History Of The Ottoman Empire And Modern Turkey: Reform, Revolution, And Republic (1977) PDF

HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 STANFORD J. SHAW Professor of History University of California, Los Angeles EZEL KURAL SHAW Associate Research Historian G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Stud...

HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 STANFORD J. SHAW Professor of History University of California, Los Angeles EZEL KURAL SHAW Associate Research Historian G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies, University of California, Los Angeles CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS  The Young Turk Period, 1908-1918 327 Collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 1918 Enver's victories in the Caucasus were, however, gained at the expense of the other fronts. Even as his forces were advancing to the Caspian, the British were moving into the heartland of the empire from the south. Mehmet V Re§at died on June 28, 1918, and was replaced quietly by Abdulmecit's eldest son, Mehmet VI Vahideddin, who became even more of a puppet of the CUP than his brother had been. The capital was filled with starving refugees. There were massive food shortages and the inevitable typhus, and a new Allied blockade of the Dardanelles further increased these problems. Almost as if on signal, the Allies began mopping up on all fronts. In Iraq the British occupation of the north continued, now in conjunction with their forces from Iran. Kerkuk fell on May 6 and the remaining Ottoman defenders were routed 40 kilometers to the north at Altin Kopru. A second force went up the Tigris, routed a series of Ottoman ambush efforts, and finally occupied Mosul soon after the armistice. In Syria the Ottoman resistance was stronger, with the army commanded by von Sanders, joined again by Mustafa Kemal, at least hold- ing together as Allenby pushed it farther northward. The fall of Nablus and breaking of the §eria River line (September 20, 1918) broke the organized Otto- man defenses, with Haifa and Acre both succumbing to the invaders on September 23. The Arab nationalists in Damascus openly revolted against its Ottoman gar- rison; thus it was evacuated (October 1), Aleppo and Horns fell without resistance a few days later. The French fleet soon occupied Beirut (October 6), and Tripoli and Alexandretta followed (October 14) as the Ottomans began to retire quickly into Anatolia toward Adana to make a new stand on home territory. The Armistice of Mondros There was, however, to be no further resistance. As Talat returned from Berlin, he saw the beginning of the end of the Bulgarian army, which led to its accep- tance of the Allied surrender terms on October 2. With the direct Ottoman con- nection with Germany thus severed, the fate of the Ottoman empire was sealed. Within the Allied camp the British gained the right to send their forces from Salonica through Thrace to Istanbul, with their Allies gaining only token repre- sentation. This gave Britain control of Istanbul and the Straits on land and sea, enabling them to impose the final armistice terms on the Ottomans without con- sulting the other Allies to assure their control of the Ottoman capital as soon as the armistice was put into effect. Talat initially joined the German efforts to make armistice overtures through President Wilson (October 5), relying on his Fourteen Points to save the empire from the kind of retribution advocated by the other Entente countries. Armistice overtures also went through other channels and were finally referred to the commander of the British Mediterranean squadron that had been blockading the Dardanelles, Admiral Calthorpe, who went to Mondros on October 11 to make final arrangements. Talat and the CUP cabinet already had resigned on October 8, but no one could be found to assume responsibility for a week until Ahmet Izzet Pa§a, former commander in the east, finally accepted the grand vezirate. For the purpose of concluding peace he formed a new cabinet (October 14), which in- cluded several CUP members (in particular Cavit Pa§a as minister of finance), though the triumvirate stood aside and soon afterward fled. The British delayed the final meeting at Mondros for two weeks to enable their forces to occupy Mosul 328 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 and Aleppo and make sure that they, rather than the French, would dominate Istanbul and the Straits. The Ottoman delegation, now headed by the new minister of war, Hiiseyin Rauf Orbay, was finally brought to Mondros only on October 27, and four days later the armistice agreement was concluded. The Armistice of Mondros, signed ten days before the fighting stopped on the western front, provided for a total and unconditional surrender, a considerably harsher arrangement than that imposed on the Christian members of the Central Powers. The Straits were to be opened at once, their forts surrendered to Allied crews, and passage facilitated for Allied warships sailing into the Black Sea for action against the Bolsheviks in southern Russia. All mines were to be removed or their locations communicated to the Allied commanders. Allied prisoners, and all Armenians held in Ottoman prisons, no matter what their crimes, were to be freed immediately. Ottoman forces were to be demobilized and surrendered ex- cept where their presence was temporarily needed to keep order. Ottoman war- ships were to surrender, and all ports were to be opened to Allied ships. The Allies were to be allowed to take over important forts, railroads, telephone and tele- graph facilities, harbors, quays, and the tunnels leading through the Taurus in Cilicia. Ottoman forces still operating in the east were to surrender to the nearest Allied troops. The Ottomans were to supply the occupation forces, without charge, with coal, food, and whatever other supplies they needed. German and Austrian military and civilian officials in the empire were to be turned over to the Allies and communications with the Central Powers cut. The Allies were put in charge of all food supplies for the empire's civilian population. Finally, "in case of dis- order in the six Armenian provinces, the Allies reserve for themselves the right to occupy any part of them," with Sis, Haqin, Zeytin, and Ayintap to come under immediate occupation.172 The armistice terms went into effect on October 31, 1918. Ottoman troops began laying down their arms, and the Allies prepared to occupy Istanbul and the other major cities. The Ottoman Empire thus was placed in the hands of the Entente Allies, led by Britain, who at long last were in position to do with it as they wished. The six eastern provinces already were being called Armenia. The Greeks came to Istanbul in the guise of victors in consequence of Venizelos' last-minute entry on the Allied side, and they were not very far behind in pressing their case. Vengeance was, indeed, for the victors. The Allied Occupation Ottoman compliance with the truce provisions went very quickly. Liman von Sanders turned his Syrian command over to Mustafa Kemal and returned to Istan- bul. After the Yildtnm Army reached Adana and surrendered to the Allies, the latter also went back to the capital (November 13). Allenby's forces immediately spread out to occupy their share, and the French landed to take up the areas allotted to them in Cilicia, including Mersin, Tarsus, Adana, and all the Taurus tunnels.173 The British took those parts of Mosul originally assigned to the French in the Sykes-Picot Agreement and surrendered later in return for oil conces- sions.174 In the east it soon became apparent that the Allies were preparing to give the Armenians not only the six provinces specified at Mondros but also the three districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, which had even smaller Armenian popu- lations and had been returned to the empire by Russia only recently.175 The British intentions seemed all too clear when, during February, Armenian officials assumed most civilian positions in the occupied eastern provinces.  The Young Turk Period, 1908-1918 329 In north-central Anatolia, efforts unfolded to establish a Greek state in the an- cient Pontus region, encompassing the districts of Samsun, Amasya, and Sivas. A secret Greek society looking for such a state had been established in Merzifon in 1904, and it had developed into a widespread movement, giving the Greek govern- ment a golden opportunity to press its claims. On March 9, 1919, British forces landed at Samsun and went on to occupy Merzifon, leading Greek bands to revolt openly and to slaughter their Muslim neighbors in the hope of founding the new state. Order was partly restored, but with great difficulty, by the Ottoman police helped with some reluctance by the British.176 In the southwest the Allied occupation was a joint affair because of the con- flicting claims for territory by the Italians by virtue of the wartime agreements, and the Greeks, who now sought to change the settlement to fulfill their old dream of restoring the Byzantine Empire. The Allied fleet that occupied Izmir (Novem- ber 7) was commanded by a British officer, but it included ships and men sent by France as well as the disputing parties. The command of individual districts as well as the blockade still enforced against Anatolia was alternated among the dif- ferent nationalities. Elsewhere in the southwest the Italians occupied Marmaris, Antalya, and Burdur to take the positions promised them in the treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne (January-April 1919) and tried also to establish a claim on Konya, though this was prevented by a British detachment that had earlier occupied the town.177 Finally, the greatest prize of all was Istanbul and the Straits, which after the withdrawal of the Russian claims had been without formal claimants until the British assured their own control preceding and following the armistice agree- ment. On November 13 a large Allied fleet sailed through the Straits and landed at Istanbul. The city was formally placed under Allied occupation, with military con- trol mainly in the hands of British troops. Overall political and administrative control was given to Admiral Calthorpe as Allied high commissioner, governing with the help of a three-man High Commission, with British, Italian, and French members. The shores of the Bosporus were originally occupied solely by the British, but on November 15 the European side was turned over to French forces.178 Allied authority in the Ottoman government was assured by appointing commissioners to supervise the ministries to make sure that the civilian authorities would do whatever the high commissioner wanted.179 The Allied forces entered the Ottoman Empire with an unshakeable belief in the truth of their own propaganda, that the Turks had slaughtered millions of Christians for no reason whatsoever, forfeiting their right to rule even themselves and demonstrating once again the essential superiority of Western civilization over that of Islam. Admiral Calthorpe himself stated that "it has been our con- sistent attitude to show no kind of favour whatsoever to any Turk..." and "All interchange of hospitality and comity has been rigorously forbidden...."180 That the minorities intended to use the Allied occupation for their own benefit was demonstrated time and again as the occupying troops marched into the major cities and were welcomed by throngs of Greeks and Armenians waving Allied flags and kissing and hugging their deliverers. The feeling was reciprocated by the Allies in hundreds of incidents. Turks and other Muslims were replaced by Christians in most of the local governments as well as in the railroads and other public utilities. Muslims were discriminated against in public places. When the state schools were reopened, only Christians were allowed to attend, while Muslim children had to re- main in the streets. Perhaps most cruel of all, Christian missionaries were put in charge of the major orphanages and they often used their positions to identify as 330 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 Christian thousands of Turkish youths who had lost their families during the war, applying the general rule that the children were Armenian or Greek unless they could prove the contrary, a difficult task indeed in a land where records had been destroyed and entire families scattered.181 In many of the occupation areas, espe- cially in eastern Thrace, southwestern Anatolia, Cilicia, and the eastern provinces, the entire machinery of local governments, and in particular the local police forces, were turned over to the minorities in preparation for the final partition of the country. The latter in turn massacred large numbers of recently discharged Otto- man soldiers as well as thousands of civilians without any visible effort by the Allied forces to interfere. Only the Italians in the south made some efforts to con- trol the minorities and protect the Muslim population.182 The Peace Conferences As the Paris Peace Conference began to meet in January 1919, various plans were put forward to partition what was left of the Ottoman Empire, with only conflicts of interest among the victors rather than consideration of the national rights of the defeated delaying a settlement. The main differences between the British and French delegates came not so much over the Turkish area but, rather, over the Arab lands, with the former, now urged on by T. E. Lawrence, desiring to satisfy the Arab national claims mostly at the expense of the Syrian areas originally as- signed to France, and the latter insisting on its share so as to retain its traditional position in the Levant. Emir Fay sal came to the peace conference as the principal Arab representative, insisting on full recognition of Arab national rights and ful- fillment of the wartime promises to the Arabs. When he visited England and France before coming to the conference, he learned of French resistance and, to get British support, signed an agreement with the Zionists (January 3, 1919) by which he welcomed Jewish immigration to Palestine and the establishment of the Jewish national home envisioned in the Balfour Declaration, but only in an Arab state made fully independent. Zionist representatives came to Paris to gain international recognition of the Balfour Declaration by including it in the peace treaties and also to prevent the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine, preferring instead British control, under which they felt they could develop the kind of home they had envisaged. Greece had entered the war only at the last minute, and in return for Allied promises, which had been limited due to Italian interests in southeastern Anatolia and those of Britain in Istanbul. Now, however, the brilliant Greek Prime Min- ister Venizelos came to Paris with a claim to occupy Izmir and much of south- eastern Anatolia because of a long historical link between the eastern and western shores of the Aegean and the possibility of their joint economic development as well. Britain supported the Greek claim because of the strong anti-Muslim senti- ment at home, fully shared by Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and also a de- sire to have a friendly state in control of the Aegean to counter any possible future Russian move. The Armenians demanded full independence for their own state, which would stretch from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean as a reward for their "long centuries of suffering" as well as their contributions to the Allies, mainly in the service of the Russians.183 Despite the exaggerations of these claims, the Armenians were able to gain British support, again in the hope of maintaining a friendly vassal state in eastern Anatolia to fulfill its longstanding hope of estab- lishing a permanent rampart against Russian expansion to the Mediterranean from  The Young Turk Period, 1908-1918 331 that direction. Early support received from France in this matter, however, soon turned to hostility when the claims were extended to include the French-occupied areas of Cilicia. The Arab delegations also had the same lands in mind for their independent state. The Kurds, Georgians, and Azerbaijanis disputed other parts of the Armenian claims along with the Turks, who had substantial majorities of the population in the entire area. Iran demanded the Caucasus regions lost to Russia during the nineteenth century, including Armenia and much of the Kurdish area in the southeast. The Republic of Azerbaijan sought the southern districts of Tiflis and Erivan as well as Baku and even Batum and Kars.184 While the debates went on, the Armenian delegations strove to get Allied support for a plan to forbid the return of any Turks or Kurds to eastern Anatolia and to replace them with Armenian refugees so as to create an Armenian majority. While continuing to express sympathy publicly, Britain and its Allies in fact largely dropped their in- terest in satisfying these extensive ambitions. At this point the position of the United States became crucial. It had not been involved in the wartime treaties and was not bound by them, as President Wilson made very clear in his Fourteen Points. His insistence on self-determination con- flicted with all the claims being made at the peace conference, with the exception only of those of the Arabs and the Turks. The Armenians in the United States therefore mounted a large-scale campaign to force the President to abandon his principles and support their cause at the conference. Lloyd George began to de- velop the idea of replacing whatever obligation Britain had to help the Armenians by getting the United States to assume a mandate over the disputed provinces or all of Anatolia, officially proposing it in mid-May just as the Council of Ten de- cided on a mandate system for the Arab provinces of the empire. In response, Wil- son sent two investigative commissions to the Middle East, one to Syria under the leadership of Henry C. King, president of Oberlin College, and Charles Crane, founder of a leading plumbing and toilet manufacturing company, and the other to Anatolia under Major General James G. Harbord. The King-Crane Commission toured Syria and Palestine in July and August 1919, concluding that almost all the Arab inhabitants wanted an independent and united Arab state, including the Lebanon, but that if full independence could not be achieved, they preferred a man- date controlled by the United States or Great Britain, with very strong opposition to France except from a few pro-French groups in the Lebanon. All expressed strong opposition to the establishment of a Jewish home of any kind in their midst. The delegations from Iraq demanded only independence, expressing no mandatory preference. The commission therefore recommended an American mandate over Syria, or otherwise that of Britain, which also would establish mandatory rule over Iraq while both would be constitutional Arab kingdoms. It opposed estab- lishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, recommending instead that it become part of a united Syrian state, with the Holy Places being internationalized. The Har- bord Commission toured Anatolia in the same summer. Its report, issued in Octo- ber 1919, found that most of the existing population was, indeed, Turkish and recommended that in view of the minority claims a single mandate be established over the entire area, including the Caucasus, to provide political and economic unity and facilitate whatever settlement might be agreed on. Wilson, however, was in no position to get the United States into the League of Nations, let alone to assume such a burden, and thus this plan was dropped.185 Most of the final treaties dealing with former Ottoman territory were signed in 1919 and early in 1920. The Treaty of Saint-Germain (July 16, 1920) provided 332 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 for a breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the surrender of its remaining Slavic areas to the new Confederation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, soon to grow into the kingdom of Yugoslavia. Bulgaria was broken up by the Treaty of Neuilly (November 27). Its western districts went to Yugoslavia while those in the Rhodope Mountains and its stretch of Aegean coastline were transferred to Greece. Bulgaria was partly compensated with Ottoman territory north of Edirne, and it was allowed to maintain a merchant fleet in the Black Sea with free access to the Mediterranean through the Straits. By the Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920) Hungary had to cede Transylvania and most of the Banat to Rumania. The Arab portions of the Ottoman Empire were dealt with by a conference held at San Remo, where agreements were reached on assignment of the mandates, with only partial consideration of local Arab desires. Syria went as promised to France, while Britain got its territories in Palestine and Iraq. The mandates were to be only temporary and were to provide the natives with training that would enable them ultimately to achieve full independence. The Balfour Declaration was in- corporated into Britain's mandate for Palestine, thus satisfying the Zionist aspira- tions. France's share in the Mosul oil operations was confirmed, and it was given the right to construct a pipeline across Iraq and Syria to Alexandretta so that it could ship its oil to Europe. Thus was laid the basis for the violence and dis- turbances that plagued the Arab world until it achieved full independence after World War II. The final treaty with the Ottoman Empire was, however, delayed due to the disputes among the Allies and the seemingly irreconcilable differences among the minority groups. It finally was to be signed only in August 1920 at Sevres, but in the meantime events in Anatolia deprived it of any practical value. The Turkish Reaction The events of the Allied occupation and of the settlement developed in Paris evoked a wide range of reactions within Ottoman government and society. Many Otto- mans felt that the only solution was to cooperate with the Allies, especially the British, as the only hope for some kind of compromise to save something for the Turks. This group included Sultan Vahideddin and the Istanbul government, which was led principally by Grand Vezir Tevfik Pa§a (November 11, 1918— March 3-, 1919, October 21, 1920-November 4, 1922), the sultan's son-in-law Damat Ferit Pa§a (March 4, 1919-October 1, 1919, April 5-October 17, 1920), AH Riza Pa§a (October 2, 1919-March 3, 1920), and Salih Hulusi Pa§a (March 8-April 2, 1920), who cooperated fully with the occupation authorities, imprisoning all those cited for crimes, justly or unjustly, by the high commissioners and their subor- dinates. Talat, Cemal, and Enver fled on a German freighter (November 2), the CUP was disbanded, and its property confiscated. In its place the Liberal Union Party (Hurriyet ve Itildf Firkast) was revived under Damat Ferit's leadership, and its politicians were happy to gain revenge against the CUP at long last. De- claring that it had been the CUP that had been defeated, not the Turkish nation, it concluded that it was the only party with a wide enough base to rebuild the nation and to govern. But soon its prewar divisions between conservatives and moderates surfaced once again. When the former managed to gain control, the latter, including most of the nationalists, began to look toward the new national movement which, as we shall see, was just beginning to build in Anatolia.186 In the meantime, the surviving members of the CUP joined several new political groups. Its parliamentary members formed the Regeneration Party (Teceddiit  The Young Turk Period, 1908-1918 333 Firkasi), which espoused a secularist and national policy. This group included several men who later were to rise as leading nationalist figures, the journalist Yunus Nadi, Tevfik Ru§tii Aras, later foreign minister, and the historian §emsettin Giinaltay, prime minister in 1949-1950. Though it disavowed any direct connec- tion with the CUP, it attempted to take over many of the latter's local branches as it expanded into Anatolia, in the process putting its leaders in a position to pursue the nationalist cause as soon as their movement in Istanbul was suppressed.187 Another CUP offshoot was the Ottoman Freedom-Loving People's Party (Osmanh Hilrriyetperver Avam Firkasi), which developed its own liberal social and eco- nomic policies while emphasizing both popular sovereignty and continuation of the sultanate, more or less the kind of constitutional sultanate that had been attempted before the war. It tried to unite all the Ottoman political groups in the face of the foreign occupation, but the demand of many that all active CUP members be purged from its ranks and lack of cooperation among the different elements led to its collapse.188 Another attempt to secure political unification came from the National Congress (Milli Kongre), organized by a group led by Abdurrahman §eref Bey, last court historian, and Dr. Esat, an Istanbul optometrist who had been chairman of the National Education Society {Milli Talim ve Terbiye Cemiyeti), which had tried to spread the ideals of Turkish nationalism to the masses during the later Young Turk period. Not a party as such, the National Congress held a series of meetings of delegates from all the major political groups in the capital, trying to reconcile their views, act as a spokesman for the defeated Turks, and mobilize popular op- position to the impending peace settlement. Though the movement failed, it did perform an important function by focusing Turkish public opinion on the immedi- ate problem of enemy occupation and built support for the nationalist movement that eventually rose in Anatolia.189 In the face of the CUP revival and the proliferation of political groups opposing the peace settlement and Allied occupation, the sultan finally dissolved the Parlia- ment (December 21, 1918) to deprive them of a forum and enable the government to rule by decree without the need of popular consultation.190 It should be recalled that while the CUP had become enmeshed in the military and nationalist aspirations of Enver and his associates, it had risen as a liberal party and had pushed through a number of basic economic and social reforms during the war. These now were systematically disbanded, as the government's al- liance with the occupiers became a cover for reaction. Taxes bearing most heavily on the poor were doubled, trebled, and then doubled again to provide the govern- ment with needed funds while the rich remained largely untouched. Strict cen- sorship was imposed to curb reactions to government policies as well as those of the occupiers.191 The army and navy patriotic organizations were dissolved and their assets transferred to the Ministry of War.192 The new Family Law was abolished,193 and the ulema restored to power. Control of the religious schools and courts was transferred back to the seyhulislatn.19* The Istanbul University was reorganized to curb student "troublemakers."195 The religious courts were given their original functions and procedures and the secular courts curbed.196 The Societies Law was strengthened to control all those who opposed the regime.197 The Financial Reform Commission was abolished,198 and the Allied desire to punish Young Turks for the so-called crimes of the former regime was satisfied with the arrest not only of people like former Grand Vezir Sait Halim but also the cream of Ottoman intellectual life, men such as Ziya Gokalp, Fuat Kopriilu, 334 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 and Hiiseyin Cahit, who were declared to be implicated in the "massacres" and sent off to detention in Malta early in 1920. The government was supported by a number of political groups united mainly by their opposition to the CUP and desire to do the best they could under the oc- cupation, of which the most important were the Ottoman Peace and Welfare Party (Sulh ve Seldmet-i Osmaniye Firkasi), established in 1919 by the former Amasya deputy Ibrahim Hakki Pa§a and many ulema, and the Friends of England Associa- tion (Ingiliz Muhibler Cemiyeti).199 There were others who felt that cooperation with the Allies was a necessary evil only and that the Ottomans had to rely on en- forcement of the Wilsonian principles to survive. Loyal to the old CUP social and economic programs, they formed several groups, including the General Welfare Committee (Selamet-i Amme Heyeti), the Wilsonian Principles Society, which in- cluded a number of liberal Ottoman writers among whom was Halide Edip, who through some previous work at Robert College was closer to the British than most of her colleagues and who therefore escaped deportation; also Refik Halit (Koray), Celal Nuri, Hiiseyin Avni, Yunus Nadi, and Ahmet Emin Yalman; and the Na- tional Unity Party (Vahdet-i Milliye Heyeti), founded and led by the old Young Turk leader Ahmet Riza. Members of these groups approached the Allied officers, explained the Turkish case, and generally tried to secure the same rights of self- determination that were being granted to the non-Turkish peoples of the former em- pire. But faced with the hostility of the government to their liberal political ideas and of the occupiers to their Muslim heritage, they soon had to join the more radical groups demanding action to save the Turks from their oppressors.200 Notes to Chapter 4 1 Edib, Memoirs, p. 258. 2 Edib, Memoirs, p. 260. 3 Diistur*, I, 9-14. 4 Ahmad, pp. 19-20; §eyhulislam Cemaleddin Efendi, Hahrat-t Siyasiye, Istanbul, 1336/1917-1918, pp. 10-12. 5 Sabah, August 16, 1908; Ahmad, pp. 21-23; Kamil Pa§a, pp. 241-253. 6 Dustier*, I, 1-105. 7 Tunaya, pp. 171-181, 206-210, 239-254. 8 E. F. Knight, The Awakening of Turkey, London, 1909, pp. 228-293. 9 Dani§mend, IV, 368-369; Ahmad, pp. 24-28; Tunaya, p. 165 n. 4; Bayur, Kamil Pasa, p. 296. 10 TV, December 18, 1908; tr. Ahmad, p. 29. 11 Dustur*, I, 105-108. 12 Bayar, I, 167-171; Farhi, pp. 275-316; Celal Nuri, Ittihad-i Islam, Istanbul, 1918. 13 Tunaya, pp. 254-261. 14 Bayar, II, 344, 388, 391, 399, 402, 407, 631, 632. 15 Tunaya, pp. 261-275; Bayar, I, 167-171. 16 Tunaya, pp. 271-72; Farhi, p. 283. 17 Bayar, I, 291-293, 297-298. 18 Farhi, pp. 286-288. 19 Bayar, I, 141-166, 184-214. 20 Bayar, I, 267-288, 297-299. 21 TV, April 28, 1909; Dustur*, I, 166-167. 22 The events of the counterrevolution are found in Sina Aksjn, 31 Mart Olayx, Is- tanbul, 1972; Ahmet Refik, Inkilab-t Azim, Istanbul, 1324/1908-1909; AH Cevat-Faik Resjt Unat, I kind Mesrutiyetin Ham ve Otuzbir Mart Hddisesi, Ankara, 1960; Tank 5 The Turkish War for Independence, 1918-1923 The Turks were the only one of the Central Powers able to overturn immediately the vindictive settlements imposed by the Allies following World War I. Because Turkish resistance ultimately was led to success by Mustafa Kemal, it long has been assumed that he created it as well. He did, indeed, do more than anyone else to create the Turkish Republic on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, but he accomplished this by bringing together elements of resistance that had already emerged. He coordinated their efforts, expressed their goals, personified their am- bitions, and led them to victory. The National Resistance Forces Resistance appeared from the first days of the occupation while Mustafa Kemal still was in Cilicia. It came initially from within the Istanbul government itself, where many of the officials organized the secret Outpost Society (Karakol Cemiyeti) shortly after the armistice and used their positions to thwart the Allied demands as well as to send arms and ammunition to Anatolia. Small boats were loaded in the capital in the cover of darkness and sent out into the Aegean and the Black Sea to deliver their valuable cargoes.1 There is considerable evidence that Talat Pa§a himself stimulated the first resistance movements in Thrace before flee- ing the country and that resistance in Istanbul was organized within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.2 When Mustafa Kemal, Kazim Karabekir, and other leading officers returned to Istanbul to protest the demobilization orders, they were warmly received by the sultan and others and appointed to important positions in the areas remaining under direct Ottoman authority, where they could lead opposition al- most under the noses of the Allies. As the movement spread through the country- side, many Istanbul officials also did all they could to conceal it from the occupying authorities until it was too late.3 Sympathetic members of the central government could have done nothing, how- ever, without the active participation of the mass of the Turkish people. The old Middle Eastern tradition of self-help, of society organizing to govern and defend itself in the absence of effective government, again came to the fore. Organized resistance came first in the areas most seriously threatened by foreign or minority occupation, where Societies for the Defense of the Rights of Turks sprang up to defend local interests. At first they attempted to persuade the occupying authorities that their areas were in fact Turkish and that the imposition of foreign rule would violate their human rights. When such claims were ignored, they assumed local authority and organized their own resistance forces, which have come to be 340  The Turkish War for Independence, 1918-1923 341 known in Turkish history as the National Forces (Kuvayi Milliye). Ranging from roving guerrilla bands to regular volunteer militias attached to local political committees, the National Forces were highly heterogeneous, including not only soldiers but also civil servants, landowners, businessmen, artisans, religious lead- ers, peasants, nomads, bandits, members of the CUP as well as the other old po- litical parties, women, and children-all united in reaction to the occupation and determined to be free.4 Strongly supporting the resistance movement in these early days was the Turkish Communist Party, organized first among Ottoman prisoners in Russian hands, some of whom came to the All-Russian Congress of International Prisoners of War held by the Bolsheviks in Moscow in April 1919, and later formed their own Congress of Turkish Radical Socialists in the same city on July 25 despite the protests of the Ottoman ambassador there at the time. Leader of the Turkish Com- munists was Mustafa Suphi, a Turkish intellectual who had fled to czarist Russia from the Young Turk police shortly before the war.5 Their activity in Turkey after the war was predicated principally in reaction to the Allied use of Istanbul and the Straits to send ships, men, and arms into southern Russia to support those opposing the Bolsheviks, though this was supplemented, of course, by a desire to use the chaos in Turkey to establish a Communist regime there. Late in 1919 the Bolsheviks established the Central Bureau of the Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East under the authority of the Communist International, with Mustafa Suphi publishing propaganda material in Turkish in a daily newspaper called Yeni Dunya (New World), printed for a time in the Crimea after it was evacuated by the French and then in Baku after May 1920. The Russians later claimed that thousands of Ottoman Communists joined the national struggle, but this does not seem to accord with the evidence, which indicates that, at best, there was in Anatolia a "small group of underground workers, former Turkish prisoners in Russia, which was not particularly large, but which worked very intensively."6 By the end of 1920, Suphi's Communist Party had only 200 members in Turkey, mainly in Istanbul, the coal-mining port of Zonguldak (on the Black Sea), Trabzon, and the Caucasus. The Bolsheviks, however, gave general propaganda support to the Turkish resistance movement in the hope that it would relieve them of at least some of the Allied pressure in the south. Beginnings of the War for Independence The resistance movement began to develop into a full War for Independence when one of Mustafa Kemal's closest associates in the army, AH Fuat Cebesoy, was sent to command the Twentieth Army corps in Ankara in March 1919 and began to send out agents to coordinate the national defense forces in the vicinity. On April 13 Kazim Karabekir, hero of the previous conquests in the Caucasus, left Istanbul by boat to assume command of the Fifteenth Army corps at Erzurum, in charge also of the provinces of Van and Trabzon, with the full intention of inspiring re- sistance among the soldiers and populace of the area under his command.7 Soon after his arrival he announced that he would work to free Anatolia from enemy rule and also regain Kars, Ardahan, Batum, and the Turkish portions of the Caucasus.8 He took over a force that still had some 18,000 men, his first job being to secure the war materiel that the British were preparing to ship back to Istan- bul.9 When he heard that the British had turned Kars over to the new Armenian Republic and that it was preparing a new force to invade Anatolia, he joined 342 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 the Society for the Defense of the Rights of the Eastern Provinces and vowed a struggle to the end to keep Anatolia Turkish.10 The next move came on May 5, 1919, when Mustafa Kemal, the greatest Otto- man military hero to emerge from the war, was appointed inspector general of the Ninth Army, encompassing much of eastern and north-central Anatolia from its center at Samsun, on the Black Sea.11 His instructions were to restore order and security, gather the arms and ammunition laid down by the Ottoman forces, and prevent organized resistance against the government, exactly what the Allies had been pressing the Istanbul government to do. To undertake this, however, he was given command not only over the army but also over all the civil servants in the area.12 With such extensive authority it appears fairly clear that he was intended to do much more than just gather arms. It has been suggested that the appoint- ment simply was an accident; that the Allies and the government were anxious to get him out of Istanbul because of his vociferous opposition to the armistice and that this assignment was chosen because it was vacant at the time. Others suggest that his opponents arranged the assignment on the assumption that he would fail and his reputation would be ruined. In fact, however, it seems clear that he was sent because his superiors in the Ministry of War, and possibly the grand vezir and sultan, fully expected him to organize resistance.13 Whatever the reason, he was urged to leave Istanbul at once before the Allies knew either of his appoint- ment or his instructions, and he did so. The Greek Invasion Mustafa Kemal's assignment to Anatolia was followed almost immediately by the event that, more than any other, stimulated the Turkish War for Independence: the Greek invasion of Anatolia. With the United States and Italy opposing the British and French efforts at the peace conference to secure territory for Greece around Izmir, Venizelos sent an expeditionary force to take what he wanted, ob- taining advance approval from Lloyd George and Clemenceau and also, at the last minute, from Wilson, who hoped that Italy's imperial ambitions would thus be frustrated and that "self-determination" would result. Legal justification for the landings was found in article 7 of the Mondros Armistice, which allowed the Allies "to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies." The National Resistance provided the pretext, and Venizelos needed little persuasion to use it. On May 14, 1919, an armada of British, American, and French warships brought an entire Greek division into the harbor of Izmir. The next day they landed amid a wild reception from the local Greek population, with church bells ringing, priests kissing the soldiers, and men and women falling to their knees before their "liberators." The landing was fol- lowed by a general slaughter of the Turkish population. Greek mobs roamed the streets, looting and killing, with those Turks who escaped being arrested by the Allied authorities. In Paris the powers went on to agree on a Greek mandate for Izmir and its vicinity, and the Italian zone was pushed to the south. The Istanbul government protested, but to no avail. The Greek army began moving into Ana- tolia, ravaging and raping as it went, with the local Greek population taking the opportunity to join in the massacre. By the end of July the Greeks had overcome the local Turkish defense forces and gained control of the greater and lesser Men- deres valleys, a far more extensive advance than the Allies originally had intended. At this point the offensive was halted, partly at the insistence of the Allies but  The Turkish War for Independence, 1918-1923 343 also because of the need to consolidate the unexpected conquests before a new offensive was launched.14 First Phase of the War for Independence, May 1919-March 1920 The War for Turkish Independence went through several distinct phases. The first began with Kemal's arrival at Samsun on May 19, 1919, and went on for about a year. During this period, his primary concern was to use his position as inspector general as well as his own prestige to secure general acceptance of his leadership. Soon after his arrival he was told stories of terrible Greek atrocities, not only in the southwest but also around Trabzon, where advocates of a Pontus Greek state had anticipated the arrival of the Greek army by instituting massacres of their own to remove the Turkish population.15 Kemal, however, still was only an inspector. The national groups in the area had their own commanders, and they certainly did not recognize his authority. If anyone, it was to Kazim Karabekir in Erzurum or to Ali Fuat Cebesoy in Ankara that they looked for leadership. But with the self- assurance that had made him such a great commander at Gallipoli and in Syria and such a difficult subordinate for both the Young Turks and the Germans, he soon began to act as if he was, indeed, the leader who would bring the Turks out of their darkest hour. By the end of May he was already writing to the local re- sistance forces and governors to suggest ways they might resist the Greeks,16 and criticizing the grand vezir for not doing more toward this end.17 He warned the British officers in Samsun that the Turks would never tolerate foreign occupation and sent a confidential letter to the corps commanders under his own authority emphasizing the need to raise a popular guerrilla force until a regular army could be uiganized for defense. Soon he left Samsun, where he had been under close British supervision, and moved into the interior where he was less likely to be ar- rested. Though it does not seem that Kemal concerted directly with Karabekir while they were in Istanbul, he now got the latter's agreement on joint action as well as the good news that he had not yet surrendered his own forces' weapons to the British.18 Thus encouraged, Kemal traveled through the east spreading his message among commanders, governors, mayors, and local resistance forces, with the Greek advance to the Menderes strengthening both his resolve and the re- sponse.19 When the British finally learned what he was doing, they got the Istanbul government to dismiss him and order all officials in Anatolia to refrain from ac- cepting his direction (June 23) ; but to save the grand vezir further embarrass- ment Mustafa Kemal simply resigned his commission, thus making him officially a full-fledged rebel though in fact close cooperation with some Istanbul officials continued. The Amasya Protocol Mustafa Kemal had already been building a new base of support to replace the authority derived from his official position. On June 19, 1919, he met in Amasya with some of the men who were to join him in leading the national movement: Rauf Orbay, former minister of the navy and Ottoman delegate to Mondros; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, commander at Ankara; and Refet Bele, who commanded several corps near Samsun. On June 21 the three signed the Amasya Protocol, soon afterward accepted also by Kazim Karabekir, which became more or less the first 344 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 call for a national movement against the occupation. The message was a simple one: 1. The unity of the Fatherland and national independence are in danger. 2. The Istanbul government is unable to carry out its responsibilities. 3. It is only through the nation's effort and determination that national in- dependence will be won. 4. It is necessary to establish a national committee, free from all external influences and control, that will review the national situation and make known to the world the people's desire for justice. 5. It has been decided to hold immediately a National Congress in Sivas, the most secure place in Anatolia. 6. Three representatives from each province should be sent immediately to the Sivas Congress. 7. To be prepared for every eventuality, this subject should be kept a na- tional secret.20 Kemal also wrote a number of leading figures in Istanbul inviting them to join the national struggle, adding that "From now on Istanbul no longer rules Anatolia but will have to follow it," thus providing the rallying cry for the events that were to follow.21 While Kemal thus moved to secure national support, he also acted to get what help he could from outside. Just before the Amasya meeting, while in Havza, he met a Bolshevik delegation headed by Colonel Semen Budenny, who offered arms and ammunition in the hope of stemming Armenian expansionism in the Caucasus as well as to close Allied access to southern Russia through the Black Sea. Budenny also urged Kemal to accept Communist ideology for the new Turkey, but the latter said that such questions had to be postponed until Turkish independence was achieved. Thus were laid the bases for the assistance that was to be of utmost im- portance once the national movement was organized. The Erzurum Congress, July 23-August 7, 1919 Even before the Sivas Congress was called, the Society for the Defense of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia had arranged a regional meeting to be held in July in Erzurum in response to the threat of further Armenian aggression in the east. Kemal attended it as well, using it to secure support from Kazim Karabekir and other local nationalist leaders. The Istanbul government ordered Kazim to arrest Kemal. But Kazim refused, thus declaring his own revolt as well as his acceptance of Kemal's leadership.22 The declaration drawn up at the Erzurum Congress, though the protection of the eastern provinces was its original concern, in fact became the basis for the national pact that followed. Its ten-point resolution set forth the principles for which the war for independence was to be fought and won: 1. The province of Trabzon, the district of Samsun, and the provinces of Erzurum, Sivas, Diyarbekir, Elazig, Van, and Bitlis, sometimes called the "six provinces/' are an integral whole which cannot be separated from each other or from Ottoman territory for any reason. 2. To preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and our national inde- pendence and to protect the sultanate and the caliphate, it is essential that the national forces be put in charge and the national will be recognized as sov- ereign. 3. As all occupation and interference will be considered undertaken in be-  The Turkish War for Independence, 1918-1923 345 half of establishing Greek and Armenian states, the principle of united defense and resistance is resolved. The bestowing of new privileges to Christians in a manner to alter political control and social balance will not be allowed. 4. In case the central government, under foreign pressure, is forced to abandon any part of the territory, we are taking measures and making deci- sions to defend our national rights as well as the sultanate and the caliphate. 5. We reaffirm the legal rights, as indicated in the laws of the Ottoman state, of non-Muslims with whom we share our Fatherland. The protection of their property, life, and honor being among the basic tenets of our religious practices, national traditions, and legal principles, this policy is confirmed by the consensus of our Congress. 6. We are calling for a decision based on right and justice, one that respects our historic, cultural, and religious rights, and that rejects totally the theory of dividing lands and separating peoples who are within the boundaries estab- lished by the armistice signed by the Allies on October 30, 1918 and in eastern Anatolia, as well as in other regions, inhabited by a majority of Muslims and dominated by Muslims culturally and economically. 7. Our people honor and respect humanitarian and progressive developments and are appreciative of our own scientific, industrial, and economic conditions and needs. Therefore, on condition that the internal and external independence of our people and our state, and the territorial integrity of our country shall be conserved intact, we will accept with pleasure the scientific, industrial, and economic assistance of every state which will not nurture imperialistic ten- dencies towards our country and which will respect the principles of national- ity as indicated under Article 6. We await, for the sake of preserving humanity and peace, the urgent signature of a peace based on these equitable and hu- manitarian conditions, which we consider to be our great national objective. 8. In this historical age when nations determine their own destinies, it is es- sential that our central government submit itself to the national will. As made clear by past events and their results, government decisions not based on the national will have no validity for the people and are not respected by foreign nations. In consequence, before the nation is forced into taking matters into its own hands to look for a remedy to its anguish, our central government should proceed without delay to convoke the national assembly and submit to it all the decisions to be taken relating to the fate of the nation and the country. 9. "The Society to Defend the Rights of Eastern Anatolia" ($arki Anadolu Miidafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti) is the union of societies born out of the sufferings and calamities experienced by our land. This assembly is totally free of party interests. All Muslim compatriots are the natural members of this assembly. 10. A Representative Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye) chosen by the Con- gress will work in its name to establish national unity on all levels from the village to the province.23 Thus Kemal and his colleagues at this point still were declaring that they were working to preserve the Ottoman nation; that all subjects, Muslim and non- Muslim, would have equal rights; that since the government in Istanbul was con- trolled by the occupiers, the national movement in Anatolia was assuming the burden of protecting the nation's rights; but that all of this still was done in sup- port of the sultan-caliph, to rescue him and to protect in particular the eastern provinces. 346 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 Soon afterward a local congress was held at Ala§ehir (August 16-25, 1919) so that the local defense organizations also could declare their support for the na- tional movement: "The aim of the congress composed of brothers uniting against the danger to the nation is to unify the national movement and completely drive away the enemy."24 This set the pattern for other local congresses that followed and manifested general support for the movement, which now was clearly led by Mustafa Kemal. The Sivas Congress, September 4-11, 1919 Just as the Harbord Commission arrived in Istanbul (see pp. 331-332), Mustafa Kemal opened the National Congress at Sivas. Delegates came not only from the east but from all over the nation, including far-off Thrace. The resolutions adopted at Erzurum now were transformed into a national appeal, and the name of the organization changed to the Society to Defend the Rights and Interests of the Provinces of Anatolia and Rumeli. The resolutions adopted in Erzurum were re- affirmed with minor additions, such as a clause added to article 3 stating that the formation of an independent Greece on the Aydin, Manisa, and Bahkesir fronts was unacceptable. In content and spirit the Sivas Congress basically reinforced the stance taken at the Erzurum Congress.25 After the Sivas Congress the nationalists entered a strange in-between period, not yet severing ties with Istanbul but pulling their political and military forces together into a movement that inevitably presaged such a split. On September 22- 23 an American investigating committee led by General Harbord came to Sivas and met with Kemal, receiving full assurance that Anatolia was, indeed, Turkish and that no mandate would be allowed or accepted. Additional Defense of the Rights of Turks committees were set up to center the movement's activities, par- ticularly in Konya, Bursa, and other places in the west. In the face of the increas- ing national resistance, Damat Ferit resigned as grand vezir and was replaced by AH Riza Pa§a (October 2, 1919), but the latter seems to have cooperated with Kemal and his associates even more than the previous leaders. In October 1919 he sent his minister of the navy, Salih Pa§a, to negotiate with Kemal to secure some kind of agreement on national objectives, with the Istanbul government promising cooperation with the nationalists in return. Negotiations took place in Amasya on October 20-22, 1919, resulting in the Second Amasya Protocol. The government was asked to accept essentially all the resolutions of the Erzurum and Sivas con- gresses and to recognize the legality of the Society for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli, promising also that the forthcoming session of the Chamber of Deputies would not be held in Istanbul so that it would be free of foreign domination. Provinces inhabited by Turks would not be ceded to enemies. No mandate would be accepted, and the integrity and independence of the Turkish fatherland would be safeguarded. Non-Muslims would be given no privileges that might undermine the national sovereignty and social balance. Only delegates ap- proved of by the Nationalist Representative Committee would be sent to any peace conference with the Entente powers.26 But Salih Pa§a ultimately was unable to get the cabinet in Istanbul to ratify the agreement. Ali Riza later announced that elections would, indeed, be held for a new Chamber of Deputies, but that it would meet in Istanbul the following January, a clear violation of the Amasya Protocol. Elections followed. But since most of Anatolia and Thrace were in fact under the control of the nationalists, it was inevitable that their members would be and  The Turkish War for Independence, 1918-1923 347 were elected, with Mustafa Kemal himself being chosen deputy from Erzurum. The Istanbul government thus, in a certain sense, was absorbing the national movement into the Parliament right under the noses of the Allies. It even went so far as to declare that Kemal had not really been dismissed from the army but only had resigned, restoring all his decorations as well as his rank (Decem- ber 29). As the elections went forward, the nationalists were immensely encouraged by the Harbord Commission report, which reached them in late November 1919. While recommending an American mandate, it went on to propose that all revenues be controlled by Turks and that foreign control over Turkey's financial machinery cease, including that of the Public Debt Commission. All countries formed out of former Ottoman possessions would have to take their reasonable share of the paper currency, foreign obligations, and reparation obligations of the empire. There would have to be a complete abrogation of all existing commercial agreements, especially the hated Capitulations. All foreign governments and troops should va- cate the country. It was, indeed, a partial victory for the nationalists, with only the recommendation on the establishment of a mandate left to be overcome.27 The Last Ottoman Parliament Kemal really did not expect the Allies either to accept the Harbord report or to respect his parliamentary immunity if he went to Istanbul. Hence he stayed in Anatolia, moving the Representative Committee's capital from Erzurum to Ankara so that he could meet with as many deputies as possible as they traveled to Istan- bul to attend the Parliament and to keep in touch with them while they met. He also started a newspaper, the Hakimiyet-i Milliye (National Sovereignty), to speak for the movement both in Turkey and the outside world (January 10, 1920). The last Ottoman Chamber of Deputies met in Istanbul starting on January 12, 1920. After the sultan's speech was presented, a welcoming telegram from Mustafa Kemal was read in the name of the Representative Committee, thus manifesting its claim to be the rightful government of Turkey. The British began to sense that something had been put over on them and that, in fact, the Istanbul government was not doing what it could to suppress the.nationalists; so they secured the dis1- missal of both the minister of war and the chief of the general staff. The latter post went to Fevzi Cakmak (1876-1950), an able and relatively conservative officer who was known as one of the army's ablest field leaders and who soon was him- self to become one of the principal military leaders of the national movement. On January 28 the deputies met secretly. Proposals were made to elect Mustafa Kemal president of the Chamber, but this was deferred in the certain knowledge that the British would prorogue the Chamber before it could do what had been planned all along, namely, accept the declaration of the Sivas Congress. This was done on February 17 as the National Pact (Misak-t Milli), thus putting the Par- liament itself on record as expressing the will of the Turkish people to regain full national integrity and independence: The members of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies recognize and affirm that the independence of the State and future of the Nation can be assured only by complete respect for the following principles, which represent the maximum of sacrifice which must be undertaken to achieve a just and lasting peace, and that the continued existence of a stable Ottoman sultanate and society is im- possible outside these principles: 348 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 1. The destiny of the portions of Ottoman territory under foreign occupa- tion and peopled by an Arab majority at the time of the signing of the armi- stice on October 30, 1918 should be determined by a plebiscite of all inhabitants. All such territories inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority, united in reli- gion, in race, and in aspirations, are imbued with feelings of mutual respect, concern, and devotion, and form an indivisible whole. 2. We accept a new plebiscite in the case of the three sancaks [Kars, Ar- dahan, and Batum] which had by general vote decided to join the mother country when they were first freed [from Russian occupation]. 3. The juridical status of western Thrace, which has been made dependent on the peace treaty to be signed with Turkey, must also be determined in ac- cordance with a free vote of the inhabitants. 4. The city of Istanbul, which is the seat of the Islamic caliphate and of the Ottoman sultanate and government, as well as the Sea of Marmara must be protected from every danger. So long as this principle is observed, whatever decision arrived at jointly by us and other states concerning the use for trade and communication of the Straits of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean shall be honored. 5. The rights of minorities as agreed on in the treaties concluded between the Allied powers and their enemies and certain of their associates shall be con- firmed and assured by us on condition that Muslim minorities in neighbouring countries will benefit from the same rights. 6. Like every country, in order to secure a more effective and well-ordered administration that will enable us to develop our political, judicial, and finan- cial affairs, we also need complete independence and sovereignty as a funda- mental condition of our life and continued existence. Therefore we oppose re- strictions that are harmful to our political, judicial, and financial development. The conditions of the settlement of our [foreign] debts shall be determined likewise, in a manner not contrary to these principles.28 The British authorities were, of course, enraged. The elections and Parliament had been presented to them as means to manifest national support for the Istanbul government, but instead the popularly elected Parliament had supported the man whom they considered to be the principal villain of the time, Mustafa Kemal. The reply was quick in coming. Ali Riza officially condemned the national re- sistance and began sending funds to Anatolia to encourage the organization of bands to oppose it. 29 Soon afterward a major revolt led by the Circassian bandit Ahmet Anzavur (see pp. 353-354) and supported by the British with arms and money rose to capture the area north of Bahkesir.30 The Allies pressured Ali Riza to arrest the leading nationalist sympathizers in Istanbul and to condemn Kemal and his associates, and when he refused they forced him to resign (March 3, 1920), with the far more malleable Salih Hulusi Pa§a replacing him. The full weight of the government now was turned against the nationalists for the first time. On March 15, 1920, 150 leading civil servants and army officers in Istanbul were arrested and turned over to the Allies for internment in Malta. Included among them were most of the members of the Karakol organization, which now was broken up. 31 The next day Istanbul was put under martial law, and Allied troops replaced the Ottoman police in control of the city. Police entered the Parlia- ment and arrested some of its leading members, after which it was dissolved on March 18.32 The Salih Pa§a cabinet was replaced with one headed once again by Damat Ferit Pa§a (April 5), who was now determined to carry out the Allied  The Turkish War for Independence, 1918-1923 349 desire to suppress the nationalists. Even the seyhulislam, Durrizade Abdullah Efendi, declared Kemal and all his associates to be infidels, to be shot on the spot.33 Soon afterward they were also condemned to death in absentia by a special Martial Law Council (Divan-i Harb-i Or ft) set up in Istanbul, setting the stage for a full civil war. Second Phase of the War for Independence, March 1920-March 1922 The strong measures taken against the nationalists by the Istanbul government in- augurated a distinct new phase in the Turkish War for Independence. For the first time the nationalists claimed the sole right to rule the Turkish people. Mustafa Kemal declared the Representative Committee in Ankara the only lawful government of Turkey and ordered all civilian and military officials to obey it rather than the Istanbul government, since the latter was now fully under Allied control.34 To make sure that everyone knew he was still fighting in the name of the sultan to rescue him from the Allies, Kemal appealed to the entire Islamic world asking for help against the infidel (March 17).35 Plans were made to organize a new government and Parliament in Ankara, and the sultan was asked to accept its authority.36 A flood of supporters moved from Istanbul to Ankara just ahead of the Allied dragnets. Included among them were Halide Edip, her husband, Adnan Adivar, Ismet Inonii, Kemal's most important friend in the Ministry of War, and the last president of the Chamber of Deputies, Cela- leddin Arif. The latter's desertion of the capital was of great significance. As legally elected president of the last representative Ottoman Parliament, his claim that it had been dissolved illegally, in violation of the Constitution, enabled Kemal to assume full governmental powers for the Ankara regime. On March 19, 1920, he announced that the Turkish nation was establishing its own Parliament in Ankara under the name Grand National Assembly {Biiyuk Millet Meclisi).31 Some 100 members of the Istanbul Parliament able to escape the Allied roundup joined 190 deputies elected around the country by the national resistance groups. On April 23, 1920, the new Assembly gathered for the first time, making Mustafa Kemal its first president and Ismet Inonii, now deputy from Edirne, chief of the General Staff. The new regime's determination to revolt against the Istanbul gov- ernment and not the sultan was quickly made evident. It was resolved that: 1. The founding of a government is absolutely necessary. 2. It is not permissible to recognize a provisional chief of state nor to es- tablish a regency. 3. It is fundamental to recognize that the real authority in the country is the national will as represented by the Assembly. There is no power superior to the Grand National Assembly. 4. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey embraces both the executive and legislative functions. A Council of State, chosen from the membership of the assembly and responsible to it, conducts the affairs of state. The President of the Assembly is ex-officio President of the Council. The Sultan-Caliph, as soon as he is free from the coercion to which he submits, shall take his place within the constitutional system in the manner to be determined by the As- sembly.38 The Assembly thus was the real government, with the Council of State carrying on the daily affairs of government. The time for deciding the fate of the sul- tanate was postponed to a more propitious occasion, presumably after full inde- 350 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 pendence was achieved. A parliamentary commission was established to draw up a constitution. The Grand National Assembly as the Ankara Government: The Constitution of 1921 A new system was incorporated into the first constitution of the Turkish nation, passed by the Assembly on January 20, 1921, as the Law of Fundamental Or- ganization (Teskildt-i Esasiye Kanunu). Both executive and legislative authority were "manifested and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly, which is the sole and rightful representative of the nation." The state of Turkey was to be run by the Assembly itself through the government of the Grand National Assem- bly. As a legislative body it would promulgate or abrogate all laws, conclude treaties, proclaim war, and the like. As an executive, it would administer "the de- partments into which its government is divided through the ministers it elects" and "give direction to the ministers, if necessary changing them." The president of the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal, was ex-officio president of the Council of Minis- ters, but he and the ministers were subject to Assembly direction on all matters. The 1876 Constitution's division of the state into provinces (vilayet), districts (kaza), and counties (nahiye) was retained. The provinces were made quite power- ful and autonomous, with their administrative councils having the right to "organ- ize and administer, in accordance with laws promulgated by the Grand National Assembly, matters relating to religious foundations, religious schools, public schools, health, economics, agriculture, public works, and social aid," while "external and internal political affairs, matters concerning the religious law, justice and the mili- tary, international economic relations, general government taxation, and matters concerning more than one province" remained to the Grand National Assembly. The administrators of the districts were to be appointed by the Grand National As- sembly but were under the orders of the governors. The counties were defined as "corporative entities with autonomy in local life," and were to be ruled by adminis- trative councils elected by their inhabitants, acting mainly in local judicial, eco- nomic and financial affairs. The provinces also were grouped "according to their economic and social relationships" into general inspectorships (umumi miifettislik), whose holders were "charged with the maintenance of public security in general and with controlling the operations of all the departments in the general inspection zones, and with regulating harmoniously the mutual affairs of the provinces," thus in fact controlling the governors and provincial councils under the authority of the Grand National Assembly. All the nationalist forces were incorporated into a united army with a central command. The ministers were to be appointed by and responsible to the Assembly. Elections for the national and provincial assemblies were to be held every two years, for two-year terms, with the sessions being ex- tensible for one additional year in emergencies. The Constitution of 1876, as amended in 1909, remained in force in all areas not covered by the new regulation.39 Soon afterward the National Pact was accepted as the Assembly's basic aim. It declared null and void all treaties, contracts, or other obligations signed by the Istanbul government after March 16, 1920, reserving thus for itself the sole right to make agreements and laws in the name of the Turkish people. The Assembly also assumed the right to confirm the appointment of diplomats and other repre- sentatives sent abroad, not because this was specifically provided in the Constitu- tion, but since the shortages of trained diplomatic personnel in Ankara made it  The Turkish War for Independence, 1918-1923 351 necessary for such persons to be chosen from among the deputies. One of the first laws passed by the new body was the National Treason Law, which essentially condemned to death anyone who betrayed the nation. Among the first to be affected were Damat Ferit and his associates.40 Thus was the Ankara government firmly established and institutionalized, and its authority was accepted by most of the country. The reasons for concentrating so much power in the Assembly varied from member to member. Kemal insisted on the Assembly's supremacy to remove the need for an executive position whose occupant would be like a substitute for the sultan: "The first goal of our struggle is to show our enemies, who intend to separate the sultanate from the caliphate, that the national will shall not allow this.... Accordingly there can be no question of designating a head of govern- ment, even a provisional one, or a regent-sultan in Anatolia. Therefore we are compelled to form a government without a head of government."41 On the other hand Kemal's opponents in the Assembly also favored its supremacy, but to limit or obstruct his power and to enable them eventually to supplant him as leader of the national movement. Whatever the reasons, the relative freedom in which the Assembly members were elected provided a representation of different interests never before seen in Ottoman legislative bodies as well as an opportunity for those interests to express and assert themselves. Its members were current and former government officials, both civilian and military (40 percent), professionals (20 percent), local landowners and wealthy businessmen (20 percent), and Muslim religious leaders (17 percent).42 The members also represented a wide spectrum of political and social beliefs: There was the conflict of laicism with religious feeling, radicalism with reac- tionaryism, republicanism with monarchism, Turkism with Ottomanism. There was the ideal of racial interest and unity versus that of the religious com- munity of Islam... each of which could survive in its own environment without contacting or harming the others, now come together in the Assembly, to be set against one another daily, with now one now the other emerging victorious.43 During most of the War for Independence, these differences crystallized around two interrelated issues involving the future of the Turkish nation-how it should be organized and what its relationship should be with the Russian Bolsheviks, who were offering more help in return for a move toward the left. The two major ideas around which opinions coalesced were called the "Eastern ideal" and "West- ern ideal." For supporters of the former, the East signified opposition to the West- ern imperialism that had engulfed the empire and all other Islamic countries, with Bolshevik Russia being the model because it had fought Western imperialism and replaced the czarist regime with a new revolutionary order. The Eastern ideal implied the replacement of the sultan-caliph with a new republican regime based on popular sovereignty and rule.44 The supporters of the Western ideal, on the other hand, retained a strong attachment to the Young Turk idea of a constitu- tional regime based on essentially Western foundations. Beyond this, however, and partly in reaction to the Easternists, they supported the old Ottoman order based on the sultanate-caliphate, as limited and controlled by a constitution. They op- posed any radical political, social, or economic reforms as well as close relations with the Soviets. Radical proposals from the Easternists, therefore, such as elec- tions on a corporative basis or women's suffrage, were opposed on the grounds that they were no more than Bolshevism.45 The attitudes of the two groups for or 352 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 against the Bolsheviks should not be overemphasized, however. Most of the East- ernists were Turkish patriots and reformers in the Young Turk tradition, not just Communist sympathizers as claimed by their opponents. The Constitution of 1921 was mainly their work and reflected the ideals of Rousseau and the French Revolution more than it did the Soviet system.46 On the other hand what the West- ernists wanted ignored the West's own reaction to the old regime and its growing commitment to the ideals of popular sovereignty. Instead, they emphasized its monarchical traditions and older social and economic systems. The Westernists were concerned with preserving the political and structural aspects of Islam, while the Easternists were attempting to prove that their ideas were compatible with its basic social tenets. The Islamic clergy was on both sides, sometimes holding the balance between them. The ideals of the Turkish Republic in the end were pro- duced by a dynamic interaction between them, not by the triumph of one over the other.47 Kemal used the war to achieve almost dictatorial powers, and in formulat- ing the programs for the new Turkey came to adopt the radical programs of the Easternists without their Bolshevik overtones, and the constitutional liberalism of the Westernists without the sultanate. The synthesis was achieved in a populist program introduced on September 13, 1920. The Civil War With the Istanbul government still operating and also claiming jurisdiction over the entire country, the stage was set for a full civil war. The situation was quite similar to that in Anatolia in the early fifteenth century after Bayezit Fs defeat by Tamerlane at the Battle of Ankara. In both cases rule over the Turks was contested by governments ruling in Anatolia and Europe, the empire was threat- ened by foreign invasion, and the land was infested by local rebellions and robber bands. And in both cases it was the heartland of Turkish life and traditions, Anatolia, that produced the victor. In response to the declarations of the Grand National Assembly, the Istanbul government appointed its own extraordinary Anatolian general inspector (Anadolu fevkaldde miifettis-i utnumi) and a new Security Army (Kuvayi Intizamiye) to enforce its rights and battle the nationalists, with help from the British, with the latter forming in essence what came to be called the Caliphal Army starting in 1920.48 Other bands rose to seek wealth and power for themselves in alliance with one or another of the governments, sometimes at the instigation of the Greeks, the British, or even the Communists, sometimes representing the large landowners and old derebeys who were seeking to regain their power. Most became little more than bandit forces, manned by a motley assortment of dispossessed peasants, Tatars from the Crimea and Central Asia, and Turkish and Kurdish nomads, always ready for a good fight against whoever was in power. These armies became so powerful that on April 29, 1920, the Grand National Assembly passed a law that prohibited "crimes against the nation" and set up Independence Courts (Istikldl Mahkemeleri) to try and execute on the spot. These courts became a major instrument of the Ankara government to suppress opposition long after independence itself was achieved.49 Most famous of the private armies operating in Anatolia during the civil war was the Green Army (Yesil Ordu), which posed a major threat to all sides. Orig- inally it was organized during the winter of 1920 "to evict from Asia the pene- tration and occupation of European imperialism." Its members were former  The Turkish War for Independence, 1918-1923 353 Unionists, known to and respected by Mustafa Kemal, including their secretary general, Hakki Behic, Bey, and Yunus Nadi, an influential Istanbul journalist, whose journal Yeni Gun (New Day) had just been closed by the British and who in 1924 was to found the leading newspaper of republican Turkey, Cumhuriyet (The Republic). Its original objective was to counter the reactionary propaganda spread in Anatolia by agents of the Istanbul government and the Allies by popu- larizing the national movement and mobilizing the Turkish peasants in support of the national forces. As such it was supported and even encouraged by Kemal.50 In fact, however, many of its members had a more radical purpose: They wished to combine Unionism, Pan-Islam, and socialism "to establish a socialist union in the world of Islam by modifying the Russian Revolution/'51 As such it soon at- tracted a number of groups opposing the Ankara government, including not only supporters of the Istanbul government but also anti-Kemalist Unionists and Com- munists connected with the Third International. This led Mustafa Kemal to get Hakki Behic, to disband the organization late in 1921, though its various anti- Kemalist elements continued to act on their own during the next two years.52 Two other independent armies, both led by Circassians and gaining most of their supporters from the Tatar and Circassian refugees driven into Anatolia by the Russians, were also active. A left-inclined guerrilla movement led by Cerkes Ethem was at first quite successful against the Greeks near Izmir in 1919, and for some time it supported the national movement against the reactionary, right- oriented Caliphal Army and the anti-Ankara movements that the latter stimulated in the eastern Marmara region in 1920. Ultimately, however, Cerkes Ethem became increasingly rapacious toward the civilian population, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. He allied with the Green Army, occasionally supported various Communist manifestos being circulated, and showed no interest in submitting to the central control that was essential for the success of the new nationalist army being built by Ankara. Finally, Kemal sent a major force, which destroyed Cerkes Ethem's army in January 1921, forcing him to flee into the hands of the Greeks and, even- tually, to exile in Italy.53 A more conservative movement was the force led by another Circassian, Ahmet Anzavur, who with money and arms from the Istanbul government and the British led two major revolts against the nationalists in the areas of Bahkesir and Goneri in October-December 1919 and again from February to June 1920. For a time leading the Caliphal Army as well, Anzavur's bands began to ravage the country- side, leading Mustafa Kemal to oppose him. He was finally beaten and sent on the run by Cerkes Ethem in April 1920, when the latter still was helping the Ankara government. Anzavur raised a new army, but he was defeated and killed and his army dispersed by the nationalists on May 15, 1920.54 The strongest local rebellions were in the areas of Bolu, Yozgat, and Duzce, the latter led by the Capanoglu derebcy family, which tried to restore its old power until its army was hunted down and dispersed by the nationalists and its leading members hanged in Amasya in August 1920.55 Such movements, however, con- tinued to be troublesome in Anatolia well into the republican period, as it took time to reduce the old family forces that were revived by the civil war. Then there were the Communists, who Mustafa Kemal opposed but felt unable to disperse because he needed help from the Russians. Mustafa Suphi remained in Russia sending propaganda literature into Anatolia. In response to his pleas, Kemal tolerated a number of Communist activities during 1920 including a new joint Communist-Unionist organization in Ankara called the People's Communist 354 The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 Party (Turk Halk Istirakiyun Firkasi), which had some connection with the Green Army.56 This organization enabled the Communists to emerge to public view in Turkey for the first time. In addition, on October 18, 1920, Kemal allowed the for- mation of a separate Turkish Communist Party (Turk Komiinist Firkasi), but it was operated mainly by some of his close associates in the Assembly.57 Far less active or radical than the first-named group, it was a government tool to divide and confuse the Communists and their supporters. Soon the former was active enough to cause its suppression. The last straw came when it issued a joint decla- ration with the Green Army and Cerkes Ethem that they had "approved the Bolshevik party program passed by the Third International... and joined to unite all the social revolutionary movements in the country," and adopted the name Turkish People's Collectivist Bolshevik Party.58 Communist agents became active around Ankara and Eski§ehir and cooperated with Unionist groups in Erzurum and Trabzon, which were centers of Enver's supporters throughout the War for Independence.59 This stimulated Kemal to criticize the Communists for working outside the organ of the people, the Grand National Assembly. After £erkes Ethem was crushed and the Green Army broken up, he suppressed the Communists and brought their leaders to trial, though the final judgments were suspended until after the Treaty with Moscow was signed in March 1921, and the sentences were relatively light compared to some. The only violent action against the Turkish Communists came when Mustafa Suphi and a few friends entered Anatolia via Kars on December 28, 1920. Though they met with Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Kazim Karabekir at Kars early in January 1921, they were arrested soon after. As they were being sent by boat to Erzurum for trial, they were assassinated by a group of pro-Enver supporters from Trabzon, apparently because of their fear that Suphi might bring discredit to Enver's efforts.60 What, indeed, had happened to Enver and his supporters? Enver, Cemal, Talat, and a few friends had fled from Istanbul the night of November 2, 1918, on a German freighter going to Odessa. From there they had gone on to Berlin, where they lived under assumed names, since the Entente victors were demanding their extradition for the "crimes" of their regime. Soon they were invited by Karl Radek to continue their work in Moscow, with full Bolshevik support for the "Turkish national struggle." Talat remained in Germany, where he was killed by an Ar- menian assassin on March 15, 1921. Cemal and Enver went to Moscow, and later to Central Asia, where they undertook a series of political activities with the ulti- mate intention of using the Bolsheviks to regain power in Turkey once the na- tionalists were defeated. With Bolshevik encouragement Enver proclaimed the organization of the Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies (Islam Ihtildl Cemiyetleri Ittihadi) and an affiliated Party of People's Councils (Halk §uralar Ftrkast)t the former as the international Muslim revolutionary organization, the latter as its Turkish branch. On September 1-9, 1920, he attended the Congress of the Peoples of the East at Baku, meeting a Kemalist delegate who was present. But while Kemal generally encouraged Enver's work in the hope of using him to get Bolshevik aid, he never actually committed himself to anything. Enver had a small group of supporters in Anatolia, mainly at Trabzon, and about 40 secret Unionists in the Grand National Assembly were working to install Enver in place of Kemal at the right time. Enver moved from Moscow to Batum in the summer of 1921 just as the Greek offensive began, so that he could enter Anatolia quickly if Kemal was defeated. But following Kemal's victory over the Greeks at the Sakarya (September 1921), Enver abandoned his plans for Turkey and went into  The Turkish War for Independence, 1918-1923 355 Central Asia in the hope of leading its Muslims against both the British and the Russians. It was while leading a band in pursuance of this aim that he was killed in a battle with Russian forces near Ceken.61 Cemal Pa§a in the meantime had also worked to facilitate Kemal's contacts with the Bolsheviks, and then he spent time training the Afghan army. While passing Tiflis on his way to Moscow he was killed by two Armenian assassins (July 21, 1922).62 The Role of the Sultan In the midst of all these conflicts and difficulties, the question arises whether the sultan was willing or able to provide effective leadership. As related by Sir Horace Rumbold, British ambassador in Istanbul, the ruler's interpretation of the activities and backgrounds of the nationalists indicated a disdain for the movement: A handful of brigands had established complete ascendancy. They were few in number, but they had got a stranglehold on the people as a whole, profiting by their submissiveness, their timidity or their penury. Their strength lay in the backing of 16,000 military officers who were concerned for their own interests.... The Ankara leaders were men without any real stake in the country, with which they had no connection of blood or anything else. Moustafa Kemal was a Macedonian revolutionary of unknown origin. His blood might be any- thing, Bulgarian, Greek or Serbian for instance. He looked rather like a Serbian! Bekir Sami was a Circassian. They were all the same, Albanians, Circassians, anything but Turks. There was not a real Turk among them. He and his government were nevertheless powerless before them. The hold was such that there was no means of access to the real Turks, even by way of propaganda. The real Turks were loyal to the core, but they were intimidated or they were hoodwinked by fantastic misrepresentations like the story of his own captivity. These brigands were the men who sought his submission. They looked for external support and had found it in the Bolsheviks. The Angora leaders were still playing with them. They might discover and regret too late that they had brought on Turkey the fate of Azerbaijan. Muslim Turks would have no truck with Bolshevism, for it was incompatible with their religion, but if it were imposed on them by force, then what ? 63 Such was the leadership that the last sultan was giving his people in their hour of distress. Though it might be said that the remarks were intended to soothe Allied irritation at the nationalist movement, they contained no redeeming spark of sympathy for those who were trying to save the country. Ankara's Preparations for War In the meantime, Kemal was trying to organize his army for the ordeal to follow. The national forces were called back to Ankara to be trained, disciplined, and armed, and a new officers' school was established. An ambassador was sent to Moscow, and Russian arms and ammunition began to flow across the Black Sea in increasing amounts. After the Karakol association in Istanbul was broken up by the Allied suppression, a new and wider-based group was founded among the remaining civil servants and officers and called the National Defense Organiza- tion (Mudafaa-i Milliye Teskildtt). Its members again began sending arms and equipment to the nationalists while the telegraphers and postal officials used their positions to confuse the enemy regarding the strength of the nationalist movement.  The Turkish War for Independence, 1918-1923 357 hesitated because of the Greek threat and limited its action to diplomatic protests.67 In the end, the postponement proved propitious, for as we shall see the new Greek offensive began on June 22, 1920, and if part of the Turkish forces had been busy in the east they might never have been able to hold back the Greeks at the crucial time. It was only after the Greek danger was contained in the fall of the same year that Karabekir finally was authorized to advance against the Armenians, but only to Kars (October 7). Right from the start, however, he was determined to go considerably further.68 On October 30 Kars was taken. Karabekir then pushed be- yond the old 1877 territory, forcing the Erivan government to ask for an armistice and agree to a peace treaty, signed at Alexandropol (Leninakan/Gumru) on the night of December 2-3. The treaty never in fact was ratified, since the Armenian Republic soon after was taken over by the Bolsheviks, and it was superseded by the Turkish-Russian Treaty of Moscow of March 1921. But it was significant in establishing the boundaries of eastern Turkey, incorporated without change into the subsequent agreements that remain unaltered to the present day. The Ar- menians repudiated all claims on Turkish territory, agreed to reduce their armed forces, and promised to allow Turkish use of the railroads passing through their lands to the north. The Turks were allowed to occupy Alexandropol, thus giving them a good strategic position for the subsequent negotiations with the Russians. The arms left by the defeated Armenian forces were sent to the west to be used in the resistance then being mounted against the Greeks.69 It should be noted that the Turkish offensive against the Armenian Republic was not, as has been alleged, accomplished in coordination with the Red Army. The Bolsheviks conquered Azerbaijan while the Armenians were fighting the Turks. It was only after the peace agreement was reached that they moved into Erivan and Sovietized its government, thus laying the basis for the Turko-Soviet Friendship Treaty that fol- lowed. The First Greek Offensive to the First Battle of Inonii, June 1920-January 1921 At the center of the Turkish War for Independence was, above all else, the Greek invasion. It was the Greeks who were trying to conquer Anatolia, and it was the Greeks who had to be beaten if the other invaders were to be pushed out. The initial Greek occupation, as defined by the British as the Milne Line, encompassed Izmir and the surrounding area, starting from Ayvahk on the Aegean to the north, extending inland to Akmaz, south to Aydin, and then west to the Aegean near Selguk, incorporating the valleys of the Bakir, the Gediz and the greater and lesser Menderes.70 While the Greeks spent the winter of 1919-1920 consolidating their position and killing or driving out as many Turkish cultivators as possible, the Kemalists had withdrawn most of their forces to Ankara for training. The small force remaining was commanded by Mehmet Efe, and most of the active re- sistance was undertaken by bands such as that of Cerkes Ethem.71 In addition to arranging the mandate system, the San Remo Conference (April 19-26, 1920) also authorized Greek occupation of the entire province of Aydin as well as eastern Thrace and thus stimulated the resumption of the Greek offen- sive in southeastern Anatolia in late June 1920. Ali Fuat Cebesoy became com- mander of all the nationalist forces facing the Greeks, but with limited numbers of men and weapons there was little he could do. The initial Greek drive went on