Political Science 252 Notes PDF

Political Science 252 Notes These are mostly from the slides, but with some explanations of the harder to understand stuff. Week 1 Introduction and basi...

Political Science 252 Notes These are mostly from the slides, but with some explanations of the harder to understand stuff. Week 1 Introduction and basics High and low politics: High Politics – The big political issues with global significance. Low politics – Smaller, specific issues that don’t usually reach global attention. Source: High vs Low Politics States’ opposing orientation to international pol: 1. Structural conditions of interdependence (the way the international system incentivises relying on others) lead to more multilateralism. Seek global solutions to global problems. 2. Based on Lord Palmerston’s quote “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests 1  it is our duty to follow.” Meaning: Put the interests of nation first and choose cooperation where it best fits those interests. The current state of Foreign Policy: Forms based on different levels of actors and decision-making. o Like non-state, governments, individuals and businesses. o Covers wide range of issues, like climate and security threats. Through traditional channels of diplomacy, like multilateral orgs and bilateral summits. o Increasingly through non-traditional channels, like Trump’s tweets. Everyday events can affect states’ foreign policy. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA): A research field. Explain how and why states conduct themselves the way they do in the international arena. Make sense of the interplay between a state’s domestic and its external environments and relatedly, the state’s international conduct. Foreign Policy: States and other actors’ explicit articulation of their international goals and objectives addressed to others in the international system (What actors say they want to others on the international stage). o Foreign policy White Papers (published) o Foreign policy strategy documents (published) o Statements by head of state or senior government officials o Communiques (e.g. BRICS Summit or G20 Summit agreements) o Speeches (e.g. PW Botha’s ‘Rubicon’ speech of 1985) o Voting positions in multilateral forums (e.g. UN) 2 Diplomacy: The practical articulation of an actor’s external aspirations, purposes and policies, and entails the official practices through which actors (generally, but not exclusively states) interact with each other (How actors convey their goals to other actors). State & non-state actors: Traditionally foreign policy and diplomacy were the preserve of state activities, but increasingly other actors have foreign policy (transnational) impacts. o non-state actors (e.g. Multinational Corporations; Al Shabaab, ISIL, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, NGOs) o sub-state actors (e.g. provincial or city governments, trade missions, twin city pacts) Today, there is an increased emphasis on: o Economic diplomacy (both state and non-state) – The use of recourses to promote the growth of a country’s economy by increasing trade, promoting investments, collaboration on bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and etc. Can also do the opposite, like sanctions and tariffs. o Track-two diplomacy (e.g. NGOs lobbying governments such as International Campaign to Ban Landmines, R2P) – Between non-state and state actors. o Track-three diplomacy (NGOs interacting with and campaigning each other) – Non state actors with each other. o Celebrity diplomacy (Bono, Bob Geldoff) - Practice of using famous individuals, such as actors, musicians, and other public figures, to promote political or social causes on a global scale. o Science diplomacy - Scientific exchanges and the cross-border collaboration of scientists and scientific organizations. Distinction between high and low pol has been less relevant. 3 Sources of foreign policy: Domestic politics applies pressure that shapes foreign policy. Events on the international stage influence domestic politics in turn. Structure vs Agency: o Debate across social sciences. o How much control do agents really have in larger structures? ▪ Structures: Wider social forces that may constrain action of agents. ▪ Agents: Groups of people who aim to create change. 4 The purposes of foreign policy: Protection o Maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity in a complex and anarchic (lacking overarching authority) world order. o Tools of conflict resolution. o Collaborate towards international stability. Way of facilitating domestic welfare, prosperity o If wider international environment favourable, such domestic goals can be better achieved. Managing scale o Given the complex nature of the world system and its many challenges, international cooperation is important. Therefore, appropriate foreign policy and foreign policy tools required. Hill’s (2015) list of seven expectations for foreign policy: 1. The maintenance of territorial integrity and social peace against external aggression – Maintaining a state’s territory and peace. 2. Advancing prosperity – Maintaining economic wellbeing. 3. Protecting citizens abroad – Keeping your nations’ citizens safe in another country. 4. Projecting identity abroad – Create an image of your nation in the minds of others. 5. Making decisions and interventions abroad – Deal with threats to your security. 6. Fostering a stable international order – Keep everything on the global stage stable. 7. Protecting the global commons – Sharing resources that should belong to everyone and preventing its abuse. FPA vs International Relations (IR): Foreign Policy Analysis is a sub-field of IR, therefore it reflects the intellectual traditions and trends of IR. 5  o Means we see the same kinds of theoretical frameworks dominating in the field of FPA. o Similar debates and issues concerning epistemology, methodology and/or the role of values. o Can class approaches in terms of IR’s major perspectives: ▪ Realism // Liberalism-Pluralism // Critical perspectives Difference: o The prevailing levels of analysis. o IR - mostly state-centric and focuses on state-level or systemic explanations o FPA encompasses analysis at the ▪ Micro- (individual) ▪ Meso- (domestic context) ▪ Macro-levels (systemic) levels 6 Realism: In chronological terms FPA was first dominated by insights from Realism and neo- Realism (i.e. macro-perspectives). Largely shaped by work of Hans J. Morgenthau (Politics Among Nations ; In Defence of the National Interest), Kenneth Waltz (Man, the State and War and Henry Kissinger (American Foreign Policy, 1969; Diplomacy). Realism - power politics o Foreign policy determined by two main factors: ▪ Maintaining balance of power (especially under conditions of Cold War and MAD) – believing that security can only come if other actors aren’t powerful enough to hurt you. ▪ To always serve national interest first National interest – Vague definition. Can be defined as the claims, objectives, goals, demands and interests which a nation always tries to preserve, protect, defend and secure itself in relations with other nations. Ideology is important, but so too is pragmatism Neo-Realism o Power rivalries are a function of the nature of the anarchic international system – The international system lacks overarching authority and control, so nations act to become as powerful as possible to protect themselves. o Therefore, foreign policy should accommodate relative distributions of power in the world – Power should be distributed to prevent one state from overpowering another. ▪ States should strive to maximise their power vis-à-vis other states, and their foreign policy should reflect this. The billiard ball view of foreign policy - international relations as interactions between self-contained, rational actors, much like billiard balls colliding on a 7  pool table. Each state is considered a unitary actor that acts primarily in its own self-interest to maintain security and power. Criticism of realism: 1. The behaviouralist approach does not give satisfactory explanations. Behaviouralists focuses on measurable & observable things = foreign policy outputs (such as actions or decisions) But what of things not accounted for by this? Intangibles in foreign policy decision-making? Role of individual leaders’ personality or psychology (e.g. JFK, Fidel Castro or Khrushchev in the 1960s) Important also to study the process, not merely the output of foreign policy decisions 2. Critique of rationality/Rational Actor Model Who’s to say that states are rational actors driven by utilitarian (cost-benefit) considerations? 3. Important to unpack the ‘black box’ of foreign policy decision-making Black box - the internal dynamics and decision-making processes of a state are not examined in detail. Instead, the focus is on the state's external actions and interactions with other states. The state is viewed as a "black box," where we only observe inputs (such as international pressures and opportunities) and outputs (such as foreign policy decisions and actions), without delving into the internal workings that produce these outputs. The internal workings include things like: 1. Bureaucracies/ministries of foreign policy 2. Executive vs legislative vs judicial authority in a given state 3. Interest groups, the media and public opinion 4. Psychology and cognition 8  4. Through influence of neoliberalism Neoliberalism – The current form of global capitalism and the interdependence that comes from it. Important to factor in complex interdependence Look at the role of international institutions (e.g. UN, WTO) & non-state/sub- state levels 5. Later on critical perspectives started to shape the field of FPA e.g. Constructivism Values and ideas matter in international politics Can distinguish between material power and ideational power in foreign policy. 1. Material power – power by virtue of attributes (wealth, military, etc.). 2. Ideational power – power to persuade/suasion or influence. States’ interests (and their foreign policy) reflect their identities and vice versa 1. e.g. present-day Russia’s or Saudi Arabia’s projection of regional power 2. South Africa’s projection as a middle power or regional hegemon Actor-General vs Actor Specific-theories: Actor Specific – Theories that emphasize the role of individual decision-makers, such as political leaders, diplomats, and bureaucrats. Actor-General - These theories treat the state as a single, rational actor that makes decisions to maximize its national interest. 9 Traditions in FPA: Realism (1900-today) o Blackbox/billiard ball view. o Homo Economicus - or "Economic Man," is a theoretical construct in economics that represents a rational and self-interested individual who makes decisions aimed at maximizing their utility. o Actor-general theories. Liberalism-Pluralism (1960s-today) o Comparative Foreign Policy – compare different states’ FP and looks for patterns. o Societal sources of FP – the forces at a societal level that influence a state’s FP. o Bureaucratic politics – The influence of bureaucracies on political decisions. o Cognitive decision-making – How the psychology and minds of elites influences policy. o Focus not on outcome but the process. o Actor-specific. o Critique of homo economicus conception of human behaviour & decision- making. Critical/Reflective Approaches (1980s-today) o Constructivism – how values and ideas matter in international politics. o Post-modernism - rejects overarching, universal truths and grand narratives, instead focusing on the diversity of perspectives. o Post-colonial approaches – Understanding how the legacies of colonialism continue to shape the foreign policies of states, particularly in the Global South. o Feminist/gendered critiques – How the patriarchy and a man-centric world influences FP. o Class-based/Marxist critiques – How class interests influence FP and how wealth shapes power relations. 10 11  Week 2 Micro-level analyses Overview Foreign Policy Decision-making is an approach to the study of foreign policy which: o Critiques the Rational Actor Model and idea of rationality underpinning Realism. o Seeks to explain the process of decision-making rather than simply output. o Is a micro-level explanation of foreign policy At the heart of Foreign Policy Decision-making is the understanding that foreign policy is the product of human agency. o i.e. persons who make decisions and act on the basis of (sometimes partial) information. In today’s context the foreign policy role of individual decisionmakers in executive positions seems to be heightened. What micro-level approaches are we looking at? The role of individual leaders – personality, cognition and psychological factors. Small group dynamics – groupthink. The individual decisionmaker: According to Valerie Hudson (2007), useful questions to ask are: o Not merely do individual (executive) leaders matter, but when do they matter? o And: Which leaders matter? Depends on (among other things): o Regime type: less democratic or totalitarian systems give more possibility for individual action than long-established parliamentarian systems. ▪ Sometimes this also happens under very hands-on leaders, such as Thatcher, Blair (vs. for instance Tony Abbott of Australia), Mandela and Mbeki. 12  o Leaders’ interest in foreign policy matters (Jan Smuts the internationalist vs. DF Malan the Afrikaner nationalist). o Crisis situations (JF Kennedy in Cuban Missile Crisis; George W. Bush in 9/11; Johnson and Brexit; Merkel and Eurocurrency and refugee crisis). o Ambiguous and uncertain circumstances. o Degree to which leader has diplomatic training (‘untrained leaders’ more likely to rely on personal world views). o Expertise in specific issue area or region. o Style of leadership. o Group interaction. Our cognitions can deceive us and the way in which we process information can be erroneous (heuristic fallacies). In most cases, decision-making occurs in environment of imperfect information, For analyst, methodological challenges: o Can’t access the mind of the individual decisionmaker (unless they allow you, e.g. authorised biographies or psychological assessments). o Have to rely on proxies – can’t directly analyse. o One instrument is Psychobiographies. 13  Decisions/behaviour: The mind model in Foreign Policy Decision-making analysis: The output. Context: Others’ presence Cognitions: Attitudes: Time constraints The process by which humans The individual’s attitude towards Stakes/importance select and process information an issue. from the world around them. Mental Model: How they think about problems. Cognitive frameworks that agents use to interpret and navigate the complexities of decision-making. Filters: Personality: Biases Mental Constructs: Encompasses a broader range of Stereotypes Beliefs individual differences in thoughts, Heuristics (Decision-making feelings, and behaviours. Values short hands) Can change. Memories Perceptions: Motivations/emotions: Character: Inputs from the world. What motivates them and their Character refers to a set of emotional state. moral and ethical traits and Personalised understanding of beliefs that define a person's history and the world. values and integrity. Can’t change (According to the14 lecturer) Groupthink (Small group dynamics): Work of Irving Janis. Focus on small group dysfunction in foreign policy realm. Group dynamics produce subtle constraints that prevent members from exercising critical powers or openly expressing doubt. Foreign policy decision-making based on emotional response o Usually centred on fear of ostracism from the group. o A lot of insincere agreement. o Morality < maintaining respect of other group members (‘keeping face’) and maintaining group cohesion. o Over time maintenance of group cohesiveness becomes primary purpose, which constrains decisions deviating from the majority. o Selection bias (not consider all the variables at play because they may be inconvenient; being selectively blind or deaf) – helps explain foreign policy fiascos. o Groupthink leads to deterioration in quality of decision-making, Janis’s groupthink case study: 1959 – Cuba - overthrow of Batista regime in armed revolt led by Fidel Castro. o Establishment of Communist government. 1961 – United States administration under JFK supports covert operation to overthrow Castro’s regime. o Bay of Pigs invasion. ▪ CIA training of Cuban exiles to lead invasion. ▪ Air strikes targeting strategic sites. ▪ By day two brigade surrounded by 20,000 Cuban troops. Sent to prison camps. Almost two years later, US paid around $53 million in food and medicine to Cuba for their release. 15 Analysis of case study: Immediate problem – troops were landing in a swamp instead of the mountains as planned. US media reported on it, so Castro knew what was coming. Decision to continue with invasion in face of contradictory information is the result of groupthink in JFK’s foreign policy inner circle. JFK under pressure to ‘perform’ and show toughness as youngest US president with no war credentials. His group of advisors also new to administration and outsiders themselves – reinforcing groupthink. Lessons learned: o ExCom (committee advising the president) formed after Bay of Pigs. o Wide range of options considered. o Devil’s advocate ‘appointed’ o Experts grilled and dissension encouraged. o No formal agenda for meetings and no protocol, avoiding groupthink. 16  Week 3 The domestic context. The blind spot of FPA: The domestic/societal context has long been in FPA’s blind spot. Reasons: o Dominance of Realism giving prominence to the state and executive (Allison’s ‘black box’). o Elitist view – leave foreign policy issues to specialists. Progressively research agenda on role of domestic factors & actors developed. Societal actors and sources of foreign policy: Role of the domestic context on foreign policy can be understood as function of two variables: o Nature of state-society relationship. ▪ Strong state-weak civil society or weak state-strong civil society? The more powerful civil society, the more influence the public and have on FP. ▪ Nature of political culture prevailing. Degree of participation or political interest on part of public. Constraints and enablers within the domestic setting. Political culture shaped by history, institutions & culture. Three approaches: 1. Elitist - Political decision-making centred at executive level and it ought to be so. Leave it to the experts. 2. Pluralist - Plurality of substate & non-state domestic actors & interest groups. Competitive engagement around (foreign) policy issues. 3. Structure of the state (i.e. systemic) - Institutional conditions and regime type most determining. 17 Critiques: Systemic approach: o Perhaps too much emphasis on institutional structure and constraints. o Overly pessimistic about ability of societal groups to impact foreign policy environment. ▪ e.g. civil society mobilisation in ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011. ▪ Even in authoritarian systems societal input/mobilisation. e.g. China = civic movements against endangered species trade. e.g. Saudi Arabia = women’s driving. Elitist approach: o Probably too dismissive of role other domestic actors can play. o Through globalisation and technology spaces of engagement opening up. ▪ Social media. ▪ Transnational environmental/social justice movements. ▪ Affected publics show interest in having say in decisions that influence them. The emerging landscape: Increased use of public diplomacy as tool of foreign policy. o Governments using various tools to inform and influence foreign publics to support and advance their national interests. ▪ US – Public Diplomacy directorate beefed up after 9/11; Voice of America (radio station). ▪ China – CCTV; Confucius Institutes. ▪ Germany, Japan – cultural foundations – Goethe Foundation, Japan Foundation; Japan’s Africa Business Education initiative (scholarship programme for African students). ▪ South Africa – Radio Ubuntu. Government leaders’ use of social media. o Obama’s 2008 Facebook-centred election campaign/Trump’s tweets. 18  Impact of Snowden Effect & Wikileaks (whistleblowing) o Making state intelligence available to domestic and foreign publics. The ‘post-truth’ era. o Objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief. Distorting facts has become common. o Alleged foreign involvement in national elections (Russia-US, etc). o Propaganda as tool in current Russia-Ukraine conflict. Main implication – interplay between domestic and international realms - dialecticism (one influences the other and vice-versa). The role of public opinion and the media: 1. The type of public matters in foreign policy (interest). a. Broad public opinion vs sub-groups. 2. Overall public opinion seldom directly guides foreign policy. 3. Generally, two effects of public opinion on foreign policy: a. Constrain elite decision-making. b. Influence what should be prioritised. 4. Subgroups and special interest groups can have significant impact on foreign policy. a. Influenced by knowledge, motivation, organisation. 5. Media’s impact less than often thought. a. The public select and filter news – take in what they want to take in. b. Events rather than foreign policy gets covered. 6. Generally, people do not follow foreign policy closely and do not send clear signals to policy makers. 7. Public opinion can shift dramatically. 8. ‘Double wish’ – Public want conflicting things. Public opinion in FP: Research on role of public opinion is inconclusive. Christopher Hill said public opinion is “the Loch Ness of foreign policy.” 19  Post-Vietnam War proliferation of public opinion studies suggesting public can have structured, coherent views even if they may lack information. In more recent years there have been some points of agreement in research: o Peoples’ core values and beliefs act as heuristic devices (decision making shortcuts) that guide their general stance or orientation (i.e. assess attitudes, not necessarily knowledge). o Lack of information does not necessarily lead to a lack of political sophistication. o Public generally disinterested in foreign policy affairs, except: ▪ Times of crisis, war or when they feel directly affected (like migrant movements, refugee or asylum policies). Risse-Kappen breaks it into: o mass public (Average uniformed people). o attentive public (Those paying attention to policy). o issues public (Attentive to particular issues). Interplay between public opinion and media: Since the first Gulf War (1991), role of the media in influencing foreign policy has become greater. o so-called ‘CNN Effect’ ▪ Suggests global that 24-hour news channels like CNN significantly influence the actions of policymakers. This effect arises from the ability of these networks to provide real-time, continuous coverage of events from around the world. 20  o Media imagery make ‘Distant Others’ a reality for the public. ▪ Makes the impact on others far away visible to audience. ▪ e.g. ‘embedded journalists’ in second Gulf War. ▪ Al Jazeera coverage of war in Syria / ISIL. ▪ India – decentralised media landscape – private media houses competing to shape public opinion. Various roles of the media: o Agenda setting – focus on certain issues. o Priming – prepare and direct public’s attention. o Framing – way of presenting news, use of certain (coded) language. Conclusion: Foreign policy realm as ‘trafficking between think tanks (including academics), media commentators and government spokespersons.’ o With occasional input by public, depending on the issue. o In South Africa recent greater role of Bench (i.e. judiciary), e.g. court rulings on SA government’s lack of cooperation with ICC regarding Omar al-Bashir (when SA refused to arrest an international leader suspected of war crimes). 21  Week 4/5 SA Foreign Policy and the African Agenda Themes pre-1994: An era of internationalism under Jan Smuts (1919-1924; 1939-1948). o Supported the founding of the League of Nations and advised Churchill in WW2. Diplomacy of isolation under National Party (1948-1994). o Primacy of ideology (rather than pragmatism) – Afrikaner nationalism. o Oligarchic-bureaucratic policy process – elite, with little space for electorate or pressure groups. o Foreign policy devised to help maintain domestic (minority) power structure. Transition period 1992-1994. o Era of multiparty negotiations, drafting of interim Constitution. o Rejoining international organisations. o From international pariah to paragon. Mandela’s Foreign Affairs article: Titled ‘South Africa's Future Foreign Policy’ (1993). Context: o multiparty negotiations. o to signal to outside world ANC intentions (stability). New foreign policy was important component of creating new, stable country. Pillars: o Human rights. o Promote democracy. o Justice and respect for international law. o Strives for international stability and arms control (regulating the trade of weapons of war). o Interdependence – cooperation (international organisations). o Africa’s concerns and interests should reflect in SA’s foreign policy. 22 Elements of SA FP: National sovereignty and constitutional order (Political interests). Safety of its citizens (Security interests). Well-being of its citizens (Human development). Economic prosperity (Economic interests). A better Africa and World (Ideological and global interests). SA’s FP decision-making architecture: Actors and decision-makers: o Constitutionally defined (Act no. 108 of 1996, Republic of South Africa). o Executive – President (formulating policy; appointing and receiving ambassadors; plenipotentiaries, etc.). o Supported by Cabinet & other organs of state (DIRCO, Presidency, Treasury, SANDF). Oversight role by Parliament (standing committee on Foreign Affairs). In an implied sense, Chapter 9 institutions also have oversight role. Provinces not mandated by Constitution to have foreign policy competence, but evolving para-diplomacy over the years. In today’s context – growing role for Bench, media, think tanks. Does South African FP come from the government or the ANC itself? The lines became blurred. FP decision-making can shift in era of Government of National Unity. 23 Key features of South African foreign policy by presidential eras: Different presidential flavours, but one foreign policy. Key foreign policy documents & statements since 1994: SA foreign policy discussion document (1996) & White paper on SA involvement in international peace missions (1998): o A commitment to the promotion of human rights. o A commitment to the promotion of democracy. o A commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations. o A commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts. o A commitment to the interests of Africa in World Affairs. o A commitment to economic development through regional and international cooperation in an interdependent world. 24 Mbeki’s espousal of the African Renaissance and the African Agenda: African Renaissance can be seen to be philosophy underpinning so-called ‘African Agenda’. Never a written policy entitled ‘African Agenda’ but generally understood as SA’s efforts towards: o Democracy promotion. o Governance. o Peace and stability & conflict mediation. Development and governance: o G5 (Outreach 5) at G8 Summits. o Millennium Africa Recovery Plan and Omega Plan, New Africa Initiative and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (2001). o Transformation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) (2002); adoption of NEPAD by AU. Peace and Stability: o Africa Peer Review Mechanism - a mutually agreed instrument voluntarily for AU member States as an African self-monitoring mechanism. o Panel of the Wise - A consultative body of the African Union, composed of five appointed. It provides opinions to the Peace and Security Council on issues relevant to conflict prevention and management. o AU Continental Early Warning System - Advises the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommends the best courses of action. o African Peace and Security Architecture – Aims to prevent, manage and resolve crises and conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction and development in the continent. o African Union High Level Implementation Panel - Assists in the implementation of peace agreements and the resolution of conflicts in Africa. 25 Features of foreign policy under Zuma presidency: Renaming of department from ‘Foreign Affairs’ to ‘International Relations and Cooperation’ (from DFA to DIRCO). Continuation of four key pillars: o Consolidation of African Agenda. o Strengthening of Global South-South cooperation. o Strengthening of Global North-South cooperation. o Participation in global system of governance. 2011: White Paper on South Africa’s foreign policy – Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. o Ubuntu (humanity) & Bato Phele (putting people first) as philosophies that underpin SA’s foreign policy and diplomacy. Key organisational shifts: o Creation of branch in DIRCO for public diplomacy (to project South Africa’s soft power) ▪ Launched Radio Ubuntu, a station that relays pro-SA coverage in other countries. o Incorporation of economic diplomacy training in cadet/diplomatic corps training. o Mooting of South African Development Partnership Agency (SAPDA) – provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA). ▪ Partnership Fund for Development to replace African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund Act of 2001. o Creation of South African Council on International Relations – engagement of non-state actors in SA’s foreign policy. Key indications of values & emphases: o DIRCO Revised Strategic Plan 2015-2020. o Foreign policy to achieve national interest (which was only officially recognised at this point). o National interest: ▪ Eradicating poverty, unemployment, inequality 26  ▪ But SA’s national interest ‘not framed in nationalistic terms… recognises importance of others in the region and on continent’. o Domestic policy that frames foreign policy based on the National Development Plan (2011). o Africa: ▪ NEPAD. ▪ AU Agenda 2063. ▪ African Standby Force. o The Global South (particularly BRICS). DIRCO in the Ramaphosa era: Vision: o The DIRCO’s vision is an African continent, which is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and united and which contributes to a world that is just and equitable. Mission: o DIRCO’s mission is to formulate, coordinate, implement and manage South Africa’s foreign policy and international relations programmes, promote South Africa’s National Interest and values and the African Renaissance (and create a better world for all). Strategic priorities: o Bilateral and multilateral interactions that protect & promote SA’s national interest & values. o SA’s sovereignty and integrity. o Contribute to formulation of international law, promote respect for its provisions. o Multilateralism to secure a rules-based international system. South Africa’s national interest: The protection and promotion of its national sovereignty and constitutional order, the wellbeing, safety and prosperity of its citizens, and a better Africa and world. 27 Consistency or inconsistency in SA foreign policy post-1994? Not a question whether SA has multiple foreign policies. Foreign policy (singular) has been consistent, but it has been inconsistently applied. o Particularly in relation to international human rights agenda. o Realpolitik tended to trump foreign policy’s ethical underpinnings (i.e. interests win over values). Bond: SA ‘talks left but acts right’. Its statements are more left-wing while its actions trend right. Two explanations for inconsistency: o Capability – ‘punching above its weight.’ SA does not always have the capacity or resources to implement its FP. o Competing values – African solidarity vs. universalist framework in human rights promotion (e.g. Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ vis-à-vis Zimbabwe; International Criminal Court). Key current features: 1. General context of strategic realignment against backdrop of geopolitical and power shifts in international arena. 2. South Africa’s expressed policy of ‘active non-alignment’: a. Principle of neutrality. b. While seeking to engage (or mediate) where opportunities arise. i. E.g. African Peace Initiative Mission to Ukraine and the Russian Federation, June 2023. 3. ‘Global South’ diplomacy and new institutional configurations. a. BRICS+. b. New Development Bank. 4. At same time Global North diplomacy and institutions remain important. 5. Re-expression of global human rights promotion in Gaza. a. South Africa’s case at UN’s International Court of Justice. 28  Week 6 South Africa’s role in peace, security and conflict mediation. Outline: 1. Peace, stability and conflict mediation in RSA’s foreign policy. 2. The international framework – norms, institutions and practices. 3. The African mediation context. 4. SA mediation efforts in various arenas – successes and failure: a. African Continent. b. UN. c. ICC. South Africa’s foreign policy and peace and stability: Contributing to international peace and stability one of cornerstones of South Africa’s foreign policy. o Although over time different emphases given by different state presidents. ▪ Mandela: Arms control and cooperation. Peace, human rights and justice (all three are indivisible). His own role in ‘big men’ mediation and negotiation. ▪ Mbeki: Peace, stability in, for & through the African Agenda. Institutionalisation of conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms (AU peace and security architecture). Multilateralisation of peace framework and SA’s role in it. ▪ Zuma and Ramaphosa: By and large continuation of the framework above. 2020 SA Chair of AU Commission – Silencing the Guns Initiative. 2020-2021 – SA’s third tenure on UN Security Council. 29 30 Arena 1: The African Continent: Notable cases of SA involvement: o 1995 Operation Boleas (Lesotho) - SA-led military incursion under SADC mandate. o 1997 – 2003 Mediation in DRC conflict (Africa’s Great War 2002-2003 Pretoria agreements; SANDF participation in MONUC). o 2000s Great Lakes – Burundi (Envoys + mediators: Mbeki, Zuma, Nqakula, Nhlapho). o 2000 – 2010 Mediation in Zimbabwe situation ▪ Early 2000s, Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy criticised. ▪ 2007 SADC appointment of Mbeki as mediator criticised by MDC ▪ Violence in 2008 elections; new negotiations. ▪ Global Political Agreement (power-sharing arrangement) – shaky. o 2004 AU appoints Mbeki mediator in Cote d’Ivoire conflict ▪ SA efforts to support disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR) and a path to elections. o Others ▪ Sudan/South Sudan (Comprehensive Peace Agreement paving way to elections 2010). ▪ Madagascar coup (2009). ▪ Peacekeeping involvement in Central African Republic. ▪ All contested and unclear outcomes. o 2020 Mozambique; Attempt to strengthen regional mediation in Sahel. Mixed record. o Authority of RSA mediation not always recognised by other African parties. o RSA ‘punching above its weight’, it tries to do things beyond its capacity. o Critique that South Africa put national (economic interests) first in some mediation processes (e.g. DRC; CAR). o Exercise of structural power through conflict resolution and mediation not always effective. 31 Arena 2: United Nations SA’s tenures as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. o January 2007 – December 2008: ▪ SA’s vote against draft resolution S/2007/14 calling to end of human rights violations in Myanmar (2007). ▪ SA’s vote against draft resolution S/2008/447 for sanctions against Mugabe-regime (2008). o January 2011 – December 2012: ▪ SA vote in support of Resolution 1973 for no-fly zone over Libya (2011). Paved way for mandate for NATO’s ‘humanitarian intervention’ (bombing). ▪ Syria conflict (2011-2012): SA accused of flip-flopping. Criticisms: o RSA voting at UN not enacting stated foreign policy principles. o Inconsistencies ▪ in voting behaviour ▪ and between foreign policy statements and actual behaviour. o Siding with 2 of the P5 (China and Russia) – i.e. allowing itself to be played off by major powers (vs. USA and UK). Supporters: o Focus on controversial votes obscures many other achievements, particularly around making African issues more central in UN. ▪ Lifting of sanctions against Rwanda; conflict resolution in Burundi, DRC, etc. ▪ AU-UN hybrid peace missions. o SA showing backbone by standing up to P5. o Took a while for SA to learn the ropes & power plays in UN Sec Council. 32 Emerging Dynamics: RSA abstains from UN vote to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, March 2022. o Reasons: ▪ Resolution tabled not conducive for diplomacy, dialogue and mediation. ▪ The institutions of the UN (role of the Security Council and Good Offices) should be applied. African mediation mission to Ukraine and Russian Federation, June 2023. Policy of active non-alignment policy under pressure from Western states. RSA case brought against Israel at International Court of Justice, December 2023. Arena 3: SA at the ICC: From being a strong advocate of 1998’s Rome Statute and founding member state of ICC… o To advocating, in framework of AU, amendment of Rome Statute in 2008/9. ▪ (Arrest warrant for Sudan’s Al-Bashir – March 2009) o Gradual questioning of principle of universal jurisdiction underpinning Rome Statute – African states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity put first. o Argument for immunity for serving heads of state: ▪ Failure to arrest Al-Bashir in 2015. ▪ 2016 – Cabinet announcement – SA withdrawal from ICC. ▪ 2017 - High Court ruling – withdrawal to be revoked. ▪ 2023 – Did SA act on ICC indictment and arrest Russia’s Putin? Putin did not show up to 2023 BRICS summit in SA. Crisis averted. o General significance: ▪ Clash between sovereignty and enacting values. ▪ Puts into question the primacy of rule of law internationally and domestically. 33 34