Collapse Of The Soviet Union PDF

COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1) The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegra9on of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s were earth-shaBering and unexpected events that stand out as some of the most drama9c developments of the twen9eth century. To understand the impact of the collapse of the USSR (between 1989 and 1990) on the Cold War and the dominance of the United States, Africa, and South Africa, it is necessary to consider how this repressive industrial giant and military power could last eighty years, survive two world wars and two invasions, and yet, collapse within the space of a few years. 1 THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DECLINE OF THE USSR In 1917, the one-party system was introduced in the Soviet Union, transforming the na9on into a police state and a dictatorship. This authoritarian regime ins9lled fear among the popula9on, making people afraid to cri9cize the way the economy was run and unwilling to take any risks. Under this system, factory managers resorted to decep9on, rou9nely lying about their produc9on levels, and using various tricks to manipulate sta9s9cs, all to avoid punishment from the state. The Soviet Union's economy operated as a centrally planned system (called a centrally planned or command economy), with the state controlling all major aspects, from the supply of raw materials to the produc9on process and the distribu9on of goods. While this approach led to rapid industrializa9on during the 1930s and 1940s, it also had inherent ineﬃciencies and lacked incen9ves for produc9vity. Centralized planning s9ﬂed innova9on and entrepreneurial spirit, resul9ng in a shortage of consumer goods and a lack of diversity in the market. The economic structure favoured heavy industries and military spending, priori9zing defence and the Cold War arms race over consumer-oriented industries and improving the quality of life for the general popula9on. As a result, consumer goods were oXen in short supply, leading to long wai9ng 9mes and substandard products. Addi9onally, the command economy led to wasteful produc9on prac9ces and a lack of responsiveness to consumer demand. The death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 triggered a leadership crisis in the Soviet Union. Successor Nikita Khrushchev ini9ated a policy of de-Staliniza9on, denouncing some of Stalin's ac9ons and policies. Khrushchev's leadership marked a period of rela9ve poli9cal thawing and cultural liberaliza9on known as the "Khrushchev Thaw." However, his erra9c behaviour and abrupt policy shiXs caused internal divisions within the Communist Party, ul9mately resul9ng in his removal from power in 1964. 2 Following Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev adopted a more conserva9ve and stagnant approach, known as the "Era of Stagna9on." While his leadership provided stability, it lacked the direc9on needed to address the country's underlying economic and social problems. Subsequent leaders, such as Yuri Andropov and Konstan9n Chernenko, were also part of the old-guard poli9cians and were unable to introduce signiﬁcant changes and reforms to revitalize the economy or inspire public conﬁdence. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union intensiﬁed the arms race, with both superpowers alloca9ng substan9al resources to the military and defence sectors. The Soviet leadership believed that maintaining military parity with the United States and its NATO allies was crucial to preserving the balance of power and preven9ng poten9al aggression. As the arms race escalated, military spending increased signiﬁcantly, diver9ng resources away from civilian sectors. The Soviet military-industrial complex became a behemoth, consuming a substan9al por9on of the country's budget. This militariza9on of the economy exacerbated the exis9ng economic challenges and limited funds available for investment in infrastructure, educa9on, and social welfare. The Soviet Union was a vast federa9on comprising about 100 ethnic groups, cultures, and languages. While the Soviet government aimed to promote a uniﬁed Soviet iden9ty, it also tried to suppress na9onalist sen9ments and exert central control. However, as Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms began to loosen state control, na9onalist sen9ments gained momentum. The rise of na9onalism within the Soviet Union highlighted ethnic tensions and raised ques9ons about the stability of the state. The asser9veness of na9onalist movements further strained the unity of the USSR, adding to the challenges faced by the central government. 3 The Impact of the USSR’s Invasion of Afghanistan Afghanistan was strategically important to the Russians because it was situated on the USSR's border. It received aid from the Soviet Union from 1953 onwards to bring it under the Soviet sphere of inﬂuence and to counterbalance the pro-American states of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran that belonged to American alliances like NATO or CENTO. Afghanistan had been a monarchy but became a republic under Muhammad Daud Khan. Under his leadership, Afghanistan con9nued to receive Soviet aid. However, he increasingly developed an independent foreign policy and tried to play the two superpowers, the USA and USSR, oﬀ against each other. Khan also began to repress the Communist People's Democra9c Party. Afghan communists inﬁltrated the army and overthrew Muhammad Daud in 1978. They installed a communist government in his place. The new government introduced land reforms that angered powerful landowners and clergy, who then encouraged rio9ng in the towns and countryside. The Soviet Union was worried that the Islamic revolu9on in neighbouring Iran, where the Shah was overthrown and replaced by Ayatollah Khomeini (a mullah or religious leader), would spread to Afghanistan. An Islamic revolu9on could then spread from Afghanistan to the Islamic republics of the USSR, such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The new government seemed unable to repress the riots and, under a new leader called Haﬁzullah Amin, became increasingly hos9le to the Soviet Union. These developments threatened the unity of the Soviet Union. If the Islamic revolu9on spread to its Islamic republics, the leaders of these republics could declare independence and secede (to withdraw formally from membership of a poli9cal forma9on) from the USSR. Even more worrying, about half of the Soviet armed forces came from its poorer Muslim republics, and secession could lead to civil war and a drama9c weakening of the Soviet armed forces. As pro-Islamic resistance grew in Afghanistan, the USSR manipulated events so that it appeared that the Afghan ruler Amin requested their help to put down the growing rebellion. Over 4 85,000 Soviet troops entered Afghanistan's capital, Kabul, in late December 1979. Shortly aXer, Amin was executed by Soviet forces and replaced by Babrak Karmal, a more compliant, pro-Soviet leader. The USA, under President Jimmy Carter, strongly condemned what it called the Soviet "invasion" of Afghanistan and cut oﬀ US grain sales to the USSR. The USA also boycoBed the Moscow Olympics in 1980, and several pro-Western countries followed suit. America also secretly funded the Mujahideen ﬁghters by about one billion dollars a year, ensuring that sophis9cated American military equipment, including S9nger surface-to-air missiles, were smuggled into Afghanistan through Opera9on Cyclone. Afghanistan became the USSR's "Vietnam" and was described by one Soviet oﬃcial as a "bleeding wound." The war used up vital resources from the ailing Soviet economy, deepening the USSR's economic problems. The Islamic Arab states of the Middle East and many Third World countries condemned the Soviet Union. 5 At its peak, there were 110,000 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, and altogether about a million Soviet ci9zens served there during the war, which lasted un9l 1988. Over 15,000 Soviet soldiers lost their lives, and 50,000 were wounded. The war cost the USSR an enormous sum of money and lasted more than twice as long as the Second World War. The grinding war broke the spirit of the Soviet people and contributed to the apathy of its workers during the 1980s. The movement of troops to Afghanistan also weakened the USSR's control over its East European allies, especially Poland, where the trade union movement, Solidarity, challenged the Communist Government. The war nega9vely inﬂuenced the USSR's economy and made its economic diﬃcul9es worse, forcing new leaders, par9cularly Gorbachev, to consider sweeping economic changes and poli9cal reforms that ul9mately unravelled the Soviet Union. 6 THE ROLE OF GORBACHEV AND REAGAN AS LEADERS Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev both played cri9cal roles in ending the Cold War in 1989. Reagan heralded a new era of Cold War poli9cs when he became president in 1981. From the beginning he made his aktude towards the Soviets and Communist regimes clear - they would not be tolerated. When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the reins of power in the Soviet Union in 1985, no one predicted the revolu9on he would bring. In many senses, it was the combina9on of this reform on the one side and belligerent aggression on the other that brought an end to the conﬂict. US President Ronald Reagan and the New Arms Race Ronald Reagan became President of the USA aXer defea9ng Jimmy Carter in 1980. One of the reasons Reagan won the presiden9al race was that he convinced American voters that Carter was 'soX' on communism and had allowed the Soviet Union to 'overtake' the USA in terms of nuclear warheads and intercon9nental missiles. Reagan argued that a dangerous 'window of vulnerability' had opened, wherein the USA could not defend itself un9l it developed a new genera9on of advanced weaponry. He believed that the Soviet Union had a military advantage and could use it to promote communism globally. Reagan even suggested that the USSR could eliminate US nuclear weapons capabili9es in a single pre-emp9ve ﬁrst-strike aBack. Cri9cs, however, pointed out that this claim was untrue; the USSR simply did not have this capability. They condemned Reagan as a 'Cold Warrior' and a 'cowboy.' Reagan's cri9cs warned that he would end detente (the easing of strained rela9ons between states characterizing the Cold War from the 1970s) with the USSR and ini9ate a 'Second Cold War.' Under Reagan's administra9on, the B-1 Bomber, which used 'stealth' technology to make it virtually invisible to radar, was put back into produc9on aXer being shelved during Carter's 7 presidency. The Trident submarine, along with its D-5 missiles, was also developed to replace the ageing Polaris submarine- launched ballis9c missiles. Reagan proposed a new defence system where 'killer satellites' would be established in orbit, using lasers to shoot down incoming Soviet missiles. Reagan called this the Strategic Defence Ini9a9ve, but cri9cs referred to it derisively as 'Star Wars.' The Soviet Union's economic troubles meant that it simply could not compete with the USA in this new Arms Race. It also lacked the technological ability to develop defences against these new American weapons. To halt this new Arms Race, Gorbachev oﬀered poli9cal reforms, allowing greater democracy and a more signiﬁcant role for the market in the Soviet economy. Gorbachev went to great lengths to restore detente with the USA. This made him reluctant to use repression against dissidents in Eastern Europe or in the USSR and may have led to the collapse of communism in 1989. Gorbachev's reforms, in turn, unleashed na9onalist forces that the Soviet government could not control, ul9mately leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev’s Reforms and the Collapse of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the USSR in 1985. Gromyko introduced him to his colleagues by saying, “He has a nice smile, but his teeth are made out of steel”. By this, he meant that Gorbachev was a charisma9c man but that he was a commiBed Marxist who would take ﬁrm ac9on to achieve his goals. 8 Gorbachev was in his early ﬁXies while most of the members of the politburo (the highest decision-making body) were over 70. He was determined to introduce wide-ranging reforms because he believed that these were necessary to save the communist system. From 1982 to 1985, the USSR buried 3 of its General- Secretaries: Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko. The ordinary people were gekng 9red of state funerals and embarrassed by their aged leaders. When Gorbachev took over the posi9on in 1985, he realized that he had to introduce reforms, which he referred to as 'new thinking.' Central to these reforms was Perestroika (restructuring). Perestroika, introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, was a set of economic changes aimed at upda9ng the Soviet economy while keeping its socialist principles intact. Gorbachev's main goal was to make the Soviet economy more compe99ve and aBract investment from other countries. To do this, he allowed some private ownership and introduced market elements into the system. He also wanted to encourage workers to be more produc9ve, so he allowed wages to rise in certain industries where skills were in demand. The process involved giving more freedom to state-owned companies so they could make decisions on their own and become more eﬃcient. Gorbachev also wanted to encourage collabora9on with foreign businesses to access advanced technologies. However, the impact of perestroika was mixed. While some industries improved and became more produc9ve, there were also challenges and resistance to the changes from certain groups. State-owned companies, used to centralized planning and support, struggled to adapt to the new compe99ve environment. This some9mes led to shortages of essen9al goods. Another problem was the rising inﬂa9on caused by price liberaliza9on. Prices were allowed to move closer to market levels, but this also made things more expensive for people, aﬀec9ng their standard of living. Overall, perestroika brought some posi9ve changes, but it also led to economic instability and a crisis that the Soviet Union struggled to overcome. He aimed to reduce censorship and allow more cri9cism in the media, believing that holding poor managers and corrupt oﬃcials accountable would improve the economy. 9 Gorbachev extended glasnost to foreign policy by breaking away from secret diplomacy. He was more recep9ve to foreign cri9cism and allowed Eastern Europe greater freedom to experiment with reforms. Gorbachev's glasnost policy sought to promote transparency, freedom of speech, and poli9cal openness in Soviet society. The media was encouraged to report more freely, discussing topics that were previously taboo, such as historical atroci9es commiBed under Stalin's regime. Poli9cal discussions and debates on social issues were allowed, increasing public engagement in governance maBers. This policy led to an outpouring of long-suppressed grievances and public cri9cisms of the government and its policies. Ci9zens had a plaporm to voice their frustra9ons and expose issues concealed by the state. The media became more cri9cal of the government, shedding light on the country's problems, including economic mismanagement, environmental degrada9on, and human rights abuses. While glasnost encouraged public engagement and transparency, it also had unintended consequences. It exacerbated ethnic tensions as na9onalist and separa9st movements within the Soviet republics gained momentum, demanding greater autonomy or independence. The openness of public discourse also intensiﬁed poli9cal divisions within the Communist Party and weakened the central authority of the Soviet government. These changes led logically to a third reform, 'Demokra9zatsiya' (democra9za9on), which aimed at increasing democra9c par9cipa9on in the poli9cal process. To begin with, Gorbachev allowed more than one Communist Party candidate to stand for elec9on to the USSR's new parliament, the Congress of People's Depu9es. Candidates were classiﬁed as 'Party' (members of the Communist Party) or 'Non-party.' However, to maintain dominance, one-third of the seats were reserved for Communist Party members under Ar9cle 6 of the Soviet Cons9tu9on. By February 4, 1989, Gorbachev's control over the people was slipping. Marches to Red Square in Moscow demanded the scrapping of Ar9cle 6 of the 1977 Brezhnev Cons9tu9on. Ar9cle 6 established the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the sole legi9mate poli9cal party in the country and gave the Communist Party the leading role in government. The next day, Gorbachev yielded to the pressure, abolished the party's monopoly of power, and established a new post of president, elected by parliament, securing the posi9on for himself. In response, 10 about half of the Communist Party members resigned, reducing its membership from nineteen million to about 12 million. The Communist Party was losing its poli9cal grip on the USSR. In June, Boris Yeltsin, the former Communist Party boss of Moscow who had resigned from the party, successfully became the president of the Russian Republic, defea9ng Gorbachev's reformist former Soviet Prime Minister, Ryzhkov. This loss was a turning point for the conserva9ve wing of Gorbachev's government. Demokra9zatsiya aimed to introduce democra9c reforms and increase public par9cipa9on in the poli9cal process. Gorbachev's eﬀorts included holding contested local elec9ons with mul9ple candidates and allowing limited opposi9on par9es to par9cipate. However, the process was controlled, and the central authority retained signiﬁcant power. The introduc9on of mul9-candidate elec9ons at the local level did not bring substan9al changes to the overall power structure of the Soviet state. Instead, Demokra9zatsiya contributed to the weakening of the centralized authority of the Soviet government. The loosening of control over the republics made it diﬃcult to maintain unity, as various regions increasingly sought to assert their sovereignty and challenge the central government's decisions. This marked a signiﬁcant shiX in the poli9cal landscape of the USSR. In August 1991, conserva9ve elements within the Soviet government aBempted a coup (The August Coup) against Gorbachev to halt his reforms and restore centralized control. The ploBers were primarily hard-line Communist Party oﬃcials who feared the loss of centralized authority due to Gorbachev's sweeping changes. While on holiday, Gorbachev was visited by a delega9on that announced that they were the 'State CommiBee for the State of Emergency.' A coup had occurred. Tanks were sent to the Russian Parliament building where Boris Yeltsin had his oﬃce to arrest him. However, the coup faced massive public opposi9on and civil resistance, led by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and supported by various other poli9cal forces. Yeltsin bravely came out and stood on the torrent of one of the tanks and angrily condemned the coup. Some of the tank 11 commanders turned the tanks around to show that they now protected Yeltsin. Tens of thousands of people gathered in Moscow to protest the coup, and the military's reluctance to use force against the demonstrators proved crucial in the coup's failure. The army was divided, and the coup ploBers panicked and then ﬂed to the airport. The coup ended not with a bang but with a whimper. Yeltsin stayed in Moscow but sent a Russian plane to race the ploBers to Crimea and return with Gorbachev. The president returned to Moscow on 22 August, exhausted but smiling. Within days, Yeltsin had brought about the end of Gorbachev's era. Gorbachev had returned to Moscow keeping faith with the communists. But by the end of August, he had resigned as general secretary. Yeltsin had ﬁrst humiliated Gorbachev by making him read aloud the communist ploBers' plans, then suspended all Soviet Communist Party ac9vi9es in Russia. As the autumn and winter went on, Yeltsin met leaders from other key Soviet republics and formed a new alliance of states. By Christmas, the Soviet Union was disbanded. The coup's failure weakened the central authority even further and accelerated the process of disintegra9on. Following the failed coup, several Soviet republics declared independence, and the Soviet Union eﬀec9vely ceased to exist. It was clear that Gorbachev's reign was over. On 25 December 1991, Gorbachev announced the end of the Soviet Union and its disintegra9on into independent republics: the USSR no longer existed. 12 THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE The events in Eastern Europe played a crucial role in the unravelling of the Eastern Bloc and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. As Gorbachev became increasingly focused on the problems of the Soviet Union, he paid less aBen9on to Eastern Europe. He made it clear to the East European communist leaders that the Soviet Union could no longer risk Western anger by intervening with Soviet troops as Russia had done in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Gorbachev encouraged Eastern European leaders to experiment with reforms. Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Poland and East Germany Czechoslovakia: In 1968, Czechoslovakia had undergone a period of poli9cal liberaliza9on known as the Prague Spring. The country's leader, Alexander Dubček, introduced a series of reforms aimed at crea9ng "socialism with a human face." These reforms included loosening state control over the media, allowing freedom of speech, and ini9a9ng economic changes to decentralize economic planning. The reforms in Czechoslovakia alarmed the Soviet leadership, who saw them as a threat to the unity of the Eastern Bloc and Soviet inﬂuence in the region. In August 1968, the Soviet Union, along with other Warsaw Pact countries, invaded Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring and reassert control. Despite the suppression of the Prague Spring, the desire for poli9cal and social change persisted in Czechoslovakia. In 1989, a series of peaceful protests known as the Velvet Revolu9on swept the country. Led by dissident groups, including the Civic Forum led by Václav Havel, the protests demanded an end to communist rule. Romania: Romania was ruled by Nicolae Ceaușescu, an autocra9c leader who implemented a repressive regime. The oppressive rule of Ceaușescu and his aBempts to suppress dissent culminated in widespread public protests in December 1989. The security forces ini9ally cracked down on the 13 protests, leading to violence and civilian casual9es. However, the situa9on quickly escalated, and a military coup against Ceaușescu's regime took place. Ceaușescu and his wife, Elena, were captured, tried in a hasty show trial, and sentenced to death. On December 25, 1989, the couple was executed by a ﬁring squad. The execu9on of Ceaușescu marked the end of his brutal regime and opened the door for Romania's transi9on to democracy. AXer Ceaușescu's fall, Romania underwent a period of poli9cal and economic upheaval. The country faced numerous challenges in transi9oning to a democra9c system and a market- oriented economy. Hungary: Hungary, under the leadership of Miklós Németh and János Kádár, pursued limited economic reforms during the 1980s. In 1988, János Kadar stood down as Hungary's General Secretary aXer holding this post since the 1956 uprising. A new reformist communist leader, Károly Grosz, soXened censorship laws and in 1989 announced a new cons9tu9on that would allow mul9-party elec9ons. He also tore down the border fences between Hungary and Austria. This prompted many East German 'tourists' to visit Hungary and then make a break to Austria through this 'hole' in the Iron Curtain. Gorbachev did nothing to challenge these sweeping reforms. 14 Hungary's transi9on to democracy was rela9vely smooth compared to other Eastern Bloc countries. In 1990, Hungary held its ﬁrst free parliamentary elec9ons since World War II, and a democra9c government was established. The Hungarian Socialist Party, formerly the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, transformed itself into a social-democra9c party and won the elec9ons. Poland: The forma9on in 1980 of the Polish trade union-cum-poli9cal movement, Solidarity, and the strike ac9ons it organized throughout Poland profoundly disturbed Soviet authori9es. It was, aXer all, acutely embarrassing for the USSR to be confronted with a movement that so obviously enjoyed widespread support from among workers, the very class in whose interests the Polish and Soviet Communist par9es claimed to rule. The birthplace of Solidarity was the Lenin Shipyards in Gdansk. There, in December 1970, workers, disgusted with price increases in food, marched on the city's party headquarters which was set on ﬁre. The ensuing strike and violence, which spread to other Polish ports, resulted in dozens of deaths. Over the next several years, as the Polish economy stagnated, strikes occurred at various enterprises throughout the country. ABempts to increase food prices again in 1976 provoked a wave of sit-down strikes and spurred a group of dissident intellectuals to form a Workers' Defence CommiBee. The increasing dependence of the Polish economy on aid and the elec9on in 1978 of a Polish cardinal as Pope John Paul II emboldened worker ac9vists and put the Polish Communist authori9es on the defensive. The immediate precipitant for the strikes that broke out in the summer of 1980 and led to the forma9on of Solidarity in August was a government decree raising meat prices. Over the next sixteen months, Solidarity and the Polish government engaged in a series of confronta9ons and nego9a9ons, but without any clear resolu9on. The movement gained widespread support among the Polish popula9on, including workers, intellectuals, and religious groups. Solidarity's leader, Lech Wałęsa, a shipyard electrician and charisma9c ac9vist, became the face of the movement. Solidarity's primary focus was to advocate for workers' rights, demand higher wages, improved working condi9ons, and the right to form independent trade unions. On December 12-13, 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the ﬁrst secretary of the Polish Communist Party, ordered a massive military opera9on and imposed mar9al law. Solidarity's leaders were arrested, and the organiza9on was driven into the underground, where it remained un9l 1989, with ac9vists organizing secret mee9ngs and distribu9ng underground publica9ons. 15 By the mid-1980s, Poland's economy was in dire straits, grappling with a severe economic crisis. The country faced soaring foreign debt, hyperinﬂa9on, and shortages of essen9al goods. The centralized economic planning system of the communist regime had proven to be ineﬃcient and unresponsive to market demands. The government's aBempts to increase prices and implement austerity measures to stabilize the economy only exacerbated public discontent. Poles were increasingly frustrated with the worsening economic situa9on and the inability of the Communist Party to address their needs. By 1989, Jaruzelski aBempted to introduce perestroika economic reforms, but these were unsuccessful as most Polish workers refused to cooperate un9l Solidarity was unbanned, and its leader Wałęsa was released from prison. As the economic crisis persisted, and the Solidarity movement con9nued to operate underground, the Polish Communist Party leadership realized the necessity for poli9cal nego9a9ons. The government ini9ated Round Table Talks with representa9ves from Solidarity in early 1989. The government was ul9mately forced to give in to maintain order. Solidarity contested the 1989 mul9- party elec9ons, winning the available parliamentary seats and all but one of the seats in the Senate. The Round Table Talks, which took place from February to April 1989, resulted in a historic poli9cal compromise between the government and Solidarity. Both sides agreed to signiﬁcant changes in the poli9cal system, leading to par9ally free parliamentary elec9ons. The agreement s9pulated that 35% of the seats in the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish parliament) would be contested in open elec9ons, with the remaining seats reserved for the Communist Party. Addi9onally, the talks also led to the legal recogni9on of Solidarity as a trade union. In June 1989, Poland held its ﬁrst par9ally free parliamentary elec9ons since World War II. Solidarity contested the seats available to them, while the Communist Party reserved a signiﬁcant number of seats for itself. The elec9ons were conducted in an atmosphere of 16 poli9cal openness and were closely monitored by interna9onal observers. Solidarity made a resounding victory, securing almost all of the seats available to them. This was a signiﬁcant milestone as it marked the ﬁrst 9me a non-communist coali9on was elected to power in a Warsaw Pact country. The elec9on results eﬀec9vely ended the Communist Party's monopoly on power, and the newly elected Sejm included a signiﬁcant number of non-communist depu9es. In August 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a prominent Solidarity member, was appointed as the ﬁrst non- communist Prime Minister of Poland since World War II. The events in Poland had a profound impact on other Eastern European countries, inspiring them to demand poli9cal reforms and challenge one-party rule. The success of the Solidarity movement demonstrated that popular opposi9on could lead to signiﬁcant poli9cal change even within the Eastern Bloc. The peaceful transi9on of power in Poland and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 marked the symbolic end of the Cold War. These events paved the way for further poli9cal changes and the eventual dissolu9on of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union. 17 East Germany: While the USSR tolerated and even encouraged these changes to Poland and Hungary, Gorbachev was more sensi9ve about East Germany. Berlin had, aXer all, been the site of numerous Cold War interven9ons. By late 1989, even East Germany was confronted by an9- government protesters in the city of Leipzig. Following the poli9cal changes in Eastern Europe and civil unrest in Germany, the East German government was under pressure to loosen some of its regula9ons on travel to West Germany. At a press conference on 9 November, East German spokesman Günter Schabowski announced that East Germans would be free to travel into West Germany, star9ng immediately. He failed to clarify that some regula9ons would remain in place. Western media inaccurately reported that the border had opened, and crowds quickly gathered at checkpoints on both sides of the Wall. As the news spread, thousands of East Berliners rushed to the border crossings, eager to visit the West for the ﬁrst 9me in decades. The border guards, overwhelmed and unsure how to handle the situa9on, eventually opened the checkpoints, and the people streamed through. As the crowds crossed over, they began to physically dismantle parts of the Wall. The Wall, once a symbol of division and oppression, was now being torn down by the people themselves, with the help of ci9zens from both sides. This pivotal event marked the beginning of the end of the Berlin Wall. The fall of the Wall represented a powerful moment of unity and freedom, symbolizing the end of the Cold War and the eventual reuniﬁca9on of Germany. It remains an 18 essen9al part of history, reminding us of the power of people coming together to bring about change. In all of these uprisings, Na9onalism played a major role. Old na9onal ﬂags were waved, and patrio9c songs were sung. Na9onalist symbols were celebrated, and all evidence of the Soviet Union was removed. The USSR lost an important source of revenue as Eastern Europe's new democra9cally elected governments began to expand trade with the West. This deepened the Soviet Union's economic diﬃcul9es. The USSR was also weakened militarily as the Warsaw Pact dissolved in April 1991. 19 THE CHANGING BALANCE OF WORLD POWER For 45 years the two superpowers had maintained an uneasy stability in the world – the Cold War. The collapse of the USSR brought the Cold War to an end and disturbed the global balance of power, since it leX one remaining superpower, the USA, in a dominant posi9on. No other country could challenge it, but some people have ques9oned how the USA has used its dominance. This change in the balance of world power aﬀected many parts of the world, including South Africa. The End of the Cold War and the Dominance of the USA Gorbachev's reforms in the USSR had an immediate eﬀect on the Cold War. To restructure the economy, the Soviet Union had to reduce military spending and stop the costly nuclear arms race. Gorbachev, therefore, ini9ated several summit mee9ngs with the American President, Reagan. AXer mee9ngs in Geneva (1985) and Reykjavik (1986), the two leaders signed signiﬁcant trea9es in Washington (1987) and Moscow (1988), agreeing to a comprehensive reduc9on in nuclear weapons. US-Soviet rela9ons con9nued to improve during the evenpul days of 1989, as the communist regimes were overthrown in Eastern Europe. Finally, at a summit mee9ng between Gorbachev and the new President George H. Bush in December 1989 (Malta), the two leaders agreed the Cold War was over. When the USSR ﬁnally collapsed, the economic fallout was remarkable. The largest independent republic to emerge out of the USSR was Russia. Its GDP fell by 17% in 1990- 1991 and 11% in 1992-93. The Russian economy shrank by nearly ﬁXy % in three years. Boris Yeltsin, Russian President un9l 1999, launched a program of radical reforms to revive the economy. But the economic problems intensiﬁed: industrial produc9on dropped by half, there was massive unemployment, very high inﬂa9on, and a collapse of na9onal income and wages. High levels of corrup9on and crime made things worse. Poland lost 1/5th of its GDP in four 20 years (1988-92) while the economies of Romania and Bulgaria shrank by at least thirty percent. These economic disasters were caused partly by inexperienced governments that followed the disastrous advice of mostly American economists who suggested rapid market reforms. Another problem facing Russia was a na9onal uprising in Chechnya, one of the smaller republics in the Russian Federa9on, whose Chechen people were mainly Muslim. Afraid that the demands for independence would inﬂuence other Muslim na9onali9es in Russia to demand the same, Yeltsin brutally crushed the Chechen uprising. This sparked even greater resistance, giving Russia another major problem to add to the economic collapse. As these formerly communist economies declined, the USA's economy increased substan9ally in rela9on to these failing states. America's only serious economic rival since the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union has been communist China, which has experienced the fastest economic growth in the world, oXen topping 10% per annum. This means that the size of China's economy doubled every decade from the late 1970s to the early 2000s. China overtook many smaller economies and through the sheer size of its popula9on of over 1 billion people has overtaken well-established economies like those of Germany and France. Yet the USA's economy was larger than China, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, and South Korea combined in the late 1990s. The 3 richest people in the USA own more assets than the en9re popula9on of the 60 poorest countries in the world. 21 The fall of the Soviet Union, if anything, has boosted the American economy, as it no longer needed to devote a large percentage of its na9onal income to rela9vely unproduc9ve defence expenditure during the 1990s earning the country an economic windfall known as a 'peace dividend.' The large deﬁcit that developed under Reagan became a surplus under Clinton. It is this defence expenditure, though, that has provided America with a military power second to none. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, America had one of the largest armies in the world (only China's is larger) and easily the largest navy. It is this power that enables it to project its strength in a meaningful way, what academics call 'global reach.' With the demise of the Soviet Union, the US simply had no serious military rival. At the end of the Cold War, some people spoke about the start of a 'new world order.' They believe that there would be no more tension resul9ng from fears of a nuclear war, but instead, that the post-Cold War world has become a more complicated and unpredictable place. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been numerous regional and civil wars around the world. The USA is a nuclear power, but so too are Israel, Russia, China, Britain, France, India, and Pakistan. A few other states have or may join the 'nuclear club,' including North Korea and Iran, both enemies of the USA. Although the Cold War is over, the world is not necessarily more united. Many observers have suggested that a division between North and South has replaced the old one between East and West. Thus, while the USA no longer confronts the powerful Soviet Union, alliances are star9ng to shiX in the world so that America will become increasingly isolated if it tries to act on its own. Mul9lateralism, par9cularly coopera9on through the UN, has arguably become much more important than it was during the Cold War. The collapse of the USSR was widely regarded as a victory for the West, as the triumph of capitalism over communism and of democracy over totalitarianism. It leX the USA in a dominant posi9on - ideologically, economically, and militarily. In the 1990s, it appeared that the USA and American-style capitalism and liberal democracy would triumph everywhere. The changes in South Africa are some9mes cited as a good example of this. However, the process was not so straighporward - as may be seen in the study of Globaliza9on. 22 The Collapse of Communism and Africa For Africa in general, the end of the Cold War meant an increase in poverty and debt, par9cularly in those countries that had received aid from the Soviet Union, as all assistance was cut oﬀ following its collapse. During the Cold War, the Communist bloc openly supported many Black libera9on movements with arms and troops and "educa9on" to their leaders and young people. The result was that many African states fell into the Soviet sphere of inﬂuence. (This support included tens of thousands of troops, par9cularly from Cuba, that were sent to Angola to assist it in defea9ng South African troops in the 1970s and 80s). However, the Soviets tended to give liBle real support in the form of trade and aid. Generally, the Soviet Union was not adequately informed about the history, poli9cal structure, economy, or needs of these states. Possibly because of this, the level of commitment or interest in socialism varied among the diﬀerent governments and movements that received Soviet military aid (see Angola as an example). OXen, the main aim of the Soviet-backed movements was not a social revolu9on but to achieve independence. The West was seldom prepared to fund, assist, or support these movements; as a result, they turned to the Communist bloc. At the same 9me, it is important to take note of the impact coloniza9on had on the popularity of the socialist doctrine. Those states that had been colonized by the West, on gaining independence, oXen turned their back on capitalism, associa9ng it with "the colonizers." As such, the an9-capitalist, socialist outlook that was central to communism was very appealing, par9cularly in a region where mineral and 23 human resources had been exploited for the gain of the capitalist West. However, to make communism work in their countries, these leaders oXen tried to develop their form of socialism, drawing on African tradi9ons. Those governments reliant on Soviet support have oXen found it impossible to maintain power, largely due to internal poli9cal pressure and economic concerns, and conﬂict has arisen as a result. However, other states were also badly aﬀected. During the Cold War, it had been important, following the ideas of the Truman Doctrine, and to halt the Domino Eﬀect, that the West provide aid to prevent the spread of communism. The Western Allies found many African leaders who were willing to support capitalist aims if the West was willing to aid them ﬁnancially and technologically, either directly or through Western mul9lateral organiza9ons. With the end of the Cold War, Africa began to be less important as a "zone of conﬂict" between the East and West. As a result of this, aid to Africa began to diminish, and that which was available became harder to access. Following the demise of the USSR, Western donors began to change their priori9es in giving loans and began to be more cri9cal of the states they previously assisted. The human rights records of African countries began to be par9cularly important in determining aid; the West was no longer prepared to overlook the shortcomings of these states and became more and more demanding regarding issues of human rights and democracy (for instance, in the case of South Africa, see below). Most aid organiza9ons and states expect free-market and democra9c principles to guide a country before oﬀering it aid. With the changing priori9es of the West, Africa became largely ignored by the rich northern hemisphere, and development in much of the con9nent stagnated. By 1998, Africa represented 10% of the world's popula9on but produced less than 1% of its industrial goods. Those who had once been prepared to assist Africa for their advantage during the Cold War conﬂict are now unwilling to aid the con9nent without gekng anything back. African countries could no longer rely on assistance from Western Cold War allies. This has had a major impact on many African countries. 24 The Effect of the Collapse of Communism on South Africa During the Cold War, the policy of Western governments, especially the USA, was inﬂuenced by compe99on with the USSR for power and inﬂuence around the world. In Southern Africa, the West wanted to ensure that the Soviet Union did not get control of its vital mineral resources and strategic sea routes around the Cape. They were alarmed, therefore, when communist regimes came to power in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique in 1975. Under PW Botha, South Africa's apartheid government began a process of reform in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One of the reasons for this was that interna9onal sanc9ons placed a severe strain on the economy, especially when foreign banks began to refuse new loans to the Apartheid Government. There was also considerable internal pressure from the rising black trade union movement under COSATU and poli9cal movements like the United Democra9c Front that waged a relentless campaign of protests and demonstra9ons against the Apartheid State. The exiled ANC and PAC had considerable success in ensuring the interna9onal isola9on of white South Africa in the form of sports, cultural, and arms boycoBs. The armed wings of both movements also placed the security establishment under increasing strain. However, by the late 1980s, this reform process had ground to a halt because President Botha refused to take the next logical step and introduce meaningful poli9cal reforms as this would require nego9a9ons with the ANC, PAC, and the South African Communist Party. Botha ﬂatly refused to do so, claiming that he would not speak to "terrorists" and "communists." Like many Afrikaner na9onalists, Botha was fervently an9-communist. He lived in a religious environment of the Dutch Reformed Church, which condemned communism as "evil" and the Soviet Union for suppor9ng an oﬃcial policy of atheism. The SACP had been banned in 1950 under the Suppression of Communism Act, and it was illegal to possess books wriBen by Marx, Engels, or Lenin. Although the ANC was a na9onal libera9on movement embracing a diverse group of people, it worked in close alliance with the SACP. Joe Slovo, the communist leader, was a vital member of the ANC's highest decision-making body. Many of the 25 ANC's top leaders held membership in both par9es. The Soviet Union and its East European satellites were the only countries prepared to provide military training, funding, and weapons. Many Western governments supported South Africa in the 1980s, despite pressure for economic sanc9ons from the UN and the OAU. The two most inﬂuen9al Western leaders were Ronald Reagan (US president from 1980 to 1988) and Margaret Thatcher (Bri9sh Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990). Both were strongly an9- Communist. Their policy was also inﬂuenced by the fact that there were substan9al Bri9sh and American investments in South Africa. They, therefore, consistently resisted pressure, even from their people, to reduce their support for South Africa. Calls for sanc9ons grew during the 1980s as the apartheid government used increasingly harsh measures to crush opposi9on. In the late 1980s, as the Cold War was ending, public opinion in the West towards SA began to change. The inﬂuence of human rights organiza9ons, such as Amnesty Interna9onal, which were strongly cri9cal of apartheid, increased. However, the main reason was that South Africa was no longer signiﬁcant in Cold War poli9cs. Western governments began to apply pressure on South Africa to end apartheid and start talks with the banned ANC. The changes brought about in the Soviet Union by Gorbachev were closely observed in South Africa, and they arguably had a profound eﬀect on the reform process. Both the ANC and the Na9onal Party quickly realized that the Soviet Union was disintegra9ng and that communism was no longer the threat that it used to be. The new Na9onalist Party leader, FW de Klerk, who replaced PW Botha when he had a stroke, was a conserva9ve poli9cian, but he travelled widely and was more alert to the implica9ons of interna9onal developments than his predecessor. He quickly realized that communism was a spent force in world aﬀairs, and this may have made him more open to the possibility of nego9a9ons with the ANC, PAC, and SACP. The improving rela9ons between the USSR and the USA also meant that the Apartheid Government could no longer use the Cold War to win the support of the West by portraying itself as a reliable ally against communism. De Klerk unbanned the ANC, PAC, and SACP on 2 February 1990, and a few days later, on 11 February, he released Nelson Mandela. The ANC and other libera9on movements were also profoundly inﬂuenced by the changes that were occurring in the USSR as they depended upon the Soviet Union for funding and faced considerable hos9lity from the West. In the late 1980s, as 26 part of the agreement to allow Cuban soldiers to leave in return for the withdrawal of SADF troops from southern Angola, the ANC lost its right to operate training camps in Angola. It became increasingly diﬃcult for the ANC to func9on as an exile movement. The Soviet Union and the 'Frontline States', African states that were sympathe9c to the ANC and PAC, began to apply pressure on the libera9on movements to nego9ate with the Apartheid Government. The ANC had always made it clear to the USSR and its other sponsors that it was prepared to nego9ate an end to apartheid the moment that the Na9onal Party government indicated a willingness to enter meaningful nego9a9ons. From Mandela's speech in the dock at the Rivonia trials to the Harare declara9on in 1989, key ANC ﬁgures expressed a clear preference for peaceful nego9a9ons. Once De Klerk had indicated a willingness to enter genuine discussions about the future of SA, the ANC rapidly agreed to take part. The fall of the Soviet Union had made it possible for De Klerk to nego9ate with 'communists', and his willingness to open talks was welcomed by the ANC in terms of its longstanding principles. AXer his release from prison, Mandela held talks with De Klerk, accompanied by some of the ANC members in exile, who were provided with protec9on. In August, the ANC announced the end of the armed struggle but did not disband MK. On 21 and 22 December 1991, the Conven9on for a Democra9c SA met at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park. A few days later, Gorbachev signed away the Soviet Union, and the USSR's ﬂag no longer ﬂew over the Kremlin building. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that communism and authoritarian one-party states were seriously weakened. It also meant that capitalism and democracy were given a powerful boost, and many believed that these were the only op9ons for smaller countries like South Africa. President George H. Bush boasted that the USA had won the Cold War and spoke of a 'New World Order' where the USA would dominate as the single superpower. The fact that the USA was capitalist and democra9c meant that this new order would tend in this direc9on as well. Capitalism and liberal democracy, as one poli9cal analyst put it, were the 'only game in town,' and those who understood this reality and took steps to master these condi9ons would be successful in the future. South Africa, it seemed, had no choice but to proceed in this direc9on or face economic ruin. Globaliza9on in the early 1990s meant that capital ﬂowed much easier and faster between states. It ﬂowed towards states that oﬀered a good return on investment and away from countries that were risky and where proﬁts were low. Foreign investment capital was seen by many economists as a vital factor in economic growth. To aBract foreign investment, SA had to become aBrac9ve to the cau9ous and highly vola9le interna9onal ﬁnancial sector. This meant, among other things, low inﬂa9on, low levels of government debt, a healthy balance of 27 payments where exports at least equalled or exceeded imports, low levels of government spending, low interest rates, and a high savings rate among its ci9zens. These were among the requirements s9pulated by the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) that govern world trade. The World Bank and the Interna9onal Monetary Fund generally required similar reforms when imposing structural adjustment programs (SAP) on states as a requirement for addi9onal loans. If countries were 'stable' and avoided radical reforms, this would create conﬁdence among investors. Joe Slovo realized this when he agreed to the 'sunset clause' that allowed the largely Afrikaans-speaking bureaucracy to remain in their jobs during the ﬁve-year transi9onal period of the Government of Na9onal Unity and his acceptance of the role of the market in the economy. Similarly, South Africa steered away from widespread and rapid land reforms, especially since Zimbabwe, which held land seizures, was plunged into an economic crisis. One of the ﬁrst and obvious eﬀects of the collapse of the Soviet Union was that the ANC abandoned its plans to 'na9onalize' banks, the mining industries, and other 'commanding heights' of the economy that were set out in the Freedom Charter of 1955. Instead, the ANC - which shared power in the Government of Na9onal Unity - opted for a 'mixed economy' and implemented a policy called the Reconstruc9on and Development Programme. The chief aim of the Reconstruc9on and Development Programme (RDP) was to address the immense socioeconomic problems brought about by Apartheid. Speciﬁcally, it set its sights on allevia9ng poverty and addressing the massive shorpalls in social services across the country. This policy aimed to redistribute wealth more fairly by building houses, schools, and clinics and providing cheap electricity and clean water for ordinary South Africans. It would do so without aﬀec9ng the fundamentally capitalist nature of the South African economy. In 1996, aXer the new cons9tu9on was passed, the Na9onal Party withdrew from the Government of Na9onal Unity, and the ANC could develop its dis9nct economic policy. The ANC followed a similar approach to that of socialist par9es in Europe, for example, the Socialist Party in France under Francois MiBerrand, which although it was leX-wing and strongly in favour of socialism, adopted a more market-based economic policy to get the economy to grow and create jobs and wealth. Many leX-wing governments around the world priva9zed state-owned property and introduced 'labour ﬂexibility' that made it easier for companies to hire and ﬁre workers. The ANC government could not risk driving away foreign investors and so broadly followed a similar path of priva9za9on, labour ﬂexibility, and investor-friendly reforms. ABrac9ng 'foreign direct investment' was seen as the crucial element that would grow the economy to the level required to create jobs and redistribute resources. This explains why the ANC has made low inﬂa9on such a priority even where it has contributed to the loss of jobs in the short term. 28 Trevor Manuel, Minister of Finance, introduced a new economic policy called Growth, Employment, and Redistribu9on (GEAR). COSATU and the SACP, allies of the ANC in the Tripar9te Alliance, were unsure and later began to cri9cize this new policy strongly. Over 9me, however, the new economic policy did result in low inﬂa9on rates, strengthened the Rand, and made South Africa a stable economy with modest growth rates. Foreign direct investment trickled in very slowly, however, and many jobs were lost in the ﬁrst few years. South Africa enjoyed its longest unbroken period of economic growth in its history from 1995 to 2005. By the mid-2000s, aXer nearly a decade of mainly jobless growth, the economy began modestly to create new jobs. Arguably, if the Soviet Union had not collapsed, South Africa would have followed a much more socialist route. On the one hand, this may have made SA unaBrac9ve to foreign capitalists and resulted in economic slumps and even recessions as occurred to emerging states, especially in South America, that tried more 'leX-wing' or 'interven9onist' economic policies during the 1990s. On the other hand, South Africa may have experienced good economic growth rates as some interven9onist states did. Apart from these economic policies that are probably more 'centrist' and market-related than would have been the case if the Soviet Union had not collapsed, another important eﬀect has been South Africa's independent foreign policy. The Apartheid government had been strongly pro-West during the Cold War, so it stands to reason that an ANC government would have been pro-USSR if the Cold War had not ended. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Africa has followed a policy that has been strongly neutral and in favour of mul9lateral solu9ons to the world's problems; in par9cular, it has been a ﬁrm supporter of the United Na9ons. Following the fall of Apartheid, expecta9ons of change were high, par9cularly in addressing past inequali9es and ques9ons of poverty. Some people believed that to accomplish this, South Africa should be a "developmental State." This is one in which the state plays an ac9ve role in direc9ng the economy and tries to balance economic growth and social development. This means, for example, making government resources available for healthcare, housing, educa9on, and social welfare. Even aXer the government adopted GEAR in 1996, it s9ll allocated nearly 50% of its budget to social services such as these. The government also steadily extended the system of social grants to all those who could not support themselves by providing state old-age pensions, child support, foster care, and disability grants, as well as care dependency grants. Child support grants, ini9ally provided for children up to the age of 7, were later extended to the age of 18. By 2002, 7 million people, out of a popula9on of 45 million, were dependent on social grants from 29 the state. By 2012, this number had risen to 16 million. With growing levels of unemployment, this was a formidable challenge to government resources. Furthermore, although social welfare had improved, millions of people s9ll lacked basic services, and serious inequality remained a striking feature of society. Developing states usually have trouble obtaining resources to pay for the required social development. Although eﬀec9ve taxa9on collec9on was improved in South Africa, the amount obtained by taxa9on alone is limited when income levels for many South Africans remain low. In the early 2000s, some people proposed that the only way to achieve real social upliXment and economic transforma9on would be for the government to na9onalize resources such as the mines. Others argued that this would reduce eﬃciency and scare oﬀ poten9al investors. 30

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