WMD in IP 2023-24 Lecture Slides PDF

14/01/2024 Proliferation Dr Susan Martin WMD in IP 2023-24 1 Overview of Lecture I. What is Proliferation? II. Explaining Proliferation III. Nonproliferation Policies Martin 23/24 2 1 14/01/2024 Readings Questions: What drives state acquisition of nuclear (and CB and other) weapons? What kinds of no...

14/01/2024 Proliferation Dr Susan Martin WMD in IP 2023-24 1 Overview of Lecture I. What is Proliferation? II. Explaining Proliferation III. Nonproliferation Policies Martin 23/24 2 1 14/01/2024 Readings Questions: What drives state acquisition of nuclear (and CB and other) weapons? What kinds of nonproliferation policies have been used to try to prevent or block proliferation? How well do the models presented by Sagan explain the pursuit of nuclear weapons by India and Iran? Reading: Everyone to read: Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?’ Benjamin, Klaudia, Spenser, Joaquin, Juliette, Linda, Hiromu, and Tanmaya to also read Kennedy, ‘India’s Nuclear Odyssey.’ Noel, Clement, Connor, Rayyanna, Zelia, Clara, Isabelle to also read Mukjatzhanova, ‘Pride and Prejudice: Understanding Iran’s Nuclear Program.’ Martin 23/24 3 What is proliferation? What’s the Puzzle? Is there anything surprising about state behavior in regard to the proliferation of CBN weapons? Why study this behavior? What is Proliferation? Key concepts: Proliferation, Vertical Proliferation and Horizontal Proliferation Nuclear Hedging Martin 23/24 4 2 14/01/2024 What’s puzzling about the proliferation of weapons? What would we expect under anarchy? (Realist versus other expectations?) But behaviour of states in regard to CBN weapons seems to be different: Currently Nine Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) out of 195 in the world; No state that admits to possessing chemical weapons, with 193 State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention; No state that admits to possessing biological weapons, with 185 State Parties to the BWC (plus four signatory states). Why else might we want to study the proliferation of weapons? Possibility that arms acquisition, the spread of weapons, and/or arms races are a cause of war/conflict; Money spent on weapons could be spent on other things (guns versus butter). Martin 23/24 5 What do we mean by ‘proliferation of weapons’? ‘proliferation’ of weapons versus ‘normal’ process of weapons acquisition by states ‘proliferation’ applied to nuclear weapons, as well as to chemical and biological weapons—and is also applied to the acquisition of these weapons by non-state actors Dictionary definition of ‘proliferation’: rapid increase in numbers ‘There are indications because of new inventions, that 10, 15, or 20 nations will have a nuclear capacity, including Red China, by the end of the Presidential office in 1964’ (JF Kennedy, 1960). But this prediction, and the concern about the rapid spread of nuclear weapons, has proven false. We have seen only a slow spread of nuclear weapons. >>So puzzle may be: Why have we seen such a slow spread of nuclear weapons? Why have so many states decided NOT to acquire nuclear weapons? And why have so many states decided not to acquire—or to give up—chemical and biological weapons? Martin 23/24 6 3 14/01/2024 Definitions of Nuclear Proliferation (Robinson 2015, Table 1, 56) Nuclear proliferation is… …the import or export of weapon-related technologies (Drifte 1997, Kampani 2002; Hastings, 2012) …the spread of nuclear capabilities (Arnett 1994; Long 1977) …the spread of nuclear weapons and the technologies and materials needed to make them (Spector 1987) …the development of nuclear weapons (Harkavy, 1981; DiChiaro III and Laurance 1977) …nuclearisation (Potter, 2005) …joining the nuclear club (Kitamura, 1996) …becoming a nuclear weapons state (Walker 2012) …the next incremental addition to the number of nuclear weapons states (Wohlstetter 1961; Roberts 1999) Martin 23/24 7 Types of Proliferation Horizontal vs. Vertical Proliferation Horizontal proliferation—an increase in the number of actors who possess and can use a type of weapons The DPRK is the most recent state to have acquired nuclear weapons Vertical proliferation-qualitative or quantitative increase in the weapons held by an actor (e.g., arms build-up, arms race) US and Russian nuclear modernisation as vertical, qualitative proliferation China nuclear modernisation as vertical, qualitative AND quantitative proliferation Martin 23/24 8 4 14/01/2024 Endpoints/Waystations on a Proliferation Pathway It’s also important to note that there can be different endpoints, or at least waystations*, on an actor’s effort to acquire weapons. For example, as discussed in relation to nuclear proliferation: Latency (possessing the technology to quickly build nuclear weapons, without having done so) Hedging (latency with intent, as defined by Bowen et al) Testing (demonstration of a capability) Deployment of the weapon (*A ‘waystation’ is a stopping point on a journey) Martin 23/24 9 Nuclear latency ‘Nuclear latency can be viewed as the possession of many or all of the technologies, facilities, materials, expertise (including tacit knowledge), resources and other capabilities necessary for the development of nuclear weapons, without full operational weaponization’ --Pilat, ‘Exploring Nuclear Latency,’ Workshop Report, 2 October 2014 ‘Technically, latency derives from the dual-use nature of the atom.’ --Pilat, ‘Exploring Nuclear Latency,’ Workshop Report, 2 October 2014 Martin 23/24 10 5 14/01/2024 Nuclear hedging ‘Nuclear hedging refers to a national strategy of maintaining, or at least appearing to maintain, a viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical capacity to produce them within a relatively short time frame ranging from several weeks to a few years’ (Levite 2002, 69). ‘Nuclear hedging refers to the policy of deliberatively developing a nuclear weapons option while stopping short of actual weapons acquisition.’ (Hiim 2022, 1369) National strategy that falls ‘between nuclear pursuit and nuclear roll-back.’ (Levite 2002, 59). Hedging as ‘latency with intent’ --hedging as ‘a deliberate strategy of developing technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons’ (Bowen and Moran 2014, 31). ‘Assessments of hedging must also account for trends in capabilities and procurement, the correlation of specific activities with stated political intentions and, not least, evidence of military involvement in the nuclear sphere’ (Bowen and Moran 2015, 689). Martin 23/24 11 For more on nuclear latency and hedging, see: Levite, Ariel E. (2002). ‘Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited.’ International Security 27, no. 3: 59–88. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092114. Bowen , Wyn and Matthew Moran (2014). ‘Iran's Nuclear Programme: A Case Study in Hedging?’ Contemporary Security Policy, 35:1, 26-52, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2014.884338 Bowen, W. and Moran, M. (2015). ‘Living with Nuclear Hedging: The Implications of Iran's Nuclear Strategy.’ International Affairs, 91: 687-707. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12337 Bowen, Wyn, Matthew Moran and Dina Esfandiary (2016), Living on the Edge: Iran and the Practice of Nuclear Hedging. Palgrave Macmillan. Pilat, Joseph H. Nuclear Latency and Hedging: Concepts, History, and Issues. Woodrow Wilson Centre, 2019. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/book/nuclear-latency-and-hedging-concepts-historyand-issues Hiim, Henrik Stålhane (2022). ‘Revisiting nuclear hedging: ballistic missiles and the Iranian example.’ International Affairs, Volume 98, Issue 4, 1367–1384. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac103 Martin 23/24 12 6 14/01/2024 Questions: Can you think of examples of latent nuclear states and/or of nuclear hedgers? Does it make sense to talk about latency or hedging with chemical, biological, or other types of weapons? Can you think of examples? Martin 23/24 13 Other proliferation choices… In trying to explain proliferation (the pursuit or actual attainment of a weapons capability), need to keep in mind related decisions/actions that actors can take, e.g. A decision not to acquire nuclear weapons A decision to reverse/rollback (reversal is defined by Levite as ‘which states embark on a path leading to nuclear weapons acquisition but subsequently reverse course, though not necessarily abandoning altogether their nuclear ambitions’ (2002, p 61) Examples of nuclear reversal include Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Ukraine A decision to disarm (e.g. nuclear--South Africa; chemical-- eight states under CWC; biological--UK, US, others). Martin 23/24 14 7 14/01/2024 Questions on defining proliferation? Martin 23/24 15 Part II: Explaining proliferation Martin 23/24 16 8 14/01/2024 Explaining proliferation What proliferation has occurred? What trying to explain (outcomes) Empirical Record (and its uncertainties) How do we explain it? Arms Dynamic (Buzan) Drivers Drivers Technology Security Domestic Politics Norms (lots of other literature that tries to explain proliferation—esp. nuclear proliferation) Martin 23/24 17 Wide-range of policy options: No acquisition Nuclear latency (? If this is a choice or just a ‘side-effect’ of nuclear energy programmes) Nuclear hedging (‘latency with intent’, according to Bowen and Moran) Acquisition (with different possible end-points: declaration, testing, deployment) Nuclear reversal or roll-back (pausing or ending programs to acquire) Disarmament (ending programs and destroying weapons) Martin 23/24 18 9 14/01/2024 Empirical record Ten states have acquired nuclear weapons: US, Russia, UK, France, China, Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, DPRK. One NWS state has disarmed: South Africa. Latent Nuclear Weapons States: Focussing on the possession of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015) argue there were 21 nuclear latent states from 1939-2012; Examples include Canada, Germany, Italy, and Australia. Hedgers: Currently, Iran and Japan are discussed as examples; Previous examples may include Sweden, Brazil, West Germany. Martin 23/24 19 Empirical record on CBW proliferation is even less clear Looking at data from open sources, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies identifies approximately 29 states that have been identified as having some sort of CBW program (from research to weaponization, from suspected to known). See https://nonproliferation.org/chemical-and-biological-weapons-possession-and-programs-past-and-present/ Carus evaluates the evidence for BW and concludes that ‘three [states] considered organizing a BW program’ And that ‘twenty-three had, probably had, or possibly had BW programs at some time during the past century.’ He adds that most of the programs ‘have been small with limited capabilities suitable for small-scale covert operations or for tactical applications.’ See W. Seth Carus (2017), ‘A Century of Biological-Weapons Programs (1915–2015): Reviewing the Evidence,’ The Nonproliferation Review, 24:1-2, 142 and 152. Poor Toulabi (2022) challenges the idea that CB weapons are the ‘poor man’s atomic bomb’ and he analyses what that idea tells us about the conceptualization and study of proliferation. In his 2021 thesis, he examines ‘forty alleged state-run CW programs and twenty alleged staterun BW programs and shows that only half of the suspected countries have actually pursued or possessed such weapons after World War II.’ Martin 23/24 20 10 14/01/2024 ‘Regular’ arms acquisition The term ‘proliferation’ has been associated with the acquisition of CBN weapons but not with the acquisition of ‘conventional’ weapons. With ‘regular’ weapons, states can acquire them by a) developing and producing them; b) buying them; c) with/through military aid and assistance. ? of state assistance in the nuclear realm? While there has been some state-to-state assistance and cooperation on CBN weapons, this has generally been limited: The 1946 McMahon Act prevented the US from sharing ‘restricted information’ with the UK and Canada, its wartime partners in the Manhattan Project ; The Soviet Union ended its nuclear assistance to China in 1960; Questions about the role of the Pakistani state in the AQ Khan network; Israeli-South African cooperation; DPRK and Iran, etc. (There has also been ‘unwilling’ assistance through espionage.) Martin 23/24 21 Arms Dynamic—explaining the ‘regular’ process of arms/weapons acquisition The ‘arms dynamic’ is defined by Barry Buzan(1987, 1998) as the ‘whole set of pressures that make states both acquire armed forces and change the quantity and quality of the armed forces they already possess.’ Action-reaction model (International level) Domestic processes model Martin 23/24 22 11 14/01/2024 Focus on Proliferation Drivers (In the following I will focus on nuclear proliferation (the literature does this too), but we can ask the same questions about other kinds of weapons proliferation) Possible Drivers Include: Technology Security Domestic Politics Norms Economics Individual leaders What is the causal logic according to which these drivers influence proliferation? What is the argument about how the driver leads to the behaviour to be explained? For example, why might a change in the external security threat(s) cause a change in a state’s proliferation behaviour? Martin 23/24 23 Technology Does technology explain the decision of a state to acquire nuclear weapons? Or does it explain the ability of a state to acquire nuclear weapons? Martin 23/24 24 12 14/01/2024 Technology is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for weapons proliferation In the 1930s, advances in physics suggest the possibility of an atomic bomb, but only the US (together with the UK and Canada) launched an all-out programme to get nuclear weapons. Today, there may be 40 or more latent nuclear states: ‘Some estimates indicate that 40 countries or more now have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, which means that if they have the required fissile material—high enriched uranium or plutonium, we are relying primarily on the continued good intentions of these countries…’ (IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei, In his September 2004 address to the IAEA General Conference, as quoted by Sagan in Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 2010, p.82). >>> The technological ability to get nuclear weapons does not lead automatically to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Martin 23/24 25 Security: Weapons are acquired in response to an external (international) military threat or opportunity Variations of security model include: Weapons are pursued/acquired in response to anarchy in general (e.g. realism). And/or in response to a particular external security threat (e.g. defensive realism): Acquisition of nuclear weapons by an adversary; Conventional superiority of adversary that can’t be matched; A threat that can’t be met in other way. And/or for offensive purposes (e.g. offensive realism). Martin 23/24 26 13 14/01/2024 Requirements for the Security Model—how would we apply or ‘test’ it? Measure of threat/opportunity (is this objective, or done from the perspective of the possible proliferant?) Understanding of military utility/power of weapon, how the weapon contributes to the security of the state—how it either meets a threat or allows a state to take advantage of an opportunity (is this objective?) Martin 23/24 27 Security Model as applied to Iran and India? What international threats faced by India and/or Iran could be met through the acquisition of nuclear weapons? Are (were) there opportunities for India and Iran to use nuclear weapons for offensive purposes (including coercion, bargaining, blackmail), and did these opportunities lead to the acquisition of weapons by these countries? What evidence, if any, links the existence of a threat/opportunity to a decision to pursue/acquire nuclear weapons? Martin 23/24 28 14 14/01/2024 Changes over Time The acquisition of nuclear weapons is usually a long-term, complicated endeavour Important to remember that the drivers for proliferation can change over time Do you see changes over time in the cases of India and Iran? Martin 23/24 29 Domestic Politics –at least four different domestic politics explanations of proliferation Version One: Interest groups ‘Security threats are merely windows of opportunity that parochial interests jump through’—Peter Lavoy (‘Nuclear Myths,’ 1993) Actors within the state—who may be motivated by the desire for more budget, by scientific curiosity, etc--can use arguments about security threats to push for the development of nuclear weapons 30 15 14/01/2024 Domestic Politics, 2 Version Two: Rally ’round the flag States pursue nuclear weapons in order to gain domestic, popular support for their regime Assumes nuclear weapons have prestige and are popular domestically—because they demonstrate state capability/technological prowess, or because it is an act of assertiveness, etc. Martin 23/24 31 Domestic Politics, 3 Version 3: Openness to international economy (Etel Solingen) A state’s position in the international economy—whether it is integrated with and dependent upon the international economy—affects the costs and benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons: >>If a state is integrated into the international economy, the costs of proliferation will be high (if leading states/the international community decide to impose sanctions); >>For states who are more internally oriented and who are less dependent on the international economy, the costs of proliferation are likely to be lower. Martin 23/24 32 16 14/01/2024 DOMESTIC POLITICS, 4 Version Four: Regime Security Koblentz (2013) argues that states may pursue CB weapons in response to domestic threats (military coups, insurgencies, etc.). Question if we can extend his argument to nuclear weapons: It is possible that regime insecurity influences the acquisition of nuclear weapons—not because nuclear weapons can be used against domestic threats, but because they may shore up support from the military or other potential opponents of the regime. Martin 23/24 33 Domestic politics model as applied to Iran and India? Are (were) there domestic political reasons for the nuclear behaviour of India and Iran? What were/are popular attitudes on nuclear weapons in these countries? Were/are there internal threats to the regime/governments, and is there evidence this influenced nuclear weapons policy? Were/are the economies of these states integrated into the world economy, and is/was there a credible threat of economic sanctions for nuclear weapons activities/acquisition? Martin 23/24 34 17 14/01/2024 Norms Model of Proliferation Norms models looks at the role played by the shared ideas we hold about nuclear weapons: the constructivist argument is that states seek weapons that reflect their understanding of themselves (state identity), or the ‘role’ they want to play Involves socially constructed ideas about what constitutes legitimate behavior for particular roles and identities Also involves socially constructed ideas about weapons—for example, are they prestigious or uncivilized? Behaviour seen as (partially) determined by a ‘logic of appropriateness' (March and Olson)--the idea that identities, rules, and institutions play a substantial role in shaping behaviour. If decision-making is driven by a logic of appropriateness, we ask what it is appropriate for us to do (given our role and identity). This contrasts with decision-making driven by a logic of consequences, where we ask what the consequences of a particular action will be. Martin 23/24 35 Example: In their study of the spread of advanced conventional weapons, Eyre and Suchman (1996, 86) find that ‘Weapons spread not because of a match between their technical capabilities and national security needs but because of the highly symbolic, normative nature of militaries and their weaponry.’ Martin 23/24 36 18 14/01/2024 Norms Model of Proliferation Of course, explanations and expectations generated by the norms model will depend on our understanding of the particular norms surrounding the weapon And it is possible for there to be competing norms, e.g. A positive norm—nuclear weapons as a carrier of status and prestige, associated with technological prowess and great power status A negative norm—nuclear weapons as barbaric, uncivilized, and as inflicting indiscriminate and disproportionate mass destruction What are the norms surrounding CB weapons? 37 Norms Model as applied to Iran and India? What ‘roles’ do/did India and Iran play or aspire to play in international politics? Did they see nuclear weapons as appropriate for these roles? Martin 23/24 38 19 14/01/2024 Questions on explanations of proliferation? Martin 23/24 39 Martin 23/24 Proliferation Security Initiative Part III: Non-Proliferation Policies 40 20 14/01/2024 Nonproliferation What is nonproliferation? Definitions Supply and Demand Examples of nonproliferation tools What tool to use? Conflicting policy implications from models of proliferation The NPT What is the motivation? International peace and security versus power Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament Western Bias Is proliferation a problem? The Sagan/Waltz debate as an example Other questions: Has nonproliferation policy (or particular tools of nonproliferation policy) been effective? Martin 23/24 41 Definition of Nonproliferation ‘Actions to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise.’ (US Govt definition, italics added) (US Govt definition) Martin 23/24 42 21 14/01/2024 Nonproliferation tools or policies Used by governments and international organisations in efforts to prevent proliferation Can target either or both the supply of/the demand for weapons Supply-side nonproliferation polices seek to impeded access to and distribution of sensitive technologies, material and expertise Demand-side nonproliferation policies seek to influence the desire or need for weapons; they seek to dissuade and deter actors from acquiring weapons, and/or to coerce and compel them to cease their attempt to acquire weapons Martin 23/24 43 Nonproliferation Tools Specific tools include: Multilateral norms and treaties (voluntary) Technology denial (controlling trade, e.g. export controls) Diplomatic influence Positive incentives (e.g. preferential trading status, security alliances) Negative incentives (e.g. economic sanctions) Interdiction (sea, air, land) - military and non-military Military force – threat or use; preventive/pre-emptive; limited/significant Non-proliferation strategies Combine tools, approaches and activities Can aim to deter or to compel Can be targeted (particular state) or universal No ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach Can aim to influence supply and/or demand, capabilities and/or intentions Martin 23/24 44 22 14/01/2024 The Nonproliferation Regime is ‘an interlocking set of treaties, agreements, arrangements and verification tools….The regime includes components that address nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, missile delivery systems, and the equipment, materials and technologies needed to produce such weapons. ‘The regime’s components can be placed into three main categories: treaties and agreements establishing norms and legal obligations; tools to verify compliance with obligations; and systems to control the means of producing weapons.’ --Cirincione and Newland (2000) Repairing the Regime, Appendix One. Martin 23/24 45 Elements of the Nonproliferation Regime include: Nuclear: Nonproliferation Treaty, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, Statue of IAEA, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Arms Control Treaties, Nuclear Suppliers group, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Biological: Geneva Protocol, Biological Weapons Convention, Australia Group (export controls). Chemical: Geneva Protocol, Chemical Weapons Convention, Australia Group (export controls). Martin 23/24 All CBN: Proliferation Security Initiative, UNSC Resolution 1540 Conventional: Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Ottawa Treaty on Landmines, etc. Prospective: Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Verification for BWC Future arms control treaties Other? 46 23 14/01/2024 Models of Proliferation and Nonproliferation Policy In his article assigned this week, Scott Sagan argues that the different models have different and incompatible policy implications. (Why does he argue this and do you think he is right?) Implications of this may include: We have to know what is driving proliferation in order to have effective nonproliferation policies (Why is this the case? Is this true on both the demand and the supply side? What do we need to understand in order to have effective supply-side policies?) We may exacerbate one driver when we try to address another (can you give an example/explain this?) Martin 23/24 47 The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Origins in 1959/1961 resolutions presented by Ireland to UN General Assembly. Text was first negotiated between the US and the USSR. Once the US and USSR were in agreement, the main issues were international safeguards versus Euratom; nonproliferation versus disarmament; security assurances. Opened for signature 1 July 1968; entry into force 5 March 1970. Grand bargain: nonproliferation, disarmament, peaceful use of nuclear energy. Martin 23/24 48 24 14/01/2024 Main Articles of the NPT Articles I and II--NWS not to transfer nuclear weapons to NNWS, and NNWS not to acquire them Article III--NNWS accept IAEA safeguards over nuclear facilities and materials Article IV--Inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy for NNWS Article VI--All states to engage in disarmament negotiations in good faith Martin 23/24 49 What motivates nonproliferation policy? Fear that one country’s acquisition will spur further acquisition (falling dominoes, security dilemma dynamics); Belief that as the number of countries possessing CBN weapons increases, their use becomes more likely--through arms races, crisis instability, attempts to use them for influence, and/or through accidental or unauthorised use; Belief that CBN weapons are inhumane, immoral, etc and that the effects of use will involve massive death and destruction; Effort to maintain relative advantage of current possessors of nuclear weapons, to maintain their freedom of action Gavin (2015) examines the role of nonproliferation in US grand strategy, and shows that maintenance of US freedom of action has been a key objective of US nonproliferation policy. Martin 23/24 50 25 14/01/2024 If nuclear deterrence works ….and if it brings stability and provides an incentive for states to avoid war, why pursue a nonproliferation policy? (connection to arguments about role/effects of nuclear weapons last term) Are new nuclear weapons states less likely to be deterred than current NWS? Are accidents or unauthorised use more likely in new nuclear weapons states? Recommended: Debate between Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (see also link to video on KEATS). Waltz argues ‘more is better,’ Sagan argues ‘more is worse.’ Martin 23/24 51 Western bias? So far we’ve talked about proliferation and non-proliferation from what might be characterized as the Western perspective. How might the discussion change if we looked at it from the vantage point of countries outside of the West? Recommended: Biejan Poor Toulabi, 'The Myth of the “Poor Man's Atomic Bomb”: Knowledge, Method, and Ideology in the Study of Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Weapons', Journal of Global Security Studies, Volume 8, Issue 1, March 2023, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss /ogac037. Martin 23/24 52 26 14/01/2024 Bias in the NPT Issues of discrimination and unbalanced obligations: 5 NWS under the NPT promise to pursue disarmament in good faith; Everyone else foreswears nuclear weapons. Martin 23/24 53 NPT, cont. However, it is a mistake to view the nonproliferation/disarmament obligations only through the lens of the relationship between Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). By using the NPT to signal their nuclear intentions, it helps NNWS avoid security-dilemma dynamics that could otherwise arise between them, where each fears its neighbours or adversaries may be seeking nuclear weapons and thus it needs to as well. While this in no way suggests that the NPT is not biased, it does suggest that NNWS benefit in multiple ways from the treaty. Martin 23/24 54 27 14/01/2024 55 Questions? Key concepts/terms include: Proliferation (horizontal versus vertical) Nuclear latency Nuclear hedging Arms Dynamic Models/drivers of proliferation Non-proliferation (definition, different policy tools, supply and demand) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Martin 23/24 56 28 14/01/2024 Next Week: Post-Proliferation Variations in Posture and Strategy Martin 23/24 57 29