Unit 3A Inter State Conflicts (Arab-Israeli Conflict) 1948-1979 PDF

UNIT 3A Causes, Development and Management of Inter-state Conflicts Arab-Israeli Conflict (1948-1979) 1. Who or what caused the Arab-Israeli Conflict? 2. How important were the different actors in shaping the development of the c...

UNIT 3A Causes, Development and Management of Inter-state Conflicts Arab-Israeli Conflict (1948-1979) 1. Who or what caused the Arab-Israeli Conflict? 2. How important were the different actors in shaping the development of the conflict over time? 3. How effective were the efforts to manage the Arab-Israeli Conflict? CONCEPTS CONTENT LEARNING OUTCOME Historical 1948 marked the start of the War of Independence /Al Nakba, LO 1: Evaluate the Concepts: while 1979 marked the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty causes of conflicts accounts Causes: LO 2: Evaluate the chronology ○ Decolonisation: British decolonisation of Palestine; UN roles of different evidence Partition Plan; superpower support for formation of Israel actors in the historical ○ Security: security interests of Arab countries and Israel development of empathy ○ Territorial sovereignty: formation of the state of Israel and conflicts over time cause and defence of its sovereignty effect ○ Nationalism: clash between pan-Arab nationalism, LO 3: Evaluate the change and Palestinian Arab nationalism and Jewish nationalism effectiveness of continuity ○ Religion: clashes between Arab and Jewish cultures; conflict diversity religious significance of Jerusalem and Palestine management. significance ○ Economic interests: economic disparities between Arabs and Jews in Palestine; Anglo-French interests Content Concepts Role of different actors in the development of the conflict conflict cooperation ○ Manifestations of conflict: War of Independence / Al peace Nakba (1948); Suez Crisis (1956); Six-Day War (1967); Yom security Kippur War (1973) conflict ○ Role of combatant states (Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan): management attitudes towards conflict; military strength; support for Palestinian nationalism; involvement in peace negotiations; unresolved tensions after each war ○ Role of the superpowers: competition for influence in the region and provision of political and military aid to clients; involvement in peace process ○ Role of the UN: conflict mediation and peacekeeping Effectiveness of conflict management ○ Diplomacy: the USA’s shuttle diplomacy [Camp David Accords (1978), Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (1979)]; achievements and limitations of peace agreements ○ Peacekeeping: UNSC resolutions 242 and 338; UN peacekeeping operations [e.g., UNTSO (1948), UNEF I (1956), UNEF II (1973), UNDOF (1974)]; achievements and limitations of peacekeeping 1  Possible Essay Questions No Question 1 Who should bear the most blame for the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1948 to 1979: the Arabs, the Israelis, or the superpowers? 2 To what extent did the involvement of the USA and USSR make the Arab-Israeli conflicts difficult to resolve? 3 How far did the superpowers’ Cold War interests shape events in the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s? 4 ‘The Israelis have been the greatest impediment to the establishment of peace in the Middle East.’ To what extent is this true of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the period 1948-1979? 5 How far do you think that the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict was more a case of secular disputes rather than religious differences? 6 Was the role of external forces more a source of stability than instability in the Middle East between 1948 and 1979? 7 To what extent can the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1948 to 1979 be attributed to the rise of Arab nationalism? 8 ‘The UN has been effective in its management of the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1948 to 1979’ How far do you agree with this view? 9 How effective have peace mediation efforts been in managing the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1948 to 1979? 10 How significant was nationalism in the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1948 and 1979? Contents No Contents Page 1 Overview, Background, and Timeline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 2 1948 Arab-Israeli War Also known as the War of Independence to the Israelis and Al Nakba to the Arabs 3 1956 Suez Crisis 4 1967 Six-Day War 5 1973 Yom Kippur War 6 Conceptual Overview and Graphic Organiser 2  Chapter 1: Overview, Background, and Timeline 1. Overview The area known as the Middle East has been one of the world’s most troubled regions, plagued by wars and civil wars almost non-stop since the end of WWII. The Middle East consists of countries like Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Yemen republics, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Most of these states, except Turkey and Iran, are of Arab descent. The Middle East also contains the small Jewish state of Israel, which was set up by the United Nations (UN) in 1948 in what was previously known as Palestine. The creation of Israel in Palestine, an area the Arabs argued belonged to the Palestinian Arabs, outraged Arab opinion throughout the world. The Arabs especially blamed Britain, whom they felt had been more sympathetic to the Jews than to the Arabs. Most of all, they blamed the US, who supported the idea of a Jewish state very strongly. The Arab states refused to recognise Israel as a legal state and vowed to destroy it. Despite the four wars fought between Israel and the various Arab states (which we will be looking at in subsequent chapters), Israel survived. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians dragged on until today; and no permanent agreement has been reached. Instead, there have been signs of escalating tensions. In this topic, we will hence be looking at the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1948 to 1979 while keeping in mind the following questions: Who or what caused the Arab-Israeli Conflict? How important were the different actors in shaping the development of the conflict over time? How effective were the efforts to manage the Arab-Israeli Conflict? 3  2. Background To understand the conflict, there are some key ideas, concepts, and background information that you first need to understand. 2.1 Zionism and Arab Nationalism Zionism (named after Mount Zion, a mountain near Jerusalem) is the international political movement that supported the establishment of a homeland for the Jewish people in the Land of Israel. Israel was the perceived historical homeland of the Jews, and also, according to the Hebrew Bible, the Land of Canaan or Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel) that was promised by God to the Children of Israel (i.e. the Jews). Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the Zionist movement primarily supports the continued existence of the State of Israel even until today. The Jewish people lived in the land of Palestine from about 1500-1000 BCE. Around 1 CE, Palestine was ruled by the Romans. In 70 CE and again in 135 CE, the Jews rebelled against their Roman rulers. Roman soldiers crushed both revolts, destroyed the city of Jerusalem, including the Jewish temple, and expelled most of the Jews. Thousands of Jews fled to neighbouring countries and over the next hundreds of years became a scattered people, though some stayed in Palestine. Zionism thus arose in response to a history of persecution and discrimination against them. Many Jews had experienced anti-semitism (which means hostility, prejudice, and discrimination against the Jews); the most famous of which was the Holocaust during World War II where millions of Jews perished. But the Holocaust was not the first of such horrific persecution of the Jews, there had been countless other instances in history where Jews were expelled or massacred. As such, many Jews wanted a state and nation of their own - to them, only a state of their own would guarantee their safety and rights - and many looked to Palestine as their “rightful land” given its historical, traditional, religious and cultural ties to the Israel (the “promise land” for the Jews in the Bible). Waves of Jewish immigrants moved to Palestine at the beginning of the 20th century, and set up the first Jewish institution in Palestine, initiating the formation of the proto-state of Israel. 4 Arab nationalism is an ideology and sentiment that broadly emphasises the unity, identity, and interests of the Arab people. It is rooted in the feeling of a shared language (Arabic), and religion (Islam). It encompasses a range of political, cultural, and social movements that emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries, expressing the desires for self-determination and independence for Arab nations, mostly in response to colonialism and imperialism in the Middle East. Pan-Arabism, a subset of political ideology and movement under Arab nationalism, called for the establishment of a united Arab state or states that transcends individual nation-states and draws on the common Arab identity. Arab nationalism was boosted by the Arab revolt of 1916 in which the Arab army fought against the Turks in the Middle East. It was further strengthened after WWI in opposition to continued European domination, and subsequently in opposition to Zionism. However, it is important to note that the Arab people are not a homogenous group. While they broadly share common linguistic and cultural heritage, there are still differences and subgroups/subcultures within the Arab people. Arab nationalism was hence not a monolithic movement. It was somewhat divided over what type of political system the Arab people should adopt, who should lead the Arab people in this movement (several contenders such as Egypt would arise), and very importantly, a splintering of the nationalist movement into distinct localised nationalist movements, with their own agenda lying outside of the designs of Arab nationalism. An example is Palestinian nationalism that started becoming an issue especially after the formation of Israel in 1948. With the fight over Palestine, Arab nationalism would come into conflict with Zionism from the early 20th century onwards. 2.2 The British in Palestine (1917-1939) Originally, the Arabs lived in the desert area that is today mostly Saudi Arabia. They all spoke the same language, Arabic. In the 7th century, most of the Arabs converted to the religion of Islam. From their homeland in Arabia, they swept across the Middle East and North Africa. Palestine was one of the regions they took over. In the 16th century, the Ottoman Turks conquered much of the Middle East, including Palestine. By the 19th century, Arab intellectuals were trying to remove their Ottoman rulers and re-establish Arab rule in the Middle East. In World War I, the Ottoman Empire entered on the side of Germany, which brought it into conflict with the British. This encouraged the British to consider building up political alliances with the local Arabs, and also with the Zionist movement, to combat the Ottomans. 5 Hussein-McMahon Correspondence To the Arabs, the British promised Arab independence and statehood, if their assistance was assured and the Ottoman Empire was defeated alongside its German ally. In the complicated arrangement of the Arab-British alliance, most of the Arab territories in the Ottoman Empire were supposed to be returned to Arab sovereignty. Some territories which were not purely Arab were not to be given over to them. These included present-day Lebanon and part of Syria. The British claimed that Palestine was also not to be returned to Arab sovereignty, though the Arabs disagree on the details. These agreements are detailed in the letters known as Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. Balfour Declaration To the Jews, the British made almost similar promises: British Foreign Minister, Arthur Balfour, was convinced by British Zionist activist Chaim Weizmann that the Jewish people deserved a homeland in return for their assistance against the Germans on the Eastern Front. This was especially as the British were very keen to bring the US into the war, and believed the US jews could influence the US government. On 2 November 1917, the Balfour Declaration (made in the form of a letter) stated: that ‘His Majesty’s Government viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.’ The term “home” was used, rather than “state”, and this made the issue of Jewish statehood and nationhood ambiguous and contentious. Neither the Balfour Declaration nor the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence was specific about the actual borders of the territory promised to both Jews and Arabs. Both Zionists and Arab nationalists thus believed that all Palestine had been promised to them. Over the next three decades, the question of who would permanently control Palestine was never fully settled. Foundations of the Arab-Israeli conflict had been laid. Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) Despite promises to the Arabs and Jews, the British subsequently agreed in secret with France to carve up Turkey’s Arab lands after the war and share them between themselves. This agreement is known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) after the politicians who signed them. Under the agreement, some Arab land would be directly ruled by Britain or France while the rest would be Arab states with either British or French indirect control. In 1920, the League of Nations announced that Britain and France were to be given mandates, or orders, to govern certain countries in the Middle East until the Arab people were considered ready to govern themselves. Britain was given mandates over Palestine, Transjordan (later Jordan) and Iraq, and British troops and government officials took control of these lands. France was granted mandates over Syria and Lebanon. This naturally angered the Arabs who felt that they had simply exchanged Turkish rulers for British ones and were frustrated and disappointed that they had not been given their independence. Impact of Contradictory British Stance The British in the international arena tended to support Zionism, while in Palestine itself, British officials often pressured by Muslim opinion in neighbouring countries favoured the Arabs. Amidst this, British policy was to encourage Jews and Arabs alike to form their own institutions in preparation for statehood. The result was a contradictory British stance that caused the Arabs and Jews to resent each other further, and to utterly distrust the British position in the whole affair. The Jews were certain that Britain was secretly aiding and arming the Arabs as well as restricting Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine to prevent the creation of a Jewish state. On the other hand, the Arabs were convinced that the British were holding onto Palestine until a Jewish majority was achieved. They were angered by increasing Jewish immigration and the fact 6  that Jews were buying land in “their” country. Much of the land was bought from big Arab landowners, many of whom were absentee landlords living in cities like Jerusalem and Damascus. As more Jews entered Palestine, they bought more land for settlement and cultivation and displaced 30% of Arab Palestinian farmers. 75-80% did not even have enough land to support themselves by the 1930s. Furthermore, Arabs who had worked on the land as tenants were evicted as typically only Jews were employed to work on Jewish-owned farms. In fact, by the post-World War Two years, the inequitable distribution of resources between the two peoples within Palestine had brought the Arabs to the brink of economic disaster. They were now even more determined to halt the Zionist enterprise, to them not just a political but also an economic evil, an alien source of economic marginalisation and impoverishment stifling their economic development. Inter-communal violence arose several times between Arabs and Jews in the 1920s. For instance, in 1921, violence erupted in the town of Jaffa, a busy sea port. After 2 days of rioting, 200 Jews and 120 Arabs were dead/wounded. The British tried to manage it by limiting Jewish immigration. In 1929, the Wailing Wall incident occurred. It resulted in over 100 Jewish and Arab deaths and led to the massacre of most of the Jewish residents of Hebron. In response, the British issued a White Paper (the “Passfield White Paper”) blaming the Jewish agency for conducting land purchases in Palestine, which had stirred up Arab resentment. This led to a tightening of restrictions on Jewish immigration. The Jewish were furious, and the British then attempted to explain the White Paper away (in the MacDonald Letter). This of course angered the Arabs. Religious Significance of Jerusalem and The 1929 Wailing Wall Incident The Jews had claimed possession of the land of Palestine (including Jerusalem) since the biblical times of King David around 1000 BCE. According to the Hebrew Bible, King David established Jerusalem as the capital of the Kingdom of Israel. His son, King Solomon, commissioned the building of the First Temple at the site known as the Temple Mount today. As such, Jerusalem is seen as the holiest city in Judaism and the spiritual centre of the Jewish people. Later, the area became subsumed under the Roman Empire, who heavily persecuted the Jews (and early Christians for that matter). The famous Wailing Wall (aka Western Wall) in Jerusalem is the only remnant of the Jewish temple built by King Solomon about 3000 years ago that has since been destroyed. After the collapse of the Roman Empire in the late 5th century AD the Holy Land came under the control of the Byzantine Empire, who were in turn pushed out by the emergence of the Prophet Muhammad and the rise of the Islamic Caliphates. Around this time, the Holy Land and Jerusalem took on significance for the Muslim faith - being the locale in which the Prophet Muhammad undertook his Night Journey (Isra and Mi'raj) and ascended to heavens from, and also the first Qibla (direction of prayer) for Muslims. The prophet Muhammad designated the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for pilgrimage, and it became considered the 3rd holiest site in Islam, behind Mecca and Medina. This means that this site in Jerusalem is considered by two different religions as their holy site. Both the Jewish and Muslims are determined to hold onto Jerusalem because the city represents their religious roots and their cultural sense of belonging. This clash of religion has sparked off a territorial dispute because both the Jewish and Muslims want to retain their control over the holy city of Jerusalem. The Wailing Wall incident happened when several Jewish worshippers brought benches to sit on, facing the wall. The police removed these benches several times but the worshippers kept bringing new ones back. Arabs began to see this as a Jewish attempt to lay claim to the Wall. Tensions began to mount as 7  worshippers from both Arab and Jewish factions came to blows. This evolved into full-scale violence. Increased migration to Palestine in the 1930s In the 1930s, the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany and the flourishing of anti-Semitism in Europe made emigrating from Europe even more urgent for the Jews. However, the United States had imposed restrictions on immigration of all races to its shores, and this left the Jews with only Palestine. By this time, the Jews had clearly begun to fixate on Palestine as their ideal homeland. The Jewish population in Palestine rose from 164,000 to 370,000 between 1930-1936, and this led the Arab population to feel insecure. While Zionist settlement expanded, many Palestinian peasants became landless and impoverished. In 1936, the Arab revolt broke out. The Arab Higher Committee, formed under the leadership of Hajj Amin al-Husseini, galvanised the Arab community to go on strikes. This eventually led to full-scale rebellion against the British and the Jews. A Royal Commission (the Peel Commission, 1937) was set up to determine the causes of the conflict and find a way of dealing with the grievances of both Jews and Arabs. The Arabs boycotted the Commission, which published its recommendations in 1937 for the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states given the impossibility of co-existence between Arabs and Jews. The Arabs naturally opposed partition, because they believed all of Palestine should belong to them. Without any agreement, the Arab revolt and conflict dragged on till 1939. By then, the Second World War was looming. The British needed the goodwill of the Arabs with the impending outbreak of war in Europe so as to ensure continued oil supplies from the Middle East. It therefore issued the White Paper of 1939 that declared Britain wanted an independent Palestine within 10 years. It also limited Jewish immigration to 15,000 per year until 1944, and made Jewish immigration contingent on Arab consent after 1944. This White Paper represented a deep betrayal to the Jews - the few Jews that managed to escape the Nazi death camps now had nowhere to go. 2.3 WWII and its Impacts The official Arab position in WWII was one of neutrality, but in Palestine, Arab sentiments were ambiguous. The leader of the Arab Higher Committee actually made contact with the Nazis, seeing them as a tool to free Palestine from both the British and the Zionists. The Jews had no choice but to ally themselves with the British, in lieu of developments in Europe. The Palestinian Jews, despite resenting the British, joined the British Army in the war effort against the Nazis. Jews from Europe also began to immigrate illegally to Palestine, in a bid to resist the 1939 White Paper. In 1940, an estimated 40,000 Jews entered Palestine 8 illegally. The British responded by deporting Jews and intercepting/diverting ships carrying illegal Jewish immigrants. The Palestinian Jews ended up having to cooperate with the British, while resisting their policies at the same time. The Holocaust led the Jewish survivors of the concentration camps and the Zionist movement to push even harder for a Jewish state. The Holocaust also generated great international sympathy for the Zionist cause. With the Jewish refugee problem increasingly unmanageable, pressure mounted to cease restrictions to Jewish immigration to Palestine, as well as allow them to freely make purchases there for settlement. The US, rising in power and influence, also threw their support behind the Jews as the powerful Jewish lobby in America led the US to support the Biltmore Programme, an initiative calling for a Jewish state in Palestine. In April 1946, US President Truman called on the British government to allow the immediate entry of 100 000 Jewish refugees to Palestine. 6 months later, he came out in support of the partition of Palestine. The British Empire was in decline during and following the war, and were increasingly incapable of managing the fractious Palestine, especially with increased violence targeted at the British in Palestine. It was too costly, and thus they sought a way of withdrawing from Palestine. As early as February 1947, the British sought the advice of the UN, and subsequently announced that it would hand Palestine over to the UN in May 1948. Picture showing the Jews wearing the Star of David 9 These set the background for what was to happen in the lead up to the 1948 War, the first Arab-Israeli War that we will be looking at in Chapter 2. 3. Brief Timeline of Key Events Date Event 29 Nov UNGA adopts the Partition Plan for Palestine (Resolution 181) dividing Palestine into separate 1947 Jewish and Arab states. Arab nations reject the plan. 14 May Israel’s declaration of independence. Arab states launch a military intervention the next day. 1948 The first Arab-Israeli war begins. Jan to Armistice agreements signed between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states, establishing July 1949 temporary borders. (Note: armistice agreement is not the same as peace treaty. Armistice just means to stop fighting.) Oct-Nov Suez Crisis - Israel, France and the United Kingdom launch a military campaign against 1956 Egypt after nationalisation of the Suez Canal 28 May The Palestinian Organisation (PLO) was founded with the goal of liberating Palestine and 1964 establishing an independent Palestinian state. 5-10 June Six-Day War - Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, resulting 1967 in Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. 22 Nov UNSC Resolution 242 was passed - it has been referred to as the “land for peace” principle, 1967 which implies that Israel should exchange the territories it occupied in exchange for Arab recognition and normalisation of relations. 6-25 Oct Yom Kippur War - Egypt and Syria launch a surprise attack on Israel to regain lost territories. 1973 22 Oct UNSC Resolution 338 passed - Reiterates Resolution 242 as the basis for the settlement of 1973 the Arab-Israeli conflict. 1977 Begin’s election victory in Israel. He became Prime Minister, representing the Likud Party, marking a shift in Israeli politics. 17 Sept Camp David Accords - Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement mediated by US President Jimmy 1978 Carter, leading to a framework for peace in the region. 26 March Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty signed in Washington D.C, normalising relations between the 2 1979 countries. Egypt becomes the first Arab state to officially recognise Israel. 10 4. The Conflict in Infographics 11  Chapter 2: The 1948 Arab-Israeli War also known as the War of Independence to the Israelis and Al Nakba to the Arabs What were the causes of the conflict? What role did different actors play in the development of the conflict? How effectively was the conflict managed? 1. Background In Chapter 1, we saw that the conflict between the Jewish and the Arabs have existed for a long time, and have worsened overtime with the increased number of Jews arriving in Palestine from the 1930s. As WWII drew to an end, and with the British keen to extricate itself, the question of what to do about Palestine came to the forefront, and was taken up by the United Nations. The United Nations (UN)1 Aims and Principles of the UN The UN is an international organisation set up in October 1945 to promote international cooperation and peace and security, and was the successor of the League of Nations. In other words, the aim of the UN was to help maintain international peace and security by acting collectively against aggressive nations and intervening in conflicts that threaten peace and security, while promoting political, social and economic cooperation between countries. Organs of the UN The UN has 6 key organs, but the 2 key ones that you must know (cause they will keep appearing) are the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). You will also need to know the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) 1. The UNSC is the most powerful organ of the UN. It is the only organ in the UN that has the power to pass binding resolutions. The UNSC is currently made up of 15 members (there were only 11 members before its expansion in 1965). Out of the 15 members, 5 of them are permanent members (meaning they permanently have a seat in the UNSC). The 5 permanent members (also known as the P5) are the US, UK, France, USSR (now Russia after USSR collapsed in 1991), and the People’s Republic of China (before 1971, the seat of China was occupied by Taiwan). The other 10 non-permanent members are elected into the UNSC for 2-year terms. Importantly, the P5 has veto power. This means that for any resolutions passed by the UNSC requires ALL the P5 members to say yes (or at least not say no). If any of the P5 says no (i.e. uses their veto power), resolutions cannot be passed. 2. The UNGA on the other hand comprises all the members of the UN (i.e. every single country who are part of the UN are part of the UNGA) and they all have one vote in the Assembly. By virtue of this, the UNGA is said to have moral authority, since it is representative of all countries. The UNGA has the power to put on its agenda and discuss anything that they want (from social, economic, political to security matters) so long as the UNSC was not already discussing it. However, while the UNGA has moral authority, it does not have the power to pass binding 1 For those who are interested to find out more about the UN, you can google the UN Charter. The UN Charter will give you all the details of the aims, organs, and processes of the UN. 12  resolutions (meaning its resolutions remain recommendations, or require the UNSC to take it up and enforce it). 3. Besides the UNSC and UNGA, you will also come across this guy known as the Secretary General of the UN (UNSG). The UNSG represents the UN, is the head of the Secretariat, and is known as the “Chief Administrative Officer” of the UN. The SG is expected to perform "such other functions as are entrusted" to them by the United Nations organs and bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in their opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN Special Committee for Palestine Britain handed Palestine over to the newly established United Nations in the latter half of 1947, and the UN immediately set to work by forming the UN Special Committee for Palestine (UNSCOP). UNSCOP listened to both Arabs and Jews in Palestine, as well as considered the views of other Arab leaders in the region in order to find some resolution to the conflict. The Arab Higher Committee boycotted UNSCOP, in the belief that the UN team was already biased towards the Zionists. The boycott necessarily confirmed UNSCOP’s distrust of the Higher Committee, remembering Hajj Amin al-Husseini’s collaboration with Hitler during WWII. On the other hand, UNSCOP was clearly influenced by the wave of international sympathy for the Jews, following the Holocaust. UNSCOP Conclusions: 1. Both Jewish and Arab claims were of equal validity and that their respective nationalistic movements were irreconcilable. 2. The only viable solution to the conflict was the separation of the two communities by partitioning the territory and creating both an Arab and a Jewish state. 3. The Partition would divide Palestine according to the existing settlement patterns of the Jews and Arabs, as well as the population centres of both communities. (see map) 4. The Jewish state was to consist of the coastal area around Tel Aviv and Haifa, the Negev in the south, and the Jezrell and Hule Valleys. 5. Jerusalem (due to its sensitive symbolism), however, would come under international control. This Partition Plan fragmented the territory of both proposed states, and yet insisted that economic unity be retained. Moreover, high proportions of Arabs were “trapped” in the proposed Jewish state. Although the Jews only made up ⅓ of the population, they were to be given 55% of the overall territory. The Zionists did not like the status of Jerusalem as international, nor did they 13 appreciate the fragmented Jewish state proposed to them. However, the Zionists accepted it as a stepping-stone to eventual statehood. The Arabs, on the other hand, could not countenance relinquishing any part of what they considered their territory to the Zionists. The Arab League met to adopt a common strategy towards the Partition Plan and decided they must go to war to prevent the creation of the Jewish state. The Arab League The Arab League is a regional organisation composed of Arab countries formed in March 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan (now Jordan) and Yemen. It has since expanded to its current 22 members. The Arab League aims to strengthen Arab unity, preserve the sovereignty and independence of member states, coordinate political positions, promote economic integration, collaborate on social and cultural matters, and uphold common interests within the Arab world. Arab leadership was actually never truly united over the Partition Plan - King Abdullah of Transjordan had secret negotiations with the Zionists, while Egypt and Syria had territorial ambitions and aspirations to lead the Arab nationalist movement (that did not always align with the Arab Palestinians’ interests). The Partition Plan was passed in the UN General Assembly in November 1947 (Resolution 181) by a vote of 33 in favour, 13 against and 10 abstentions, with the Arab states opposing it. Notably, both the superpowers supported the establishment of Israel. The Soviets believed that the Zionist movement, then dominated by the socialist-oriented Labour Party, was open to good relations with Moscow, and represented a potential ally in the Middle East. They also reckoned that an independent Jewish state would break the stranglehold of the Western powers over the region, which would be to Soviet advantage and serve the USSR’s Cold War interests. The US had more mixed considerations. On the one hand, the State Department was wary of antagonising the Arabs, which would threaten the supply of Middle Eastern oil to the West and potentially drive the Arabs into Soviet orbit. On the other hand, Clark Clifford, Special Advisor to President Truman, warned that if the US did not favour partition, the Soviets, who did, would gain political mileage and influence in the Middle East. There was also a strong Jewish lobby in the US. With Truman’s own consideration, the US decided in favour of partition ultimately. Following the General Assembly vote, both Jews and Arabs began to arm themselves, convinced that war would break out between them. The Arab Higher Committee called for a strike against the Jews from 2 - 4 December 1947, and inter-communal clashes began. There was bitter fighting and large numbers of civilian casualties, with 869 people killed and 1909 wounded between November 1947 and February 1948. Resolved to secure control over Jewish territory, the Jewish Defence Force came up with Plan Dalet in March 1948, the aim of which was to take over any installations evacuated by the British, especially military bases, and expel as many Palestinians as possible from the future Jewish state. In April 1948, Jewish forces began the forcible expulsion of Arabs from villages inside what was to become the Jewish state. The main question Plan Dalet raises is to what extent the plan constituted a blueprint for the expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs and can thus be seen as the cause of the Palestinian refugee problem. There was a particularly bitter struggle to control the roads leading to Jerusalem and massacres of civilians were carried out by both sides. By 14 May 1948, when the British finally withdrew from Palestine, over 300 000 Arabs had fled from what was to become the new Jewish state. 14  2. The 1948 War On 14 May 1948, following British departure, the Jewish agency declared the territory allotted to them the new state of Israel, and declared Israel’s independence. On 15 May, the Arab states invaded Israel on the pretext of liberating Palestine. And so began the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion reading Israel’s declaration of independence in Tel Aviv, flanked by members of his provisional government. The first phase of fighting occurred between 15 May to 10 June 1948. In the first month of fighting, Israel was desperately fighting for survival. It faced problems with arms acquisition, and coordinating an army of European refugees and local Jews initially. The Arab campaign threatened Jewish settlements and their supplies. Israel was surrounded by its enemies, with Egyptian forces coming from the south, Syrian, Iraq and Lebanese troops from the north and Transjordan from the east. The battle for Jerusalem was the fiercest. Israel’s position, however, changed with the first ceasefire. On 11 June, the UN persuaded warring parties to agree to a ceasefire. The ceasefire was used by all parties to try to regroup despite the UN arms embargo. In particular, Israel used the period of the truce to begin a significant import of rifles, machine guns, armoured cars, ammunition etc, while recruiting and training more men. With numerical superiority and greater firepower, the advantage belonged to the Israelis when fighting resumed on 9 July. Between 9 - 18 July, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) managed to resist further Egyptian advances in the Negev while, in the north, they gained control of the whole Galilee region, including the land that had been allocated to the Arabs. In the 10 days of fighting in this 2nd phase of war, Israel improved its position and was to retain the initiative for the rest of the war. 15  On 19 July a second truce was called by the UNSC. Both Arabs and Israelis were not interested in abiding by the truce. Count Bernadotte from Sweden, the special UN mediator, kept trying to promote a compromise between Arabs and Jews, and as the Israelis continued to advance territorially, he was perceived as pro-Arab. Zionist underground organisation shot him in September 1948. In mid-October 1948, Israel broke the second ceasefire and concentrated on defeating the Egyptians in the south. This they did, even pursuing the Egyptian army over the border into Egypt. In January 1949, armistice negotiations began because it was clear the Arab states would not defeat the Israelis. With coordination and mediation by the UN, Israel went on to sign a series of armistice with Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria respectively in 1949.2 The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), having established its headquarters in Jerusalem, deployed its military observers to various observation posts and positions along the armistice lines between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states. UNTSO had observer teams stationed in locations such as Gaza, El Auja, Negev Desert, West Bank, Golan Heights, etc. They were responsible for monitoring the adherence to the armistice agreements, investigating incidents, reporting on cease-fire violations, and facilitating communication between parties involved. While UNTSO has remained in the Middle East till this day and is important in providing much needed UN supervision over the volatile area, UNTSO is limited in the amount of influence and impact it could actually have on the complex Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite the presence of UNTSO, conflict and violence still flawed up in the region from time to time, as we will see in the subsequent Arab-Israeli wars. 3. Results and Aftermath of the 1948 War As a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Israel increased its territory to such an extent that a contiguous and defensible border had been created. Its territory had increased by 21% compared with the original Partition boundaries. Interestingly, the Arab states also increased their territory, by absorbing parts of Palestine that were promised to the Palestinian Arabs. Transjordan gained the West Bank including the Old City of Jerusalem, and Egypt gained the Gaza Strip. As a result, the Palestinians had lost all possibility of their own statehood. This exacerbated the refugee problem even further. By the end of 1948, the number of Palestinian refugees stood between 550,000 and 800,000. 2 Note that an armistice is not the same as a peace treaty. An armistice is just a formal (perhaps temporary) agreement between warring parties to stop fighting. A peace treaty, on the other hand, is a more comprehensive (perhaps longer term) agreement that aims to permanently resolve a conflict and establish a framework of peaceful relations. 16  Palestinian Refugee Problem Following the partition and invasion by the Arab states, Palestinians began to leave their settlements when affected by inter-communal violence. Originally, these departures were considered temporary, and the refugees expected to return to Palestine once the fighting had died down. However, Palestinians continued to leave, such that the numbers of refugees went on rising: by January 1949, their numbers had swelled to 750,000. By June 1949, it was 940,000. The Arabs demanded that the Palestinian refugees be allowed to return to their homes, citing the fact that they had been expelled illegally by the Jews. Israel instead insisted that the Palestinian refugees be integrated into the Arab states because they had, in fact, left Palestine voluntarily. Some Palestinian refugees emigrated to the Persian Gulf, Europe, and North America. Most, however, settled in refugee camps close to the Israeli border, or on the outskirts of major Arab cities. The refugees were literally dumped in the hands of voluntary relief organisations. Ironically, a stronger sense of Palestinian identity developed because of this condition of being refugees: Palestinian national identity now rested on the principles of a right to statehood and a right to return home. This also gave rise to political movements with paramilitary wings, aimed at liberating Palestine through force. The Palestinian refugee problem played an increasingly destabilising role in their Arab host countries, and would pose a massive stumbling block to the peace process between Israel and the Arab states as time went on. Following the Israeli armistice in 1949 with the various Arab states, the Arab capitals began nurturing a desire for vengeance against the Israelis, as well as an intention to resolve the Palestinian question of statehood. Palestinians also infiltrated Israel from their camps in the Gaza Strip, and also from Jordan and Syria. They, in addition to unifying families, also sabotaged Israel’s infrastructure while attacking civilian and military targets. The Palestinian paramilitary raids in the 1950s grew increasingly organised and more frequent and successful. From 1950-1955, hundreds of Israeli citizens were killed or wounded by these attacks. Israel organised retaliatory strikes from 1953 onwards, escalating tensions. The defeat in the 1948 war led to instability in the Arab states as a result of domestic challenges to the leadership which had lost the war, rivalry between the Arab states in pursuit of regional hegemony, the rise of Arab nationalism and an emerging tendency towards more extreme ideas. The extent of instability becomes clear when looking at the years between this 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the 1956 Suez Crisis. Egypt’s monarchy was overthrown in the 1952 Free officers coup, culminating in the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954. King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated in 1951 and succeeded by his eldest son, who reigned until May 1953 when he was deposed and succeeded by Hussein. In May 1951 Lebanon’s Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh was assassinated, and in 1952 President Bishara al-Khoury was deposed in a bloodless coup and replaced by Camille Chamoun. In Syria, a military coup occurred in May 1949, followed by 2 more coups by December 1949, and 2 more by 1955. The Arabs talked a lot about unity, socialism and nationalism, but in reality they were deeply disunited. The Syrian and Egyptian leaderships fretted about plots allegedly instigated by the monarchies in Jordan and Saudi Arabia to overthrow them, while the Kings worried that the military populists who led Syria and Egypt would incite revolution and topple them. 17  While Israel was comparatively more stable, that did not however mean that there was no tension within the decision-making elite. In fact, a major rift was emerging between Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharret over the direction of Israel’s foreign and defence policy. Ultimately Gurion’s hardline security-driven policy, as opposed to Sharett’s diplomatic approach, won out by 1955, and Israel seemed determinedly set on a collision course with its Arab neighbours. Photo of David Ben Gurion The inconclusive outcome of the first AI war and the inability to conclude a peace agreement led both Israel and its Arab neighbours to believe that ultimately there was going to be a second round. An Israeli historian asserts that ‘even before the ink on the armistice agreements was dry, there arose in the Arab capitals a clamour for an avenging second round.’ 4. Analysis of the 1948 War 3.1 Who was to blame for the war? Most of the rest of the world seemed to blame Britain for the chaos in Palestine. Many newspapers which supported the Conservative Party also criticised the incumbent Labour government for its handling of the situation. It was said that British troops should have stayed on to ensure that the partition of Palestine was carried out smoothly. The Arabs accused the British of being pro-Jewish, for letting far too many Jews into Palestine in the first place, and for causing them to lose half their homeland. The Jews accused the British of being pro-Arab, for trying to limit Jewish immigration. The Labour government blamed the US for the chaos. It was President Truman who pressured Britain to allow extra 100,000 Jews to go to Palestine in April 1946. Although this was bound to upset the Arabs even more, Truman refused to allow any more Jews to enter the US. The US also supported partition, even though all the Arab nations voted against it. Some historians have defended the British, pointing out that they were trying to be fair to both sides and that in the end, it was impossible to persuade both the Arabs and Jews to accept a peaceful solution. The British withdrawal was understandable: it would force the Americans and the UN to take more responsibility for the situation they had helped create. It would save the British, who since 1945 had spent over 100 million Pounds trying to keep the peace, further expenses which they could ill afford. The role of the Arabs in initiating the attacks for their respective considerations and interests should be considered as well. 3.2 Why did the Israelis manage to defeat the Arab states? Except for the Transjordan’s Arab Legion, the Arab armies were generally poorly trained and badly equipped. Morale was also very low and the campaign lost momentum merely a month from its start. Israeli troops on the other hand, were highly motivated, literally fighting for their survival. They were better trained as many of their numbers had served in the British army during WWII. Israeli troops also had numerical superiority with increased influx of Jewish refugees to Israel. In mid-May 1948, Arab troops were estimated at 20,000 to 25,000 while the IDF had mobilised 65,000. By September, that number had increased to 90,000 and by December it peaked at 96,441. 18 The Arab leadership was also very divided, especially over their agenda. While the official aim of the Arab states was the liberation of Palestinian, a closer look at the dynamics revealed that each state was pursuing its own political and territorial aims. King Farouk of Egypt joined the war effort in order to check the leadership ambitions of Transjordan’s King Abdullah. Transjordan, Egypt and Syria were also more interested in laying claim to the Arab parts of Palestine to enlarge their own territory rather than establish a Palestinian state. The case of King Abdullah of Transjordan is interesting. Before the war he had held a secret meeting with one of the Palestinian Jewish leaders. He had let it be known that he did not think the Palestinian Arab state could survive on its own. He thought it would be too weak and wanted it attached to Transjordan instead. He also led Jewish leaders to believe that he would not invade territories allocated to the new Jewish state. No actual agreements were made but a mutual understanding was established. When the war started, ​Abdullah’s Arab Legion advanced to defend the Old City, the eastern part, of Jerusalem against the Israeli offensive and they held onto it throughout the war. Yet the Arab Legion made little effort to stop the Israelis seizing West Jerusalem. Nor did the Legion invade the territory of the new Jewish state. Furthermore, the Arab Legion remained neutral when the Israelis fought Egyptian forces and did not join in support of Egyptian forces in the second and third phases of the war. In other words, the army from Transjordan invaded what was to be the new Arab state but it never invaded Jewish, Israeli territory. Its aim was to gain control of most of Arab Palestine on the Western side of the river Jordan, which it did, but not to destroy the state of Israel. Israel was able to exploit its understanding with Transjordan in order to break the chain of hostile Arab states, deepen the divisions in the Arab coalition and pick off its Arab opponents one by one. The fact that Israel and Transjordan were ‘the best of enemies’ is largely ignored in the heroic interpretation of the war which sees the little Israeli David pitted against the united Arab world of Goliath. 3.3. Why were the Arabs and Israelis unable to reach a permanent peace? Despite perceptions that peace would be achieved in due time after the armistice agreements, the right conditions for conflict resolution simply did not exist. Jordan was the most likely country who might sign a peace deal with Israel, considering their collusion just before the 1948 conflict, yet nothing came out of it. Jordan was insistent that Israel make some territorial concessions in order to ensure peace between the two states, but Israel was equally insistent that it had only just acquired defensible borders through the expansion during the 1948 war. Territorial concessions were also the main point of contention in Israel’s secret negotiations with Syria and Egypt. Syria demanded half of the Sea of Galilee, and Egypt wanted parts of the Negev desert in return for full peace. But to the Israeli mindset, the notion of ‘land for peace’ was unacceptable and potentially threatening to Israeli security. Conflicting expectations, aims, and perceptions, as well as intransigence on both sides led to discord in the early Arab-Israeli negotiations. The Arab states might have lost the war, but they were not defeated to such an extent that they were ‘forced’ to make peace at all costs. Israel, conversely, while desiring peace and negotiations, was also not ready to make territorial concessions. Both Israel and Arab states had only just moved towards independence, and consequently nation and state building were higher up on the list of priorities than peace. Both had a strong society and a comparatively weak state and were still in the process of construction and legitimisation. They could not be seen as weak and making concessions to the “enemy”. 19 3.4 Involvement of the superpowers and the UN The superpowers were largely ineffectual in this war, and their attempts at mediation were indecisive. The UNSC’s calling of two truces were violated by the participants of the 1948 war. In fact, the truces were utilised by the Israelis to arm themselves more rapidly, while also violating the UN embargo on arms and ammunition to the Middle East for the period of the conflict. The ill-fated Bernadotte was assassinated by the Zionist underground, and this suggests how seriously the Israelis took the international mediation efforts - they perceived Bernadotte as pro-Arab. Following the armistices, the UN established official channels for negotiating peace between Arabs and Israelis. The UN ploughed its efforts into trying to further the peace, but nothing was achieved. The intractable nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict suggests that whatever interference by the superpowers would likely be on the terms that the participants in the conflict dictated. Though it is acknowledged that there were moments in the next three wars (1956, 1967, 1973) when the superpowers did have some influence on the conflict. 3.5 Involvement of the Palestinians Both official diplomatic initiatives and secret negotiations reveal that while attempts were being made to resolve the dispute between Israel and the Arab states, the Palestinian dimension had been completely marginalised. In fact, it could be said that Israel used contacts with its Arab neighbours to bypass the Palestinians, while Arab leaders, in turn, only played the Palestinian card to consolidate their own political position domestically and regionally. Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank in April 1950 made it very clear that there was little Arab support for a separate Palestinian state. 20  Chapter 3: The 1956 Suez Crisis What were the causes of the conflict? What role did different actors play in the development of the conflict? How effectively was the conflict managed? 1. Background The 1956 Suez Crisis was a political and military conflict involving the French, Britain, Israel, and Egypt over Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal, with Israel, Britain and France undertaking military actions against Egypt. To understand why this crisis happened, it is important to understand the developments before 1956. 1.1 Israeli-Egyptian Tensions Egypt was part of the Arab nations that attempted to invade Israel in the 1948 war. In the early 1950s, there were mutual accusations between the Egyptians and Israelis of attempts to undermine each other’s state through subterfuge. Israel was particularly upset at Egypt for encouraging Palestinian raids into Israel from Gaza. In the July 1954 Lavon Affair, Israeli and Egyptian Jews collaborated to sabotage British and American property in Egypt in order to create discord between the Egyptian government and the West. It was hoped that this would encourage the British to keep their military presence in the region (especially the Suez Canal zone), thereby maintaining a buffer between Egypt and Israel. The sabotage attempt failed, but the controversy that arose allowed Ben Gurion to return to the premiership of Israel and focus the state on his hard-line foreign and defence policy. In February 1955, an Egyptian intelligence-gathering squad entered Israel and killed an Israeli near Rehovot. In retaliation, Israel launched the Gaza raid on 28 February, killing 38 Egyptian soldiers. Egypt called this an ‘action of unprovoked aggression carried out with deliberate brutality.’ In response, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran in September 1955, which was important as it links Israel’s Port of Eilat to the Indian Ocean without having to sail through the Suez Canal. Map showing the Straits of Tiran, the Suez Canal, and the Gulf of Aqaba (all are important waterway to Israel) 21 The Israeli attack was, as intended, humiliating for Nasser, the President of Egypt, who came into power after the 1952 Egyptian Revolution. He knew that it would have a very damaging effect on his leadership of Egypt and his image in the wider Arab world. His forces now armed and trained guerillas to carry out attacks in Israel. However, what he needed most was weapons to strengthen Egypt’s army and deter any further Israeli attacks. He had already approached the US and had been rebuffed. Now, he urgently needed to secure Soviet arms. This he did through the Czech Arms Deal in Sept 1955, where he purchased 200 tanks and other weapons from the USSR through Czechoslovakia. The arms deal strengthened the Egyptian military immensely, and in response Israel courted the French for a supply of arms to match the Soviet weapons that came to Egypt, and set in motion Israeli deliberations on a pre-emptive war against Egypt. 1.2 Cold War and the Middle East As the Cold War developed, the superpowers began searching for allies/clients in different parts of the world to benefit their Cold War objectives. Their rationale was to make the regional ally/client friendly to and dependent on them at the expense of their opponent. The regional powers, however, were not passive actors in this. They too cultivated such relationships and chose to align with the superpowers that could better fulfil their own agenda. This can be observed in the actions by Egypt. The Baghdad Pact (1955) The Baghdad Pact of 4 February 1955 was a defence pact of mutual cooperation between the United Kingdom, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. It was renamed the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) after the departure of Iraq in 1959. The Baghdad Pact was initiated by the US and NATO in a bid to create a chain of anti-Soviet alliances across the globe, and thus, though it was not an official signatory of the Pact, the US also participated in its work. It was aimed particularly at the members of the Arab League, in attempting to dissuade them from becoming part of the rival Soviet clientele system. This attempt was hampered by the refusal of countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan to join the alliance, and the departure of Iraq who was the strongest regional participant during its membership. Nasser refused to join the Baghdad Pact as he saw it as an instrument of Western intervention and meddling in Arab affairs, as they had been doing for decades. He also wanted Egypt to remain non-aligned. Gamal Abdel Nasser was one of the young officers who came from a poor background but had received an education and rose through the ranks of the army. Appalled by the incompetence of the Egyptian government in the 1948-1949 war, he was part of those who overthrew the Egyptian King in 1952, and became President of Egypt in 1954. Highly nationalistic and anti-British/Western imperialism, Nasser viewed the West with suspicion. Determined to stay neutral and non-aligned (not to the USSR as well, though he cultivated that relations strategically and increasingly moved closer to the USSR to balance the Western powers), Nasser refused to be a part of any pro-Western alliance, which made the West suspicious in return. In the context of the Cold War, the Western powers thought if Egypt was not for them, it must be against them. 22 Naturally, the Baghdad Pact was viewed by the USSR as a foray into establishing “aggressive military groupings'' as well as “colonial enslavement”. In an official response to the formation of the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet officials denounced it as an “aggressive bloc” intended to “exploit the people of the countries of the Middle East so as to enrich their big monopolies which are making greedy use of the natural wealth of these countries. Crisis of the Aswan High Dam Project The Czech arms deal (mentioned above) was a shock to the West. However, Britain and the US thought they could still control Nasser because he depended on them for money to build the Aswan High Dam. Meanwhile, Nasser continued to show that he would not be pushed around and that Egypt was determined to be neutral. In May 1956, he recognised Communist China. In July 1956, the US and Britain decided to cancel the promised US$56 million loan for the building of the Aswan Dam to “punish” Nasser for refusing to join the Baghdad Pact, turning to the USSR for the Czech arms deal, and recognising Communist China. In retaliation, Nasser announced on 26 July 1956 that he intended to nationalise the Suez Canal, with the intent of financing the Aswan Dam expenditure through this. This alarmed the Western powers. The Aswan Dam The Aswan Dam was a huge project on the River Nile which would create hydroelectric power for Egyptian industry and allow vast areas of agricultural land to be irrigated. It was such an important issue because Egypt in the 1950s was trying desperately to modernise herself and become the most important regional power in the Middle East - weapons alone would not suffice, and economic development (from a hydroelectric dam project) would be part of its bid to modernise and become stronger. 1.3 The Decision to Invade Egypt A convergence of interests occurred for the British, French and Israelis. The Israelis considered Nasser a security threat, especially in light of the Czech arms deal, the border raids from Gaza, and the Egyptian blockade of the Tiran Straits. The French believed that Nasser was directly responsible for supporting the Algerian revolution (Algeria was a French colony who was fighting for independence from the French from 1954 to 1962), and sought to depose Nasser. The Anthony Eden administration of the UK feared that Nasser intended to form an Arab alliance to truncate oil supplies to Europe, and were also insecure about their faltering influence in the Middle East. 23 This was not to mention the immense importance of the Suez Canal to the economic activities of the three countries. The Suez Canal is strategically located as the bridge between Africa and Asia, and was the main trading link between Europe and the East. A majority of trade is facilitated through this shipping channel, and if the Canal were to belong to Egypt, rather than remain international, the possibility that Egypt would prejudicially control other parties’ usage of it would be very real. It was a particularly vital link for Britain, which had many military bases in the east and which depended on supplies of oil from the Persian Gulf. Egypt's control over Suez would also threaten the economic lifeline of Israel. These three countries hence secretly negotiated to stage a joint attack upon Egypt, with the principle of removing Nasser, thus heralding the Suez Crisis of 1956. Map showing the strategic location of the Suez Canal. 2. The events of the 1956 Suez Crisis 2.1 The British-French-Israeli Plan and Action In their plan, Israel was to attack Egypt and seize the canal, an action that would inherently invite the British and the French to intervene and demand both Egypt and Israel to withdraw from the canal. On the assumption that Egypt would naturally refuse to withdraw, Britain and France would be “forced” to intervene in order to protect the Suez. Acting on this plan, Israeli troops invaded Egypt on 29 October 1956 and reached the canal on 30 October. Britain and France issued an ultimatum for both Israeli and Egyptian forces to cease fighting and withdraw from the area. Nasser rejected the ultimatum (as was expected). In response, Britain and France bombed Egyptian airfields on 31 October, and subsequently invaded Egypt. 2.2 Intervention of the US and UN The US was kept in the dark about Britain, France, and Israel’s plans. Moshe Dayan, Defense Secretary of Israel, wished to keep the US in the dark about the planned assault on the Suez. This was because Israel wished to keep good relations with the US, and knew that the US opposed any military action on the part of Israel, which was why America refused to supply Israel with arms in the first place. 24 Hours into the initial Israeli attack on Egypt, the US proposed a UNSC resolution requiring the Israelis to return to their borders. Despite the vetoes of Britain and France, the UN General Assembly convened under the Uniting for Peace resolution, and approved a US-sponsored resolution for an immediate ceasefire in the Sinai, and the withdrawal of all forces from Egyptian territory on 2 November 1956 (UNGA Resolution 997). Over the next few days, the emergency special session adopted a series of resolutions pertaining to the conflict, including the setup and deployment of the UN emergency force (UNEF) to the Canal to supervise the ceasefire (UNGA Resolution 998, 1000, 1001). In attempting to dissociate the US from the act of aggression, US openly condemned the move of her ally, and refused to aid Britain out of a financial crisis caused by waging the war until the fighting was ceased. Israel was also condemned by the US for aggression, and economic sanctions were slapped on the Jewish state. A severance of US-Israeli ties was threatened if Israel did not withdraw. Israel, under severe US pressure, was forced to accept the ceasefire. Britain and France, who had not yet even seized control of the canal, also reluctantly bent to international will (mostly US pressure) and agreed to a ceasefire on 6 November (causing confusion as the military operations were still ongoing on the ground when the governments agreed to a ceasefire), and subsequently withdrew their troops. There were various considerations that the US had to explain why it condemned the actions of Israel, Britain, and France, and sought to distance itself from their actions: The US felt deliberately deceived by the Israelis, British, and French, who had attempted to keep America in the dark. With the election campaign ongoing in America, Eisenhower was unwilling to be seen as condoning the use of force in the Middle East, believing that it would taint his image. The Americans had just condemned the Soviet Union’s use of force in Hungary in 1956, and thus could not be seen supporting the use of force on Egypt. The US also feared that if they did not grab the opportunity to provide world leadership, the USSR might seize the opportunity instead. The US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict at this point was meant to come across as even-handed. This was because: ○ The US leadership was convinced that military force was inexpedient as it would lead other countries (especially in the Third World) to turn against the West, which would provide opportunities for Soviet intervention. ○ The US was also careful not to alienate the producers of much needed oil resources and harm America’s economic interests. Peacekeeping and the Deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) While the General Assembly initially passed Resolution 997 on 2 November 1956, which called for a ceasefire, withdrawal of forces, and the reopening of the Suez Canal, the UK and France insisted on some sort of international police force before they withdrew their troops from the Suez Canal area. On 4 November 1956, the General Assembly passed the landmark Resolution 998 (UNGA Resolution 998), which authorised the Secretary-General to set up “an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.” Support for the force in the General Assembly was not universal. Although none of the member states opposed the resolution, 19 of the 76 voting members abstained. The support of those countries for the operation was contingent upon the force’s makeup and its mission. 25  General Assembly Resolution 998 did not make clear what kind of force was envisioned, spelling out neither a fully articulated strategy nor guidelines for its operation. Because of the wide latitude given to the Secretary-General, it was largely Hammarskjöld (the UNSG at that time) who defined this new strategy. Canadian foreign minister, Lester Pearson, also helped develop many of the ideas behind UN peacekeeping and designed the framework adopted for the force. What made UNEF I different was not so much that all its components were new, but that the combination of the components was unprecedented. Various aspects of prior observation missions were combined with new principles to form a new strategy, later what became known as “peacekeeping operations.” Various reports by UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld early on laid out the basic principles of the UNEF I, and indeed traditional peacekeeping forces for decades to come. Notably, “there was no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the current conflict.” Furthermore, the force would be “in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory on which it was stationed; nor should the Force have functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions.” This established the principle of neutrality; unlike collective security actions, no side in the conflict was labelled an aggressor and UN actions were not designed to favour or defeat any protagonist. UNEF I was also designed to “be of a temporary nature,” suggesting that peacekeepers would be responsible for immediate tasks of ensuring the ceasefire in anticipation of longer-term peacemaking concerns. The size of the force was left to the discretion of the force commander in consultation with the Secretary-General, with the initial target of 6,000. In practice, the actual number varied somewhat over the course of the deployment, peaking at just over 6,000 personnel. These were drawn from a number of different states, none of which was geographically proximate to the area of conflict or closely associated with any of the principal disputants. Indeed, there was an explicit stipulation to recruit personnel from member states “other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council” (UNGA Resolution 1000), thereby reinforcing the principle of neutrality but also reflecting the particular concerns of this crisis in which four of the five Permanent Members had close ties to the conflict principals, and indeed two were disputants themselves. Furthermore, deployment was confined entirely to Egyptian territory with the consent of the host government. These facts would play an important role in the precedent set for future peacekeeping operations as well as for the fate of the operation itself. UN Peacekeeping Operations3 For the purpose of our syllabus, Peacekeeping refers to anything that the UN does to keep peace. One tool available to the UN to keep peace is peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations were not envisioned in the initial setting up of the UN, and were hence not included in the UN Charter. Due to various reasons, peacekeeping operation was officially introduced and formalised during the 1956 Suez Crisis (though the UNTSO that was mentioned in the 1948 war was retrospectively considered as the predecessor of peacekeeping operation). 3 This is a very brief and summarised introduction to UN Peacekeeping, but Peacekeeping is definitely a much more complex part of the UN than we have established here. For those who are interested, you can refer to this book The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping operations. 26  The main aim of peacekeeping operations during the early years was conflict control and the insulation of regional conflicts. In other words, when the peacekeeping operation was first introduced, it was meant to be an interposition of UN military personnel between conflicting groups, either to stop violence and prevent its escalation or to prevent conflict from even happening. Initially at least, peacekeeping operations were meant to be guided by the principles of consent, impartiality/neutrality, and the minimum use of force: UN peacekeepers required the consent of the host state to operate on its territory; they were to remain impartial in their relations with the conflict parties; and they were to use military force only in self-defence. Over time, and especially after the 1980s, encouraged by the increasing number of operations deployed into civil wars and complex internal armed conflicts, peacekeeping operation’s aims and principles evolved. Although by the 1980s the UN’s peacekeeping operations were authorised exclusively by the Security Council, this had not always been the case, with a number of early missions seeing a leading role taken by the Secretary-General and the General Assembly. The General Assembly also retained an important role in determining the mission budgets. Because the UN does not have its own armed forces, its peacekeeping operations have always involved a variety of different actors who collaborate to produce a single mission. In terms of financing, the first UN peacekeeping operations were carried out without a system in place. The issue proved to have the potential to cause major damage within the United Nations as different countries (such as USSR and France) subsequently refused to pay for or contribute to various peacekeeping operations, hampering the effectiveness of the missions. The UN peacekeeping forces are recognised by their distinct blue helmets. With the gradual deployment of the peacekeepers, British and French forces pulled back by the end of 1956 and UNEF assumed control of Port Said at the northern end of the canal. UN forces secured the area and were responsible for monitoring the ceasefire and maintaining order there. UNEF also engaged in some mine-clearing and facilitated some prisoner exchanges in the earliest phase of the operation. 27 The withdrawal of Israeli troops proved more problematic, although eventually they too were removed from the area. Israel denounced the demarcation line dating from a 1949 armistice agreement and would not permit any UN peacekeepers to be stationed on its side of the line. The Israeli withdrawal occurred in several phases and was not completed until March 1957. In the interim, UNEF I monitored the ceasefire, interposing itself between Israeli and Egyptian military forces and carried out various minor tasks in the areas vacated by the Israelis. The Suez Canal was reopened in April 1957, under Egyptian control, to international traffic. Following troop withdrawal, UNEF I settled into its ceasefire monitoring role for the next decade. Deployed along the armistice line on the Egyptian side, it acted as a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces. With various patrols and other monitoring techniques, UNEF sought to detect any infiltration of the surrounding area and any acts of violence that would constitute a violation of the ceasefire. Although the situation around the deployment area in the Sinai was relatively stable, relations between Israel and Egypt were interwoven with the Arab–Israeli conflict more broadly. Armed raids by Palestinian forces against Israel became common in the 1960s as did Israeli retaliatory strikes. These generally occurred along the borders of Syria and Jordan, whereas the Sinai border remained relatively quiet due to the presence of UNEF I. These incidents therefore did not affect the ceasefire in the area of peacekeeping deployment. That would change with serious military encounters between Israel and Syria in the spring of 1967 (which we will look at in the next chapter). 3. Analysis of the 1956 Suez Crisis 3.1 Egypt (Nasser) 28 In spite of a military defeat for Nasser’s forces, he emerged a victor in the political arena in many ways. He could dismiss the Israeli campaign as insubstantial since Israel had to withdraw from the Sinai, and he managed to retain control over the Suez Canal. He was also to become the de facto leader of the Arab world, hailed as the one Arab leader to successfully challenge the West, expelling British and French imperialist forces from Egypt territory. In fact, the “victory” of Nasser over the Western powers contributed to a rising tide of Arab nationalism that Syria even demanded a merger with Egypt to form one state in 1958. During the course of the war, Nasser successfully continued his nationalisation drive, and nationalised the remaining British and French holdings in Egypt, thus providing funds for the Aswan Dam and the economic modernisation of Egypt. He even succeeded in acquiring an international peacekeeping force, the UNEF, to protect Egypt from any retaliation by Israel. In considering Nasser’s actions in the Suez Crisis (such as its decision to nationalise the Suez Canal), we observe the multifaceted considerations that Nasser had, ranging from its desire to be the leader of the Arab world, the prestige of Egypt, its anti-imperialist stance, and economic considerations, etc. Egypt was hence not acting as a proxy of the Soviet Union (nor as part of the wider Cold War) to undermine an American ally in the Middle East. Israel was actually suffering from the American decision to remain even-handed in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, Egypt’s decision to close the Straits of Tiran, and to broker the Czech arms deal, was not part of the Cold War rubric of conflict between the two superpowers. 3.2 Israel Despite failing to depose Nasser, the UNEF guaranteed freedom of shipping for Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba, which reversed the closure of the Straits of Tiran. Israel’s military reputation was also further enhanced: the IDF mobilised troops at a phenomenal speed towards the Sinai, and this elevated Israel to the status of a regional superpower. The Suez Crisis also reflected the autonomy of Israel. The fact that the US was left in the dark suggests that the agenda of Israel was not very much influenced by the directions that Washington intended for it. In fact, the US wanted Israel to refrain from any military operations against its Arab neighbours, and strove to prevent any arms race in the Middle East by refusing to supply arms to Israel. However, Israel sought arms supplies from the French instead, deliberately violating the foreign policy directions the US wanted for it. Israel was also not engaging in war with Egypt as a proxy of the US (in the context of the Cold War) despite Egypt coincidentally being a client of the USSR for arms supply. Israel was instead reacting to the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, attempting to manoeuvre itself into a position of advantage and strength in the Middle East. In this case, it was merely reacting to/pre-empting any acts by its Arab neighbours to choke its economic/strategic lifelines. 3.3 Britain and France Egypt remained in control of the canal and Britain and France made no headway whatsoever. Egypt was also perceived to have successfully challenged the former colonial powers, and this led to the further decline of their influence in the Middle East (and across the world, as their empires crumbled). Furthermore, the diplomatic clout of the US was far more evident than that of Britain and France, as they were easily prevailed upon to withdraw from the Sinai by the superpower. 3.4 Soviet Union 29 The Soviets emerged from this debacle very much having the upper hand, where influence in the Middle East was concerned. The Soviet Union made a late entry into the crisis on 5 November 1956 as it was occupied with suppressing a rebellion in Hungary. The USSR immediately aligned itself to Egypt and the interests of the Middle East by proposing joint action with the US to force France and Britain into retreating. At one point, USSR even threatened military actions to defend Egypt’s sovereignty. In this manner, the USSR scored a diplomatic victory as it would now appear that it was the USSR that was genuinely concerned about the preservation of peace in the Middle East. In fact, we now know that the Soviet peace overtures were rather insubstantial: a Soviet threat to employ rockets against Britain and France was left hanging when countered with an American threat to retaliate. Statements declaring that Soviet volunteers would be dispatched to Egypt actually surfaced after the fighting had ended. Nonetheless, having already gained Egypt as a client state, the Soviet aim of establishing a comprehensive clientele system was in fact aided by the Suez War. In considering the role of the Soviet Union in the Suez crisis, the Soviets undeniably bears some responsibility. It supplied financial support to Egypt for the building of the Aswan Dam when Nasser courted Soviet aid following the US’ refusal to fund the project, it also gave Egypt its lifeline of arms supplies to threaten the strategic military balance in the Middle East. The Czech Arms Deal was instrumental in upsetting the balance so much so that Israel was alarmed, in part motivating Israel to take action. The USSR would continue to provide arms to Egypt and Syria. 3.5 United States The various motivations that the US had regarding their intervention had already been laid out above. The US’ withdrawal of funding for the Aswan Dam project too undoubtedly contributed to the Suez Crisis. Beyond that, the US’ involvement in the quelling of the Suez Crisis demonstrated its superpower clout, especially in the way it managed to push Israel out of the Sinai through sanctions and threatening the severance of diplomatic relations. However, Israel did not appear to be an ally for the US in any shape or form - it did not adhere to the American line, and also had to be “beaten” into submission through threats. In response to rising Soviet influence in the region, the US sought to create an anti-Soviet bloc consisting of pro-West Arab states such as Jordan and Lebanon against the Arab states that were hostile to the West and potentially pro-Moscow, like Egypt. In Jan 1957, America announced the ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’, which pledged that the US would aid any Middle Eastern country that requested support against communism economically and militarily. This actualised when the US sent 5000 troops to Lebanon in support of pro-Western Lebanese leaders in the 1957 Lebanon elections, who claimed to be threatened by communists. By the end of the Suez Crisis, it was clear that there was increased superpower involvement in the Middle East. 30  Chapter 4: The 1967 Six-Day War What were the causes of the conflict? What role did different actors play in the development of the conflict? How effectively was the conflict managed? 1. Background The 1967 War, referred to by the Israelis as the Six Day War (cause it lasted for 6 days from 5th to 10th June 1967) and by the Palestinians as al-Naksa (the setback) was the third Arab-Israeli war in less than two decades. It was triggered by a growing intensity in attacks on Israel as well as increasing Israeli retaliation against its Arab neighbours in late 1966 and early 1967. To understand why the war started, there is the need to understand some developments before 1967. 1.1 The Creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation The 1956 Suez crisis had once again shown the focus of the Arab leaders to be on their own foreign and domestic problems rather than on the conviction to liberate Palestine. The Arab world and international community seemed to have forgotten about the plight of the Palestinian refugees. It was this realisation that led to a Palestinian political and military revival. Building on earlier underground nationalist groups, the Fatah (a Palestinian guerilla group) was formed in the 1950s in Kuwait, and had bases in 3 of the Arab countries that bordered Israel: Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Renewed Palestinian resistance was organised under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, Khalil Wazir, and Salah Khalaf. In an attempt to control the Palestinian fedayeen (an Arabic term used to refer to various military groups willing to sacrifice themselves for a larger campaign) and to prevent their actions from completely destabilising the region, Nasser established the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in January 1964 at an Arab summit meeting in Cairo. (At this same meeting, the Arab states had declared in an official document that their ultimate aim was the destruction of Israel, and also discussed strategies to prevent Israel from using the Jordan River to irrigate the barren Negev Desert in the south of Israel). This new Palestinian organisation also provided Nasser with leadership credentials in his regional rivalry with Syria and Iraq. Thus, it is not surprising that the PLO soon became the object of an inter-Arab struggle for influence between Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, as well as an Arab-Palestinian struggle for control. From its establishment, the PLO served as an umbrella for all Palestinian resistance groups, providing political and military coordination when needed, but essentially leaving individual groups free to act. The PLO, in its Manifesto, laid claim to Palestine as a future state and designated armed struggle as the means to this end. The increasing numbers of Palestinian fedayeen operations (i.e. raids) against Israel reinforced Israel’s feeling of vulnerability and insecurities. 1.2 Worsening Relations Between Israel and its Arab Neighbours Syria, Egypt and Israel 31 On 23 February 1966, there was a change of government in Syria. The rise to power of militant Ba’thists resulted in increasingly hostile rhetoric at a time when already bad Syrian-Israeli border relations were deteriorating. It demanded a ‘revolutionary struggle’ against Israel and called for the ‘liberation of Palestine’. In August 1966, Syria and Israel clashed in a fierce battle in the area of the Sea of Galilee. The Syrians also stepped up support for the PLO guerillas and accused the Egyptian government of not supporting them. The Egyptian leader, Nasser, was stung, but he did not want war: he knew that the Arab states were not ready and that Israel had a stronger military force than all the neighbouring Arab states combined. However, he wanted to remain the leader of the Arab world, the champion of Arab nationalism. So, in November 1966, he signed a mutual defence pact with Syria whereby if one state was attacked, the other would come to its defence. Nasser hoped the pact would restrain the hotheads in the Syrian government but all it did was encourage them. The pact boosted Syria’s confidence, but at the same time, increased Israel’s sense of vulnerability and insecurities. Jordan and Israel Syrian and Egyptian moves were compounded by continued fedayeen operations against Israel from Jordan. A week after the Egyptian-Syrian pact was signed, a mine exploded on the Israel-Jordan frontier, killing 3 Israeli soldiers. In light of this triple threat (increasing attack on Israel by the PLO residing in Jordanian controlled West Bank, increasingly hostile Syria, and the Egypt-Syria Pact), Israeli decision makers adopted a more hardline security response. On 13 November 1966, Israel launched its most extensive operation since the Sinai Campaign where the IDF raided the Jordanian-occupied West Bank villages of as-Samu, Jimba, and Khirbet Karkay (in what is now known as the Samu Incident). 3 Jordanian civilians and 15 Jordanian soldiers were killed, and another 54 civilians and military personnel were wounded. A clinic, a school, and 140 houses were damaged. The raid caused uproar among Palestinians in the West Bank. Hussein was aghast. Hussein imposed martial law on the West Bank and became more convinced than ever that his throne was in jeopardy, and that he could be overthrown by angry Palestinians. He feared that a coup by radical pro-Nasser officers in the army would be used by Israel as a pretext to swallow the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The king did not want to share the fate of the other Hashemite monarchs in the Middle East; his cousin and friend, King Faisal of Iraq, had been shot in the yard of his palace in a military coup in 1958. Inching Towards War In early 1967, more raids and reprisals across the borders happened. Tensions were particularly high on the Israeli-Syrian border. On 7 April 1967, an Israeli tractor was ploughing land in the demilitarised zone which the UN had established on the Israeli side of the border after the 1948-1949 war. The Syrians opened fire and the Israelis fired back. The Syrians then started shelling other Israeli settlements in the area. Israeli planes were called up, which were intercepted by Syrian fighter planes and in the dogfight that ensued, 6 Syrian planes were shot down. The Israeli planes roared low over Damascus, further humiliating the Syrians. The region was once again on the brink of war. Some historians believe that this incident started the countdown to the 6 days war. Many years later, the Israeli leader, Moshe Dayan, explained in a private interview how the Israelis provoked the Syrians to attack: 32  I know how at least 80% of the clash there started. It went this way: we would send a tractor to plough some place where it wasn’t possible to do anything, in the demilitarised zone, and knew in advance that the Syrians would start to shoot. If they didn’t shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance further, until in the end the Syrians would get annoyed and shoot. And then we would use artillery and later the air force also, and that’s how it was. By May 1967, Israel and its Arab enemies were sliding into a crisis that neither side could control. Soviet Intelligence Report The final thing to set the ball rolling was a Soviet intelligence report. On 13 May, the Soviets told Nasser’s aide Anwar Sadat (the future President of Egypt) that Israeli troops had mobilised and intended to invade Syria. However, a UN inspection team provided Nasser information that the Israeli troops had neither mobilised nor were they deployed in any threatening position against Syria. Why Soviet intelligence offered such an erroneous report gave rise to much debate about the intentions of the Soviets. Nonetheless, the story spread rapidly. Arab eyes were on Nasser. What would he do? He did not want war as he knew Israeli forces were far superior yet had had to respond because his leadership of the Arab world was being challenged. Since the attack on Samu, the Jordanians had been accusing Nasser of cowardice and of hiding behind the protection of the UN troops. Besides, he had a defence agreement with Syria which compelled Egypt to go to Syria’s aid if Syria was attacked. Nasser subsequently took actions that carried him over the brink. Theories on the erroneous Soviet intelligence One theory offered by historians is that Israel deliberately misled the Soviet intelligence gatherers in order to lure Nasser into military confrontation. The implication of this theory is that Israel was manipulating the superpower into dragging its Arab clients into war with Israel; a war that Israel wanted and intended to win. Unfortunately, this is not an iron-clad conclusion to make, but merely a point to demonstrate how controversial the issue is: did the superpowers have control over the Arab-Israeli conflict or did the Arabs and Israelis have control over the superpowers? Another theory provides the exact opposite viewpoint: perhaps the Soviet Union wanted a war, a viewpoint supported by some segments of Egyptians. They believe that the Soviet Union wanted to illustrate the efficacy of Soviet weapons and the military and political support that the Soviet Union was providing to its client states in Egypt. The third theory was that the Soviet Union planned this war in order to stretch American commitment worldwide, and compromise the US position in Vietnam. This is a Cold War globalist perspective. Of course there is also the possibility that it was simply an inaccurate and poorly evaluated report. Note that there are no conclusive verdict, and all these theories remain possible