Tentamen Case Study Syria PDF

Tentamen Case Study Syria WEEK 1 The battle for Syria, Chapter 1: Syria and the Middle East on the eve of civil war Syria in the Middle East Young country in an ancient land Syria, home to ancient cities like Damascus and Aleppo, gained independence in 1945, despite being ruled by France and Britain...

Tentamen Case Study Syria WEEK 1 The battle for Syria, Chapter 1: Syria and the Middle East on the eve of civil war Syria in the Middle East Young country in an ancient land Syria, home to ancient cities like Damascus and Aleppo, gained independence in 1945, despite being ruled by France and Britain in the 1920s. The colonial powers created borders that ignored local traditions, cultures, and historical trade routes, leading to a fragmented state. Syria's diverse population included Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, and other minorities, with a mix of religious groups such as Sunni Muslims, Alawis, Druze, and Christians. This diversity complicated national unity. Arab nationalism sought to unite all Arabs, while some called for a Greater Syria, which included neighboring Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. Meanwhile, Kurdish demands for cultural rights grew. After independence, Syria struggled with instability, weakened by the French-imposed parliamentary system and a powerful military. Between 1949 and 1970, there were eight successful coups. Syria briefly joined Egypt in the United Arab Republic (1958–1961), but left amidst internal authoritarianism. In 1963, the Ba'ath Party seized power, and a radical faction's internal coup in 1966 led to aggressive policies that contributed to the 1967 Six Day War. Syria remained politically chaotic, further destabilized by external influences. Assad takes over In November 1970, Hafez al-Assad, the Ba'athist Defence Minister, seized power in Syria, stabilizing the country after years of instability. He strengthened state control and built public support through job creation, subsidies, and infrastructure projects, particularly benefiting peasants and the working class. He moderated radical socialist policies to gain the support of the merchant class, co-opted tribal leaders, and integrated Sunni elites. To protect his regime from coups, he restructured the security forces, placing relatives and Alawis in key positions, using fear and force to maintain control. Hafez’s rule was supported by three key regional shifts: 1. The 1970s oil boom, which brought funding from rich Gulf states. 2. Arab cooperation after the Six Day War, with Arab states agreeing to respect each other's sovereignty. 3. Cold War dynamics, with Syria backed by the Soviet Union while the U.S. showed little concern for Assad's repressive policies. Hafez also played a key role in Lebanon’s civil war, building a network of political alliances and supporting non-state militias, including Kurdish separatists (PKK) to pressure Turkey. Though an Arab nationalist socialist domestically, he was pragmatic internationally, as seen in 1990 when Syria supported the U.S.-led coalition to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein, repairing relations with Arab states like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which provided loans as Syria’s economy struggled after the Soviet collapse. Change and continuity under Bashar Hafez al-Assad passed away in June 2000, and his son, Bashar al-Assad, succeeded him. Initially, Bashar’s Western education raised hopes for reform, but his brief attempt at liberalization, known as the "Damascus Spring," was swiftly repressed by 2001. His first decade in power was marked by confrontation with the U.S. under President George W. Bush. Bashar revived his father's tactic of supporting non-state militias, facilitating jihadist flows into Iraq to undermine the U.S. occupation.  The U.S. retaliated by targeting Syria’s influence in Lebanon, imposing trade sanctions and pushing for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, which had remained since the civil war. In 2005, after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, Syria faced international pressure to withdraw. As a result, Assad withdrew troops from Lebanon, aligning more closely with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, forming an "Axis of Resistance" against U.S. and Israeli influence in the region. Despite U.S. opposition, Assad improved relations with countries like Russia, Turkey, and Qatar, and was invited to Paris in 2008, signaling a partial end to Syria’s international isolation. While Assad’s position seemed stronger by the end of the Bush administration, regional shifts and the end of U.S. dominance contributed to Syria’s eventual descent into civil war. The Middle East and American hegemony While Hafez (father Bashar) made the most of the shift in regional circumstances marked by the end of the Cold War, Bashar conversely suffered from the gradual end of US regional hegemony. America’s ‘moment’? After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. emerged as the sole superpower, dominating global politics, including in the Middle East. The U.S. asserted military power, exemplified by Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and former Soviet allies like Syria sought to accommodate the U.S., while Iraq and Libya faced isolation. U.S. trade and military presence in the region grew, but despite efforts to maintain U.S. dominance, the 1990s saw little political transformation. The Arab-Israeli peace process failed, and autocratic regimes persisted. While some Middle Eastern states, like Syria, engaged in U.S.-led peace efforts, many regional rivalries remained unaffected by global shifts. Iran, Iraq, and Syria framed themselves as resisting U.S. hegemony, reinforcing American dominance in the region. The post-1991 U.S. presence created a relatively stable order: Iran and Iraq were contained, Gulf security was ensured, and the Israeli-Arab peace process reduced conflict risks. However, the 2003 Iraq war disrupted this balance, sparking regional competition, sectarianism, jihadism, and Kurdish nationalism, which weakened U.S. influence and contributed to the dynamics of the Syrian civil war. Shifting the balance of power: the 2003 Iraq war The 2003 Iraq war was a key turning point that disrupted the post-1991 order in the Middle East, leading to regional competition, sectarianism, jihadism, and Kurdish nationalism, while weakening U.S. influence. The removal of Saddam Hussein and the occupation of Iraq shifted the regional balance of power, with Iran emerging as the major beneficiary. Iraq, once a counterbalance to Iranian influence, became more aligned with Iran after Saddam's fall, as many Iraqi Shia leaders had longstanding ties with Tehran. This allowed Iran to expand its influence across Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine, using anti-U.S. and anti-Israel rhetoric to gain regional support. In response, Saudi Arabia, now without its Iraqi ally, engaged in proxy conflicts across the region, especially in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, and used media like al-Arabiya to counter Iran's influence. The Iraq War also provided opportunities for Turkey and Qatar to assert themselves. Turkey engaged more with the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq for security and economic reasons, while Qatar, benefiting from high oil prices, positioned itself as a mediator in Gaza and Lebanon. This period marked a significant shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics, with heightened Saudi-Iranian rivalry and increased regional roles for Turkey and Qatar. The rise of sectarianism, jihadism and Kurdish nationalism The 2003 Iraq War intensified three key transnational forces in the Middle East: 1. Sectarianism: The war deepened Sunni-Shia divides, turning long-standing religious differences into a central political issue. Saddam Hussein's persecution of Shia Iraqis and the subsequent  power shifts heightened sectarian tensions, leading to violent clashes between Sunni and Shia militias, widespread displacement, and a polarized regional narrative. Leaders like Jordan's King Abdullah warned of a "Shia Crescent," though polls showed broad Arab support for Shia figures like Hezbollah's Nasrallah. 2. Jihadism: The Iraq War revitalized jihadism, with the U.S. invasion and its handling of Iraqi prisons serving as major recruitment tools for militant groups. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) emerged as a prominent force, later evolving into two key jihadist groups in the Syrian civil war: Jabhat al- Nusra and ISIS. 3. Kurdish Nationalism: The war boosted Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, particularly with the establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, setting a precedent for Kurdish self-rule. This development united previously divided Iraqi Kurdish factions and influenced Kurdish movements in Syria, Turkey, and Iran, with the PKK shifting its focus to Syria to advance its nationalist goals. Ending America’s moment? The Iraq War and its aftermath significantly shifted U.S. power and influence in the Middle East, altering both regional perceptions of the U.S. and its leaders' views on what the U.S. could achieve. The war revealed vulnerabilities, such as Bashar al-Assad allowing jihadists to enter Iraq, highlighting the perceived U.S. military threat by its regional adversaries. Iraq, once seen as a potential success, descended into insurgency and sectarian civil war, undermining hopes for a pluralist democracy. By 2011, the U.S. withdrew, influenced by several factors: 1. The 2008 financial crisis, which refocused U.S. attention internally and led to military spending cuts. 2. Public fatigue over foreign military engagements, with public opinion favoring isolation. 3. The election of Barack Obama, who reduced U.S. involvement in the Middle East, culminating in the Iraq withdrawal. There are two main explanations for this retrenchment: Obama’s choices: Some argue Obama, as a declinist, believed U.S. global dominance was waning and swung too far toward disengagement after Bush's overreach. Structural changes: Others contend that the financial crisis, the rise of China, and the decline of unipolarity shifted the global balance, making disengagement and regional balancing a response to broader structural changes. Both views are oversimplified. While the global and regional context in 2009 was less favorable to U.S. dominance, Obama's personal opposition to further Middle Eastern involvement accelerated the U.S. retreat. Regardless of the cause, the region began perceiving the U.S. as less omnipotent and invincible. The Syrian civil war emerged as both a symptom and reinforcer of these shifts, with the U.S. no longer the uncontested leader. Instead, other powers—Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar—became influential players in shaping the conflict, often independently of one another. The view from the United States Obama, despite his initial lack of foreign policy experience, campaigned on his opposition to the Iraq War, setting him apart from Hillary Clinton and George Bush. Upon taking office, some observers claim he transitioned from a foreign policy idealist to a realist. His key advisers were realists, and internal pressures, including differing views from the State Department, military, and intelligence agencies, influenced his decisions. Critics argue that Obama lacked a consistent strategy, while supporters contend that his flexible, non-ideological approach was suited to the complexities of the modern world, allowing him to address issues on a case-by-case basis to protect U.S. interests. Obama's main priorities in the Middle East were:  1. He wanted to reduce the US physical presence; he announced that US troops would be removed from Iraq and Afghanistan at the end of his first term, although the deadline for Afghanistan was extended 2. Rebuild America’s reputation in the Middle East and the rest of the Islamic world; he rolled back on Bush’s interventionism by stating that ‘America does not presume to know what is best for everyone’. Investment in grass-roots civil society activism quietly continued 3. He had sought out to reach out to the US’ enemies; mostly Russia and Iran. Obama pushed the idea of relations being reset with new President Dmitri Medvedev. Obama’s comparative silence was interpreted as a sign of rapprochement to Iran. At the same time, Obama was committed to nuclear non-proliferation, and stepped up the pressure on Tehran to abandon its programme A shift in Obama’s approach to Syria emerged as part of his broader agenda. Initially, Syria was a low priority, but after 2011, Obama sought to re-engage with Assad to stabilize Iraq, prevent the flow of jihadi fighters, and counter Iran by attempting to shift Syria into the pro-Western camp. For years, Syria had been isolated, and outside the State Department, it was mainly seen through the lens of its relationship with Israel. Meanwhile, France and Britain maintained better ties with Syria, with France under Sarkozy exploring improved relations, and Britain, led by Cameron, also seeking stronger diplomatic connections. These countries later played significant roles in supporting U.S. efforts as the Syrian crisis escalated. Russia After the collapse of the USSR and Russia's subsequent decline under Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin reasserted Russia’s global influence. While often seen by Western commentators as autocratic and expansionist, Putin's Middle East policy was more nuanced. Initially, he viewed global power dynamics through a balance-of-power lens, but after 2003, his approach became more nationalistic. Despite his autocratic tendencies, Putin was populist and responsive to public opinion, leveraging Russia’s growing economy to modernize the military and gain national support. He was also opportunistic, responding more strongly to U.S. actions, such as the Iraq war, once it turned unpopular. By 2010, Russia’s Middle East policy focused on three main concerns: 1. Domestic security – to counter Islamist and separatist threats linked to the region, especially in Russia’s Muslim-majority North Caucasus. 2. Economic interests – Russia’s trade with the Middle East, particularly in gas, had expanded significantly. 3. Geopolitical strategy – viewing the Middle East as a zero-sum game, where any gain for Russia was a loss for the U.S., and vice versa. Russia worked to improve its image by strengthening ties with both U.S. adversaries and allies, positioning itself as a neutral "third force" in the region. While historically a Soviet ally, Russia's relationship with Syria had weakened by the 1990s. However, by 2011, Syria hosted Russia's only Mediterranean naval base, and although Putin was not particularly fond of Assad, Russia’s support for the Syrian regime became central to its foreign policy due to the evolving dynamics of the Syrian conflict and the desire to maintain regional stability. Iran The post-1979 Islamic Republic of Iran is more participatory than many Arab autocracies, with multiple centers of power influencing its regional policies. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, holds the most power, guided by four main priorities: To resist the US’ and, by extension Israel’s, plans to dominate the region and Iran To maintain support for the Palestinians, and Lebanese, in their struggle against Israel To pursue nuclear power as a rout to Iranian independence and regional prestige To be a key player or the key player within the Islamic world While Khamenei is the ultimate authority, other factions, such as the IRGC (Revolutionary Guard), Reformists, Traditionalist Conservatives, and Conservative Pragmatists, influence policy direction. Under President Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), Iran adopted a more aggressive stance, particularly against the U.S. and Israel, and accelerated its nuclear program. However, the 2009 ‘Green Revolution’ damaged Iran’s regional image, with allegations of electoral fraud and the brutal suppression of protesters, which conflicted with Ahmadinejad's anti-Western rhetoric. Despite sanctions and criticism over its nuclear program, Iran retained regional influence, particularly through alliances with Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen. Iran's relationship with Turkey also strengthened during this period, with both opposing UN sanctions. Syria remained a key ally, with Iran using it as a conduit to support Lebanon and other regional allies. Despite tensions with Western and Arab diplomats trying to detach Assad from Iran, Assad continued to pursue independent policies, emphasizing that there was no separating the two nations. Saudi-Arabia The rise of Iran forced Saudi Arabia to shift from its traditional quiet diplomacy to a more active regional role. Saudi leadership faced numerous internal challenges, including uncertainty over succession, with Prince Nayef and the Sudairi clan competing for power. King Abdullah's relationship with the conservative Wahhabi establishment and the threat of domestic jihadist terrorism further complicated his rule. Additionally, Saudi Arabia's economy, sensitive to oil market fluctuations, encouraged a focus on regional stability. After 2003, Saudi elites viewed Iran, especially its nuclear program, as the top regional threat, investing heavily in military modernization and strengthening ties with China, although the U.S. remained its key ally. Abdullah urged the Bush administration to confront Iran, but relations soured under Obama, whose more detached approach clashed with Saudi expectations. This cooling in U.S.-Saudi relations coincided with Saudi Arabia's efforts to improve ties with Syria, despite occasional differences with Assad. The 2009-2010 détente between Saudi Arabia and Syria reflected the fluctuating nature of their relationship, shaped by mutual concerns over Iran. Turkey At first, Turkey limited its engagement with the Middle East, leaning more to the west, but three factors shifted that position: The aftermath of the Iraq war created dangers and opportunities o Danger: militant, Islamism, sectarianism, Kurdish separatism, which necessitated greater cooperation with Syria and Iran o Opportunity: regional power vacuum left after the fall of Saddam Turkey’s economy was growing rapidly, there was a pursuit of new markets, particularly in the Middle East Election of the mildly Islamist AKP, Erdogan sought to rehabilitate the Ottoman Empire, moving it away from the negative Kemalist historical view. There was a more active foreign policy in the former Ottoman lands of the Middle East ➔ neo-Ottomanism, Turkey wanted to become a central country in the Middle East and beyond by implementing a ‘zero problems with neighbours’ strategy Erdogan’s criticism of U.S. policies, particularly regarding Israel and Palestine, boosted his popularity in the Arab world. However, Turkey’s historical Westward orientation left it without the institutional depth or resources to become a dominant Middle Eastern power overnight. While Turkey’s institutions, like the military and foreign service, were stronger than those of its neighbors, they were largely controlled by Erdogan’s Kemalist rivals. To circumvent them, Erdogan and Davutoğlu centralized power, allowing rapid, personalized policy shifts. Despite this, the AKP upheld two core Kemalist policies:  1. Opposition to Kurdish independence: While offering limited concessions to Kurdish communities, the AKP remained firm on preserving Turkey’s borders. 2. Commitment to U.S. and NATO ties: Although Erdogan projected an anti-U.S. stance, he allowed NATO’s missile defense radar on Turkish soil in 2011. Improved relations with Syria, spurred by new leadership on both sides, benefited both Erdogan and Assad. Assad gained diplomatic support, while Erdogan strengthened his anti-U.S. image by aligning with Syria’s “Resistance Axis.” Unexpectedly, Turkey soon pivoted to become a key supporter of the anti- Assad opposition. Qatar By 2011, Qatar’s foreign policy had three core assets: a small citizen population, immense wealth, and ambitious leadership under Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani. After seizing power in a 1995 coup, Hamad pursued a distinct, independent path from the Saudi-led Gulf States, leveraging Qatar’s wealth to act without strong domestic constraints. The presence of a U.S. airbase since 2003 guaranteed Qatar’s security, allowing Doha to pursue independent and sometimes anti-American policies while maintaining a strong alliance with Washington. Qatar’s strategy to expand its influence unfolded in three stages: 1. Al-Jazeera: The rise of this media network increased Qatar’s profile and allowed it to promote an anti-Western narrative. 2. Regional Mediation: Qatar took over Saudi Arabia’s traditional role as a mediator in regional disputes. 3. Support for Opposition Groups: By 2011, Qatar provided financial and military support to opposition forces, marking its most assertive phase. Qatar also invested heavily in high-profile projects, such as hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup, to enhance its global image. It balanced its alliances by maintaining ties with Iran, the “Resistance Axis,” and Syria, primarily for political leverage rather than economic gain. Although Hamad and Syria’s Assad shared personal ties, these proved shallow as Qatar shifted support during the Syrian crisis. The regional landscape was transforming. The 2003 Iraq War shifted the balance of power toward Iran, triggering Saudi Arabia and other states, including Qatar and Turkey, to pursue more active foreign policies. This shift intensified sectarianism, jihadism, and Kurdish nationalism, further destabilizing the region. Meanwhile, U.S. influence was waning, and some Western countries began engaging with Assad again. However, Syria’s apparent stability was misleading, as Assad faced unresolved economic, political, and social issues, which he often worsened, leaving Syria vulnerable on the brink of civil war. The battle for Syria, Chapter 2: The Arab Spring comes to Syria Assad crafted an image as an accessible, modern leader, living among the people with minimal security and even driving his own car. This carefully managed persona led him to believe that Syria would be immune to the Arab Spring unrest. The wave of protests had begun on December 17, 2010, when Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated in protest against ongoing government harassment. Bouazizi’s act ignited widespread protests, toppling Tunisia’s President Ben Ali in January 2011, inspiring similar uprisings across the Arab world in countries like Egypt, Libya, and Jordan. Assad dismissed the possibility of similar unrest in Syria, attributing his regime’s stability to its anti-U.S. stance, which he believed resonated with popular opinion despite Syria’s economic struggles. However, on March 6, 2011, the arrest of teenagers for anti-regime graffiti sparked protests across Syria, proving Assad’s assumptions wrong. Yet, Syria’s situation was complex. Initially, foreign governments also assumed Syria was different and treated the unrest cautiously. Later, they overcorrected, assuming Assad’s regime would collapse like Tunisia’s or Egypt’s. Syria shared the same economic and social grievances as other Arab Spring countries, but its regime’s structure and deeper societal connections meant Assad’s departure would not be swift. Syria was both similar enough to experience the unrest yet distinct enough to endure a much bloodier, prolonged conflict. Syria’s Troubles The image: Assad’s Syria Prior to 2011, Assad was quite popular and on the surface Syria appeared stable. The President was seen as held back in his desire to reform Syria by remnants of his father’s era. While he won an absurdly inflated 97 percent victory margin in unopposed re-election in 2007, many believed he also would have won an genuinely democratic poll. After 2000, political reform was mooted but sidestepped and transforming the economy was prioritised. Socialism had been slowly abandoned under Hafez, but the economy remained heavily state-dominated and sluggish. Since 2006 private banks and stock exchange opened. A marked increase in foreign direct investment prompted growth in luxury construction and tourism. The GDP doubled in five years. Modern shopping centres arose and old cities were smartened with new boutique hotels and restaurants. Syrians were celebrated for their friendliness to visitors. They also seemingly approved of the regime’s anti-US, anti-Israel resistance foreign policy and rhetoric, and of Assad himself. His wife was labelled by Vogue as the rose in the desert. Assad was confident that Syria would be immune to the Arab Spring and this did not seem misplaced. Beneath Assad’s glamour: The murkier reality Syria faced deep-rooted political, economic, and social issues beneath the surface. Politically, power was highly centralized under the Ba'ath Party and Assad loyalists. Hafez al-Assad had filled key security and military roles with loyal Alawis, reinforcing a tight regime structure. When Bashar al-Assad took power, he attempted limited reforms, ousting the "Old Guard" and installing a "New Guard" of technocrats and loyalists. He marginalized the Ba'ath Party’s role, reducing its significance in local governance, yet stopped short of opening the political system. Opposition parties remained banned, and the feared Mukhabarat intelligence agencies increased their intimidation and control. Economically, Bashar’s shift toward a "social market economy" achieved minimal success but failed to generate enough jobs for Syria’s growing, increasingly educated youth population. Instead, the new system eroded the welfare safety net without producing enough jobs, resulting in high underemployment. Rural areas, especially hard-hit by a severe 2006–2010 drought, saw subsidies cut and infrastructure investments diverted to urban centers, worsening rural poverty and triggering large internal migrations. By 2010, poverty affected 30% of Syrians, while the wealthy elite enjoyed a booming luxury sector in urban centers. Socially, Syria was fractured by complex divides along lines of class, geography, tribe, and sect. Hafez had turned Syria into a crony capitalist state in the 1990s, enriching a few loyal families, mostly within the Alawi community, yet many rural Alawis remained impoverished. Sunni resentment simmered over perceived Alawi privilege, despite some Sunnis benefiting from regime patronage. While sectarian tensions were present, they were not universally prominent but did fuel anti-Assad sentiment and shaped the civil war’s development. Syria’s issues were multifaceted, with intersecting political, economic, social, and sectarian grievances that made it vulnerable to unrest similar to that seen during the Arab Spring, but with far more entrenched and complex obstacles to stability. Unrest begins The Arab Spring provided the catalyst for Syrians, who shared common frustrations with the broader Arab world, to rise against their own regime. Decades of Arab identity-building and shared grievances over political, economic, and social oppression made the slogans and protests of 2011 resonate deeply. Technology amplified this effect; with internet access, satellite TV, and platforms like Al-Jazeera, Syrians were quickly informed about the regional protests and could mimic and connect with activists in other countries. Although Assad had initially blocked Facebook and YouTube, he lifted these restrictions in February 2011—a decision that inadvertently facilitated coordination among protesters. The spark for Syria’s uprising ignited in early March, when teenagers in Deraa were arrested and tortured for scrawling on their school wall ‘doctor, your turn next’. This referred to Assad and ‘down with the regime’, leading to protests in which security forces killed four demonstrators. This marked a turning point, as news of the violence spread through social media, sparking larger protests across Syria. Unlike previous minor protests, the unrest in Deraa unified opposition, particularly among Sunnis and tribal communities, in opposition to an Alawi Mukhabarat commander. On March 18, demonstrations spread to Homs, Banias, Damascus, and, by April, to even more cities. Syrians were outraged by the brutality in Deraa, inspired by the Arab Spring, and motivated by years of disenfranchisement. However, the protests reflected both national anger and varied local grievances, creating an uprising with a paradoxical unity in purpose but division in underlying motivations. This fragmentation influenced who joined or abstained from protests and revealed the unique nature of Assad’s regime—distinct from other Arab states whose governments had quickly fallen—setting Syria on a path to a complex and protracted conflict. The regime fights back Buy- ins and coup- proofing The Assad regime’s resilience in the face of the 2011 uprising was largely due to its strategic "buy- ins" that sustained support among diverse groups and its strong internal security mechanisms. 1. Economic Benefit: Middle-class Syrians, especially merchants and government workers, benefited from Assad’s reforms and infrastructure projects. Damascus merchants were loyal, and Assad successfully courted the more skeptical business class in Aleppo. The regime also increased public-sector pay on April 1, 2011, to maintain worker loyalty. 2. Patronage: Tribal and regional alliances influenced political alignment during the uprising, as tribes previously supported by the regime were more likely to back Assad. 3. Ideological Loyalty: Some Syrians continued to believe Assad was a reformer, despite little progress, and held onto this hope. 4. Sectarian Fear and Secularism: Many minorities supported Assad due to fear of sectarian revenge by Sunni groups and because Assad’s secular regime provided religious freedoms not available in neighboring countries. 5. Appeal of Stability: Older Syrians remembered the instability before Hafez Assad’s rule, and regime propaganda highlighted the chaos in Iraq and Lebanon to emphasize the importance of order. These buy-ins fostered a neutrality or passive support for Assad, preventing large-scale mobilization against the regime as seen in other Arab Spring countries. Additionally, coup- proofing measures fortified Assad’s position. The military officer corps was packed with loyalists indebted to the Assad family, and unlike in Egypt or Tunisia, the Syrian military remained institutionally loyal. The extensive Mukhabarat (intelligence) network created a climate of fear, discouraging dissent within the regime itself. These combined factors allowed Assad’s regime to endure amid the regional upheaval. Regime violence As protests grew in Syria, the Assad regime responded with both violence and attempts to placate various groups. Civilians were regularly killed during these protests and a pattern emerged: demonstrators protested about earlier deaths, more were the killed, initiating larger protests the next day. The regime justified its crackdown by claiming the protests were driven by “armed gangs,” using the military, security forces, and irregular Shabiha gangs to intimidate and suppress protesters. Shabiha gangs, with some autonomy and private funding, engaged in brutal tactics, including alleged massacres and intimidation campaigns, giving the regime plausible deniability. Arrests and arbitrary violence by the Mukhabarat further intimidated the population. Regional responses varied: in some areas, like Deraa and Homs, force was used heavily, leading to cycles of protest and repression. In contrast, other areas like Hama saw milder responses, avoiding escalation. Alongside repression, the regime attempted to pacify groups, reaching out to tribal, religious, and business leaders and trying to dissuade Kurdish involvement by offering citizenship to stateless Kurds. Assad also used propaganda, blaming foreign conspiracies for the unrest, framing the protests as driven by Sunni jihadists, and fostering fears among minorities and secularists. Some superficial concessions were made—like the release of political prisoners and the lifting of emergency law—although these reforms had limited impact, as security forces retained unchecked power. But it was al too little too late. This response reflected both a strategy of “divide and rule” and internal divisions within Assad’s inner circle, with Assad appearing indecisive and influenced by varied perspectives. The rapid ousting of Tunisia’s and Egypt’s leaders taught Assad’s regime to avoid excessive concessions, fearing they would embolden protesters. Assad also worried that extreme violence could prompt foreign intervention, while underestimating Syrians' connection to the Arab Spring and the depth of public frustration. This mix of repression, superficial reform, and misjudgments contributed to a volatile and increasingly violent environment in Syria. The only option? There were two options open to Assad, what he could have done differently; those recommended by the hardliners and by the compromisers in his inner circle. Assad lacked the skill and vision to transform Syria from the autocracy he inherited. Ten years in power assimilated him into the dictatorial system. The regime’s structure as a security state mainly using repression as a solution, made it highly unlikely any other route would have been taken. If that was the case, why did Assad not deploy even more lethal force? Assad was not as decisive as his father, and there were divisions within his inner circles. A massacre in Deraa would have seemed disproportionate and might have alienated even more Syrians. Additionally, technology meant that containing new of such a massacre would be difficult both at home and abroad. The UN reaction to Libya also suggested that unrestricted violence would not go unpunished. Lecture 1: Introduction The issue is multi-level and multi-actor Conflicts that start on a local level go all the way to the international level. A lot of different actors are involved. You can point out many starting points of the conflict: 17th century: the start of the end for Ottoman Empire. 1916: decolonisation > secret Sykes-Picot Agreement. You can also look for a starting point at the decolonisation. In 1916 the UK and France made a secret treaty, called the Sykes-Picot Agreement. In this agreement they divided the middle-east, they did so without any regard for already existing cooperation between tribes or trading routes, creating unrest. One of ISIS primary goals was to undo the agreements in the Sykes- Picot Agreement When you start studying the war is Syria & ISIS, many of the grievances & narratives relate to this moment. 1963 of 1971-2000: Hafez AL-Assad, Syrian politician and president of Syria from 1971 to 2000. Already a dictator, but still treated Syrians with compassion. He did not use the military against them, seeing himself as neutral. o Bashar Al-Assad was his 2nd son; o His party started the Al-Assad dynasty and changed the way politics worked in Syria; - Sectarianism, economic policy > changed the social fabric of the country and set the stage for unrest to grow. o Already a dictator, but still treated Syrians with compassion. He did not use the military against them, seeing himself as neutral 9-4-2003: Firdos square statue destruction > a group of Iraqi civilians started to attack the statue of Saddam Hussein. Took place after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the USA, as the symbolic end of the Battle of Baghdad. 17th-09-2010: Tunisian fruit vender (Mohammed Bouazizi) set himself on fire on the 17th of December 2010, as a protest for unemployment. This became a catalyst for the Tunisian Revolution and the wider Arab Spring. o Protesting economic & political situation; o Consequently, the government was overthrown and the start of the Arab Spring > Syrian Civil War 10-03-2010: a schoolboy Naief Abazid (14) wrote 'It's your turn doctor' on their school wall. o Al-Assad was an eye-doctor; Was brough back from London to Syria when his brother, Bassel, (car crash 1994) & father died to become the next leader of Syria. o The boys were detained & tortured and consequently large-scale protest in Daraa erupted; o These protests fuelled for democratic reforms, and ever after this event, protests shaped. 17 December 2010: Bashar Al-Assad 15 March 2011: 'Day of Rage' > hundreds of protests in Damascus and Aleppo took place, calling for democratic reforms. Another factor which could have fueled the conflict was the 'De-ba'athification'. In both Syria and Iraq the Ba'ath party was in charge, in Syria led by the Assad family. When the VS took over Iraq they fired everybody connected to the Ba'ath party, causing a big group of intelligent and educated angry people. Main themes and topics discussed in this course: Humanitarian conflict: Threatening events in terms of health/ safety of a large group of people. The Syrian civil war is a humanitarian crisis, 3% of the pre-war population have been killed in the civil war. Involved parties and their motivations: Local and international factors take part in this war, proxy war. A proxy warfare is a war fought between groups or smaller countries that each represent the interests of other larger powers and may have help and support from these larger powers. Typically, proxy wars are initiated by Russia and the US. The large powers sponsor tinier states and private parties to fight in their interest. Proxy warfare involves fewer risks than direct confrontation for the sponsors, as the casualties and the damage are not on their own soil. The sponsors are motivated by three goals: 1. Coercion: You support your enemies enemy, whoever they may be, to push them to give in on another issue. 2. Disruption: You intend to weaken you enemy militarily. 3. Transformation: To engineer a major political transformation in the target state. Some risks for the sponsors are: The unintended sponsoring of terrorist groups & Risk of escalating involvement that will cause you to employ you own troops anyway. Jihadist groups: From Civil War to involvement Jihadism (ISIS). o World started to become familiar with this group. o 2012: American journalist, James Foley, captured and a video in 2014 got released of his beheading and multiple others’ beheading. o Released a whole new dynamic in conflict, the international involvement changed, public opinion started to interpret in a different way. June 2014: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi establishing a caliphate > ISIS transformed from a terrorist organization to a state. o Had all kinds of effects locally & internationally. o Limburgse Sultan Berzel (19) became a suicide terrorist of Jihadist ISIS-group (Iraq) and blew himself up, killing over 20 people. Studying EU & US impact. o 13-11-2015: Paris & Saint-Denis, France terrorist attacks. o Belgium, Germany & UK. - These terror attacks became a huge trigger turning point for many countries to get involved more into this (Iraq-Syrian) conflict. - Wasn’t about fighting (human) rights & democracy anymore but fighting against terrorism, Jihadists groups. - The roles of the countries started to change Migration crisis: A million of Syrians had reached Europe, which changed European politics. 2015: in Geldermalsen, the Netherlands an asylum seeker centrum were to be build, which led to a storm of the municipality.  Nigel Farage (UK)> framed the migration flow by exaggerating way from actual fact at that time. o Miss match between the fact & framing. o Interesting to see how politicians use visions of the future to shape politics now > led to the Brexit. Germany: “Wir schaffen das” (We can do this). o This sentence became a motto and was used against Angela Merkel ever since. Links between regional dynamics, international migration crisis, and the effects on national politics and wide-regional politics. So, all links across the different levels of analysis 3 triggers: international involvement 1. 2014-2017: weekly published images like Alan Kurdi (3) on 2-09-2015; These images contributed to the ideas that, specifically the West, couldn’t just sit down and do nothing, but because this was such a complex question, Western governments did do nothing for a long time. 2. Yazidi is a minority religious group actively threatened by ISIS; Through genocide; Young girls have been traded & sold amongst ISIS groups and got raped. o ISIS made them slaves. o This raised questions why not also focussing on the victims, instead of only the killers? 3. Destruction of cultural heritages 2016: destruction of the Syrian city, Palmyra, by ISIL. o Secondary human suffering that triggers international involvement; o Performative violence > during this course other forms of this will be discussed and that all comes together into one coherent strategic narrative for groups, such as ISIS. The involvement of international countries The Syrian war is notorious for its use of chemical weapons; It set the civil Syrian war apart from other conflicts in the past decades; These ‘different and strange’ weapons are ‘interesting’, because it constitutes a very isolated group of weapons from a legal, humanitarian, and technical perspective. The type of suffering and international response that they cause. Brings into play many strategic dilemma’s: o What makes chemical weapons so different that they cause such red line? o How did a ‘red line’ get created in the first place? o What do we do when the red line has been crossed? o What does it do to the credibility of a country, like the USA, when they say there is a red line, but they don’t act on it? Sending non-violence support units: At the end, leads to huge political implications (or even scandals) in a country. o Trucks to particular groups, which are being transformed into semitanks; o This raises concerns > “So many involved factions & groups that constantly merge & make coalition. How sure can you be that your support to those groups you think are good, are fighting for your ‘right’ cause and stay like that. Who, in the end, don’t radicalize or merch with other groups and that your support units aren’t being used to support ISIS?” Coalition warfare: The headquarters in Qatar from where the international coalition coordinated its activities in Syria & Iraq. o Complex situation > many difficult political questions. o All the countries within this coalitions have different rules of engagement. o Requires a lot of coordination. o A Dutch documentary about the crowdfunding for Omar during the Dutch bombing in 2015 > led to ethical questions: o When did we do well & did the right thing? o What is justice, when is it enough? o What is the responsibility of the state? Support & resistance against NGO’s (within their home country). The Syrian observatory for human rights or the white helmets. o Precarious situation: depended on international aid & often the subject of misinformation & disinformation International involvement of the highest level; UN-secretary general > leading efforts for many different peace of land. o Geneva peace stocks; o US & Syria peace stocks; o US & Russia agreement that led to Syria joining the chemical weapon convention. o This legitimized Assads position as a ruler. o Leads to many difficult questions: opinions differ. o Who do we invite to the table? o Who represents Syria? - USA & Europe have long supported various constellations of oppositional groups; - Russia & Iran have always supported President Assad as the legitimate leader and representative of Syria You can distinguish 'different' conflicts: 1. The core conflict: Assad vs. Opposition 2. Among the opposition. The opposition broke up in different militions with different underlining goals and sponsors. 3. Islamic state vs. the rest 4. Foreign interventions and proxy wars - Russia has backed Assad from the beginning, providing arms. - Iran and Syria have been close strategical allies, Iran sponsors the Syrian government and in return gets regional influence. - US provided weapons and support to Syrian rebels, executed air strikes and fought ISIS. - Turkey is a NATO member and is allies with the EU and US. They did have friendly relations with Syria before the conflict, but they switched as soon as it started and provided a safe haven for defected syrian soldiers. They became a major sponsor of factions fighting Assad. Making it extra complicated is that a group sponsored by Turkey is fighting a group sponsored by the US. - Qatar has a major airbase from which ISIS was fought by a coalition of several NATO members.  - Saoedi-Arabië supports the Syrian opposition in hope of installing a government able to fight the Iran influence. It’s not clear who ‘won’ during this conflict: Assad neither lost nor won. Remarkable, that Assad after 2 decades remains in power. He is now also being reintegrated into regional politics. Which is remarkable since Arabia ostracised Assad into earlier years of the war > Idealism meets pragmatic politics. Important lesson: “you can go quite far in not wanting someone in charge, but at some point, you’ve to confront political realities and there wise or less wise ways Take aways: 1. Conflict in Syria became a stage of proxy war and even one for great power politics (US - Russia). 2. There are advantages and disadvantages to proxy war. There are also different purposes: coercion, disruption and transformation. 3. IR theories can help understand the interactions between states. 4. IR theories are widely divergent. Sectarianism Afflicts the New Middle East President Obama explained Middle Eastern conflicts as stemming from "ancient sectarian differences," but the situation is more nuanced. While sectarian tensions have long existed, communities in the region often coexisted peacefully. The recent rise in sectarian conflict largely results from the Arab Spring, which weakened state structures and left a power vacuum exploited by extremists. Social media has amplified sectarian messages, and some regimes, like Saudi Arabia’s, use sectarianism to solidify their support and weaken rivals. Conflicts in Iraq and Syria have intensified sectarian clashes, as Shia and Sunni groups vie for power, with external actors like Iran backing sectarian allies to maintain influence. While the U.S. cannot directly counter sectarianism, it can help strengthen state institutions in the region, as stable states are better equipped to manage internal tensions and reduce the influence of sectarian divisions. A sectarian snapshot Sectarianism in the Middle East has surged since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which dismantled the Sunni-dominated regime, empowered the Shia majority, and sparked sectarian violence. This conflict intensified with Iraq's civil wars, where both Sunni and Shia militias committed brutal acts, and Iran's support for Shia groups heightened Sunni fears across the region. The Syrian civil war further fueled tensions, with the Alawite-led Assad regime's violent suppression of Sunni-led protests, drawing in regional actors like Hizbullah and Sunni jihadists. This conflict has destabilized Iraq and Lebanon, disrupting Lebanon's sectarian balance. Other countries, including Egypt, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, have seen sectarian divisions deepen, with violence against minorities and political marginalization, often portrayed as foreign influence. Modern sectarianism in the region is driven by power vacuums, regional rivalries, and jihadist activities rather than by ancient animosities alone. The sectarian moment Sectarian conflict in the Middle East has deep historical roots, shaped by events like Ibn Saud's conquests, Lebanon's civil war, and Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. While sectarian differences were less significant in the past, political instability, particularly after the Arab Spring, has exacerbated tensions. The collapse of strong governments and power vacuums allowed previously suppressed grievances to resurface, with groups organizing along sectarian lines for protection. In countries like Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, leaders have manipulated sectarian rhetoric for political gain, deepening divisions and mistrust. Media, especially social media, has amplified these tensions, spreading extremist content and inflaming sectarianism, which now easily crosses borders and fuels conflict between nations. The logic of war War exacerbates sectarianism by deepening popular fears and dividing communities. During conflict, governments and factions often mobilize people by appealing to sectarian identities, drawing on emotions intensified by violence. This approach strengthens sectarian recruitment, financing, and alliances, leaving durable networks and skills long after conflicts end. For example, groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS emerged from Iraqi conflicts as particularly skilled fighters, effectively outmaneuvering other Syrian factions and attracting foreign support. War fuels the narrative of an existential sectarian threat, as shown by Iraq’s 2006 Samarra mosque bombing, which reinforced religious divisions and led to brutal sectarian violence. In Syria, where an Alawite minority regime ruled over a Sunni majority, the descent into civil war sparked predictable sectarian conflict. Local grievances aligned with outside support, especially from Saudi Arabia and Iran, who exploited but did not invent these social divisions. The Syrian war intensified sectarian logic across the region, reconfiguring alliances and inflaming already dangerous divides. Iran Iran’s actions in the Middle East reflect a strategic, rather than purely sectarian, approach. Despite portraying itself as a pan-Islamic revolutionary power, Iran's Shi’a identity and the 1979 revolution raised fears among Sunni Arab neighbors, who framed Iran as a sectarian, destabilizing influence. In Iraq, Bahrain, and Syria, Iran did not start sectarian violence but leveraged it to advance its interests, notably backing Shi’a groups to secure allies and counter rival powers, particularly Saudi Arabia. In Syria, Iran’s extensive support for Assad—its oldest regional ally—is primarily strategic, aiming to preserve influence rather than based on shared Shi’a identity. Iran's growing support of Shi’a communities, especially as Sunni extremist threats rise, has heightened regional tensions and deepened perceptions of a “Shi’a conspiracy.” Although Iran’s influence in most Sunni-majority states is limited, its role in places like Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain, where Shi’as are prominent, has expanded. However, the Sunni majority across the Middle East continues to push back, isolating Iran and intensifying regional rivalries, which hampers Tehran’s aspirations of broader regional leadership Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states Saudi Arabia views its rivalry with Iran as both a geopolitical and sectarian struggle for influence in the Muslim world, especially after Iran's 1979 revolution. To counter Iran, Saudi Arabia, along with Kuwait and the UAE, has funded Sunni mosques and organizations globally, promoting a conservative interpretation of Islam. In Syria, Qatar also funded Sunni groups to challenge both the Assad regime and Saudi influence within Sunni politics. At home, Gulf states portray unrest among local Shi’a populations as Iranian interference, fueling anti-Shi’a sentiments, especially among Saudi Salafis. However, Gulf regimes are cautious about encouraging jihad, fearing it could lead to extremism. While Saudi Arabia supports more secular Syrian opposition factions, some Gulf states struggle to manage private donations to radical groups. Despite Saudi aspirations to lead the Sunni world, Qatar and others occasionally challenge its influence, undermining a united Sunni front against Iran. Other actors Non-state actors have significantly intensified sectarian divisions in the Syrian conflict, often openly fueling a hostile, divisive agenda. Iranian-backed groups like Hizbullah and Iraqi Shia militias, such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, have sent fighters to support the Assad regime, with Hizbullah leveraging its involvement to bolster its influence in Lebanon and cast itself as the Shi’a community’s defender in a sectarian “holy war.” Hizbullah’s experienced fighters, numbering at least 2,000, have proven essential in Syrian battles, such as the 2013 capture of al-Qusayr. Sunni fighters, also motivated by sectarianism, have joined from Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, North Africa, and even Europe. Syrian jihadist groups, learning from past mistakes in Iraq, have attempted to win over local populations by providing services like bread distribution, which helps to replace state functions and earn local support. Wealthy Gulf donors, particularly from the private sector, funnel funds through Iraqi Sunni groups to Syrian jihadists, amplifying sectarian rhetoric for strategic advantage.  The escalating involvement of each faction reinforces the perception of a region-wide sectarian conflict, creating a vicious cycle of retaliatory sectarian violence. Hizbullah’s growing prominence has pushed Sunni groups toward increasingly extreme rhetoric, emboldening sectarian-aligned donors and inciting more attacks on Christian and Shi’a communities in Syria. Implications for the US and its allies Sectarianism is destabilizing the Middle East, fueling radicalism, and creating complex challenges for the West, which has limited influence over the situation. Both Shi’a and Sunni communities have been radicalized, leading to the rise of militant groups like Hizbullah and al- Qaeda-linked factions in Syria, intensifying regional conflict. Sectarian tensions are spreading to Lebanon and Iraq, and foreign fighters returning from Syria are increasingly radicalized, posing security risks in their home countries, including Europe. Sectarian divisions also hinder democracy, as leaders exploit sectarianism to rally support, making compromise difficult and fostering violence. Iran, despite its regional power, faces backlash from Sunni-majority Arab nations due to its support for Syria, damaging its image. The West, struggling with credibility on religious issues, can help mitigate sectarianism by supporting state-building and refugee management, though the conflict is expected to persist, complicating efforts for peace and stability. The battle for Syria, Chapter 3: Assad must stand aside? The international community’s ambivalent response The Syrian-Turkish border region, particularly around the Orontes River, has long been a point of contention due to the Turkish province of Hatay, which was originally Syrian territory. However, by early 2011, relations between Syria and Turkey had improved, highlighted by the joint "Friendship Dam" project. This period of cooperation was disrupted by the unexpected escalation of unrest in Syria, which both Assad and Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan initially believed would not affect Syria. As protests erupted, the international response was cautious, with key players like Russia, Iran, Turkey, and even Western nations hesitant to see Syria destabilized. However, as violence worsened, patience with Assad declined. By mid-2011, Turkey and Qatar distanced themselves from Assad, and Western leaders, including Obama, called for his resignation. In contrast, Russia and Iran continued to support Assad, deepening the divide in the civil war. The shift in international stance was driven by both moral concerns and political motives, with many states underestimating Assad’s resilience, mistakenly believing his regime was on the verge of collapse. The Arab Spring shakes the Middle East The international response to the Syrian crisis was heavily influenced by the wider Arab Spring context. The protests in Deraa erupted amidst significant events, such as the crackdown in Bahrain and the UN vote to intervene in Libya. Consequently, policymakers did not view Syria in isolation but as part of a broader, complex regional upheaval. This overlapping of crises made it challenging for leaders and bureaucrats to formulate a cohesive regional strategy, impacting how they approached the unfolding situation in Syria. Egypt Barack Obama, initially aiming to reduce U.S. involvement in the Middle East, became increasingly drawn into the Arab uprisings, particularly as protests spread to Egypt, a key U.S. ally. While his administration was divided between idealists and realists, Obama initially advocated a cautious approach, following advice from Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates. However, as Mubarak resisted reforms, Obama shifted his stance and called for Mubarak’s immediate resignation, a move that led to political criticism for both delaying action and abandoning the Egyptian leader. Regional responses varied: Qatar, Turkey, and Iran supported the uprisings, with al-Jazeera's coverage signaling Qatari backing and Iran framing the movements as Islamic and anti-Western. Iran also sent ships to Syria through the Suez Canal, alarming Saudi Arabia. Fearing domestic instability, Saudi Arabia condemned the uprisings, sheltered Tunisia’s Ben Ali, and supported Egypt’s military after Mubarak’s fall. Enraged by Obama’s actions, Saudi Arabia focused on maintaining internal stability during the regional upheaval. Bahrain After Mubarak's departure, large-scale protests in Bahrain, led by mostly Shia citizens demanding democratic reforms, prompted a response from the Bahraini Sunni-led government, which requested assistance from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. On March 14, Saudi Arabia sent 1,000 troops and the UAE sent 500 to suppress the protests, marking a significant moment in the Arab Spring and exposing selective regional and international support for uprisings. While Qatar had supported protests in Egypt, it backed the Bahraini intervention and avoided coverage of the events through its media outlet, al-Jazeera. The U.S. and Turkey, concerned about Bahrain's strategic importance and possible Iranian influence on the Shia protesters, refrained from strong responses. The U.S. also compromised on Bahrain to secure GCC support for NATO actions in Libya. Saudi Arabia emerged as the leading counter-revolutionary force, providing financial aid to other unstable governments like Oman and Jordan and taking an active role in addressing unrest in Yemen. Its unilateral intervention in Bahrain without consulting the U.S. highlighted growing dissatisfaction with Washington's stance during the uprisings. Despite efforts by Obama to improve relations with King Abdullah, the U.S.'s lack of engagement on Bahrain left Saudi Arabia unconvinced of the U.S. as a reliable partner. Libya The Libyan protests, starting on February 15, 2011, sparked a swift and distinct international response compared to other Arab Spring uprisings. Muammar Gaddafi’s violent repression of protesters led to civil war and the formation of the National Transitional Council (NTC) in Benghazi. As Gaddafi’s forces advanced toward the city, calls for a no-fly zone intensified. France led the push for Gaddafi’s ouster, followed by the UK, while the U.S. faced internal debates. Despite initial hesitation, Obama, influenced by European allies and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, supported UN Resolution 1973, authorizing NATO intervention. By October, Gaddafi was toppled, but Libya descended into instability, affecting Obama’s future reluctance toward intervention in Syria. Regional responses were varied: Saudi Arabia supported the UN resolution but avoided direct involvement, while Turkey initially opposed intervention due to economic ties with Libya before ultimately agreeing. Qatar played a crucial role, using its influence within the Arab League to back the no-fly zone and providing military support to the Libyan rebels. Qatar’s success in Libya boosted its regional confidence, prompting it to seek a similar role in Syria. Syria When protests erupted in Deraa, the international response to Syria was subdued due to concurrent crises in the Middle East, such as the conflicts in Egypt and Libya. Western diplomats, focused on managing the Libya intervention, had limited resources to address Syria. Regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Qatar were preoccupied with their own issues and delayed public criticism of Assad. Even Western nations, including the U.S., took a cautious approach, with Hillary Clinton initially calling Assad a potential "reformer" and Obama urging him to "change course" without demanding his removal. This restrained response meant that early international reactions to Syria's crisis were muted, avoiding direct confrontation with the Assad regime. Syria: Protests and violence increase By mid-2011, the Syrian regime's violent crackdown on expanding protests became increasingly untenable for the international community. Protests spread across Syria, with diverse groups, including middle-class youth, Kurds, and even traditionally pro-regime areas, joining in. The regime responded with escalating violence, including sieges, mass detentions, and killings, such as the murder of anti-Assad singer Ibrahim Qashoush. Despite claiming the uprising was driven by armed gangs and jihadists, Assad’s promises of reform were seen as empty gestures. The situation worsened in August with a brutal crackdown during Ramadan, particularly in Hama, where hundreds were killed. This violence, widely documented and shared globally, prompted a shift in the stance of the West, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, who began to distance themselves from Assad. Iran, Russia, Qatar and Saudi Arabia: The world turns to Syria In 2011, as the Syrian conflict escalated, regional powers solidified their positions. Iran, despite initially supporting popular uprisings, chose to back Assad, providing substantial support, including riot control equipment and military advisors. Russia, after initial mild criticism, defended Assad diplomatically, blocking UN resolutions and supporting Syria’s narrative of external conspiracy. Saudi Arabia, initially focused on containing the Arab Spring, shifted its stance in August, condemning Assad’s actions and recalling its ambassador to counter Iran’s influence. Qatar, originally an ally of Syria, switched to supporting the opposition, using Al Jazeera to cover the crisis and freeze relations with Assad. Turkey, once a close ally, also abandoned Assad, cutting ties and becoming a key player in supplying the opposition, shaping the course of the civil war. Revolution in Turkey’s foreign policy In 2003, Turkey's foreign policy was traditionally shaped by the secularist, cautious principles of Kemalism, led by military and bureaucratic elites committed to distancing Turkey from Middle Eastern affairs. However, after the AKP (Justice and Development Party) rose to power in 2002, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the political landscape shifted. Erdoğan aimed to reduce the influence of the military and the secular establishment, pursuing reforms that included lifting the headscarf ban and prosecuting military figures accused of plotting against the state. With the support of conservative, business, and religious groups, Erdoğan consolidated power and reshaped Turkey’s foreign policy. Under his leadership and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey adopted a “strategic depth” approach, focusing on deeper ties with the Islamic world while maintaining an ambivalent stance toward the West, marking a shift from Turkey’s Kemalist isolationism to a more proactive regional role. Assad stands firm Turkey faced significant challenges in Syria, balancing security concerns, economic interests, and political considerations. Initially, Turkish officials believed Assad could manage the unrest, but as violence escalated, Turkey grew frustrated. Erdoğan publicly condemned Assad, supported the opposition, and hosted armed opposition groups. Despite private diplomacy urging Assad to implement reforms, including power-sharing with the Muslim Brotherhood, relations deteriorated after Assad's failure to act. In August 2011, Turkey’s frustration peaked, and by September, it cut diplomatic ties with Syria. In November, Erdoğan called for Assad’s ouster, and Turkey supported the formation of the Syrian National Council, marking a clear break from Assad. Miscalculations urkey’s inability to persuade Assad was largely due to an overestimation of its influence and a fundamental misunderstanding of the Syrian regime. The relationship between Turkey and Syria had been based on three main pillars: strong economic ties, soft power (such as Turkish soap operas), and personal relationships, particularly between Erdoğan and Assad. However, these factors held little weight in pressuring an autocratic regime like Assad’s. Syria was not economically dependent on Turkey, and Assad’s crony capitalist elites had much more to lose by abandoning him, with their ties to Iran offering a more reliable source of support than Turkey’s relatively limited leverage. Moreover, Turkish officials misjudged the nature of Assad’s regime. The Turkish Foreign Ministry (MFA) had traditionally focused on the West, with few diplomats having expertise in the Arab world or speaking Arabic. Erdoğan and his foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, were overly confident, mistakenly assuming that their shared Islamic culture with Syria would enable them to understand the complexities of the situation. This led to a belief that Syria could reform when, in fact, the regime’s survival relied on maintaining its authoritarian control. Several factors influenced Turkey’s dramatic shift in stance from supporting Assad to calling for his resignation. First, Syria’s economic importance to Turkey had diminished, as Syria was no longer a major regional market, while trade opportunities in northern Iraq had improved. Second, Erdoğan had gained significant popularity in the Arab world, and his association with Assad increasingly hurt his standing in the region. By June 2011, Erdoğan’s domestic political position was strengthened after successful parliamentary elections, which allowed him to take a more assertive stance on Syria. The Arab Spring presented an opportunity for Turkey to redefine its role in the Middle East, positioning itself as a model for a new regional order centered around Turkish influence. Erdoğan saw the potential fall of Assad as an opportunity to establish a more favorable government in Syria, possibly led by the Muslim Brotherhood, which could align with Turkey’s regional ambitions and promote a vision of moderate Islamism. Thus, Turkey’s shift from support to condemnation of Assad reflected both domestic political calculations and broader regional aspirations. Did Turkey have a choice? Erdoğan’s supporters argue that Turkey had no choice but to reverse its stance on Syria due to Assad’s ongoing duplicity. However, critics contend that Erdoğan’s swift shift towards supporting the opposition and calling for Assad's removal was a misstep. Analysts like Ilhan Uzgel argue that Turkey narrowed its options too quickly, while Philip Robins suggests Erdoğan could have used his relationship with Assad to mediate. Turkey’s earlier success as a neutral regional power was undermined by its firm alignment against Assad, which compromised its credibility. In hindsight, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu’s decision to push for Assad’s quick removal was a significant miscalculation. While Turkey’s lack of understanding of Syria is deserving of criticism, many other actors were similarly deceived by Assad’s image as a reformer. Erdoğan’s impulsiveness and personal sense of betrayal clouded his long-term strategy. An ideological belief in the Arab Spring as an inevitable triumph of the people over autocrats also fueled the decision to abandon Assad. Furthermore, Turkey’s desire to advance its regional influence during the Arab Spring contributed to the quick pivot towards supporting the opposition. While Erdoğan’s Islamist ideology played a role, Turkish nationalism was also a key factor in shaping these decisions. ‘Assad must step aside’ Turkey's shift to supporting Assad's opponents, along with the collective announcement by the US, UK, France, Germany, and Canada on August 18, 2011, calling for Assad to step down, were two key developments that pushed Syria closer to civil war. This Western declaration marked a significant escalation, solidifying regime change as official policy and raising fears among Assad's allies, like Russia and Iran, of potential military intervention. It also encouraged countries like Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, who believed the US would take action to topple Assad, while boosting the morale of opposition and rebel groups. The misjudgment by the US stemmed from two key issues: limited intelligence on Syria due to its long-standing hostility toward the US and insufficient understanding of the internal dynamics, given the lack of engagement in the prior decade. Additionally, Obama’s highly centralized decision-making, influenced by a small group of advisers and a preference for prioritizing defense over diplomacy, marginalized Syria in policy discussions. His focus on public perception ahead of the 2012 elections also complicated the US response, leading to a strategy that underestimated the broader consequences of the Western push for Assad’s removal. The ‘Escalator of pressure’ Early diplomatic efforts by Turkey and Western leaders to persuade Assad to implement reforms failed, leading to increased pressure on his regime. This "escalator of pressure" included targeted sanctions on individuals involved in the crackdown, such as Maher al-Assad and members of Iran's IRGC Quds force. The EU imposed similar sanctions, freezing assets of regime-linked individuals and institutions. Britain and France led efforts at the UN to condemn Assad’s actions, but these were often blocked by Russia and China. Despite strong rhetoric from Western leaders, including Obama and Hillary Clinton, who demanded Assad’s resignation, there was a critical miscalculation in assuming the regime would collapse under pressure. Assad’s regime was more resilient than anticipated, having survived past sanctions and receiving support from Iran on circumventing them. This flawed view of the regime's fragility led Western leaders into escalating rhetoric and actions without reassessing the situation, ultimately trapping them in a policy that prioritized Assad's removal. Our guys in Damascus Despite widespread belief among Western leaders that Assad’s regime was close to collapse, key ambassadors in Syria, including Robert Ford (US), Eric Chevallier (France), and Simon Collis (Britain), cautioned against this view. They formed a close diplomatic group to exchange intelligence and provide a more nuanced analysis. They engaged with both the regime and opposition, despite travel restrictions. Collis, having been in Damascus since 2007, argued that Assad's fall would require significant unrest in key cities and a breakdown in military cohesion, and that economic sanctions would take months to have an effect. Ford and Chevallier also believed that regime change would be a lengthy process and opposed calls for Assad’s immediate removal. However, their advice was ignored, especially after Chevallier clashed with French officials who believed Assad’s fall was inevitable. Ultimately, the White House led the call for Assad’s departure, with Britain and France following despite their diplomats' warnings. Decision from DC: Assad must go On August 18, 2011, President Obama, joined by Western leaders including British Prime Minister David Cameron, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, publicly called for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down. Obama framed this demand by stating that Assad was obstructing the aspirations of the Syrian people and had failed to implement meaningful reforms. This marked a significant shift in U.S. policy, which had previously been cautious. Initially, Obama had resisted calls for Assad’s removal, hoping that the Syrian people would lead their own revolution, particularly in light of Assad’s claims of a foreign conspiracy. However, by August, the belief within the administration was that Assad was losing power, influenced by Arab Spring idealists who compared Syria to earlier uprisings in Egypt and Libya, though overlooking key differences. Domestic pressures also played a crucial role in the shift. As media criticism and congressional demands for a stronger stance grew, Obama’s team felt the political cost of inaction was rising, especially with the upcoming elections. There was concern that if Assad fell before a formal U.S. statement, it could result in political embarrassment. Despite the gravity of the announcement, there was no clear strategy for achieving regime change, and the State Department expressed concerns over the lack of follow-up plans. The timing of the announcement—just before Obama’s ten-day vacation—left policymakers without a coherent approach, and the White House showed little interest in exploring further options for regime change. As Assad’s regime remained resilient, this inconsistency between rhetoric and action created a dilemma for the administration. Following the announcement, regional actors split into pro- and anti-Assad camps. Russia and Iran pledged support for Assad, while Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Western powers backed the opposition. This division not only intensified the conflict but also led external actors to encourage their respective sides within Syria, escalating tensions further. Ultimately, Obama’s call for Assad’s resignation, while intended to influence the situation, resulted in a misalignment between U.S. rhetoric and its actions, contributing significantly to the dynamics of the ensuing civil war. Regional powers, acting on the belief that they had U.S. support, escalated their involvement, even though the administration was not prepared to follow through with military or concrete strategic action. Destroying a Nation: The Civil War in Syria , Chapter 3: Confrontation between the military of the regime and the opposition The military opposition The Syrian uprising began in 2011 with peaceful protests that escalated into violence after the regime’s brutal crackdown. This led to defections from the Syrian military, including notable figures like General Manaf Talas, and the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in July 2011. Although initially seen as a moderate and secular force by the West, the FSA struggled with internal divisions, poor coordination, and limited foreign aid. International support was fragmented, with countries like the U.S., Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar pursuing their own interests, which weakened the FSA’s effectiveness. Over time, Islamist factions, including Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam, and jihadist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra (linked to al-Qaeda), grew in prominence. These groups received more consistent support, especially from Gulf states, and were better organized than the FSA. In 2013, ISIS entered Syria, expanding rapidly and declaring Raqqa as its capital, operating under the brutal leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The group's brutal tactics, including targeting religious minorities and enforcing extremist ideologies, further complicated the conflict. As ISIS grew, Western priorities shifted toward combating the group, sidelining efforts to remove Assad. This focus on ISIS inadvertently strengthened jihadist factions, as moderate opposition groups lost critical support. The U.S.'s Train & Equip Program, which aimed to create a force focused solely on ISIS, struggled because many fighters still prioritized opposing Assad’s regime. By 2015, Syria had become home to over 150,000 insurgents, with numerous factions, including the FSA and jihadist groups, operating in loose coalitions. These groups cooperated out of necessity but often blurred ideological lines. This fragmentation of support allowed jihadist groups to dominate, with analysts warning that Syria was becoming a breeding ground for global jihadist militancy, with long-term implications for regional and global security. The military forces of the regime Various scenarios were proposed for Syria’s outcome after the 2011 uprising. One was a military coup by discontented Alawi officers, but this was deemed too risky due to the regime’s history of brutally suppressing dissent. The Assad regime remained tightly unified despite internal criticisms, with significant anti-Sunni discrimination under Bashar al-Assad, leading to the diminished role of Sunni officers in the military. The Syrian military, already weakened by declining readiness since the 1990s and preferential treatment of Alawi units, struggled to respond effectively to the uprising. Despite its large size, only a fraction of the army remained loyal, and high desertion rates among Sunni conscripts further weakened the regime. This led to a reliance on loyalist units and family members in key positions. The regime also increasingly depended on militias, including the National Defence Forces and the Shabbihah, but these groups became increasingly corrupt, undermining the regime's authority. Internal instability within the regime was further highlighted by suspicious deaths of officials and the July 2012 bomb blast that killed top members of Assad’s inner circle. Despite these setbacks, the regime managed to retain core power by reshuffling leadership and relying on Russian military intervention in 2015. However, the conflict became more fragmented as the opposition, particularly jihadist factions like Jabhat Fath al-Sham, grew in prominence, further complicating the fight against Assad. The lack of unity among opposition factions, including moderate and radical groups, hindered their effectiveness. These divisions, combined with sectarianism and local militias pursuing their own interests, allowed the Assad regime to maintain control, culminating in the regaining of Aleppo in December 2016. Despite the regime’s challenges, its ability to adapt and navigate internal and external pressures helped it retain power amid a fractured and complex battlefield. Shifting military alliances During the Syrian War, shifting military alliances often reflected temporary "marriages of convenience," with groups collaborating for immediate strategic advantages rather than ideological alignment. Moderate military factions sometimes allied with radical jihadist groups like Jabhat al-Nusrah for survival, and the Syrian regime was accused of tacit cooperation with the Islamic State (IS) to weaken opposition forces. Critics argued that Western air forces avoided targeting IS’s military columns near Palmyra in 2015, fearing they would appear to be protecting the Assad regime. Despite being an enemy, IS helped the regime by fighting other opposition factions, allowing the regime to focus resources on more immediate threats. The Syrian government was also accused of withholding support for towns like Salamiyah, where the Isma'ili population risked massacre by IS due to a lack of cooperation with the regime. Additionally, the regime was suspected of cooperating with the Kurdish YPG, despite their goal of Kurdish autonomy, as the YPG was used to counterbalance other opposition forces, including IS. However, Turkey initially supported the YPG but later saw it as a threat, leading to a shift in policy toward cooperating with Russia and Iran to resolve the conflict. The U.S. continued to support the YPG for its role in fighting IS, further complicating the situation, particularly with Turkey, which viewed the YPG as linked to the PKK, a Kurdish separatist group. The Syrian regime also received backing from Iraqi Shi’i militias, even as the U.S. cooperated with Iraq's Shi’i-dominated government to combat IS. This created a contradictory web of alliances based on differing political and military priorities. Meanwhile, the control of territories previously held by IS depended on the evolving balance of power, with significant political consequences for the region’s future. Lecture 2: Social and Political History of Modern Syria History as a discipline 1. What is History? Is a discipline, of acquiring knowledge by investigation, collection of memory, and interpretation of past events 2. Why do we study History? 3. Who writes History? 4. Why do people write History? “He who controls the past controls the future. He who controls the present controls the past.” History is the analysis and interpretation of the human past. Historians use a wide variety of methods to evaluate sources. Not all historians agree on the interpretation since they all differ. History helps looking at changes in a nation. Politics affect history and vice versa. Reconstructing a historical timeline 1. Ottoman empire and the Arab world: - Syrian region since 1516. Before it was part of a Christian Mediterranean world. - Demise of the Ottoman Empire, Many Western countries wanted a part of the Ottoman Empire. - Sick man of Europe. - WWI. This was the end of the Ottoman Empire, foreign troops came and said, that this land was now Syria, Israel, etc. The Ottoman Empire spread from the Middle East to Europe. It was an autonomous rule but local governors were allowed to have their own identity. Greater Syria (or Syria and the Levant) was, even though religious differences, also an autonomy since 1516. The feeling of being an “Arab” was overarching. With Constantinople as its capital, the Ottoman Empire was at the centre of interactions between the East and the West. However, the Ottoman Empire lost power when they fought Europe. There were lots of rebels which made it almost impossible to fight the wars. Since it lost a lot of power and with the rise of the VOC, it was then called “The Sick Man of Europe”. There were two important men during this era: Sir Mark Sykes (Britain) and Francois Georges-Picot (France). o Sir Mark Sykes was a catholic English traveller. He was considered to be a specialist, since he had some knowledge and working + living experience of the Ottoman Empire. In 1915, they were thinking: “What do we want? How can we influence them before we lose control?” Afterwards, the focus of the UK was mainly on imperialism and trade: Syria was geographically good located. Iraq was thought of to be the future due to oil. The UK did not only want Syria and Iraq, but also the Holy Land. o Francois Georges-Picot was a catholic imperialistic French diplomat and lawyer. He was aware of colonisation. He was also considered to be a specialist, since had worked and lived in Beirut. Historic civilizing mission: he wanted to secure agribusiness and therefore wanted Syria as well. Due to the fact that he wanted to safeguard investments, France also wanted the Holy Land. Continuing protecting the Maronite Christians in Lebanon (the largest Christian denomination in the country)  2. The Sykes-Picot agreement: - Negotiations finished (1916). Both the men above made a plan and finished the negotiations in 1916. They divided the Middle East and gave it to Western countries - Share of Italians and Russians - How about local reality? In a way, it is awful because people live there and they just draw borders. - Groundwork for war (McMillan, 2016:65). - A & B autonomous regions led by Arabians. Bleu and Pink are directly controlled The Sykes-Picot Agreement was a secret 1916 agreement between the UK and France. Negotiations finished quickly due to WWI. The agreement defined their mutually agreed spheres of influence and control in the Middle East. According to this agreement, the British got control over the area surrounding the Persian Gulf, whereas France got control of south-eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. It however did not include the desires of the people living in the Middle East. The agreement had no focus on the local reality. In some way the Russians and Italians became involved too. The Sykes-Picot Agreement divided the Middle East into nations and created borders where previously none had existed. According to McMillan, this agreement can be seen as groundwork for war governments by the British or French. 3. Meanwhile in the Arab world (1915-1920) - The United Kingdom agreed in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence that it would support Arab independence if they revolted against the Ottoman. - The struggle of the French and British in the Western world was also important, they wanted to make sure that Turkey lost the war. - Arab Revolt. - In 1916 British and French sent troops (Lawrence of Arabia). - The UK promised to support Arab independence. - 1919 Ottoman troops defeated The Arab Revolt was initiated by Hussein bin Ali (Sharif of Mecca) on the 10th of June 1916, with the aim of securing independence from the ruling Ottoman Turks and creating a single unified Arab state. The British were afraid of the Germans and wanted the Arabs to fight with them. If they would do this, the UK promised to support the Arab Independence. Therefore, in June 1916, the British sent out several officials to assist the revolt in the Hejaz; Officer Lawrence was sent to the Hejaz on intelligence gathering. Lawrence's most important contributions were in the area of strategy and liaison with British armed forces but he also participated in several military engagements. A French military mission was also sent out. In 1919, the Ottoman Empire was defeated which caused problems, because multiple promises were made. The first king afterward of Iraq was Faisal I. 4. After the war: - 1919:Redrawing map of Europe. - 1920: Redrawing map M-E -San Remo Conference & Treaty of Sevres. - Echoed Sykes-Picot. - Indirect rule in Iraq and Jordan by the British. The Sykes-Picot Agreement has become a symbol for treason and untrustworthy. In 1919, they redrew the map of Europe and in 1920 they redrew the map of the Middle East (San Remo conference and the Treaty of Sèvres). The Treaty of Sevres confirmed the Sykes-Picot agreement. The British and the French could secure their objectives very easy, as other allies dropped out during the negotiations since they had other issues to worry about (such as WWI). In this manner, UK had indirect rule in Iraq and Jordan. 5. Syria 1920-1932: - This map is not the same as Syria today. It was a period where Frans did not know what to do with the land (Syria). - Nobody speaks the language, the government is gone and from scratch, you drew the borders and there are a lot of differences between the people in the state. - There were regional differences and had to make sure that that was reflected in the way the governed Syria became a state under direct rule of France. Cities, such as Damascus, Aleppo and Homs, lost their autonomy which took away their sovereignty. Syria was made up of different regions, and now forced to live together. 6. Syria 1930-1958: - The State of Syria declared, the French wanted that the state would work toward independence, WWII sped up the process of independence - Treaty of Independence 1936 –not ratified by French - During WO II under Vichy France – invaded. - Independence in 1945 via UN. - Instability: 3 coups in 1949, 20 cabinets in 10 years, etc. Is very logical and is a result of major changes. - It was a period of change because of technology developments The Franco-Syrian Treaty of Independence was a treaty negotiated between France and Syria to provide for Syrian independence. France attempted to impose a treaty that was heavily prejudiced in its favour. It promised gradual independence, but kept the Syrian Mountains under French control. The League of Nations gave mandates to the UK and France to prepare Syria for independence. At first the French did not ratify the Syrian Independence, later on they did. Syria was declared an independent state in 1945 by the UN. This led to a period of instability 7. Syria 1958-1961 - Instability, commonalities policy, and Egyptian President Nasser. Nasser stood up against the West (Arab nationalism) and became a very iconic figure. And managed to spread the idea and said that we should become one state, there is one language and we have the same culture. - United Arab Republic (1958). Syria became the northern part of the United Arab Republic. It mad the political system in Syria dissolves. - Syrian political parties dissolved and withdrew the army from politics. - Viewed with worry. Instability, commonalities policy, and Egyptian President Nasser. Wanting to create a new state: The United Arab Republic (1958). The end of politics; Syrian political parties dissolved and the withdrawal of the army from politics. This was viewed with worry and therefore got support from Iraq. Syria felt like they were not playing the role they wanted or needed to play. They were fairly suppressed by Egypt and President Nasser.  8. Syria 1961-1963: - Syria had its independence back but led to a failing economy and political system. - Centralized, military dictatorship was destroying Syria’s political and economic life. - Coup d’etat Syria (1961): Syrian Arab Republic. The idea of Arab nationalism was still there but became a Syrian Arab Nationalism, which was the alternative to the Pan-Arab nationalism spread by Nasser. - Coups and counter-coups. Political system failed, which led to failed economy and failed political system. Centralized military dictatorship was destroying Syria’s political and economic life. This caused for a lot of unrest, and this triggered the 1961 Syrian coup d'état: an uprising by disgruntled Syrian Army officers that resulted in the break-up of the United Arab Republic and the restoration of an independent Syrian Republic. Period of coups and counter-coups. 9. Syria 1963-1972: - Ba’ath party in crisis: establishing the military committee. - Ba’athist coup d’etat (1963). The rise of the Assad family - Internal power struggle. - Coup in 1966. - Lost Six-Days War (1967) and Golan - New leadership struggle. - 1970: Hafez al-Assad became leader. At the right moment, he jumped to power. - Improvement for minorities. Hafez al-Assad is part of the Alawite minority and maybe therefore he is not a big threat. He had a good idea of how to deal with the country. You have the Sunni Arab majority and Shia groups, Turkish groups. A lot of these minorities feel a connection to Hafez because he is a part of a minority and he gives priority to minorities. - Hafez Assad joined a movement and climbed up in the military, seizing a number of coups. - Before you see instability explained by global movements and then Assad came to power and also brought a number of good things. The Ba’ath Party, meaning renaissance, was found in 1947. It is an ideology which mixes Arab nationalist, PanArabism, Arab socialist, and anti-imperialist interests. Ba'athism calls for unification of the Arab world into a single state. The 1963 Syrian coup d'état (8 March Revolution) was the successful seizure of power in Syria by the military committee of the Syrian Socialist Ba'ath Party. The planning and the unfolding conspiracy, was inspired by the Iraqi Regional Branch's successful military coup. A power struggle erupted between the Nasserites in the National Council for the Revolutionary Command and the Ba'ath Party, which led to another coup. The 1966 Syrian coup d'état refers to the events between 21-23 February in which the government of the Syrian Arab Republic was overthrown and replaced. When also the Six-Days War was lost to Israel in 1967, there was a new leadership struggle. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad became the new leader. The Assad family belongs to the Alawiteminority: an offshoot of Shia Islam. The new Syrian constitution of 2012 introduced a multi-party system based on the principle of political pluralism without guaranteed Pan-Arabic view. Overarching identity: we are all Arabs, however during coups, political power became located at the minorities, in this case the Alawites, making it a sectarian war.  10. Syria 1972-1980 - Federation of Arab Republics (1972-1977), pan-Arabism was still out there. - Yom Kippur (1973): defeat after initial successes - Resistance against the Assad regime. If you disagree with the regime you are in trouble and can/will be murdered. - The Tadmor prison massacre is an example of this - The Muslim Brotherhood is the biggest worry to the Assad regime, a Muslim religious identity by a political force. Becomes a force that provides an alternative idea about how top govern Syria/Arab world - The Arab League started to emerge. The Federation the Arab Republics was an attempt by Qaddafi to merge Libya, Egypt and Syria in order to create a United Arab state. Although approved by a referendum in each country on 1 September 1971, the three countries disagreed on the specific terms of the merger. The federation lasted from 1 January 1972 to 19 November 1977. Government under the ruling of the al-Assad family became a symbol, making Syria a dictatorship. The Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War, or October War (also known as the 1973 Arab–Israeli War) was a war fought by a coalition of Arab States; Egypt and Syria against Israel. They wanted revenge for the Six-Days War. Syria intervened in Lebanese civil war as they saw Israel as foreign occupation. Muslim Brotherhood: a transnational Sunni Islamist organization founded in Egypt by Islamic scholar and schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928. Attacks in cities and on al-Assad. 11. Syria 1980-2011 - State terrorism. Hama massacre (1982). - Uprisings lead to a war-repressed state - Reversed democratization. - Death Hafez al-Assad (2000). His eldest son should have taken over but he died in a car crash, now the younger brother Bashar al-Assad become the heir to the throne. - Not Basil but Bashar al-Assad new leader. There was hope when he came to power because he studied in the West and maybe had good innovative ideas. - Damascus spring: ‘ reformer’? - The United States promotes democracy. - The United States is a very dominant force and in those days there was the idea that the West should deal with the mess in the Middle East. There was an Imperialistic idea that they knew better, partly it worked because the US pressured countries to make peace, and there were some peace agreements. - The US invaded Iraq for a second time in 2003, and a government was installed by the US, they wanted to bring democracies, but Iraq had a lot of regional divergences. - The rise of sectarianism, it is our religious identity that is important, jihadism and also Kurdish nationalism, these new ideas spread. - In Syria the Assad regime, sent Jihadists to Iraq. - Iran’s power is rising and Syria is connected to Iran - The world around Syria is changing. 1982 Hama Massacre happened when the Syrian Arab Army and the Defense Companies, under the orders of the country's president Hafez al-Assad, besieged the town of Hama for 27 days in order to suppress an uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood against al-Assad's government (State Terrorism). This is also known as reversed democratization, as the regime became more violent. Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, when Bashar al-Assad became the new leader. The Damascus Spring was a period of intense political and social debate in Syria which started after the death of President Hafez al-Assad and continued to some degree until autumn 2011, when most of the activities associated with it were suppressed by the government. 12. Syria 2011-nu - Social unrest (socio-economic factors). People suffer because of economic incline. Demography (a lot of young men without a future), economy, changing political order, and power lines. A lot - Tunisian vegetable seller set itself on fire