Justice and Immigration PDF (The University of Warwick)

lOMoARcPSD|36365031 Justice and Immigration Issues in Political Theory (The University of Warwick) Scanne pour ouvrir sur Studocu Studocu n'est pas sponsorisé ou supporté par une université ou un lycée Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 Week 10. Justice and Immigr...

lOMoARcPSD|36365031 Justice and Immigration Issues in Political Theory (The University of Warwick) Scanne pour ouvrir sur Studocu Studocu n'est pas sponsorisé ou supporté par une université ou un lycée Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 Week 10. Justice and Immigration Lecture Part 1: The Right to Exclude and Freedom of Association Migration and movement: - Migration = physical movement between different geographical locations. - Important part of human life/society: people move for all sorts of reasons (job opportunities, loved ones, attraction to culture, climate, to escape war, political persecution, natural disasters, severe poverty…). - May happen within territorial states or across international borders. Crossing international borders (= geographically defined boundaries between the territories claimed by different states): - Often come up against enforcement power of those states (surveillance, militarised border gates…) → makes it difficult to cross those borders. - To avoid these enforcements, it is necessary to ‘ask for permission’ → before giving this permission the state in question will ask you a number of questions, submit you to tests… - If you get across without permission, you may find yourself imprisoned, or ultimately deported. Migration and political philosophy: - Questions political philosophers ask about migration tend to be normative questions, about what kind of immigration policies we should have, which kind of policies are morally justifiable… Some of these normative questions concern particular kinds of migration policies, such as: Is immigration detention permissible?; Is deportation permissible?; Can states select immigrants on the basis of skills? Race? - There is a more basic question (which is going to be our focus): Is it morally permissible, in the first place, for states to exclude would-be immigrants from crossing their borders? What, is anything, gives states a right to exclude? - Temptation to think that if we are committed to some sort of liberal value (freedom, autonomy…), that must commit us to think that there is something wrong with coercive border restrictions. But, there is an interesting argument that claims that we should think that states do have the right to discretion in excluding immigrants and choosing who to exclude. This argument argues states have this kind of right for liberal reasons (argument made by Christoper Wellman). 1 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 Christopher Wellman’s Freedom of Association Argument: - Starting point of his argument: thinking of states as analogous to individuals, with rights to self-determination (rights to decide for themselves how to live their collective lives). 5 steps in the argument: 1. There is a general right to freedom of association, and the value of this freedom gives the right significant weight (this is something we tend to recognise, at least with individuals). - Argues by analogy with mariage and religion: we tend to think that it is important for people to be free to choose who to marry or associate with for religious purposes, and we also seem to think that not only it is permissible for us to make these choices about who to marry or associate with for religious reasons but we also seem to think that others have some sort of duty to respect our choice. 2. The right to freedom of association includes the rights not to associate with others. - The right to choose who to marry must include the right to refuse to marry someone. - My freedom to choose who to marry will always be limited by your freedom to choose who to marry (ex: if I propose and you decline, then I will not be able to choose to marry you → choosing to marry someone doesn’t give you the right to, unless the person chooses to marry you too). 3. The right to freedom of association extends to groups as well as individuals (including perhaps the group that is a state). - States are different from you and me: they are groups, not individuals (major disanalogy). - Wellman thinks groups can too have rights to freedom of association. - Groups such as golf clubs or friendship groups seem to have such a right: might be hurtful or offensive if one of these groups refuses you to join, but doesn’t seem impermissible or morally wrong. - We tend to think it would be wrong for us, the rest of society, to force these groups to accept members they don’t want to associate with. 4. It is not only voluntary groups that have such a right, but also states (which are not voluntary groups as members of states don’t generally get a choice about whether or not to be a member of that state). There is still an important disanalogy: - Most of us are born into our state, meaning we don’t have a choice about whether or not to be a member of it, or at least the only choice we do have depends wholly on there being another state willing to accept us ≠ groups like golf clubs and friendship groups (voluntary associations). - States are not voluntary associations in the same way as golf clubs. - Wellman argues that our ordinary way of thinking about freedom of association applies also to non-voluntary associations like states; his argument: seems like we treat states as having a right of this kind & tend to think that it wouldn’t be permissible/morally justifiable to 2 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 force a state to join some sort of regional association, like the EU for instance, or for one state to annex another. - Ex: if it’s wrong for France to annex Switzerland even if no harm or rights violation is done to any individual person, Wellman thinks this is explained by states’ (here Switzerland’s) right to freedom of association. 5. States have the presumptive right (= there is a presumption in favour of this right that could be defeated by certain other things but we should start from the presumption that states have the right to…) to choose whether or not to associate with would-be immigrants, which is a right of some significant importance. Part 2: objections Possible problem 1: - If states do have a right to freedom of association, it may seem that it will just come into conflict with other rights. Ex: individuals’ rights to freedom of movement comes into conflict with states’ right to freedom of association. Or the rights of members of the state to freedom of association (if the state has the right to exclude it can prevent its members from inviting outsiders, from coming to visit for instance). - Wellman points out that there are limits on both of these sorts of right. And, he thinks, the state’s being able to control its membership matters for the state’s citizens, because it will have a significant impact on the future of the state. So, he thinks, we shouldn’t assume that individuals’ rights will win out. Possible problem 2: - Do states really have a right to freedom of association? (Sarah Fine). - They are importantly different from voluntary associations: Exclusion from a state has much more significance for your life (than exclusion from a voluntary association such as a golf club or friendship group). And theres no option of not living in the state (unlike there is an option to join or not voluntary associations). - Even if you can have a decent life outside this particular state, exclusion from it denies you all of the benefits and opportunities specific to this state (especially if you have personal connections to people in this state). - Wellman’s reasons for thinking that states too have a right to freedom of association has to do with the though that it would be wrong to force a state into the EU, or to annex another state. But there are other possible explanations: could have something to do with the rights of individual members of the states, these things could wrong them. 3 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 Xavier Hidalgo and compatriot deportation: - If states (as groups) have rights to freedom fo association, those presumably are rights to control who is a member of the group or who the group associates with. 2 ways in which a group like a state might control membership: 1) prevent entry; 2) remove existing members. Friendship groups and golf clubs usually have rights to do both. In addition, there are 2 ways in which people ‘enter’ a state: by immigration, and by birth. - So, if our interest in self-determination and control; over the nature and make-up of our association gives us a rights to restrict immigration, why does it not also give us as a group the right to deport existing citizens? - Hidalgo suggests this a reductio ad absurdum of the argument (= it has an absurd or implausible consequence. If a view follows from something absurd it must be that the view is wrong). Surely it is not ok to deport an existing citizen just because we collectively decide they do not fit in, or contribute enough. States do deport existing citizens, but generally only naturalised ones (not ones that are born in the state or have no other state). - Hidalgo: what is wrong with compatriot deportation is that it unjustly restricts their freedom and harms them. But restricting immigration also restricts freedom. And it can be a significant harm, ex: prevents people escaping poverty. - So if we want to defend immigration restrictions on these freedom of association grounds, we need an explanation of what is different between deporting existing citizens from preventing entry from outsiders. Asymmetries: - Hidalgo: whatever might explain the impermissibility of deporting citizens can apply to non-citizens too. - Ex 1) Maybe it’s wrong to deport citizens because they have contributed to the state’s institutions and economic well-being. But not all citizens have contributed (ex: children) and many noncitizens have contributed (ex: through trade, cooperation…). - 2) Maybe its wrong to deport citizens because it is harmful to them (ex: it disrupts valuable relationships etc). But excluding non-citizens can also harm them. If we prevent you from escaping harm, we cause harm to you. Many migrants can only escape harm (ex: poverty, war, environmental disaster…) by emigrating, and they can only do that if another state will admit them. A deeper problem: 4 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 - If Wellman’s arguments work, they would support the right of states seen as associations to exclude from membership in the association = his argument seems to include thinking about states as roughly equivalent to things such as golf clubs. So if the argument works, they show that the state has a right to exclude from its membership int he same way that a golf club has a right to exclude from its membership. - In order to be able to exclude people from territories, states need something more. - If an association (group of people) has the right to determine its own membership, that doesn’t give it any right to exclude from a place (ex: a park) - ex: if a football club meets in a public park, the club can exclude you from the club but not from the park as it does not own the park. On the other hand, if a chess club meets in a house it owns, it can exclude you from the house as it owns it (crucial difference). - Similar for states, even if they have the right to exclude from the state as association, that doesn’t show they can exclude from their territory unless they have rights over that territory. Part 3: Abizadeh and democracy Self-determination and democracy: - It is common to think that states or ‘peoples’ have a right to control their borders that arises from their right to self-determination. Wellman’s argument is a version of this view. This idea is often closely related to the value of democracy. People have the right to determine their own laws, or to control their own collective fate, democratically. That must include a right to decide who to associate with, or to determine the make-up of the democratic group. - The objections we looked at mainly had to do with the limits to democratic decision making. But Arash Abizadeh argues that democracy itself rules out of unilateral border restrictions. Boundary problem: - Democracy: the people should decide on/determine their own affairs. - But who is the people? If there is an isolated and self-contained group of people (ex: stuck on a raft), it’s straightforward what democracy requires: everybody should have a vote. - It’s common to think of existing societies in this way: all British people should have a say in British affairs; all Danish people should have a say in Danish affairs… Why should only Danish people have a say in Danish affairs? And who counts as Danish? What if I want to be Danish and to have a say? 5 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 - Societies are not isolated and self-contained (like the group of people on the raft). There are other people around who might want to join or have a say. - You could say ‘well, tough luck, they’re not Danish’ but that doesn’t help. The question is precisely why am I not Danish, or cannot become Danish. - You could appeal to the idea of some sort of natural community. Something like the idea of ‘ethnicity’ perhaps. But then it is not the ideal of democracy that explains why you can be excluded from Denmark, but the idea of ethnicity (or whatever). And that is not very useful for a modern, multi-ethnic state. Democracy and circularity: - Democratic procedures themselves can’t help. - Democracy requires everybody to have a say. But we can’t decide the boundaries of ‘the people’ (the ‘demos’) by voting. If we decide who the voting ‘demos’ is by a popular vote, we then need to decide who are the relevant people to decide on that. And if we want to decide this too by popular vote, we’ll need another vote to decide who gets a say in that vote, and so on… Democracy and coercion: - But the ideal of democracy might be able to help us. Maybe if we dig down, the value of democracy has to do with the idea that using state force to make you do something can be justified if you had an equal say in determining how state force would be used. Abizadeh: democracy requires at least that state coercion needs to be democratically justified to those coerced. - If thats the idea, it might help us see who should have a say in a democratic decision. Ans: everyone coerced by a decision should have a say. Border controls and coercion: - But the existing citizens of a state are not the only people who a state coerces. - In particular, creating borders is coercive. There are many people who would like to migrate to, and join a new state, and a good number who are prepared to risk a lot in order to do so. Denying these people membership, or access to the territory, involves coercing them. It involves subjecting these people to our will, and denying them valuable, in some case necessary, options. - So the ideal of democracy seems to rule out border controls, unless those border controls are democratically justified to those excluded. 6 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 I.e. for border controls to be justified democratically, they would have to be voted on by everyone subjected to them (both citizens and those excluded). If those excluded don’t have a say in deciding what the border control policy is going to be, then the thought is it looks like it can’t be democratically justified (because we are using coercion against some people who have no say in deciding how that coercion is going to be used). Keywords ★Freedom of association = The freedom of individuals to associate as an end in itself or with a view to pursuing common projects (through churches, trade unions, political parties, and sporting clubs). Widely seen as a core personal liberty by liberal political philosophers, warranting strict protection by the state (Oxford dictionary of politics). Freedom of association is a right to associate with any group they wish, including joining or leaving the group, and for the group to take collective action on behalf of its individual members (hrzone.com). According to Wellman’s argument, the right to freedom of association not only applies to the individual but also extends to the state. This right also includes the right to not associate and, in many cases, to disassociate (Wellman, 2008). - Stuart White (‘Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude’, 1997): “Freedom of association is widely seen as one of those basic freedoms which is fundamental to a genuinely free society. With the freedom to associate, however, there comes the freedom to refuse association. When a group of people get together to form an association of some kind (e.g., a religious association, a trade union, a sports club), they will frequently wish to exclude some people from joining their association. What makes it their association, serving their purposes, is that they can exercise this ‘right to exclude.’” ★Voluntary association = Groups we choose to be members of (not the case of the state we are born in, for example). ★Right to self-determination = freedom of association is an important component of this right. Seminar readings ‘Immigration and Freedom of Association’, Christopher Heath Wellman (2008) - Argues that every legitimate state has the right to close its doors to all potential immigrants, even refugees desperately seeking asylum from 7 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 incompetent or corrupt political regimes that are either unable or unwilling to protect their citizens’ basic moral rights. - A state’s right to limit immigration is an instance of its more general right to freedom of association. I. The case for the right to closed borders - Freedom of association includes a right to reject a potential association and (often) a right to disassociate. - Freedom of association does not work the same for individuals and states: for example, when it comes to matrimony, an individual has the right to marry who he pleases, and to reject a proposal. Along these lines, it would mean that a state has a right to determine whom (if anyone) it would like to invite into its political community, and just as an individual’s freedom of association entitles one to remain single, a state’s freedom of association entities it to exclude all foreigners from its political community. However, this may seem problematic: 1) There are morally relevant differences between individuals and groups, and these differences might explain why only individuals can have a right to self-determination. 2) Even if it is possible for groups to have rights, presumably the interests a group of citizens might have in controlling immigration are nowhere near as important as an individual’s interest in having a decisive say regarding whom he or she marries. - The non-voluntary nature of political states can raise complex problems for those who would defend a state’s right to political selfdetermination. - Unpleasant implications that follow from denying a country’s right to freedom of association: if legitimate states did not enjoy a right to freedom of association, entitling then to decline invitations to associate with others, they would not be in a position to either accept or reject the terms of regional associations, such as the EU → However, no one believes it would be permissible from the EU to coerce a country to join. Under this angle (an association cannot coerce a country into joining it, a country cannot annex another one…), there is not reason to doubt that groups, even political states, can have right to autonomy analogous to those enjoyed by individuals. - Since there is no intimacy among compatriots (most fellow citizens will never meet one another), it is not all clear why we need to respect freedom of association for groups of citizens. - “Freedom of association is to something that requires an elaborate justification, since it is simply one component of the self-determination which is owed to all autonomous individuals and legitimate states.” - For several reasons, it seems clear that control over membership in one’s state is extremely important → for example, members of a golf club care about the membership rules because they care about how the club is organised and the new members have a say in how the club is 8 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 organised → nothing irrational about people being heavily invested in their country’s immigration policy. - Although fellow citizens do not need to personally associate with each other, they remain political associates → people rightly care very deeply about their countries and, as a consequence, they rightly care about those policies which will affect how these political communities evolve and who enters the country (as they will have a right to vote to decide on these policies). - If there is any group whose self-determination we care about, we should be concerned about its rules for membership. - A second less obvious reason to care about immigration policy: has to do with one’s duties of distributive justice. II. The egalitarian case for open borders - Given that one’s country of birth is a function of brute luck, it seems grossly unfair that one’s place of birth would so profoundly affect men’s life prospects; i.e. if an individual is born in a country in which a war is taking place, he should have the right to migrate to another, safer country. - Political borders must be opened, so that no one is denied access to the benefits of wealthy societies. - Chandran Kukathas (expresses his argument in terms of a principle of humanity rather than equality, but makes the above point particularly forceful): “A principle of humanity suggests that very good reasons must be offered to justify turning the disadvantaged away. It would be bad enough to meet such people with indifference and to deny them positive assistance. It would be even worse to deny them the opportunity to help themselves. To go to the length of denying one’s fellow citizens the right to help those who are badly off, whether by employing them or by simply taking them in, seems even more difficult to justify— if, indeed, it is not entirely perverse.” - This argument presents an especially imposing obstacle to the prima facie case for the right to restrict immigration outlined above = both its moral and empirical premises appear unexceptionable (not open to objection or criticism): How could one plausibly deny either that all humans are in some fundamental sense equally deserving of moral consideration or that the staggering inequalities across the globe dramatically affect people’s prospects for living a decent life? - Intuitive line of reasoning: Allowing states to limit immigration is regarded as problematic on this view only because countries cannot enjoy this form of freedom of association without people’s life prospects being seriously affected by morally irrelevant matters, that is, factors entirely beyond their control. Wellman counters this: 1) the most compelling understanding of equality does not require us to guarantee that no one’s life prospects are affected by matters of luck, 2) more minimally, equality demands 9 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 that we address those inequalities that render people vulnerable to oppressive relationships. If this is correct, then the particular theory of equality required to motivate the egalitarian case for open borders is suspect and should be rejected in favour of a theory of relational equality. Even if luck egalitarianism is the best theory of equality, it would not generate a duty to leave borders open, because a wealthy state’s redistributive responsibilities can be discharged without including the recipients in the union. III. The libertarian case for open borders - To motivate the libertarian case for open borders, Carens imagines the following scenario. “Suppose a farmer from the United States wanted to hire workers from Mexico. The government would have no right to prohibit him from doing this. To prevent the Mexicans from coming would violate the rights of both the American farmer and the Mexican workers to engage in voluntary transactions” → libertarian argument against restricting immigration can take either of 2 forms, depending upon whether they focus on property rights or rights to free movement. Property rights emphasise the rights of those within the state and contends that limiting immigration violates individual property owners’ rights to invite foreigners to visit their private property. - States may not limit immigration because doing so wrongly restricts their constituents’ rights to private property → If the farmer’s government denies foreigners access to its political territory, however, then it thereby effectively denies the farmer the right to invite foreigners onto her land. Thus, since a state cannot limit immigration to its territory without also limiting its constituents’ property rights, political communities clearly are not morally entitled to control who crosses their borders. - This argument is not skeptical of the moral importance of freedom of association, it merely questions why the state should get to enjoy this right when its doing so necessarily limits the ability of its individual constituents to do so → In a conflict between an individual’s right versus a state’s right, a libertarian will typically argue that the individual’s right should take precedence. - Wellman is inclined to favour the claims of a state: one cannot consistently insist that property rights are totally unlimited without committing one-self to anarchism. Rights to free movements stress the rights of foreigners, claiming that closing territorial borders wrongly restricts an individual’s right to freedom of movement. - Wellman concedes that there is a right to freedom of movement and that states must take great care not to violate the individual rights of either constituents of foreigners, but does not think that the right to free movement is perfectly general and absolute → My right to freedom of movement does not entitle me to enter your 10 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 house without your permission, for instance, so why think that this right gives me a valid claim to enter a foreign country without that country’s permission? - No inconsistency in insisting upon freedom of emigration and internal migration, and allowing states to restrict immigration: one may unilaterally emigrate because one is never forced to associate with others, but one may not unilaterally immigrate because neither are others required to associate with you. Immigration is importantly different because, unlike either emigration or internal migration, it can involve costs to those who must include you as an equal in their political community. IV. A question of criteria - Samuel Huntington raises a difficult question: Assuming that states have the right to control who, if anyone, may enter their territories, does it follow that a country may adopt a policy that explicitly excludes people based upon their race, religion, or ethnicity? - If a state is genuinely at liberty to exclude everyone, how could an applicant righteously complain about not being admitted? - Walzer believes that there is nothing inherently unjust about an immigration policy that discriminated based upon race. - Miller argues that, even if the state is at liberty to exclude everyone, it wrongs potential applicants for admission by excluding them based on a category like race. - If the importance of freedom of association entitles racist individuals to marry exclusively within their race, why does it not similarly entitle racist citizens to exclude immigrants based upon race? - Blake: “Even if a hypothetical pure society could close the borders to preserve itself, a modern multi-ethnic democracy could not do so without implicitly treating some individuals already present within the society as second class citizens. Seeking to eliminate the presence of a given group from your society by selective immigration is insulting to the members of that group already present.” - Wellman’s conclusion on the ‘White Australia’ example used by Huntington: Thus, unless Australia were already composed exclusively of white constituents (and no state is completely homogenous), it would be impermissible to institute immigration policies designed to approximate a “White Australia,” not because such policies might insult potential black immigrants (though no doubt it would) but because they would fail to treat nonwhite Australians as equals. And because no state is completely without minorities who would be disrespected by an immigration policy which invoked racial/ethnic/religious categories, no state may exclude potential immigrants on these types of criteria. - Possible exception to this rule might be a religious state: if a country is designed as a state for people of a certain religion, it might be thought entirely appropriate to deny entry to people who are not of that religion → this would only work this way round, not the other way round 11 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 (however, would only be acceptable for a state that is strictly composed of people of that religion, not if a part of the population, however small it is, is of another religion; ex: Israel could not implement such an immigration policy on non-Jews sinon 20% of its population is already non-Jew). - Whether or not we are sympathetic to the idea of a state designed especially to serve a specific racial, ethnic, or religious constituency, such a state is not exempt from the requirement to treat all of its subjects as equal citizens. - If restricting immigration according to racial, ethnic, or religious criteria wrongs the current subjects (of the country implementing this restrictive policy) in the banned groups, then only a state completely devoid of people in the banned category could permissibly institute this type of immigration policy (therefore, Australia can’t reject immigrants based upon their race and Israel based upon the fact that they are not Jewish). ‘Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders’, Arash Abizadeh (2008) - Anyone accepting the democratic theory of political legitimation domestically is thereby committed to rejecting the unilateral domestic right to control state boundaries. - The regime of boundary control must be democratically justified to foreigners as well as to citizens, in political institutions in which both foreigners and citizens can participate. - Whether a democratic polity has the right to unilaterally control and close its borders to foreigners cannot be settled until we know to whom the justification of a regime of border control is owed. According to the state sovereign view (dominant ideology of the contemporary interstate system): entry policy ought to be under the unilateral discretion of (the members of) the state itself, and whatever justification is required for a particular entry policy is simply owed to members. The above position is inconsistent with the democratic theory of popular sovereignty: anyone who accepts a genuinely democratic theory of political legitimation domestically is thereby committed to rejecting the unilateral domestic right to control and close the states boundaries, both in the civic sense (regulate membership) and in the territorial sense (regulate movement). - Abizadeh argues that democratic theory either rejects the unilateral right to close borders, or would permit such a right only derivatively and only if it has already been successfully and democratically justified to foreigners (does not defend democratic theory but only shows what follows if one is already a committed democrat). Conclusion 12 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 - 1) A right to unilaterally control (and close) borders is incompatible with liberal and democratic reasons for the existence of borders (except under stringent circumstances). - 2) Potential justifications for border restrictions must be addressed in democratic forums in which foreigners, on whom such restrictions coercively fall, also have standing to participate. - To be democratically legitimate, any regime of border control must either be jointly controlled by citizens and foreigners or, if it is to be under unilateral citizen control, its control must be delegated, through cosmopolitan democratic institutions giving articulation to a "global demos," to differentiated polities on the basis of arguments addressed to all. - An objection = this argument ignores the assumed fact that regimes of border control implicate the interests of citizens much more than those of foreigners, and since citizens supposedly have a greater stake, they ought to have a greater participatory say. → HOWEVER: the fact that some foreigners give up everything they know and risk their lives to cross state boundaries (ex: Africans who risk the treacherous waters between Morocco and Spain) exposes the claim that citizens invariably have more at stake than foreigners as false, at least in relation to these foreigners. - However, there is some truth in the unequal-stakes objection, which is well assimilated by Raz’s triconditional account of autonomy in a way that helps frame the institutional implications of this part of truth (helping frame the institutional implications of Abizadeh’s thesis): 1) appropriate mental capacities, 2) adequate range of valuable option, and 3) independence. - Since border coercion invades the independence of everyone subject to it, a state wishing to place entry restrictions on foreigners owes those persons a democratic say, but border coercion undermines the first and second conditions of autonomy of only some foreigners. Thus, when thinking about the cosmopolitan democratic institutions necessary for legitimating regimes of border control, the second condition of autonomy suggests giving the weakest rights of participation to foreigners for whom the option of entry is of little value; a greater participatory say to foreigners for whom entry actually represents a valuable option; an even greater say to those for whom the option of entry is necessary to have an adequate range of valuable options; and perhaps the greatest say to citizens themselves. Seminar questions 1. Can an appeal to freedom of association justify a state's right to exclude? - Wellman reading: Whether or not we are sympathetic to the idea of a state designed especially to serve a specific racial, ethnic, or religious 13 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 constituency, such a state is not exempt from the requirement to treat all of its subjects as equal citizens. - If restricting immigration according to racial, ethnic, or religious criteria wrongs the current subjects in the banned groups, then only a state completely devoid of people in the banned category could permissibly institute this type of immigration policy. - Wellman reading: “while freedom of association provides a weighty consideration in favour of a state’s right to limit immigration, it is obviously not the only value of importance” (p.119). 2. Does the importance of freedom of movement provide a strong case for open borders? - Libertarian argument against restricting immigration stresses the rights of foreigners, claiming that closing territorial borders wrongly restricts an individual’s right to freedom of movement. - Wellman concedes that there is a right to freedom of movement and that states must take great care not to violate the individual rights of either constituents of foreigners, but does not think that the right to free movement is perfectly general and absolute → My right to freedom of movement does not entitle me to enter your house without your permission, for instance, so why think that this right gives me a valid claim to enter a foreign country without that country’s permission? 3. Does a concern for preserving national identity justify restrictions on immigration? - Abizadeh: If you are under to coercive control then you have the right to have a say in the coercive control. What is considered coercive control when it comes to immigration? Seminar notes - Is the exclusion from a state justified on the basis of freedom of association? - Some people have more than one citizenship so will not be the case for everyone. - European Union: a citizen of a certain country has the right to work in other countries without citizenship. Having a single citizenship is not an issue when things such as dual citizenship and ‘work permits’ exist in different countries. - Is tourism a kind of association? Economic benefits. Should a tourist have a right to vote in a country he/she is visiting? → consequentialist answer = people that visit many countries in a year would have a right to vote in many different countries + tourists are not really impacted by these elections. 14 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected]) lOMoARcPSD|36365031 - - - - Anyone who is interested in the direction of the country could be given a vote → but could have malicious intents towards a country. If people have a problem with tourists voting, then they might already have a problem with the completely open borders’ position. Freedom of association seems to extend to tourism (tourism is a form of association that countries regularly allow, even though they don’t allow open borders from the point of citizenship, which is a danger since people can overstay their tourist visas). Point of elections is to have an idea of the point of direction of a country. Open borders = people can go live wherever they want and have employment rights there (basically the rights people in the EU have but for everyone, everywhere). Is freedom of movement limited by property rights? 15 Téléchargé par Jonathan Layn ([email protected])