Americas Costa Rica/Nicaragua Conflict (Resolved) PDF

Americas Costa Rica/Nicaragua Con ct (Resolved) Behavior Decisions fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi There were several inter-related major decisions by the two principal adversaries in the early and late phases of this protracted con ct. The frst was an initiative by Costa Rica’s military dictator, General F...

Americas Costa Rica/Nicaragua Con ct (Resolved) Behavior Decisions fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi There were several inter-related major decisions by the two principal adversaries in the early and late phases of this protracted con ct. The frst was an initiative by Costa Rica’s military dictator, General Federico Tinoco (1917–1919), designed to achieve three goals simultaneously: to assert Costa Rica’s independence from Nicaragua, its perennial rival in Central America, and from the United States, the long-time patron of Nicaragua; to prevent an anticipated rebellion, and to achieve international recognition for his regime. The decision took the form of a pre-emptive dispatch of troops to the Nicaragua border on 25 May 1918. However, it proved to be illconceived, for this provocative act aroused the active hostility of the USA, which had earlier precipitated Tinoco’s overthrow and enforced exile. Nicaragua responded with a similar provocative decision—to recognize and support the anti-Tinoco Costa Rican rebellion against his regime, led by Julio Acosta. That Nicaragua decision was implemented by an identical act, moving troops to the Costa Rica border. The USA, as always in these tit-for-tat non-violent military exchanges, adopted a passive 174 M. BRECHER non-interventionist attitude that both adversaries correctly perceived as tacit support for Nicaragua’s hostile act. Three decades later, another successful military coup in Costa Rica brought General José Figueres and a 10-man junta to power in April 1948. Nicaragua, as always, seeking a submissive ‘friendly’ regime in Costa Rica, made the strategic decision to seek regime change. This was implemented in the form of a Nicaraguan invasion of Costa Rica in December 1948, with a sizeable armed force in Central America’s interstate crises, 1000. Figueres responded with mobilization of all available Costa Rica manpower and the dispatch of troops to the Nicaragua border. The bitterly disputed presidential election in Costa Rica between pro- and antiFigueres candidates spawned a 44-day civil war, with 2000 killed, the bloodiest event in twentiethcentury Central America. The victor in this civil war, Figueres and his military junta, drafted a new constitution providing for a democratically elected assembly and abolished the Military in Costa Rica, a unique condition in the Americas to the present day and virtually in the rest of the world. Soon after a peace treaty between Costa Rica and Nicaragua was mediated by the Organization of American States (OAS) in February 1949, Figueres and his junta relinquished power to the newly elected Costa Rica government, in November 1949, another unique act. The last of the three interstate crises during this con ct (January 8–20, 1955) was a re-play of the frst two crises and con cting decisions. Nicaragua once more made a decision to support Costa Rican rebels, with the aim of overthrowing Figueres (He had been elected president of Costa Rica in 1953—in the frst of 13 peaceful and transparent presidential elections in Costa Rica in more than half a century, until 2010). Nicaragua implemented its decision with the dispatch of troops and aerial bombings, but the OAS called on its members to provide aircraft to Costa Rica. It also succeeded in ending the crisis and mini-war and created a demilitarized zone between the two adversaries in 1955, marking the end of their protracted con ct. Decision-Makers The key decision-makers of Costa Rica during this interstate con ct were noted above in the discussion of decisions. They emerged during each of the crises in which Costa Rica’s strategic and important tactical decisions were made and implemented: Federico Tinoco in the frst 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 175 major decision during the 1918 crisis, and Jose Figueres in the major decisions during the 1948 and 1955 crises. The decision-makers of Nicaragua during this con ct can be traced to two sources. One was the Somoza family dynasty that exercised dictatorial power in Nicaragua for more than half a century (1927–1979), that is, during the second and third phases of this Central America con ct, 1948–1949 and 1955. The founder of this dynasty, Anastasia Somoza, commanded Nicaragua’s National Guard from 1927 to 1937, and then as president from 1937 until his death in 1956. He was succeeded by his two sons from 1956 until 1979, when the family dynasty was overthrown by the Left-wing Sandinista Party, whose fve-person junta ruled Nicaragua from 1979 to 1984 and whose acknowledged leader since 1981, Daniel Ortega, was elected president for 1985– 1990 (and again, for 2006–2011 and 2011–2016). Throughout their 52 years of absolute power over fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi all decisions of any consequence in Nicaragua, including economic policy and the attempts to generate regime change in Costa Rica, the Somoza family had the unqualifed backing of the United States. Moreover, the USA intervened frequently in the two adversarial states and their relations from 1909 to 1933, with occupation of one or the other by Marines from 1912 to 1933, except for 9 months in 1925. Thus senior American offcials in Washington throughout this con ct, notably all who served as Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Deputy Secretary, Under-Secretary, and Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, all the US ambassadors and consuls to Costa Rica and Nicaragua from 1918 to 1955, were decision-makers during their tenure in that period, with particular infuence during the three crises between the adversaries in this con ct. (Unlike the 1965 Dominican Republic crisis, in which President Johnson was the active, pre-eminent US decisionmaker, and several presidents who were directly involved in decisions relating to the Panama Canal, from Theodore Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter, the US president was not involved in the Costa Rica/ Nicaragua con ct.) Decision Process The decision process in the two principal adversarial states, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, was primarily authoritarian, with decision-making power concentrated in an individual (Tinoco in the 1918 decision), a junta (led by Figueres in the 1948 decision), a family (Somoza throughout this con ct), and probably, an input from the Costa Rica Assembly in its 176 M. BRECHER 1955 decision. As for the decision process during this con ct in Central America, it replicated the US decision process in other con cts in which the USA was highly involved as a con ct actor, with US diplomatic representatives in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and at OAS meetings deliberating an issue related to their con ct—generally, diplomats and consuls in the feld —acting under instructions from the US State Department. Con ct-Sustaining Acts During the shortest of the three Americas’ post-World War I interstate con cts—Costa Rica/Nicaragua, 37 years (1918–1955), compared to Ecuador/Peru, 80 years (1918–1998), and Honduras/Nicaragua, 89 years (1918–2007), political hostility was the most frequent con ct-sustaining technique (CST), with the greatest impact. Violence occurred during two interstate crises between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, as did verbal hostility, but they were secondary in frequency and impact. Political Hostility was evident throughout this con ct but was conspicuously intense at its onset and during its last decade. Although Costa Rica and Nicaragua were the principal adversaries, they were heavily dependent on the longstanding self-appointed hegemon of the Americas, the United States, since its proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine (1823). Thus their politically hostile relationship was intertwined with US goals, policy, and behavior in Central America since both became formally independent of Spain in 1821. At the onset of this con ct, Nicaragua was a virtual protectorate of the USA, which dominated its government and political leaders and continued this role informally long after it voluntarily ceased its direct control of Nicaragua in 1933. By contrast, Costa Rica, like the hegemon of the Americas, proudly retained its image as an ‘exceptional’ state and society. This incurred the hostility of the USA, which did not recognize the regime of Costa Rica’s president, General Federico Tinoco, in 1917–1918. He responded with a pre-emptive military strike against Nicaragua in 1918. Tinoco was deposed in August 1919, as was his successor in 1919, because the USA refused to recognize him as Costa Rica’s president. Nicaragua exhibited its political hostility to Costa Rica by supporting a rebel force that invaded Costa Rica and proclaimed a provisional government. The new regime, led by Julio Acosta, was recognized by Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala. After a lengthy period of calm between the principal adversaries (1919–1943), the con ct was renewed between Costa Rica’s 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 177 military-political leader, José Figueres, and Nicaragua’s longtime, US-supported dictator of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza. When Somoza, coping with a domestic political crisis, supported a left-wing Costa Rican president in 1947, the USA intervened once more and secured Nicaragua’s withdrawal of forces from Costa Rica in exchange for renewed American support for Somoza. Toward the end of this con ct, Costa Rica’s President Figueros was accused by Nicaragua in 1954 of supporting a plan by Nicaragua revolutionary, Chamorro, to assassinate Somoza, reinforcing the animosity generated by acts of political hostility. Violence was used in two of the three military-security crises during this interstate protracted con ct. An invasion of Costa Rica by 1000 Nicaraguan National Guardsmen in December 1948 led to the movement of fi fi fi fi fi Costa Rican troops to its border with Nicaragua and to minor clashes in January–February 1949; their second crisis was resolved by an OAS inquiry commission and a military commission to supervise activity on their border. Minor clashes in Central America also occurred in the third Costa Rica/Nicaragua crisis, from January 8 to 20, 1955: 500 Costa Rica rebels, supported by the Somoza government, crossed the frontier from Nicaragua and captured a town near Costa Rica’s capital. Once more the OAS sent a fact-fnding mission. The rebels were forced by Costa Rican forces to withdraw from captured Costa Rican territory, ending this crisis, with the adversaries agreeing to an OAS plan for demilitarized zones along the border. As in several other interstate con cts, violence, during a military-security crisis, in January 1955, became the catalyst for con ct resolution, soon after termination of an interstate crisis. Verbal hostility was employed by both of the principal Central America adversaries, especially from 1944 to 1955. It was highly personalized propaganda by the two leaders, Figueres in Costa Rica and Somoza in Nicaragua, who viewed their neighboring head of government as an enemy and strongly encouraged the overthrow of ‘the other.’ These frequent acts of verbal hostility contributed to the persistence of this con ct but were essentially reinforcement of a deeply rooted political hostility and rivalry between two neighbors with very different societies, incompatible outlooks, and con cting interests since their independence after two centuries of colonial rule by Spain. Economic discrimination was not apparent in this Central America interstate con ct.