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UCLouvain

Babette Léonard

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Geopolitics Cold War Peaceful Coexistence International Relations

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This document details a lecture or study guide on the Cold War era, focusing on peaceful coexistence and the rise of multipolarity between 1963 and 1971. It analyzes the strategies of the two superpowers.

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Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard Part 4. The Cold War of peaceful coexistence and the rise of Multipolarity, 1963-71 Peaceful Coexistence From confrontation to acceptance Cuba crisis o Awareness of dangers of (direct) confrontation...

Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard Part 4. The Cold War of peaceful coexistence and the rise of Multipolarity, 1963-71 Peaceful Coexistence From confrontation to acceptance Cuba crisis o Awareness of dangers of (direct) confrontation o Soviet military investments Opening of a hot line between USSR and the US First disarmament negotiations (PTBT in 1963, NPT in 1968) Nuclear Technology and parity between US & USSR o Reality of M.A.D. Real détente after Nixon elections “After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiations” (Jan. 1969) A lot of nuclear weapons very heavy that you can deliver from the ground, real détente will only start. The confrontation produced by the Cuban missile crisis made both sides very much aware of the dangers of Cold War competition leading to hot war. From the Soviet perspective, the lessons learned by 1963 cantered on their relative lack of traditional military and economic power, compared to the US. At some point they will realise that more conventional weapon will cost a lot of money so very early they need to find a balance with the number of weapons. The Soviets were always very concerned with the stark realities of power. The new Soviet leadership that had replaced Khrushchev in 1964 really wanted to avoid any future humiliation like the Cuban crisis. The Soviets, thus, believed that it was vital to increase all-round Soviet strength to equal that of Washington. Before the crisis, it was Kennedy who launched a significant arms build-up; after Cuba, it was the Soviets who led the way, helped by the fact that the Americans got bogged down in Vietnam. In the end, the high American military spending failed to deliver dividends in strategic terms, nor did it produce domestic or political benefits—far from it. It was partly because the US realized that the Soviets had achieved nuclear parity that Nixon was willing to take up détente. Détente Easing of tensions between the two superpowers: Mutual recognition and non-interference in each others’ affairs Objectives: o To avoid nuclear war o Limit the (nuclear) arms race o Hope for economic benefits Major “Achievements”: o Arms negotiations (SALT I & II) o Ostpolitik and Détente as a European project o Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki (1975) It is not easy to delimit the Détente period. Generally, it is considered as the period from the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. However, real détente occurred once Nixon came to office in 1969 and already started to deteriorate after the Helsinki agreements of 1975. So, there are 47 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard certainly variations even within the détente period. Here, we refer to the first period right after the Cuba crisis as the period of peaceful co-existence. It is also not easy to describe exactly what it is. Basically, it is a period in which the tensions between the two superpowers are eased, accompanied by mutual recognition of each other – and of their spheres of influence and non-interference in each other’s affairs. The 1st purpose of detente was to avoid nuclear war. Therefore, efforts were made to improve direct communication between them (through the hot line in 1963), followed by agreements on reducing confrontations by mistake or some confidence building measures in Europe. Both parties wanted to manage crises without risking a nuclear war. Related to this, the second purpose of détente was to limit the nuclear arms race. Thus, the partial test ban treaty was concluded in 1963, but with little hope of a continuation, because both still wanted to keep the option of having additional nuclear weapons and to keep their existing arsenals intact. Rather than to achieve nuclear disarmament, the purpose was to slow down the arms race (arms control). A further purpose, perhaps not of equal significance to both, was the hope of economic benefits, not only from slowing down the arms race, but from direct exchanges between the two; grain and technology were the two most important commodities sought by the Soviet Union, while new markets appealed to the United States. Soviet at this point is not economically well because of no motivation (inherent to the system), The difference between the west and east in technology will become greater and greater. So Soviet need to improve their relationship to have access to a better technology.  The pick of détente will be the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. US Foreign Policy… a step back Kennedy o Call for a ‘genuine peace’ "What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do between the USSR and the US we seek?" he asked. "Not a Pax Americana enforced on (1963) the world by American weapons or war. Not the peace o Limited Test Ban Treaty (TBT– of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking 1963) about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life Johnson on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and o Limiting disputes with USSR nations to grow and to hope and build a better life for o Isolating China their children - not merely peace for Americans but o Domestic priorities (The great peace for all men and women - not merely peace in our society) < Vietnam war time but peace in all time.” o Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT– 1968) Nixon o Rapprochement to USSR and China o Kissinger’s ‘linkage’ between issues o Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT–1972) Kennedy He was President during the bay of pigs, the Cuban Missile crisis and during the peak of the Berlin Wall crisis. After the Cuba crisis, in a speech in 1963 at the American University, Kennedy calls for a genuine peace between the US and the USSR. Among his achievements in the regard is the limited test ban treaty: the US, Soviets, and British agree to ban all but underground nuclear tests. Underground tests required greater technological sophistication, and would this way add another obstacle for nations who want 48 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard to develop nuclear weapons. While this is certainly a step toward détente, the treaty was also aimed at the nuclear aspirations, real or feared of China and West Germany. In line with the last year of Kennedy and his commitment to avoid an escalation of violence, Johnson Johnson was able to limit the disputes with the Soviet Union. The goal of his administration in the second part of the 1960s to isolate China, which was then considered as very unpredictable and even irrational. Johnson had big plan on the domestic front, as he wanted to invest in the United States. This was a big social plan, which aimed to eradicate poverty and racial injustice through major investments in education, health care, urban policies and transportation. With respect to arms limitation, Johnson helped achieve the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, in which those countries who disposed of the nuclear weapon committed not to spread the knowledge and help other countries acquire it and they would also not use it offensively and those countries who did not have it engaged in not trying to acquire it.  Of course, Johnson will be especially remembered as the President who will let the Vietnam war escalade to a point of no return. The US will actively seek rapprochement with the USSR and China. Nixon’s foreign policy Nixon was characterized by the linkage between issues. This foreign policy was designed and carried out by Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s security advisor and later also his Secretary of State. Linkage implied that advances in one area would also entail advances on other issues. For example, Kissinger would link negotiations on Vietnam (i.e., support from the Soviets to get North Vietnam to negotiate) to advances in the Arms limitation talks.  A major achievement under Nixon will be the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1972 John Fitzgerald Kennedy was the 35th President of the US – he was a democrat and Johnson JKK & LBJ was his Vice-President. In his inaugural speech, he said "Ask not what your country can do for you-ask what you can do for your country". Kennedy will be assassinated in Dallas, TX on 22 Nov 1963 at age 46. He is still today the President with the highest average approval rating (70%) of any US president. He took important decisions to further the Civil Rights Movement. Lyndon Baines Johnson was Vice-President under Kennedy and automatically became President after his death in 1963. He sought for election on a program called the Great Society (1964-65), a major social program. He also enacted the Civil rights Act in 1964, an initiative from Kennedy, banning racial discrimination in public facilities, interstate commerce, workplace, and housing and the Voting Rights Act (1965), removing racial discrimination in voting. 49 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard Soviet Foreign Policy Relaxing tensions o Reduce dangers of (nuclear) war – (MAD by early 1960s) Economic o Financial consequences of arms race o Access to Western Technology Political o Strengthen grip on Eastern–Europe o Outbid China for cooperation with US But first, a little focus on Khrushchev-Brezhnev: As confidence in Khrushchev had started to decrease in the early 1960s, by 1963, the wheels were set in motion for his removal and replacement and his second in command, Brezhnev became involved in a plot to remove him. On the international scene, he would be cautious and continue the policy of ‘Détente’. Now, Soviet Foreign Policy: As for the United States, the most important goal for the Soviets, at this point, was to ease the tensions that had been built up since the 1950s and reduce the risk of a direct confrontation and nuclear war, as Mutual Assured Destruction was believed to have been attained in the early 1960s. The large military of both countries came at a high financial cost and, as we saw, the Soviets would invest even more in their nuclear arsenal after the Cuban missile crisis. Therefore, the Soviets needed to find more resources to finance these investments. The Soviets were also eager to improve relations with the West to gain access to better technology, as the Soviets were lagging (because of this lack of competition). Politically, however, the Soviets will strengthen their grip on Eastern Europe while also trying to improve cooperation with the US to outbid the Chinese. As the Americans will renew their relations with the Chinese, the Soviets will want to make sure that their relations with the US are even better.  They want to avoid isolation and want to obtain something economically; they want to have access to a better technology, so they need to collaborate. They invest and maintain their army and weapon. The tried to increase they grips on Poland and others that they stay with them and didn’t go to the west. They want to make sure their relation will USA be better than the relation between China and USA. Soviet will rewrite history and the things Khrushchev did. Emergence of a more multipolar world New independent states o Non-alignment movement Cracks in Western bloc o de Gaulle’s independent course o Ostpolitik Split in communist bloc o Sino-Soviet split o Eastern Europe (Prague Spring) During the 1960s, the initial stage of detente, we will see that the world is not simply divided into two monolithic blocs with strong internal coherence. The creation of many new independent states in Asia and Africa had challenged, and altered, the global domination of the rival blocs. 50 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard Another key factor to a more multipolar world was the split in the communist bloc, with differences emerging between the USSR and China, but also within Soviet-dominated east-central Europe, as we will see with the Prague Spring of 1968.  We have been dependant of this model country so they will have said we are with no one of you. In the conference of Bandung, they will talk about that and the different challenge. France and de Gaulle Critical of US domination –> maximize French independence Develop links with communist countries NATO o 1966: French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command structure LBJ: “when a man asks you to leave his home, you don’t argue, you just get your hat and go” o NATO headquarters relocated from Paris to Brussels EEC o 1963: veto British candidacy o 1965: boycott to prevent further centralization of the EEC: empty chair o 1967: second veto against British membership (accession in 1973) Resignation of de Gaulle in 1969 Came back to power 1958, and there was still this feeling France should be an Empire and progressively they accept this idea of a France leader for Europe. And France didn’t want to be dependant of USA. The cession between east and west is very unnatural for Europe. So being in this position, French will try to resist and to have a least continue the dialogue with the soviet. France is a constituent member of NATO. However, in 1966, France withdrew from NATO’s NATO integrated military command structure. The French withdrew because they were displeased with America’s domination of NATO and the special relation between the US and the UK, which strengthened this domination. De Gaulle probably timed his action in 1966 because of his successful re-election as president four months earlier. He never actually ended France’s commitment to NATO, which bound it to aid fellow members if they were attacked; nor did he categorically state that NATO could not use French soil in the event of war, but he raised the danger that France might pursue a defense policy out of step with other Western powers. France’s withdrawal did cause administrative inconvenience, too, in that NATO headquarters had to be moved from Paris to a new site, just outside Brussels in the Shape.  France returns under integrated NATO command in 2009 under President Sarkozy/ Lyndon Johnson’s response to de Gaulle’s action was remarkably accepting; he argued that “when a man asks you to leave his home, you don’t argue, you just get your hat and go”. With respect to the European Economic Community, in 1963, there were signs that the ECC negotiations with the British would have succeeded if not for de Gaulle’s veto, which he had probably intended for some time. He felt that British were to clause of USA and that was a relation he couldn’t have and didn’t want and so if you let British come in UE there will be a 51 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard part of American influence so he refused British joined UE and because everyone needs to approve, they cannot come. In 1965 de Gaulle became increasingly concerned by the centralizing tendencies of the EEC, which might undermine French independence. There were proposals to give the EEC its own budgetary resources and to increase the power of the European Parliament and Commission. De Gaulle wanted the power of the EU to remain with the member states and not within the Commission. In 1967, de Gaulle again vetoes British accession to the EEC. The UK will only accede to the EEC in 1973. De Gaulle will resign in 1969 after losing a national referendum on his proposal for constitutional reform in France. De Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard After his defeat in the national referendum for constitutional reform – for which he had announced that he would resign in case of refusal – de Gaulle effectively steps down. At the next presidential elections in 1969, his former Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou is elected. Pompidou dies in 1974, only 5 years into his 7-year presidential term (septennat). Pompidou’s former ministers, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Jacques Chirac become President and Prime Minister, respectively. Giscard, Mitterrand and Chirac Giscard d’Estaing will be France’s President for one term, from 1974 until 1981, when he loses the presidential elections to François Mitterrand. Giscard will continue to have a full political life, in France and in Europe and will die in 2020 from the effects of COVID-19. Mitterrand will become the longest standing French President, as he will be in office for two terms of 7 years, from 1981 until 1995, when he will be succeeded by Jacques Chirac. Although from a different political party, Chirac and Mitterrand will closely work together, as Chirac will be Prime Minister under Mitterrand from March 1986 – May 1988. Such a complex configuration whereby a President and PM are from a different party is called cohabitation. Chirac will become President himself from 1995- 2007. During his time in office, the Presidential term will be reduced from 7 to 5 years, which explains why he was in office for 12 years. 1Giscard (l) & Mitterrand (r) 2Chirac (l) & Mitterrand (r) 52 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard European détente Physical divide line in Europe contrary to diplomatic tradition Detente as tactic o More interactions would lead to proving western superiority, leading to demands for reforms in communist camp NATO: Harmel Report (1967) o Military and political purpose of NATO o Dual-track policy: deterrence and détente Germany: Ostpolitik (1966-71) o Abandoning Hallstein doctrine under Adenauer o Willy Brandt o Signing NPT (1969) o 4 power agreement on Berlin, confirming status quo (1971) Both Western and Eastern Europeans were inevitable concerned by their physical proximity to the dividing line between the two camps: this meant that in the event of a war much of Europe would be destroyed. Also, the West European great powers had a different diplomatic tradition that of the US, as this was less ideological in emphasis, more pragmatic and more ready to accept the current state of power politics. By respecting the European status quo in the short term, the West would use trade, talks, and other contacts to break down barriers with and suspicions within the East, and proving the superiority of Western economic goods, infiltrating liberal ideas across the Iron Curtain, and so diluting the cohesion of the Soviet bloc. Basically, they were working for a reduction of tension in Europe. If this was successful, it might create pressures inside the Communist camp which could, over time, loosen the Russian grip on Eastern Europe. So, détente as a policy had a direct goal to ease tensions and improve the security situation in Europe through better relationships, but it was also a longer-term tactic towards the East bloc. “Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance” at a time when the existence of the Alliance was put into question. The report proposes. Twin purpose of the alliance: political and military. The goal of the alliance is to NATO Harmel counter Moscow and the Warsaw Pact militarily if necessary. But NATO’s goal is also Report political, as it should ease the tensions between both camps and provide stability in Europe Dual-track policy: deterrence and détente. Détente was important, as everybody realized that there were great advantages to improving relations between east and west, but it was also essential, at the same time, to show that the alliance was ready and strong enough to counter any provocation or attack from Moscow. The notion of détente was new to the alliance and marked a shift towards a more cooperative approach. The report considered how NATO could contribute to international peace and stability. Germany: More and more, newly independent states in the less developed world gave diplomatic Ostpolitik recognition to East Germany, undermining West Germany’s Hallstein Doctrine. According to this doctrine, Germany would not have relations with governments who recognized East Germany. However, ‘Instead of isolating the GDR from the rest of the world, [West Germany] faced the prospect of being isolated itself.’ In October 1969, Brandt became West German Chancellor and, within two months, signed the Non- Proliferation Treaty, ending Warsaw Pact fears that Germany would acquire a nuclear arsenal. The Berlin 53 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard agreement of 3 September 1971, between the four occupying powers, essentially recognized the existing status quo. The Eastern Bloc Criticism from hardline conservatives Albania o Enver Hoxha, (Stalinist) hardliner o Critical of Khrushchev o 1961 Soviet embargo compensated by Chinese aid Romania o Resistance to economic integration o Nicolae Ceausescu (1965) o Recognition of West Germany in 1967 o Ended active involvement in Warsaw Pact military command Much like the Western bloc, it will become clear that the communist bloc is also not one coherent monolithic bloc, but there are different perspectives and approaches within. Around 1961 Khrushchev revived his attacks on Stalinism and tolerated a limited amount of intellectual diversity in the USSR. But, inspired in part by Mao’s China, East European leaders were suspicious of Khrushchev and keen to establish a degree of equality for themselves within the bloc, so that they did not slavishly have to mirror every major turn in Soviet policy. Paradoxically, it was hardliner communists, rather than would-be reformers, who were often most successful at distancing themselves from Moscow’s authority in the 1960s. As the examples of Albania and Romania show, it is ironically, not the reformers who want a more moderate course, who will be at odds with Moscow, but it is those who want a more strict and conservative interpretation of communism At the extreme, Enver Hoxha, the Stalinist dictator of Albania was able to assert his Albania independence in 1960, openly criticizing Khrushchev and relying on Chinese aid to compensate for the economic embargo which the Soviets tried to impose. In December 1961 Moscow severed relations with Albania, though it remained a nominal member of the Warsaw Pact until 1968. In 1961–3 Khrushchev tried to encourage integration via COMECON, partly in response to Romania the EEC’s success in Western Europe. However, Gheorghieu-Dej feared that such a policy would leave Romania as an agricultural state, while industrial production was concentrated in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Prague Spring Harsh regime under Antonin Novotny (1953-68) o Strong calls for reforms o Replaced by Alexander Dubček (1968) o Introduction of market elements in economy, free discussion of reforms Multiple warnings from Brezhnev Dubček emphasizes loyalty to Warsaw Pact Military maneuvers as intimidation Operation Danube (20-1 August 1968) o (adverted) Domestic Coup o Military intervention (500,000 strong) Dubcek replaced by Husak (April 1969) 54 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard The most noticeable crack in the Eastern bloc will come in 1968 during the Prague Spring. Under the leadership of Antonin Novotny after 1953, Czechoslovakia was one of the most orthodox and stable countries in the Eastern bloc. But the harshness of the regime, the rigid planning system, and the stagnation of economic growth in the early 1960s brought criticism from some party members, led by a Slovak politician, Alexander Dubček. In January 1968, Dubček replaced Novotny as party leader and Czechoslovakia soon became of deep concern to the Kremlin. Their first step to achieving this new system was to allow freer discussion of reform in Czechoslovakian society through a marked relaxation of censorship. This means that it was now allowed to openly discuss what was going wrong and how to improve things. Dubcek, of course, received several warnings from Brezhnev in March, May and July 1968. Dubcek tried to make sure there would not be any reason for a Soviet intervention by following an orthodox foreign policy: ‘the Dubček government seized every opportunity to emphasize its loyalty to the Warsaw Pact. An invasion was launched on 20 August under the codename ‘Operation Danube’ and was meant to be accompanied by a domestic coup against Dubček, led by conservatives. However, the domestic side of the operation failed. Instead, the Soviets were forced to arrest Dubček (who remained in office until April 1969) and other leaders, taking them to Moscow for several days of talks, during which they were forced to agree to the country’s ‘normalization’ as a loyal member of the Soviet bloc. The Soviets feared a domino effect that would spread to other satellite states in Eastern Europe. But Brezhnev also wanted to make sure there would not be a reaction to the invasion from the West. Dubcek was succeeded by Gustav Husak, who would return to a hard line and get rid of anyone he believed not loyal to Moscow, further decreasing the popularity of the communist party in Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev Doctrine “When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries. Limited sovereignty: fraternal solidarity trumps national sovereignty Justification for invasion of Czechoslovakia (and later Afghanistan) The invasion of Czechoslovakia made clear how Brezhnev perceived of the Soviet relationship and its role towards the satellite states. He argued that the solidarity between nations was more important than the national sovereignty of single countries. This would justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia and later of Afghanistan. So, in his perspective, a single country within the Eastern bloc should not be allowed to threaten the regimes of other countries. When that happens, this becomes a common problem that will be dealt with. Sino-Soviet Split Communist bloc not monolithic Detente vs. international proletarian revolution Mao posed as ‘true’ anti-imperialist o Support to Albania and Romania Personal animosity between Mao and Khrushchev o Public critique on Cuban crisis 55 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard o Lack of support in the 1959 China-India border war o Reluctance to support China’s nuclear weapons program + TBT Split by 1963 The examples of Albania, Romania and Czechoslovakia showed that the communist bloc was certainly not a monolithic one. This was even less the case for the relationship between the USSR and China, an alliance that had been deteriorating for years up until its split in 1963. While the Soviet Union realized that relaxing tensions between east and west would be beneficial for peace and decrease the risk of nuclear war, Mao positioned himself as a true anti-imperialist, advocating for further proletarian revolution internationally. According to the conservative writings of Marx, the proletarian revolution should be actively spread and promoted. By easing tensions, the Soviet Union was taking a more pragmatic approach, which Mao criticized to increase his own popularity among communists. That is also why China supported Romania and Albania against the USSR. Mao announced that the Soviet retreat from class struggle amounted to revisionism and to the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. Mao feared that the same thing might happen in China, as he was very concerned with consolidating his regime. There was also a personal animosity between Mao and Khrushchev. Mao had openly criticized the Soviet Union on several occasions: Mao had ridiculed the SU for its handling of the Cuban missile crisis China received little support from the SU in its border war with India over Tibet The USSR also did not support China in its development for nuclear weapons. Moreover, it saw the TBT as selfish, and aimed against China. And so, as tensions between the two intensify, by 1963, we can talk of a split between the Soviets and China.  Communism is just not one thing, there is many perspectives, it’s not alle the same. In the west we have also different level of democracy, it’s the same case. China will show URSS is no longer a revolution country. Communism is about the global revolution against communism. China considers itself as a true communist country. China didn’t fell supported by the Soviet even when they were in the revolution with Saline. There was a personal dislike between Mao and Khrushchev, no longer allies. Rise of China Successful nuclear test (16 Oct. 1964) and hydrogen bomb (1967) (future) Third superpower Limited attraction for developing countries despite efforts of premier Zhou Enlai Vietnam War: competition with USSR to resist US imperialism China had not been in good shape during most of the 19th century. At the beginning of the 20th century, it was still the playground of western powers and in the late 1930s and early 1940s, it had been invaded by and at war with Japan. Then, it had gone through a civil war in the late 1940s. By 1964, however, China had successfully tested its first nuclear weapon and by 1967 disposed of a hydrogen bomb. Mao saw this as an 56 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard important step towards establishing China as the world’s third greatest power which, with the largest population on earth and vast, untapped economic potential, might one day match the superpowers. However, China was not very attractive as an ally. It lacked the potential of either America or the USSR to provide large-scale economic aid or modern military equipment and those who wished to pursue anti- Western policy saw the Soviet Union as a more attractive sponsor. During the Vietnam War, China and the USSR will compete in their support for the North-Vietnamese and their fight against South Vietnam and what they saw as the imperialist US. The Cultural Revolution and foreign policy (1965- 9) Failure of the “Great leap forward” (1958-62)  Cultural Revolution Launched in 1965 to eliminate remaining ‘bourgeois’ influences in society The ‘Red Guards’ and internal purges Sino-Soviet relations deteriorate o Breaking off relations after border incidents (1966) o Violent actions around the Soviet embassy (Jan 1967) o Military confrontation on Zhen Bao Island (March 1969) and clashes in Xinjiang (August 1969)  The fear of a confrontation between the USSR and the PRC 11 Sept. 1969: Meeting between PM Kosygin and Zhou Enlai resulting in cease-fire The great leap forward was a campaign launched between 1958-62 to quickly transform China from an agrarian to an industrial society. As a program, the policies of the great leap forward failed miserably and caused millions of people to die. This had, of course, weakened Mao’s position within the Chinese communist Party, as he was criticized for the devastating policies of the Great Leap forward and lost prestige within his own party. The cultural revolution, launched in 1966, would mark Mao’s return to the central position of power, his return as the undisputed leader. Mao claimed that bourgeois elements had infiltrated the government and society, and they threatened to restore capitalism and, therefore, needed to be eliminated. The goal for Mao was also to get rid of those who opposed or were critical of his policies. The Cultural Revolution was spearheaded by the young (child from 10 years) ‘Red Guards’, armed with advice and encouragement from Mao’s ‘Little Red Book’. Their enthusiasm, ruthlessness, and immaturity led them not only to terrorize ordinary Chinese, but also to target moderates in the communist leadership and to launch investigations against officials at all levels. Everything that did not fit the socialist system and the proletarian dictatorship would be attacked. Mao announced the end of the cultural revolution in 1969, but it effectively continued until Mao’s death in 1976. Throughout the Cultural Revolution, relations between China and the Soviet Union deteriorated. The two communist parties broke off relations in 1966 and there were already intermittent small-scale border incidents, especially over disputed islands in the Amur and Ussuri rivers. In 1967, the Red Guards attacked the Soviet embassy. Faced with these threatening developments, the Soviet Politburo decided to upgrade defense capabilities in the East. 57 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard The Chinese were determined to stand up to the Soviets and in March 1969 the Sino-Soviet relationship reached another critical point. On 2 March, after several weeks of mounting border tension, large scale fighting occurred on Zhen Bao Island when Chinese troops ambushed a Soviet patrol, killing more than 20. At this point, there is a real fear that this conflict would escalate into a full-scale war and possibly into a nuclear war. Both sides realized that there was much to lose from such a conflict. The Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969 was a result of the increasing tension that had accumulated along China’s Northern borders during the Cultural Revolution years. However, the process soon got out of hand and the tensions of the Sino-Soviet border conflict began to go far beyond Mao’s expectations. Chinese leaderships were now facing a real war. The result was a real war scare in Beijing, especially since China was very isolated. On 11 September 1969, Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, on his way back from the funeral of the Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, stopped over in Beijing for talks with his Chinese counterpart, which resulted in a cease-fire. Triangular diplomacy US did not initially see the potential in exploiting division between USSR and PRC o Internal chaos in China + Hydrogen bomb (1967) Nixon Presidency: o Better relations with USSR than with China at start o “We simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations” (Foreign Affairs, 1967) China’s turn to the United States as a lesser threat o Third party diplomacy (1969) o Ping-pong diplomacy (1971) → Yes, the game! Kissinger trip to Beijing (1971) and Nixon visit to China (1972) One China policy and recognition of Beijing China (switch from Taipei) in 1979  From ideological struggle to a confrontation between great powers In 1967, China exploded its first hydrogen bomb, pointedly refusing to contemplate non-proliferation, while also developing long-range rockets to carry nuclear warheads. Given the near anarchy created by the Red Guards, the two superpowers reacted to China’s growing nuclear capacity with great concern. At this point, however, the Johnson administration did nothing to exploit the Sino-Soviet split but instead treated China as a pariah: ‘throughout Asia, China became the focus of the Johnson administration’s campaign against Communism. After Stalin, Mao now assumed the role of aggressor.  The unthinkable is happen. The Nixon When Nixon entered the White House, America’s relations with the USSR were much better Presidency than those with China. Beijing was still blamed for the drawn-out war in Korea, it was behind the communists in Vietnam, its Maoist ideology seemed utterly sinister, and its revolutionary diplomacy made it, apparently, impossible to negotiate with. By June 1969 the White House believed that it might be possible to use improved Sino-American relations as a pressure point on the USSR. From the Chinese perspective, in August 1969, at the height of the border dispute between China and the Soviet Union, Moscow had made some veiled threats of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against China. Mao was not convinced by the Soviet assurances and suspected that Moscow might launch a first strike on China, 58 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard perhaps under the cover of the forthcoming border talks. To counterbalance the Soviet threat, Mao turned to China’s former enemy, the United States. For the Soviets, the fear of facing conflict on both the Western and Eastern fronts prompted Soviet leaders to choose the lesser of two evils, and by the turn of the decade the US was seen as a more limited threat than the Chinese. In April 1971 the possibility of improved relations was publicly acknowledged when the Ping Pong Chinese invited an American table tennis team to Beijing. This ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ was Diplomacy followed by another relaxation of US’S trade with China and by intensive discussions on an idea the Chinese had raised some months before of Nixon sending an emissary to Beijing. This all had to happen in secrecy Since the early years of the Cold War, the US had not only been the USSR’s primary strategic opponent but its ideological adversary. The Cold War had been a struggle of ideas, not merely a confrontation of great powers. Taking the Soviet threat as a shared concern, Beijing and Washington gradually moved toward a tacit strategic partnership. Although the two countries did not establish formal diplomatic relations until 1979, leaders from the two sides often consulted on political and even military issues throughout the 1970s. The Moscow summit: SALT I and ABM treaty Strategic Arms Limitation Talks o Restrict the impact and spread of nuclear weapons Two Complications: o ABM technology o MIRV technology Different arsenals, so what is equality? Moscow Summit (1972) – achievement in itself o ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Offensive Missile American criticism The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks confirmed the superpowers’ desire to restrict the impact and spread of nuclear weapons, to maintain a supposedly secure balance based around ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ (MAD), and to keep defense costs under control. However, two developments in the 1960s had threatened to upset the nuclear balance: the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and the multiple independent re-entry vehicle (MIRV). The first threatened to provoke a new 59 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard spiral in the arms race, because if either side developed an effective ABM, it might also be tempted to launch a ‘first strike’ on its opponent. The second development, MIRV, was a means of improving US strike capacity without increasing the number of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The Soviets—who concentrated in the 1960s on building ever-larger, but less advanced missiles, like the giant SS-9—were well behind in this area. The challenges to finding an agreement were enormous. So, it was difficult to decide what represented ‘equality’ between them. Moreover, given the context, it has been argued that ‘The importance of the conference... lay in the fact that it was held at all.’ Because this confirmed that the new relationship with Washington was more important to Brezhnev than solidarity with his fellow Marxist- Leninists in Hanoi. So, the fact that the Summit was maintained was an achievement. The SALT I Agreements included a series of agreements, among which the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, restricting the number of ABM installations to a total of two each with a maximum capacity of 100 ABMs. It also included the ‘Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles’, which limited the number of missiles for each of the two countries to unequal ceilings – so the maximum number of missiles allowed was different for both countries. Basically, the Soviet Union was allowed more ICBM because the Americans had a more developed MIRV program. This part of the SALT I Agreement was, however, only temporary, for 5 years and was to be renegotiated within that time.  First strategic arms limitation: stop proliferation of nuclear weapons. Maybe they can just content of what they have and if they build new, they need to destroy the older → to have a remain name. The Americans have ABM (not the best) is able to destroy 9/10 missile, so we need to send 10 times more. This complicate negotiations because of the system. MIRV technology, the head of missile, soviet have more missile and bigger, but Americans can put more head so it’s not fear they have less but better. They decide Soviet can have more because of that. On of the critic in USA because if Soviet develop their technology, they will have an advantage that’s why it’s only a temporary treaty. At the same time, they are not very good in Vietnam. 60 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard Vietnam (reminder) Americans install a pro western dictator in the south. In the north it’s a communism leader. 1954: Geneva agreements o Independent and neutral Laos and Cambodia o Division of Vietnam (17th parallel) o Withdrawal of French troops o Elections for unified government Installation of Ngô Đình Diệm o Inefficient and corrupt regime o Military coup (backed by Kennedy administration) and assassination in 1963 South part is a corrupt regime support by the Americans and in the north a communism regime. People in the south are unhappy because of the corruption and supported of a certain elite (minority). They form the Viet-Cong, but they are not an army. The big problem, Americans can see who who is. In the south, the people in the government knows and said to the Americans you need to do something, but they didn’t. Instead, they kill the leader, but it was all the government that was corrupt. Vietnam Insurrection in the South (NLF/VC) 1963: 16 000 US military advisors in the country Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Aug. 1964): o Authority to ‘take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression’ Frustration with South-Vietnamese Army Americanization of the conflict: Operation Rolling Thunder (1965-68) and ground troops (1965: 180 000; 1968: 536 100) Change in communist tactics o From more classic warfare to jungle guerilla  The maximum capacity of soldiers that USA can have abroad is in Vietnam. Generally, they don’t send a so high number of troupes. Because the Americans are frustrated. The motivation of soldier in the south are not very motivated to kill their own people so the only solution is to increase the Americans side. Careful diplomacy under JFK who was himself also assassinated in 1963. Three months before the election, his ability to fight the Vietnam war as he pleased was strengthened by a brief clash with the North. On 2 August North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked an American vessel, the USS Maddox, operating in the Gulf of Tonkin where US covert operations, intelligence gathering, and support of commando raids on North Vietnam had been taking place. Two days later American ships reported a further attack, but one that probably had never taken place. The sense of outrage in Washington, at what was seen as an unprovoked assault, was such that, on 7 August, a motion was introduced in the Senate allowing Johnson to take ‘all necessary measures to repel any armed 61 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard attack against the armed forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression’. it effectively gave Johnson a carte blanche to deal with the Vietnam conflict as he pleased In March 1964, the US Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, visited South Vietnam, saw the growing frustration of the US military at South Vietnamese ineffectiveness, and reported to Johnson that increased American action was necessary to save the country from communism. 1965: decision to commit US ground troops. With a friendly Congress and an overwhelming election victory behind him, Johnson believed he could carry opinion with him in executing a limited war. The communists simply changed tactics, refusing to engage in large-scale clashes, harassing US forces when they were at company strength or less—and then only at close range (so that aircraft and artillery were harder to use)—and melting away in the face of ‘search and destroy’ missions, only to return to old haunts when the Americans had moved on. Vietnam escalation Stalemate in the war: The deadlock of escalation o Americans were not losing o Luxury position for the North and VC o Support from USSR and China to the North Tet offensive (30 Jan. 1968) o Great loss for the North o Shock for US that NVA was able to launch such a country-wide attack o Loss of confidence in official discourse o Increased domestic protest and opposition o LBJ withdrawal of re-election (March 1968) Economic consequences The American forces fought well, and their entry into the conflict in 1965 helped stave off a South Vietnamese defeat. Main objective achieved. Nevertheless, Chinese and Soviet military and economic aid now flowed into North Vietnam. Up to 320 000 Chinese troops into North Vietnam. Each American escalation was matched by a North Vietnamese escalation. The offensive went forward at the Vietnamese new year, Tet, on 30–1 January, when half the TET ARVN was on leave and a ceasefire was supposed to be in place. The Viet Cong attack on offensive urban centers proved disastrous for them. In the towns the guerrilla army made a more obvious target than in the countryside, unable to melt so easily away, and losses to their front- line forces were probably around 35,000, a large proportion of their number. The fact that the Viet Cong could launch such an audacious countrywide assault, seizing control of so many cities, and catching Westmoreland by surprise, after his recent assurances that victory was only a matter of time, came as a profound psychological shock to many Americans. The public and the press increasingly lost faith in official pronouncements on the war Economic Economic consequences were also due to heavy government programs, like Medicare and consequence Medicaid. He also achieved the voting rights and civil rights act s 62 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard Ending the War Richard Nixon: ‘I’m going to stop that war. Fast’ o ‘Secret plan’ o Vietnamization of the conflict o Secret talks between Kissinger and NV Repeal of Tonkin resolution (1970) and introduction of War Powers Act (1973) March 1972: NV Spring offensive and major US counteroffensive 27 January 1973: Ceasefire between the US and North Vietnam 29 April 1975: Reunification of Vietnam under Communist government in Hanoi After 1968, Congress was far more questioning about foreign policy, repealing the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1970 and eventually, in the 1973 War Powers Act, limiting the President’s freedom to commit troops abroad. Nixon promised an end to the War and claimed to have a secret plan. Yet, he did not finalize the war fast. Just like the Johnson team before him, Nixon feared that a quick disengagement would harm American credibility on the world stage. The only plan was Vietnamization: The idea was to replace the US forces by South Vietnamese Forces: To reach 60 000 troops by the Fall of 1972. Better from a domestic perspective in the US. By 1972, there were less than 100,000 us troops. In 1972, The North Vietnamese launched their Spring offensive, which was countered by US bombing of the North (the first since 1968). The idea behind the cease fire was that South Vietnam was pushed to commit to the agreement (threat to cut off American aid), US promised to withdraw all their troops within sixty days. A coalition government that included the Vietcong eventually would be formed in the South. The Cease-fire was not respected by either side. Open conflict started again. Vietnam was finally reunified under a Communist government in Hanoi. Rem: Johnson didn’t take part to the election and Nixon win the election he was the vice president of Eisenhower. He said I have a secret plane to win (// Donald). He won the election, but he realised there is no way he can win this war. He wants to make the south Vietnamese strongest to fight instead of sending soldiers (// Afghanistan). Congress made more condition after 90 days the president need to make a rapport to Congress. Americans are asking the Soviet to negotiate. Linkage: each party need to negotiate so they needed the better position on the ground to have more power during the negotiation. Americans said they will leave the south, but the fight continues, and north Vietnams took the entire country. But it’s not the end of the story. 63 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard Vietnam consequences Vietnam put American credibility to the test… and it had failed. Divided society o Pentagon Papers (NYT 1971) Unwinnable war o Enemy just had to wait Dirty War o Napalm, Agent orange Willingness to support corrupt authoritarian regimes American action can be as bad as its inaction (cf. domino theory) Myths surrounding the Vietnam War A lot of people think they lost because they were opposition in America. A very dirty war. That show also the determination of Americans to support a corrupt regime (against human rights) just because they are opposed to communism. People believed before Vietnam… But what it’s true that exacerbate the tension. Left upset that so much money what spend in this war. Credibility was the new watchword, as policy makers declared it essential to stand firm in Vietnam in order to demonstrate America’s determination to defend its vital interests not only in the region but around the world. Should the US waver in Vietnam, friends both in Southeast Asia and elsewhere would doubt Washington’s commitment to their defense and might succumb to enemy's pressure without a massive invasion by foreign communist forces. The Vietnam experience has been seen as deeply scarring for American society and undermining the US role in the world, even though the suffering and devastation was essentially borne by the Vietnamese. More US troops would not have guaranteed a win. the idea that the war was ultimately winnable if only more resources had been used is less convincing. For example, if American ground forces had been used to invade the North then the likelihood of direct Chinese intervention would have greatly increased. The possibility of another Korean conflict between the US and China would have constituted a major escalation and could have led to a third world war. Internationally, Vietnam was seen as part of America’s campaign to prevent the spread of communism anywhere. It was also a further indication that, in order to prevent the spread of communism, Washington was willing to support corrupt, authoritarian regimes. It was not that the US had given up on its ideological support for liberal democracy where this could be established on a stable basis, as in Western Europe and Japan. But, in the less developed world attempts to liberalize often led to political instability and, if it was a choice between communism and dictatorship, the US would rely on the latter. The growth of the blocs, measured in terms of political allegiance to Washington or Moscow, was now even more important as a global issue. This increased competition for ideological loyalty had been created by the emergence of so many independent countries in the years up to the early 1960s. 64 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard In order to triumph, the insurgents did not have to win any battles but merely to stay in the war. Both General de Gaulle and Ho Chi Minh were confident that the Americans would lose, with Ho emphasizing that, however long it took, the communist forces seeking to unite the country would stay and fight longer than the Americans. In other words, for the North and the insurgents in the South, victory would only require continuing the fight. There are several myths surrounding the Vietnam War, like how it ended the pre- Vietnam consensus on foreign policy and international politics, or how internal dissent caused the Americans to lose Napalm One of the tactics when you can see you enemy you bomb everything. Agent Orange Pesticide spread. Cambodia Neutralist Prince Sihanouk (first king, then PM) overthrown and replaced by gen. Lon Nol (1970) Extension of Vietnam war, as North Vietnamese attack Cambodian army and support communist Khmer Rouge Civil war in Cambodia and the emergence of Pol Pot’s communist Khmer Rouge regime (1975) Cambodian border attacks on Vietnam The domino theory had predicted that the fall of Vietnam would lead to communist regimes seizing power beyond. Events showed that American action, as much as inaction, could help the process by widening divisions and encouraging extremism. The border with the Vietnam is called the Ho Chi Minth Trail (picture). One of the generals decided they need to be more active, and Vietnams were tacking to many liberties, so Vietnams are supported communist fraction in Cambodia. By 1975 they felled into communism. Chicness didn’t like that everyone was pro soviet or Vietnamese. So, they decided to invade the country. Cambodia (2) Dec. 1978: Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and support of pro-Soviet Revealing Pol Pot’s genocide (1975-9: +2 million deaths) 17 Feb. 1979: Chinese invasion of Vietnam (300.000 troops) Civil war through the 1980s (Hun Sen, Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk) Paris Peace Conference (23 Oct. 1991) o Supported by P5 of the UNSC Civil war after 1993 elections 1997: arrest of Pol Pot the leader (dies 15 April 1998) & complete dissolution of Khmer Rouge by 1998 65 Geopolitics Q2 Babette Léonard On 25 December 1978, months of border incidents culminated in a full- scale Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Ideological differences had developed between the Vietnamese and Pol Pot, which were exacerbated by the latter’s alliance with China. In November 1978, Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in response to border raids by the Khmer Rouge. The People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), a pro-Soviet state led by the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, a party created by the Vietnamese in 1951, and led by a group of Khmer Rouge who had fled Cambodia to avoid being purged by Pol Pot and Ta Mok, was established. The capital, Phnom Penh, was taken on 7 January and a pro-Vietnamese regime established under the Presidency of former Khmer Rouge guerrilla, Heng Samring. The gruesome story of Pol Pot’s policy of genocide in Cambodia was now fully revealed. His regime had killed about two million people (out of seven million) over the previous three and a half years. Following Deng’s return from his American visit the Chinese themselves invaded Vietnam on 17 February 1979. Their 300,000 troops destroyed four provincial capitals and devastated large areas but did not fare well against Vietnam’s experienced armed forces and withdrew within a month. In Cambodia, or Kampuchea as it was then called, the Vietnamese continued to uphold the government of Hun Sen with about 250,000 troops throughout the early 1980s, boycotting UN-sponsored peace talks and trying to extinguish Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge who, despite their genocidal policies in 1975–9, were still recognized as the legal government of Cambodia by China and the Western powers. Peace conference in Paris. Here, the joint agreement of the five permanent members of the Security Council—something which would have seemed impossible four years before—was of vital importance. For a time, a vicious civil war erupted once more, but by now there was little support for the Khmer Rouge, and it was soon in steep decline. In mid-1997 Pol Pot was arrested by his own followers and sentenced to life imprisonment, after trying to eliminate some key deputies. The following year he died. Watergate Elections of 1972 (George McGovern – Dem) 17 June 1972: 5 men arrested in Watergate Complex Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein (Washington Post) o Link to republican committee for re-election of Nixon o Special prosecutor Cox investigated link to Nixon (tapes) o Informant – FBI associate director Mark Felt 1974: Supreme court: release of the tapes Nixon resignation on 9 august 1974 because of his clear role in the cover up Amnesty by successor Gerald Ford Pentagon papers → articles about Nixon lied to the politics and to the public. Nixon was re elected but he is a very nervous person. Link between the 5th man captured and the one involved in the Nixon’s campaign. He helped them covered the entire story that led to a special prosecutor. Nixon doesn’t want to give his record and tried to make him fired but it’s illegal! He was forced to resign because of the situation so his Vice president became the president. 66

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