1930s, culminating in World War II, for the France/Germany con ict; four interstate cri- ses from 1935 to 1991, culminating in the 1995 Cenepa War, for the Ecuador/Peru con ict; and 11 interstate crises from 1948 to 1973, cul- minating in the 1973 October-Yom Kippur War, for the Egypt-Israel seg- ment of the Arab/Israel interstate con ict. In all three cases, successful con ict management led to peace agreements and con ict resolution, fol- lowed by varying degrees of reconciliation— active (France-Germany), moderate (Ecuador/Peru), and passive (Egypt-Israel and IsraelJordan). There are, however, exceptions to this three-stage linear process leading to con ict resolution. The Inter-Korea con ict is a prominent illustration. During most of this unresolved con ict, there have been unmistakable indicators of a mutual interest in, and acts of, reconcilia- tion between North and South Korea, the principal adversaries, without con ict resolution. The quest for reconciliation took the form of verbal commitments to peace, reuni cation, and reconciliation by gov- ernment leaders of the DPRK and the ROK, as evident in their 1972 Communiqué, 1992 Basic Agreement, 2000 Joint Declaration, and 2007 Joint Declaration. Moreover, the last of these expressions of amity was an integral part of the active implementation of South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” from 1998 to 2008, which included tangible acts of fraternal aid to the people of North Korea during and after a time of troubles, the famines and economic deterioration of the 1990s. These concilia- tory acts occurred despite the absence of a formal peace agreement or other forms of con ict resolution during more than six decades after the 292 M. BRECHER fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fi fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fl fl fl costly, divisive, and stalemated Korean War, which ended with only an Armistice Agreement in 1953, still in force 65 years later. More signi - cant, the frequent outbursts of verbal condemnations of alleged hostile acts by one or both of the principal adversaries, or of verbal threats of hostility against the adversary, were frequently accompanied or followed by conciliatory acts by one or both Korean adversaries. What seems to have made this possible was the special character of the adversaries in this con ict: their populations were members of the same nation, shar- ing a common history, language, and kinship. Thus, while experiencing a devastating interstate war (1950–1953) and a lengthy con ict between two independent states since 1948, it was also a civil war between two segments of the Korean nation. Thus, notwithstanding profound differences in ideology and political and economic systems, the popula- tion of the more prosperous and economically developed South Korea often contributed food and other forms of economic aid to the people of North Korea during periods of famine and other sources of distress. This kinship-driven behavior was often re ected in attempts, sometimes suc- cessful, to facilitate reunions of families that had been separated during the Korean War. A recent expression of this conciliatory behavior, after a lapse of more than 3 years in which these reunions were suspended by the DPRK (2010-early 2014), was a public appeal for improved relations by the North Korean leader on New Year’s Day 2014, followed by his agreement in principle, in early February, to a resumption of family reun- ions between people in the two Koreas separated since the end of the Korean War, though without a speci c date. In the absence of resolution of the Inter-Korea protracted con ict, it is not surprising that full reconciliation between North and South Korea remains elusive: even among the vast majority of 20 resolved interstate con icts that have been active for some or all of the years since the end of WWI, most with deep historical roots, very few have achieved genu- ine reconciliation, measured by Auerbach’s imaginative but demanding seven-stage Reconciliation Pyramid (2009). Yet some progress in the Inter-Korea con ict is evident. The leadership and large segments of the elites in both North and South Korea, as well as the attentive public in South Korea, are well-acquainted “with clashing narratives” (Stage 1 of the Reconciliation Pyramid); that is, they “acknowledge the other’s narrative...” more so in the post-1987 open society of South Korea than in the closed society of North Korea (Auerbach 2009, 304–305). 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 293 One can also infer, from the meetings and direct negotiations between leaders (Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee in 1971–1972, Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung in 2000), and from their verbal and formal commitments and concessions to each other, that the Korean leaders “Acknowledge the Other’s Narratives, Without Necessarily Accepting Them as True” [Ibid.‚ 305] (Stage 2 of the Reconciliation Pyramid). In 1971–1972, the DPRK “Supreme Leader” for most of the period of this protracted con ict (1948–1994), Kim Il Sung, acknowledged that North Korea would no longer demand a complete withdrawal of USA forces from South Korea as a pre-condition of negotiations between the two Koreas. The same leaders also formally agreed on peaceful uni ca- tion of their states, tension reduction, and reconciliation of their ideolo- gies and political systems, with the shared objective of national unity as one people, and these principles were re-af rmed, as noted in the above discussion of the ve communiqués and agreements by Korean leaders from 1972 to 2000. The fact that these formal agreements were not implemented does not nullify their “acknowledgement of the Other’s Narratives...”. fl fi fl fl fl fi fl fl fi fi “Expressing Empathy for the Other’s Plight” [Ibid., 307] (Stage 3 of the Reconciliation Pyramid) which is uncommon in identity con icts, has been evident on frequent occasions by large segments of South Korea’s population, in words and deeds, including the granting of material aid to North Koreans, especially during periods in which famines ravaged the North Korean economy and society, as noted. Little is known of the atti- tude of North Koreans to South Koreans. However, a strong feeling of kinship with the population of the other Korea can be inferred; that is, on both sides of their ‘iron curtain’ the population at large regards ‘the other’ as part of one Korean people. Thus, Stage 3 of the Pyramid seems to have been ascended by South Koreans and, likely, by the silent major- ity of North Korea’s population. There is no evidence that any of the other four stages of Reconciliation has been achieved: “Assuming (at Least) Partial Responsibility for the Other’s Alleged Plights” (Stage 4); “Expressing Readiness for Restitution or Reparations for Past Wrongs” (Stage 5); “Publicly Apologizing and Asking for Forgiveness for Past Wrongs” (Stage 6); and “Striving to Incorporate Opposite Narratives into Accepted Mutual Accounts of the Past” (Stage 7) [Ibid., 307–311]. Are the two Korean adversarial states likely to ascend these advanced stages of reconciliation once interstate con ict resolution has been attained? 294 M. BRECHER In the absence of any evidence, one must suspend judgment. However, except for the France/Germany protracted con ict, the states and peo- ples of North Korea and South Korea are probably the best prepared, psychologically and ethnically, to achieve the ‘great leap’ to Stages 5 and 6 of the Reconciliation Pyramid, with Stage 7—and genuine reconcilia- tion—at some unde nable point in the post-con ict resolution phase of their complex relations. north vietnaM/usa con ict (resolved) Behavior USA Decisions The rst of many important USA decisions during this interstate, inter-region con ict was to issue a virtual declaration of war against the Communist-ruled Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), in response to a perceived attack by North Vietnam torpedo boats on an American naval vessel in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 4, 1964. The decision, which took the form of an act by the USA Congress—overwhelming approval of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 10—was strategic in content, scope, and impact: President Johnson was granted far-reaching, virtually unlimited, authority to cope with what was designated a grave threat to USA security and inter- ests. This act provided the legal basis (and perceived legitimacy) for all subsequent USA military acts during the 11-year war (1964–1975). [Informally, the USA participated in the broader Vietnam protracted con ict for a much longer period, as a major supplier of nancial aid and weapons to France during its war with the DRV, North Vietnam, from 1950 to 1954, as well as the dispatch of military advisors to South Vietnam in the early 1960s, followed by massive direct military involve- ment in the Vietnam War for a decade]. fl fl fi fl fl fi fl fi fl fl fi fi The rst USA tactical military decision relating to this emerg- ing interstate con ict was to respond quickly to the then-USA identi ed North Vietnam naval attack on August 4, 1964: it took the form of a retaliatory act against four North Vietnam torpedo boats (Operation Pierce Arrow) soon after Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The next two tactical military decisions, to launch air raids against Vietcong and DRV forces in 1965, were more substantive and signi cant, for they led 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 295 to direct American military involvement in the Vietnam War. One was the short Operation Flaming Dart, in response to a Vietcong attack on USA barracks in Pleiku on February 7. The other was a prolonged air campaign, Operation Rolling Thunder, from March 2 to November 2, 1965, which set the pattern for other lengthy American military acts dur- ing that war. A minor tactical military decision a week after the start of Operation Rolling Thunder—the deployment of 3500 Marines to pro- vide more security for USA bases in Vietnam—was a hardly noticed signal of American participation in the ground war. The next USA mili- tary decision—President Johnson’s acceptance, early in August 1965, of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommendation to send 100,000 USA troops to Vietnam—was much more signi cant, a strategic decision, for it marked the rst substantive escalation of American involvement in that predominantly land war. The contents of a signi cant strategic military-cum-political, peace- oriented USA decision were conveyed in President Johnson’s surprise announcement on March 31, 1968, soon after the unanticipated large- scale North Vietnam-Viet cong Tet Offensive in February—of the cessa- tion of almost all USA bombing and a USA invitation to North Vietnam to engage in formal peace talks. The importance of that announcement was greatly enhanced by the addition of Johnson’s personal political decision which was bound to have far-reaching consequences for subsequent USA policy and behavior relating to the Vietnam War, that is, for the North Vietnam/USA con ict: he also indicated that he would not be a candi- date in the USA presidential election scheduled for the next 8 months. Almost certainly linked to this fundamental shift in USA policy toward American involvement in the Vietnam War, the year 1968 also witnessed the beginning of a prolonged American attempt to implement its strate- gic decision—to achieve ‘Vietnamisation.’ This policy goal had two com- plementary elements: steady, stage-bystage withdrawal of USA forces from Vietnam and the stage-by-stage transfer of responsibility for the continuing conduct of the war to the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam), along with an escalation of USA airstrikes throughout Vietnam to persuade the DRV to re-enter peace negotiations. This ambitious but unsuccessful program continued until 1973, the virtual end of USA active engage- ment in that long war. The rst substantive policy decision on the Vietnam War by the newly elected President Nixon in 1969 was to attempt to entice North Vietnam to enter serious peace negotiations; the attempt failed—it was premature. fl fi fi fi fi fi 296 M. BRECHER In February 1971, once more with the active support of his principal adviser on the Vietnam War, as on USA foreign policy challenges gen- erally, Henry Kissinger, the USA president made and implemented the highly controversial and much-criticized decision to launch a massive secret bombing of Vietcong-North Vietnam military sanctuaries and the ‘Ho Chi Minh’ supply trail in Cambodia and Laos. The magnitude of the Laos operation, castigated as grave war crimes by many, is evident in two awesome quantitative indicators. The USA dropped more bombs on Laos in 1971 than it did everywhere throughout World War II, killing 350,000, 10% of the Laos population. Another massive bomb decision by Nixon and Kissinger, the ‘Christmas Bombing’ of North Vietnam in December 1972, again designed to compel the DRV to re-enter peace negotiations, was successful. It led directly to the decision—by both of the principal adversaries—to sign the Paris Peace Accord on January 13, 1973, which marked the end of the formal USA involvement in the Vietnam War. USA Decision-Makers There were two clusters of crucial USA decision-makers in the North Vietnam/USA con ict and the Vietnam War, which were synonymous in duration. During the Lyndon Johnson phase (1964–1968), there were four ‘principals’—President Johnson, Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, and McGeorge Bundy, National Security Adviser. There was one notable dissenter from the ‘hard line’ propounded by the key decision-makers in Phase I of the Vietnam War, George Ball, Under-Secretary of State in both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (1961–1966): he was known, then and later, as ‘Vietnam’s Devil’s Advocate.’ During Phase II (1969– 1973), there were two crucial USA decision-makers on the Vietnam War and the North Vietnam/USA con ict: President Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Kissinger, the principal USA negotiator with North (and South) Vietnam since the beginning of the Nixon presidency in January 1969. USA Decision Process The USA Constitution and political system generated an array of institu- tions and constraints on the exercise of authority by the USA President in the conduct of foreign policy: the role of Congress in creating a state of war by the United States and any other state; supervisory con- trol over all Departments in the Executive branch of Government; the 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 297 fl fl fl vetting of presidential appointments to senior posts in the foreign service and the armed services; and the allocation of funds for all USA involve- ment in foreign wars. Theoretically, these and other constraining powers by a non-cooperative or unfriendly Congress could seriously undermine the president’s formal authority as commander-inchief and head of the Executive branch of Government. In practice, however, as evident in the analysis of all interstate protracted con icts in which the USA was/ is a principal adversary, the USA decision process is much less complex. The authority and power to make and implement strategic and tacti- cal political and military decisions on issues relating to adversaries (and allies) in wars and military and political crises is highly concentrated in the president and his appointed aides. For example, this was evident in USA international crises within the USA/USSR interstate protracted con ict, such as the Berlin Blockade (1948–1949) and Cuban Missile crises (1962). So it was in the North Vietnam/USA con ict as well: all of the strategic and important tactical decisions by the USA in Phase I (1964–1968) were made by President Johnson and the small group of his appointees to the key national security positions in the USA gov- ernment. During Phase II (1969–1973), the important decisions relat- ing to North Vietnam and the Vietnam War were made by President Nixon and/or National Security Adviser Kissinger. This is not to dismiss or denigrate the advisory-pressure role of others whose input to these decisions, whether sought by the president or initiated independently by other senior of cials, such as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairs of the House and Senate committees on the armed forces and foreign affairs- relations, may in uence, at times signi cantly, the decisions taken by the president and a core group of aides. There may also be in uence exerted by pressure groups—the media, prominent political party leaders, inter- est groups, the media, and most broadly, public opinion. These were evi- dent, for example, in President Johnson’s announced decisions on March 31, 1968—the cessation of most bombing in Vietnam and the invitation to North Vietnam to enter peace negotiations. Thus the decision process may, and often does, extend far beyond the core decision-makers and in uence their choices. However, the USA decisions on March 31, 1968 were made by President Johnson, not by any of the institutions or per- sons in the Executive or Legislative branches of the USA Government, or the leaders of the Armed Forces or the Intelligence agencies. In sum, the USA decision process on national security and foreign policy 298 M. BRECHER issues is complex at one level of analysis, namely, for advisory roles by select Congressional leaders and senior of cials in relevant bureaucratic Departments— advisory or pressure roles; it is much less complex at the decision-maker level of analysis. In the North Vietnam/USA con ict, an atypical case, Kissinger played a dual role— National Security Adviser and decision-maker. Yet, as those who have analyzed this interstate con ict in depth have noted, and Kissinger himself acknowledged in his memoirs, his role as decision-maker, with few exceptions, was authorized and vet- ted carefully by President Nixon. fi fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fl fl fl fi DRV-North Vietnam: Decisions The overall strategy of North Vietnam for the achievement of its primary objective—the uni cation of North and South Vietnam in a Communist- ruled state—preceded the onset of its protracted con ict with the USA in 1964. A policy decision by the Politburo of the DRV Workers Party to pursue the dau tranh (two-track) strategy—combining carefully planned military action with revolutionary zeal to counter superior USA weapons already made available to South Vietnam—was communicated in a July 1962 letter from Le Duan, Secretary-General of the Workers Party, to the Communist organizations and cadres, notably the Vietcong, in South Vietnam. This dual strategy, which also called for continued adherence to the 1954 Geneva Accords that led to the ‘temporary’ creation of two Vietnam states, would facilitate the unhindered economic reconstruc- tion of North Vietnam’s damaged economy along communist lines and the achievement of uni cation of the two Vietnams, via continued resist- ance to USA plans to transform all of Vietnam to a USA-type capitalist dependency. The rst signi cant strategic DRV decision in the North Vietnam/ USA protracted con ict, on November 22, 1964, soon after the USA Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 10, 1964), but before the initial display of superior USA military power in the Vietnam War—Operation Rolling Thunder, in January 1965—was to accelerate the war against South Vietnam, with the goal of a total military victory before the beginning of large-scale USA military intervention. (It took 11 years for North Vietnam to achieve total military victory over its southern adversary and the USA) The most wide-ranging military decision by North Vietnam and its South Vietnam af liate, the Vietcong, during this interstate-intrastate con ict was to launch a “General Offensive and Uprising” on January 31, 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS... 299 1968, the date of the of cial TET holiday; the date of the decision is not known. The scope of this operation was vast: 84,000 North Vietnam and Vietcong troops attacked simultaneously ve of South Vietnam’s major cities, 36 of 44 provincial capitals, and many district central towns. While there is disagreement about its degree of military success, the psycho- political effects of this daring North Vietnam-Vietcong initiative on a totally surprised USA leadership were profound. A bipartisan group of former government of cials from both American political parties advised President Johnson to set in motion steps to disengage from Vietnam. Most important, the TET Offensive was the catalyst to President Johnson’s 31 March announcement noted above—declaring a cessation of almost all USA bombing and inviting the DRV to enter peace nego- tiations, the rst meaningful step in a belated peace process, along with his no-less surprising statement that he would not stand for re-election in November 1968. As such, the TET Offensive can be termed the DRV’s most decisive military-political decision during the prolonged Vietnam War-protracted con ict. While there were many North Vietnam tactical decisions throughout the Vietnam War, they will not be discussed here. Two important DRV decisions in December 1972 and January 1973, both related to termi- nation of this con ict and lengthy war, merit attention. The rst was a quick response to the massive USA Christmas Bombings in late December 1972—the North Vietnam Politburo made the decision to return to negotiations in Paris, as demanded by President Nixon and Kissinger, his National Security Adviser. fi fi fl fl fl fl fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi The nal North Vietnam strategic decision in this interstate con ict, also noted in the above discussion of USA behavior—since this deci- sion was shared by the two principal adversaries—was to sign the Paris Peace Accord, the terms of which constituted a major triumph for the DRV. The USA made three major concessions in this peace agree- ment. It agreed to withdraw all its forces from Vietnam (at their peak, more

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