Taiwan Strait Conflict (Unresolved) PDF

Taiwan Strait Con ict (Unresolved) Behavior: fi fi fl fi fi fl fi fi China [PRC] and Taiwan [ROC] Decisions There were three principal adversaries in this InterRegion con ct—the People’s Republic of China [PRC], Taiwan, Republic of China [ROC], and the United States. However, this discussion on con...

Taiwan Strait Con ict (Unresolved) Behavior: fi fi fl fi fi fl fi fi China [PRC] and Taiwan [ROC] Decisions There were three principal adversaries in this InterRegion con ct—the People’s Republic of China [PRC], Taiwan, Republic of China [ROC], and the United States. However, this discussion on con ct behavior will focus primarily on the decisions, decision-makers, and decision process of the ‘two Chinas’ that were the most directly engaged participants in this unresolved con ct, China (Mainland China, PRC) and Taiwan (ROC). 304 M. BRECHER Moreover, since most of their major decisions were intertwined or impacted the target, as well as the initiator, they will be discussed together. The frst strategic decision was initiated by the People’s Republic of China 5 years after its triumph in China’s prolonged civil war: that triumph of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its proclamation of the PRC on October 1, 1949 were accompanied by the expulsion of the forces of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) to the island of Taiwan, where it proclaimed the Republic of China (ROC) on December 8, 1949. The initial decisions of the “two Chinas” re-activated the struggle for control of Taiwan, which both contenders for ‘the Mantle of Heaven’ agreed was an integral part of One China. (Mainland China had terminated control of Taiwan [Formosa] by the Netherlands in 1662 and had ruled the island until its defeat in the frst China/Japan War (1894– 1895) and its enforced cession of Taiwan to Japan until September 1945 when, in accordance with several pledges by the victorious Powers in World War II—the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the July 1945 Potsdam Agreement—Taiwan was restored to China’s sovereignty soon after Japan’s surrender to the USA) The initial PRC decision— the date is unknown, but ‘liberation’ of Taiwan was an oft-stated commitment by Communist China —was implemented by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) artillery bombardment of one of the Nationalist-controlled ‘off-shore’ islands, Quemoy, on September 3, 1954; these islands were the major land obstacles to an invasion of Taiwan by sea. The Nationalist Republic of China, on Taiwan, which, since its expulsion from the mainland, had often declared its intention of invading the mainland to regain control of historic China, implemented its frst major responsive decision by launching air strikes against the Chinese mainland opposite the ‘off-shore’ islands on September 7. The USA became an active con ct actor in this dispute soon after the outbreak of the 1954–1955 Taiwan crisis by several high-pro e acts in support of Taiwan: its 7th Fleet was deployed to the Taiwan Strait; three USA aircraft carriers were repositioned in the East China Sea; and it authorized the Nationalist regime on Taiwan to use USA-provided jet planes against mainland targets. The 7th Fleet remained in the Taiwan Strait for 5 years. More important for the evolution of the balance of military capability in this con ct between the “two Chinas,” the USA formalized its protector role for Taiwan 3 months later: Taiwan (the ROC) and the US Mutual Defense Pact, incorporating a Missile Defense 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 305 Treaty (MDT) on December 2, 1954. This qualitative escalation—the MDT formalized Taiwan’s right to use USA-supplied air power against the Mainland without consulting the USA Military— led, in turn, to a major tactical decision by the PRC, namely, to persist in its claim to all ‘off-shore’ islands and Taiwan. The PRC implemented that decision by heavy bombardment of the Nationalistcontrolled Tachen Islands on January 10, 1955. This tit-for-tat behavior by the principal adversaries continued with Nationalist-initiated battles on all these off-shore islands during January. Finally, USA material aid to Taiwan in fortifying Quemoy and Matsu ended the crisis for Taiwan on March 25. The crisis for the PRC (and the USA) ended on April 23, when PRC Prime Minister Zhou Enlai offered to negotiate its termination, and the PRC ceased military operations against those two islands. (Taiwan evacuated the Tachen Islands later.) Another post-China Civil War cluster of decisions and implementing acts occurred during the second full-scale military-security crisis in the Taiwan Strait con ct: it too involved all three principal adversaries, after 3 years of relative tranquility, following the winding down of the 1954– 1955 clashes over the off-shore islands. Once more the PRC was the triggering entity, on that occasion deciding to test USA (and USSR) resolve in another dramatic assertion of its claim to Taiwan, via the dispute over the ‘off-shore’ islands: it fi fi fi fi fi fi implemented this decision on July 17, 1958 when it concentrated military forces near Quemoy and Matsu, triggering a crisis for Taiwan. The PRC escalated the crisis by another bombardment of those ‘offshore’ islands on August 23. Nationalist forces on these islands returned fre, as in 1954– 1955. Once more, the USA played an active role, moving part of its Seventh Fleet into the con ct zone. This act triggered a crisis for the PRC, which responded on September 4, by extending its territorial waters to 12 miles off-shore, thereby blockading Quemoy and Matsu. (The USA, in turn, rejected the unilateral PRC extension of territorial waters and threatened military intervention, with the possible use of nuclear weapons, if Quemoy were invaded). The PRC backed off, with Zhou Enlai proposing a resumption of PRC-USA ambassadorial talks. These were resumed on September 14, ending the USA crisis. On the 30th, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed a compromise solution, indicating that the USA favored the withdrawal of Nationalist forces from the “off-shore” islands if the PRC agreed to a cease-fre. The international crisis ended with a joint communiqué by Chiang Kai-shek the President of Taiwan and Dulles on 23 October, expressing their tacit 306 M. BRECHER understanding that a Nationalist invasion of Mainland China would not receive USA support. (The USSR also contributed to de-escalation of this crisis by a TASS news agency statement on October 5, 1958 that excluded Soviet military support for a PRC attempt ‘to liberate’ Taiwan). Unlike the frst two clusters of decisions and implementing acts (1954–1955 and 1958), the third was initiated by Taiwan. After another 3 years of relative tranquility in this con ct, the leader of Taiwan, President Chiang Kai-shek, revived a longstanding core Nationalist decision—to attempt a restoration of Kuomintang power over all of China by force. This was implemented by several acts, verbal and tangible: his threat to invade the mainland, during an Easter message to Chinese everywhere, on April 22, 1962; publicized conscription of more troops for Taiwan’s army; a new tax, levied on 1 May, to support the “return to the mainland”; further statements about an invasion, from 22 May onward, and a claim by the PRC’s Foreign Minister of a plan by Nationalist special agents from Taiwan and anti-Communists on the mainland to join forces, if Taiwan parachuted troops on to the mainland. This led to the PRC’s frst responsive decision in this cluster—to mobilize more troops, which was implemented by a substantial troop build-up in Fukien Province, opposite the ‘off-shore’ islands, beginning on 10 June. (Once more, the USA contributed to crisis de-escalation: on 27 June, President Kennedy reaffrmed USA policy in this con ct—to defend Taiwan against a PRC threat, clearly implying no support for a Taiwan attempt to invade the mainland.) This statement ended the 1962 crisis between the two China adversaries. There were occasional upsurges of tension between the PRC and the ROC during the years that followed, but only one further cluster of hostile decisions and acts, in 1995–1996. Notwithstanding the USA renunciation of its ‘Two Chinas’ policy in 1971, which led to the ouster of Taiwan, the ROC, as China’s representative to the United Nations and the formal recognition of the PRC as the legitimate representative of ‘One China’ at the UN, along with a USA commitment not to extend an invitation to any senior offcial of Taiwan’s government to visit the USA, permission was granted to the Republic of China President, Lee Teng-hui, for a ‘private visit’ to his alma mater university, Cornell, in May 1995. No other decision and implementing act in this con ct, with the possible exception of the PRC bombardment of the “off-shore” islands in 1954, generated such a hostile reaction. The PRC was enraged, as evident in its (un-announced) decision—to re-assert dramatically that it 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 307 was determined, at some unspecifed time, ‘to liberate’ Taiwan, considered by the PRC a heretical province of China that must be restored to ‘the Motherland,’ by negotiation, if possible, by force, if necessary. That reactive decision was implemented by multiple acts that, together, conveyed rage and determination. The PRC ambassador to Washington was withdrawn for 5 months. High-level offcial visits to and from China were suspended. Most visible were ‘show of force’ naval maneuvers near Taiwan conducted during the summer and autumn of 1995. Later, in February– March 1996, intense, high-visibility military pressure was exerted by the PRC on Taiwan. However, largely in response to countervailing USA naval pressure, along with muted apologies, no violence occurred; and the crisis did not linger. However, this protracted con ct persists. Decision-Makers Both of the principal adversaries in this con ct were characterized by a pre-eminent decision-maker during all fi of the crises noted above, except the crisis in 1995–1996. For the PRC, the ‘Paramount Leader’ was Mao Tse-tung from 1949 until his death in 1976, as well as the commanding fgure in the Chinese Communist Party since the mid-1930s. Similarly, Chiang Kai-shek was the dominant decisionmaker of the Republic of China from 1949 until his death in 1975, as well as the Generalissimo of the Kuomintang and China’s Government even longer, from the late 1920s until its collapse in the prolonged civil war that ended in 1949. As noted below, both pre-eminent fgures consulted political and military aides but retained ultimate decision-making power on all major issues of public policy in their respective domain. China [PRC] and Taiwan [ROC]: Decision Process As in all Communist regimes, the People’s Republic of China had an elaborate institutional structure. Formally, there were three crucial centers of decisional authority. One was-is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with the Political Bureau Standing Committee of 9 or 7 members, headed by the Secretary-General, at the apex of the pyramid of decision-making power. A second key institution was-is the Central Military Commission, which controlled the Ministry of Defense and all of the armed forces, notably the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The third was the elaborate State structure, headed by the President, assisted by a State Council, directed by the Prime Minister. In the Mao era (1949– 1976), the ‘Paramount Leader’s power derived from his charismatic 308 M. BRECHER leadership of the Party, the Military and the State, not from his positions in these structures: he held only two formal posts—Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (NC CPPCC) [1949–1954] and President of China (1954–1959); but throughout his rarely disputed reign, no decision of consequence in the PRC was made without his approval. His principal aide and China’s master diplomat, Zhou Enlai, was Premier of China (1949–1975) and Chairman of the NC CPPCC after Mao relinquished that post (1955–1975). Thus, on all matters relating to Taiwan, from 1949 to 1975 (both died in 1976), Mao consulted Zhou, among others, including military leaders, marshals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Directorate of Signal and Imagery Intelligence (DSII). He might have been persuaded by one or more of those consulted, but on any issue in which he was involved, including all important matters related to Taiwan, the fnal decision was made by Mao. For much of the period after Mao there was also a commanding PRC fgure, Deng Xiaoping, the acknowledged ‘Paramount Leader’ and primary decision-maker on important issues in both foreign and domestic policy (1978–1992). Like Mao, he too ruled China on the basis of acknowledged leadership qualities, rather than formal positions of authority in the Party and the State: he also held only two governmental posts for short periods—Chairman of the NC CPPCC, after Mao and Zhou en-Lai, (1978–1982) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, one of the most powerful sources of power in the political system of the PRC. However, while he was more powerful than frst among equals in the Standing Committee of the Communist Party Political Bureau, Deng was less authoritarian than Mao. He consulted more widely and more frequently than Chairman Mao, was more open to advice, sought to persuade his younger colleagues in the leadership, and was prepared to be outvoted, a situation that seemed inconceivable in the Mao era. Since the Deng era, there has not been a commanding fgure in China’s decision-making on issues related to Taiwan and their unresolved protracted con ct. Rather, the three post-Deng leaders—Jiang Zemin (1993–2003), Hu Jintao (2003–2013) and Xi Ping, the current leader—all held/hold the three formal posts of decision-making authority and power in the PRC political system: President of the People’s Republic of China, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party; none has exhibited political charisma. The only 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 309 crisis in relations with Taiwan in the post-Deng era occurred during the leadership of Jiang Zemin; the decision-process in that case is not well known but would seem to have been the product of extensive consultation by the president with political, military, and bureaucratic colleagues and aides. The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan also developed an elaborate formal structure of legislative, executive, and military institutions. As in the PRC, however, the period from 1949 to 1975 was dominated by its frst and most authoritarian leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek: he held all three positions of decision-making authority—President of the Republic of China, Chairman of the ruling Kuomintang Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the ROC armed forces. In fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi terms of their decision-making power and their authoritarian style of leadership, the commanding fgures in the two China adversaries from 1949 to 1975 were remarkably similar. Thus, for most crises in this protracted con ct, the decision-making process was essentially the same: consultation with aides and colleagues at the will of the dominant decision-maker; decisions by Mao in the PRC, Chiang in the ROC. The process changed after their passing, with a more consultative process among political and military leaders in both China adversaries. Taiwan Con ct: Con ct-Sustaining Acts Political Hostility was the predominant type of con ct-sustaining act in this interstate– intrastate con ct. Both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China claimed to be the sole legitimate representative of ‘One China’ from the beginning of this protracted con ct—the proclamation of the two regimes soon after the decisive Communist triumph over the Nationalists in China’s civil war, the PRC on the mainland, October 1, 1949, and the ROC on Taiwan, December 7, 1949. Until 1971, the ROC was recognized by the UN and a majority of states as the representative of China, since then, the PRC has been recognized by the UN and the vast majority of states as ‘China.’ That political con ct over which regime represents ‘China,’ accompanied by violence in the frst 13 years (see the discussion of violence below) remains formally unresolved. Even in the Deng Xiaoping era as ‘Paramount Leader’ of the PRC (1978–1992), the political dimension of their con ct has resisted all attempts to reconcile these competing claims. For example, the PRC ‘peace offensive,’ from the beginning of 1979, elicited a ‘three no 310 M. BRECHER response’ from Taiwan (the ROC)—‘no negotiations, no communications, no compromise.’ Similarly, a later attempt to achieve agreement, the ‘1992 Consensus,’ met with clearly opposed interpretations: for the PRC, Mainland China, that Consensus denoted agreement on it being the sole legitimate government of China, including Taiwan, whereas for the ROC, Taiwan, the Consensus meant that both sides agreed to disagree over ‘One China.’ So it was thereafter, with the two claimants reiterating their con cting interpretations of the optimal formula for Cross-Strait relations. Thus ROC, Taiwan, President Chen rejected the PRC view of the 1992 ‘Consensus’ as ‘one China with different interpretations’ and opted for ‘one country on either side.’ The PRC persisted in the attempt to secure from Taiwan (the ROC) acceptance of a legal status as an integral part of ‘One China,’ the PRC, while Taiwan persisted in attempting to secure Beijing’s acceptance of Taiwan’s distinctive status as a legal entity, not part of ‘One China,’ as interpreted by the PRC, though not, formally, an independent state. This political-verbal competition served as a near-permanent con ctsustaining act, to which both adversaries contributed equally. Verbal Hostility as noted above, a large part of con ct-sustaining acts that derived from political hostility between the PRC and the ROC took the form of verbal jousting by the two principal adversaries in the Taiwan con ct—over the meaning of ‘One China,’ regime legitimacy in representing ‘China,’ the legal status of Taiwan, and the correct relations between the two claimants to the designation, ‘China.’ As such, political hostility was often expressed as verbally hostile acts, in a prolonged, con ctive verbal contest, a major source of persistence of this con ct. Perhaps the most cogent expression of verbally hostile behavior was the PRC pronouncement of fve conditions in which it would resort to violence in this con ct: Taiwan’s declaration of independence; political chaos within Taiwan; Taiwan’s attempt to acquire nuclear weapons; its long-term (unspecifed) refusal to negotiate the cross-border relationship; and an attempt by a third party [the USA] to resolve this con ct by unilateral acts. This formulation of a threat to use violence in any one of a wide-ranging set of circumstances served as an ultimatum on the limits of acceptable behavior by Taiwan. As such, it was a pervasive con ctsustaining act by the PRC, with a potentially profound infuence on the behavior of the two principal adversaries. 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 311 A less overt manifestation of hostile verbal behavior, framed as aimed at reducing the intensity of interregime con ct but which, objectively, served to sustain the protracted con ct, was the use of propaganda and collective memory in their verbal communication with an ethnic/ national kin group. The PRC, acting through its principal state news agency, Xinhua, frequently distributed leafets in Taiwan emphasizing the shared Han Chinese ethnic identity of the majority population in Taiwan and the mainland, their ancestral and cultural antecedents, their shared interest in restoring China’s once-exalted status among the nations, and its economic prosperity for the beneft of all fi fi fi fi fi constituents of ‘One China.’ Across the Strait, a ‘Taiwan Sentiment’ was gradually extolled by multiple elites on the island, who invoked Taiwan’s long history of foreign rule, including the ‘Middle Kingdom,’ the Netherlands, Japan (from 1895 to 1945), and the oppression of the mainland’s Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek (from 1949 to 1988). They portrayed the PRC as a Communist dictatorship, attempting to impose its will on a weak anti-Communist society, and were determined to remain separate from the mainland’s political system and ideology, and the planned economy controlled by China’s Communist Party until the liberalization of the PRC economy from 1978 onwards. The opposition in Taiwan to formal merger with the Mainland, even the Hong Kong formula of ‘one state, two systems,’ embraced a wide range of ‘separatists’: it included those who publicly favored full independence for Taiwan, and a much larger group who did so, privately, but were reluctant to identify openly with a political party that espoused the goal of an independent Taiwan. There were others who favored closer economic relations with the mainland— in fact, Taiwan’s economic liberalization long preceded that of the PRC, and private investment from Taiwan played a notable role in the early years of Mainland China’s economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, with a continuing role as a source of foreign investment for the PRC. Political decisionmakers and the attentive public in Taiwan are aware of China’s vastly superior military and economic power and the need to adapt to that material reality. However, while PRC propaganda has persisted in its attempt to persuade the Taiwanese to accept its notion of ‘One China,’ it has failed thus far to achieve that goal. Rather, appeals to shared kinship and culture, and the lure of benefts of partnership in a renewed ‘Middle Kingdom’ seem to have aroused skepticism or outright opposition among the majority of Taiwan’s people, more attracted 312 M. BRECHER to the ‘Taiwan Sentiment.’ In sum, the use of propaganda by the PRC has enhanced verbal hostility, thereby contributing to sustaining this protracted con ct, rather than to con ct termination. Violence threats of violence occurred spasmodically during the near-7 decades of this con ct, notably in the fourth Taiwan Crisis, 1995–1996, with a dramatic ‘show of force’ by PRC naval and missile power. However, the actual resort to violence, by both adversaries, was very infrequent—only in the frst three Taiwan crises. Taiwan Strait I (early August 1954–April 23, 1955). The PRC bombarded Nationalist (Taiwan, ROC) held off-shore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, beginning on September 3, 1954. The ROC responded on the 7th with air strikes on the mainland. The exchanges continued until late November. On December 2, the USA and the ROC signed a Mutual Defense Pact. The PRC responded on January 10, 1955 with a heavy bombardment of the Taiwan-held Tachen Islands. Taiwan responded in January, and the exchanges wound down by March. The crisis ended on April 23, when the PRC Premier, Zhou Enlai, offered to negotiate a resolution of this crisis. Taiwan Strait II (July 17–October 23, 1958). The violence began with a PRC bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu on August 23. The violence ended when the USA threatened to intervene militarily if Quemoy were invaded. The crisis continued until the USA intervened diplomatically, frst with a statement by Secretary of State Dulles on September 30 that the USA favored evacuation of the offshore islands by ROC forces if the PRC agreed to a ceasefre, and then with a joint communiqué by Dulles and ROC leader, Chiang Kai-shek on October 23, which served as a tacit understanding by the PRC and ROC that the USA would not support a ROC invasion of the mainland. Taiwan Strait III (April 22–June 27, 1962). Taiwan’s president, Chiang Kai-shek, threatened, on April 22, to invade the mainland, a threat repeated several times in May, along with the addition of manpower to Taiwan’s army. The PRC responded on June 10 with a troop build-up in Fukien province, the closest mainland territory to the ‘off-shore’ islands. The USA made it clear, again, that it would not support a ROC invasion of the mainland, and the crisis ended. 9 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 313 Taiwan Strait IV (May 1995–March 1996). The PRC threatened resort to force and engaged in a provocative large-scale show-of-force, in the summer and autumn of 1995 and again in February–March 1996, with naval and missile power, thereby demonstrating its superior military capability to Taiwan’s political and military leadership and people, along with its determination to integrate Taiwan into ‘One China,’ preferably by negotiation, but by force if necessary. Economic Discrimination This type of con ct-sustaining act was virtually non-existent in the Taiwan protracted con ct. Rather, as noted above, during the frst 3 fi fi fi decades of this con ct the more highly developed Taiwan economy was a major source of investment during the early phase of the People’s Republic of China’s economic modernization program (1980s and 1990s) and continues to play this role, with substantial economic cooperation between the two entities. As such, their economic relationship has contributed to successful con ct management and cooperation, not to con ct persistence.