RRII Asia Oriental 2 PDF
Document Details
Uploaded by Deleted User
Irene Yu García Iglesias
Tags
Summary
This document is a lecture or study notes on East Asian International Relations, covering topics such as the 1919 Mont-Ford reforms, the Indian independence movement, the Vietnam War, and the US-China rapprochement, by Irene Yu García Iglesias.
Full Transcript
East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias he1919Mont-FordreformsdidnotsatisfytheINCambitions.Insteadofgrantingmore T rights,impositionoftheRowlattActs(pressandmovementrestrictions...
East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias he1919Mont-FordreformsdidnotsatisfytheINCambitions.Insteadofgrantingmore T rights,impositionoftheRowlattActs(pressandmovementrestrictions),answeredwith nationwide protests (peak with the Amritsar massacre) → adoption of noncooperation tactics and Gandhi as president. Gandhi’s satyagraha tactics (noncooperation and nonviolent resistance) + outreach to rural society → expansion of the INC movement and mass following and sustained leadership. Lahore1929:independenceasgoal,Nehruelectedaspresident.UKrespondedtothe INC’s campaign of civil disobedience with suppression andthenreforms:Government of India Act (1935), abolishing dyarchy + providing provincial autonomy through elections. 1937 provincial elections: INC and Muslim League failed to agree on league representation of Muslims in provincial offices. 1940: independent Pakistani state for Muslims as the Muslim League’s goal. New opportunities with the beginning of WWII: a) INC: to press London for a promise of independence (“quit India”)inexchange for Indian support during the war. b) Muslim League: to consolidate its claim to represent Indian Muslims. New INC campaigns of civil disobedience → 1942: British attempts at suppression, imprisonment of Gandhi and INC leaders. 1944: Gandhi’s release, negotiations for outright self-rule – set the stage for thepostwarINC-MuslimLeaguestruggleoverthe form of self-rule, a united India (INC) or a separate state for Muslims (Muslim League). outheast Asia: decolonization and Cold War alignments. The Nixon S Doctrine and its impact: the Vietnam War he Vietnam war T TheVietnamwarresultsfromthedecolonizationprocessesinSoutheastAsia.Someof the colonial territories have a straightforward path towards independence. - Indonesia under Sukarno declared independence in 1945. Indonesia became independent in 1949, leading the NAM. Indochina: at theendofthewartheFrenchcontinuedtohavecolonialintentions.First Indochina war against the French (North Vietnam: communist guerrilla under Ho Chi Minh leadership). 1954 Geneva accords: abandonmentofFrance.Theterritoryknown as Indochina will be Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (independent states). Division of Vietnam along the 17th parallel (pro-western government dictatorial in the South, communistguerrillasintheNorth).NotaveryactiveAmericaninvolvementforabout10 years. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias 964: incidentofTonkin–sinkingofaUSmilitaryship(USSMaddox),allegationsthat 1 the communist guerrillas in North Vietnam are responsible (later known that it was a manufacturing failure). Reason for the US to get more involved in the war. 2 key events that changed the direction of the war: Tet offensive (rapid raids by the communists from the North intoSouthernVietnamusingtheHoChiMinhTrail)+May Lai Massacre (Vietnamese civilians murdered, US soldiers were involved). The domestic pressure in the US becomes strong to leave the war → dilemma: 1. Cold War logic: if they leave Vietnam it could fall under communist power. 2. The consequencesaretoobig.Theadministrationcannotwintheelectionswith that much opposition in the public opinion. Excusetogetout:ParisAccordof1973(tripartiteagreement),agreementonendingthe warandrestoringpeaceinVietnam.TheUSsupportsSouthVietnambuttheywillleave the conflict up to the Vietnamese – the 2 Vietnamese governments will settle their disputes and the US will withdraw from its engagement in the war. Paris Accords not respected by the North Vietnamese – fall of Saigon 1975. It entails a big defeat of the US in the Cold War – it will change the way the US faces/articulates its security approach to East Asia. Towards “tripolarity” S security architecture in the Asia-Pacific U Before: SanFrancisco/hubandspokessystem,dominoeffecttheory.Hub-and-spokes: asymmetrical,networkofbilateralsecurityrelationships(USassecurityguarantor)with Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia and New Zealand (trilateral: ANZUS). US-Japan security partnership: key pillar of the system. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias ixonDoctrine(1969),GuamDoctrine:theUSwillcontinuetobethesecurityprovider, N butitdoesnotmeanthattheywillbedirectlyinvolvedintheregionalconflicts.TheUS will support, offerhelp,providesecurity,butincaseofdisputetheywillhavetodefend themselves → allies in the region will have to step up and take more responsibilities (Japan). - Maintaining its security commitments with a more pragmatic, less idealistic approach. The US will also adopt a pragmatic approach towards China (pragmatic partner). Guamdoctrine:theUSwillremaincommittedwithEastAsia/AsiaPacific,buttheallies will have to step up their responsibilities. ino-Soviet Split (late 1950s) S EarlyColdWar:theWestassumedtheCommunistbloctobeamonolithicactor,butin the mid-1950s discrepancies appeared between the PCR and USSR. - Kinmen (金門) and Matsu (馬祖群島) islands. - Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing in 1959. - Sino-Albanian relations. 1960s: split is a consolidated reality, realities severed in 1962. Causes: multiple and complex,althoughprimarilyideological.Late1950s:discrepancieshadledMaothatthe USSR was nottrustworthy,leadingtothesplit.Late1970s(afterMao’sdeath):startof improval of relations between the two communist powers. he Nixon or Guam Doctrine T 1969: amidst the fatigue of the Vietnam War (contextofdétente),Nixonputsforththe Guam Doctrine. The US would redefine its compromise with the region’ssecurityand would expect its allies to assume more responsibilities in their defense. S-China rapprochement (after 1971) U Strategies that smaller powers can do in the system: - Balancing: try to deny great powers’ dominance. - Bandwagoning: joining efforts. The US strategy is to make an agreement with the PRC to counter Soviet power, althoughmotivatedbydifferentreasons.Result:TriangularDiplomacy–rapprochement between the US and China during the 2nd half of the 1960s. Resolution UN 2758 (1971): the PRC with capital in Beijing, will replace in the UN institutionstherepresentativesofChiangKaiShek(representativesofChinauntilthen). PRC becomes a UN member and permanent member of the UNSC – change of the legal personality. 1972: visit of President Nixon to China, paves the way to recognition. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias 1. F irst Joint Communiqué (1972), during Nixon’s visit: formalizes a political willingnesstoimprovetheirrelations,andacknowledgesthere’sonlyoneChina. Mao exposed that the possibility of the PRC and US improving relations is unavoidablycrippledbythefactthattheUSrecognizestheROCasalegitimate state. - OneChinaprinciple:therecanonlybeoneChinaentity(state)claimingto represent the Chinese people internationally. Currently, Beijingconsiders Taiwan as a province. Strategicambiguity:theUSacknowledgesthatthereisonlyoneChina(although not saying which China, entailingthatitdoesnotstoprecognizingTaiwan).The Chinese, in their own translation substituted “acknowledge” by “recognize”. 2. Second Joint Communiqué (1979): USrecognitionofthePRCasthelegitimate representativeoftheChinesepeople,anddiplomaticrelations.Articulationofthe oneChinapolicy:practicalapplicationofhowtheUSunderstandstheoneChina principle. US-PRC relations 1949-1971: 3 main periods. 1. Enmity and distance (1950s): political, economic and military repercussions. 2. Gradual rapprochement (1960s): a case of strategic balancing. 3. Toward normalization (1970s): 1979 – vast implications in terms of regional structure (diffused bipolarity), also for the ROC in Taiwan. ixon visits China (1972) N China wanted: build up their world credentials (recognition),Taiwan,gettheUSoutof Asia. US as potential economic partner. USwanted:Indochina(Vietnam:persuadeChinanottosupporttheNorthVietnamese), restrainChineseCommunists’expansioninAsia,reducethethreatofaconfrontationby China Super Power. Both wanted: reduce the possibilities of eventual confrontation, weaken the USSR, a more stable Asia. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias US Triangular Diplomacy The US and the ROC (Taiwan) NGA Resolution XXVI (1971) U DespitetheoutcomeoftheChineseCivilWar,theROCretaineddejurerecognitionas the legitimate representative government of China (UNmembership)until1971.1971: UNGA Resolution 2758 – recognition of PRC as the representative of China in the organizations, expelling ROC representatives. Since then, most members of the international community have switched their recognitions from the ROC to the PRC, leading to the isolation of the former. Since then, the PRC demands that all countries with whom it maintains diplomatic relations comply with the so-called One China Principle (there is only oneChina,and Taiwan is part of it). Practical implication of the one China policy:diplomaticrelationswithoneortheother entity (in Spain, embassy of the PRC; in Guatemala, embassy of the ROC). Only 11 states recognize the ROC and therefore have full diplomatic relations. Implications of the one China policy: relations with Taiwan, (except the 11 states), are always informal. S-China rapprochement and consequences for the ROC U Strategicambiguity:useoflanguageinaddressingTaiwan(“ourfriendsinTaiwan”,“the people in Taiwan”). 1st Joint Communiqué:acknowledges“there is onlyone China and Taiwan is part of it”. 2nd Joint Communiqué: normalization of relations and PRC as the “legitimate government of China” → recognition. 3rd JointCommuniqué(82):USunderstandsChinesepositiononTaiwanandcommits not to follow a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias ix assurances to Taiwan S The strategic ambiguity is complemented by a series of commitmentsthattheUSwill maintain with “the people of Taiwan”: - The US will not be the one that puts a date to stop selling arms to Taiwan. - The US will not change the terms of the Taiwan RelationsAct.Exchangesand cooperation with “the people of Taiwan” - TheUSwillnotconsultwithChinainadvancebeforemakingdecisionsaboutUS arms sales to Taiwan. - The US will not mediate between Taiwan and China. - The US will not alteritspositionaboutthesovereigntyofTaiwan–thequestion was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese. The US will not pressure Taiwan to enter negotiations with China. - TheUSwillnotformallyrecognizeChinese(PRC)sovereigntyoverTaiwan.The US officially understands that Taiwan is part of China, but does not explicitly explain how or say explicitly that Taiwan is part of the PRC. Status quo: Taiwan is not internationally recognized, is not considered a subject of international law initsownright,butisabletomaintainitsdefactosovereigntythanks to the balance created by the strategic ambiguity. Japan and its new role as an international actor apan as a pivotal US ally J Japan after WWII maintains a low profile foreign policy. The Korean War highlighted Japan’sgeostrategicrelevance.TheUSsawtheneedtoconsolidateJapanasastable and strong ally to maintain the region’s balance of power. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (1951): - Japan: under US protection. - Some controversies and domestic opposition initially. - 1952: National Police Reserve → 1954: Self-Defense Forces. Amended in 1960. Remains a key pillar of Japanese foreign policy. oshida Doctrine Y Yoshida Doctrine: “economy first” – Japan could benefit from the US as a security provider,andthereforeconcentrateitsnationalresourcesandeffortsonrecoveringthe economy. Japan had an exponential economic growth, becoming one of the biggest economies in the world. The future of Japan depended on its economic recovery: - Mercantilism: expansion into Asian markets. - Separation between politics and economy: avoid being involved in sensitive political disputes, East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias J apan’sforeignpolicywasfocusedmainlyontheUSandimprovingitsrelations.Itthen aimed to become a “bridge between Asia and the Western world”. There is a new body of research that wants to take credit out ofYoshida:it’snotthat Yoshida was a visionary genius, but that he was skillful in playing with the conditions given to him. n asymmetric relationship A Hub-and-spokes system, asymmetric relationship: the US were providing security, access to American markets essential for Japanese economic recovery and growth. Consequences of this asymmetric relationship: - Japan saw itself replicating or reacting to American foreign policy: rather than articulatingaforeignpolicyofitsown,theJapaneseforeignpolicywasreplicating American foreign policy – i.e. recognition of the PRC. Gaiatsu (external pressure) / beiatsu (Americanpressure)debates:whetherJapanese foreign policy is mainly reactive to foreign (American) pressure. he Nixon or Guam Doctrine T 1969: amidst the fatigue of the Vietnam War (contextofdétente),Nixonputsforththe Guam Doctrine. The US would redefine its compromise with the region’ssecurityand would expect its allies to assume more responsibilities in their defense. ilemmas/incognitas:fearofbeingabandonedbytheUS.Japan,oneithaspositioned D as a governing nation, second economy in the world, starts thinking how they can articulateanewforeignpolicythatisnotsolowprofile(more“normal”)→flyinggeese: Japan as the leading geese understands that its economic growth can have positive externalities for other developing/less advanced economies. Redraw its foreign policy by introducing new elements. ukuda Doctrine F FirstdeviationoftheYoshidaDoctrine:FukudaDoctrine.Japanwantedtohaveamore robustforeignpolicy,butwiththepremiseofart.9limitationsandthehistoricalmistrust of other countries. - Objective:projectanimagethatJapaneseforeignpolicywantstointroducenew elements such as security into the foreign policy toolbox,butwillnotbecomea military power. Japanwouldnotbecomeamilitarypoweranditwouldestablisheconomicandcultural relations, based on trust, with all countries in Southeast Asia – implicit acceptance of thediversityofallpoliticalregimesintheregion(concentrateinfosteringeconomicand trade relations). East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias iven the military limitations by art. 9 of the Constitution, a new concept to frame G security: comprehensive security – aim to have an influence in the region’s security without having to resort to military force. - Economic, diplomatic or political instruments → Official Development Aid (ODA). - Human security: people’s centered vision of security. Providing people with certain basic rights and goods. Checkbook diplomacy (diplomacia de talonario): by giving money, Japan has built a network of friends. Deployed until early 1990s. The USSR in East Asia he USSR in East Asia T CW: East Asia is the scenario of tensions (and proxy wars). US plays a leading role, USSRalsorelevant.AtthebeginningofCW:aimstoestablishanetworkofstrongallies in the region. Between 1945-1989 Moscow: - Maintains weak and tense ties with Seoul andTokyo.Diplomaticandeconomic relations. - Weaker but less tense links with Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Philippines). - Fluid relationswithcommunistregimesinNorthKoreaandVietnam–economic and military assistance. North Korea was skillful at not being affected in a negativewaybytheSino-SovietSplit(friendlyrelationswithboth,notcommitting excessive with either one). - Complex relations with China: from friend and ally toconfrontation.Sino-Soviet Splitasarealitybytheendofthe1950s.Theywillhavetheirownproxyconflicts: India vs. China (late 1960s), the Soviets supported India. he USSR and Japan T Historically, there have been arguments as to whom the Kuril Islands belong. Russia claimed the Kuril and the Sakhalin Islands. Dispute: four islands that were de facto controlled by the USSR understood as a natural continuation of the Kuril Islands. AccordingtoJapan,those4islandsarepart of the Hokkaido prefecture. Soviet-Japanese relations were difficult: - Japan was a core US ally. - Moscow mistrusted American presence on Japanese soil. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias - T erritorial conflict over the Kuril islands fueled the confrontation between Japanese and Soviet leaders. Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956: reestablished diplomatic relations and aimedatapeacetreaty(pending).Traderelationswereweak,althoughmoresignificant since the 1960s. Kuril Islands dispute (key stumbling block): - Shikotan and Habomai question. - Conflict of low and moderate intensity during the CW. - No fear of Soviet invasion of Japan (insularity + American presence). Lowprofile.RelationsbetweenJapanandRussiadidn’tstarttointensifyuntilthe1990s, when the USSR collapsed. he USSR and China T Throughout the Cold War, Moscow often saw China as a potential threat to Soviet leadership of the socialist world. Early1950s:Sino-Sovietalliance.Drivenmainlybyconjecturalfactors:commonenemy (US, who could threaten their influence) and bipolar dynamics. By the end of the decade: Sino-Soviet split. Destalinization plans in the USSR and pursuitofpeacefulcoexistencewiththeUS(Khrushchev):seenbyMaoasabetrayalto Marxist-Leninist ideology. Moscow felt safer afterachievingnuclearparitywiththeUS. At the same time, Soviet concern about the perils of a nuclear confrontationbetween the superpowers. Needed stability for economic development. Numerous points of tension: - Chinese pact of cooperation with Albania (1962). - Soviet support to India in border dispute case with China (Tibet border issue) (1962). - BeijingcriticizedMoscow’sattitudeduringtheCubanMissileCrisis–theattitude was too confrontational. - China’s first nuclear test (1964) raised concerns in the Soviet Union. - Localized border battles (1969). - Heightened tensions during Sino-American Rapprochement. he USSR and Korea T Weak links with South Korea: mistrust due to American presence, and South Korea seen as an “instrument” of American imperialist ambitions. Close ties with North Korea: economic assistance packages to Kim Il-Sung (although North Korean population did not really benefit). Sino-Soviet Split → USSR ties with NorthKoreainitiallyweakenedinfavorofPRCbutrelationsrecovered:despitealigning first with Beijing (1962-1964), Pyongyang maintained a pragmatic balancing between East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias the USSR and China. Relations withtheUSSRstrengthenedKimIl-Sung’spositionof power. China: from rapprochement to Tiananmen hina’s foreign policy (1969-1979) C End of 1960s, bad situation: at odds with the USSR and with the West (image deteriorated by the Cultural Revolution) and marginalized from the international community. Rapprochement with the US changed the scenario: UN representation, relations with Japan (1972-1978), Western European countries’ recognition. Approximation to EEC: Sino-Albanian Split. Beijing aimed to contain Soviet efforts to form an alliance against them: - Tensions with India: due to Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (1971). - Tensions with Vietnam (1974) due to growing Soviet influence. - Support to Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (USSR opposed). - Strengthening of relations with Asean (from mid-70s). - Support to all Western initiatives in the Third World that could diminish Soviet influence. hina’s foreign policy (1979-89) C Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and opening-up allowed a reorientation of China’s foreign policy: articulation of a low profile foreign policy. China will prioritize economic relations. - Establishment of Special Economic Zones intheareassurroundingHongKong and Macau. Related to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between China, Taiwan and Japan. - Synergies with Japan facilitate its growth. - Relations with capitalist Asian countries. - 1960s: resumed contact with communist countries (Eastern Europe). GorbachevassumedUSSRleadership:aimedatadistentionwithBeijing.1989:Visitto Beijing, amidst Tiananmen crisis – resumption of Sino-Soviet relations. Improvement of relations with Japan (despite criticisms) and ASEAN. The low profile foreign policy was maintained until the Xi Jinping leadership. hina and the US (1972-1989) C Early1970s:normalizationofdiplomaticrelationsandforgingofastrategicalliance.US motivatedprimarilybygeopoliticalreasons(isolatingtheUSSR),butlatermorerelevant economicreasons(Chinesereformsandopeningafter1978)–amovethatsignificantly altered the regional order that had prevailed during the first 2 decades of the Cold War. - Soviet position weakened. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias - T aiwan loses UN (and UNSC) seat and becomes a partially-recognized State (one China principle + 3 US-China Joint Communiqués). 1980s:improvementofSino-Americanrelations,qualitativegrowthofbilateraleconomic relations. Crackdown of June 4th 1989 in Tiananmen Square distorted this improvement in the relations: - US Government froze relations while enacting other measures – US student visas: permanent residence for Chinese nationals (students) that came to the United States, pushed by the political repression the Chinese faced after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. - TheTiananmenSquareincidentintroducedhumanrightsissuesintodiscussions in the complex Sino-American relations and the rest of the world. iananmen and the end of the CW T ThecrisisofTiananmenmotivatedtheinternationalisolationofChina.TheUS,Western Europe and Japan condemned the events and advocated for human rights.However, some of the isolating measures were quickly removed: China’s economic appeal motivated the rapid abandonment of sanctions and isolation. - Some instances remain in place – EU arms embargo: European countries will self-restrict their ability to sell military assets to Chinaastheycouldbeusedto repress the population in similar ways as the Tiananmen incident (political conditionality). However there have been ways to avoid this conditionality (interpreting that the military assets a country sends will not be used for repressing the population). Collapse of the USSR: China saw itself as the only standing socialist great power. PowertransitionsintheformerUSSR+internationalsanctions:motivatedChinatolook toward East Asia and the “Third World”. - Normalization of relations with South Korea (1992). - Reestablishment of cross-border trade with India (1991). The end of the Cold War: the emergence of a new international order onsequences of the end the Cold War C EndoftheCW:triggeredbytheeventsthatfollowthecollapseoftheUSSR.Theendof the CW has not an exact date (despite dating the end with the resignation of Gorbachov), as it was part of an ongoing process in the years prior – approaching maneuvers between the Soviets and the Americans. It will have profound consequencesinthestructureoftheinternationalsystem,andthereforeconsequences in the region and structure of power in East Asia. TheUSemergesaswinneroftheCWandhegemonintheinternationalsystem.Russia wasbornasthesuccessoroftheUSSR(takesitsseatintheUNSC).Whatconfigures East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias thestructureintheinternationalsystemistheunequaldistributionofpowercapabilities between the actors – one of the superpowers has collapsed into 15 different independent states, and entered a period of economic decline. During all this period (1945-1991) the international systemwasunderstoodasbipolar, maintaining the balance of power. The international system becomesunipolar,theUS emerges as the only remaining superpower at the end oftheCW,entailingthatthose institutions that were first shaped to be the institutions of the Western bloc(IMF,WB) they acquire a universal character. There are debates about the current nature of the international system (bipolarity, asymmetric tripolarity…), but there remain elements of unipolarity. After the USSR collapse, possibility of a unipolar moment – there was no other powerthatcouldface theUS.Thereweresomescholarsthatwroteaboutthe“endofhistory”:noleftstruggle in the world, the end of the dialectics had reached an end. Fukuyama predicted that eventuallyallthecountrieswouldembracethevalues,normsofthesystemofwhatwas once the Western bloc. heterogeneous regional system A Thechangesintheregionwerelessdramaticthanthoseofglobaldynamics.EastAsia was particularly heterogeneous. Main dynamics of change: - Economic development: China was in the process of opening up, North Korea entered a period of economic stagnation. - Politicalsystem:consolidationofdemocraticsystems(Japan),emergenceofnew democracies (Taiwan, South Korea). The configuration of the region at the end of theCWhasmanyaspectsthathavenot changed after 30 years, many elements of continuity. - North Korea (almost no reform): stagnant economy, Kim Il-Sung remained in power until 1994. - Japan:almostnochangesinthepoliticalsystem,butsystemicchangesbrought about by the end of the CW forced a later reconsideration of its role in international relations and as a foreign policy actor (crisis of the checkbook diplomacy). InSoutheastAsia,politicaldiversitycontinuedtobepredominant.Theendofbipolarity did not abruptly change these conditions. Thailand and Philippines: towards democratization. Indonesia: Soekarno confronted pro-democracy pressures and prevailed. Cambodia: Khmer Rouge regime replaced in the 1980s by the Vietnamese Occupying Forces (also authoritarian). Myanmar (Burma): instability and economic crisis → grounds for the 1988 economic military coup (military junta). East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias M alaysia: Mahathir’s Premiership since 1981 did not end authoritarianism (Parliamentary Monarchy + inter-ethnic equilibrium). Singapore: continued as an interventionist and authoritarian regime since its independence (1965). Vietnam and Laos: retained throughout the 1980s the communist governments established during the 1970s despite the reduction of Soviet help. region in search of leadership A The US was in a strong position in the region (hub-and-spokes system) although it seemed toservenopurposewiththedisappearanceoftheUSSR,andbecomealess active actor in the early post-Cold War period – triggered the fear of abandonment amongstsomeallies(Japanreactivatedthedebatesonitsforeignpolicy:shouldJapan remilitarize or remain peaceful). The outside leadership is clear (the US has become the unipolar hegemon). In the region there is no clear leadership. a) Neither the ROC (Taiwan) and the two Korean states were capable of leading. b) Japan presented itself as a regional leader with the flyinggeesemodel,butfor someneighborsitwasstilldifficulttoassumeJapanasaregionalleader(China, South Korea). c) China had the potential, but the main problem was the recent episode of Tiananmen and raised concerns about its future path. d) In Southeast Asia no country was inarealpositiontoassumeleadership.Only Indonesia was strong enough to occupy the leadership vacuum. - Suharto led ASEAN throughout the 1980s but his regime was non-democratic. The reconfiguration of the Asia-Pacific region was more gradual, a process involving gradual power shift: US → China. The US,inrelativeterms,hasgraduallydeclinedin comparison to the unipolar moment. CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN ASIA Change and continuity actors of continuity and change pre and post Cold War F Change: rapid rise of China. Continuity: sequels of the Cold War. The CW hasshapedtheregionofSoutheastAsiaprofoundly.TheUSemergesasthe regional hegemon and security provider of the region (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan…). ransformations at the global (systemic) level T ThecollapseoftheUSSRandthecommunistblockusheredinatransformationofthe international system: from bipolarity to unipolarity (temporarily), or multipolarity. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias ew challengesunderpinnedbyglobalization(cooperation,trade,etc).RiseofAsiaas N the pole of gravity of global economic growth. In East Asia changes were not immediate but more gradual by China’s ascendant power trajectory. ast Asia in the post-Cold War era E The region continues to have some elements after the CW: - Diversity in terms of political systems: communist states, capitalist states, democracies and autocracies. - Leadership vacuum at the end of the CW with several candidates. The US continuestobetheregionalhegemon,duringtheearlypost-CWyearsChinadid not yet have the potential to become the regional leader; Japan and its perception of colonial past. - Nationalism and complex strategic cultures by the region’s states. Nationalism has had many manifestations (disputes over territory, history, trading and commercial issues, alignment). Competing nationalisms. - Fragile regional equilibria: the balance of power, theequilibriumintheregionis difficulttomaintainduetotheincreasinglyclosingpowergapbetweenChinaand the US (and its allies). Lowyinstituteasiapowerindex:thereare2regionalsuperpowers(theUSandChina), while the rest fall lower. ot economics, cold politics H Economically: East Asia istodayoneofthe most dynamic regions in the world. The countries in the region have fluid economic relations,theynormallyhaveChinaasmain trading partner, there is high inter regional trade. This contrasts with the cold/difficult political relations: China-Japan political relations improve, but there have been notable instances where tensions have increased. With Japan-South Korea it seems thatthey can put aside historical grievances but it depends on the political leaders. Politically:therehavebeensignificantpower shifts that are occurring as a result of the rise of China as a regional (and in many aspects global) power. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias atent tensions: there are potential flashpoints where a conflict could develop in the L region,thereisapotentialvolatility,butaslongasthepowerbalanceismaintained,by now those flashpoints are not seen to create a serious conflict. Some of those are legaciesoftheColdWar:perpetuationofdivisions(KoreanPeninsula,tensionbetween the Taiwan strait); and some are new: South China Sea dispute. ontinuedUSpresenceintheregionandroleintheregion.EndofthePax C Americana? he US is a key player in Asia Pacific International Politics T US presence in the Asia Pacific is rooted in two principles: 1. American exceptionalism: it justifies the idea of the US being engagedinother parts of the world as a country that brings stability. 2. The Pacific as a “natural” area of influence: what happens in the Pacific is naturally relevant for the US and the US should have a presence in it. Theoretical perspectives: - Realism: the US acts as a hegemonic stabilizer. As the regional hegemon, the presence of this superpower naturally brings stability. A hegemon has a great capacity to influence the regional politics, to project capacity of deterrence (prevent others from destabilizing the region). As long as the US maintains regional hegemony, stability will be maintained. - Liberalism, constructivism: the USengageswiththecountriesintheregionwith itsroleasasecurityproviderwhichshouldbeconsideredalongsidesoft-security initiatives in Southeast Asia. Pattern of continuity in theUSmainalliesintheregion(hubandspokessystem),with some new additions: QUAD alliance (Australia, US, Japan and India) + trilateral pact (US, Japan and South Korea). East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias S presence in East Asia U The US retains an important role as a security provider in the region, because the network of allies built after WWII remains in place. 1. The US has had an architecture that has not had a competing alternative for security architecture (by China). 2. ThecountriesintheregionopposetheideaofaChineseregionalhegemony.US presence is sought after and something that countries wish to maintain. Geopolitical component: the US by consolidating the network of alliances, is able to maintain enough presence to contain China and its attempts to seek regional hegemony. China is trying to assert its dominance bygraduallychangingthesituation de facto (salami slicing technique) – increasing the military posts and the fake islands. The US nowadays they are increasingly talking about interoperability (military term): theywanttoensurethattheequipmentsthattheUSisusingisfullycompatiblewiththe onesthatitsalliesareusing,soincasethereisadestabilizationoftheequilibrium,itis much easier if all allies have mutually interoperable technology. S’ involvement in the Asia-Pacific U 2 deeply rooted factors: 1. American exceptionalism (moralism). 2. Pacific – “natural zone of influence” (“our lake”). 19th century concept. Historically,“reluctantimperialism”.Ambivalentpositiontowardsdirectimperialism.The US colonized territories in the Pacific (Hawaii, Philippines), but with public reluctance and with preference for an economic and military influence in other parts of Asia (in contrast with European direct imperialism). Now (post CW): convincement that the Pacific is the center of gravity of global geopolitics. US politics/foreign policy: closely watched throughout the region today. Remarkably consistent presence and engagement since the end of CW, despite new economic and security challenges. S’ post-CW strategic setting U Unipolar moment: the new world order to be built along the lines of US-led liberal hegemony, values and core beliefs. USemergedfromtheCWasaweakerpower,especiallyontheeconomicfront.Trade deficit with Japan (1990s) – 50B USD. Concerns among US allies in the region: fear of abandonment + fear of entrapment (concernthatthesecurityalliancewillforcethemintoconflictsortensionsinwhichthey would prefer not to be involved). East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias S administrations and the Asia Pacific (2000-2023) U GeorgeW.Bush(2001-2009):PerceptionthattheUSwas‘toobusy’inSouthwestAsia and the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iraq) BarackObama(2009-2017):correcttheweakenedUSpresenceintheregion.Begins a strategic refocusing in AsiaandthePacificingeneralthatcontinuestoinfluencethe Americanforeignpolicyvis-à-visthispartoftheworld.PivottoAsia:amoresystematic and consistent reliance on diplomatic, economic and military instruments to create a solid and durable basis for US’ relations with the region. - Objectives: deepening and strengthening alliance commitments with US treaty allies (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines) + building new partnerships with Southeast Asian states. - India: regarded with a central role, with the potential to develop into a key strategic ally (QUAD). Hillary Clinton: China as a strong competitor, but collaboration needed(nozero-sum logic, a win-win situation would be reached if cooperation with China) Donald Trump (2017-2021): Most disruptive. Trump is a differentcharacterregarding trading politics: he favors certain isolationism and some of the things he didwerenot consistent with the previous administrations: 1. Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): a. Defactokillednegotiations.Inthistradeforum,Chinatakesresponsibility for filling the power vacuum. b. It brought widespread implications for US-Southeast Asia economic and political implications. 2. Strategic component: focus on building ties with SEA nations and China. - China: revisionist power (in terms of the South China Sea, HR, not to economic norms and multilateral institutions like WTO) and strategic competitor → starts to be perceived as a threat. 3. Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), 2018: to “develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted and principled US policy for the Indo-pacific region”. - Promotion of US and allies’ interest (liberalorder),promotingUSvalues, defense and security ties with partners throughout the region, US-India-Japan Trilateral meeting, QUAD. Biden(2021-2025):continuationofthe‘strategiccompetition’withChina,strengthening of relations with Taiwan and commitment to the “One China Policy”. ilateralism vs. multilateralism B US-Japan alliance: remains the backbone of US engagement with the Asia-Pacific (renewed in 1996-97). US-South Korea alliance: close second. US “strategic rebalancing” to the region (started with Obama): East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias - B eyond protecting Japan, now the alliance has a wider interpretation: a safeguard mechanism againstanincreasinglyassertiveChina(thoughnotoften stated as such). An exception regarding maritime disputes in SEA. - North Korea: despite some attempts, the US has not managed to articulate an effective approach vis-à-vis Pyongyang. US interests with Japan’s are aligned and intertwined. - Expansion of US-SEA relations and military ties. ASEAN-centered multilateral approaches to “build regional order” have acquired new importance for the US. - Regional-ledinitiatives–QUAD(Australia,US,JapanandIndia),FOIP(Freeand Open Indo-Pacific). From emerging China to emerged China he rise of China T In 2024, the idea ofChinaasarisingpowershouldbeabandoned.Chinaisalreadya consolidated regional power (in 2010-2011 it surpassed Japan).Underthecommunist ruleandthePRC,ChinaovercametheCenturyofHumiliation(decline:lossofterritories to UK and other European countries, the invasion of Japan, etc). Mistrust of perceived US “unipolar” trends: - Relationship with Russia, increasingly asymmetric. - Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). - “Beijing Consensus”: economic policies with Deng Xiaoping (after Mao’s death 1976). 1. Incremental Reform (as opposed to a Big Bang approach). 2. Innovation and Experimentation. 3. Export Led Growth. 4. State Capitalism (as opposed to Socialist Planning or Free Market Capitalism). 5. Authoritarianism (as opposed to a Democratic regime type) Not embedded in the region’s security architecture. Main “lifeline” for the DPRK, complex relations with India and Japan. Interdependence with the region and the world. Post CW period, and remarkably since 2010 (when Xi assumes power): China has increasingly opposed American unilateral moves and states that the world should be understood as multipolar – manifested in Chinese actions focused on expanding its influence (Belt and Road Initiative, soft power, etc) +partnershipsandalliancesithas forged in the last years. he transformation of China and its international relations T China is no longer an “emerging power”. China as a great power, regional and global: - Major economic presence around the world. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias - 2 nd largest GDP (since 2010). - Success without democratization, “without being a US satellite”, without having fought a war. Beijing now seeks to consolidate and extend its reach and power projection globally. China is a recent and consolidated power – superpower or great power: a) Superpower: astatethatcanshapethestructureandnormsoftheinternational system. b) Great power: strong presence and powerbutcannotunilaterallyfullychangeor establish the rules of the game. “Great Walls” view (Osawa): 1. Great wall in cyberspace (the Great Firewall): creating a separate internet in Chinathatdoesn’tconnecttotherestoftheglobe(certaindomainsdonotwork, VPNs). 2. Great wall in the sea: trying to claim as much area of water as possible. 3. Great wall in the sky: ADIZ (air defense identification zone) requiring identification over disputed zones. China has asymmetric power: 1. Economic front: few doubts that China can be described as a superpower because it has power to project its influence. 2. Military front: still lacks this power because it depends on the US. ThewayChinaprojectspowerisdifferentdependingontheareas(economic,security, etc)andthewayitisperceivedvariesdifferentlyindifferentpartsoftheworld(“bueno, bonitoybarato”vs.theperceptionfromGlobalSouthcountries).Itiskeynottosettlefor simplistic explanations on what China is. hina’s FP before Xi Jinping C Longtermview(waitforone'stime,low-profileFPtaoguangyanghui韬光养晦):donot activate the a Thucydides’ trap (a rising power will always want to challenge the hegemonic power) – maintain a low profile and wait for the moment. - Foreign policy of self-contention, non-aggressive stances, low belligerence and accommodation within the preestablished liberal order. Xi Jinping’s leadership assumes that China is ready and capable of taking the US down. J-curve: when a country is very close, the political regime is stable. China hassuccessfullytransitioned towards great stability and openness without having democratized. The CCP is therefore not concerned about losing the authority and can now be more assertive and aggressive in its FP. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias hina’s under Xi Jinping C Clear strategic objective: leave behind Western hegemony → establish a new international order that accommodates China's new status as a great power. A more assertive FP, a more aggressive defense policy and a new catalog of hard and soft power projection mechanisms. oft power S Economic and commercial presence worldwide: - Investments, technology, science, business partnerships. - Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): boost of presence in Central Asia, Southeast Asia. - Now: Global Development Initiative. Top-down narrative construction: it is first presented the concept before the content. There are differences between the conceptualization and the implementation. China operates with a premise of “no-strings attached” – connected to the idea of Chinese narrative that China always respects the sovereignty of other states (the US always tells states what to do, China doesn't). “No-strings attached”: associated with why Chinese investments, projects, and loans to be returned with commodities, are welcomedinauthoritarianregimes→Chinadoesnotimposepoliticalconditionality(the EU or US imposes political conditionality with its development aid). - Europe has due diligence procedures that are higher in standards than those with which China operates. Chinadoesnotattachanypoliticalconditionality,butthatbringscriticism–theChinese presenceincreasesbutthatdoesn’tmeananactualimprovementoflivingconditionsof the locals. Reformulation of the architecture of multilateral institutions: - Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. - New Development Bank. - Participation in the RCEP. - Reach out to LATAM, EU, Africa during TPP negotiations… - SCO: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and India. Diplomacy: - Well-builtSouth-Southdiscourse:Chinaprojectsthat,asadevelopingcountry,it can understand and respond to the needs of developing countries. - Quest for a role as a diplomatic broker: occupying a place where traditionally Western powers were the main diplomatic interlocutors for dialogue. China brokered a dialogue between Saudi Arabia-Iran, Arab states-Israel. - As an actor in global issues with which to cooperate: climate change, drug-related problems, human trafficking, etc. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias - C hange in Chinese diplomatic language, more assertive and less diplomatic: wolf-warrior diplomacy (not used anymore) – use of not so diplomatic, rather rough language. More assertive, direct language (insulting or threateningthose deemed to violate China's interests). hina’s integration in the global economy C +40 economic agreements (regional), +15 FTAs and some more under negotiation. Recent developments: RCEP (includes ASEAN, India, China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand). 1. Since 1993: largest recipient of incoming FDI (services and advance manufacturing + importance of Hong Kong). 2. In the last decade: major source of outward FDI (increase of x20 between 2004-2015). Interdependence of the Chinese economy with the rest of the world: - Export-led growth. - WTO membership since 2001. - Largest holder of US Treasury bonds (American debt) – leverage. - Accusations of currency manipulation (artificially undervalued RMB/yuan). Recent policy announcements: focus on the internal market, reduce dependency on exports (ex: on the rest of the world). ard power H Ongoing significant military modernization and expansion of capabilities. 2012: China spentmoreonmilitarythanEuropeforthefirsttime.2015:+36%thanEurope.Bynow, China’s ability to project military power is today mostly circumscribed to the Asia Pacific. - String of Pearls of China (vs. Necklace of Diamonds of India): competition of strategies of building ports in friendlycountriessurroundingtheother’scapacity to expand geopolitically. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias isputes in the South China Sea D Overlappingterritorialclaimsoverwaters(UnitedNationsConventionontheLawofthe Sea, territorial waters and continental platform) – between ASEAN countries. Among them, they somehow can manage to deal with it peacefully. ainproblem:Chinahasaredterritorialclaimbasedonahistoricalmapof1937where M it was found a nine dash line. The government ofManilaelevatedaquestiontotheInternationalCourtofArbitration: in 2016 the court ruledinfavorofthePhilippinesthattheSouthChinaSea,especially concerningtheterritorialwatersofthePhilippines,werePhilippineterritorialwaters.The Courtaddedthatahistoricalmap,whetheritexistsornot,doesnotlayabasistoexert territorial claims → China rejected the Court’s ruling. “Great Wall of Sand”: construction of artificial islands to increase Chinese military presence in the South China Sea. Challenge:doesanartificiallybuiltislandallowitto claim territorial water (theoretically not). he Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) T Security (they discuss security, not a collective defenseorganization)andcooperation forum. Organization that has existed since the 1990s. Members: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan. The idea behind was to promote cooperation between Russia and China and some other minor powers that opposed a perceived toomuchAmericaninfluenceinCentral Asia. Russia and China consider competitors in the expansion of influence in Central Asia. - Different from the Washington Consensus. - Apillaroftheso-called“BeijingStrategy”:academicwaytorefertotheChinese strategy of creating new international organizations, forums for cooperation, East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias xpanding its influence, new economic rules ofthegame,contestationofsome e liberal principles. hina as a revisionist power C Chinaaimstoreshapetheregionalandinternationalorder(nottofullycontestit,butto accommodate the existing structures, norms and rules to its new status as a great power with ambition to play a greater role in the international system). - BRI: new connectivity routes. Because of global warming, the Arctic pole is easier to navigate – the Chinese have been financing infrastructureinnorthern Russia (one of China’s backup plans toavoidfuturegeopoliticaltensionsinthe South China Sea and reach Europe). hina is seemingly acting as an assertive or aggressive power, but in terms of C economiccooperationChinahasthelargesteconomyintheregionandthepatternsof interdependence are vast → the countries oftheregionhaveChinaasthemaintrade partner. Push and pull dynamics: intensified geopolitical competition together with increasing economic interdependence. China has created new norms, rules andinstitutionsthatdonotnecessarily aim at substituting the existing ones. - Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): connected to the building of infrastructures related to the BRI. China East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias referstofinanceitsprojectsthroughtheAIIBbutbecauseit’saninstitutionofits p own creation → the terms and conditions better respond to China’s demands (growth, expectations). Chinese official narrative “China is rising peacefully”. Trend that as China grows in influence and power, it doesn’t always draw positive views from the rest of the international community. China projects a positive image in those regions in which it exerts its soft power. CountrieswithfairlynegativeviewsofChinaconsiderthatChina’sgrowingeconomyis a good thing for their economy (pull of economic growth). South Korea has well managed its relations with the US and China. In economic aspects they are direct competitors with China. As China rises with more military force, it is seen as a threat. ontending views C Is China’s rise peaceful: 1. Realist view: pessimistic – an open war is avoidable, but a situation of intense security competition is unavoidable as there is an established power being contested by a rising power (Thucydides trap). All rising powers wanttoassert dominance eventually. 2. LIberal view: more optimistic – the strong economic interdependence in the region is a good recipe to avoid conflict. Theycancreatemechanismstoavoid the security competition. “Return to traditional East Asian order”. Japan at a crossroads apan’s changing role J Cold War: low-profile international actor. Post-Cold War: increasingly tense and potentially volatile regional environment. Need for Japan to adapt. Factors that have conditioned the readjustment of Japan’s foreign security strategy in the 21st century: a) Changes in the geopolitical scenario: the international environment becomes increasingly restrictive (limitedmarginofmaneuver),economicinterdependence with China, threats posed by North Korea, rapidly changing security environment. b) Internal political factors (legal framework, preferences, perceptions, etc): the Constitutional restriction, the fact that Japan does not havearobustmajorityin parliament → extending the boundaries of interpreting the Constitution, Japan historically having a dominant party (conservatism, nationalism, pragmatism). apan as an “anomalous” foreign and security policy actor J ShinzoAbe,2015:“IfJapanisattacked,USForceswillsparenoeffortindefendingit… EvenifthoseUSForcesondutytoprotectJapanareattacked,wecannotdoanything, East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias ewillnotdoanything,unlessJapanitselfisattacked.ThathasbeenJapan'sposition w to date. Does this really make sense?” Conclusion: it did not really make sense. As a result, in 2015 Japan extended the interpretationofart.9:notonlyresortingtomilitarymeansinself-defense,butnowalso to defend allies. Japan’s foreign and security policy – a questionthathasbeenposedinvariousforms since the 1950s: - Can Japan maintain forces? - If so, can they be deployed overseas? - Can they use weapons? - What about collective self-defense? The answer depends on the interpretation of art. 9: - Initially in 1947: “no war potential”. - 1990s: interpretation begins to be challenged. - 2000s: “normalization” underway. y the end of the Cold War B Japan’s economic agenciespromotedthenotionofJapanasadriverforgrowthinthe East Asian region (flying geese model): FDI, interdependence, technology transfers, investment… Japan’s coins its own security doctrine: Comprehensive security (80s). Broad concept of security. Shared responsibilities. Codified Japan’s regional and global role Soft power With the collapse of the bipolar order, new fears: a) Abandonment. Will the US stay or leave? b) Entrapment. What if the US gets in trouble as the hegemon,andwillJapanbe dragged into those conflicts? arly post-Cold War period E Toshiki Kaifu, 1990: “With dialogue and cooperation now replacing missilesandtanks as the tools for achieving order, Japan has both the chance and the duty to applyits technological and economic strength, along with its store of experience and its conceptual ability, to the creation of a new framework for international relations.” apan in the post-Cold War context J Japan aimed to formulate a foreign and security policy approach to: Address the challenges posed by an increasingly hostile international environment. East Asian International Relations Irene Yu García Iglesias P ushing forward multilateralism, trade, development and institution-building (liberal order) and the development of the UN. Japan actively aligns itself as a systemic supporter of the US. Promote regional security dialogue – “if Taiwan has a problem, Japan has a problem”. Human rights, human security, support to UN peacekeeping operations. International engagement beyond the US-Japan alliance. Strategic partnership agreements, participation in the QUAD, with the EU (not only for economic cooperation but also political and security cooperation). Japan wants to stop being a “rule-taker” to become a “rule-maker” in global governance (economic & political). JapanhasonlyreinterpretedtheConstitution,andintheprocessofnormalizationJapan is more engaged and principled in its foreign policy, reflecting the ambitionofbeinga rule-maker rather than just being a passive actor. apan as an economic rule-maker J Economic initiatives have played a major role. Important negotiation processes were launched during the second Abe Administration (2012-2020): - Economic Partnership Agreement (Free trade agreement) with the EU. - Bilateral agreement with the US – trade in preferential terms. - Proposal to make a free trade agreement between Japan, China and the Republic of Korea. - JapantakespartintheRegionalComprehensiveEconomicPartnership(RCEP) which includes China and traditional American allies). - TPP12 → TPP11/CPTPP: Japan recovers the initiative after the US withdraws and assumes the role of being the leader of negotiations. Up to 18 Economic Partnership Agreements have been signed with 21 countries/regions. 1. 51.6
