American Foreign Policy (Module 4) PDF

**Teaching-Learning Activity/Lesson Proper:** +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | **AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY** | | | | **A. Definition of Terms:**...

**Teaching-Learning Activity/Lesson Proper:** +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | **AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY** | | | | **A. Definition of Terms:** | | | | **Foreign Policy -- a nation's external goals and the techniques and | | strategies used to achieve them** | | | | **Diplomacy --the total process by which states carry on political | | relations with each other; settling conflicts among nations by | | peaceful means** | | | | **economic aid -- assistance to other nations in the form of grants, | | loans, or credits to buy American products** | | | | **technical assistance -- sending experts with technical skills in | | agriculture, engineering, or business to aid other nations** | | | | **foreign policy process -- the steps by which external goals are | | decided and acted on** | | | | **national security policy -- foreign and domestic policy designed to | | protect the independence and political and economic integrity of the | | United States; policy that is concerned with the safety and defense | | of nation** | | | | **national security council -- a board to advise the president on | | matters of national security** | | | | **\*Making Foreign Policy** | | | | **B. Constitutional Powers of the President** | | | | **1. executive power -- 'preserve, protect, and defend the | | constitution of the US"** | | | | **2. Commander in chief -- been involved in wars** | | | | **3. Power to make treaties, provided that 2/3 of the senators | | present concur (executive agreements - a binding international | | obligations made between chiefs of state without legislative | | sanction** | | | | **4. Appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; power | | to recognize foreign governments through receiving their | | ambassadors** | | | | **5. Other sources:** | | | | **(a) has access to information from the CIA, state department, and | | defense department. This carries with it the ability to make quick | | decisions -- and that ability is used often;** | | | | **(b) a legislative leader who can influence the amount of funds that | | are allocated for different programs -- can increase defense spending | | and decrease non-defense spending; and,** | | | | **(c) can influence public opinion - can command the media -- appeal | | to patriotic sentiment and sometimes fear and can make the people | | think that their foreign affairs is fair and necessary.** | | | | **(d) can commit the nation morally to a course of action in foreign | | affairs -- once he made the commitment, the congress finds a | | difficulty in backing down from the commitment.** | | | | **C. Sources of Foreign Policy within the Executive** | | | | **1. Department of State** | | | | **a. supervises relations with other countries** | | | | **b. ambassadors and diplomatic corps but set aside in case of more | | important concerns** | | | | **2. National Security Council** | | | | **a. advise the president on information on the integration of | | domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national | | security** | | | | **b. provide policy continuity from one administration to the next** | | | | **c. composition: president, vice president, secretaries of state and | | defense, director of emergency planning, and often the chair of the | | joint chiefs of staff and the director of the CIA** | | | | **d. used in just anyway the president wants to use it** | | | | **e. national security adviser is to advise the president** | | | | **3. Intelligence community** | | | | **a. government agencies involved in gathering information about the | | capabilities and intentions of foreign governments and engaging in | | covert activities to further American foreign policy aims** | | | | **b. Composition** | | | | **1. Central Intelligence Agency -- overt information gathering as | | well as covert actions; covertly aided in the overthrow of foreign | | leaders; found in the 1970s to be routinely spying on American | | citizens domestically; from military to economic intelligence; used | | the US Information Agency particularly its Voice of America to spread | | information and propaganda throughout the world on behalf of the | | American government and from an American point of View** | | | | **2. Department of Defense -- bring all of the activities of the | | American military establishment under the jurisdiction of a single | | department headed by a civilian secretary of defense; Pentagon** | | | | **a. National security agency** | | | | **b. Defense intelligence agency** | | | | **c. Bureau of intelligence and research in the department of state** | | | | **d. Federal bureau of investigation** | | | | **e. Army intelligence** | | | | **f. Air force intelligence** | | | | **g. Department of treasury** | | | | **h. Drug enforcement administration** | | | | **i. Department of energy** | | | | **D. Domestic sources of foreign Policy** | | | | **1. elite and mass opinion -- elites in American business, | | education, communication, labor, and religion try to influence | | presidential decision making through several strategies e.g., | | publicizing the issues, use of the media -- capture the attentive | | public who likely transmit their opinions to the less-interested | | members of the public through conversation and local leadership** | | | | **2. military industrial complex -- mutually beneficial relationship | | between the armed forces and defense contractors; pentagon has | | supported a large sector of the economy through defense contracts, in | | addition of supplying retired army officers as key executives to | | large defense-contracting firms; department of defense employs almost | | 350 lobbyists on Capitol Hill; it maintains some 2,850 public | | relations representatives I the Us and in foreign countries** | | | | **E. Major Foreign Policy Themes** | | | | **1. avoiding entanglements - due to its perception of corrupt | | European governments; its geographical distance, avoid entangling | | alliances** | | | | **2. 19th century Isolationism: Monroe Doctrine -- the policy | | statement which set out three principles: (1) European nations should | | not establish new colonies in the western Hemisphere, (2) European | | nations should not intervene in the affairs of independent nations of | | the Western Hemisphere, and (3) the United States would not interfere | | in the affairs of European nations** | | | | **Throughout the 19th century is characterized by isolationism: a | | period of abstaining from an active role in international affairs or | | alliances, which characterized most of the nineteenth century** | | | | **3. Interventionism and World War I -- involvement in foreign | | affairs, actions directed at changing or preserving the internal | | political arrangements of the nations; declaration of war against | | Germany was intended to protect American properties and lives** | | | | **With their geopolitical position completely unhampered by | | international developments, upon their re-emergence the Americans | | immediately became the ultimate arbiter of global affairs.** | | | | ** In 1898, the Americans seized nearly all of Spain\'s remaining | | overseas empire, including the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. By | | war\'s end, the Americans had 160 vessels, 114 of which were steel, | | placing it in the world\'s top five naval forces.** | | | | ** In 1899, the Americans adopted the Open-Door policy, ostensibly | | to allow trade with China. The policy was expressly designed to limit | | Japanese options and was certain in time to provoke a Japanese | | military response. While Europeans held most of the trade concessions | | in China, none of the European powers had the ability to project | | sufficient power into East Asia to protect them in the presence of | | Japanese action. The Americans, however, could. Open Door set the | | stage for the elimination of the European presence in Asia.** | | | | ** In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt announced his corollary to | | the Monroe Doctrine, indicating that the United States would | | proactively intervene in Latin American affairs expressly to minimize | | any and all European influence there; over the next twenty years the | | United States dispatched troops to the region thirty-two times. Not | | once were they opposed by an extra hemisphere power.** | | | | ** In 1905, the Roosevelt administration arbitrated an end to the | | Russo-Japanese War, splitting the disputed territories so that the | | Russians and Japanese not only had hopelessly entangled economic | | interests, but also something that Russia and Japan had never had | | before: a land border. The peace deal guaranteed future military | | conflict.** | | | | ** The Americans completed the Panama Canal in 1914. As if the | | American territories were insufficient to sustain American power, | | they had now permanently locked Mexico, Central America, and the | | northern third of South America into the American economic orbit. The | | canal also sliced nearly a month off the time it would take for their | | naval vessels to switch between Atlantic and Pacific theaters, adding | | strategic flexibility that no preceding naval power had ever | | possessed.** | | | | ** In 1917, the Americans became the last major belligerent to | | join** | | | | **World War I, where they turned a German near victory into | | capitulation.** | | | | **The Americans helped to implement a peace deal that resurrected | | Russia and humiliated Germany, but ensured that Germany would be able | | to rebuild and rearm. A second conflict was guaranteed to ignite, and | | ignite a good long distance from American territory.** | | | | **From 1917 on-just twenty years after the Americans had reinserted | | themselves into the world with the Spanish-American War-the United | | States became the determining factor in European affairs rather than | | the other way around. It was neither pretty nor nice, but neither was | | it unique. Every naval power in history has tried to keep its | | land-based rivals bottled up with each other rather than floating | | navies that could challenge them. What set the Americans apart was | | that their home territories were so rich and so removed that they | | could keep the disruption, conflict, and bloodshed in a different | | hemisphere.** | | | | **4. era of Internationalism -- triggered by the bombing of the Pearl | | Harbor -- horrors experienced by the survivors had aroused public | | outrage and the first time that American soil was never attacked; | | produced a permanent change in the size of American government | | defense spending; its military bases had increased from 3 in 1940 to | | almost 450 at the end of WWII** | | | | **But as awesome as the sheer magnitude of the American war effort | | was in absolute terms, it paled in comparison to the United States\' | | strategic position when the dust settled.** | | | | ** The Germans and the Soviets had lost 7 million and 26 million | | people, or about 11 and 15 percent of their total populations, | | respectively. The Americans had lost \"only\" 420,000 people, in | | relative terms one-thirty-fifth the German losses and one-forty- | | fifth the Soviet losses.** | | | | ** At war\'s end the Americans had forces-on friendly terms-in the | | United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, | | Belgium, Denmark, Austria, and Norway. The European geographical | | advantage over the non-American world remained so huge that even in | | the ashes of the post-war devastation the occupied Western European | | states still collectively represented one-quarter of global economic | | power.** | | | | ** There was little industrial capacity outside of the United | | States. The United Kingdom was running at full throttle, but running | | at full throttle on materiel and capital provided almost exclusively | | by the Americans. Only the Soviets had an independent system-a system | | that had depended upon U.S. materiel for the past three years. And | | even with that assistance it was still less than one-third of | | American economic output.** | | | | ** Not only had most of the world\'s industrial and consumption | | capacity been destroyed, but the war had been so destructive that it | | had taken as well the bulk of the imperial militaries. Only the | | Soviets still had an army, but bereft of naval transport it was an | | army that was not deployable in a global sense.** | | | | ** The Americans controlled the oceans. In mid-1939, the Americans | | had 178 surface combatants and 58 submarines in the water out of a | | total fleet of less than 400 vessels. On the war\'s final day only | | six years later the Americans had a 6,800-vessel navy with over 1,000 | | major surface and submarine combatants. As important, the navies of | | every major naval combatant of every significant prewar power had | | been relocated to the seabed. The United Kingdom was the sole | | exception, and it could no longer operate without assistance beyond | | European waters. For the first time since the onset of the blue-water | | era in the early sixteenth century, there was only one navy on the | | oceans.** | | | | **It was the single greatest concentration of power that the world | | had ever seen.** | | | | **The question was what to do with the war gains. One obvious option | | was to absorb the Axis and Western European empires into itself and | | establish a Pax Americana over the global system.** | | | | **5. the Cold War ideological, political, and economic impasse that | | existed between the United States and the Soviet Union following WW | | II** | | | | **Waging Peace: Free Trade as a Weapon** | | | | **The three-point American plan was nothing short of revolutionary. | | They called it \"free trade\":** | | | | **(a) Access to the American market. Access to the home market was | | the holy grail of the global system to that point. If you found | | yourself forced to give up the ability to control imports, it | | typically meant that you had been defeated in a major war (as the | | French had been in 1871) or your entire regime was on the verge of | | collapse (as the Turks were in the early twentieth century). A key | | responsibility of diplomats and admirals alike was to secure market | | access for their country\'s businesses. The American market was the | | only consumer market of size that had even a ghost of a chance of | | surviving the war, making it the only market worth seeking.** | | | | **(b) Protection for all shipping. Previously, control of trade lanes | | was critical. A not insubstantial proportion of a government\'s | | military forces had to be dedicated to protecting its merchants and | | their cargoes, particularly on the high seas, because you could count | | on your rivals to use their militaries to raid your commerce. As the | | British Empire expanded around the globe in the eighteenth and | | nineteenth centuries, they found themselves having constantly to | | reinvent their naval strategies in order to fend off the fleets of | | commerce raiders that the Dutch, French, Turks, and others kept | | putting into play. The Americans provided their navy-the only one | | with global reach - to protect all maritime shipping. No one needed a | | navy any longer.** | | | | **(c) strategic umbrella. As a final sweetener, the Americans | | promised to protect all members of the network from the Soviets. This | | included everything right up to the nuclear umbrella. The only catch | | was that participants had to allow the Americans to fight the Cold | | War the way they wanted to.** | | | | **Accepting the deal was a no-brainer, None of the Allies had any | | hope of economic recovery or maintaining their independence from the | | Soviets without massive American assistance. There really was no | | choice: Partner with the only possible consumer market, the only | | possible capital source, and the only possible guarantor of | | security-or disappear behind the Iron Curtain. (Iron curtain -- the | | term used to describe the division of Europe between the Soviet Union | | and the West. Popularized by Winston Churchill in a speech portraying | | Europe as being divided by an iron curtain, with the nations of | | Eastern Europe behind the curtain and increasingly under Soviet | | Union.)** | | | | **As the strategic competition of the Cold War took firmer shape, the | | Americans were able to identify critical locations in the | | geopolitical contest and invite key countries to join their trading | | system. Among the first post-war expansions, the Americans approached | | none other than the defeated Axis powers.** | | | | **If America\'s Western allies thought the deal was a boon, the | | Germans and Japanese perceived it as too good to be true. The primary | | reason Germany and Japan had launched World War 11 in the first place | | was to gain greater access to resources and markets. Germany wanted | | the agricultural output of Poland, the capital of the Low Countries, | | the coal of Central Europe, and the markets of France. Japan coveted | | the manpower and markets of China and the resources of Southeast | | Asia. Now that they** | | | | **had been thoroughly defeated, the Americans were offering them | | economic access far beyond their wildest pre-war longings: risk-free | | access to ample resources and bottomless markets a half a world away. | | And \"all\" it would cost them was accepting a security guarantee | | that was better than anything they could ever have achieved by | | themselves. Bretton Woods expanded swiftly:** | | | | ** India joined shortly after independence, which at a minimum | | complicated any Soviet efforts to gain a toehold in South Asia.** | | | | ** Sweden, which controls the bulk of the Baltic coastline and | | boasts a potent regional navy and air force, joined in the 1950s, | | denying the Soviets the ability to use the Baltic safely.** | | | | ** Argentina\'s membership in the 1960s limited Soviet influence in | | Latin America by putting the most advanced South American power in | | the other camp.** | | | | ** After the failure of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt jumped into | | the Bretton Woods pool, robbing the Soviets of their largest client | | state in both the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin.** | | | | ** Indonesian (1950), Singaporean (1973), and Thai (1982) membership | | both curtailed meaningful Soviet penetration into the most valuable | | portions of Southeast Asia and eliminated any hope of the Soviets | | exercising naval power in South or Southeast Asia.** | | | | **The lure of Bretton Woods proved to be the critical component that | | made the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s a reality. The unlikely | | partnership between America and China of course helped rework the | | strategic math of Southeast Asia in the age of Vietnam, but that was | | only a small piece of a much larger puzzle. The Soviets had plenty of | | Pacific coastline, but the only good ports they had access to were | | Chinese locales like Tianjin and Hainan Island. Once China joined | | Bretton Woods, the Soviet Union\'s only remaining deep water, | | ice-free port was Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula, a base so | | removed from Russian population centers that** | | | | **it could only be supplied by air.** | | | | **xxx** | | | | **Containment -- US diplomatic policy adopted by the Truman | | administration to "build situations of strength" around the globe to | | contain communist power within its existing boundaries.** | | | | **Truman doctrine -- policy adopted by President Harry Truman in 1947 | | to halt communist expansion in southeastern Europe** | | | | **Since 1963, US has conducted underground tests of more than four | | hundred nuclear weapons, whereas the USSR has conducted more than | | three hundred such tests** | | | | **Confrontation in a nuclear world: closest was in 1962 -- for 13 | | days, the US and the Soviets were close to nuclear war, the soviets | | had decided to place offensive missiles 90 miles off the coast I | | Cuba. This was photographed by an American U-2 spy plane on October | | 14, 1962. Kennedy and his advisers rejected the idea of armed | | intervention, setting up a naval blockade instead. Then tension | | heightened when the Soviet vessels carrying nuclear warheads appeared | | in Cuban waters. After intense negotiation between Washington and | | Moscow, the Soviet ships turned around on October 25 and October 28 | | the Soviet Union withdrew its missile operations from Cuba in | | exchange of US agreement not to invade Cuba** | | | | **Détente - relaxation of tension characterized by a direct | | cooperative dealing with cold war rivals and avoiding ideological | | accommodation** | | | | **Mutual Assured Destruction -- a theory that if the United States | | and the Soviet Union had extremely large and invulnerable nuclear | | forces that were somewhat equal, then neither would chance a war with | | the other** | | | | **Antiballistic Missile -- a defense system designed to protect | | targets by destroying the attacking airplanes or missiles before they | | reach their destination** | | | | **Multiple, Independently Targetable, Warheads -- multiple warheads | | carried by a single missile but directed to different targets.** | | | | **First Strike capabilities -- the launching of an initial strategic | | nuclear attack before the opponent has used any strategic weapons** | | | | **Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty -- aimed to stabilize the nuclear | | arms competition between the two countries** | | | | **xxx** | | | | **Throughout the Cold War, the grand geopolitics between the | | Americans and the Soviets raged as sharply as ever. But as little as | | one tier down, things could not have been** | | | | **more different. Quite intentionally, the American system suspended | | local geopolitical competitions, relieving Bretton Woods members from | | needing to seek out markets or protect their trade flows. That freed | | America\'s allies from the need to defend against age-old rivals, | | many of whom were now allies. A few examples:** | | | | **(a) France and Germany didn\'t have to arm to protect themselves | | from each other; instead, they collaboratively formed the | | supra-governmental institution of the European Union, something that | | would have been laughable pre-war.** | | | | **(b) Mid-tier European states such as Sweden and the Netherlands | | were able to focus on their trade and brokering strong points with a | | minimum of effort to defense.** | | | | **(c) With global trade lanes guaranteed, the need to occupy this or | | that location dissolved. The world\'s oldest wheat producer | | Egypt-breathed free for the first time in two millennia.** | | | | **(d) European colonies around the world were freed. The Southeast | | Asian states formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations | | (ASEAN) and with it their own-also American- guaranteed-free trade | | network.** | | | | **(e) Japan no longer had need to prey upon the East Asian rim. With | | American security guarantees, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore | | emerged as three of the world\'s most dynamic economies. China, for | | the first time in its history, existed in a security environment that | | allowed it to consolidate free of outside interference.** | | | | **xxx** | | | | **Post-Cold War:** | | | | **Partners: American Allies in the New Era** | | | | **1. Market. In times of global stability, the United States already | | boasts a market larger than any other by a factor of three. As the | | global situation deteriorates, the U.S. market will tower above all | | others in its stability, size, and strength. It will also be among | | the few that not only boast the demographic and financial | | capabilities to grow, but also possess the security and stability | | necessary to grow continuously. The United States will be one of only | | a scant handful of developed countries with substantial populations | | of citizens in their twenties and thirties, making it the state to | | experience consumption-led growth.** | | | | **2. Capital. As the country with the greatest river network, the | | United States has a capital supply that is independent of its | | demographics. American capital, however, will not even be limited to | | its ample domestic sources. The relative stability of** | | | | **the American system will make it a magnet for capital fleeing less | | stable lands. In times of global strength like the 1990s, some \$5 | | trillion-over 6 percent of American GDP over the decade-fled to the | | United States. Just imagine the sorts of volumes that will flee to | | the United States in times of global mass disruption. In a world of | | rapidly shrinking volumes of capital, the Americans will hold the | | lion\'s share.** | | | | **3. Security. While other countries will be forced to reallocate | | scarce resources to secure their defensive interests at home and | | their economic interests abroad, the United States\' geographic | | position and embedded, cordial relations with Canada and** | | | | **Mexico will spare the Americans that onerous cost. In fact, | | American defense spending may actually decrease while available | | American forces increase. Part of the Bretton Woods deal is that the | | Americans would patrol the seas for all and defend** | | | | **the territory of all. That will no longer hold. This raises the | | distinct possibility that the United States\' military posture will | | return to the traditional role it played between 1898 and 1945: | | almost no foreign bases, but a posture of permanent offense. The | | United States will once again be a country with a global military, | | but one free of global interests. This will not only ensure that | | potentially hostile powers get nowhere near American shores, but will | | also enable the Americans to intervene where and when and how they | | wish.** | | | | **4. Trade. While the Americans are extraordinarily unlikely to | | provide freedom of the seas for the world at large, they will still | | have a navy that is triple the power of the combined world in terms | | of its ability to project power. That is actually more** | | | | **in favor of the Americans than it sounds: At the beginning of this | | age, the United States will have twelve fully deployable | | supercarriers against the combined fleet of the rest of the world\'s | | two, and those two will be British and French. Nearly** | | | | **every other navy on the planet is limited to coastal and support | | vessels. At the beginning of this age, only the Americans have | | aircraft that can be based at home and yet bomb any location on the | | planet. That means that only the Americans will** | | | | **have the capacity to guarantee-or more importantly, deny shipments | | to or from any coast on the planet at any time. Any ocean-borne trade | | that is to be sustainable will require-at a minimum-American | | disinterest.** | | | | **(a) North America. In 2013 the United States exported roughly \$1.6 | | trillion in goods and \$680 billion in services, while importing | | \$2.3 trillion in goods and \$450 billion in services. That sounds | | like a lot-it is a lot-but it isn\'t as bad as it seems at first | | glance. The American economy settles in at a very non-dainty \$16 | | trillion; its total trade exposure in absolute terms may be the | | world\'s largest, but in relative terms it is below that of everyone | | but Brazil and South Sudan-even Afghanistan is more internationally | | integrated. Additionally, what exposure the Americans have is | | remarkably local: The United States\' top two trading partners for | | decades have been Canada and Mexico,\' accounting for one-third-some | | \$1.15 trillion-of the total U.S. trade portfolio. While NAFTA is by | | its very definition a free trade agreement, it was negotiated | | separately from the global free trade order, and is legally and | | administratively disconnected from the Bretton Woods system, complete | | with its own adjudication mechanism that exists solely for the NAFTA | | signatories. The United States doesn\'t even need to patrol the | | oceans to keep the trade open, since nearly all of it occurs either | | in territorial waters, the Gulf of Mexico, or via land routes. | | Bilateral American-Canadian trade on the Ambassador Bridge, which | | links Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor, Ontario, is by itself of | | greater volume than the total combined trade with all but four of | | America\'s other trading partners. NAFTA and its CAFTA extension, | | which brings in the Central American states of Honduras, Nicaragua, | | Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic, are | | no-brainers for the Americans. All are already firmly integrated into | | the American economic system independently of Bretton Woods. In | | essence, they are America\'s backyard. The Americans can-easily-have | | their local trade without lifting a finger to support global trade.** | | | | **(b) Cuba. The notable outlier from the NAFTA/CAFTA system is of | | course Cuba.** | | | | **As a bastion of anti-Americanism since its revolution in 1959, Cuba | | has** | | | | **been the plank in the eye of the American strategic position in the | | Western** | | | | **Hemisphere for decades. This will not last, and not simply because | | Fidel** | | | | **Castro will (probably) not live much longer. Cuba\'s problem is | | primarily economic. It doesn\'t collaborate with the vibrant economic | | giant at its** | | | | **doorstep and so is dependent upon limited trade with the wider | | world.** | | | | **This is tolerable so long as the world as a whole lives by the | | rules of free** | | | | **trade. Remove that characteristic, however, and Cuba, which lacks | | even a** | | | | **merchant marine, is all on its own.** | | | | **The Americans are certain to underscore that status, because | | Cuba\'s** | | | | **ability to vex the United States comes from its position at the | | mouth of the** | | | | **Gulf of Mexico. Capable military forces stationed on the island | | would be able to pinch closed the Florida and Yucatan Straits, | | blocking most trade that would have entered or exited the greater | | Mississippi system. However, \"capable\" military forces are not ones | | that could naturally originate on an island with as few resources as | | Cuba. The danger to the United States from Cuba isn\'t from Cuba, but | | from larger powers that would ally with Cuba. The Americans were | | willing to risk nuclear war during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis for | | just this reason. With the end of the Cold War there wasn\'t a | | hostile blue-water navy anywhere in the world, so Cuba fell into | | strategic irrelevance and Americans stopped paying it any attention. | | Fast-forward just a few years to a more mercantilist world, however, | | and the Americans are unlikely to tolerate a hostile country on such | | a strategically positioned chunk of land so close to their internal | | trade ways. Whether it is because Havana wants to avoid destitution | | or because the Americans force the issue, Cuba is about to be folded | | into the American** | | | | **system.** | | | | **(c) Colombia and Venezuela. Don\'t think of South America as a | | single entity, or even a single landmass. The combination of the | | mountains of the Andes and the tropics of the Amazon divides the | | continent into pieces. The northern tier of states - Colombia and | | Venezuela-are for all practical purposes in another world. Only the | | most remote and low-quality of roads link Colombia and Venezuela to | | their own tropical interiors, much less span the thousand- plus miles | | of the Amazon Basin to the developed portions of Brazil. The | | Venezuelan rail network does not even connect to another country. | | Nearly all of the populated centers of both countries access the | | wider world by looking north to the Caribbean rather than south to | | Brazil or west/east to each other. Integration with each other would | | be difficult. Integration to the south is simply ludicrous. They are, | | in essence, part of the United States\' extended backyard, and | | integration with the Americans is the only natural economic | | partnership they can hope for.** | | | | **Colombia has accepted this fate - not a lightly made decision | | considering that under Teddy Roosevelt the Americans sponsored a | | revolution in Colombia, helping carve the country of Panama out of | | Colombian territory. Bogota has partnered repeatedly with the | | Americans on issues of security importance to Washington, namely | | efforts to reduce cocaine and coca flows out of the Colombian | | highlands, and they have achieved a bilateral free trade agreement.** | | | | **Venezuela has not. Ideological opposition has landed Caracas with | | one** | | | | **of the worst bilateral relationships with Washington of anywhere on | | earth.** | | | | **This need not be the case. But since Venezuela does not actually | | border the** | | | | **United States and it is not strategically located like Cuba, the | | Americans will** | | | | **not make the decision for the Venezuelans. If Venezuela is to be | | anything** | | | | **other than a dispossessed country with a crushingly impoverished | | population, it will need to start repairing relations with the United | | States before it is too late. It isn\'t a pretty choice, but unlike | | most countries in the coming era, at least Venezuela has the option | | of making a choice about its future. But time is running out, and it | | all comes down to shale.** | | | | **Venezuelan crude is so viscous and thick with contaminants that | | only** | | | | **a handful of refineries anywhere in the world can process the | | stuff. Almost** | | | | **all of those refineries are on the Gulf Coast of the United | | States.** | | | | **Hugo Chavez, who ruled as Venezuela\'s president from 1999 until** | | | | **his death in 2013, sought to reduce his country\'s economic | | connections** | | | | **to the United States in general and those refineries in specific. | | His solution was to sell his crude to China and subsidize the Chinese | | for the huge additional transport costs as well as compensate them | | for the lower volume of products their refineries could produce from | | crude grades they were not designed to handle. The Chinese happily | | accepted the subsidies, picked up the crude from the Venezuelans, | | sailed it north to the Gulf of Mexico, sold it to the Americans, and | | pocketed the difference.** | | | | **(d) Asia.** | | | | **1. Thailand is in many ways America's favorite ally. The Thais | | occupy an interesting piece of real estate: a coastal bowl valley on | | a fantastically insulated bay adjacent to an open plateau, all | | surrounded by jungle mountains so impregnable that even after seventy | | years of Bretton Woods only coastal rail corridors lead out of the | | country. That protection has allowed the Thais to develop with a | | minimum of interference from outside powers regardless of era, | | enabling them to hold on to their independence even at the height of | | the European imperial age. Thailand\'s mix of geographies grant** | | | | **it a capital-intensive, high-value-added industrial-technocratic | | society** | | | | **around its Bangkok core, but also a more agrarian highland interior | | that** | | | | **benefits from a modest amount of raw materials. It isn\'t simply | | mainland** | | | | **Asia\'s most secure state and best equipped to protect its own | | borders and** | | | | **interests, it is also the only one that can interface with the | | outside world on** | | | | **its own terms. Even better, perennial political discord between the | | Bangkok core and the inland plateau all but guarantees that Thailand | | will never** | | | | **pose a military threat to its neighbors. It is the perfect ally: It | | doesn\'t need** | | | | **U.S. troops stationed on its soil, it doesn\'t need much economic | | help, and it** | | | | **doesn\'t generate much heartburn. It is also a damnably useful | | friend due to its strategic position between India, China, and the | | Southeast Asian trade** | | | | **lanes. Additionally, Bangkok\'s extensive experience in dealing | | with its** | | | | **somewhat squirrelly neighborhood means it can even offer the | | Americans** | | | | **extensive security cooperation as a sweetener to any alliance | | deal.** | | | | **2. Myanmar is a country that has been on America\'s blacklist for | | the past generation. Myanmar has three things going for it. First, it | | has moderate volumes of a wide array of natural resources from oil | | and natural gas to zinc and copper to hydropower and timber. As it is | | right next door to Thailand, the synergies are many and obvious. | | Second, Myanmar\'s Irrawaddy River is the only river in the region | | that is navigable for any reasonable length. If there is a part of | | the region that cannot just rapidly develop, but start to bootstrap | | its own economy, it is Myanmar.** | | | | **Third, the Myanmarese have a streak of paranoid mistrust of their** | | | | **more powerful neighbors. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, this led | | to a de** | | | | **facto alliance with China in the face of Western disapproval of | | Myanmar\'s** | | | | **choice of political management system (i.e., military | | dictatorship). But in** | | | | **the early 201Os, the Chinese started treating Myanmar as a | | province, and** | | | | **such perceived intrusions into internal Myanmarese business | | resonated so** | | | | **poorly that as of 2014 the Myanmar-Chinese relationship has | | imploded.** | | | | **The result is a lurching democratization process in order to | | facilitate a** | | | | **strategic opening to the very Western countries that the government | | so** | | | | **distrusted for so long. You can count on the Myanmarese not to | | trust their** | | | | **larger neighbors. Those larger neighbors - India and China - are | | precisely the sort of would-be regional hegemons that the Americans | | would prefer to keep locked down. The mere continuing existence of | | Myanmar, regardless of the flavor of the local government, achieves | | that all by itself.** | | | | **3. Taiwan and South Korea are not so clear-cut. Strategically, they | | are** | | | | **absolutely partners the Americans want. The two countries are | | smashed** | | | | **between the Japanese and Chinese spheres of influence, incredibly | | competent in managing their own defense, and could go nuclear over a | | long** | | | | **weekend if they were particularly stressed.\' But keeping them in | | America\'s circle of allies will not come cheap. Both countries | | import nearly all of the** | | | | **energy and raw materials they use, and their markets are too small | | to sup-** | | | | **port the world-class industrial base they have developed under the | | Bretton** | | | | **Woods regime. Keeping those economies alive and relevant would | | require** | | | | **the Americans to maintain on-land military footprints in East Asia, | | and to** | | | | **continue, at least in part, with the ocean-patrolling and | | trade-protecting** | | | | **activities that they would so like to get out of. For instance, | | just these two** | | | | **small countries require twenty supertankers of crude per month. | | That** | | | | **would force the Americans to convoy tankers from at least Southeast | | Asia,** | | | | **and maybe even the Persian Gulf, as well as maintain transpacific | | trade** | | | | **access so that Korean and Taiwanese goods can be sold into the | | American** | | | | **market. These two traditional allies will be the litmus test for | | just how far** | | | | **the Americans are willing to go to support allies in the new era.** | | | | **4. Singapore sits upon the world\'s busiest trade and energy | | transport artery; it is difficult to imagine a country that gained | | more from the United States\' forcing of free trade upon the world-or | | to imagine a country that will suffer more from its removal. | | Singapore has greater trade and energy throughput than any other | | location on the planet, the flows it manages form global benchmarks, | | and its considerable technocratic-industrial base is funded almost | | entirely from its trade facilitation profits. Simply put, Singapore | | is free trade in physical form. Without a global trade order, without | | the Americans protecting trade flows between East Asia and Europe and | | energy flows between East Asia and the Middle East, Singapore has | | nothing \... except a damnably strategic piece of land. If there is | | to be any trade between East Asia and Europe, or any East Asian | | purchases of Middle Eastern energy, then Singapore is the place that | | would enable the Americans to short-circuit any East Asian rival at | | any time without firing a shot. But this makes Singapore a** | | | | **strategic ally, not an economic one. Bereft of American commitment | | to** | | | | **patrol much beyond the Strait of Malacca itself, Singapore\'s | | economic fortunes will need to be recast in a far narrower-and more | | local-net.** | | | | **5. Australia and New Zealand. Between them they are low- to | | mid-cost reliable producers of nearly every significant industrial | | and agricultural commodity under the sun: oil, natural gas, coal, | | uranium, aluminum, wheat, fruits, vegetables, dairy, beef, and lamb. | | There is no more perfect mating to the resource-poor and hungry | | states of Taiwan and Korea than the Anglos of Australasia.** | | | | **While a commitment to keep trade lanes to the Middle East might | | be** | | | | **more than the Americans are interested in, commitment to keep the | | far** | | | | **shorter and less fraught lines to political and cultural mates in | | Australia and New Zealand would be comparatively simple. The pair are | | also so physically removed from the Asian mainland that the defense | | commitment required to maintain their sovereignty would be minimal. | | American involvement in Australasia would also solve-at least | | partly-Singapore\'s problem. A web of trade among the United States, | | Korea, Taiwan, Myanmar, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand would | | put Singapore smack in the middle. In fact, in the middle along with | | Singapore would be its current partners.** | | | | **6. Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. All four of those | | Southeast Asian countries will never be able to project meaningful | | amounts of power on the water. The first three are archipelagoes, but | | so disassociated across distance that they cannot develop into a | | powerful empire as Japan did, or even maintain a navy that might more | | than marginally threaten their neighbors. The fourth, Vietnam, has | | its northern and southern populations so separated by distance and | | geography that simply solidifying internal integrity is a | | century-long process that the Vietnamese are not even halfway | | through.** | | | | **These weaknesses also create a very peculiar demographic geography. | | All** | | | | **of the countries sport only lightly populated hinterlands, instead | | being** | | | | **extremely urbanized with very dense population centers packed with | | people trying to carve out a better life for themselves than is | | possible in tropical agriculture.** | | | | **It is this odd characteristic that will make them so attractive to | | the** | | | | **Americans. First, all are perennial sources of low-cost, low- to | | medium-** | | | | **skilled labor. Second, that labor is already concentrated in the | | region\'s** | | | | **urban centers; the concentration of supply both eases recruiting | | and keeps** | | | | **labor and infrastructure costs down. Third, bracketed as these | | countries are by a mix of resource and energy providers, financial | | powers, and mid- to high-tech manufacturers, everything is perfectly | | positioned for a regional supply-chain network. All they need are | | sufficient food imports to feed their young, urbanized | | populations-something the American agricultural sector is eminently | | capable of doing for everything besides rice (and rice demand can be | | met from within Southeast Asia). Finally, collectively the Southeast | | Asian region represents a market for American goods of over a half | | billion people-that\'s one larger than the Chinese coast and far, far | | less politically complicated.** | | | | **Convincing the Americans to treat Southeast Asia as a unit as the** | | | | **above implies may not be a simple sell, but likely American | | commitments** | | | | **will already ring the entire area, and no power within Southeast | | Asia could** | | | | **possibly mount a threat to American interests. In fact, a vibrant | | and inter-** | | | | **connected Southeast Asia would help keep China and India apart, | | while** | | | | **involving the United States with a combined economy bigger than | | that of** | | | | **its NAFTA/CAFTA partners.** | | | | **Supplemental Readings:** | | | | 1. **THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS by: Fernando Alcoforado** | | | | **(4 pp. pdf file)** | | | | 2. **Carl P. Watts "Is the United States a declining power?" | | Politics Review Online Vol. 20, No. 4 (Apr. 2011) \[ 6 pp. pdf | | file)** | | | | 3. **The-End-of-History-and-the-Last-Man-Francis-Fukuyama-1992** | | | | **(pp23-51, Chapters 3-5 pdf file)** | | | | 4. **Samuel\_P\_Huntington\_The\_Clash\_of\_Civilizations** | | | | **(pp. 80- 101, Chapter 4 pdf file)** | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+