Police Corruption and Responses PDF

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Police Justice and Law and Responses Corruption 7 Getty Images News/Getty Images Learning Objectives 1. Provide examples of two types of police misconduct: economic corruption and Former officer Michael Slager was charged with the killing abuse of authority. of Walter Scott in North Charleston, South Carolina. After 2. Describe individual explanations of a mistrial in state proceedings, he pleaded guilty to federal corruption and potential solutions. charges in May 2017. 3. Explain organizational explanations of F corruption and potential solutions. rank Serpico is arguably the most famous police officer in the United States, even though he hasn’t worked in law 4. Describe societal explanations of corruption and potential solutions. enforcement since 1972. As an NYPD detective, his whis- tleblowing led to the Knapp Commission. Serpico was shot in what was suspected of being a setup by fellow officers, although no one was ever charged. The name Serpico continues to elicit two different reactions. For some, it rep- resents the epitome of an honest and brave man who stood against corruption at great risk to self. For others, it represents a “rat,” a man who turned his back on his friends, and, for some officers, to be called a “Serpico” is a serious insult. Why we still talk about Frank Serpico is that his story includes all the elements of the problem of police corruption. From what we know, the problem is often “vertical” in that supervisors and administrators are either involved, have been involved, or, more often, actively try to cover up or ignore the corruption. Second, the problem is known to other officers, and even if only a few are involved, the “blue curtain” shields them. Finally, whistleblowers that expose the corruption are considered traitors and, some- times, retaliation occurs as the In the News box and Walking the Walk box describe. 181 182    Pa r t I I    Police In the NEWS Whistleblower in Oregon An internal affairs supervisor was concerned that Port- misrepresentation, and lying to internal affairs. In all land police were not sharing information about officers cases, the officers’ supervisors had recommended sus- who had credibility issues with prosecutors for so-called taining the allegations but the chief overturned those Brady lists (named after Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, recommendations. In response to his calling attention 1963) which requires prosecutors to share exculpa- to the problem, he was investigated, and eventually, tory information with defense attorneys). He alerted transferred and passed over for promotion by two former the prosecutor to five officers who had credibility chiefs. He was finally promoted under a current chief. issues, including being accused of sexual harassment, “I took my hits for that,” he said. Source: Bernstein, 2017. WALKING THE WALK In the movie Training Day, a new recruit is “schooled” in the of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, filing false police methods of a veteran, decorated cop that included brutal- reports, assault and battery, kidnapping, and false impris- izing suspects, planting drugs, and generally committing onment. Not everyone applauded Keith Batt’s decision to crimes to catch the criminals. In a real-life version of Training testify against them. According to one fellow officer at the Day, Keith Batt earned a criminal justice degree at ­California time, “These guys are awesome cops, they never did any- State University at Sacramento and fulfilled his life’s dream thing to anybody who was innocent, just pukes, criminals, by being hired by the Oakland Police ­Department. He gradu- see? They just got a little too intense and went over the ated at the top of his recruit class and ­became an O ­ akland line.” Even residents had mixed feelings, with some arguing police officer in 1999. that it took a tough cop to police a tough street. As one Batt was assigned to Clarence Mabanag as his field resident said, “The only thing the bad people understand training officer. Almost from the first day, Batt says, he was is force.” During the ensuing scandal, Oakland paid out told to falsify offense reports and to use force on suspects. $11 million to settle civil suits from 119 victims of po- Batt did as he was told for two and a half weeks, including lice officers (including the Riders) and ended up under a hitting a suspect and lying on an offense report, because court-ordered federal consent decree. Hornung, Mabanag, he knew that he would be retaliated against if he did not. and Siapno were prosecuted between 2000 and 2005, Then he decided that he could not continue to be a police but the juries either acquitted them or were deadlocked. officer if it meant violating the law he was sworn to uphold. Vazquez is a fugitive of justice, believed to be in Mexico. He quit the Oakland force and turned in his FTO and the Batt has been honored as a courageous whistleblower who other officers to internal affairs. stood up to the “blue curtain of secrecy,” but also has been Mabanag and other officers, including Matt Hornung, vilified as a liar who feared a negative evaluation. He be- Jude Siapno, and Frank (Choker) Vazquez, were known as came a respected police officer in Pleasanton, California, the “Riders.” According to testimony, they patrolled their and received an award for “ethical courage.” But Clarence western poverty-stricken district of Oakland with an iron Mabanag is also a police officer in a different department fist and used excessive force, planted drugs, and intimi- in southern California, which hired him after the dead- dated witnesses as the means to keep the peace. Partly locked jury verdict. In February 2009, in response to their as a ­result of Keith Batt’s report, all four officers were fired appeal, an independent arbitrator ruled that the city was and charged with a range of offenses, including obstruction justified in dismissing Mabanag and Siapno. Sources: Bay City News, 2007; Institute for Law Enforcement Administration, 2008; Lee, 2004; Zamora, Lee, and van Derbeke, 2003.  183 Chapter 7  Police Corruption and Responses    There is no doubt that most police officers are honest and strive to be ethical in all they do; however, examples of corruption and graft in law enforcement agencies are not difficult to find. In this chapter, we provide a more detailed discussion of miscon- duct. For our purposes, we divide misconduct into two broad categories: economic corruption and abuse of authority. Economic corruption can be defined as the use of one’s position to obtain improper financial benefit. Abuse of authority is when the power and authority of the office is misused. First we discuss prevalence, then we pro- vide examples. Finally, individual explanations for corruption are presented, followed by organizational and societal explanations. This same order is followed when discuss- ing responses and potential solutions. A long list of commissions and task forces have investigated police corruption, including the Chicago Police Committee (in 1931), the Knapp Commission (New York City in 1972–1973), the Kolts Commission (Los Angeles County in 1992), the Mollen Commission (New York City in 1993), the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force (in 1987), the Christopher Commission (Los Angeles in 1996), the New Orleans Mayor’s Advisory Committee (in 1993), and the St. Clair Commission (Boston in 1992). Bayley and Perito (2011) analyzed 32 different commissions that investigated police corruption; 13 were in the United States. Space prohibits any ­description of corruption in other countries, but the same scandals occur world- wide. Transparency International charts perceptions of corruption and New Zealand and Scandinavian countries always rank highest. The United States is ranked below Canada and Great Britain and has a ranking of 20 of all countries in the latest report. At the bottom of the current rankings were countries such as Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Myanmar, North Korea, and Somalia (Transparency I­ nternational, 2014; 2017). Even though there is a large body of literature on police corruption, few studies have been able to measure its extent and prevalence. An obvious barrier to discovery is getting police officers to admit to wrongdoing. One early study reported that, by officers’ own accounts, 39 percent of their number engaged in illegal uses of force, 22 percent perjured themselves, 31 percent had sex on duty, 8 percent drank on duty, and 39 percent slept on duty (Barker and Carter, 1994). In a sample of narcotics offi- cers, Stevens (1999) reported that 63 percent said they had very often heard of narcot- ics officers using more force than necessary to make an arrest, 26 percent had often heard of other officers personally consuming and/or selling drugs, and 82 percent had very often heard of other narcotics officers violating the civil rights of suspects. These numbers must be interpreted carefully in that they do not mean that large numbers of officers were corrupt, only that a fairly large number of officers were aware of at least one officer’s misconduct. Fyfe and Kane (2006; also see Kane and White, 2009) studied police officers in New York City who were terminated for cause and found that only 2 percent of officers in the 22 years under study (1975–1996) were terminated for mis- conduct. This study’s findings must also be interpreted with caution since the number of officers who come to the attention of supervisors and are officially sanctioned by termination is probably quite a bit lower than the numbers who commit corrupt acts. Further, officers are sometimes terminated for rule breaking that does not fit into any category of corruption. Before one can begin to research prevalence, it would be necessary to have some shared understanding of a definition of corruption. There are many definitions and 184    Pa r t I I    Police typologies in the literature. Fyfe and Kane (2006: 37–38), for instance, reviewed the literature, and then identified a long list of types of misconduct: Profit-motivated crimes (all offenses with the goal of profit except those that are drug-related) Off-duty crimes against persons (all assaultive, non-profit-related crimes off-duty) Off-duty public-order crimes (not including drugs, and most commonly DWI [driving while intoxicated] and disorderly conduct) Drugs (all crimes related to possession, sale, conspiracy, and failing departmental drug tests) On-duty abuse (use of excessive force, psychological abuse, or discrimination) Obstruction of justice (conspiracy, perjury, official misconduct, and all other offenses with the goal of obstructing justice) Administrative/failure to perform (violating one or more departmental rules, poli- cies, and procedures) Conduct-related probationary failures (simple failure to meet expectations) In the discussion to follow, we will offer a much simpler typology of simply eco- nomic corruption and abuse of authority. Economic Corruption Corruption has been described as “acting on opportunities, created by one’s author- ity, for personal gain at the expense of the public one is authorized to serve” (Cohen, 1986: 23). Baksheesh, a euphemism for graft, is endemic in many developing countries where officials, including law enforcement officers, expect baksheesh before doing the job they are supposed to do; alternatively, they extort money in exchange for not doing their job. “It’s just the way it is” is the explanation for why such corruption exists. Obvi- ously, the problem is not systemic in this country; however, one can find many exam- ples of police officers using their position to acquire unfair benefits. In 1973, the Knapp Commission used the terms grass eaters and meat eaters: accepting bribes, gratuities, and unsolicited protection money was the extent of the corruption engaged in by grass eaters, who were passive in their deviant practices. Meat eaters participated in shakedowns, “shopped” at burglary scenes, and engaged in more active deviant practices. The Mollen Commission, which investigated New York City Police Department corruption 20 years later (1993), concluded that meat eaters were engaged in a qualitatively different kind of corruption in more recent times. Beyond just cooperating with criminals, the corrupt cops were active criminals themselves, selling drugs, robbing drug dealers, and operating burglary rings. The In the News box on the next page illustrates that it is not only New York that has this problem. Economic corruption includes gratuities (when they conflict with law and policy), kickbacks (e.g., from towing companies), overtime schemes, misuse/appropriation of departmental property, payoffs (payment for shifts, promotions, or other benefits), ticket “fixing,” bribery/extortion (shakedowns of storeowners or protection money to drug dealers), and theft from burglary scenes or from drug raids. The more seri- ous acts in this list are also crimes. An important distinction should be made between  185 Chapter 7  Police Corruption and Responses    In the NEWS “Meat Eaters” in the News News accounts in 2017 described how a rogue team of the officers eating marijuana edibles from the shop and East Cleveland police officers committed perjury and taking other products. One officer was charged with van- planted evidence. They also stole from and robbed drug dalism and petty theft, and he was fired but the city’s per- dealers, manufacturing evidence to justify raids and turn- sonnel board reduced his punishment to a seven-week ing in only some of the money seized. They were secretly re- suspension and a transfer from the special enforcement corded “shaking down” a dealer who was working with the team to the patrol division. Other officers involved in the FBI for $3,000. Three of the former officers are in prison. raid were also fired and are appealing to the city’s per- Dozens of people have had their convictions overturned or sonnel board. charges dropped because of the actions of the officers. In Houston, an officer who had been applauded as In Santa Ana, California, a police officer was fired (but an “officer of the year” was caught on video illegally sell- got his job back in an arbitration hearing) after a secret ing assault rifles and sensitive information to undercover video went viral on YouTube.com that showed the officer informants who posed as drug dealers. Allegedly he has and several other officers during a 2015 raid of Sky High been secretly working for a drug cartel since 2006, provid- Holistic, a marijuana dispensary. The video showed the ing them with firearms, bulletproof vests, luxury vehicles, officers smashing security cameras; however, they didn’t police scanners, and database access. His nephew was a see the hidden camera. The hidden camera recorded member of the cartel and provided evidence against him. Sources: Emett, 2016; Gerda, 2017; Schuppe, 2017. crimes and ethical transgressions. It is an insult to law enforcement officers when certain actions, such as stealing from a burglary scene or taking money from a drug dealer to guard a shipment of drugs, are discussed as if they were ethical dilemmas in the same category as whether to avoid responding to a minor traffic accident or whether an officer should call in sick so he can go fishing. Stealing from a burglary scene and conspiring to protect drug dealers are crimes. The officers who engage in such acts are criminals who are quite distinct from officers who commit ethical lapses akin to other workers. Gratuities Gratuities are items of value received by an individual because of his or her role or gratuities Items position rather than because of a personal relationship with the giver. The widespread of value received by practices of free coffee in convenience stores, half-price or free meals in restaurants, an individual because of his or her role or and half-price dry cleaning are examples of gratuities. Frequently, businesspeople offer position rather than gratuities as a token of sincere appreciation for the police officers’ work. Although because of a personal the formal code of ethics prohibits accepting gratuities, many officers believe there is relationship with the nothing wrong with them, seeing gratuities as small rewards for the difficulties they giver. endure in police work. Justifications for gratuities include the idea that some businesses need (and should pay for) extra protection; that they are no different than the perks of other occupa- tions; that they compensate for poor pay; and that they cement community relations, for example, when the officer stays and drinks coffee with the storeowner (Kania, 1988; Prenzler, 1995). Research indicates that people do not support gratuities, but do not think they are very serious either, especially when the items were infrequent, food, or inexpensive 186    Pa r t I I    Police (Lord and Bjerregaard, 2003; Prenzler, 1995). Critics of gratuities argue that they “erode public confidence in law enforcement and undermine our quest for professionalism” (Stefanic, 1981: 63). Cohen (1986) believes that gratuities violate the social contract because citizens give up their liberty to exploit only to be exploited. Critics (Coleman, 2004a, 2004b; Ruiz and Bono, 2004) argue against gratuities for the following reasons: Police are professionals, and professionals don’t take gratuities. Gratuities are incipient corruptors because people expect different treatment in return. Gratuities are an abuse of authority and create a sense of entitlement. Gratuities add up to substantial amounts of money and can constitute as high as 30 percent of an officer’s income. Gratuities can be the beginning of more serious forms of corruption. Gratuities are contrary to democratic ideals because they are a type of fee-for-­ service for public functions that are already paid for through taxes, such as police protection. Gratuities create a public perception that police are corrupt. Kania (1988, 2004) argues that only when either or both the giver and taker (offi- cer) have impure intent are gratuities wrong. For instance, it would be an unethical exchange if the intent of the giver was to give in exchange for some future service, not as reward for past services rendered. In Kania’s scheme, ethical exchanges are only when true rewards or gifts with no expectation of future acts are offered and received with no expectations. Where should one draw the line between harmless rewards and inappropriate gifts? Is a discount on a meal okay, but not a free meal? Is a meal okay, but not any other item, such as groceries or tires or car stereos? Do the store or restaurant owners expect anything for their money, such as more frequent patrols or overlooking sales of alcohol to underage juveniles? Should they expect different treatment from officers than the treatment given to those who do not offer gratuities? Suppose that an officer is told by a convenience store owner that she can help herself to anything in the store— free coffee, candy, cigarettes, chips, magazines, and the like. In the same conversation, the store owner asks the officer for her personal cellphone number “in case something happens and I need to get in contact with you.” Is this a gift, or is it an exchange? Should the officer accept the free merchandise? Many merchants give free or discount food to officers because they like to have police around, especially late at night. The question then becomes the one asked fre- quently by citizens: Why are two or three police cars always at a certain restaurant? Police argue that they deserve to take their breaks wherever they want within their patrol area. If it happens that they choose the same place, that shouldn’t be a con- cern of the public. However, an impression of unequal protection occurs when officers make a habit of eating at certain restaurants or congregating at certain convenience stores. Free meals or even coffee may influence the pattern of police patrol and, thus, may be wrong because some citizens are not receiving equal protection. “The blue discount suit,” according to Ruiz and Bono (2004), was a term that indi- cated how officers felt about gratuities, explaining how officers expected merchants to extend free merchandise with the saying, “If you got no pop, you got no cop.” Officers  187 Chapter 7  Police Corruption and Responses    Ethical Dilemma You are a police officer who, after eating at a new restau- and make judgments that affect store owners and other rant, is told that the meal is “on the house.” You did not go gift givers. This may explain why some think it is wrong to that restaurant knowing the owner gave free meals to for police to accept gifts or favors. It also explains why so police officers. Should you accept the offer? many other people do not see anything wrong with some Law types of gratuities, for police officers in most situations are While bribery laws punish taking or receiving something not making decisions that affect the giver and, instead, of value in return for a specific act of omission or com- are simply providing a service, such as responding to a mission related to one’s office, conflict-of-interest laws burglary or disturbance call. punish merely taking something of value prohibited by Ethical formalism would indicate that we must be com- the law when one holds a public office, with no neces- fortable with a universal law allowing all businesses to give sity to show that a specific vote or decision was directly all police officers certain favors or gratuities, such as free influenced by receipt of the valued items or services. meals, free merchandise, or special consideration. How- Conflict-of-interest laws recognize the reality that public ever, such a blanket endorsement of this behavior would official’s discretion is compromised after receiving things probably not be desirable. The second principle of ethi- of value from stakeholders, even if there is no way to prove cal formalism indicates that each should treat every other a direct connection. In Skilling v. U.S. 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2010, with respect as an individual and not as a means to an the Supreme Court invalidated a federal “honest services” end. In this regard, we would have to condemn gratuities law as being unconstitutionally vague. The law (18 U.S.C. in cases where the giver or receiver had improper motives Sec. 1346) made it a crime to deprive someone of honest according to Kania’s typology. This also explains why some services. The federal prosecutor did not have to prove a gifts seem acceptable. When something is given freely and specific bribe or kickback, but only that there was some accepted without strings, there is no “using” of others; loss of honest services from the suspect to their clients or therefore, it might be considered an innocent, honorable fiduciaries (because of private dealing or conflict of inter- act by both parties. est). Even if state conflict-of-interest laws could withstand If utilitarian ethics were used, one would have to weigh a similar legal challenge, such laws would probably not the relative good or utility of the interaction. On one hand, apply to a free meal anyway because the value is too low harmless gratuities may create good feelings in the com- to assume any influence. munity toward the officers and among the officers toward the community (Kania’s “cementing the bonds” argument). Policy On the other hand, gratuities often lead to perceptions of Many departments have policies against gratuities while unfairness by shopkeepers who feel they are being taken others specify some nominal value of goods that may be advantage of, or those who feel they are not receiving the received. Gratuity policies are often the most ignored of all appropriate police protection because they don’t give gra- policies and considered to be hypocritical by the rank and tuities, by police who think they deserve rewards and don’t file since the administration often solicits goods from the get them, and so on. Thus, the overall negative results of same type of vendors that might offer gratuities to individ- gratuities, even “harmless” ones, might lead a utilitarian to ual officers. Policies that are not enforced and prevalently conclude that gratuities are unethical. ignored are problematic in the organization. The ethics of virtue would be concerned with the indi- Ethics vidual qualities or virtues of the officer. A virtuous officer Professional ethics discourages gifts or gratuities when the could take free coffee and not let it affect his or her judg- profession involves discretionary judgments about a clien- ment. However, if the officer does not possess virtues, tele (i.e., judges, professors, appraisers, and inspectors). such as honesty, integrity, and fairness, even free coffee Whether gifts are unethical relates to whether one’s occu- may lead to special treatment. Further, nonvirtuous officers pation or profession involves judgments that affect the gift would seek out gifts and gratuities and abuse their author- givers. The police obviously have discretionary authority ity by pursuing them. 188    Pa r t I I    Police bring up the seeming hypocrisy of a departmental prohibition against individual offi- cers accepting gratuities, yet at the same time there may be an administrative policy of actively soliciting and receiving donations from merchants for departmental events, such as pastries, coffee, or more expensive catering items. MacIntyre and Prenzler (1999) found that most officers would not write a ticket to someone who had given them gratuities. Another study found that gratuities influ- enced police patrol coverage (DeLeon-Granados and Wells, 1998). More research is needed to see if these findings would be replicated. Graft Graft exploitation Graft is the exploitation of one’s role by accepting bribes or protection money. Graft of one’s role for illegal also occurs when officers receive kickbacks from tow truck drivers, defense attorneys, financial benefit, e.g., or bail bond companies for recommending them. In Klockars, Ivkovic, and Haberfeld’s bribes or protection (2004) international comparison of officers’ views regarding hypotheticals drawn to money illustrate various forms of corruption, officers in the United States rated bribery as the second most serious offense. Only theft from a crime scene was rated as more serious. Examples of graft involve a range of seriousness from “cheating a little” on over- time to sophisticated schemes that utilize police powers for private gain. For instance, a former Savannah-Chatham police chief was convicted for running interference for a gambling operation for 10 years, earning payoffs to protect it (Skutch, 2014). Other schemes in the news involved officers getting kickbacks for calling certain tow-truck companies and receiving money and goods for illegally using police computers to run background investigations (CNN.com, 2011; Guilfoil, 2010; Saltzman, 2010). Abuse of Authority Abuse of authority involves officers’ misuse of the power and authority inherent in their positions. The most serious abuse of authority is when officers use their legal power to use force against individuals without just cause as described in the In the News box. Barker and Carter (1994) and Fyfe and Kane (2006) discuss police abuse of author- ity that can be summarized as follows: Physical abuse—excessive force, physical harassment, and retaliatory brutality Psychological abuse—disrespect, harassment, ridicule, excessive stops, intimida- tion, and deception in interrogation Legal abuse—unlawful searches or seizures, manufacturing evidence, perjury, planting evidence, and hiding exculpatory evidence Professional Courtesy and Ticket Fixing One practice not included in the typologies above is called “professional courtesy,” which refers to the practice of not ticketing an officer who is stopped for speeding or for other driving violations. Obviously, officers do not ticket everyone they stop. They often give warnings instead, and that is a legitimate use of their discretion. Whether to ticket or give a warning should depend on objective criteria, such as the seriousness  189 Chapter 7  Police Corruption and Responses    In the NEWS Abuse of Authority? Two cases in New York involve potential abuses of power. from the hydrant and Baker did not resist the detectives In the first case, two NYPD police detectives were charged before he was beaten. The detectives opted for a bench with felony and misdemeanor assault, and perjury ­because trial without a jury and were acquitted in 2017. Baker has of beating Karim Baker, 26, a uniformed postal worker in filed a $100 million lawsuit against the city. October of 2016. Baker said he had been ­harassed since In another case, a cellphone recording shows that a 2014, when he gave street directions to the man who am- mail carrier was almost hit by a car driven by plainclothes bushed and killed NYPD officers Wenjian Liu and Rafael officers as he was delivering a package. He yelled at the Ramos before killing himself. He said he has been stopped car and the car backed up and the officers jumped out approximately 20 times over 10 months. The ­detectives and challenged Gray. After some words were exchanged, stopped their car and approached him sitting in his car Gray was handcuffed and placed in an unmarked car after he had finished his shift. They asked to see identifica- without a seatbelt. The officers left Gray’s postal vehicle tion and told him he was parked too close to a fire hydrant. unattended and double-parked. Then the officers rear- Mr. Baker tried to call 911, but the officers began hitting ended a vehicle on the way to the precinct and Gray was him and dragged him from the vehicle. He was charged injured in the impact. Gray spent four hours at the station with resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and criminal pos- and then was issued a summons for disorderly conduct. session of a controlled substance. Mr. Baker sustained spi- Ironically, Gray’s wife is a police officer. A lieutenant who nal fractures and a knee injury. A grand jury indicted the was the highest ranking officer of the four was placed on officers after they watched the surveillance video from a administrative duty in April of 2016. The Postal Service’s business across the street from the arrest that contradicted office of inspector general is investigating whether any the detectives’ account. The vehicle was more than 15 feet federal laws were violated. Sources: Bellafante, 2016; Carrega, Parascandola, and Greene, 2017; Southall 2016a, 2016b. of the violation. If the officer would let another person go with a warning in the same situation, there is no ethical issue in giving a warning to a fellow officer. However, if every other person would have received a ticket, but the officer did not issue one only because the motorist was a fellow officer, that is a violation of the code of ethics (“enforce the law... without fear or favor”). It is a violation of deontological univer- salism as well as utilitarianism. Under deontological ethics, it is the officer’s duty to enforce the law against everyone, including officers. Under utilitarianism, the fact that the speeding officer can cause an accident means that the utility for society is greater if the ticket is issued, for it might make the officer slow down, and by doing that, acci- dents can be avoided. Justifications for not ticketing other officers are diverse and creative. For instance, some honest justifications are purely egoistic: “If I do it for him, he will do it for me one day.” Other justifications are under the guise of utilitarianism: “It’s best for all of us not to get tickets, and the public isn’t hurt because we’re trained to drive faster.” One troubling aspect of professional courtesy for traffic offenses is that the practice tends to bleed over into other forms of misconduct. Officers who are stopped for driving while intoxicated are sometimes driven home rather than arrested, but this application of discretion is less likely to be afforded to any other citizen. In some cases of domestic violence, victims of police officer husbands or boyfriends describe how the responding officers do nothing or take their complaints more lightly than they would if the alleged perpetrator was not a police officer. 190    Pa r t I I    Police The idea that officers are above the law is insidious. Officers who believe that they should not have to follow the same laws they enforce against others may be more prone to other forms of abuse of authority as well. It should also be noted that many officers think that they are held to a higher standard of behavior than the public. Offi- cers point out that a domestic violence, DUI, or any other arrest may cost them their job. The argument against this position is that other jobs also are at risk if one receives a DUI (bus drivers, train conductors, pilots), and, perhaps, one who has taken an oath to uphold the law, but engages in unlawful behavior should not have the job. One step more serious than not ticketing an officer (or anyone) solely for prefer- ential reasons is “fixing” a ticket that has already been written. The reason is that such acts could be considered and charged as “tampering with official documents.” A major ticket-fixing scandal in New York City involved a widespread practice in one precinct of “fixing” tickets for friends and family. A former lieutenant was fired and convicted of obstruction for tipping the officers to the investigation. The Bronx district attorney’s office estimated that ticket-fixing cost the city more than $1 million in ticket revenue (Hu, 2014). On-Duty Use of Drugs and Alcohol Carter (1999) discussed the extent of on-duty drug use, citing previous research that found up to 20 percent of officers in one city used marijuana and other drugs while on duty. That seems to be a high figure; in other surveys, about 8 percent of employees reported drug use and only 3 percent of all workers in a “protective services” category reported drug use. In a more recent survey, protective service employees were the least likely to report any drug use (Mieczkowski, 2002). The sources are not exactly compa- rable and all are dated, but we have no current information about prevalence. Certain circumstances are present in law enforcement that, perhaps, create more opportunities for drug use. Elements of police work (especially undercover work) that can lead to drug use include exposure to a criminal element, relative freedom from supervision, and uncontrolled availability of contraband. Drug use by officers cre- ates the potential for even more serious misbehavior, such as stealing evidence, being blackmailed to perform other unethical or illegal actions, and being tempted to steal from drug users instead of arresting them. This, of course, is in addition to the obvious problem of compromising one’s decision-making abilities by being under the influence of any drug while on duty. In a study of drug use, it was found that officers used drugs to relieve stress and for social reasons. No predictors emerged as to which officers were more likely to be drug users. The study results also noted other crimes that were associated with drug use, including giving drugs to others, providing confidential information to suppliers and theft (Gorta, 2008). The use of drug tests during the hiring process is longstanding, but periodic and/or random drug testing of employed officers is a more recent policy. Generally, courts have upheld the right of law enforcement agencies to employ drug testing, applying the balancing test between a compelling governmental interest and indi- vidual privacy rights. Officers have some due process rights, however, and they must be notified of the policies and procedures involved in the agency’s drug testing, have access to the findings, and have available some sort of appeal process before sanctions are taken (Mieczkowski, 2002). In Fyfe and Kane’s (2006) study of police  191 Chapter 7  Police Corruption and Responses    officers terminated for cause in New York City, the most common reason for termi- nation was a failed drug test. Alcohol use is more socially acceptable than drug use, and it has also been cited as a problem. In one survey, it was found that about 8 percent of those in protective services occupations (which include police officers) reported heavy alcohol use. This compared to 12 percent of construction workers and 4 percent of sales workers (Mieczkowski, 2002). Barker and Carter (1994) indicated that 8 percent of officers reported drinking alcohol on duty. The problem of drinking on duty does not involve the vulnerability to blackmail that drug use does, but there are obvious problems, and officers who are aware of another’s on-duty intoxication are faced with an ethical dilemma of whether to take official action. Officers may choose to informally isolate themselves from drinking officers by refusing to partner with them or avoid working calls with them. Sexual Misconduct It is a sad reality that a few police officers use their position of authority to extort sex from female citizens (there doesn’t seem to be the parallel situation of female police officers extorting sex from male victims). Egregious cases in the United States include rapes by officers on duty, and by jailers in police lockups, and a few instances where the sexual misconduct of police officers was widespread and protected by departmental supervisors (McGurrin and Kappeler, 2002). The Cato Institute sponsors the National Police Misconduct Reporting Project, which acts as a clearinghouse for misconduct reports across the nation. It was reported that 9.3 percent of all civilian complaints on police involved sexual misconduct, the second most common form of misconduct after excessive use of force (Packman, 2011). In the NEWS Police Predators In Pasco, Washington, former officer Richard Aguirre had or take her underwear; a Charlotte-Mecklenburg, N.C. relationships with underage girls and used other officers’ officer went to prison for pressuring a half-dozen women names to access a law enforcement database to look up for sex during traffic stops; a school resource officer in the addresses of women and young girls, and the boy- Atlanta molested a 12-year-old developmentally disabled friends of his former lovers; none of the searches had girl as he drove her around town after school one day and anything to do with any official investigation. In 2014, was sentenced to 20 years in prison; a New Mexico offi- he was arrested for sexually assaulting a woman in his cer was sentenced to 9 years in prison for assaulting a home. When he was forced to submit a sample of DNA, it high school intern; a Georgia deputy was sentenced to matched a 1986 murder of a sex worker near Spokane. 25 years in prison after he falsely accused and arrested a In San Diego, Christopher Hayes was fired and received bar waitress, who spoke little English, and took her to his a felony conviction for forcing women to perform sex acts. apartment where he raped and beat her. Also in San Diego, former officer Anthony Arevalos was Finally, Daniel Holtzclaw, a former Oklahoma City offi- convicted in 2011 of extorting sex acts from women and cer, forced at least 12 black women to perform oral sex is serving eight years in prison. during traffic stops and raped others in their homes. In a In other cases, a Texas officer told a motorist she highly publicized trial he was found guilty and sentenced could drive off without a ticket if she let him lick her feet to over 200 years in prison. His case is on appeal. Source: Davis, 2014; King, 2015; KUSA, 2016; Spina, 2015. 192    Pa r t I I    Police Stinson, Brewer, and Mathna (2015) analyzed 771 sex-related arrest cases from 2005 to 2008 of 555 sworn officers at 449 nonfederal law enforcement agencies in 44 states. Less than 1 percent of the offending officers were female; most were patrol officers. The modal time in service was one to five years. On-duty and off-duty offenses were about equally divided. A majority (70 percent) of the victims were minors (under 18). Most of the cases involving a child victim occurred when the officer was off duty and most of the cases involving an adult victim occurred when the officer was on duty. Forcible fondling was the most serious offense charged in most cases, followed by forc- ible rape, statutory rape, and forcible sodomy. This study and others like it show that sexual misconduct of officers is not a negligible problem and involves more serious crimes and victimization than previously believed. Kraska and Kappeler (1995) looked at a sample of 124 cases of police sexual mis- conduct and proposed a continuum of sexual invasion that ranged from some type of invasion of privacy to sexual assault. This range of behavior includes: viewing a victim’s photos or videos for prurient purposes; field or custodial strip searches; illegal detentions; services for sex; and sexual assault. Sapp’s (1994) inventory of sexual misconduct includes: nonsexual contacts that are sexually motivated (nonvalid traffic stops); voyeurism; inap- propriate contact with crime victims; and sexual demands of suspects or offenders. Prostitutes, homeless, and minority women are populations that are extremely vul- nerable to sexual extortion by police officers, because people tend not to believe them. But women who have been subject to intimidation and outright assault come from all social classes. Officers argue that, if sex occurred, it was consensual. The problem is that when officers acting in their official capacity meet women (as victims, witnesses, defendants, or suspects), the power differential makes consent extremely problematic. When a rapist is a police officer, victims feel completely powerless. Michael Ragusa, a former officer, is serving a 10-year sentence for sexually assaulting three women. One of his victims moved out of the county, unable to shake her fear every time she saw a man in uniform (Merchant and Sedensky, 2015). There is a troubling pattern whereby police officers accused of serious sexual misconduct have charges dropped or down- graded and then move and obtain law enforcement positions in other jurisdictions. (McGurrin and Kappeler, 2002; Merchant and Sedensky, 2015). Sexual harassment of fellow officers is also a problem. About three-quarters of female officers report being sexually harassed (Kraska and Kappeler, 1995; Maher, 2010). It may be that the culture of policing is particularly conducive to sexual harass- ment. It has been described as a “macho” or “locker room” culture even though women have been integrated into patrol since the early 1970s. Female officers today do not encounter the virulent harassment and hostility that was present in the 1970s when patrol forces were first integrated, but some remnants of that culture remain. For instance, female officers who pretend to be prostitutes are targeted for sexual innu- endos, jokes, and other forms of comments about their body and dress, with mixed findings as to whether this rises to sexual harassment (Dodge, Starr-Gimeno, and Williams, 2005; Maguire and Nolan, 2011; Nolan, 2001). Criminal Cops The extremely serious side of misconduct is usually associated with the drug trade and involves officers who cross over into being more criminal than cop. There have been scandals of criminal cops in every decade. In the 1980s, the “Miami River Rats”  193 Chapter 7  Police Corruption and Responses    committed armed robberies of drug deals, and at least one homicide (Dorschner, 1989; see also Rothlein, 1999). The “Buddy Boys” in New York operated almost openly in a precinct rife with lesser forms of corruption. Ultimately, 13 officers in a precinct of only a little over 200 were indicted for crimes ranging from drug use to drug sales and armed robbery (Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert, 1984/1994). In the 1990s, Michael Dowd testified to the Mollen Commission that he and other officers accepted money for protecting illegal drug operations, used drugs and alcohol while on duty, robbed crime victims and drug dealers of money and drugs, and even robbed corpses of their valuables (Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert, 1994). The Rampart scandal that exploded in the late 1990s, involving a rogue anti-gang task force, ­tarnished the reputation of LAPD for years afterward. Other scandals occurred in Indianapolis (Murray, 2009), New Orleans, Boston, and Philadelphia (Graham and Gormisky, 2010); and it continues with scandals currently unfolding in several cities across the country. These officers are a minuscule portion of the more than a million law enforcement professionals, but their actions damage the credibility of all. Costs of Corruption We have examined a range of corruption, from the arguably trivial (gratuities) to crim- inal acts that include murder. The costs to communities are considerable. First, there is the cost of lost prosecutions. Literally thousands of cases across the country have had to be dismissed because prosecutors could not trust that the evidence provided by police officers was legitimate or the officer had lost credibility as a witness in all cases because of his or her wrongdoing. Although civil lawsuits or civil rights lawsuits against errant officers are notori- ously difficult to win, many cities and police departments have faced large judgments or agreed to large settlements. By one analysis, the settlement money paid out by the 10 American cities with the largest police forces increased by 48 percent from 2010 to 2014, to nearly $250 million annually (Gass, 2015b). These lawsuits are most often claims of police brutality, traffic accident claims, or wrongful death suits due to police shootings. In some instances, the numbers represent settlements for old cases, and some cities have shown recent declines in the amounts paid out; however, no one dis- putes that these money judgments have, for the most part, increased (Gass, 2015b). Thus, ironically, residents who are the victim of police misconduct also end up paying for it through taxes. There are two ways that cities become responsible: first, if the plaintiff can show a pattern and practice, for example, lack of training, that led to the actions of the offi- cer; or, second and most common, cities routinely indemnify an officer against lawsuit judgments. What this means is that the officer is sued individually, but if he or she loses, the city will pay the judgment. Cleveland has been reported as coming up with a way around their fiscal responsibility, however, in that they refuse to indemnify the officer but city attorneys help the officer file bankruptcy. In those cases, even if the plaintiff wins, no party is responsible for the settlement (Balko, 2016). There is no way to know the total amount of money taxpayers pay across the nation in any given year because of police misconduct. Some specific localities do not even keep tallies of how much is spent in judgments or in settling lawsuits, but news reports call attention to the costs of misconduct. The amounts below are not consistent 194    Pa r t I I    Police in what they cover, for example, while some count only misconduct settlements, others may count settlements involving auto collisions; however, they give an idea of how expensive police misconduct can be for cities: Baltimore—$6.4 million settlement for the Freddy Gray case; from 2011 to 2014, $5.7 million; Boston—more than $36 million to resolve 2,000 legal claims and lawsuits against the police department between 2005 and 2015 (mostly brutality and wrongful death claims); Chicago—nearly $5.4 million just to settle three cases of misconduct in 2012– 2013; more than a half-billion dollars to resolve police brutality cases between 2004 and 2014; Cleveland—$8 million between 2003 and 2013 on claims related to police misconduct; Los Angeles—about $101 million between 2002 and 2011; Minneapolis—$14 million in payments in the previous seven years; in 95 payouts between 2006 and 2012, only eight led to officers being disciplined; New York City—in fiscal year 2013, $138 million; in fiscal year 2014, $217 mil- lion; the Eric Garner case alone was $5.9 million; $348 million to settle miscon- duct cases between 2006 and 2011 (Dardick, 2013; Gass, 2015b; Hennelly, 2015; McKinney, 2015; Wallack, Ransom, and Anderson, 2015). It is estimated that Philadelphia pays out about $10 million a year because of police abuse and misconduct. Between 2011 and 2015, officials settled more than 200 cases alleging that the cops used excessive force, and about 120 cases were ­settled on claims that police falsely arrested someone. In 2015, 184 lawsuits against police were filed. The claims are settled with funds from a city indemnity fund for legal set- tlements. City officials argue the 150 or so cases settled every year are not necessarily indicative of an officer’s wrongdoing. Each year, the police commissioner receives a report describing patterns with recommendations for policy changes. An independent researcher, however, found that there was little effort to analyze information from law- suits to reduce civil liability. This differs from Los Angeles, a city that requires the police department to describe corrective action for any claim paid over $20,000 (Allyn, 2015; Denvir, 2015). Despite the costs to the city of such lawsuits, there is no evidence to indicate that they are a deterrent to errant police officers. In fact, one study showed that there is no follow-up generally with the police officers involved. The lawsuit doesn’t appear in the officers’ personnel records, nor does anyone keep track of patterns or problem officers (Milligan, 2015). Only recently in New York has an automated system been implemented that tracks lawsuits and feeds information back to the police depart- ment for discipline or training purposes (Lewis and Veltman, 2015). In some cities, investigations for lawsuits proceed out of the city’s legal department and the police department isn’t even involved. A troubling practice was exposed in Baltimore where, when the city settles with an individual in one of these cases, there is usually a gag order imposed on the plaintiff that means that they cannot talk about what happened to them or they will lose their settlement money. This impedes the public’s ability to know how widespread police misconduct is or whether an individual officer has a his- tory of misconduct. There is no easily available source to find out how many cities utilize this practice (Craven, 2015).  195 Chapter 7  Police Corruption and Responses    Police officials sometimes don’t even know when the city settles because it is a decision made by city officials outside the police department. Police officers believe that city lawyers are too quick to settle “nuisance” claims, where the officer is not at fault; however, when such cases do go to trial, there is the risk of a much larger judg- ment (Schwartz, 2010). The important point to note though is that civil lawsuits seem to be independent from the department’s own discipline system and, rarely, is there the mechanism to take note of when officers become the target of lawsuits multiple times. Explanations of Deviance Explanations of corruption can be categorized into individual, organizational, and societal, based on the identified factors. These factors then provide an avenue for how to reduce misconduct. It is important to note at the outset that there is rarely only one factor or group of factors responsible for corruption scandals. Generally, a constella- tion of factors is present. Individual Explanations The most common explanation of police officer corruption is the rotten-apple rotten-apple ­argument—that the officer alone is deviant and that it was simply a mistake to hire argument The him or her. This argument has been extended to describe rotten bushels—groups of proposition that the officer alone is deviant officers banding together to commit deviant acts. The point of this argument is that and that it was simply nothing is wrong with the barrel, that deviance is individual, not endemic. a mistake to hire him Sherman (1982) explained that deviant officers go through what he called a “moral or her. career” as they pass through various stages of rationalization to more serious misdeeds in a graduated and systematic way. Once an individual gets past the first “moral crisis,” it becomes less difficult to rationalize new and more unethical behaviors. While it seems to be true that corrupt officers who come to the attention of authorities engage in a range of minor misconduct to serious behavior, there is no good evidence to indicate that some- thing like taking gratuities inevitably leads to more serious forms of misconduct. Many police officers have clear personal guidelines on what is acceptable and not acceptable. Police routinely deal with the seamier side of society—not only drug addicts and muggers but also middle-class people who are involved in dishonesty and corruption. The constant displays of lying, hiding, cheating, and theft create cynicism, and this, in turn, may develop into a vulnerability to temptation because officers may redefine corrupt acts as acceptable behaviors. Following are some rationales that police might easily use to justify unethical behavior (Murphy and Moran, 1981: 93): The public thinks every cop is a crook, so why try to be honest? The money is out there; if I don’t take it, someone else will. I’m only taking what’s rightfully mine; if the city paid me a decent wage, I wouldn’t have to get it on my own. I can use it because it’s for a good cause—my son needs an operation, or dental work, or tuition for medical school, or a new bicycle. Greene, Piquero, Hickman, and Lawton (2004) found that 15 characteristics were significantly related to receiving departmental discipline in the Philadelphia Police 196    Pa r t I I    Police Department, including being younger, being previously rejected for hire, experiencing military discipline, scoring low on some sections of academy training, and receiving academy discipline. Officers having six or more of these risk factors were 2.5 times more likely to receive departmental discipline (2004: iv). The research found that 22 factors were significantly related to receiving a citizen complaint of physical abuse, including being younger, receiving military discipline, having one’s driver’s license sus- pended, having ever been placed under arrest, and having had one or more deceptive polygraph results. Greene, et al. (2004) found that higher levels of cynicism predicted disciplinary actions, shootings, and other misconduct. They also found that officers who worked in districts with lower ethics scores were more likely to be involved in shootings, but no other relationships were found. Note that this study did not collect the data in a way that would allow them to match the actions and attitudes of individ- ual officers; instead they had to aggregate ethics scores by district level. Fyfe and Kane (2006; also see Kane and White, 2009) identified correlates related to termination in their study of NYPD. College-educated officers were less likely to be terminated. They found that women were more likely than male officers to be ter- minated during their probation, although male officers were more likely to be termi- nated for brutality and bribery. Black officers were also more likely to be terminated. Other groups more likely to be terminated during probation included those under 22, those who had prior negative employment histories, dishonorable discharges, and/or did poorly in the academy. Also at high risk were those with prior citizen complaints, prior criminal history, and a history of a public-order offense. Nonindividual factors included being assigned to posts with low supervision and high citizen contact. These findings must be viewed with caution, however, as they are only from one department, they utilize only official reports of misconduct, and they do not control for other vari- ables. Manning (2009) criticized Kane and White’s (2009) study because it combined misconducts like administrative rule-breaking with much more serious deviance such as lawbreaking. Criminological theories have been used to explain misconduct. Hickman, et al. (2001) found that officers with lower self-control were more likely to report fellow officers engaged in misconduct. These researchers assumed that asking respondents to estimate other officers’ misconduct could be used as a proxy for self-misconduct (this assumption may be problematic). Researchers have also concluded that social learning theory is supported; in other words, officers learn deviance from each other (Chappell and Piquero, 2004). Pogarsky and Piquero (2004) found that the threat of extra-legal and legal sanctions did potentially deter misconduct and that the trait of impulsivity tended to reduce the effect of such threats. Harris (2010a, 2010b) adds to this discussion by offering a life-course perspec- tive to officer misconduct. He used citizen complaints as a measure of misconduct, acknowledging that this is a somewhat problematic measure. He found that being female, having a higher education, and not being a minority are related to lower levels of receiving citizen complaints. Other findings were that officers tend to receive citizen complaints early in their career and there is a desistance over the course of the career; however, most officers in his sample had fewer than three complaints over their entire career. There was a group of officers who received a higher level of citizen complaints, and the number did not decline as dramatically as all other officers after the sixth year. This small group of officers (5 percent) received 20 percent of all complaints. One  197 Chapter 7  Police Corruption and Responses    explanation is that those officers with disproportionately high complaint numbers are more likely to make arrests and a high number of arrests leads to complaints, but Harris found that productivity (arrest) measures were not related to the number of cit- izen complaints. He also found that internally generated complaints were more likely to be substantiated in formal disciplinary proceedings (Harris, 2012). One emerging individual explanation for some types of police misconduct is post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Researchers have found that about 14 percent of military veterans may experience some symptoms of PTSD and other research indi- cates that between 3 and 17 percent of police officers experience these symptoms as well. As noted in an earlier chapter, many police officers are military veterans, so there is the potential that a military veteran may already have PTSD when he or she expe- riences trauma in policing. Other research indicates that 7–35 percent of all police officers display some PTSD symptoms, or what is called subclinical PTSD. Symptoms include hypervigilance, trouble sleeping, anger control issues, and flashbacks. Factors involved in developing PTSD symptoms include the following: Witnessing the death of a law enforcement officer or viewing the body at the scene, especially when the victim was a friend or partner Accidentally killing or wounding a bystander, especially if the victim is a child Failing to stop a perpetrator from injuring or killing someone Killing or wounding a child or teenager, even if the life of the officer was threatened by the person injured or killed Viewing the body of a child victim, particularly if the officer has children (espe- cially if the officer’s child is the same age and sex as the victim) Interacting with grieving family members or friends of homicide victims Feeling caught in a violent riot, especially if the officer cannot use deadly force to defend himself or herself for fear of hurting children in the mob Viewing particularly bloody or gruesome scenes Observing an event involving violence or murder, but not being able to intervene Being undercover and constantly “on guard” because of the likelihood of being hurt, killed, or discovered Being threatened by suspects who have been indicted, are being tried, or are incar- cerated (Hamidi and Koga, 2014) Research also shows that PTSD symptoms are correlated with family violence and alcohol abuse (Hamidi and Koga, 2014). More research is needed to determine if offi- cers who engage in drinking on duty, excessive force, and other forms of misconduct may also display PTSD symptoms. Organizational Explanations Various elements of the organization can breed misconduct. Recall from Chapter 4 that organizational factors that affect ethical behavior include small work-group influ- ences. Isolated work groups develop their own micro-climate that can be one that does not conform to organizational ethics. Other organizational elements include perverse incentives and a culture that does not emphasize integrity. 198    Pa r t I I    Police Small Work Groups Small work groups are exemplified by special units and narcotics task forces. There seems to be a pattern in news stories of these small work groups developing a micro-culture of unethical behavior. The most famous example of this is the ­Ramparts scandal in Los Angeles, but other examples across the country exist as well and ­scandals continue to emerge every year. In Philadelphia, patterns of misconduct (theft from drug dealers, sales of drugs, and falsifying evidence) in narcotics squads date back to the early 1980s, including the “One Squad” scandal, the “Five Squad” scandal, an unnamed scandal in the early 1990s involving five narcotics officers, and another scandal in 2000 with officers accused of using false information to get search warrants, planting evidence and committing perjury, and stealing drugs, cash, and valuables from drug dealers (Slobodzian, 2009). Most recently, a newspaper series spurred an internal investigation of a ­Philadelphia narcotics squad who were accused by Latino bodega owners of raiding their stores, turning off the security cameras, and then (allegedly) stealing money and goods from the stores. The squad was also accused of planting drugs, falsifying war- rant affidavits, and stealing from drug dealers, and one of them was accused of sex- ual assault by several women. Ultimately, the only officer punished was the one who agreed to work with investigators and prosecutors. The others either were not tried, or they were acquitted when they went to trial. Juries evidently did not believe the wit- nesses against the officers, many of whom had criminal records, despite (or perhaps because of) their vivid descriptions of being dangled over balconies, threatened with the seizure of their homes, held in hotel rooms for days, or beaten as the officers kept score on who could inflict the most debilitating injuries. The officers won back their jobs along with back pay for the years they were off the force in an arbitration hearing; however, because the district attorney continued to refuse to use the officers as witnesses, all have been reassigned to positions out- side of narcotics. Two were promoted by city officials against the police commission- er’s recommendation. Five of the acquitted officers have filed a defamation lawsuit against the district attorney, mayor and police commissioner. Their attorney argued they were a highly successful narcotics squad and the decision to refuse their cases and charge them defamed their reputation. The attorney argued that the campaign against them was a turf war over forfeited drug money (Fazlollah and Whelan, 2015; Roebuck, 2015). Despite the acquittals, the city has settled 21 of the estimated 135 civil rights cases stemming from the officers’ actions. Also, a judge has overturned 158 convic- tions based on the officers’ testimony. It is estimated that over 500 cases have been vacated since the officers’ indictments in 2014 (Faziollah, Slobodzian, and Steele, 2012; ­Slobodzian and Fazlollah, 2015). Perverse Incentives As noted in Chapter 4, organizational incentives may encourage unethical behavior. When there is pressure to achieve a goal without a corresponding message that ethical means are just as important, organizational actors are tempted to take shortcuts. The best example of how good practices can result in bad outcomes is the Compstat pro- gram, a computerized crime-counting method that emphasizes accountability of mid- dle managers. William Bratton is credited with beginning the program in New York  199 Chapter 7  Police Corruption and Responses    City. He also brought it with him to Los Angeles in 2002 when he took over as police chief of Los Angeles. Back in New York, the program continued but became the center of a scandal when it was alleged that some precincts were routinely downgrading crime reports, even calling victims to encourage or coerce them to withdraw the report or change the facts. Adrian Schoolcraft, an officer in the 81st precinct, first reported the prac- tice to the Quality Assurance division of the NYPD with examples of victims whose crimes were misrecorded, but nothing was done. Then he went to the media. He also had secretly recorded tapes of roll calls where supervisors urged the officers to make arrests, regardless of whether there was probable cause, and employ a very aggressive style of policing in one housing project, telling officers to make the arrest and think of a reason later. After the news broke, Schoolcraft was retaliated against and even, at one point, under the orders of high-level police supervisors, was forcibly taken to a men- tal ward in a Queens hospital, supposedly because he left work early the day before and was not answering his phone. It took him six days to obtain his release. School- craft was suspended from the NYPD and now lives in upstate New York. He filed a $50 million lawsuit against the NYPD, the city, and the hospital. In 2015, the suit against the city and police department was settled for $600,000 exclusive of back pay and benefits (S. Brown, 2015; Goodman, 2015). In 2012, a report by the NYPD Q ­ uality Assurance Division supported Schoolcraft’s claims (Parascandola, 2012). Academic research also supported the allegations that midlevel managers felt great pressure and crime reports were routinely downgraded in NYPD (Eterno, Verma, and ­Silverman, 2014). More recently, there has been at least one news report of 19 officers being charged with downgrading crime reports, identified by the NYPD’s own quality assur- ance program after an anonymous tip (Baker, 2015a). Arguably, Compstat can be an effective tool for improving the accountability of middle managers and ultimately improve police services for the community, or it can create pressure for “making the numbers” that causes police to downgrade serious crime reports and increase stops and arrests. An interesting new twist on Compstat is using the same principle to track procedural justice. In a recent news article, an innovative way to measure how residents feel about NYPD will use technology that accesses cellphones, requests the reader to go to the survey, and geocodes the loca- tion. Responses cover how they feel about the NYPD and satisfaction scores will be evaluated based on districts, evidently in a similar way that crime statistics was used in Compstat. Some express concern about privacy even though the NYPD won’t have individual phone numbers and individuals will be volunteering to fill out the survey (Baker, 2017a). Organizational Culture Both the formal culture and the informal culture may generate deviance. Crank and Caldero’s (2000, 2005) “noble-cause” explanation of some types of deviance (described more fully in Chapter 5) is an organizational explanation of corruption although it focuses on the subculture of policing. Gilmartin and Harris (1998) also have discussed why some officers become com- promised and argue that it is because the law enforcement organization does not adequately train them to understand and respond to the ethical dilemmas they will face. They coined the term continuum of compromise to illustrate what happens to the 200    Pa r t I I    Police officer. The first element is a “perceived sense of victimization,” that refers to what hap- pens when officers enter the profession with naïve ideas about what the job will be like. Citizen disrespect, bureaucratic barriers, and the justice system’s realities sometimes make officers cynical, with a feeling that no one cares and that they are needlessly exposed to danger. Cynicism leads to distrust of the administration and the citizenry. At that point, the officer is alienated and more prone to corruption. Gilmartin and Harris also talk about the officers’ sense of entitlement and how that can lead to cor- ruption. There is a sense that the rules don’t apply to them because they are different from the citizenry they police. This leads to the “blue curtain of secrecy,” discussed more fully in Chapter 5, when officers believe it is more ethical to cover up for other cops than it is to tell the truth. Crank (1998: 187) and others have noted that there is a pervasive sense among rank-and-file police that administrators are not to be trusted: “Officers protect each other, not only against the public, but against police administrators frequently seen to be capricious and out of touch.” The classic work in this regard is Reuss-Ianni’s (1983) study of a New York City precinct in the late 1970s. She described the “two cultures” of policing—street cops and management cops. She observed that law enforcement man- agers were classic bureaucrats who made decisions based on modern management principles. This contrasted with the street-cop subculture, which still had remnants of quasi-familial relationships in which “loyalties and commitments took precedence over the rule book” (1983: 4). The result of this conflict between the two value sys- tems was alienation of the street cop. Despite the gulf between management and line staff, most agree that employee behavior is influenced directly by the behavior of supe- riors. One might note that most large-scale police corruption that has been exposed has implicated very high-level officials. Alternatively, police departments that have remained relatively free of corruption have administrators who practice ethical behav- ior on a day-to-day basis. Research reveals that close supervision, especially by midlevel managers such as sergeants, reduces the use of force and incidents of misconduct by officers (Walker, 2007). Huberts, Kaptein, and Lasthuizen (2007) obtained measures of corruption (or what they called integrity violations) by asking officers to report what they knew was happening. The independent variable was leadership style. Findings indicated that role modeling was significant in limiting unethical conduct of an interpersonal nature (sex- ual harassment, discrimination, and bullying), while strictness in supervision seemed to be more important in controlling the misuse of resources, fraud, and other forms of financial corruption. A third component of leadership was described as openness and referred to leaders encouraging subordinates to talk to them about ethical dilemmas. This was associated with fewer violations in several areas, especially in favoritism and discrimination. Interestingly, this study of more than 6,000 police officers found that strictness had no effect on reducing the gratuitous use of violence, but that role mod- eling and openness did. As discussed in previous chapters, the concept of organizational justice has been advanced by the pioneering work of Tom Tyler (1990) who distinguished procedural justice (whether people feel the process is fair) and outcome justice (whether they think the decision is fair). There has been a growing body of literature that explores how these concepts affect citizenry and employees (for instance, Tyler and Huo, 2002; Tyler and Wakslak, 2004). De Angelis and Kupchik (2007) found that officers’  201 Chapter 7  Police Corruption and Responses    satisfaction with the discipline system was more influenced by procedural justice ele- ments (perceptions of fairness in the process) than outcome. Wolfe and Piquero (2011) found that police officers’ beliefs about organizational justice were associated with the likelihood of ethical misconduct. Those who believed their organization was fair were less likely to engage in the code of silence or believe in noble-cause corruption. Per- ceptions of organizational justice have been associated with feelings of self-legitimacy and identification with the organization, less cynicism, and favorable perceptions of community policing (Nix and Wolfe, 2015). Further, researchers found lower levels of police misconduct among those who more strongly agreed that the organization was just (Reynolds, 2015). All research indicates that to ensure ethical employees, the organization must treat workers ethically. The police organization is no different from other organizations in this regard. Societal Explanations Murphy and Caplan (1989) argue that lax community standards over certain types of behavior (gambling, prostitution) and lack of support from prosecutors and the courts (or corruption at that stage of the system) lead to police corruption. Police hear mixed messages from the public regarding certain types of crime. They are asked to enforce laws against gambling, pornography, and prostitution, but not too stringently. They are expected not only to enforce laws against drunk driving but also to be tolerant of individuals who aren’t really “criminal.” They are expected to uphold laws regarding assault unless it is a family or interpersonal dispute that the disputants want to settle privately. In other words, we want the police to enforce the law unless they enforce it against us. Also, rationalizations used by some police when they take bribes or protec- tion money from prostitutes or drug dealers are made easier by the public’s tolerant stance toward certain areas of vice; for example, to accept protection money from a prostitute may be rationalized by the relative lack of concern that the public shows for this type of law breaking. We also ask the police to take care of social problems, such as the homeless, even if they must step outside the law to do so. Extra-legal means are acceptable if they are not used against us. Citizens who want police to move the transients out of a park or get the crack dealers off the corner aren’t concerned with the fact that the police might not have the legal authority to do so. If a little “informal” justice is needed to accomplish the task, that is fine with some people, if it is used against those we don’t like. When we accept and encourage such extra-legal power in some situations, we shouldn’t be surprised when it is used in other situations as well. The police role as enforcer in a pluralistic society is problematic. The justification for police power is that police represent the public: “The police officer can only validly use coercive force when he or she in fact represents the body politic” (Malloy, 1982: 12). But if the police do not represent all groups, their authority is oppressive. Police take their cue from the community they serve. If they serve a community that emphasizes crime control over individual rights or other public service, we will see the results of that message in the way laws are enforced. The point is that, to a large degree, the community creates the police department by what it demands and what it is willing to overlook. 202    Pa r t I I    Police Reducing Police Corruption Comprehensive lists of suggestions to reduce police misconduct and corruption have been proposed (Carter, 1999; Malloy, 1982; Metz, 1990; Prenzler and Ransley, 2002; Wood, 1997). Some date back decades but that doesn’t mean they have been imple- mented. Such lists include the following: Increase the salary of police Eliminate unenforceable laws Establish civilian review boards Improve training in ethics (including specific training for supervisors) Set realistic goals and objectives for the department Provide ethical leadership Perform audits (of resources and funds paid to informants) Have financial disclosure rules Provide a written code of ethics Provide a whistleblowing procedure that ensures fair treatment Improve internal affairs units Rotate staff in some positions Have better evidence handling procedures Employ early warning systems Use video cameras in patrol cars Use covert high technology surveillance Employ targeted and randomized integrity testing Conduct surveys of police and the public Decriminalize vice crimes Note that most of these suggestions target administrative changes rather than identify- ing the individual officer as the problem. In more recent years, body cameras, requir- ing police to carry their own insurance, docking pensions for misconduct, and other suggestions have been offered to reduce the costs of misconduct. In the next sections, we take a closer look at some of these means to reduce corruption and improve the ethical climate of police agencies. “Rotten Apple” Responses “Rotten apple” approaches to reducing misconduct focus on the individual officer. There is an assumption that, if an officer or officers are found to be deviant, the wrong person was hired or there needs to be better training, or better monitoring/discipline. Improving Screening Background checks, interviews, credit checks, polygraphs, drug tests, and other screening tools are used to eliminate inappropriate individuals from the pool of poten- tial hires. The extent of screening varies from department to department, but generally  203 Chapter 7  Police Corruption and Responses    has become more sophisticated, especially in the use of psychological testing and interviews. Sanders (2008) argues that the process is more “weeding out” than select- ing in those candidates best suited to policing and points out that it is hard to develop tools to identify traits that are associated with successful police performance when, in fact, there is no consensus on what makes a good police officer. Most research on the effectiveness of screening tools utilizes academy test scores or firings as the measure of good (or failed) performance. The most common pre-employment screening tool that is used by law enforce- ment agencies is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI or its subsequent versions) (Arrigo and Claussen, 2003; Dantzker and McCoy, 2006). The Inwald Personality Inventory (IPI) was developed to measure personality characteris- tics and behavioral patterns specific to fitness for law enforcement. Researchers have found that the IPI more accurately identifies individuals who are unsuccessful in law enforcement (terminated) (cited in Arrigo and Claussen, 2003). The so-called Big Five (extroversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness) have been the target of enough studies to indicate that they are reliable measures of personality and, of those, conscientiousness seems to be the most relevant to job performance; however, there has been very little research done to determine if the trait accurately measures police performance success (Arrigo and Claussen, 2003; ­Claussen-Rogers and Arrigo, 2005; Sanders, 2008). Education and Training Education has been promoted as a necessary element to improve the ethics of policing and research does show that educated officers were less likely to be terminated from NYPD (Fyfe and Kane, 2006). However, many of the unethical officers described in this book have been college graduates. Ethics training in the academy, and in in-service courses, is common and is rec- ommended for all police departments today. Reuss-Ianni (1983) described how, after the Knapp Commission uncovered wide-ranging corruption in the New York Police Department, ethical awareness workshops were begun. Unfortunately, they have not stopped the periodic corruption scandals that have occurred since that time. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (2008) found that about 80 percent of responding agencies said they committed resources to ethics instruction, although most courses simply employed lectures and were four hours or less. The major recommendations of the IACP based on this study were to provide job-specific training on ethics and to differentiate training for recruits, in-service, and manage- ment, as well as other units. Another recommendation was that ethics training begin with recruits and be an integral part of the departments’ structure and policies. The IACP also rec- QUOTE & Q U E R Y ommended enhancing content and using appropriate learn- Would you stop your partner from getting shot if ing styles. A final recommendation was that departments you could? Why wouldn’t you stop your partner concentrate more on ethics training for field-training officers from being fired if you could? (IACP, 2008). (An instructor in the EPIC training program) Recall from Chapter 4 that New Orleans and ­Springfield, Source: Robertson, 2016a. Massachusetts are piloting “Ethical Policing is Courageous” Is the EPIC training a viable response to (EPIC). This unique and innovative training takes the the “blue curtain of secrecy”? approach that officers should help other officers stay out of 204    Pa r t I I    Police trouble and that intervening when another officer is about to commit misconduct is not “snitching” but, rather, may save a career (Robertson, 2016a). Various models of ethics training exist but there is not enough data to understand the most effective approaches. Moran (2005) described several models of police ethics training, including a view of ethics as a “shield” to protect officers from trouble, as a programmed element in the officer’s training “hardwire,” as a mission or crusade, or as a “command from on high,” along with the sanctions for disobeying. Conti and Nolan (2005) found that ethics training typically is structured in such a way to encourage conformity to the “traditional image and identity of police officers.” Integrity Testing integrity testing Integrity testing occurs when a police officer is placed in a position where he or she “Sting” operations to might be tempted to break a rule or a law and monitored to see what he or she will do. test whether police New York City has used integrity testing since the late 1970s, after the Knapp Com- officers will make mission exposed widespread corruption. Field associates were recruited straight from honest choices. academies to investigate suspected officers (Reuss-Ianni, 1983: 80). Integrity testing is like undercover work in that unsuspecting officers are tempted with an opportunity to commit an illegal or corrupt act, such as keeping a found wallet or being offered a bribe (Marx, 1991). Most police officers have highly negative attitudes about integrity testing. Spokes- men argue that “testing raises serious issues regarding privacy, deception, entrapment, provocation, and the legal rights of individuals” (Prenzler and Ronken, 2001a: ­323–324).