China-Vietnam Conflict PDF

China/Vietnam Con ict (Unresolved) Behavior fi fi fi fi fi fl fl Both of the principal adversaries in this age-old con ct, more than two millennia, made—and implemented—many strategic and important tactical decisions. China: Decisions Long before the onset of the post-World War II interstate con ct...

China/Vietnam Con ict (Unresolved) Behavior fi fi fi fi fi fl fl Both of the principal adversaries in this age-old con ct, more than two millennia, made—and implemented—many strategic and important tactical decisions. China: Decisions Long before the onset of the post-World War II interstate con ct phase between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), there was unmistakable evidence of tension and mistrust between these two ideologically kin Communist states. As early as 1954, PRC Premier Zhou en-Lai had taken the lead, at the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, in implementing the PRC decision, following North Vietnam’s decisive victory over France’s military forces in the transforming Battle of Dien Bien Phu, to press the DRV not to insist on the immediate unifcation of North and South Vietnam and to accept a temporary two-state solution for 2 years; it lasted 21 years, until the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Ho Chi Minh, the charismatic DRV leader, did not conceal his and the Communist DRV’s anger at the Communist PRC’s pressure to deny its ideologically kin, the DRV, the fruits of its dramatic, history-shaping military triumph. Moreover, China made a strategic decision—the date is unknown, probably in the early 1970s, possibly earlier —to support the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea (Cambodia), rather than to accede to Vietnam’s request to assist in crushing that Far-Left revolutionary movement. That slow-to-evolve China decision was formalized, secretly, by an agreement with the Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, in 1975. The earliest known PRC decision in the post-WW II China/Vietnam con ct took the form of a hostile verbal act by China’s Communist Party (CCP) Chairman, Hua Guofeng, around November 20, 1977—accusing 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 203 Vietnam, at a high-pro e Beijing banquet for the visiting DRV leader, Le Duan, successor to Ho Chi Minh, of bullying Cambodia and trying to dominate it. In another decision that was implemented as a verbal act, China’s ambassador to Cambodia-Kampuchea publicly expressed the PRC’s “full support” for the weaker state in the Vietnam/Cambodia con ct, on January 21 1978. On May 12, 1978, in a tangible material decision, China suspended (part or all of) its foreign aid to Vietnam because of Vietnam’s alleged maltreatment of its ethnic Chinese minority, followed by a severe public criticism on 24 May. The two principal adversaries, the PRC and DRV, held unsuccessful talks on this issue from August 8 to September 24, 1978. Nonetheless, China declined a Cambodia request in the autumn of 1978 for a ‘volunteer’ PRC force to enhance Cambodia’s security in the face of Vietnam’s unconcealed hostility. A crucial strategic decision by China, ‘to teach its little brother a lesson’ was implemented by the invasion of the DRV, Vietnam, on February 17, 1979. Eight days after its invasion, China publicly announced its decision not to “extend its attack on Vietnam to the lowlands around Hanoi,” Vietnam’s capital, though it was “still in the process of teaching Vietnam a good lesson.” On March 5, 1979, the PRC announced that it had achieved the goals of its invasion and began to implement its decision to withdraw from northern Vietnam. China: Decision-Makers In the most violent phase of this post-WW II interstate con ct— Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979—the two dominant leaders of the PRC were Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping. Hua was Mao’s designated successor and held the three most important titles in China—Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party [CCP], Chairman of the Central Military Commission [CMC] (October 1976–June 1981), and Premier [Head of the State Council] (October 1976–1980). Deng re-emerged from a long period outside the PRC inner circle of decision-makers until after Mao’s death in September 1976, serving as Vice-Chairman of the Communist Party and Chief of the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] General Staff from July 1977 to 204 M. BRECHER June 1981. In a December 1978 contest for the role of Leader, more important than all those formal titles, Deng, the advocate of a marketoriented economy, ousted Hua, the advocate of a revival of Soviet-style governmental economic planning. Thereafter, on the crucial PRC decisions to invade Vietnam (February 17, 1979) and to withdraw its forces from Vietnam (March 5, 1979), in fact, until his death in 1992, Deng was the highly respected ‘paramount leader’ of China, that is, the preeminent decision-maker on all important fi fi fi policy issues. China: Decision Process Unlike the Mao era of charismatic leadership and absolute ultimate decision-making power, Deng was more than ‘frst among equals’ but a leader who consulted his colleagues in China’s pivotal decision-making institution since the PRC attained power in Mainland China in 1949, the Standing Committee of the Communist Party Politburo. The decision process in the Deng era was not transparent in the sense that decision-making in democratic political systems aspires to project and, may, on occasion, achieve. However, while Deng was China’s pre-eminent decision-maker during more than a decade of this con ct with Vietnam (1978–1992), decision-making was not the sole prerogative of the ‘paramount leader’: the views of powerful interest groups—political, economic, bureaucratic, and military—were expressed, directly or indirectly, not entirely without infuence, on important decisions on many issues of public policy, including Vietnam’s behavior toward Cambodia and China. Moreover, in the postDeng era, the concentration of decision-making power in an individual diminished during the presidency of both Jiang Zemin (1993–2003) and Hu Jintao (2003–2013), with a more important role for the most infuential political institution, the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, than the ‘paramount leader.’ The preeminence of the current PRC leader, Xi Jinping (2013–2017), appears to be reversing this trend. Vietnam: Decisions Like the PRC, the other principal adversary in this interstate con ct, Vietnam, made—and implemented—many strategic and tactical decisions directed to the PRC leadership in 1977–1979. Immediately after a Cambodia attack against its border villages on April 30, 1977, Vietnam responded with retaliatory bombing raids. On 12 May, in a move perceived by China as hostile, Vietnam implemented a strategic decision to proclaim an enlargement of its maritime border to 200 km. 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 205 In May–June, Vietnam implemented another strategic decision perceived by China as extremely hostile, namely, to increase ties with the USSR, by joining two international organizations of Soviet bloc member-states, dominated by the Soviet Union—the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC) and the International Investment Bank (IIB), both international fnancial organizations controlled by the USSRdominated Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). At the same time, and later, Vietnam decided in favor of a peaceful resolution of disputes with its neighbors: it proposed talks with Cambodia on June 7, 1977 and held meetings with China from October 3 to 7, 1977 to achieve this goal, but neither initiative was successful. Two months later, Vietnam exhibited another fundamental shift in policy toward Cambodia and, indirectly, China: it invaded the Fish Hook Parrot’s Beak in southeast Cambodia on December 5, 1977, severely defeating Cambodia’s forces and occupying considerable territory on the road to Phnom Penh. Even though Vietnam’s forces stopped short of Cambodia’s capital, its invasion was condemned by both Cambodia and China. Vietnam also made and implemented major decisions during this con ct in 1978 and 1979. At the beginning of January 1978, again on January 13, and on February 5 Vietnam offered to negotiate its differences with Cambodia, without success. In the midst of these accommodating gestures, on January 6, Vietnam withdrew its combat forces, either entirely from Cambodia or part of the distance to their border. At two meetings of its Communist Party Politburo from late January to mid-February, Vietnam made the strategic decision to overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia and began to arm and train antiKhmer Rouge insurgents. On March 24, Vietnam began to implement its decisions [date unknown] to deport ethnic Chinese residents of Vietnam and to increase its confscations of their property. On June 6, Vietnam revised its February 5, 1978 proposal for negotiations with Cambodia, calling for a mutual withdrawal of forces 5 km from their border and joint determination of a location for negotiations. On June 29, Vietnam formalized its alignment with the USSR by becoming a full member of COMECON, the Soviet bloc’s over-arching organizational integration of Communist states. 206 M. BRECHER From August 8 to September 26, Vietnam and China held informal talks about their differences—without success. On November 3, 1978, in a strategic decision, the growing bonds between Vietnam and the Soviet Union crystallized into a treaty of friendship. On December 25, fortifed by the security provision of its recent treaty of friendship with the USSR, Vietnam invaded Cambodia. On March 4, 1979, Vietnam responded to China’s invasion of its territory by mobilizing its population to assist in the defense of their homeland, but decided not to withdraw its forces from fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi Cambodia. On March 16, Vietnam proposed peace talks with China in Hanoi, conditional on total withdrawal of China’s forces from Vietnam. The same day, China announced its withdrawal from Vietnam. On April 4, Vietnam agreed to negotiations without complete withdrawal of PRC forces. On April 6, China agreed to talks in Hanoi. The withdrawal of China’s forces from Vietnam did not resolve their con ct—it continues 38 years later (2017). Rather, attention of the two principal adversaries in this interstate con ct shifted to another major discordant issue, their dispute over territory in the South China Sea, the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Vietnam: Decision-Makers There were three key Vietnam decision-makers during the formative initial phase of this interstate con ct, continuing for almost a decade (1977– 1986): Le Duan, who became First Secretary, later Secretary-General, of the Vietnam Workers Party in 1969, upon the death of the founder of that Communist Party, Ho Chi Minh, and held that position until his death in 1986; Pham Van Dong, who held the position of Premier as long as Le Duan was Party leader, and Truong Chinh, another longserving DRV leader as Chairman of the State Council. Institutionally, the most infuential body in Vietnam’s decision-making process was the Politburo of Vietnam’s Workers Party, though a consensus among the three leaders ensured institutional approval. Vietnam: Decision Process Other than the Ho Chi Minh era of charismatic leadership of Vietnam’s Communist movement, even before he founded the Vietnam Workers Party in 1935, decision-making in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 207 (DRV) has always been a collective process. Le Duan, who was Ho’s principal aide for decades, lacked charisma and favored collective leadership, which he shared throughout his tenure with Van Dong and Chinh. Moreover, the most infuential decision-making institution in the DRV was the Workers Party Politburo, with a remarkably stable composition: 8 of its 14 members at the onset of the twentieth-century China/ Vietnam con ct (1977) had served on this pre-eminent body since 1960 and 3 others since 1953. Le Duan was a respected ‘frst among equals’ throughout his years of party leadership. The Workers Party Central Committee, which was a much-larger group in 1977—101 full members and 32 temporary members, one-third of whom had been elected the preceding year— had limited infuence on decision-making related to this interstate con ct. The bureaucracy’s infuence was limited to the implementation of decisions. In sum, long-time association and mutual respect among the Politburo’s members, Le Duan’s preference for collective leadership, and the legacy of Ho Chi Minh’s disposition to consultation with his much younger Politburo colleagues, unlike Mao’s decision-making behavior in the PRC’s Politburo, ensured genuine collective participation in the framing of Vietnam’s strategic and important tactical decisions aimed at China. China/Vietnam Con ct-Sustaining Acts Three of the four con ct-sustaining techniques (CST)— violence, political hostility, and verbal hostility-propaganda—have been used by both of the principal adversaries in this unresolved interstate con ct. Violence had the greatest impact on the persistence of this con ct but violent acts were of relatively short duration, from its Onset in 1979 until 1988. The most important of three occurrences of substantial violence was the China/Vietnam Border War in 1979. The catalyst was Vietnam’s successful 1978 invasion and occupation of Cambodia, which compelled the China-supported Khmer Rouge regime to seek asylum in neighboring Thailand and installed a pro-Vietnam regime in Cambodia. China responded with a large-scale invasion of Vietnam on February 17, 1979, declaring its intention ‘to teach Vietnam a lesson’ it would not soon forget. The war between the two Communist states, that had been allies against the U.S. from the France-Viet Cong War (1950–1954) until the end of the Vietnam War (1975), was very intense, with an 208 M. BRECHER estimated China invasion force of 320,000, the largest People’s Republic of China (PRC) military operation since its involvement in the Korean War (1950–1953) , and a Vietnam defending force of 75,000–100,000. Although a short war, from February 17 to March 16, 1979, there were very high casualties—an estimated 25,000 Chinese soldiers killed and 37,000 wounded, and 39,000 Vietnamese killed and wounded. Both adversaries claimed victory, but there was no victor, only the Chinese brief capture of 3 Vietnamese provincial capitals and several border villages in Vietnam before what appeared to observers an ignominious withdrawal of Chinese forces from Vietnam 28 days later. Vietnam remained in control of Cambodia, despite China’s resort to minor violent clashes along the China/Vietnam border, from fi fi fi fi fi fi fi 1980 to 1984, and a second major incursion by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from April 28 to July 12, 1984, in another failed effort to compel Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia. The third phase of resort to violence relates to a longstanding competition between the claims of China and Vietnam, among others, to disputed territories in the South China Sea, dating to the mid-1970s. A notable instance of naval violence as a con ct-sustaining act was the controversial patrolling of waters surrounding the contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea by the naval arm of China’s PLA in May 1987, to which Vietnam objected. This resulted in a low-intensity naval battle between the two principal adversaries in this interstate con ct in March 1988, a precedent for threatening acts of violence in what has become the most active contentious issue in the China/ Vietnam con ct in the second decade of the twenty-frst century. Political hostility has been evident throughout this interstate con ct. One type of hostile political act was the attempts by the PRC to maintain the exiled Khmer Rouge regime’s retention of Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations, long after its ouster from power. Two recent incidents highlight the political hostility dimension of the China/Vietnam con ct. In February 1992, China passed a Territorial Waters Law declaring its suzerainty over the South China Sea, reputed to contain very large natural gas and oil resources. And in May 2003, Vietnam belatedly responded by offcially proclaiming its sovereignty over the two largest island clusters in the South China Sea, the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Moreover, both adversaries were accused of committing hostile acts with political implications: China was accused in May 2011 of severing the cables of a Vietnam vessel that was conducting a seismic survey in the South China 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 209 Sea, and, a month later, Vietnam ordered live-fre drills in the South China Sea, beyond its disputed territories. This territorial con ct is complicated by the competing claims of four other states with territory in the South China Sea. In 2013, a near-physical clash between China’s and the Philippines’ patrol boats near the Spratly Islands indicated that this multilateral con ct, of which competing claims by China and Vietnam are a part, might escalate in the future. Verbal Hostility served to reinforce violent and politically hostile acts by both of the principal adversaries, mainly through offcially sanctioned articles and editorials in the ruling party’s newspaper, the People’s Daily in China, and “the voice of the Party” in North Vietnam. Thus, in July 1979, a few months after the end of the China/Vietnam Border War, a PRC Vice-Premier threatened to teach Vietnam “a second lesson,” a threat frequently uttered by senior China offcials over the years, as in January 1985, in a message conveyed indirectly to Vietnam. Moreover, each of the adversaries accused ‘the other’ of hostile acts. For example, China, in a Beijing radio broadcast, accused Vietnam of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ in the expulsion of the Hoa minority, without using the highly charged term, and Vietnam accused “the Peking ruling circles,” on the tenth anniversary of their naval clash in 1974— when China occupied several islands in the Paracel chain, then occupied by South Vietnam— of mobilizing large forces “to launch a massive attack” (on the Spratly Islands) and occupy it (article in Vietnam Communist Party newspaper, Nhan Dan, January 19, 1984).