Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict (Dormant) PDF

Ethiopia/Somalia Con ict (Dormant) Behavior fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi Somalia: Decisions and Decision-Makers Viewed in terms of decisional behavior by Somalia, one of the two principal adversaries in this unresolved Horn of Africa con ct, there were four 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONF...

Ethiopia/Somalia Con ict (Dormant) Behavior fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi Somalia: Decisions and Decision-Makers Viewed in terms of decisional behavior by Somalia, one of the two principal adversaries in this unresolved Horn of Africa con ct, there were four 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 153 phases: Phase I Independence (1960–1969); Phase II Regime Change, War, and Instability (1969–1991); Phase III Collapse (1991–2004), and Phase IV Islamist War. (In the last two phases, as will be evident below, this unresolved con ct was dormant because Somalia descended into chaos, disintegration, and civil strife.) There was one strategic decision by Somalia in Phase I, the pre-condition for any relations between Somalia and Ethiopia: after a 10-year UN trusteeship by the UK and Italy over former British and Italian Somaliland (1950–1960), the two Trust Territories held elections, and 5 days after independence they decided to form the United Republic of Somalia. Among several tactical decisions soon after the creation of a new state, the founders decided to send an unequivocal irredentist message to Ethiopia (and Kenya), the most directly affected neighbors of Somalia, by issuing a fve-star national fag, identifying fve territories in the Horn of Africa that Somalia asserted, in 1960 and since then, rightfully belonged to Somalia by virtue of the Somali ethnicity of its pastoral population. The largest of these Somalia-claimed territories was the Ogaden, a vast desert frequented mainly by Somali pastoralists, which had been recognized as an integral part of Ethiopia, in an 1897 treaty between Ethiopia and the UK, the then-leading Great Power in Africa and the world. From the onset of the Ethiopia/Somalia con ct, this disputed territory has been the core discordant issue of their still-unresolved con ct. The Ogaden, one of the fve stars in Somalia’s fag, was never remote from the concern and aspiration of Somalia’s political and military elites, but it was not a source of offcially directed hostile activity toward Ethiopia by either of Somalia’s presidents during the frst phase of this con ct, Aden Abdullah Osman Daar (1960–1967) or Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke, who was elected president in 1967 but was overthrown in a 1969 coup. However, hostile activity was not wanting: the most visible manifestation of Somalia’s persistent claim was the visible role among Somalis in the disputed Ogaden territory by a state-supported interest group, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). Somalia’s state behavior toward Ethiopia changed only after a coup d’état brought Muhammad Siad Barré to power in 1969, but the change did not occur immediately. In Phase II of Somalia’s behavior during this interstate con ct, the authoritarian regime headed by Barré made the second Somalia strategic decision, in 1977—to issue a formal declaration of war against Ethiopia and to invade the Ogaden region. 154 M. BRECHER It was ill-advised: in 1978, Somali forces were expelled from the disputed territory, and within a few years, domestic opposition to Barré’s rule became evident. A third Somalia strategic decision in this phase, part of the political fall-out of its severe defeat in the war with Ethiopia, was to sever its longstanding alignment with the USSR, expelling Soviet advisers, and seeking support from the United States. Another consequence of that military defeat was a fourth Somalia strategic decision, by an increasingly weaker Barré-led regime—to sign a formal peace treaty with Ethiopia in 1988. Ironically, the mutual obligation undertaken by the principal adversaries in that treaty, to respect their existing borders, became a catalyst for escalating political instability in Somalia. The provision calling for Somalia’s cooperation with Ethiopia to eliminate rebellious factions in the Ogaden, notably the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), further undermined the Barré-led regime. Its descent into state collapse, Phase III, began in 1991, with Barré’s ouster after two decades at the helm of Somalia’s functioning government. Civil strife was rampant for 13 years, highlighted by territorial fragmentation within Somalia—the 1991 Declaration of Somaliland Independence from Somalia and the 1998 Declaration of Puntland Independence, leading, in turn, to a territorial dispute between them over northern regions of Somalia. As a consequence of Somalia’s deterioration into the status of a ‘failed state,’ the Somalia/ Ethiopia con ct became dormant during Phase III: there were no strategic decisions, while Somali fi fi fi fi fi fi fi factions were immersed in a struggle over the succession to the defunct Barré regime. Attempts to restore a semblance of unity to the Somali state characterized Phase IV of Somalia’s woes (2004– 2015); however, since 1991 the Ethiopia/Somalia con ct was dormant. Somalia: Decision Process Throughout the three decades (1960–1991) and two phases (1960–1969, 1969–1991), in which Somalia was an active principal adversary in this con ct, its decision process was dominated by inter-clan relations. Presidents of Somalia were, frst and foremost, clan leaders, dependent upon support by the members of their clan, and engaged in interclan relations, designed to maximize support from within one’s clan, to weaken competing clans, and to attain and sustain political power by constructing alliances or effective coalitions with friendly clans. 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 155 Overall, such an inter-clan political system functioned like inter-party systems in Western democracies. During the two decades in which Siad Barré was Somalia’s authoritarian political leader, he retained power by an adept skill in mobilizing intra-clan support and loose alignments with one or more other clans, with ties of kinship and/or shared interests and political goals. During that long Phase II (1969–1991), notwithstanding his serious error in waging war against a more powerful Ethiopia in 1977–1978, his clan-based political regime was a viable, generally effective principal adversary against a more powerful foe. Ethiopia: Decisions The pattern of Ethiopia’s behavior in this con ct was similar to that of the other principal adversary. As in Somalia, there were two phases. The frst phase (1960–1974) was dominated by Ethiopia’s twentiethcentury long-time ruler, Haile Selassie, who was restored to his throne by the UK in 1941, after it defeated Italy in an early World War II East Africa military campaign. Ethiopia’s Phase II began with the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974 by a military coup and lasted until 1991: as in Somalia, it too was dominated by an authoritarian ruler for 14 years (1977–1991), Mengistu Haile Mariam, the counterpart of Siad Barré in Somalia: Mengistu was head of the Military Junta, known as the ‘Derg,’ the Coordinating Committee of Ethiopia’s regular army, police, and territorial army. As the stronger regional power, in occupation of the Ogaden with the UK’s sanction since 1897 and long before, Ethiopia’s policy throughout this con ct was defensive, aimed at maintaining the status quo; it was the counterpart of Somalia’s revisionist policy toward the disputed territory. Thus the two major decisions by Ethiopia in its Phase I (Haile Selassie) were only indirectly relevant to the Ogaden. In 1962, it enlarged the image and reality of its primacy in the Horn of Africa by annexing the neighboring territory of Eritrea. Two years later, Ethiopia formed an alliance with Kenya, whose North West District was explicitly identifed as one of the fve stars in Somalia’s fag, that is, an irredentist territory rightfully belonging to Somalia because of its Somali ethnic majority. Phase II for Ethiopia began with another decision and act indirectly relevant to the protracted con ct with Somalia: having triumphed in its 1974 coup, the Derg re-affrmed the federalist character of Ethiopia, including the annexed territory of Eritrea. Three years later, Ethiopia 156 M. BRECHER made the most important strategic decision in this phase—to engage in full-scale defensive warfare against Somalia’s invasion of the Ogaden. The result was a decisive Ethiopia military victory in 1978, leading to the expulsion of all Somalia forces from the disputed territory. In perspective, that decision and act marked the de facto end of the Ethiopia/Somalia con ct. However, it took another decade for that outcome to be sealed in the decision of Ethiopia (and Somalia) to sign a peace treaty that formalized the pre-war existing border. Although Somalia’s fve-star fag, including the explicit identifcation of the Ogaden as ‘lost’ territory remained unchanged, the 1988 treaty constituted Somalia’s recognition of Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the entire disputed territory by imposing an obligation on the two signatories, essentially, Somalia, as noted, to cooperate in eradicating insurgent proSomalia forces from the Ogaden Desert. Even before the signing of the 1988 border treaty, Ethiopia had reinforced its primacy in the Horn of Africa and Somalia’s relative weakness by renewing, in 1984, its 1964 alliance with Kenya, the location of another irredentist star in Somalia’s national fag. Ethiopia: Decision-Makers and Decision Process The similarity in the behavioral structure of the two principal adversaries in this interstate con ct extends to their decision-making process. In Somalia, it was characterized by a highly authoritarian structure, led by General Siad Barré, from 1969–1991. In Ethiopia, the decision process was also highly authoritarian, both in Phase I, with the Emperor as the dominant decision-maker from 1960 fi fi fl fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi (and long before) to 1974, and in Phase II, with General Mengistu as the dominant decision-maker from 1974 to 1991. Both Barré and Mengistu also espoused a Left-Socialist ideology though it was never clear whether this was an ideological commitment or a tactical choice to ensure the very substantial military assistance provided by the USSR for most of their tenure in power. The authoritarian leaders in both adversarial states also operated under structural and personal constraints: in Somalia, inter-clan relations and pressures limited Barré’s freedom of choice, and in Ethiopia, Haile Selassie often experienced dissent, even opposition, from lesser kings in Ethiopia’s regions, while Mengistu operated within the constraints of a military junta. In sum, there were many similarities in the decision process of the two principal adversaries in this Horn of Africa interstate con ct. 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 157 Ethiopia/ Somalia: Con ct-Sustaining Acts Violence—Ethiopia was the status quo adversary throughout this con ct, with the primary goal of retaining control and sovereignty over the disputed Ogaden Desert. Somalia has been the revisionist adversary since this con ct’s inception in 1960. However, the initiation of wars and military-security crises was almost equally divided between the adversaries. Somalia precipitated one of the two wars (Ogaden II, July 22, 1977– March 14, 1978), via its proxy, the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), which launched an attack on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in its on-going quest to wrest control of this territory. Soviet and Cuban aid to Ethiopia led to Somalia’s withdrawal from the Ogaden. In October 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia, defeating the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had declared a holy war against (Christian) Ethiopia. Of the three violent interstate crises, Somalia initiated the brief Ogaden I crisis (February 7–March 30, 1964), with an attack on an Ethiopian frontier post. A ceasefre seven weeks later led to the withdrawal of Somali forces to the original frontier. Ethiopia triggered the other two violent crises: Ogaden III (June 30–August 1982), when Ethiopian troops invaded the Hiran region and threatened communication between the two parts of Somalia, and USA military and economic aid to Somalia led to an inconclusive fading of the crisis, and the Todghere Incident (February 12–April 1987), when Ethiopian-supported irregulars attacked half a dozen Somali villages. Ethiopia apologized to Somalia, and the violence ended with a ceasefre in early April. A year later, the two con ct adversaries agreed to demilitarize their border and to resume diplomatic relations. Political Hostility —Frequent hostile political acts were initiated by both adversaries. Notable among Somalia’s con ct-sustaining political acts was the formal approval of its constitution, which proclaimed the goal of unifcation of all ethnic Somali majority territory and the authorization of Somalia’s provision of weapons to achieve that objective. Moreover, Somalia became a member of the Arab League, to secure aid and support for this most fundamental of its goals, generating an Ethiopian perception of ‘enemies at [most of] the gates.’ Ethiopia, too, contributed several high-pro e con ctsustaining political acts, all of them perceived by Somalia as gravely threatening: Ethiopia succeeded in securing formal approval of the ‘inviolability of state frontiers’ as a basic principle of the 158 M. BRECHER Organization of African Unity (OAU), thereby pre-empting Somalia’s claims to ethnic-majority territories in several neighboring states. It formed a military alliance with Kenya in 1963, another unfriendly neighbor of Somalia, which Somalia perceived as a thinly disguised hostile act by its ‘common enemy’ [Somalia has long claimed Kenya’s North West District because of its large ethnic Somali population]. Moreover, the rulers of Ethiopia and Kenya publicly called on Somalia, at an ‘East Africa Confrontation,’ to renounce all of its territorial claims against Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, a former French colony, and Tanzania, and to pay reparations to Ethiopia for damage caused by Somalia during their 1977– 1978 Ogaden War. Finally, both Ethiopia and Somalia, as noted above, drew the two superpowers into their protracted con ct by securing from them military equipment and political support to their African proxy— the USA as patron of Ethiopia from 1953 to 1977, with the USSR playing that role for Somalia in the 1960s and most of the 1970s, including a Treaty of Friendship, followed by a reversal of both superpower Horn of Africa alignments in 1977. Verbal Hostility (propaganda)—this type of con ct-sustaining activity was subsumed within the most relevant acts of political hostility by both adversaries, discussed above. Economic discrimination—the paucity of economic relations between the two adversaries in this con ct meant a virtually non-existent role for this type of con ct-sustaining acts, fi except for Somalia’s emphasis throughout the unresolved con ct on the economic deprivation of the pastoral Somali majority in the Ogaden Desert caused by Ethiopia’s denial of unhindered access to land and water in the disputed territory.