Walt 1998_One World Many Theories.pdf

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC International Relations: One World, Many Theories Author(s): Stephen M. Walt Reviewed work(s): Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 29- 32+34-46 Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC St...

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC International Relations: One World, Many Theories Author(s): Stephen M. Walt Reviewed work(s): Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 29- 32+34-46 Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149275. Accessed: 29/12/2012 03:00 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at. http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].. Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign Policy. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Relations: One World, Many Theories M. Walt byStephen Why shouldpolicymakersand practitioners care about the scholarlystudy of interna- tional affairs?Those who conductforeign policy often dismiss academictheorists(frequently, one mustadmit,with goodreason),but thereis an inescapablelink betweenthe abstractworldof theoryandthe realworldof policy.We need theoriesto makesenseof the blizzard of information that bom- bardsus daily.Evenpolicymakers who are contemptuous of "theory" mustrely on theirown (often unstated)ideasabouthow the world worksin orderto decidewhatto do. It is hardto makegoodpolicyif one'sbasicorganizing areflawed,justasit is hardto construct principles good without theories knowing lot abouttherealworld.Everyone a uses theories-whetherhe orsheknowsit ornot-and disagreements about policyusuallyreston more fundamental disagreements about the basic forcesthatshapeinternationaloutcomes. Take,forexample,the currentdebateon how to respondto China. Fromone perspective, China'sascentis the latestexampleof the ten- S TEPHEN M. WALTisprofessor andmaster science ofpolitical of thesocialscience colle- giatedivision attheUniversity He isa member ofChicago. ofFOREIGNPOLICY'Seditorial board. SPRING 1998 29 This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  Relations International dencyforrisingpowersto alterthe globalbalanceof powerin poten- tiallydangerous ways,especiallyas theirgrowinginfluencemakesthem moreambitious.Fromanotherperspective,the key to China'sfuture conductis whetherits behaviorwillbe modifiedby its integrationinto worldmarketsandby the (inevitable?) spreadof democraticprinciples. Fromyet anotherviewpoint,relationsbetweenChinaand the restof the worldwill be shapedby issuesof cultureand identity:Will China see itself(andbe seenbyothers)asa normalmemberof the worldcom- munityor a singularsocietythatdeservesspecialtreatment? In the sameway,the debateoverNATO expansionlooksdifferent dependingon whichtheoryone employs.Froma "realist" perspective, NATO expansion is an effort to extendWestern influence-well beyond the traditionalsphereof U.S. vital interests-duringa periodof Russ- ian weaknessand is likelyto provokea harshresponsefromMoscow. From a liberalperspective,however,expansionwill reinforcethe nascentdemocraciesof CentralEuropeand extendNATO'S conflict- managementmechanismsto a potentiallyturbulentregion.A third viewmightstressthe valueof incorporating the CzechRepublic,Hun- gary, and Polandwithin the Westernsecuritycommunity, whosemem- berssharea commonidentitythathasmadewarlargelyunthinkable. No singleapproachcancaptureall the complexityof contemporary worldpolitics.Therefore,we arebetteroffwitha diversearrayof com- petingideasratherthan a singletheoreticalorthodoxy.Competition between theorieshelps reveal their strengthsand weaknessesand spurssubsequentrefinements,while revealingflawsin conventional wisdom.Althoughwe shouldtake care to emphasizeinventiveness over invective,we shouldwelcomeandencouragethe heterogeneity of contemporary scholarship. WHERE ARE WE COMING FROM? The studyof international affairsis bestunderstoodas a protracted com- petitionbetweentherealist,liberal,andradical traditions. Realismempha- sizes the enduringpropensityfor conflictbetweenstates;liberalism identifiesseveralwaysto mitigatetheseconflictivetendencies; andthe radicaltradition describes howtheentiresystemofstaterelations mightbe transformed. The boundariesbetweenthese traditionsaresomewhatfuzzy and a numberof importantworksdo not fit neatlyinto any of them, but debateswithin and amongthem have largelydefinedthe discipline. 30 FOREIGN POLICY This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  Walt Realism Realismwas the dominanttheoreticaltraditionthroughoutthe Cold War.It depictsinternational affairsas a struggleforpoweramongself- interestedstatesand is generallypessimisticaboutthe prospectsfor eliminatingconflictandwar.Realismdominatedin the ColdWaryears becauseit providedsimplebutpowerfulexplanations forwar,alliances, imperialism, obstaclesto cooperation, and otherinternational phenom- ena,andbecauseits emphasison competitionwasconsistentwiththe centralfeaturesof the American-Soviet rivalry. Realismis not a singletheory,of course,andrealistthoughtevolved considerably throughout the ColdWar."Classical" realistssuchasHans Morgenthauand ReinholdNiebuhrbelievedthat states,like human beings,hadan innatedesireto dominateothers,whichledthemto fight wars.Morgenthau alsostressedthe virtuesof the classical,multipolar, balance-of-power systemandsawthe bipolarrivalrybetweenthe Unit- ed Statesandthe SovietUnionas especiallydangerous. By contrast,the "neorealist" theoryadvancedby KennethWaltz ignored human nature and focused on the effectsof the international For system. Waltz,the international systemconsistedof a numberof greatpowers,each seekingto survive.Becausethe systemis anarchic (i.e., thereis no centralauthorityto protectstatesfromone another), each statehas to surviveon its own.Waltzarguedthat thiscondition wouldlead weakerstatesto balanceagainst,ratherthan bandwagon with, morepowerfulrivals.And contraryto Morgenthau, he claimed thatbipolarity wasmorestablethanmultipolarity. An importantrefinementto realismwas the additionof offense- defensetheory,as laid out by RobertJervis,GeorgeQuester,and StephenVan Evera.These scholarsarguedthat warwas morelikely whenstatescouldconquereachothereasily.Whendefensewaseasier thanoffense,however,securitywasmoreplentiful,incentivesto expand declined,and cooperationcould blossom.And if defensehad the advantage, andstatescoulddistinguish betweenoffensiveanddefensive weapons, then statescould acquirethe meansto defendthemselves withoutthreatening others,therebydampening the effectsof anarchy. Forthese"defensive" realists,statesmerelysoughtto surviveandgreat powerscouldguaranteetheirsecurityby formingbalancingalliancesand choosingdefensivemilitarypostures(such as retaliatorynuclearforces). Not surprisingly,Waltz and most other neorealistsbelieved that the United States was extremelysecure for most of the Cold War.Their SPRING 1998 31 This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  Relations International principlefearwasthatit mightsquander itsfavorable positionbyadopt- inganoverlyaggressiveforeignpolicy.Thus,bytheendof theColdWar, realismhadmovedawayfromMorgenthau's darkbroodingabouthuman natureandtakenon a slightlymoreoptimistictone. Liberalism The principalchallengeto realismcamefroma broadfamilyof liber- al theories.One strandof liberalthoughtarguedthateconomicinter- dependencewould discouragestatesfrom using force againsteach otherbecausewarfarewouldthreateneachside'sprosperity. A second strand, often associated with President Woodrow Wilson, saw the of spread democracy as the keyto world peace,basedon the claimthat democraticstateswere inherentlymorepeacefulthan authoritarian states. A third, more recent theory argued that international institutionssuch as the InternationalEnergyAgencyand the Inter- nationalMonetaryFundcouldhelp overcomeselfishstatebehavior, mainlybyencouraging statesto foregoimmediategainsforthe greater benefitsof enduringcooperation. Althoughsomeliberalsflirtedwiththe ideathatnew transnational actors, especially the multinationalcorporation,were gradually encroaching on thepowerof states,liberalism sawstatesasthe generally centralplayersin international affairs.All liberaltheoriesimpliedthat cooperation wasmorepervasive thaneventhe defensiveversionof real- ismallowed,buteachviewoffereda differentrecipeforpromoting it. RadicalApproaches Until the 1980s,marxismwasthe mainalternativeto the mainstream realistand liberaltraditions.Whererealismand liberalismtook the statesystemforgranted,marxismofferedboth a differentexplanation forinternational conflictanda blueprintforfundamentally transform- ing the existinginternationalorder. Orthodoxmarxisttheorysawcapitalism asthe centralcauseof inter- nationalconflict.Capitaliststatesbattledeachotheras a consequence of theirincessantstruggleforprofitsandbattledsocialiststatesbecause they saw in them the seeds of their own destruction.Neomarxist "dependency"theory, by contrast, focused on relations between advancedcapitalistpowersand lessdevelopedstatesand arguedthat the former-aided by an unholy alliance with the ruling classes of the developing world-had grown rich by exploiting the latter.The solu- 32 FOREIGN POLICY This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  Relations International tion wasto overthrowtheseparasiticelitesandinstalla revolutionary governmentcommittedto autonomous development. Bothof thesetheorieswerelargelydiscredited beforethe ColdWar even ended.The extensivehistoryof economicandmilitarycoopera- tion amongthe advancedindustrial powersshowedthatcapitalism did not inevitablylead to conflict.The bitterschismsthat dividedthe communistworldshowedthat socialismdid not alwayspromotehar- mony. Dependencytheorysufferedsimilarempiricalsetbacksas it becameincreasingly clearthat,first,activeparticipation in the world economy was a betterroute to prosperity than autonomous socialist development;and,second,manydeveloping countriesprovedthem- selvesquitecapableof bargaining with successfully multinational cor- porationsandothercapitalistinstitutions. As marxismsuccumbedto its variousfailings,its mantle was assumedby a groupof theoristswho borrowedheavilyfromthe wave of postmodernwritingsin literarycriticismand social theory.This "deconstructionist"approachwas openly skepticalof the effortto devise generalor universaltheoriessuch as realismor liberalism. Indeed,its proponentsemphasizedthe importanceof languageand discoursein shapingsocialoutcomes.However,becausethesescholars focusedinitiallyon criticizingthe mainstream paradigms but did not offerpositivealternativesto them, they remaineda self-consciously dissidentminorityformostof the 1980s. DomesticPolitics Not allColdWarscholarship on internationalaffairsfit neatlyintothe realist,liberal,or marxistparadigms.In particular,a numberof impor- tantworksfocusedon the characteristics of states,governmental orga- nizations,orindividualleaders.The democratic strandof liberaltheory fits underthis heading,as do the effortsof scholarssuch as Graham AllisonandJohnSteinbruner to use organization theoryandbureau- craticpoliticsto explainforeignpolicybehavior,and thoseof Jervis, IrvingJanis,andothers,whichappliedsocialandcognitivepsycholo- gy.Forthe mostpart,theseeffortsdidnot seekto providea generalthe- oryof international behaviorbut to identifyotherfactorsthat might lead states to behave contraryto the predictionsof the realistor liber- al approaches.Thus, much of this literatureshould be regardedas a complement to the three main paradigmsrather than as a rival approachfor analysisof the internationalsystemas a whole. 34 FOREIGN POLICY This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  Walt NEW WRINKLES IN OLD PARADIGMS Scholarshipon internationalaffairshas diversifiedsignificantlysince the end of the Cold War.Non-Americanvoices are moreprominent,a wider range of methods and theories are seen as legitimate,and new issuessuch as ethnic conflict, the environment,and the futureof the state have been placed on the agendaof scholarseverywhere. Yetthe senseof dejavu is equallystriking.Insteadof resolvingthe strug- gle betweencompetingtheoreticaltraditions,the end of the Cold Warhas merelylauncheda new seriesof debates.Ironically,even as manysocieties embracesimilaridealsof democracy,freemarkets,and humanrights,the scholarswho studythese developmentsaremoredividedthan ever. Realism Redux Although the end of the Cold War led a few writersto declare that realismwas destined for the academicscrapheap,rumorsof its demise have been largelyexaggerated. A recent contributionof realisttheoryis its attentionto the problem of relativeand absolutegains.Respondingto the institutionalists'claim that internationalinstitutionswould enable states to foregoshort-term advantagesforthe sakeof greaterlong-termgains,realistssuchasJoseph Grieco and Stephen Krasnerpoint out that anarchyforces states to worryaboutboth the absolutegainsfromcooperationand the way that gainsare distributedamongparticipants.The logic is straightforward: If one state reapslargergains than its partners,it will graduallybecome stronger,and its partnerswill eventuallybecome morevulnerable. Realistshave alsobeen quickto explorea varietyof new issues.Barry Posen offersa realist explanationfor ethnic conflict, noting that the breakupof multiethnicstatescouldplace rivalethnic groupsin an anar- chic setting,therebytriggeringintensefearsand temptingeach groupto use force to improveits relativeposition. This problemwould be par- ticularlyseverewhen each group'sterritorycontainedenclaves inhabit- ed by their ethnic rivals-as in the formerYugoslavia-because each side would be tempted to "cleanse"(preemptively)these alien minori- ties and expand to incorporateany othersfromtheir ethnic groupthat lay outside their borders.Realists have also cautioned that NATO, absent a clear enemy, would likely face increasingstrains and that expandingits presenceeastwardwouldjeopardizerelationswith Russia. Finally,scholarssuch as Michael Mastandunohave arguedthat U.S. SPRING 1998 35 This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  Relations International Waiting for Mr. X The post-ColdWarworldstill awaitsits "X"article.Althoughmany have tried,no one hasmanagedto pen the sortof compellinganalysis thatGeorgeKennanprovided foranearlierera,whenhe articulated the theory of containment. Instead of a singlenew the vision, most impor- tantdevelopment in post-ColdWarwritingson worldaffairsisthe con- tinuingclashbetweenthosewhobelieveworldpoliticshasbeen (oris being)fundamentally transformed andthosewhobelievethatthefuture will looka lot likethe past. Scholarswhoseetheendof theColdWarasa watershed fallinto two distinctgroups.Manyexpertsstillsee the stateas the mainactor butbelievethatthe agendaof statesis shiftingfrommilitarycompeti- tionto economiccompetitiveness, domesticwelfare,andenvironmen- tal protection.Thus,PresidentBill Clintonhas embracedthe view that"enlightened self-interest[and]sharedvalues.., willcompelusto cooperatein moreconstructiveways."Some writersattributethis changeto the spreadof democracy, othersto the nuclearstalemate, andstillothersto changesin international norms. An evenmoreradicalperspective questionswhetherthe stateis still the mostimportantinternational actor.JessicaMathewsbelieves that "theabsolutesof the Westphalian system[of]territoriallyfixed states... areall dissolving,"andJohnRuggiearguesthatwe do not even have a vocabulary that can adequately describethe new forces that (he believes) are transforming contemporary world politics. Althoughthereis still no consensuson the causesof this trend,the view that statesare of decreasingrelevanceis surprisingly common amongacademics, journalists,andpolicywonks. Prominent realistssuchasChristopher LayneandKennethWaltz continueto givethe stateprideof placeandpredicta returnto familiar patternsof greatpowercompetition.Similarly, RobertKeohaneand otherinstitutionalists alsoemphasize the centralroleof the stateand arguethat institutionssuch as the EuropeanUnion and NATO are important preciselybecausetheyprovidecontinuityin themidstofdra- maticpoliticalshifts.Theseauthorsallregardthe endof the ColdWar asa far-reaching shiftin the globalbalanceofpowerbutdo notseeit as a qualitative transformation in the basicnatureof worldpolitics. Who is right?Toosoon to tell, but the debatebearswatching in the yearsto come. -S.W. 36 FOREIGN POLICY This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  Walt foreignpolicyis generallyconsistentwithrealistprinciples, insofarasits actionsarestilldesignedto preserveU.S. predominance andto shapea postwarorderthatadvancesAmericaninterests. The mostinteresting conceptualdevelopment withinthe realistpar- adigm has been the emergingsplitbetween the "defensive"and"offen- sive"strandsof thought.Defensiverealistssuchas Waltz,VanEvera, andJackSnyderassumedthatstateshadlittleintrinsicinterestin mili- taryconquestand arguedthat the costs of expansiongenerallyout- weighedthe benefits.Accordingly, they maintainedthat greatpower warsoccurredlargelybecausedomesticgroupsfosteredexaggerated per- ceptionsof threatandan excessivefaithin the efficacyof militaryforce. Thisviewis nowbeingchallengedalongseveralfronts.First,asRan- dallSchwellernotes,the neorealistassumption thatstatesmerelyseek to survive"stackedthe deck"in favorof the statusquobecauseit pre- cludedthe threatof predatory revisioniststates-nationssuchasAdolf Hitler'sGermanyor NapoleonBonaparte's Francethat "valuewhat they covet far more than whattheypossess" arewillingto riskanni- and hilationto achievetheiraims.Second,PeterLiberman,in his book DoesConquest Pay?,usesa numberof historicalcases-such astheNazi occupation WesternEuropeand Soviet hegemonyover Eastern of Europe-to showthatthe benefitsof conquestoftenexceedthe costs, therebycastingdoubton the claimthatmilitaryexpansionis no longer cost-effective.Third, offensive realists such as Eric Labs, John Mearsheimer, and FareedZakariaarguethat anarchyencouragesall statesto tryto maximizetheirrelativestrengthsimplybecauseno state can everbe surewhena trulyrevisionistpowermightemerge. Thesedifferences helpexplainwhyrealistsdisagreeoverissuessuch as the futureof Europe.FordefensiverealistssuchasVanEvera,waris rarelyprofitableandusuallyresultsfrommilitarism, hypemrnationalism, or someotherdistortingdomesticfactor.BecauseVanEverabelieves suchforcesarelargelyabsentin post-ColdWarEurope,he concludes that the regionis "primedfor peace."By contrast,Mearsheimer and otheroffensiverealistsbelievethatanarchyforcesgreatpowersto com- pete irrespective of theirinternalcharacteristics andthatsecuritycom- petition will return to Europeassoonasthe U.S. pacifieris withdrawn. New Life for Liberalism The defeatof communismsparkeda roundof self-congratulationin the West, best exemplified by Francis Fukuyama'sinfamous claim that SPRING 1998 37 This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  International Relations COMPETING PARADIGMS REALISM LIBERALISM CONSTRUCTIVISMI MainTheoretical Self-interested states forpower Concern State behavior shaped Proposition compete for constantly overridden byeconomic/ beliefs, byl61ite powerorsecurity considerations political collective norms, forprosperity, (desire andsocial identities commitmentto liberal values) MainUnitsof Analysis States States Individuals (especially l61ites) MainInstruments Economic and Varies (international Ideas and especially military economic institutions, discourse power exchange, promotion ofdemocracy) Modern Theorists HansMorgenthau, Michael Doyle, Alexander Wendt, Kenneth Waltz RobertKeohane JohnRuggie Representative Waltz, of Theory Keohane, Wendt, Is "Anarchy Modern Works International Politics After Hegemony WhatStates Make ofIt" "Back Mearsheimer, to "The Fukuyama, Endof (International theFuture: Instability (National History?" 1992); Organization, inEurope after 1989) Interest, Koslowski & theCold War" Kratochwil, "Under- (International Security, standing Changesin 1990) International Politics" (International 1994) Organization, Post-Cold War of Resurgence Increased cooperation Agnostic it because Prediction overt great power asliberal free values, cannot the predict competition markets,interna- and content ofideas tional institutions spreac MainLimitation Does notaccount for Tendstoignore the Better atdescribing the international change role ofpower pastthan anticipating thefuture 38 FOREIGN POLICY This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  Walt humankind hadnowreachedthe "endof history." Historyhaspaidlit- tle attention to this boast, but the triumph of the West did give a notableboostto all threestrandsof liberalthought. Byfarthe mostinteresting andimportant development hasbeenthe lively debateon the "democratic peace."Althoughthe most recent phase of thisdebate had begun even beforethe SovietUnioncollapsed, it becamemore influentialas the numberof democraciesbeganto increaseandas evidenceof thisrelationship beganto accumulate. Democraticpeacetheoryis a refinementof the earlierclaimthat democracies wereinherently morepeacefulthanautocratic states.Itrests on the beliefthat althoughdemocracies seemto fightwarsas oftenas other states,they rarely,if ever,fight one another.Scholarssuch as MichaelDoyle,JamesLeeRay,andBruceRussetthaveoffereda number of explanations forthistendency,the mostpopularbeingthatdemocra- cies embracenormsof compromise that bar the use of forceagainst groups espousing similarprinciples. is hardto thinkof a moreinfluen- It tial,recent academic debate,insofarasthebeliefthat"democracies don't fight each other"has been an importantjustification for the Clinton administration's effortsto enlargethe sphereof democratic rule. It is thereforeironicthatfaithin the "democratic peace"becamethe basisforU.S. policyjustasadditional researchwasbeginningto identify severalqualifiersto this theory.First,Snyderand EdwardMansfield pointedout thatstatesmaybe moreproneto warwhentheyarein the midstof a democratictransition,which impliesthat effortsto export democracymightactuallymakethingsworse.Second,criticssuchas JoanneGowaandDavidSpirohavearguedthatthe apparent absenceof warbetweendemocracies is due to the waythat democracy has been definedandto the relativedearthof democratic states(especiallybefore 1945). In addition,ChristopherLaynehas pointedout that when democracies havecomecloseto warin the pasttheirdecisionto remain at peaceultimately hadlittledo withtheirshareddemocratic character. Third, clearcut evidencethatdemocracies donotfighteachotheriscon- finedto the post-1945era,and,asGowahasemphasized, the absenceof conflictin thisperiodmaybe duemoreto theircommoninterestin con- tainingthe SovietUnionthanto shareddemocratic principles. Liberalinstitutionalistslikewisehave continued to adapttheir own theories.On the one hand,the coreclaimsof institutionalisttheoryhave become more modest over time. Institutionsare now said to facilitate cooperationwhen it is in each state'sinterestto do so, but it is widely SPRING 1998 39 This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  Relations International agreedthattheycannotforcestatesto behavein waysthatarecontrary to the states'own selfishinterests.[Forfurtherdiscussion,pleasesee RobertKeohane's article.]On the otherhand,institutionalists suchas JohnDuffield and Robert McCalla have extended the into theory new substantive areas,mostnotablythe studyof NATO.Forthesescholars, NATO'S highlyinstitutionalized characterhelpsexplainwhyit hasbeen ableto surviveandadapt,despitethedisappearance of itsmainadversary. Theeconomicstrandofliberaltheoryisstillinfluential aswell.Inpar- ticular,a numberof scholarshaverecentlysuggested thatthe "globaliza- tion" of world markets,the rise of transnationalnetworksand nongovernmental organizations, andthe rapidspreadof globalcommu- nicationstechnologyareundermining the powerof statesandshifting attentionawayfrommilitarysecuritytowardeconomicsandsocialwel- fare.The detailsarenovel but the basiclogic is familiar: As societies aroundthe globebecomeenmeshedin a web of economicand social connections,the costsof disrupting theseties will effectivelypreclude unilateral stateactions,especiallythe useof force. This perspectiveimpliesthat warwill remaina remotepossibility amongthe advancedindustrial democracies.It alsosuggeststhatbring- ing China and Russiainto the relentless embrace of worldcapitalismis the bestwayto promotebothprosperity andpeace,particularly if this processcreatesa strongmiddleclassin thesestatesandreinforces pres- suresto democratize. Get thesesocietieshookedon prosperity andcom- petitionwillbe confinedto the economicrealm. Thisviewhasbeenchallengedby scholarswho arguethatthe actu- al scopeof "globalization"is modestandthatthesevarioustransactions stilltakeplacein environments thatareshapedandregulated bystates. Nonetheless, the beliefthat economic forces are superseding tradition- al greatpowerpoliticsenjoyswidespread acceptanceamongscholars, pundits,andpolicymakers, andthe roleof the stateis likelyto be an importanttopic forfutureacademic inquiry. Constructivist Theories Whereasrealismandliberalism tendto focuson materialfactorssuchas powerortrade,constructivist approaches the impactof ideas. emphasize Insteadof takingthe state for grantedand assumingthat it simplyseeks to survive,constructivistsregardthe interestsand identitiesof statesas a highly malleable product of specific historical processes.They pay close attention to the prevailingdiscourse(s)in society because dis- 40 FOREIGN POLICY This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  Walt coursereflectsandshapesbeliefsandinterests,andestablishes accepted normsof behavior.Consequently, constructivismis especiallyattentive to the sourcesof change,andthis approach has largelyreplacedmarx- ismas the preeminentradicalperspective on international affairs. The end of the ColdWarplayedan importantrolein legitimating constructivisttheoriesbecauserealismand liberalismboth failedto anticipatethis event andhad sometroubleexplainingit. Construc- tivists had an explanation:Specifically,formerpresidentMikhail Gorbachevrevolutionized Sovietforeignpolicybecausehe embraced new ideassuchas "commonsecurity." Moreover,given that we live in an erawhereold normsarebeing challenged,once clearboundaries aredissolving,andissuesof identi- ty arebecomingmoresalient,it is hardlysurprising thatscholarshave been drawnto approachesthat place these issuesfrontand center. Froma constructivistperspective,in fact, the centralissue in the post-ColdWarworldis howdifferentgroupsconceivetheiridentities and interests.Although power is not irrelevant,constructivism emphasizes how ideasandidentitiesarecreated,howtheyevolve,and how theyshapethe waystatesunderstand andrespondto theirsitua- tion. Therefore,it matterswhetherEuropeans definethemselvespri- marily in nationalor continentalterms;whether GermanyandJapan redefinetheirpastsin waysthatencouragetheiradoptingmoreactive international roles;andwhetherthe UnitedStatesembracesorrejects its identityas "globalpoliceman." Constructivist theoriesarequitediverseanddo not offera unified set of predictionson anyof theseissues.At a purelyconceptuallevel, AlexanderWendthas arguedthat the realistconceptionof anarchy doesnot adequatelyexplainwhy conflictoccursbetweenstates.The realissueis how anarchyis understood-inWendt'swords,"Anarchy is whatstatesmakeof it."Anotherstrandof constructivist theoryhas focusedon the futureof the territorialstate,suggestingthat transna- tionalcommunication andsharedcivic valuesareundermining tradi- tionalnationalloyaltiesandcreatingradicallynew formsof political association.Otherconstructivists focuson the roleof norms,arguing thatinternational lawandothernormativeprincipleshaveerodedear- lier notions of sovereignty and altered the legitimate purposesfor which state power may be employed.The common theme in each of these strandsis the capacityof discourseto shape how political actors define themselvesand their interests,and thus modifytheir behavior. SPRING 1998 41 This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Relations DomesticPoliticsReconsidered As in the ColdWar,scholarscontinueto explorethe impactof domes- tic politicson the behaviorof states.Domesticpoliticsareobviously centralto the debateon the democraticpeace,and scholarssuch as Snyder,JeffreyFrieden,andHelenMilnerhaveexaminedhowdomes- tic interestgroupscandistorttheformation of statepreferencesandlead to suboptimalinternationalbehavior.GeorgeDowns,DavidRocke, andothershavealsoexploredhowdomesticinstitutions canhelpstates dealwith the perennialproblemof uncertainty, whilestudentsof psy- chologyhave appliedprospecttheoryandothernew tools to explain why decisionmakersfail to act in a rationalfashion.[Forfurtherdis- cussionaboutforeignpolicydecisionmaking,pleasesee the articleby Margaret HermannandJoeHagan.] The pastdecadehas alsowitnessedan explosionof interestin the conceptof culture,a developmentthatoverlapswiththe constructivist emphasison the importance of ideasandnorms.Thus,ThomasBerger andPeterKatzenstein haveusedculturalvariables to explainwhyGer- and many Japan have thus far eschewed more self-reliant militarypoli- cies;ElizabethKierhas offereda culturalinterpretation of Britishand Frenchmilitarydoctrinesin the interwar period;andlainJohnstonhas tracedcontinuitiesin Chineseforeignpolicyto a deeplyrootedformof "cultural realism."SamuelHuntington's direwarningsaboutan immi- nent "clashof civilizations"aresymptomatic of thistrendaswell,inso- faras his argumentrestson the claimthatbroadculturalaffinitiesare now supplantingnationalloyalties.Thoughthese and other works defineculturein widelyvaryingwaysand have yet to providea full explanationof how it worksor how enduringits effectsmightbe, cul- turalperspectives have been verymuchin vogueduringthe pastfive years. This trendis partlya reflectionof the broaderinterestin cultural issuesin the academicworld(andwithinthe publicdebateaswell)and partlya responseto the upsurgein ethnic,nationalist,andculturalcon- flictssincethe demiseof the SovietUnion. TOMORROW'S CONCEPTUAL TOOLBOX While these debatesreflectthe diversityof contemporaryscholarshipon internationalaffairs,therearealsoobvioussignsof convergence.Mostreal- ists recognizethat nationalism,militarism, and other domestic ethnicity, factorsare important;liberalsacknowledgethat poweris centralto inter- 42 FOREIGN POLICY This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  Walt nationalbehavior;and someconstructivists admitthat ideaswill have greaterimpactwhenbackedbypowerful statesandreinforced byenduring materialforces.The boundaries of eachparadigm aresomewhatperme- able,andthereis ampleopportunity forintellectual arbitrage. Whichof thesebroadperspectives shedsthe mostlighton contem- poraryinternational affairs,andwhichshouldpolicymakers keepmost firmly in mind when charting our course into the next century? Althoughmanyacademics(and morethan a few policymakers) are loatheto admitit, realismremainsthe mostcompellinggeneralframe- workforunderstanding international relations.Statescontinueto pay closeattentionto the balanceof powerandto worryaboutthe possi- bilityof majorconflict.Amongotherthings,thisenduringpreoccupa- tionwithpowerandsecurityexplainswhymanyAsiansandEuropeans are now eagerto preserve-andpossiblyexpand-the U.S. military presencein their regions.As Czech presidentVaiclavHavel has warned,if NATO failsto expand,"wemightbe headingfora newglob- al catastrophe... [which]couldcost us all muchmorethanthe two worldwars."Thesearenot the wordsof a manwhobelievesthatgreat powerrivalryhasbeenbanishedforever. As fortheUnitedStates,thepastdecadehasshownhowmuchit likes being"number one"andhowdetermined it isto remainin a predominant position. The United Stateshas taken advantage of itscurrentsuperiori- ty to imposeitspreferences wherever possible,evenat the riskof irritat- ingmany of itslong-standing allies.Ithas forceda seriesofone-sidedarms controlagreements on Russia,dominated theproblematic peaceeffortin Bosnia,takenstepsto expandNATOintoRussia's backyard, andbecome increasingly concernedaboutthe risingpowerof China.It has called repeatedly for greaterrelianceon multilateralism and a largerrolefor international institutions, but has treatedagenciessuchas the United Nationsandthe WorldTradeOrganization withdisdainwhenevertheir actionsdidnot conformto U.S. interests. It refusedto jointherestof the worldin outlawingthe production of landminesandwaspolitelyunco- operative at the Kyotoenvironmental summit.AlthoughU.S. leadersare adeptatcloakingtheiractionsin theloftyrhetoricof"world naked order," self-interest liesbehindmostof them.Thus,theendof theColdWardid not bringthe end of powerpolitics,andrealismis likelyto remainthe sin- gle most usefulinstrumentin our intellectualtoolbox. Yet realism does not explain everything, and a wise leader would also keep insights from the rival paradigmsin mind. Liberaltheories SPRING 1998 43 This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Relations identify the instrumentsthat states can use to achieve shared inter- ests, highlight the powerful economic forces with which states and societies must now contend, and help us understandwhy states may differ in their basic preferences.Paradoxically,because U.S. protec- tion reducesthe dangerof regionalrivalriesand reinforcesthe "liber- al peace"that emergedafter 1945, these factorsmaybecome relatively more important, as long as the United States continues to provide securityand stability in many partsof the world. Meanwhile,constructivisttheoriesare best suited to the analysisof how identities and interestscan change over time, therebyproducing subtle shifts in the behavior of states and occasionallytriggeringfar- reaching but unexpected shifts in international affairs.It matters if political identity in Europecontinues to shift from the nation-stateto more local regionsor to a broadersense of Europeanidentity,just as it matters if nationalism is graduallysupplantedby the sort of "civiliza- tional" affinitiesemphasizedby Huntington. Realism has little to say about these prospects, and policymakers could be blind-sided by change if they ignorethese possibilitiesentirely. In short, each of these competing perspectivescapturesimportant aspects of world politics. Our understandingwould be impoverished were our thinking confined to only one of them. The "compleatdiplo- mat"of the futureshouldremaincognizantof realism'semphasison the inescapablerole of power,keep liberalism'sawarenessof domesticforces in mind, and occasionallyreflecton constructivism's vision of change. WANT TO KNOW MORE? For a fair-mindedsurveyof the realist,liberal,and marxistparadigms, see Michael Doyle'sWays of War and Peace (New York,NY:Norton, 1997). A guide to some recent developmentsin internationalpolitical thought is Doyle & G. John Ikenberry,eds., New Thinking in Inter- national Relations Theory (Boulder,CO: Westview,1997). Those interestedin realismshouldexamine The Perils of Anarchy: ContemporaryRealism and InternationalSecurity (Cambridge,MA: MITPress,1995) by MichaelBrown,Sean Lynn-Jones,& Steven Miller, eds.; "Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their War Aims" (SecurityStudies,Summer1997) by EricLabs;and "Dueling Realisms" (International Summer1997) by Stephen Brooks.Foralter- Organization, 44 FOREIGN POLICY This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  Walt native realistassessmentsof contemporary worldpolitics,see John Mearsheimer's "Backto the Future:Instabilityin Europeafterthe Cold War"(International Summer1990) and RobertJervis' Security, "TheFutureof WorldPolitics:WillIt Resemblethe Past?"(Interna- tionalSecurity,Winter1991-92).A realistexplanationof ethniccon- flict is BarryPosen's"The SecurityDilemmaand EthnicConflict" (Survival, Spring1993);an up-to-datesurveyof offense-defense theory canbe foundin "TheSecurityDilemmaRevisited"byCharlesGlaser (WorldPolitics,October 1997); and recent U.S. foreignpolicy is explained in Michael Mastanduno's"Preserving the Unipolar Moment:RealistTheoriesand U.S. GrandStrategyafterthe Cold War"(International Spring1997). Security, The liberal approachto internationalaffairsis summarized in AndrewMoravcsik's "Taking Preferences Seriously: A LiberalTheo- ry of InternationalPolitics" (International Organization, Autumn 1997).Manyof the leadingcontributors to the debateon the democra- tic peacecan be foundin Brown& Lynn-Jones, eds.,Debatingthe DemocraticPeace (Cambridge, MA: MITPress,1996) and Miriam Elman,ed.,Paths to Peace: Is Democracythe Answer?(Cambridge, MA:MITPress,1997).The contributions of institutionalist theoryand thedebateon relativegainsaresummarized in DavidBaldwin,ed.,Neo- realismand Neoliberalism:The Contemporary Debate (New York, NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993).An importantcritiqueof the institutionalist literature is Mearsheimer's"TheFalsePromiseof Inter- nationalInstitutions"(Intemrnational Security,Winter1994-95),butone shouldalsoexaminethe responses in the Summer1995issue.Forappli- cationsof institutionalist theoryto NATO,seeJohnDuffield's "NATO's Functionsafter the Cold War"(PoliticalScienceQuarterly, Winter 1994-95) and Robert McCalla's"NATO's Persistenceafterthe Cold War"(International Summer1996). Organization, Authorsquestioningthe roleof the stateincludeSusanStrangein The Retreatof the State:The Diffusionof Powerin the WorldEcon- omy(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1996);andJessicaMath- ews in "PowerShift" (Foreign Affairs,January/February 1997). The emergenceof the stateis analyzed by Hendrik Spruyt in The Sovereign Stateand Its Competitors (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1994), and its continued importanceis defended in Globalizationin Question: The InternationalEconomyand the Possibilitiesof Gover- nance (Cambridge:Polity, 1996) by Paul Hirst and GrahameThomp- SPRING 1998 45 This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Affairs son, andGoverningthe GlobalEconomy:InternationalFinanceand the State (Cambridge, MA:Harvard UniversityPress,1994)by Ethan Kapstein.Anotherdefense(froma somewhatunlikelysource)is "The WorldEconomy:The Futureof the State"(TheEconomist, Septem- ber 20, 1997),anda moreacademicdiscussionof theseissuesis Peter Evans'"TheEclipseof the State?Reflectionson Statenessin an Era of Globalization" October1997). (WorldPolitics, Readersinterestedin constructivist approachesshouldbeginwith AlexanderWendt's"AnarchyIs WhatStatesMakeof It: The Social Constructionof Power Politics"(International Organization,Spring 1992), while awaitinghis Social Theory of InternationalPolitics (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,forthcoming).A diverse arrayof culturaland constructivistapproaches mayalso be foundin PeterKatzenstein, ed., The Cultureof NationalSecurity(New York, NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996) and YosefLapid& Friedrich Kratochwil, eds.,The Returnof Cultureand Identityin IR Theory (Boulder:CO:LynneRienner,1996). Forlinksto relevantWebsites,aswell as a comprehensive indexof relatedarticles,accesswww.foreignpolicy.com. aheanwaaetl gplace o gg ah fregng icyCmuiy http://www.forei Selected full-text articles from the current issue of FOREIGNPOLICY * Access to internationaldata and resources* Over 150 relatedWeb site links * Interactive Letters to the Editor * Debates * 10 years of archival summariesand more to come... Access the issues! This content downloaded on Sat, 29 Dec 2012 03:00:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions