Berkeley's Philosophy PDF

‭ ERKELEY (1685–1753) The immediate prompt for George Berkeley’s philosophy is Locke.‬ B ‭Berkeley agreed with Locke’s empiricism, but could not accept his fudge over the scepticism‬ ‭that arises because of the ‘veil of perception’ theory – the theory that our ideas are‬ ‭intermediaries between o...

‭ ERKELEY (1685–1753) The immediate prompt for George Berkeley’s philosophy is Locke.‬ B ‭Berkeley agreed with Locke’s empiricism, but could not accept his fudge over the scepticism‬ ‭that arises because of the ‘veil of perception’ theory – the theory that our ideas are‬ ‭intermediaries between ourselves and a world that lies otherwise inaccessibly behind them‬ ‭[behind our ideas] and causes them [causes our ideas]. Berkeley was born at his family’s home,‬ ‭Dysart Castle, in County Kilkenny in Ireland, and educated at Trinity College, Dublin. He took‬ ‭orders in the Church of Ireland and later became Bishop of Cloyne. As these facts show he was‬ ‭a member of the ‘Protestant Ascendancy’, the English-descended ruling elite. [The Church of‬ ‭Ireland is an Anglican church, Anglicanism being a Protestant denomination, though Ireland has‬ ‭remained since the Protestant Reformation a predominantly Catholic country.] His major‬ ‭philosophical works were written early in life; his Principles of Human Knowledge was published‬ ‭in 1710 and his Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, written to address the‬ ‭incomprehension that had greeted the Principles, in 1713. He published treatises on vision,‬ ‭motion and medicine later, but these two works contain his enduring philosophical contribution.‬ ‭The contemporary reaction to Berkeley’s Principles was that his views were neither refutable nor‬ ‭believable. He is still either misunderstood or ignored by some philosophers, even though he is‬ ‭an influence on two twentieth-century schools of thought that will be met with later in these‬ ‭pages, positivism and phenomenalism. Berkeley’s philosophical view is often described as‬ ‭‘immaterialism’, by which is meant a denial of the existence of matter (or, more precisely, [a‬ ‭denial of the existence of] material substance). But he also, famously, argued in support of three‬ ‭further theses. He argued for idealism, the thesis that mind constitutes the ultimate reality. He‬ ‭argued that the existence of [so-called material] things consists in their being perceived: esse‬ ‭est percipi. [This Latin phrase literally means: To be is to be perceived.] And he argued that the‬ ‭mind which is the substance of the world is a single infinite mind – in short, God. These are four‬ ‭different theses, but they are intimately connected, the arguments for the first three sharing most‬ ‭of their premises and steps. Berkeley’s aim in arguing for these theses was to refute two kinds‬ ‭of scepticism. One is epistemological scepticism, which says that we cannot know the true‬ ‭nature of things because of the perceptual and psychological contingencies that oblige us to‬ ‭distinguish appearance from reality in such a way that the latter [reality] lies [perpetually] hidden‬ ‭behind the former [behind appearance—or behind appearances], so that knowledge of it‬ ‭[knowledge of reality] is at least problematic and at worst impossible. 2 The other is theological‬ ‭scepticism, which Berkeley called ‘atheism’ and which in his view included not only denials of‬ ‭the existence of a deity, but also ‘deism’, the view that although the universe might have been‬ ‭created by a deity, it continues to exist without a deity’s active presence. [Deism is the view that‬ ‭God created the world but after that doesn’t do anything to control or determine what goes on in‬ ‭the world—that the physical world is like a machine created by God but which subsequently‬ ‭runs or operates entirely on its own, according to its own internal principles, the so-called laws‬ ‭of nature, so that everything that happens in the world, such the revolving of the planets around‬ ‭the sun or the occurrence of rainstorms, are to be explained scientifically or “mechanically,”‬ ‭rather than as due to God’s will or intervention. In other words, according to deism, God‬ ‭designed and created the world but does not run it or take any further action to cause whatever‬ ‭happens in the world to happen.] In opposing the first scepticism Berkeley took himself to be‬ ‭defending common sense and eradicating ‘causes of error and difficulty in the sciences’. In‬ ‭opposing the second he took himself to be defending religion. Berkeley took the root of‬ ‭ cepticism to be the opening of a gap between experience and the world, forced by theories of‬ s ‭ideas like Locke’s which involve ‘supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense, the one‬ ‭intelligible, or in the mind, the other real and without [i.e. outside] the mind’. Scepticism arises‬ ‭because ‘for so long as men thought that real things subsisted without [outside] the mind, and‬ ‭that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows,‬ ‭they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known, that the‬ ‭things which are perceived, are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist outside‬ ‭the mind?’ The nub of the problem is that if we are acquainted only with our own perceptions,‬ ‭and never with the things which are supposed to lie beyond them, how can we hope for‬ ‭knowledge of those things, or even be justified in asserting their existence? Berkeley’s‬ ‭predecessors talked, as Locke had done, of qualities inhering in matter and causing ideas in us‬ ‭which represent or even resemble those qualities. Matter or material substance is the technical‬ ‭metaphysical concept denoting a supposed corporeal basis underlying the qualities of things.‬ ‭Berkeley was especially troubled by the unempiricist character of this view. If we are to be‬ ‭consistent in our empiricist principles, he asked, how can we tolerate the concept of something‬ ‭which by definition is empirically undetectable, lying hidden behind the perceptible qualities of‬ ‭things as their supposed basis? If the claim (that matter is the substance underlying things)‬ ‭cannot be defended, we have to look elsewhere. [In other words, Berkeley is attacking the view,‬ ‭which Locke upheld, that an object with qualities or properties, such as a piece of paper having‬ ‭qualities like color and shape, can be understood as a material substance in which its qualities‬ ‭of color, shape, size, etc., inhere—according to Berkeley, an object of sensory perception, such‬ ‭as a piece of paper, is nothing more than a bundle or collection of 3 perceptible or “sense”‬ ‭qualities, not some sort of “substance” that exists “behind” its perceivable qualities and in which‬ ‭those qualities “inhere.”] Berkeley’s answer is provided by his answer to scepticism itself. This‬ ‭answer is to deny that there is a gap between [subjective] experience and the [objective] world –‬ ‭in his and Locke’s terminology: between ideas and things – by asserting that things are ideas.‬ ‭The argument is stated with admirable concision in the first six paragraphs of the Principles, its‬ ‭conclusion being the first sentence of paragraph 7: ‘From what has been said, it follows, that‬ ‭there is not any other substance than spirit [or mind], or that which perceives’ (‘spirit’ and ‘mind’‬ ‭are the same thing for Berkeley). All the rest of the Principles and Three Dialogues consists in‬ ‭expansion, clarification and defence of this thesis. The argument is as follows. Berkeley begins‬ ‭in Lockean fashion by offering an inventory of the ‘objects of human knowledge’. They are‬ ‭‘either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or such as are perceived by attending to the‬ ‭passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination,‬ ‭either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid‬ ‭ways’. Ideas of sense – colours, shapes and the rest – are ‘observed to accompany each other’‬ ‭in certain ways; ‘collections’ of them ‘come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed‬ ‭one thing’, for example an apple or a tree. Besides these ideas there is ‘something which knows‬ ‭or perceives them’; this ‘perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul or myself’, and it‬ ‭is ‘entirely distinct’ from the ideas it perceives. Thoughts, feelings and imaginings exist only in‬ ‭the mind. But so also do the ideas of things – which, remember, are collections of ideas: the‬ ‭idea of an apple is a composite of ideas of the colours, shapes and tastes that constitute it. So it‬ ‭is no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense [or on the‬ ‭senses], however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose),‬ ‭ annot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. From these claims it follows that the gap‬ c ‭between things and ideas vanishes; for if things are collections of qualities, and qualities are‬ ‭sensible ideas, and sensible ideas exist only in the mind, then what it is for a thing to exist is for‬ ‭it to be perceived – in Berkeley’s phrase: to be is to be perceived: esse est percipi. ‘For as to‬ ‭what is said of the absolute [i.e. mind-independent] existence of unthinking things [i.e. ideas or‬ ‭collections of ideas] without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly‬ ‭unintelligible. Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible that they should have any existence, out of‬ ‭the minds or thinking things which perceive them.’ 4 Berkeley knows that this claim is surprising,‬ ‭so he remarks that although people think that sensible [or perceptible] objects like mountains‬ ‭and houses have an ‘absolute’, that is, perception-independent, existence, reflection on the‬ ‭points just made show that this is a contradiction. ‘For what’, he asks, ‘are the aforementioned‬ ‭[perceptible] objects but the things we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides our‬ ‭own ideas or sensations; and is it not plainly repugnant [illogical, contradictory] that any of these‬ ‭or any combination of them should exist unperceived?’ A point that requires immediate‬ ‭emphasis is that this argument, together with Berkeley’s correlative denial of the existence of‬ ‭material substance, is not a denial of the existence of the external world and the physical‬ ‭objects it contains, such as tables and chairs, mountains and trees. Nor does Berkeley hold that‬ ‭the world exists only because it is thought of by any one or more finite minds, such as yours or‬ ‭mine. In one sense of the term ‘realist’...Berkeley is a realist, in holding that the existence of the‬ ‭physical world is independent of finite minds, individually or collectively. What he argues instead‬ ‭is that its existence is not independent of mind as such. The source of the belief that things can‬ ‭exist apart from perception of them [according to Betkeley] is the doctrine of ‘abstract ideas’,‬ ‭which Berkeley attacks in his Introduction to the Principles. Abstraction consists in separating‬ ‭things which can be separated only in thought, not in reality, for example the colour and the‬ ‭extension of a surface; or which involves noting a feature common to many different things, and‬ ‭attending only to that feature and not to its particular instances – in this way we arrive at the‬ ‭‘abstract idea’ of, say, Redness, apart from any particular red object. Abstraction is a falsifying‬ ‭move [according to Berkeley]; what prompts the ‘common opinion’ about houses and mountains‬ ‭is that we abstract existence from perception, and so come to believe that things can exist‬ ‭unperceived. But because things are ideas, and because ideas exist only if perceived by minds,‬ ‭the notion of ‘absolute existence outside mind’ is a contradiction. So, says Berkeley, to say that‬ ‭things exist is to say that they are perceived, and therefore ‘so long as they are not perceived by‬ ‭me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any created spirit, they must either have no existence‬ ‭at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit.’ And from this the conclusion follows that‬ ‭‘there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives.’ The argument in sum is‬ ‭therefore this: the things we encounter in episodes of perceptual experience – apples, stones,‬ ‭trees – are collections of ‘ideas’. Ideas are the immediate objects of awareness. To exist they‬ ‭must be perceived; they cannot exist ‘without (independently of) mind’. Therefore mind is the‬ ‭substance of the world. Berkeley is a rigorous empiricist; we are not entitled to assert, believe or‬ ‭regard as meaningful anything not justified by experience. To deny that there is a ‘seems–is’ 5‬ ‭distinction [in other words, to deny that there is a distinction between appearances and a reality‬ ‭that stands behind the appearances and exists independently of any and all appearances] is‬ ‭just another way of asserting that sensible objects (things in the world) are collections of‬ ‭sensible [or sense] qualities, and hence of ideas. This shows that the concept of matter is‬ r‭ edundant, Berkeley claims, because everything required to explain the world and experience of‬ ‭it is available in recognizing that minds and ideas are all there can be...-‬