Finland:Russia-USSR Conflict (Resolved) .pdf

Europe Finland/Russia-USSR Con ict (Resolved) Behavior fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi Finland: Decisions Finland made several strategic and important tactical decisions during this con ct with its great power, later superpower, neighbor, RussiaUSSR (1919–1961). The frst two Finland decisions occurred...

Europe Finland/Russia-USSR Con ict (Resolved) Behavior fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi Finland: Decisions Finland made several strategic and important tactical decisions during this con ct with its great power, later superpower, neighbor, RussiaUSSR (1919–1961). The frst two Finland decisions occurred within the frst year of this interstate con ct (1919). One was to participate in the Western Powers’ military intervention in Northern Russia, in support of the ‘White Russian’ opponents of the Bolshevik regime. The second, near-simultaneous, decision was to dispatch Finnish ‘Volunteers’ to ‘liberate’ Eastern Karelia, a predominantly ethnic Finnish majority population that was an integral part of Tsarist Russia and its Communist successor. The frst decision was only partly implemented because its primary advocate, then General, later Marshal, Mannerheim, acting as Regent of Finland in 1918–1919, was replaced by a moderate elected president, and because the ‘White Russians’, the intended benefciary of that intervention, refused to recognize Finland’s independence. The second decision, like all subsequent attempts to secure control of East Karelia, failed; CHAPTER 8 Select Case Study Findings on Interstate Con cts: Europe and the Middle East © The Author(s) 2018 M. Brecher, A Century of Crisis and Con ct in the International System, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57156-0_8 212 M. BRECHER in fact, Finland was compelled to abandon its claim to that disputed territory in the 1920 Soviet Union-imposed Peace of Tartu, the third Finland decision in that initial phase of their con ct. There were no Finland decisions in the inter-World War period, the second peaceful phase (end 1920–beginning 1939). The third phase of this protracted con ct (November 1939–1944) witnessed another cluster of important Finland decisions. One was to accept the terms of the Soviet-initiated Peace of Moscow in 1940 that ended their ‘Winter War’: it was less onerous for Finland than the preceding peace agreement (Tartu in 1920), as noted, because of the tenacious Finnish defense against vastly superior Soviet military power. The next Finland decision, in the autumn of 1940, was to permit passage through its territory to German troops and their permission to establish supply bases, in exchange for military equipment. This sharpened the hostility and mistrust of the USSR for its northern neighbor and led to the second major act of violence in their con ct, the ‘Continuation War’ (1940–1944), and the more demanding Moscow Armistice in 1944, because of the more emphatic Soviet military victory than during their ‘Winter War’. Moreover, Finland had no alternative to accepting the severe terms of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty which incorporated the harsh terms of the 1944 Moscow Armistice, for Finland was merely one of a group of lesser European enemy states that had supported Germany during WWII. The fnal, strategic, decision by Finland was to change drastically its traditional attitude and policy to Soviet Russia: in light of the transformation of world politics, especially, the emergence of the USSR as a superpower. Finland gradually decided to transform its historic image of the USSR as inveterate enemy to an overwhelmingly powerful peaceful neighbor that required of Finland a basic change of policy to that of a trusting, friendly neighbor. This found expression in the accommodative 1948 FinlandSoviet Union Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA). [See below.] Finland: Decision-Makers There were three principal Finland decision-makers during this Northern Europe interstate con ct. The frst was Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, the commanding fgure in Finland’s political and military leadership during the frst half of this con ct. He was the military leader of the ‘Whites’ in Finland’s civil war (1918) and the Regent of Finland in 1918–1919. Then, after a 12-year semi-retirement, he served as Chairman of 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 213 Finland’s Defense Council from 1931 to 1945 and, most important, was Commander-in-Chief of Finland’s Defense Forces from 1939 to 1944, during the two Finland/USSR wars. He was elected President in 1944 and resigned in 1946 because of ill-health. Throughout his active public life, he was the most infuential member of Finland’s decision-making elite. Mannerheim adhered to the Realist paradigm until the end of WWII. However, he then became a primary and effective advocate of a fundamental fi fi fi fi fi fi change in Finland’s attitude and policy toward the USSR during the formative years of the transition on that core issue of Finland’s foreign and national security policy (1945–1948). The second important Finnish decision-maker was Juho Kusti Paasikivi. He was Finland’s representative in the crucial, unsuccessful negotiations with Stalin in 1939, leading to the ‘Winter War’ (1939–1940). After a withdrawal from the public arena during most of WWII, he served as President Mannerheim’s Prime Minister (1944– 1946) and was President from 1946 to 1956. He too advocated a positive change in Finland’s policy toward the USSR, which became known as the ‘Paasikivi Doctrine of Finlandization.’ The third and longest-serving Finland leader was Urho Kekkonen, who headed several Finnish governments as Prime Minister from 1950–1953 and 1954– 1956 and then served as President from 1956 to 1982. He shared the Paasikivi policy of ‘active neutrality’, which became known as the ‘Paasikivi-Kekkonen line’, and forged friendly relations with the Soviet leader, Khrushchev (1955–1964), as well as with Western and NATO leaders. All three senior decision-makers for Finland contributed to the profound change in Finnish attitudes and policy toward its superpower neighbor from the mid–late 1940s. Finland: Decision Process The political system in which Finland’s decisions in this interstate con ct were made and implemented was a Western-type democracy that combined a strong president, with some independent decisional powers, and a strong parliament: presidential decisions that were not ratifed by parliament did not bind later governments or presidents. At the same time, the electoral principle of proportional representation made coalition government the norm, thereby introducing an obstacle to an effcient and stable decision process in all aspects of public policy. Another constraint was the deep-rooted and widespread antipathy of the Finnish nation to all aspects of Russian culture and politics from the period of Finland’s colonial 214 M. BRECHER status vis-à-vis Tsarist Russia (1809–1918) until the end of WWII. Notwithstanding these constraints, Finland’s respected and politically astute decision-makers succeeded in transforming a collective negative perception of Finland’s powerful neighbor and people into a recognition that respect and accommodation were essential for the welfare of a small nation dependent on the goodwill of a major power for its survival in a complex, con ct-prone international system. Russia-USSR: Decisions The important decisions of RussiaUSSR in this con ct can be presented more briefy, since almost all were the antithesis of Finland’s core decisions. One, a strategic decision, was to respond to the challenge and threat posed by Finnish ‘Volunteers’ to USSR control over East Karelia in 1919. This took the initial form of successful military defense of Soviet territory against an intruding neighbor, followed by a demanding peace agreement (Tartu 1920), in which, as noted, Finland was compelled to yield its claim to rightful sovereignty over East Karelia (The Finnish 1919 decision to participate in Western military intervention in Northern Russia did not require a response because it was not fully implemented). The second important decision was to resort to force in late 1939, the ‘Winter War’, after negotiation with Finland failed to secure its political goals. The third, closely related decision was to initiate a peace proposal in 1940, in order to end a very costly war, which led to the Peace of Moscow that year. The fourth major USSR decision was a replication of the third, namely, to present a peace proposal in 1943, in an attempt to end the long, drawn-out ‘Continuation War’: this produced the 1944 Armistice, which effectively terminated that war; and its terms were formalized in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, the terms of which the USSR was a principal framer. The only major Soviet decision in this con ct that refected a more cooperative than con ctive relationship was to initiate the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948, which denoted a transformation of their longstanding hostile relationship. Russia-USSR: Decision-Makers The dominant fgure among Russia’s decision-makers in the frst phase of this con ct (1918–1919) was Lenin, who often consulted two other senior members of the Communist Party Politburo, Trotsky and Stalin. In the second phase (1939–1945), Stalin stood alone as the most 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 215 powerful fgure in the USSR regarding decisions on war and peace with Finland during the ‘Winter War’ (1939–1940) and the ‘Continuation War’ (1940–1944). The only other person who played an important role was Molotov, who held the USSR positions of Prime Minister or Foreign Minister during most of the period of Stalin’s unfettered dominance after Lenin’s death in 1922, Trotsky’s banishment from the Soviet fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi Union in 1929 and decimation of the Bolshevik ‘Old Guard’ by Stalin in the ‘show trials’ of the 1930s. Stalin remained the supreme decision-maker of the Soviet Union in all important aspects of its relations with Finland, as with all major USSR decisions in foreign policy and national security everywhere in the global system, until his death in 1953. For 2 years thereafter, the intra-party struggle for power, among the contenders for the succession to Stalin, generated instability and decisional uncertainty until the triumph of Khrushchev in 1955. His power was superior to that of his Politburo colleagues but less than absolute as in the brief tenure of Lenin and the much longer period of Stalin’s pre-eminence as the unchallenged decision-maker in all issues of public policy, foreign and domestic, that he chose to address. The second phase of the protracted con ct with Finland (1939–1944), with both wars during this con ct, was one of those issues. Russia-USSR: Decision Process The political system in which decisions by Russia-USSR in this interstate con ct were made was a marked contrast to the democratic, parliamentary system of competing parties that characterized Finland. From the Onset of this con ct until its Termination and for 30 years beyond its resolution, the pivotal institution for authorizing decisions on all aspects of public policy was the Communist Party and, especially, its principal executive organ, the Politburo. For some decisions of lesser importance, an issue might be decided by the larger Party body to which, in theory, the Politburo was responsible, the Central Committee. In reality, however, all important decisions, strategic and tactical‚ were made by the General Secretary, later, the First Secretary of the Party. During the brief Lenin era, the decision process was largely confned to Lenin and a few senior members of the Politburo, notably Trotsky and Stalin, and sometimes the entire Politburo. During the frst phase of the Finland/ Russia-USSR con ct, the two major decisions in 1919 noted above were made by Lenin, in consultation with Trotsky and Stalin, as noted. In the crucial second phase (1939–1944), as well as on the crucial decision 216 M. BRECHER leading to the 1948 bilateral Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Stalin acted alone or in consultation with his subordinate Foreign Minister, Molotov. In sum, the decision process in Finland was more complex, involving more institutions, interest groups, and parties in a coalition government. The decision process in RussiaUSSR was confned to the Communist Party elite decision-making body, the Politburo, but even narrower, to the incumbent Party leader for most of the important decisions in the Finland/RussiaUSSR interstate con ct. Finland/Russia-USSR: Con ct-Sustaining Acts Violence was the most consequential, but not the most frequent, con ct-sustaining technique utilized by both of the principal adversaries. The frst notable threat of violence was Finland’s informal military intervention via the dispatch of ‘Volunteers’ to the southern part of East Karelia on April 20, 1919, in support of its attempt to secede from Russia and integrate into Finland. This dispatch of ‘Volunteers’ continued in 1921, despite Finland’s formal renunciation of its claims to predominantly Finnish-speaking East Karelia in the 1920 Peace of Tartu (East Karelia had never been part of Finland). After almost two decades of non-violent hostility between the two principal adversaries, the USSR initiated a border incident on November 26, 1939, alleging the fring by Finnish artillery on Soviet forces across their frontier: this was accompanied by the USSR’s renewed severance of diplomatic relations with Finland and renunciation of their 1932 non-aggression treaty, culminating in the invasion of Finland on November 30, the beginning of their 1940 ‘Winter War’, which lasted for 3 months. Finland initiated another important non-violent military act in June 1941, granting free passage of German troops through its territory, thereby enabling Germany to launch the northern front of its ‘Operation Barbarossa’ on 22 June. During the following 6 months, Finland took advantage of the Soviet Union’s pre-occupation with the siege of Leningrad and re-gained all of the territory that it had been forced to cede in the 1940 Peace of Moscow, after the ‘Winter War’. Then Finland shifted to a defensive posture, until the massive Red Army attack on the Karelian front on June 9, 1944, which restored Soviet territorial gains at the end of the ‘Winter War’ (1939– 1940), but had lost to Finland during the early months of Germany’s attack on the USSR, that is, in the second half of 1941. Following a ceasefre in early September 1944, the Moscow Armistice agreement on September 19 ended the ‘Continuation War’, the second 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 217 major violent con ct-sustaining act during the Finland/Russia-USSR interstate con ct. As in 1920 (Peace of Tartu) and 1940 (Peace of Moscow), fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi Finland was compelled to make territorial concessions in 1944—to cede parts of Finnish Karelia and several islands in the Gulf of Finland, as well as the northern Petsamo region, to the USSR. It also undertook to expel German forces from Finland, achieved in April 1945, near the close of WWII in Europe, to legalize the Communist Party in Finland, and to ban fascist, pro-Germany, organizations. There were no other violent con ct-sustaining acts in this con ct from 1944 to con ct termination in 1961. Political Hostility—the second important con ct-sustaining technique in this Northern Europe con ct, with Finland its more frequent initiator, though sustaining the con ct was more often the consequence of its acts than their intent. Always insecure during its frst 25 years as an independent state, Finland sought allies, sympathizers, and patrons to help compensate for its adversary’s vastly superior military capability. At frst, in the early 1920s, Finland sought the friendship and support of the Soviet Union’s nearest neighbors—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and Poland. Given their geographic location and complex relations with the USSR, their embrace by Finland was perceived by Moscow as hostile political acts. Then, Finland sought alignment with Scandinavia states, acts that also generated Soviet mistrust. Of greater concern to the Communist regime in the USSR were several domestic political acts by its Finnish adversary. One was the election of conservative, pro-German and anti-Communist presidents during the 1920s and 1930s, notably Svinhufsud (1931–1939), whose hostile attitude to the Soviet Union was unconcealed. Another related politically hostile act was Finland’s ban on its Communist party in 1930. The USSR’s most hostile political acts were its creation of a puppet regime in Finland at the beginning of their ‘Winter War’ (1939–1940) and its withdrawal of formal recognition of the internationally recognized, politically hostile Government of Finland, followed by the Soviet Union’s attempt to interfere in Finland’s domestic politics during the early months of WWII. This, in turn, contributed to Finland’s unconcealed support for Germany’s invasion of Northern Russia in 1941. Although less consequential than direct violent acts by both adversaries, acts of political hostility further enhanced mutual distrust of the other’s intentions and objectives. 218 M. BRECHER Verbal Hostility mostly in the form of propaganda attacks on Finland by the offcial Soviet media, and the disparaging images of Communism and Russian society, culture, politics and its economic system by Westerntype private media and senior offcials in Finland, from 1919 to 1944, reinforced the more signifcant and tangible negative consequences of violent and political con ct-sustaining acts. Whatever acts of Economic Discrimination occurred between the adversaries did not contribute to the persistence of this con ct. Finland/Russia-USSR: Con ct Management Evidence Con ct management in this Northern Europe protracted con ct was virtually unique among post-World War I interstate con cts, in the form in which it was manifested: three of the four major hostile episodes during the Finland/Russia-USSR 42-year interstate con ct (1919–1961) were characterized by violence, usually intense, serious clashes or full-scale war. All were ended by formal peace agreements, none of which led to lasting peace, or a resolution of their con ct. Rather, con ct management in this con ct generated fnite periods of the suspension of violence between the two principal adversaries, each lasting for years; they were similar to periods of a lengthy truce, each of which was followed by a resumption of violence; and the third episode of violence was followed by 17 years without violence, until con ct resolution was achieved in 1961. The frst hostile episode in this con ct began on April 20, 1919, when Finnish soldiers, posing as “volunteers,” backed by Finland’s government, entered Russia-controlled East Karelia and seized a border town; this occurred even before Finland’s independence was recognized by the UK and the USA, on 6 May; Russia’s recognition came 1½ years later. There was sporadic fghting in May and through the summer and September. Finland/Russia negotiations began in June 1920, and the frst peace agreement, the Treaty of Tartu, was signed on October 14. Con ct management was devoted to establishing a border between the two adversaries, in the form of a binding peace treaty. In essence, newly independent Finland ceded to Bolshevik Russia [the USSR was formalized in 1922] the eastern part of the Karelian Isthmus and two border districts, along with demilitarizing and neutralizing some islands in the Gulf of Finland, which Russia deemed vital for the defense of Leningrad; in return, Russia recognized Western Karelia and the northern region of 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 219 Petsamo as integral parts of fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi Finland. An informal promise by Russia of a referendum in East Karelia, with the option of secession, which Finland believed would lead to integration with Finland, was never held. The Treaty of Tartu maintained a ‘cold peace’ between mutually distrustful neighbors, accentuated by unconcealed hostility by Finland to every dimension of its giant neighbor—its political and economic system, ideology, culture, national behavior—until the outbreak of World War II. The cleavage was accentuated by Soviet Russia’s creation of a rival, proCommunist government, headed by Kuusinen, in the near-proximity of Finland, and the reluctance of Finland’s recognized RytiTanner government to respond favorably to the Soviet Union’s offer of negotiations. The USSR, suspecting possible Western Powers’ direct support to Finland, launched an offensive almost two decades later, designed to annex the rest of the Karelian Isthmus. The result was the high casualty, 3-month, full-scale, bitter Winter War from December 1939 to early March 1940. As the much stronger power, the USSR emerged the victor, but Finland’s defense against overwhelming odds evoked admiration from many Western and European states and respect from the Soviet Union. Once more, con ct management occurred in the form of a peace agreement, the Peace of Moscow, signed on March 13, 1940, which entailed even more far-reaching territorial concessions by Finland to the Soviet Union than the Peace of Tartu: the entire Karelian Isthmus, restoring the border set by Peter the Great; some islands coveted by the USSR in the Gulf of Finland, along with a 30-year lease of Hanko Cape and surrounding islands and water. It also prohibited either party from entering into an alliance with a third party to attack the other signatory. Like the Peace of Tartu, it produced a ‘cold peace’, along with intense grievances among the Finns, but for a much shorter period, 4 years. The third phase of war and con ct management replicated the Winter War and the Peace of Moscow (1939–1940), with the Continuation War and its Armistice. By August 24, 1944, following another successful Soviet Union offensive in the Karelian Isthmus, and the awareness by Finland’s leaders that their longstanding patron, Germany, would suffer defeat in WWII and, therefore, could not serve any longer as Finland’s defender against further Soviet Union encroachments on its territory and, ultimately, its sovereignty, Finland decided to accept a harsh Soviet offer of peace. As conditions for negotiations, the USSR demanded a complete termination of Finland’s relations with Germany and the withdrawal of all 220 M. BRECHER German troops from its territory. Surprisingly, the Soviet Union’s armistice terms were mild—no occupation of Finland’s territory, a modest imposition of reparations, and a commitment by Finland not to enter an alliance with, or permit the transit of armed forces through its territory by, any potential Soviet enemy. The Armistice in the Continuation War was signed on September 19, 1944 and served as a prelude to a formal peace agreement—the Paris Peace Treaty (September 15, 1947) between the victorious Four Powers in the European theatre of World War II (the UK, USA, USSR, and France) and the fve allies or satellites of Germany (Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Romania). Finland and the other four defeated states had no role in the drafting of this European Theatre peace treaty, unlike its formally equal role as a negotiator of the Peace of Tartu, the Peace of Moscow, and the Armistice in the Continuation War; they were invited to address the Paris Conference, attended by 21 states, but they were not permitted to participate in its discussions. Several provisions of the 1947 Peace Treaty related directly to Finland, though some were stated in terms applicable to the fve defeated states. Two replicated provisions in the 1940 Peace of Moscow: an obligation to refrain from any attack on, or participation in an alliance directed against, another signatory; and a specifc admonition against participation in the rearmament of Germany or in its military industries. Moreover, the Finland/ USSR boundaries stipulated in the 1944 Armistice were re-affrmed; and the size of Finland’s armed forces seriously limited, notably an army of 34,000 soldiers and 60 military planes. As for its contribution to con ct termination, the Paris Peace Treaty ended a War, World War II and Finland’s participation in that war. However, it did not constitute resolution of the Finland/RussiaUSSR interstate con ct. That did not occur until 14 years after the Paris Peace Treaty. Finland/ Russia-USSR: Con ct Resolution The above discussion of con ct management in this con ct noted a unique trait—in three of the four major con ct episodes, management took the form of peace treaties between Finland and Russia-USSR, but lasting peace and con ct resolution were not achieved by any of their peace agreements! A second unique feature of this protracted con ct is that fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi the path to con ct resolution was a de facto alliance between the principal adversaries, one year after the last of their peace treaties, the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty which, like its predecessors, did not constitute 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 221 con ct resolution: their alliance was entitled “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” (FCMA), signed in April 1948. A third unique characteristic of the Finland/RussiaUSSR con ct and relationship is that, while the formal wording of this treaty was identical to that used in other treaties that defned the relations between the Soviet Union and the East European states which became members of the Warsaw Pact, the USSR determined when the commitments of the alliance, affecting all signatories to FCMA treaties, took effect for all. By contrast, the activation of all FCMA commitments by Finland and the USSR required the approval of both signatories. Moreover, the Soviet Union accepted the proposed Finland wording, which signifcantly circumscribed the alliance commitments: in the Soviet proposal, Finland would have been committed to assist the USSR in defending its territory whenever necessary; the Finland counterproposal would restrict military cooperation to a specifc situation, an attack on the Soviet Union by Germany or its allies through Finnish territory; and Finland wished to include a clear statement of its desire not to be involved in great Power disputes. The USSR accepted the Finland formulation, as evident in Article 1 of their FCMA treaty: its terms were to apply only to an armed attack on the Soviet Union through Finland’s territory, and determination of the need for Finland’s assistance was subject “to mutual agreement between the Contracting Parties.” Article 2 reinforced the content of the frst article by calling on the signatories to confer with each other on a course of action if the threat of an armed attack was considered genuine. This conciliatory Soviet behavior on the wording of their FCMA treaty, unique in the relations between the USSR and its other smallstate neighbors, refected the qualitative change in the Finland/Russia USSR con ct; and it contributed to a fundamental change in Finnish attitudes to its superpower neighbor, from hostility, mistrust, and hatred in the earlier decades of their con ct to growing mutual trust by the leaders of both adversaries, Stalin and Molotov for the USSR, Paasikivi and Kekkonen, who set the tone for an accommodation with the Soviet Union during their long tenure as presidents of Finland. In essence, the former had achieved its primary goal, an assurance about Finland’s future behavior in case of war between the USSR and one or more Western Powers, always a pre-occupation for Soviet leaders: Finland would not be a willing party to a military attack on the Soviet Union from its territory, land or sea, and Finland would provide military assistance to the USSR, however, limited it might be. 222 M. BRECHER The Finnish leaders, in turn, felt reasonably secure that the Soviets would not attempt to occupy part or all of its territory and would not attempt to coerce it into accepting the demeaning status of the East European Communist-ruled states vis-à-vis the USSR, even before its dominance was formalized by the Warsaw Pact in 1955 and reaffrmed in 1956 by its suppression of the Hungarian Uprising, and by crushing the Prague Spring in 1968. Stated schematically, their Finland/USSR 1948 treaty, the FCMA, was a trade-off with high-value benefts for the principal adversaries: for Finland, a USSR commitment to accept Finland’s independence and its neutrality regarding the Cold War between the superpowers; for the USSR, a Finland commitment to attempt to prevent a re-occurrence of an attack on Leningrad through its territory. Nonetheless, in light of more than a century of Tsarist Russia rule over Finland and three decades of mistrust and hostility between Communist Russia and independent Finland, reinforced by four con ct episodes, three of them with violence, including one bitter and costly full-scale war, the 1939–1940 ‘Winter War’, con ct resolution of the Finland/Russia-USSR con ct needed more time and more tests. One was a 1958 domestic political crisis in Finland, which aroused suspicion by Soviet leaders: they feared an abandonment of ‘the PaasikiviKekkonen foreign policy Line’, a conciliatory posture toward the USSR that had been sustained by two Finnish presidents. The Soviets made known their displeasure; and Finland’s parliament attempted to form an alternative government. Finally, Kekkonen’s Agrarian Party formed a minority government, terminating that crisis without a negative fall-out for Finland-USSR relations. The second test of the authenticity of the mutual trust and conciliatory attitude of the two adversaries came in the form of their 1961 Note Crisis. The Soviet Union, concerned as always about Germany’s reemergence as a major power, fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi was disquieted by its entry into NATO, re-armament, and the 1961 Berlin Crisis, along with the integration of Norway and Denmark into NATO’s northern Europe command structure, perceiving these developments as possibly portending another Western attack on the USSR, via Finland. On October 30, refecting these concerns and the possibility that, as in the 1958 crisis, Finland might discard the conciliatory ‘Paasikivi–Kekkonen Line’, the USSR sent a diplomatic Note to Finland, requesting consultations, in accordance with Article 2 of their 1948 FCMA Treaty. Finland responded a week later by sending its Foreign Minister to Moscow for consultations 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 223 with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. When that proved inconclusive, President Kekkonen met with Soviet leader Khrushchev on November 24 and convinced him that consultations on a declared military threat would cause fear in Norway and Denmark, leading to their military preparations; further, that by cancelling the request for consultations, the Soviet Union would indicate that it had no belligerent plans regarding its neighbors; and, perhaps most important, whoever won the pending Finland presidential election, Finland would remain committed to the 1948 Treaty. The Soviet leader was persuaded, and the military consultations were waived. This outcome of the 1961 Note Crisis crystallized the longdeveloping change from mistrust to trust by both adversaries and de facto resolution of their fourdecade long con ct. Finland/Russia-USSR Con ct: Causes of Resolution Does the evidence on con ct-crisis management and con ct resolution of the Finland/Russia-USSR con ct support any, some or all of the likely basic causes of—favorable conditions for—con ct resolution postulated in the Resolution Model presented earlier? Exhaustion—While the con ct episodes in this 42-year resolved con ct (1919–1961) were relatively few and scattered (1919–1920, 1939–1940, 1944, and 1958), the persistence of intense hostility and mistrust by both principal adversaries for ‘the other’ generated cumulative fatigue by both: it reached the level off exhaustion during the ‘Winter War’ (1939– 1940) and the ‘Continuation War’ (1944). For Finland, the smaller, weaker state, a series of national challenges led to sustained collective fatigue, which escalated to exhaustion on several occasions. These developments began with a collective memory of Russian colonial rule (1809– 1918). This was followed by a Communist-anti-Communist civil war in 1918, the former supported by Soviet Russian aid; military confrontation between Finnish and Soviet Union forces in three military campaigns; and the longstanding uncertainty about Soviet intentions. Uncertainty ranged from possible occupation and re-integration of Finland into a Russian state, to the frequent risk of unwanted involvement in major power con cts and wars, notably between Western Powers and Communist Russia, as in the latter’s civil war (1918–1921), and the war between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (1941–1945). The Finnish nation also confronted the geographic reality of permanent proximity to a major power, linked to a hostile historical relationship that continued as 224 M. BRECHER an interstate protracted con ct (1919–1961). All of these developments undoubtedly generated a desire for con ct termination, especially after the ‘Winter War’ and the ‘Continuation War’. Although the available evidence is sparse, and Finnish culture is not favorably disposed to complaints about exhaustion, it is reasonable to assume that national fatigueexhaustion made Finland aspire to a measure of tranquility and security that con ct resolution would provide. While the combined pressures on Finland from con ct, war, and uncertainty about Soviet intentions were not shared to the same extent by Soviet forces beyond those engaged in battle with Finnish forces, or by Soviet society, which suffered from other sources of fatigue-exhaustion, the exhaustion of the Soviet defenders of Leningrad during a monumental 3-year siege, in a region where Soviet Russian and Finnish national interests collided directly, the Gulf of Finland, made the Finland dimension of con ct and war an important source of overall Soviet exhaustion. In sum, the role of exhaustion as a cumulative inducement to con ct resolution was more signifcant in Finland’s behavior, especially after 1944, but it was not marginal as an inducement to the Soviet Union’s wish for con ct resolution, especially because of the vulnerability of Leningrad to the infuence of Finland in permitting or denying transit rights through its territory; this Soviet perception was evident in the USSR’s conciliatory acts toward Finland on several occasions during their interstate con ct. Changes in the Balance of Capability—For the leaders of Russia-USSR, the discovery that a small, weak state was capable of extraordinary feats in a military campaign against an enemy with fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi overwhelming superiority in manpower and weapons, as displayed in the ‘Winter War’ and the ‘Continuation War,’ had a profound effect on their subsequent behavior. At the time, Western observers from afar expressed admiration for the tenacity and bravery of Finnish armed forces. During World War II, Stalin was reported as reluctant to expend more Soviet military power against the Finns in the 1944 ‘Continuation War’ because of his respect for the quality of Finnish soldiers who might slow the advance of Soviet forces in ‘the race for Berlin.’ While the material balance of military capability clearly favored the USSR throughout this interstate con ct, the non-material change in the balance of capability—the display of an impressive Finnish defense capability in their two wars—and the vulnerability of Leningrad to invasion via the Gulf of Finland, if Finland were 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 225 disposed to assist one or more major powers in an invasion of the Soviet Union, remained a pre-occupation of Soviet behavior in the protracted con ct with Finland. This link is most clearly evident in the wording of the two articles in the 1948 Finland-USSR FCMA Treaty, noted above, and in the Soviet decision to initiate its 1961 Note Crisis by attempting to persuade Finland to hold consultations about a Sovietperceived military threat, referring to the danger of hostile, anti-Soviet, states trying to secure permission to use the Gulf of Finland as the path to an attack on the USSR. Thus, while the unequal military balance, per se, was not a condition to induce a USSR preference for con ct resolution, the profound concern for the security of Leningrad was a strong inducement to resolution, including a willingness to ‘pay the price,’ that is, to manifest a conciliatory, ‘good neighbor’ policy to the small state in geopolitical command of physical access to the Soviet Union’s metropolis in the north. Domestic Pressures—Within Finland’s society the main source of pressure for a resolution of this con ct was the Communist Party and non-Party supporters of the Soviet Union. During the early years of Finland independence, the Communist movement was a substantial political force, which persistently advocated con ct resolution as a step toward closer relations with the USSR, to culminate in membership of USSR-led institutions. The Communist Party never achieved that ultimate goal but it remained a vocal, articulate exponent of peace and cooperation with the Soviet Union. More generally, support for con ct resolution in Finland emanated from national fatigue with a con ct, the beneft of which was virtually nil, politically, economically, socially, and culturally. Given this negative consequence, Finnish public opinion was favorably inclined to con ct resolution, after the ‘Continuation War’ (1944), as long as the most fundamental Finnish values were ensured—sovereignty, political independence, a democratic system of government, an economy free from external constraints or control, and guaranteed individual freedoms. Because of innate uncertainty as to the ability of any Finland Government to safeguard all of these values, the attitude to con ct resolution, while supportive, was more passive than active. Apart from exhaustion, as an independent cause, the presence of domestic pressures to induce a policy directed to con ct resolution was not strongly supported by the evidence—until after the end of World War II. 226 M. BRECHER External Pressures—All of the available evidence on con ct-reducing acts in the Finland/Russia-USSR con ct, that is, successful con ct-crisis management, and on con ctresolving acts, that is, successful con ct resolution, point to primarily bilateral processes. The three peace treaties, Tartu (October 1920), Moscow (March 1940), and the Armistice in the Continuation War (September 1944)—evidence of con ct management—resulted from direct negotiations between Finland and RussiaUSSR; so too with the major acts leading to con ct resolution, notably the FCMA treaty (April 1948) and the termination of the Note Crisis (November 1961). Major Powers and a regional power were involved in some of these but none with a profound infuence. In the 1919–1920 Karelia episode, Germany tried to mediate; France, the USA, and the UK issued statements supporting Finland, and the UK sent naval vessels to the Baltic at Finland’s request to enhance Finland’s bargaining position in the negotiations. During the ‘Winter War,’ Sweden’s king refused to aid Finland; the UK and France pressed Finland to accept Allied armies in its territory, but Finland refused and negotiated an armistice with the USSR via Sweden. There was no external involvement in the Finland-USSR negotiations culminating in their 1948 ‘friendship’ treaty or in the 1961 Note Crisis that led to con ct resolution of this con ct. Thus, external pressures for con ct resolution were minimal and insignifcant. Decline in Con ct-sustaining Acts—Interstate violence fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi was intermittent in the Finland/Russia-USSR con ct, with three major episodes: the struggle over territory, East Karelia, in 1919–1920, with serious clashes between Finland Government-supported “volunteers” and Soviet forces, and two full-scale wars, the “Winter War” in 1939–1940 and the “Continuation War” in 1944, their last violent episode. While hostile Finnish attitudes and mutual mistrust continued, non-violent episodes of verbal hostility declined steadily from their April 1948 Treaty of Mutual Friendship, Cooperation, and Non-Aggression (MFCN), until the end of their con ct. Con ct resolution, without a formal document, emerged from successful negotiations between Finland’s President Kekkonen and Soviet leader Khrushchev in November 1961 terminating the second “Soviet Note to Finland” crisis, which was treated by the two neighbors then and later as the end of their protracted con ct. Reduction in Discordance of Objectives—The change from Finland-USSR acute discordance over objectives to mutual toleration of different social, 8 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 227 economic, and political systems, and values, was the result of a slow process of changing perceptions of intentions of the adversary, mainly from Finland’s political leaders, elites and mass public, from the end of the Continuation War in 1944 until 1961. After two costly wars, without any compensating benefts, along with a more compelling awareness of the massive difference in military power between the USSR and Finland, further enlarged by the USSR’s emergence as a superpower, and possibly by a recognition of greater Russia-USSR security as a result of victory in World War II, the Finns began to view their former ruler as a potential ‘good neighbor’ which, despite their profound differences in ideology, system of government, economy, and values, no longer feared an invasion by a Western great power, via the traditional source of Russian and Soviet insecurity, the Gulf of Finland, with direct access to the highly vulnerable Soviet metropolis in the North, Leningrad. Thus, while ideological discordance over objectives (and values) remained, Finland’s leaders made a choice to attempt to foster a ‘good neighbor’ relationship with the Soviet Union. For their part, the USSR leaders began to view Finland no longer as an agent of a hostile West determined to destroy their Communist rival but, rather, as a potential model of peaceful coexistence in a new conciliatory relationship. Whatever the reasons that prompted the leaders of both former adversaries to create a more positive, friendly, mutually benefcial relationship, the reduction in discordance of objectives became evident in the 13 years after the signing of their 1948 treaty of friendship, which differed fundamentally from treaties of friendship between the Soviet Union and other Communist states. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, that reduction in discordance over objectives continued long beyond resolution of the Finland/USSR con ct in 1961, and beyond the disintegration of the Communist Bloc and the USSR, in 1989 and 1991. In sum, four of the six conditions that were postulated in the Con ct Resolution Model as most likely to lead to con ct resolution were present in the Finland/Russia-USSR protracted con ct. The most important condition—basic cause—of con ct resolution was collective exhaustion, especially in explaining Finland’s behavior. Change in the balance of capability was relevant but only because the strategic vulnerability of Leningrad to grave damage if the Gulf of Finland were made available by Finland to potential invaders of the Soviet Union declined in relevance for Soviet attitudes to con ct resolution. Moreover, there was a marked decline in con ct-sustaining acts, specifcally in state-organized 228 M. BRECHER and implemented violence from the end of the ‘Continuation’ War in 1944 to resolution of the Finland/ USSR con ct in 1961. No less evident was the reduction in discordance over objectives by the two adversaries: both, especially Finland, made a conscious choice to build a ‘good neighbor’ relationship with its former ruler which, in turn, perceived the benefts of a positive relationship with a neighbor whose prevailing ideology, economic and political system differed fundamentally from that of the Soviet Union. Overall, the four basic causes of con ct resolution in this con ct acquired policy signifcance by generating a fundamental shift in Finland’s perceptual calculus. This was expressed in the change in its attitude to the Soviet Union, from an extremely negative perception of Communist Russia as Finland’s hereditary enemy, a widely held view propagated by the nationalist wing of its political spectrum, toward a Realist view of Finland’s need to adapt to a new confguration of power, specifcally, to seek to transform Soviet mistrust of Finland’s behavior to a relationship of mutual trust. This fundamental change in Finland’s foreign policy was advocated by Finland’s charismatic leader from the beginning of independence, Field Marshal Mannerheim, and his successor as Finland’s President, Paasikivi. The change began at the end of the 1944 ‘Continuation War’ and acquired widespread support, from the 1948 friendship (FCMA) treaty with the Soviet Union onwards.