Martin BA WMD Lecture Slides Part I NSA 2324 PDF

2/8/2024 Non‐State Actors and CBRN Weapons‐Part I Dr Susan Martin BA WMD in IP 2324 Reminder: Shared docs on KEATS for key concepts and practice essay questions 1 Reminder: National Student Survey How do I complete the NSS? The NSS opens at King's on 15 January 2024 You will start receiving an email...

2/8/2024 Non‐State Actors and CBRN Weapons‐Part I Dr Susan Martin BA WMD in IP 2324 Reminder: Shared docs on KEATS for key concepts and practice essay questions 1 Reminder: National Student Survey How do I complete the NSS? The NSS opens at King's on 15 January 2024 You will start receiving an email from Ipsos in the week beginning 15th January inviting you to complete the survey. Just click the link in the email. Or you can complete the survey at any time by the NSS website www.thestudentsurvey.com Check your emails for updates on NSS. Ipsos will email, text and even call you to remind you to complete the survey. Once you have completed the survey, Ipsos will stop contacting you. The survey is open until Sunday 30 April 2023. But remember. To enter the prize draw, you must enter before 29 February 2024. Prize winners will be notified by 8 March. 2 1 2/8/2024 Rest of Term 16/2 CBN and Arms Control (CWC, Landmines and TPNW) Different room: FWB 3.146 23/2 Reading Week 20‐24 February. No class, no office hours. 1/3 Arms Control and Use/Non‐use: Syria (FWB 2.46) 8/3 New Technologies, the Return of Major Power Competition, and New Questions about Limited Nuclear War (FWB 2.46) 15/3 Dr Strangelove/nuclear strategy discussion (FWB 2.46) 22/3 Conclusion and Review (Practice for exam) (FWB 2.46) Exam Period 29/4‐31/5 3 Overview Part 1: 1. Definitions & methodological problems 2. Brief overview of NSA CBRN threat 3. Risk assessment & perception 4. International response Discussion: Readings Case Studies 1. Aum Shinrikyo 2. Islamic State and Al Qaeda/Al‐Nusra 4 2 2/8/2024 Why Study VNSAs & CBRN Weapons? * *VSNA stands for Violent Non‐State Actor; the R in CBRN stands for radiological. Radiological weapons are weapons that are designed to disperse radioactive agents. Relatively rare events? CW terrorist attacks form 0.19% of terrorist incidents between 1970 and 2015 (Santo et al. (2019) – data from Global Terrorism Database). Historical significance—think about impact of 9/11. Policy towards Iraq, North Korea & Iran: “The prospect of an adversary state covertly giving a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials to a terrorist organization has been the animating force in U.S. grand strategy for more than a decade” (Lieber & Press 2013). However, most analysts find such a scenario incredible. Potential for high impact – but need to assess risk (how measure risk?). Ongoing phenomenon. 5 Global Terrorism Database (biological) https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ DATE COUNTRY CITY PERPETRATOR GROUP FATALITIES INJURED TARGET TYPE 2020‐ 09‐19 United States Washington Anti‐Trump extremists 0 0 Government (General) 2019‐ 02‐28 Tunisia Tunis Muslim extremists 0 0 Government (General),Journalists & Media, Private Citizens & Property 2018‐ 09‐08 Russia Moscow SERB Group (Russian Liberation Movement) 0 1 Private Citizens & Property 2014‐ 04‐01 Colombia Juntas de Birmania Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 0 0 Unknown 2013‐ 05‐20 United States New York City Anti‐Gun Control extremists 0 0 Government (General) 2013‐ 05‐20 United States Washington Anti‐Gun Control extremists 0 0 Private Citizens & Property 2013‐ 05‐20 United States Washington Anti‐Gun Control extremists 0 0 Government (General) 6 3 2/8/2024 Global Terrorism Database (chemical) https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ Date COUNTRY CITY PERPETRATOR GROUP FATALITIES INJURED TARGET TYPE 2020‐09‐11 Afghanistan Matani Taliban 13 5 Terrorists/Non‐state Militia 2020‐06‐04 France Zouaves Paris (ZVP) 0 1 Business 2020‐05‐25 West Bank Jerusalem and Gaza Strip Democratic Munena Republic of the Congo Afghanistan Sherkhan Bandar West Bank Unknown and Gaza Strip US St. Louis Palestinian Extremists 0 1 Police Mai Mai Hapa Na Pale,Twa 2 Militia 6 Private Citizens & Property Taliban 5 0 Police Israeli settlers 0 0 Private Citizens & Property Unknown 0 0 Government (General) 2020‐05‐20 2020‐04‐15 2020‐04‐14 2020‐03‐10 Paris 7 Global Terrorism Database (nuclear) https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ No results for terrorism incident involving nuclear weapons 8 4 2/8/2024 Global Terrorism Database (radiological) https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 9 Defining Terrorism? Few modern groups identify themselves as terrorists “Defining terrorism is the most ambiguous component in terrorism studies.” Sinai, 2008. “Terrorism is a pejorative term… [it] becomes almost unavoidably subjective.” Hoffman, 2006. 10 5 2/8/2024 Nonetheless, we need a definition… “Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear‐generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non‐ combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.” ‐ Alex P. Schmid (2011; 2012) 11 Why would a non‐state actor be interested in CBRN weapons? 12 6 2/8/2024 Motivations? Compared to conventional weapons, a greater ability to Demonstrate inability of a state to protect its citizens Greater media coverage > advertise capability > Attract followers Escalate violence / Normative transgression > intimidate opposition and generate terror Greater potential lethality > generate chaos (‘revolutionary conditions’) _________________ May also be driven and/or facilitated by: Access to material Control over territory ? Desperation > use anything Apocalyptic ideology Desire to acquire a deterrent against reprisals Attract retaliation? 13 Disincentives? Higher chance of retribution? But “a large‐scale CBRN attack would require self‐destructive behaviour within entire organizations” – Dolnik, (2003) Inability to discriminate targets Alienate supporters, perhaps due to above Acquisition of material & technical difficulty Conventional means far more available, reliable and often more lethal Cultural expectations for attack modalities: Biological weapons for Islamist groups – lack of martyrdom 14 7 2/8/2024 Definition of ‘WMD’ Terrorism? Legal rather than technical: U.S. Code Section 2332a CBRN & ‘Destructive Devices’ Destructive Devices – explosives, incendiary or poison gas bombs, grenades, rockets, missiles, mines or similar Bentley (2011) – ‘No essentialist notion of WMD’ Convictions for 9/11 for using a WMD Enemark (2011) – ‘Misleading’ when applied to chemical and nuclear threats, open to political ‘manipulation.’ Shamai (2015) – WMD has served as a way of stigmatising indiscriminate weapons Defined in 1948 by UN Commission for Conventional Armaments as CBRN (and other equivalent future weapons) 15 Definitions Matter…. But all are contested By helping to frame the threat, definitions have policy consequences (example – conflation of radiological and nuclear threats) Definitions also shape analysis—identification of cases and ‘evidence’, for both quantitative and qualitative studies Groups/Actors: Terrorist vs Non‐State Actor vs Insurgent vs Assassination vs Hybrid warfare? Tamil Tigers (1990) vs Anthrax Letters (2001) vs Litvinenko (2006) & Skripal (2018) Weapon type: CBRN vs CBN vs WMD? Mass casualty only? Brings us back to legal vs technical definitions – politicised. CBRN – huge spectrum – individual poisoning to thermonuclear detonation; radiological often not included Activity/Attack type: Limited number of cases of use (thankfully), so what counts? Initial research, attempted acquisition, acquisition without use, attempted use, threats with possession, hoaxes, or use only? 16 8 2/8/2024 What counts as an incident? Intent, Hoaxes and Non‐viable Plans Many NSA cells disrupted before conducting attacks When can a NSA be considered to have plotted a CBRN attack? Expressed intent? Researched means & methods? Acquired materials? Attack options explored often aspirational, often not viable Answers here can significantly alter threat assessment Examples: 2023 arrests in Germany—ricin and cyanide AQ cell Osmium tetroxide 2004 plot. Halted at “early stages of development.” AQ cell ‘dirty bomb’ 2004 plot. Proposed acquiring 10,000 smoke detectors. Would have needed 10,000,000+ 1993 WTC ‐ judges comments vs reality (Parachini, 2000) Hoaxes – ‘White powder’ letters 17 Chemical—quick overview of technical characteristics Huge variation in potency and complexity of agents Chemical warfare agents vs Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Airborne Chemicals Chlorine, Sarin, VX Different types: chocking, blood, nerve, blistering, acid, etc.. Acquisition/Production Acquisition of equipment, precursors and protection – Aum & ISIS ? Quality of agent Weaponisation and dispersal Explosives can destroy agent Sabotage of industrial facilities Bhopal pesticide plant – 1984 – 4000 dead—as example of what could happen (accident/design fault vs sabotage) 18 9 2/8/2024 Radiological—quick overview of technical characteristics RDD ‐ Explosive dispersal (‘dirty bomb’): Relatively simple design and construction? Difficult to decontaminate (Goiânia 1997) Not a WMD? Acute exposure difficult – elevated cancer risk ‘Weapon of mass disruption’? Dispersal via inhalation, ingestion or immersion Attack on industrial irradiator facility/nuclear site Stolen Co60 Source, Mexico, 2013 19 Biological—quick overview of technical characteristics Toxins – potent poisons derived from a biological source (or synthesised) e.g. Ricin & Botulinum toxin Right wing use – Koehler & Popella (2018) Bacteriological agents – e.g. Anthrax Anthrax letters (2001) – 5 dead, 17 injured – Bruce Ivins – Biodefence insider Contagious viral agents – e.g. Ebola & Smallpox Requires viable strains Rajneeshee cult – 1984 – Oregon – Salmonella ‐ 751 infected ‐ disrupt council elections Difficultly with safe creation, storage, and dispersal Effectiveness highly dependent on environmental conditions Level of skill required? OTA (1993) 20 10 2/8/2024 Nuclear—quick overview of technical characteristics Several pathways: Purchase/given from a state actor Unlikely. Control vs deniability ‐ (Lieber & Press, 2013) Attribution – nuclear forensics Theft Challenging Guarded Arming mechanisms would have to be bypassed Creation of Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) At best, unlikely to be ‘efficient,’ but several kiloton yield all that needed (?) (challenges on next slide) 21 Challenges for an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) NSA scenario? Acquire fissile material – 25kg of U235 Transport fissile material Assemble material: requires expertise & equipment (recruitment of specialists) Overcome technical challenges Avoid criticality; process metals (metallurgy), create assembly mechanism Transport IND to target & detonate All avoiding detection, leaks, infiltration; risks if have to rely on criminal elements and/or specialists who are not committed to cause Leonid Smirnov – stole 1.5kg HEU in 1992 22 11 2/8/2024 Creating an Improvised Nuclear Device? Credible scenario? ‘Bomb in the Backyard’ (Zimmerman) total of 19 persons, less than $10 million, matter of month Nth Country Experiment Charles Ferguson and William Potter – possible but challenging Mueller—20+ steps—each difficult, together extremely unlikely Heated disagreement in literature Individual stages ‐ not implausible? Comparison to incident record 23 Literature on Measuring Risk of NSA nuclear use What do you think the risk of a nuclear terrorist incident is in the next ten years? Garwin (2007) ‐ 90% in 10 years Graham Allison – (2004) – >50% in 10 years William Perry – 50% in 10 years Matthew Bunn – (2006) – 29% in 10 years David Albright – (2005) – 1% in 10 years John Mueller – (2008) – 1/1000000 of happening per attempt Limited number of relevant cases on which to base analysis of risks Need to measure risk – it affects policy, how we distribute resources How do we develop policy for, and guard against, rare/non‐observed events? 24 12 2/8/2024 Assessing Risk How would you go about measuring it? Should you give it a number? Soft quantitative approach: Risk = likelihood x consequence (x vulnerability); Likelihood subjectively assessed by experts. Event trees Successive steps with assigned probabilities—but requires what trying to get out of model— understanding of alternatives and outcomes and how group evaluates them. Different assumptions about probability and effect can lead to radically different policy prescriptions – e.g. John Mueller vs Matthew Bunn. Cox (2008): Variables are not static; analyses often ignore adaptation by intelligent adversary. Hobbs and Downes (2017): Nuclear terrorism is a ‘virtual risk’ –models of this risk are useful, but not for prediction; instead, they are useful for structuring discussion and directing research, especially towards specific components of possible scenarios. 25 UK National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies – 2017— Matrix B, Malicious Attack Risks 26 13 2/8/2024 Risk Perception? Risk Rhetoric? “The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of a secret and sudden [terrorist] attack with chemical, biological, or radiological, or nuclear weapons.” George W. Bush, February 11, 2004 “The gravest danger we face [is] nuclear terrorism…We used to worry about our nuclear stalemate with the Soviet Union. Now, we worry about 50 tons of highly enriched uranium ‐ some of it poorly secured ‐ at civilian nuclear facilities in over forty countries around the world.” Barack Obama, July 16, 2008 27 Politically Motivated Terrorism 1970s/80s Terrorism dominated by ethno‐nationalism, radical left/right: Hostage taking; Some interest in CBRN weapons; Crude weapons. Examples: Contamination approach with biological (Rajneeshee, 1985); CSA cyanide plot (1985); Dark Harvest Commandos (1981). Understood as wanting a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead (Jenkins). As aiming for political change. 28 14 2/8/2024 ‘Changing Face of Terrorism’ Perceived shift in use of terrorism to create social drama: Change from “terrorist wanting a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead to terrorist wanting a lot of people watching AND a lot of people dead” (Brian Jenkins, 2006). Global trend of growing lethality of terrorist attacks, e.g. World Trade Center (1993 & 2001); Mumbai attacks (2008). Increase in “religious” and extreme identarian right‐wing terrorist groups. Perceived as suicidal/no intention of survival. Perceived as irrational Less barriers to CBRN use? 29 Additional Factors 1990s – 2000s: confluence of events Collapse of the Soviet Union Material on sale on the black market Expertise – worry about scientists Decline in the threat of nuclear war? Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack (1995) Rise of AQ – particular focus on WMD weapons AQ Khan – centrifuge parts & bomb plans (2004) Biotechnological revolution Globalisation & spread of capabilities Even literature & films 30 15 2/8/2024 Such rhetoric can create the threat “Secretary of Defense Cohen holding up a five‐pound bag of sugar (in 1997) and asserting that such a small quantity of anthrax could devastate the entire population of metropolitan Washington, D.C. This apparently highlighted to al Qaeda the value of pursuing unconventional attacks: More specifically, the group’s fascination with CBRN essentially reflected our own.” (Libicki et al., 2007) “The fear of WMD terrorism and the publicity associated with each incident within the US have strengthened the likelihood of more incidents” (Cameron et al., 2000) 31 And inspire hoaxes Source: Tishler, (2016) ‘Taking Hoaxes Seriously: Characteristics of Terrorism Hoaxes and their Perpetrators’ shows that CBRN hoaxes clustered and peaked around the millennium. 32 16 2/8/2024 International Responses Deterrence through denial – Supply side responses Many initiatives, resolutions & treaties: The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (1991) UNSCR 1373 (2001) & UNSCR 1540 (2004) – Chapter VII adoption Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (2002) Proliferation Security Initiative (2003) International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005) IAEA Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005) Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (2006) Nuclear Security Summit Process (2010‐2016) Role for pre‐existing arms control & export regimes Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) – schedules & security Wassenaar arrangement (1996, but successor to COCOM (1949)) Australia Group (1985) 33 UNSCR 1540 (2004) Chapter VII of the UN Charter "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.“ Primary obligations: No assistance to NSA CBRN Criminalise NSA CBRN efforts Must control CBRN material Provide progress reports Other actions and issues In US‐‐Matrix reports (2005) – legislation and implementation Inconsistent implementation – governmental priorities Limited capacity itself – 15 members of 1540 committee Involvement of civil society – VERTIC, Project Alpha 34 17 2/8/2024 Measuring Effectiveness of Policy? Graham Allison, 2018: risk reduced due to international focus John Mueller, 2018: risk always inflated and no significant change Open question: have efforts markedly improved security? Continued vulnerability of military stockpiles Pelindaba (2007), Y12 incident (2012), Volkel airbase (2014) Efforts to mitigate risk and improve resilience include: Nuclear Security Summit process – 33 countries have totally cleared HEU stocks; Introduction of alternative technologies to remove radiological material; Improved contingency planning. Politicisation: post Crimea (2014), split with developing countries 35 Future Challenges Credit: instagram.com/heybuddycomics/ Increased threat due to scientific advancement and continuing spread of capabilities and materials? CRISPR 3D printing – metal components Chemical microreactors Dissemination of expertise – dark web / encrypted messaging apps Biotech revolution Artificial Intelligence Or less relevant? Shift back to simpler, more conventional means of attack? Guns, vehicles, explosives, etc.. Halting state‐based proliferation 36 18 2/8/2024 Terrorism, Tacit Knowledge and Other Knowledge Barriers What is tacit knowledge? Collins (2001): ‘Knowledge or abilities that can be passed between scientists by personal contact but cannot be, or have not been set out or passed on in formulae, diagrams, or verbal descriptions and instructions for action’ >>learning by experience, more difficult to share Other knowledge barriers: Impossible dilemma between information exchange and secrecy (Ouagrham‐Gormley, 2012) Explicit knowledge errors – due to conspiratorial mind set? E.g. ‘Red Mercury’ Coercive management Terrorist groups tend to be imitative and conservative >>>All of this helps to explain limited success of VNSA use of CBRN 37 Discussion Ackerman and Jacome, ‘WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat.’ Purkitt and Burgess, ‘South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme.’ Case studies: 1. Aum Shinrikyo 2. Islamic State and Al Qaeda/Al‐Nusra 38 19 2/8/2024 Remember next week: 16 February CBN and Arms Control (CWC, Landmines and TPNW) New room (this week only): FWB 3.146 39 Discussion—Ackerman and Jacome Some of the hype regarding CBRN terrorism is overblown New technologies can help defence too>>race between offence and defence… ‘Except that in this case, technologies seem to favor the adversary, the empowering empowerment of the individual is unlikely to be reversed, and there are a number of tipping points—such as the first demonstration by a terrorist of a WMD capability— that could profoundly alter the system. It thus appears that the VNSA offense in future will be playing with a stronger hand than the international security defense—and with the stakes as high as with WMD, the defense cannot afford to falter even once’ (2013 40 20 2/8/2024 Definition of ‘Weapon of Mass Destruction’ Ackerman and Jacome, 23: WMD as weapons that ‘would inflict catastrophic casualties, widespread social disruption, or devastating economic consequences beyond those resulting from all but the largest conventional attacks’ (citing Ackerman and Tamsett, 209). Carus 2012, 5 favours the 1948 UN definition: ‘[WMD are]... atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons.’ Carus is citing the Commission on Conventional Armaments (CCA), UN document S/C.3/32/Rev.1, August 1948, as quoted in UN, Office of Public Information, The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1965, UN Publication 67.I.8, 28. 41 Discussion—Purkitt and Burgess (2002) What did you make of article? Reaction and key take‐aways? Any general lessons from South African case? 42 21