Chad:Libya Confict (Resolved) .pdf

Africa Chad/Libya Con ct (Resolved) Behavior Decisions fi fi fi Many of the major decisions and implementing acts by the two principal adversaries in this 23-year African sub-system, interstate con ct (1971– 1994) were inter-linked in a direct cause–effect relationship, mostly Chad’s reaction to Lib...

Africa Chad/Libya Con ct (Resolved) Behavior Decisions fi fi fi Many of the major decisions and implementing acts by the two principal adversaries in this 23-year African sub-system, interstate con ct (1971– 1994) were inter-linked in a direct cause–effect relationship, mostly Chad’s reaction to Libya’s hostile initiatives. Thus, their decisions will be presented together, noting the linkage wherever relevant. The onset of this con ct, in 1971, was triggered by Libya’s frst strategic decision—to support an attempted coup by the pro-Libya Front Liberation Nationale de Tchad (FROLINAT) to overthrow Chad President Tombalbaye. The decision (precise date unknown) was made by a group of young Libyan military offcers, headed by Col. Muammar Gadhaf, sometime after they had seized power in Libya in 1969, overthrowing King Idris, and was implemented on August 27, 1971. The attempted coup and Libya’s concealed intervention failed to achieve Libya’s objective—bringing the friendly FROLINAT to power in Chad, with expected benefts to Libya, namely, virtually unlimited access to the reputed valuable material resources such as uranium, oil, iron, etc., in the northern part of Chad, the Aouzou Strip, long a disputed territory, to which Libya aspired and laid claim. Libya’s frst major decision triggered a foreign policy crisis for Chad and its frst responsive decision—to sever diplomatic relations with Libya. That act, in turn, generated a responsive decision by Libya, which took the form of recognizing FROLINAT as Chad’s legitimate government, on September 17, 1971. External pressure by France on both of the principal adversaries led to an initially shared conciliatory decision by Chad and Libya: they resumed diplomatic relations in mid-April 1972. The next episode of serious hostility between these Africa neighbors occurred 6 years later, when FROLINAT forces, supported by Libya, advanced to within 100 miles of Chad’s capital, N’Djamena. France, long the pre-eminent colonial power in the Saharan region, responded to an urgent decision by Chad’s President Malloumto request immediate French military aid, dispatched 1700 troops in an airlift from near-by 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 149 French bases in other former French colonies and created a defense perimeter around Chad’s capital. In this Libya-generated crisis, Libya decided to intervene directly, with indirect beneft to FROLINAT: it invaded parts of northern and central Chad with 800 troops. Confronted by French military pressure, both FROLINAT and Libyan forces withdrew, and the Chad state survived once more. In a variation of Libya’s 1971 decision to recognize FROLINAT as Chad’s legitimate government, Gadhaf and the FROLINAT leader, Goukouni Oueddei, announced a plan in January 1981 to merge Chad and Libya. This was greeted with strong public opposition by many African states and, especially, France, which increased its military presence in Chad. Once more, Libya responded with an announced decision to withdraw its large military contingent in Chad, estimated at 7000–12,000 troops. However, only a few were withdrawn, leading to a schism between Libya and FROLINAT. Eventually, Libya’s forces were withdrawn by agreement in late 1981. During the 5 years that followed, several political and military developments in Chad set in motion profound changes in the behavior of the two principal adversaries. One was a split in the Goukouni–Gadhaf alliance, largely due to the former’s discontent with Gadhaf’s initial refusal to withdraw Libya’s forces from Chad in early 1981. This led to a split within the FROLINAT–Goukouni-led forces and FAP; clashes between Goukouni’s splinter from PAP and the forces of another Libya ally in Chad; and cooperation between Goukouni’s post-PAP forces and those of the Chad government. Together, this enlarged, merged Chad government army succeeded, for the frst time, in mounting a counteroffensive north of the long-established informal line between Libya’s and Chad’s infuence, the 16th Parallel. France’s forces, long established in Chad, provided valuable forms of military aid, notably an air defense system, bombing Libyan airstrips in Chad, and a fow of weapons for Chad’s forces. fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi The Chad counteroffensive was surprisingly successful, culminating in the frst Chad military invasion of Libya. The capital of the disputed Aouzou Strip, the town of Aouzou, was captured, along with a Libyan airbase within Libya proper. This successful Chad military offensive, late in their interstate-intrastate con ct, led to attempted mediation of the Chad/Libya con ct. When that failed, the two adversaries made a shared decision in 1990—to seek a judicial ruling on their con cting claims to the long-disputed Aouzou Strip: the shared decision was implemented by the submission of their dispute to the International Court of Justice for a binding ruling. The ICJ ruled 150 M. BRECHER in 1994 in favor of Chad almost unanimously: the vote was 16-1. Libya accepted the Court’s decision and withdrew all of its forces from the Aouzou Strip within a few months, a rare example of protracted con ct termination generated by an international judicial ruling. Chad and Libya: Decision-Makers Throughout this post-World War II Africa con ct, the dominant decision-maker for Libya was the charismatic Muammar Gadhaf: he retained that role for the entire period of his authoritarian rule (1969–2011). For Chad, too, there was one commanding fgure in decision-making on issues related to this con ct—but only for the period in offce as President of Chad. Notable among them were Francois Tombalbaye, the frst Chad president, who was assassinated in 1975, Felix Malloum, and Hissené Habré. There were other infuential Chad leaders, notably Goukouni Oueddei, commander of the PAP forces in Chad, long an ally of Gadhaf, until 1981, but he did not have direct power in the making of Chad’s decisions. Moreover, none of the presidents of Chad possessed the power exercised by Gadhaf as dominant decision-maker for Libya in all major issues relating to its con ct with Chad. Chad and Libya: Decision Process Although hard evidence is lacking on the making of Libya’s decisions, it is likely that, for the major decisions in the early years of this con ct, members of the military junta that assumed power in 1969 were involved; this was before Gadhaf eliminated all rivals to his power in the junta. By the mid-1970s, he had succeeded in establishing undisputed control over every aspect of Libya’s public policy, in which the on-going con ct with Chad ranked high for Gadhaf, as it would have for any leader—and did for King Idris, his predecessor as Libya’s ruler (1951–1969). While little is known about the Chad decision process, beyond the primacy of its presidents during their tenure, the lack of a commanding fgure and the existence of multiple Chad ethnic communities suggests that, on some issues, notably the disputed Aouzou Strip, Chad’s presidents consulted with leaders of some of these communities for possible benefts enhancing their power or costs of ignoring all but those sharing power and its benefts in highly restricted political elites. Notable among Chad’s communities were the Sara, the most populous and infuential ethnic group in Chad, and the Tebu, the most populous ethnic group in the pivotal disputed region within this con ct, the Aouzou Strip. 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 151 Con ct-Sustaining Acts Among the four con ct-sustaining techniques (CST) and acts that contribute to the persistence of interstate con cts, political hostility and violence were of relatively equal frequency and impact in this con ct, political hostility in Phase I (1971–1978) and violence in Phase II (1978– 1987). Both verbal hostility and economic discrimination were inconsequential, the former more so. Political Hostility: It was manifested in the behavior of both principal adversaries, primarily by Libya, in three distinct forms—attempted Libyan coups in Chad, fnancial and military backing by Libya for Chad rebel groups, and the severance of diplomatic relations. The frst, highly visible, hostile political act, the catalyst to Chad/Libya I, the frst of eight interstate crises in their protracted con ct, was Libya’s active support for a (failed) coup against Chad President Tombalbaye on August 27, 1971, by the most prominent Chad rebel group, FROLINAT which, throughout this interstate–intrastate con ct, served as Gadhaf’s instrument for penetration of Chad’s political system and society. As noted, Chad responded by breaking diplomatic relations with Libya, and Libya retaliated by recognizing the FROLINAT as the legitimate government of Chad. Relations between Chad and Libya were restored in April 1972, as a result of material incentives to both adversaries by France, the preeminent power in Saharan and much of North Africa during the last half of the nineteenth and the pre-World War II part of the twentieth century. Libya occupied the disputed mineral-rich border area of Chad, the Aouzou Strip, in April 1972. Chad ceded the territory to Libya in November 1972, and Libya again occupied the Aouzou Strip in 1973 (retaining control fi fi fi until Chad’s brief successful invasion of Libya in September 1987—see below). Chad’s President Tombalbaye was overthrown in a coup by Malloum in April 1975. He, in turn, was the target of another Gadhaf failed assassination attempt, in 1976. Violence: There were renewed FROLINAT attacks on Chad’s government in 1977. And in January 1978 Libya provided active support for a FROLINAT attack on the crucial administrative center of northern Chad, Faya-Largeau, one of several such attacks by Libya’s proxy in Chad. This triggered the Chad/Libya II crisis and set the tone and pattern of continuous hostile military attacks, mostly by Libya, during six 152 M. BRECHER subsequent Chad/Libya crises from 1979 to 1987. During that period, there were three major occurrences of violence. The frst was an invasion of northern Chad by 2500 Libyan troops in June 1979, directed at the strategic center, Faya-Largeau. Chad responded with a counteroffensive which, with the military aid of France, notably bombers and reconnaissance planes, the frst use of aircraft in this con ct, compelled Libya to withdraw its forces (Chad/Libya IV). The second violent episode occurred in June 1983, the onset of Chad/LibyaVI, when Libya-supported forces of the Goukouni-led Chad faction occupied Faya-Largeau on June 24. Military aid to the Habré regime in Chad from France, Zaire, and the USA led to the recapture of the prized city in northern Chad on July 30. Libya attacked the contested city the next day, and France countered by sending troops from the neighboring Central African Republic. France and Libya terminated this violent episode by agreeing to withdraw their forces from Chad. The fnal phase of violence began in December 1986, when Libyan forces attacked Chad troops in northern Chad who, surprisingly, recaptured Libyaoccupied cities north of the 16th Parallel, the de facto boundary between Chad and Libya agreed-to by France and Libya in 1984. The violence persisted for 6 months, with the Aouzou Strip captured by Chad troops in August 1987 and then recaptured by Libya the same month. In early September, for the frst time, Chad troops invaded Libya and occupied a major air base. A ceasefre, initiated by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), terminated the third and last intense episode of violence and Chad/ Libya VIII on September 11, 1987. Their con ct was resolved on May 30, 1994 when Libya formally transferred the Aouzou Strip to Chad, in accordance with an ICJ near-unanimous ruling 4 months earlier, on February 3, 1994, supporting Chad’s claim to the disputed territory. (The eight interstate crises in the Chad/Libya con ct, like all crises discussed in this book, are summarized in the ICB Data Viewer).