National Identity in the UAE PDF

7 National identity in the UAE and its capacity for social transformation James Toth The Arab uprisings has been an absolutely exhilarating time for people in the Middle East and those, like myself, who observe and study the region. As we watched CNN or, more likely, tuned...

7 National identity in the UAE and its capacity for social transformation James Toth The Arab uprisings has been an absolutely exhilarating time for people in the Middle East and those, like myself, who observe and study the region. As we watched CNN or, more likely, tuned in to Al Jazira,1 the thrill of watching the old tyrants fall one by one was breathtaking. Such tumult and jubilation have not erupted in the Arab world for quite some time, aside from the occasional engi- neered food riot, underpaid draft-­soldier run-­a-muck, or a postwar slump protest. Or, indeed, if revolutions were to take place, they were instigated by counter-­ elites, those in the military or under the guidance of a dissolute scion of the royal family, or else a well-­born but alienated graduate of a famous left-­wing univer- sity. But never, absolutely never, by the sha’b or nas, by the people themselves, except, perhaps, to serve just in a supporting role, as the passive chorus in a Greek drama (or tragedy). Despite all the theories of history being made by the working class in its efforts at class struggle, seldom has this been observed in the Arab world (or elsewhere, for that matter).2 Instead, history remained rooted in the pampered hands of the well-­to-do or their underlings. But not this time. At a time when massive unemployment, neoliberal state policies, and unforgiving price inflation afflicted the region, punctuated by the worldwide recession that began in late 2008, the people (such as those in Egypt) finally said “enough is enough” – kifaya! Whether optimistic or fatalistic, hesi- tant or defiant, these crowds started from various compass points and converged on Tahrir Square. For sure, these tributaries that joined the main stream were shaped and channeled by college-­educated activists – the April 6th contingent, “We’re All Khalid Sa’id!”– trained in the ways of nonviolent resistance and brought together through social media.3 Still, they gestured and waved to the nas peering out the windows of their flats that flanked all sides of Cairo’s urban canyons. “Come, join us, demand change!” never dreaming that people had become so fed up, so misanthropic, so angry that few refrained from joining the march. And when they did reach Tahrir Square, they realized that thousands of others had also answered the summons, and the uproar and commotion grew even more intense. And so the government did what it could do to stop them. It pulled the plug. It simply shut down the internet, switched off the servers, disconnected the cables, turned off the towers. Mobilized over Facebook, Twitter, and SMS, 128   James Toth the activists had coordinated their energies through their keyboards. Pulling the plug, disconnecting the electronic devices, meant silencing them, making their voices unheard in the vacuum of a transmission-­less space. Day 1, Tuesday, January 25, was stunningly successful. But what about Day 2? And thereafter? Western news agencies heralded the Arab Spring uprisings as a triumph of advanced electronic media. The Western-­backed tyrants (whom the same media had supported for several decades) crumpled like so many dummies in an auto- mobile crash test. It had even surprised the CIA.4 But if there was a victory to be salvaged, the media explained, it was the overwhelming dominance of Western technology and, behind this, the West’s remarkable ingenuity and superior crea- tivity, yet another example of Western exceptionalism, that, if not sparked, at least strongly accelerated these critical political transformations.5 Another angle to the success story of Western electronic devices was the triumph (and triumphalism) of the educated (or at least the schooled) middle class. It just goes to show, the media reported, that Marx was wrong: It is not the proletariat (who most often find social media inaccessible) that makes history. It is the agency of the white-­collar elite that propels history onward to its future. Lower-­class people can be safely forgotten; it is journalists, writers, scholars, and bloggers who create history, society, and culture. It is the middle class that learns about computers, and it is computers and social media that have become the new driving force of history. Yet the crowds at Tahrir expanded at an enormous rate. The day after the Egyptian government “pulled the plug,” Friday, January 28, the crowds at Tahrir reached their zenith.6 Larger and larger, they did not care that the plug had been pulled. The revolution was engorged not by the stroke of a keyboard or the click of a mouse, but the old-­fashioned way: talking and shouting. Neighbors told neighbors, friends beckoned to friends, brothers waved to brothers. It did not require a computer monitor to learn about Tahrir. Nor did people rely on the constrained or state-­controlled press. Word of mouth sufficed.7 Social pundits often forget, in their world of disassociation and disaffection, where people appear to be disaggregated stars in a disjointed constellation of individual consoles, cell phones/mobiles, living rooms, apartments, and houses, that the bulk of people outside the West exist in very sociable and genial com- munities.8 Such commentators tend to forget that most people do not have or do not use computers and social media. These educated graduates of the middle class imagine the world to be created in their own image, and that image is a landscape of computer terminals, keyboards, and cables that connect people in their supposedly isolated universe to other isolated universes. Then when people do come together corporeally, it seems to be a triumph – indeed, it is: a conquest over their own quarantine and a victory over their own confinements. The sha’b, on the other hand, mired in their density and squalor, their poverty of gadgets and contraptions, remain immersed in their sociability, amity, and “multi-­ stranded relationships,” as Eric Wolf once called their premodern bonding.9 If the role of social media, in and of itself, has been inflated and is not enough to explain the eruption of the Arab uprisings, then what is the right recipe of  National identity in the UAE   129 ingredients, the correct formula for combining such inputs as class (and class segments and alliances), state (and state policies and legitimacy), and ideology (and culture and identity) that permits a solid understanding of these events? Communications by either modern or traditional means is certainly important. But they are not sufficient. This chapter will examine what some of the other inputs might be, and why they remained separated and uncombined in the United Arab Emirates such that the country did not experience Arab-­uprisings-like transformations.10 The contrast between the UAE and Egypt is stark; a compari- son of the two countries can help shed light on the factors that explain why they went in such two different directions. By Arab uprisings, I refer to the recent upheavals in the Middle East – most of which are still undergoing transformation – generated by high youth unem- ployment, high dependency ratios, stagnant family incomes, neoliberal state pol- icies, crony capitalism,11 single-­party polities, unorganized oppositions, growing class polarization, and histories of Islamist activism. These festering economic and political problems were severely aggravated by the sudden recession that took place in November 2008, which reduced the possibility of ameliorative investments (FDIs) to extremely low levels. Then, despite the fact that these despots-­for-life were opportunistically but unscrupulously supported by Western powers, often for decades, the abruptness of the explosions caught unsuspecting officials and diplomats off guard and surprised. Instead these hegemons were relegated, like the local elite, into becoming bystanders to a plebian project. Were the media the single most important ingredient in the Arab uprisings, then the UAE would have been in the forefront of this kind of spectacular trans- formation, for it is leading the Arab world in the use of social media and com- puters. But it has not witnessed an Arab uprising, despite the headway and dominance of electronic interactive programs like Twitter, Facebook, and SMS. Social media Young Emiratis, like young people elsewhere, use social media to contact friends, maintain relationships, find new friends, and even meet loved ones. Social networking maintains relationships over wider distances even as corpo- real, face-­to-face contact declines. This detachment can be mistaken for indiffer- ence. Instead, though, it compensates when time does not permit sufficient interaction. Only those not yet habituated to social media – those who are older, for example – might find the impersonality or lack of emotional involvement jarring. Many Emiratis claim that the velocity of everyday life precludes maintaining direct and immediate contact with everyone they know. And, as the circle of acquaintances widens, social media become even more essential. When family members pursue employment opportunities in far-­reaching cities and countries and when friends go to school in universities located far away, social media become key tools in maintaining and nurturing these relationships. Some find it easy, of course, to simply make a phone call. But frequently time zone 130   James Toth differences are such that the delays between sending messages and reading them necessitates Facebook and Twitter.12 Before independence and petroleum, when the Trucial States13 consisted of a number of small and separate communities, direct, face-­to-face interaction was possible, preferable, and frequent. Now, as economic and governmental globali- zation increases, so, too, do people’s localities. Social media help to keep these relationships active. Instead of writing letters home, young people communicate through Facebook and Twitter to find out – and on a daily basis – what their distant friends and family are doing. Many feel that social media are an exten- sion of the cultural emphasis on hospitality and friendship that is so important in Arab society.14 In the first decade of the twenty-­first century, Saudi Arabia and the UAE registered the largest gains in internet users. The number of UAE users as a pro- portion of the population (“penetration”) was 69 percent in 2011,15 the second highest, compared to 88 percent in Bahrain and 66 percent in Qatar.16 Despite the massive increase in the actual number of users, the KSA displayed a penetra- tion rate of only 43.6 percent.17 The UAE has the second highest number of installed computers per capita, or penetration rate, in the Arab world, with 45.47 percent of its population using computers. It is topped by Qatar, with 46.77 percent of its population operating computers, and is followed by Bahrain (35.66 percent), Kuwait (35.32 percent), Saudi Arabia (28.54 percent), and Oman, with 19.29 percent of its population demonstrating computer literacy. Growth rates indicate an increasing saturation. Those at the top end of computer utilization show lower growth rates (3.2 to 8.3 percent), while those at the bottom experience higher rates (10.2 to 13.2 percent). These ratios also reflect the reliance on personal home computers over internet cafes, with Qatar (1.07), the UAE (1.18), and Kuwait (1.42) at the high end – lower numbers show parity between the number of computers and the number of users – and Bahrain (1.53), Saudi Arabia (1.68), and Oman (2.08) at the low end of the spectrum.18 Not unexpectedly, the number of Facebook users throughout the Arab world rose rapidly in 2011, the first year of the Arab uprisings, when compared to 2010 (a 30 percent increase in January–March 2011 alone, compared to 18 percent over the entire twelve months of 2010).19 The UAE has the highest proportion of Face- book users, 29.1 percent, but ranks second in terms of absolute numbers, a little less than 2.5 million compared to almost twice that number, 4.0 million in Saudi Arabia (which has a penetration rate, however, of just 15.1 percent). The UAE registers the lowest proportion of users communicating in Arabic (9.9 percent, compared to 59.6 percent in Saudi Arabia, the highest proportion, and 16.7 percent in Qatar, the second lowest).20 The UAE has the highest absolute number of Twitter users, a little over 200,000 (2.43 percent penetration), compared to 133,000 for Qatar (7.83 percent penetra- tion) and 115,000 for Saudi Arabia (but only a 0.42 percent penetration).21 Mobile phone use is extremely common in the Gulf Cooperation Council states, with all six of its countries registering high cell phone penetration with  National identity in the UAE   131 multiple phones per person. In 2011, Saudi Arabia had a rate close to 190 percent, followed by Oman, with nearly 170 percent. Qatar followed close behind with 164 percent, the UAE with a little under 140 percent, Kuwait with 135 percent, and Bahrain with 130 percent.22 This appears as much an index of per capita wealth as well. It is clear, then, that the UAE, along with the other members of the GCC, exhibit an extremely high rate of computer and media use. Were the Western media correct, there should have been an Arab uprising in the region. But this did not happen. Social media could have united the youth who use them. But the constant and overwhelming message has been to use this technology in order to continue forging straight ahead into the modern world. The automobile once caused social analysts to predict a far-­flung, dispersed population, dazzled by speed and comfort, where the community’s social bonds would be washed away by the detergent action of asphalt and gasoline. Instead, it sped up the opportunities to visit and thus integrated people together over a much wider area, creating a national culture out of many distant and isolated communities. Social media in the UAE have reinforced the bonds of kinship, family, and tribe and, like the automobile, have joined people together over a much more vast area. But social media have also promoted an unlimited mod- ernity that in itself means the discarding of traditional values. Car speed is moni- tored by roadside radar, Twitter feeds are monitored by the government as well.23 They are the tools of modernization, but not the mechanisms for revolt. Were the message not tightly controlled, social media could otherwise provide the means to fuel discontent. United among themselves, young Emiratis could become increasingly distant from the older generation, just like what happens in many rapidly developing societies and just what happened with the Arab uprisings, which left the older generation behind wondering how their chil- dren were able to communicate outside the surveillance of the state. The genera- tion gap in the UAE is modest but growing. Young Emiratis have embraced a modernization lifestyle without the hesitation displayed by their elders. The elec- tronic social media have been in the forefront of this cultural transformation But much of this computer use has been superficial – fashion, cuisine, techno- logy, and leisure tastes (music, movies, TV programs). Yet, a deeper cultural problem is emerging as English trumps the Emirati dialect as the primary medium of interpersonal communications and as family relationships weaken under the onslaught of globalization’s widening scope of nonkinship social bonding and diversifying array of different lifestyle concerns.24 Birthday cards, Eid greetings, and special announcements all take place in English. English has become the global language of social media, in the Gulf in particular. In one study, the UAE ranks the third lowest (sixteenth) of eighteen Arab countries in its use of Arabic with social media.25 In another, it ranks fif- teenth out of twenty Arabic-­speaking nations in preferring English on Face- book.26 This reinforces the lessons from school. It also indicates the educational levels of social media users and their distance from the unschooled who are not familiar with computers and smartphones. 132   James Toth Under the onslaught of the internet, smartphones, and iPads, language prac- tices have shifted considerably. Some argue that, despite this linguistic change, youth are still dedicated to local culture. Yet the youth appear addicted to social media devices. Instances of “excessive individualism” and “selfishness” have become more frequently reported; the bonding that was nurtured by the close confines of premodern urban neighborhoods and village life has changed under the effect of the vast expansion in urbanization and transportation.27 Thus the use of social media has left UAE identities uneasily divided between tradition and modernity, unable or unwilling to mount alternative political and economic options. But if these kinds of social media are not, in and of themselves, prime ingre- dients for the Arab uprisings, then what features of the UAE’s class alliances, state legitimacy, and cultural identity preclude such upheavals? What has been absent from UAE society that checks the rise of such opposition to national authority? Class Two years before Egyptians removed their president-­for-life, it was the Iranians who, in 2009, rose up in protest, this time against the apparent fraudulent elec- tions that returned Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency. It was, in many ways, a precursor to the Arab uprisings and appeared more like the Arab Spring (as the Western media described it) than the Arab uprisings did themselves. By this I mean it was, by and large, an uprising of educated, urban middle-­class youth who communicated, organized, and mobilized through social media. They excluded those who did not use social media. These potential, lower-­class parti- cipants, uneducated in the ways of Facebook and Twitter, were recruited and employed instead by the government to serve as ballast and counterrevolution to combat the street protesters.28 The results were predictable. Their very exclusion from the elitist uprising demonstrated that any revolution that ignored them was not likely to succeed. Fortunately, but only by accident, the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria combined both media-­savvy young- sters and word-­of-mouth workers into a united front of opposition to their ossified regimes. Thus, the formula of including both class segments seems indispensable. The Arab uprisings did not embrace everyone who lives in the Arab Middle East. In those countries that did actually witness social and political upheavals, many nevertheless remained sidelined, many continued to support a regime they had known all their lives, and many remained actively opposed to the “indulgent whiners” (as one informant called them) who rushed here and there down Cairo streets. “Obviously,” this person went on to say, “these people don’t have to get up in the morning and go to work.” And many countries avoided such disorder altogether, and remained dominated by an unelected elite, captive to the com- prador agents of Western interests, or else satisfied with the Keynesian govern- ment they had thought highly of all along.  National identity in the UAE   133 Legitimacy Many analysts make the distinction between, on the one hand, the republican governments that nevertheless have what Roger Owen calls “presidents for life”29 and what Saad Eddin Ibrahim once called “gumlukiyya,” the inherited presidency,30 and then elsewhere, on the other hand, the real monarchies that legitimately rule father-­to-son or brother-­to-brother because this method of selecting rulers has been justified and legitimated over years and decades, if not centuries, of dynastic rule. The noise and clutter of the Arab uprisings have been noticeably silent in these stable monarchies. Republican governments tumble; monarchies remain upright. It would be all too easy to claim that Middle East people crave a legitimate but permanent ruler that is predictable and stable. They are not wedded – not yet, at least, and not like the young activists in the streets of Cairo, Tunis, Sana’a or Aleppo – to supporting a democratic way of governing just for its own sake or as a matter of principle. Their state ideological apparatuses are still too weak. But does this mean they desire a benevolent strong-­man, a permanent potentate? Is the stereotype of heeding an Oriental Despot actually true?31 Perhaps buried in this all-­too-easy and somewhat essentialist analysis lie a few kernels of truth. The concept of legitimacy seems to be a key principle here. A legitimate ruler is a just ruler; an unlawful ruler is a tyrant. Justice in the Arab world, at least as it was defined by Sayyid Qutb in his famous book Social Justice in Islam,32 does not mean democracy and equality, as it does in the West. (Marx was certainly chimeric in the West, if not utopic, but even more so in the Middle East.) Qutb argued that Middle East people can put up with inequality and class disparity if these differences are brought about by legitimate ways of earning wealth or tolerable ways of suffering poverty. If wealth and poverty are rightfully or justly generated, then social class and cultural disparities can be accepted. If the affluence is illegal or immoral, then so, too, is the unequal status it reinforces. In a day and age of almost global, if not universal, Western egalitarianism,33 monarchies adapt by practicing the noblesse oblige that is essentially required of them. That is, they treat the common, ordinary people as equals even though, all the while, both sides are well aware of the discrepancy in status, a discrepancy that comes with the legitimacy of dynastic rule. It is a legitimacy that Hesham al-­Awadi once called, following Arnold Gehlen, a type of eudaemonic legiti- macy, the credibility that comes from a welfare state that provides very neces- sary (and desirable) goods, services, and material benefits to its citizens.34 Perhaps presidents-­for-life cannot afford to be beneficent, or else people start suspecting there may be more, hidden away somewhere (say in a Swiss bank account). Even where this stinginess is actually the outcome of the neoliberal policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund, presidents still stand accused of corruption, bribery, and manipulated elections.35 However, with mon- archies, people know there is always something more. And there is, legitimately so; IMF restrictions make only a dent in these funds. Thus, the very natural and 134   James Toth acceptable wealth expected of and enjoyed by monarchs is considered crooked and venal when practiced by rapacious presidents, such as “presidents-­for-life,” itself already a contradiction in principles.36 Countries like the United Arab Emirates that belong to the Gulf Cooperation Council have not had an authentic “spring,” nor do they seem to need one insofar as there is no entrenched but illegitimate ruler.37 In the GCC, eudaemonic legiti- macy reaches its full extent and power. There is a strong satisfaction – indeed, almost a smugness – about reaping the benefits of living in a petroleum-­drenched country. There is free housing, free education, free healthcare, and public-­sector employment that requires little effort. Why would any Emirati (or a Gulfi, more generally) even think about overthrowing their government when there are so many benefits to maintaining the status quo and since they have become so dependent on state patronage? Strong arms and weak unity It might be easy to say, at first glance, that given the ubiquity of human nature’s penchant for disorder and chaos – a fondness that is, by the way, brought out self-­righteously when writing about the Middle East, but not very often for other regions – that all the ingredients for an Arab uprisings in the GCC countries actually exist but that a heavy hand has simply prevented their combining together and erupting. Indeed, there does seem to be a Singapore-­like quality to GCC political life that brooks no challenge to dynastic authority. The example that is often raised is Bahrain, where the large Shi’a minority presumably has protested its treatment under a Sunni monarch, notwithstanding the possibility of covert Iranian incitement.38 Yet, Bahrain is exceptional in its bifurcated societal structure.39 Elsewhere, where the citizenship (as such) is much more homogenous, the opposition that would ignite an Arab uprisings does not appear. For this citizenship, itself, has no need to protest injustices, inequalities, and disparities, as they are the prime recipients of the state’s eudae- monic largesse. But what is characteristic of the GCC countries, however, and the UAE in particular, is the distinction (and distance) between the citizenship, as a small demographic minority, and the large guest worker community resident in the country, which far and away swamps the size of its national host sponsors. The numbers of the expatriate community drastically overshadow the size of the indi- genous population. Over the last decade, on average 39 to 43 percent of the entire GCC popula- tion has been nonnational. This proportion rises sharply when simply the labor force is considered, almost doubling, with nonnational labor representing 67 to 70 percent of the total workforce. Individual countries vary, of course. The UAE and Qatar are consistently at the high end of the spectrum, whereas Oman and Saudi Arabia lie at the low end of the range.40 In 2010, the most recent census year, UAE citizens made up 948,000 people, or 11.5 percent of the country’s population. The remainder of the 8.26 million  National identity in the UAE   135 people included 3.5 million from South Asia (India and Pakistan for the most part) and one million from East Asia (China and the Philippines, primarily).41 This demographic imbalance is the harshest in the Gulf. Herein lies the Singapore quality of GCC society: agitation and protests by these noncitizens receive, if not arrest and imprisonment, then a swift one-­way ticket back home. If successful vernal uprisings are contingent not so much on social media per se but on uniting the middle and lower classes, can this be done in the UAE when there is such a wide national gap between the two segments, when the middle and upper classes are Emirati and tied to their home territory but the lower class is expat, imported, and exportable? Minority status for local citizens grates on people’s sense of themselves and their country. Many recognize the need to rely on a foreign workforce since there are not enough laborers locally to achieve the rapid development the country wants. Achieving such magnificent growth rates evokes a sense of national pride and privilege, and a readiness to pay the price by remaining out- numbered. But these accomplishments and privileges also elicit apprehension. There is a feeling of superiority about their success, but there is also a fear of losing their identity. Many Emiratis remain contentedly employed in government and the public sector, but they are also aware of their inability to compete were they employed in the private sector, next to better-­educated expatriates.42 Very often, both nationals and nonnationals feel alienated from one another. This, in turn, sets up zones of separation and avoidance. Streets, parks, and shop- ping malls become, at certain times of day, informally restricted to one side and off limits to the other. The common response to trespassing or transgressing the confines is an ineffable but nevertheless strong feeling of discomfort. Expatriates resent the unenforceable encroachment and Emiratis ask themselves if the price they paid for modernity and advancement is worth it. Each side becomes frus- trated, a prescription guaranteed to breed resentment and hatred, rather than camaraderie and tolerance. It maintains the chasm, and any bridge to bring the two sides together is too weak to operate satisfactorily. Wealth differentials com- pound the problem (although expatriate labor is often compensated at rates higher than their home countries). The result is grumbling, but it rarely, if ever, goes beyond private complaints.43 The Arab uprisings did not take place along such fault lines. National citizen- ship and expatriate status were not salient issues. Instead, the divisions in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, and Syria (which have much more homogenous popula- tions of citizens and residents) have been more standard: class (or occupation), age, urban (vs. rural), and education. The Arab uprisings have been about entrenched but illegitimate rulers, unjust wealth differentials, the lack of eco- nomic opportunity, and the absence of democratic decision-­making that formu- lates policies that drastically upset people’s lives. They have not been about political participation and enfranchisement, apart from the metaphors used to symbolize the political alienation and apathy that appear under undemocratic dictatorships. For the South and East Asians in the UAE, or the Africans and Europeans, the arena for their political action lies back home, not in their host 136   James Toth country. Should they nevertheless erupt in protest about their current transient conditions, they are bundled off and deported back to where their political activ- ism ought to be played out. Contested identities and modernization Yet this abyss in GCC countries between citizen and resident has a much greater meaning than just political rights and Keynesian benefits. The massive importa- tion of guest workers has made the citizenry strangers in their own country. They own it but they did not create it. They take surplus value but they do not produce it. Those residents who bristle at this disparity are advised to go home. Those citizens who are already home (by several generations spanning millennia) have no need to complain. Yet their “minority status” creates an unstable and insecure sense of their own identity. It is this sense of contested identity that precludes the very kinds of coalitions that elsewhere spawn social movements for change. This anxiety is further buttressed by the widespread modernization that is imported from the West. For this modernity is steadfastly embraced by a ruling elite dead set not just on winning and succeeding but also on standing tall and proud as equals among their peers in the international community, to be “just as good” as the next country.44 This uneasiness and insecurity is reinforced by the subordination of the native language and its local dialect outside the home, the public promotion of English to succeed in school and jobs and to communicate across the chasm of multiple nationalities, the phantasms of Western sexuality, gender parity, and foreign marriages, and the so-­called backwardness of a young country that remains an uneasy memory. With the rising status of Modern Standard Arabic in the media and the growing prestige of English through the schools, the Emirati dialect is in steep decline. Citizens do talk with one another in English, but then they are unable to talk with their grandparents.45 Although English as a common lingua franca could very well speed up the communication and mobilization required for mass demonstrations and protests, this would involve, however, a crucial bridging of the separation between citizens and residents. Recall that the essential formula that guaranteed Egypt and Tunisia a successful “spring” and that insured Iran’s failure in its summer of discontent was the uniting of the educated classes and masses. The divide in the UAE, however, and the insecurity it has bred, have also created for- bidding walls that prevent any interaction but the most businesslike contact. One segment or the other might rise up, but, without both, the uprisings would be squashed. A contested, fractured identity, torn between modern and traditional, English and European on the one hand, and Arab, Arabic, and local on the other, does not lend itself to creating the unity and critical mass necessary for the eruption of an Arab uprisings. Uncertain goals and lack of confidence and political acumen also weaken potential political and economic demands. This cultural alienation is amplified even further as parents increasingly rely on maids, nannies, governesses, and au pairs. After a short initial period of home  National identity in the UAE   137 care, Emirati children are passed along to foreign domestics and their Arabic begins to decline. Even though both mothers and fathers believe that the parents themselves ought to tend to their children, time, employment, and prestige push them into employing unrelated assistants. Although these employees ease the parents’ constrained time schedules, they also reduce the quality time with family members and often pull children away from the home and more toward the non–family members. Language, culture, and overall communications suffer as a consequence as children grow closer to unrelated domestics than they do their own family.46 A few years later, young Emiratis enroll in schools that teach in English as the universal language of successful employment and so-­called sophisticated culture. Media outlets, TV, radio, and cinema, are bilingual; signs and official documents are, too, and social interaction relies less on Arabic and more on Hindi, Urdu, Tagalog, Malay, Chinese, or – in order to traverse all of these, as well as to participate globally – English. There is a noticeable absence of Arabic-­speaking instructors qualified to teach students in advance subjects. Emiratis seldom choose to enter the teaching profession; most teachers, then, are imported. And while many of these are from other Arab countries, the need to draw in paying clients from the local non­ national, expatriate communities requires English as the lingua franca. Parents insist on enrolling their children in English-­speaking schools in order for them to be successful in their later careers in the universities and beyond. In contrast, monolingual Arabic teachers tend to graduate from substandard schools and place heavy emphasis on rote memorization and verbatim recitation. This may not be a function of Arabic per se, but those teachers graduating with more advanced analytical approaches to education tend to come from univer- sities that operate in English-­speaking environments. Such teachers adjust much more easily to the needs of their students that reflect the diversity of living in the UAE’s cosmopolitan communities. English is also the language for higher education. The national university system (both public and private) and its curriculum has yet to convert to using Arabic as its medium because college faculties are themselves trained in English.47 Despite attempts at nationalizing its labor force, higher education faculties remain over- whelmingly dominated by English-­speaking instructors. Most, if not all, fields remain heavily dependent on English, and schools compete to attract the best stu- dents, where “best” is measured, in part, by their fluency in English.48 The number of Emiratis who are college-­educated is expanding and their local dialect is declining sharply under an assault from both the public media (with their Modern Standard Arabic) and private English-­based schools (with their expensive and exceptional education).49 Public universities remain below the standard of private education, and so children of the well-­to-do flock to inter- national instruction that inevitably takes place in English. Arabic textbooks have not yet been able to catch up with the incredible advances in science and math, and translations also lag behind. So this material is necessarily imported from the West. 138   James Toth When students graduate, English becomes the main avenue to finding employment and advancing within the enterprise. Hiring and promotion depend very strongly on the candidate’s command of English. Abu Dhabi and Dubai are world-­famous, of course, as cosmopolitan cities that attract and retain multitudes of foreign companies. English serves as the necessary means to conduct busi- ness, among firms and with the government, which itself is bilingual.50 Thus there are strong pressures to use English throughout the country, relegating Arabic to casual conversations in the home or in recreation.51 The extent to which Emiratis are losing their Arabic, their particular dialect, and its contribution to the world of ideas and culture can best be measured by the number of programs developed to instill the language and the country’s cul- tural heritage into its children. School classes, summer camps, heritage villages, museums, and other special programs are constantly being designed, developed, and reworked in order to inspire young Emiratis with their native language, history, heritage, and religion. These measures are seen as necessary to counter the overwhelming effects of social media, TV, and the cinema. Many comment on the lack of book stores and outlets for Arabic print material as the youth rush to their monitors and keyboards to communicate with one another in English. Marriage and its weddings have become an emotionally charged topic, a small but serious issue in the much larger race toward modernity. It, too, con- tributes to undermining Emirati identity. The cost of weddings has grown astro- nomically even by UAE standards. This forces a delay in the age at marriage, making the years of female fecundity fewer, the birth rate decline, and the mar- riage more brittle, resulting in a rising divorce rate.52 The improvement in women’s status is one key to understanding this new dilemma, a major component of the modernization package that Emiratis are pursuing. Seventy percent of students in the three national universities (UAE University, Zayed University, and the Higher Institutes) are women.53 Their growing equality with men has raised the cost of marriage, the price of the wedding,54 the insistence on parity within the marriage, and, frequently, a search for nonnational brides to offset these “undesirable” advances and improve- ments.55 The age at marriage is higher because of schooling’s demand for more years of training, and the weddings costs that require longer employment. This, in turn, has meant there are fewer years for women to produce families, resulting in smaller family size and lower birth rates. Divorce rates are rising because of “rapid social change” in general and, more specifically, differences in age and education, communication failures, arguments and inflexibility, in-­law interfer- ence, domestic violence and abuse, jealousy, and infidelity. This means that the population of Emiratis will be even lower in the next generation, against a greater proportion of immigrant workers and residents. This situation has left many Emirati women mature without husbands, pulled away from marriage by the unpleasant educational inequalities they face and pushed away by exasperated Emirati males seeking brides from among temporary foreign visitors or among those encountered abroad. The “demo- graphic imbalance” resulting from “mixed” marriages has so alarmed the  National identity in the UAE   139 government that in 1992 it established a “UAE Marriage Fund” to finance the rising cost of marriage, but it is only available to couples who are both Emirati.56 But, as more Emiratis marry outside their nationality, their offspring are less likely to speak the local Gulfi dialect57 and national solidarity and identity decline even further.58 A greater and greater historical distance separates the citizen benefitting from the government’s largesse from their parents and grandparents, who experienced the region before it became an oil exporter and an independent country in 1971. Was there ever a time before Facebook, Twitter, Blackberries, and Google? Was there ever a time before air conditioning, desalination, asphalt, and Mercedes? Jane Bristol-­Rhys reports that younger Emiratis have become spoiled not only by the sheer magnitude of conveniences wrought by their petroleum economy but also by the scale of achievements in such a short time: beautiful and gracious buildings, luxurious and spacious homes, and a high level of consumption and living that comes from having the world’s second largest sovereign fund59 and the seventh highest level of per capita income.60 Their history is one that essen- tially does not exist before 1971. It begins, instead, only with Shaykh Zayed of Abu Dhabi and Shaykh Rashed of Dubai carving out a new experiment in human living. Any time earlier becomes the “dark ages” of their parents, who, for all that, exhibit a modesty and humility about the achievements that are somewhat lacking in the younger generation.61 Yet, there is a history of sorts that does seep through. The history that comes from commodified heritage villages, reconstructed Oriental bazaars, and simu- lated Bedouin encampments relays the message that there is no going back. The nostalgia that these constructions provide means that while the past is appreci- ated, it is not desirable. Wistfulness breeds wonder and admiration, but no wish at all to return. There are few, if any, patriotic principles derived from the coun- try’s cultural heritage, such as thrift, hard work, pride, and moderation. Arab unity and justice that once reflected strong, local norms are now diluted by Western standards. A forgotten history does not so much condemn its neglectors to repeat it as it does to remind them, once it is remembered, of their deficien- cies. As such, then, it reinforces the directions of modernization set out by the country’s leadership. Kinship alone seems to have survived the erasures of history and the triumph of modernization. Significantly, it remains enshrined in the very tribalism that constitutes the UAE’s governing structure, embodied in the diwan, majlis, and patriarchy, which, together, check the desire to adopt the more unfamiliar Jacobin or republican form of impersonal democracy. Thus, modernity has brought about increases in estranged relationship, paren- tal neglect, unqualified supervision, and even some forms of child abuse. Other factors that mitigate a strong local identity include negligent caretakers (nannies, nursery supervisors, maids, and household workers), absentee parents, greater employment demands, added commuting time, and the growing distance among neighbors and friends.62 Parents and children become more distant, and the gen- eration gap of knowledge and achievement do little to reduce the detachment. In sum, Emirati identity remains fragmented, fractured, and contested. It has yet to 140   James Toth solidify to the point that Emiratis could challenge their leaders, however legiti- mate these rulers might be, protesting with the confidence and idealism dis- played in Egypt or Tunisia. Conclusions The UAE is almost on the brink of a revolution. But it is not at all the kind that has affected the republican countries in the Arab world (or the wider Islamic world, if Iran is included) that have witnessed the democracy and antidespotism movements of the “Arab Spring.” The unchecked modernization that has had such a tremendous impact on people in the country is felt much more by the young than by the old. Senior Emiratis may well hesitate to adopt the techno- logy, values, fashion, and language of modernity and globalism that their chil- dren have embraced without doubt or deliberation. This makes the forthcoming “revolution” essentially a youth rebellion that seems to take place almost each generation, or at least when there is such rapid technological change that parents cannot possibly know what their children know, and thus find it hard to relate to their offspring. But it is not a revolution of rising expectations or a rebellion against an unjust entrenched tyranny. The message that comes through the rapid adoption of social media has reinforced the pell-­mell rush toward modernization that the older gen- eration questions but ultimately accepts, but that the young acknowledge without hesitation. Emiratis are increasingly ignoring their native culture and adopting Western values and practices. This full-­scale embrace of modernization is reinforced through social media. The identity crisis that is appearing more frequently is accentuated, not attenuated, by Facebook, Twitter, and the internet. Emiratis are faced with a gnawing suspicion that Arab and Gulfi culture appears mediocre. This doubt (however much unfounded) is not only not mitigated by the modern media; it is fully promoted throughout repeated public proclamations. The result is a headlong embrace of Western modernity and a suppression of the past. Far from fomenting an Arab uprisings, identity crises and electronic media are strengthening an uncritical drive toward modernization. Although the UAE ranks among the highest users of social media, the gadgets and devices do not come with the ordinary price tag of questioning the system or challenging authority, simply because the state is behind this progress and the state is the sponsor for the youth’s continued success. The ingredients that sparked violence in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria do not exist in the GCC or in the UAE more specifically. The poverty, disenfranchisement, antiestablishment anger, and anomie that have struck the Arab uprisings countries have not afflicted the Gulf. GCC governments remain legitimate and even beloved. The powerlessness to alter policy that under- scores the Arab uprisings does not happen in these Keynesian welfare states. Rulers are too careful about the well-­being of their constituents, so there is little need to change policies that are actually beneficial. The majalis, or  National identity in the UAE   141 informal meetings, of tribal elders continue to suffice and satisfy, although their constraints are increasingly stretched. The coalition between well-­educated, media-­savvy, middle-­class activist and disgruntled, underpaid, and demoralized working-­class supporters who both share the same culture and political values cannot happen as long as the gap in nationality separates the former, who are UAE citizens, from the latter, who are guest workers. The insecurity of the national elite and the transience of the working class translate into a wider chasm between the two, not an emergent solidarity. They are headed in two different directions, perhaps even dialectically opposites of one another – one relinquishes surplus value that the other appropri- ates for sustaining their own comfortable lifestyle. The modernization that is running at such a high velocity in the UAE identifies itself as bourgeois, com- pliant, and Western, not alienated, critical, and Asian. Arab uprisings have taken place in poor countries where corruption and venality are transparently obvious to its citizens and where the zero-­sum game of “your bribe” coming from “my pocket” means that this dishonesty has a direct consequence on people’s income, budget, and lifestyle. In the oil-­rich countries of the GCC, this very important and necessary ingredient for sparking opposition and violence is altogether lacking. The eudaemonic legitimacy of the state sees to it that its citizens are kept in a lifestyle that is appreciated and desired. Arab uprisings have also occurred in countries with an unjust set of rulers entrenched for life despite their constitutions and devoid of the dynastic legit- imacy found among the GCC emirs, kings, and sultans whose families have rightly ruled their countries for decades and centuries. The admiration and loyalty awarded the UAE’s founders, Shaykh Zayed and Shaykh Rashed, demonstrate that the rulers of the country do not govern wrongly or unjustly. Emiratis would no sooner depose these founders than they would overthrow their parents. Social media are embraced fervently but, without the elements of poverty and injustice, there is simply no reason to use this technology to further an agenda that is altogether missing in the Gulf. Instead, this technology basically advances the modernization project endorsed more by the young than the old, but signifi- cantly sanctioned by the founders and their state. There is no revolution, no Arab uprisings, no going back. The citizens of the UAE – more or less – stand united in their quest for modernization. Solving the empiricist dilemma, of measuring or detecting an event that does not occur, can be accomplished by following the trail of individual constituent ingredients of the Arab uprisings. The huge and sudden use of social media in the Gulf is well documented. But the content of the media is modernization, not revolution. The crises that elsewhere has promoted critical questioning translates into an embrace, not a rejection, of modernity. Moreover, the class structure that promotes a united opposition in the Arab uprisings countries has not emerged in the UAE. Finally, in a country with such fabulous resources and incomes, the poverty and venality that plague their poorer brethren elsewhere in the region is gratefully absent. 142   James Toth Far from typifying the Orientalist notion of people blindly and thoughtlessly pursuing their raw, biological, and religious compulsions, the Arab uprisings reflect a rational and coherent response to poverty, powerlessness, alienation, and dictator- ship. Where these elements are missing, so, too, is the insurrectionist response. Notes 1 I lived in the United States in 2011. Al Jazira was not permitted to broadcast there. Therefore, those of us who watched the station out of preference for its news per- spective needed to stream its broadcast through their home computers. 2 For an examination of how one of the lowest-­paid segments of Egypt’s working class influenced that country’s history in the last half of the twentieth century, see James Toth. Rural Labor Movements in Egypt and Their Impact on the State, 1961–1992. University Press of Florida, March 1999 (world rights) and the American University in Cairo Press, May 1999 (Middle East rights). 3 These two virtual reality groups were primarily responsible for organizing the initial stages of the January 2011 events in Cairo by means of social media and the internet. The April 6th Movement, a Facebook group with almost 70,000 members, was organ- ized by Ahmed Maher and Waleed Rashed and was named for a major labor strike staged by textile workers in the industrial Delta town of al-­Mahalla al-­Kubra on this date in 2008. This strike was called principally for economic grievances and political justice. Khalid Sa’id was a twenty-­eight-year-­old man in Alexandria arrested and then beaten to death by state security police in the summer of 2010. Photographs of Sa’id’s mangled body, smashed face, and broken ribs promptly appeared on the internet and a Facebook page was created with 159,000 members, galvanizing an angry public into a forceful political protest movement. 4 Greg Miller. “Senators Question Intelligence Agencies’ Anticipation of Egypt Upris- ing.” Washington Post. February 3, 2011. 5 Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain. “The Role of Digital Media.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 22, No. 3. July 2011; Jose Antonio Vargas. “Spring Awakening: How an Egyptian Revolution Began on Facebook.” The New York Times. February 17, 2012; Sean Webster. “Has Social Media Revolutionized Revolutions?” World News: The Carroll News. February 16, 2011; Scott Shane. “Spotlight Again Falls on Web Tools and Change.” New York Times. January 29, 2011; and Frank Rich. “Wall- flowers at the Revolution.” New York Times. February 5, 2011. 6 Fadi Salem and Racha Mourtada. “Civil Movements: The Impact of Facebook and Twitter.” Arab Social Media Report. Vol. 1, No. 2. May 2011:3. 7 On the Thursday evening before the day of enormous crowds at Tahrir Square, the Muslim Brotherhood officially declined to endorse the revolution. But, significantly, it issued a decree permitting its members to join individually. The Brotherhood was still hesitant about using social media, and so the unofficial backing went out by word of mouth. Two-­faced, perhaps. But without the participation of hundreds of thousands of Brothers the next day the revolution organized by the secularists would have collapsed. 8 The French Marxist Nicos Poulantzas once discussed the ideological function of capi- talist democracy as culturally separating everyone out into a pattern much like a far-­ flung solar system, and then reuniting them, but only under the exclusive aegis and control of a Leviathan state. Nicos Poulantzas, “Introduction,” in Classes in Con- temporary Capitalism, David Fernbach, trans. London: Verso Press, 1974. 9 Eric Wolf, Peasants. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-­Hall, 1966:81. 10 Here lies a major predicament, the empiricist’s dilemma: how to measure something that is not present, that is not derived from sense experience. How can we discuss something that did not happen, such as the Arab uprisings in the Gulf?  National identity in the UAE   143 11 Yahya M. Sadowski. Political Vegetables?: Businessman and Bureaucrat in the Development of Egyptian Agriculture. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991. 12 These views about social media were stated by students at the American University of Sharjah. 13 The Trucial States, or Treaty States, were those Arab countries (Oman and the UAE) on the southern shore of the Arabian Gulf organized under British protection in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 14 Habib Toumi. “Social Networks Answer Wish.” Gulf News. September 15, 2012:11. 15 Taghreed M. Alqudsi-­ghabra, Talal Al-­Bannai, and Mohammad Al-­Bahrani. “The Internet in the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC): Vehicle of Change.” Inter- national Journal of Internet Studies. Vol. 6, no. 1. 2011:44–67. This number differs from the figure stated elsewhere in the report that claims that 75.9 percent of the UAE’s population used the internet in 2010. Since the UAE has shown a steady increase over the decade, the discrepancy where the proportion declines cannot be easily explained. 16 According to the (a) Arab ICT Use and Social Networks Adoption Report 2012. Masdar Research & Development. 2012:38–40, Bahrain and the UAE remained in the top two ranks, but they posted much lower penetration rates of just 54.37 percent and 53.85 percent, respectively, instead of the 88.0 percent and 69.0 percent reported in the (b) Alqudsi-­ghabra, Al-­Bannai, and Al-­Bahrani study. Qatar slipped to number 4 (50.06 percent in (a) compared to 66.5 percent in (b)), replaced by Kuwait (50.13 percent in (a), compared to 39.4 percent in (b)). Oman ranked fourth in (b) and last in (a), Saudi Arabia ranked fifth in (b) and fifth in (a). Although the figures came from different (yet adjacent) years, there is no explanation for the wide discrepancy in numbers. 17 These percentages conceal the fact that, in actual figures, the number of users in the KSA vastly outweigh those in other GCC countries. Since it is by far and away the most populated and most expansive country in the GCC – more than twenty-­six million people and an area of more than two million square kilometers – the number of internet users – a little less than 11.5 million – greatly exceeds the numbers else- where in the Gulf. The UAE comes in a distant second with the second largest number of actual users, 3.5 million. See Alqudsi-­ghabra, Al-­Bannai, and Al-­Bahrani, op. cit. 18 Arab ICT Use and Social Networks Adoption Report 2012. Masdar Research & Development. 2012, 38–40. 19 Fadi Salem and Racha Mourtada. “Civil Movements: The Impact of Facebook and Twitter.” Arab Social Media Report. Vol. 1, no. 2. May 2011:23. Dubai: Dubai School of Government. 20 Arab ICT Use and Social Networks Adoption Report 2010. Masdar Research & Devel- opment. Cited in Salem and Murtada, op. cit., p. 9. The Arab ICT Use and Social Net- works Adoption Report for 2012 reports that the UAE still ranks the highest in the proportion of its population (32.6 percent) and the proportion of its internet users (60.5 percent) accessing Facebook. Saudi Arabia continues to have the most Facebook users in terms of absolute terms – 4.5 million, compared to the UAE’s 2.8 million – but these constitute just 16 percent of its population and one third of all its internet users. Kuwaiti Facebook users are a quarter of the population and half of all internet users. Bahrain’s Facebook users are about a quarter of the population as well and 44 percent of all inter- net uses. Qatar’s proportions are 19 percent of its population and 38 percent of its inter- net users. Oman is last among GCC countries, with 13 percent of its population and one-­third of its internet users accessing Facebook. Arab ICT Use and Social Networks Adoption Report 2012. Masdar Research & Development:90. 21 Ibid. These numbers apparently fluctuate greatly, so precise measurement must be dif- ficult. In a similar report a year later (2012), the same authors, Salem and Mourtada, reported that the numbers for Saudi Arabia increased more than sevenfold, from 115,000 Twitter users to 830,291. The penetration rate for the KSA similarly rose 144   James Toth from 0.42 percent of the total population to 2.88 percent of the total and 5.58 percent of all internet users. Kuwait showed a similar sharp rise, though not as steep, from 113,000 users to over 370,000, an increase of 227 percent. Similarly, the 3.24 percent penetration rate of 2010 increased to 9.88 percent of Kuwait’s entire population and 18.79 percent of all internet users a year later. In the UAE, the Tweeter population who had numbered 201,000 in 2010 rose roughly 30 percent in 2011 to 263,070. They had constituted 2.43 of all Emiratis; now they made up 3.07 percent of the total popu- lation and 5.4 percent of all internet users. Bahrain remained slightly steady, with its 61,900 Twitter users increasing to 72,468 over the one-­year period, with the penetra- tion rate of 3.09 percent, rising slightly as a proportion of the entire population to 3.43 percent and as proportion of all internet users to 6.53 percent. Oman had had 6,680 Twitter users in 2011, who represented 0.22 of all Omanis. By 2012, they had increased 30 percent, to 9,832, which was 0.33 percent of the national population and 0.76 percent of all internet users. All these countries increased, but Qatar’s Twittersphere actually shrunk, by more than half. Qatar saw its number go from 133,000 users to 59,835, who then consti- tuted just 3.43 percent of its population – down from 7.83 percent – and 6.53 of all its internet users. With these wild fluctuations, it seems safe to conclude that measuring this social medium remains haphazard. It is also likely that changes in government policy has led to some of these abrupt increases and declines. 22 This multiple utilization is similar with other countries in the Middle East – Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt – and it is only with Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen that individuals cease using numerous personal phones. Yet it is these latter countries that demonstrate the greatest growth in phone use, with expan- sion in the GCC countries leveling off. Arab ICT Use and Social Networks Adoption Report 2012. Masdar Research & Development. 2012:24–25. 23 “Ta’adilat Qanuniyya thaghlazh ’Aqubat al-­Jara’im al-­Iliktruniyya.” (“Legal Amend- ments Thickening Sanctions against Cybercrime.”) Al-­Imarat al-­Yawm, June 5, 2012; Bassam Za’za. “ ‘Be Careful while Using Social Media’ ” Gulf News. December 18, 2012, and Rania El Gamal and Raissa Kasolowsky. “UAE Arrest Four People after Tightening Internet Law.” The Star Online. December 19, 2012. 24 Al-­Qudsi-Ghabra, Al-­Bannai, and Al-­Bahrani, op. cit. 25 Arab ICT Use and Social Networks Adoption Report 2012. Masdar Research & Development. 2012:109. 26 Fadi Salem and Racha Mourtada. Op. cit., 14. 27 Jumana Al Tamimi. “A Disconnect with Tradition.” Gulf News. June 1, 2012:21. This article complements many of the comments I head from older Emirati parents of my students at the American University of Sharjah. See also Frank Fanselow, The 2015 Election for the Federal National Council of the UAE, paper presented at the 2016 Middle East Studies Association (MESA) conference, November 17–20, 2017. Boston, MA, USA. Fanselow’s paper was part of a larger panel, “Rival Epistemolo- gies: Modernizing and Traditionalizing Trends in the Arabian Gulf,” where the all four contributions emphasize the divisive nature of the modern–traditional divide. 28 Michele Bach Malek. “Cyber Disobedience: Weapons of Mass Media Destruction,” in Yahya R. Kamalipour, ed. The 2009 Presidential Election Uprising in Iran. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. 2010:277–288, and Jonathan M. Acuff. “Social Net- working Media and the Revolution That Wasn’t,” in Yahya R. Kamalipour, ed. The 2009 Presidential Election Uprising in Iran. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. 2010:221–234. 29 Roger Owen. The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2012. 30 Ibrahim’s sardonic combination of two Arabic words – gumhuriyya, republic in the Egyptian dialect, and mulukiyya, kingdom – for which he was in jail a year and a half  National identity in the UAE   145 (released due to health reasons) because it incurred the displeasure of his former student, Suzanne Mubarak, who did not like the implications for her son, Gamal. 31 For complete explanation of this term, and its uses in Western stereotypes, see Edward Said. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books. 1979. 32 Sayyid Qutb. Al-­Adala al-­Ijtima’iyya fi al-­Islam (Social Justice in Islam). Cairo: Maktabat Misr. 1949; reprint, Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International. 2000. For more on Sayyid Qutb and his other publications, see James Toth. Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual. New York: Oxford University Press. 2013. 33 Ironic, given the ever-­increasing national disparities between rich and poor even while international gaps are declining. This makes designations like super-­rich and super-­ poor much more salient, but terms like First World–Third World, North–South, or even “developed” and “developing” more obsolete. Francois Bourguignon. “The Glo- balization of Inequality.” Lecture, February 17, 2013. New York University in Abu Dhabi. 34 Hesham Al-­Awadi. In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–2000. London: Tauris Academic Studies. 2004:9–11. Arnold Gehlen. Studien Zur Anthropologie und Soziologie. Neuwied am Rhein: Luchterhand. 1963:255. 35 For more on the cutbacks and distortions introduced by neoliberal policies, see Manfred B. Steger. Globalization: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press. 2003:20–22. 36 Roger Owen. The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2012, and Robbins Burling. The Passage of Power: Studies in Polit- ical Succession. New York: Academic Press. 1974. 37 The “gulf ” in question, of course, is the Arabian Gulf, which the original members all border. It is interesting that there are now proposals to expand the GCC to include all monarchies even if they lie nowhere near the Gulf – Jordan and Morocco being two such candidates. The GCC would hence represent the monarchical outlook in order to counter the Arab League, which, while including the royals, has come to convey a strong republican perspective. 38 “UK Points Finger at Iran in Bahrain Unrest” Gulf News. March 26, 2013. 39 Unfortunately, space does not permit a thorough discussion of the situation in Bahrain. The concentration here on the UAE might take an unnecessary detour were Bahrain’s case examined more fully. 40 Averaging three separate estimates, it is estimated (Baldwin-­Edwards, PACI, and Fargues) that 87.0 percent of Qatar’s population is expatriate and 81.8 percent of the UAE is expatriate. (The figures for the UAE differ from the 88.5 and 11.5 figures stated later in this text since the latter are based on the UAE National Bureau of Sta- tistics estimate for May 2010.) By contrast, Oman’s expatriate population constitutes 31.4 percent of the country’s total population and Saudi Arabia’s expatriate popula- tion is only 31.0 of the total. Between these two extremes lie Kuwait at the upper end, with 68.2 percent expatriates, and at the lower end Bahrain, with 51.4 percent of its population nonnational. Nasra M. Shah. Trends and Patterns of Asian Migration to GCC Countries, paper presented at the Third Workshop on Nationalization of the Workforce in GCC Countries. New York University Institute. Abu Dhabi. November 20–21, 2011. (Dr. Shah begins her presentation with figures for these proportions for all nationalities before she focuses on the Asian workforce in particular.) When just the labor force is considered, these percentages shoot up dramatically. In 2008, according to a 2011 study conducted by Baldwin-­Edwards, Qatar’s expatri- ate labor force was a huge 94.3 percent of the total workforce and the UAE’s expatri- ate labor force constituted 85 percent (a decline from an even higher figure of 89.8 percent in 2005). Saudi Arabia’s proportion of foreign workers was almost half as much, 50.6 percent in 2008, and Oman was halfway between these two endpoints, with 74.6 percent of its labor force coming from outside. Kuwait’s expatriate labor 146   James Toth force rivaled the UAE’s, with 83.2 percent of its workers nonnational, and Bahrain’s proportion was similar to Oman, at 76.7 percent. 41 UAE. National Bureau of Statistics. Population Estimates, 2006–2010. March 30, 2011:5. 42 Mishaal Al Gergawi. “A Forty-­Year-Old Minority.” The National: Weekend Review. December 2, 2011:8. Media sources, such as the report from Al Gergawi, reinforce the anecdotal material gathered through informal discussions and unstructured inter- views in the UAE. In the remainder of the chapter, news articles help to condense and consolidate the various strands of discussions I have encountered throughout the country. 43 Vivian Nereim. “Invisible Borders Cut Both Ways.” The National. June 21, 2012:18. The article interviews Dr. Jane Bristol-­Rhys and cites two important publications. Jane Bristol-­Rhys. “Socio-­Spatial Boundaries in Abu Dhabi.” Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf. Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, eds. Center for International and Regional Studies. Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. London: Hurst; New York: Columbia University Press. 2012, and Jane Bristol-­Rhys. Future Perfect: Transnational Societies in the Emirates. London Hurst & Company. New York: Columbia University Press. Forthcoming. 44 Thus, not only are the old splits between First and Third World anachronistic, but the distribution of countries among those categories is also outdated. The GCC is no longer part of the “developing” world; it is, front and center, a solid member of the developed bloc. 45 Melanie Swan. “Defenders of the National Identity.” The National. April 17, 2012:4. 46 Vivian Nereim. “Residents Fear Effects of Relying on Nannies.” The National. November 26, 2011:4. 47 The irony of requiring all students, even those matriculating in Islamic studies, to know English has not been lost on the country’s policymakers. See Ola Salem. “All Students Must Learn English, UAE Education Minister Says.” The National. Novem- ber 21, 2012:4. 48 Andrew Gardner describes the necessity of providing free zones of abbreviated sover- eignty (including political, social, and cultural sovereignty) to expatriate workers as the price Qatar and other GCC countries must pay in order to attract any foreign lab- orers and employees at all. Heavy reliance on nonnationals would be seriously under- mined and the fast pace of development severely curtailed were these nonnational enclaves not offered and communications held principally in dialect Arabic. See Andrew Gardner. The Amalgamated City: Petroleum Wealth and Urban Space in Doha, Qatar, unpublished paper presented at the conference Boom Cities; Urban Development in the Arabian Peninsula. New York University Abu Dhabi, December 3–4, 2012. 49 Swan. “Defenders.” op. cit. 50 Mariam M. Al Serkal. “Young Emiratis Run into the Language Barrier.” Gulf News. June 11, 2012:10. 51 Iman Sherif. “Poor Arabic Language Curriculum, Teaching Plague Education System.” Gulf News. April 8, 2012:10. 52 Department of Economic Development (UAE). The Phenomenon of Divorce in the Society. Causes and Social Impact. Abu Dhabi (UAE). Department of Economic Development. Planning & Studies Division. Studies Directorate. Social Studies Section. 53 This percentage is mitigated by the fact that their brothers often choose to attend universities abroad where, however, they can succumb to marriage with those in their school classes rather than with Emiratis. Natasha Ridge and Fatma Abdulla. Where Are All the Men: Gender, Participation and Higher Education in the United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Dubai School of Government. Working Paper Series No. 11–03. March 2011.  National identity in the UAE   147 54 Wedding costs include the dower or mahr at the start, plus the increasingly costly jewelry, clothes, and household accoutrements. Vivian Nereim. “Dubai Divorces Up, Emirati Weddings Down, but Mixed Marriage Rise.” The National. January 22, 2013:1 & 4. 55 But see Jane Bristol-­Rhys. “Weddings, Marriage and Money in the United Arab Emirates.” Anthropology of the Middle East. Vol. 2, no. 1. Spring, 2007:20–36, for a more complex and multifaceted explanation. In addition, also see Jane Bristol-­Rhys. Emirati Women: Generations of Change. New York: Columbia University Press. 2010. 56 The majority of outside marriages has occurred with wives from neighboring Arab countries where cultural affinities can smooth out marital problems. Even so, some families refuse to accept these outsiders. Such problems are compounded even further when men choose non-­Muslim wives from Asia. Tariq A. Al Maeena. “A Case in Point for Demographic Balance.” Gulf News. June 17, 2012:B2. 57 Nereim. “Dubai Divorces Up.” op. cit, and Swan. “Defenders.” op. cit. Iman Sherif. “Study Shows Alarming Increase in Divorce.” Gulf News. June 15, 2012:5. 58 Ayesha Almazroui. “Emirati Marriage Norms Reflect Cultural and Ethnic Diversity.” The National. 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