Ancient Rome: A History PDF

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itor | q |: : q| | : j i | q Valin s | d ' } d q iy > Second Edition 8 7 S| BeBRENDAN NAGLE, Ancient Rome A History Second Edition  Ancient Rome A History Second Edition D. Brendan Nagle University of Southern California 2013 Sloan Publishing Cornwall-on-Hudson, NY 12520 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nagle, Brendan B. Ancient Rome: a history / D. Brendan Nagle, University of Southern California. -- Second Edition pages cm Includes bibliographical referencese and index. ISBN 978-1-59738-042-3 -- ISBN 1-59738-042-3 1. Rome--History. I. Title DG209.N253 2013 937--dce23 2012048713 Cover photo: “Segovia Aqueduct” by Juergen Weiss, whatawonderfulworld.eu Cover design by K&M Design © 2014 by Sloan Publishing, LLC Sloan Publishing, LLC 220 Maple Road Cornwall-on-Hudson, NY 12520 All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the Publisher. Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 WG BS 4t so ISBN-10: 1-59738-043-2 ISBN-13: 978-1-59738-043-2  Brief Contents Introduction: Rome in Context l Part I: The Rise of Rome 13 1 The Founding ofthe City 21 Early Rome: External Challenges 37 The Rise of Rome: How Did it Happen? 63 WN Roman Religion 86 5 Roman Society 107 Part If: Rome Becomes an Imperial Power 125 6 The Wars with Carthage 129 7 After Hannibal: Roman Expansion 145 Part III: The Fall of the Roman Republic 159 8 The Consequences of Empire 163 9 The Crisis of the Roman Republic: The Gracchi 187 10 After the Gracchi 198 11 The Fall of the Republic: From Sulla to Octavian 210 Part IV: The Republic Restored: The Principate of Augustus 239 12 The Augustan Settlement 247 Part V: Making Permanent the Augustan Settlement 269 13 The Julio-Claudians: Tiberius to Nero 273 14 From the Flavians to the Death of Commodus 289 Part VI: The Roman Empire: What Held it Together? 305 15 What Held the Empire Together: Institutional Factors 309 16 What Held the Empire Together: Social and Cultural Factors aor Part VII: Rome on the Defense: The Third Century.p. 359 17 Rome on the Defense 363 18 The Challenge of Monotheism 376 Part VIII:Late Antiquity:Rome Reinvents Itself ous 19 Recovery and Transformation 403 20 Final Transformations: East and West 418 Glossary 449 Suggested Readings 457 Credits 463 Index 465  Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2022 with funding from Kahle/Austin Foundation https://archive.org/details/ancientromehisto0000nag|  Contents Brief Contents Vv Contents Vii List of Maps xi Preface xiii Introduction: Rome in Context 1 1. Is Roman History European History? 1 2. The Connecting Sea: the Mediterranean Context of Roman History 2 3. Climate, Food and the Economy 4 4. Population and Demography 8 5. Political and Cultural Themes 10 Part I: The Rise of Rome 13 1. Introduction and Overview 13 2. Sources: What do we Know about Roman History and How do we Know it? 15 1. The Founding of the City 21 1. The Environment of Rome's Early History 24 2. Rome's Rise: Archaeological and Social Theories 27 3. The Roman Version of What Happened 30 4. The End of the Monarchy 34 2. Early Rome: External Challenges 37 1. Life in a Dangerous Environment OW, 2. A New Beginning: Rome After the Latin War 50 3. The Samnite Wars: The Campaign for Italy 55 3. The Rise of Rome: How Did it Happen? 63 1. The Most Fundamental Explanation: The Nature of the Polis 63 The Making of Rome's Hybrid Polis Stage I: How Rome Attached the Elite to the State 65 The Making of Rome s Hybrid Polis Stage II: The Plebeian State Te Progress—At Last KRwWN 75 5. The Military Revolution of the Fourth Century B.c.: Rome's Hybrid Army 80 4. Roman Religion 86 1. “By Pietas and Fides the Romans Reached Their Present Eminence” 86 2. Religion: Ancient and Modern Assumptions 87 3. Roman Religion 92 4. Religion and Politics 100 Vii Vili CONTENTS 5. Roman Society 107 1. A Very Peculiar Society 107 2. The Household: The Foundation of the Roman State 109 Questions for Part 1 124 Part If: Rome Becomes an Imperial Power 125 1. Introduction and Overview 125 6. The Wars with Carthage 129 1. The First Punic War (264-241 B.c.) 129 2. Carthage and Rome Between the Wars 133 3. The War with Hannibal, or the Second Punic War (218-202 8.c.) Wwnn 7, After Hannibal: Roman Expansion 145 1. Roman Expansion in Italy and Spain 145 2. Macedonia and the East 149 3. Rome’ Empire: Analysis 155 Questionsfor Part LI 157 Part III: The Fall of the Roman Republic 159 1. Introduction and Overview 159 2. The Historiographic Tradition: Ancient and Modern Explanations 3. The Crisis 160 8. The Consequences of Empire 163 I. The Economic Transformation 163 2. The Cultural Transformation: History and the Theater yal 3. The Impact of Empire on Roman Society 180 4. The Disintegration of Rome s Compact with Italy 184 9. The Crisis of the Roman Republic: The Gracchi 187 I. The Social and Political Context 187 2. The Gracchan Revolution 190 10. After the Gracchi 198 I. After the Gracchi: Further Unraveling of The Constitution 198 2. Marius 199 3. The Social War 204 4. The Military Dynast Sulla 205 5. Analysis: The Nature of the Breakdown 208 11. The Fall of the Republic: From Sulla to Octavian 210 1. The Political Transformation 210 2. Social and Cultural Transformations 224 3. Summary: The Fall of the Roman Republic 234 Questions for Part II 237 Part IV: The Republic Restored: The Principate of Augustus 239 If. Introduction and Overview 239 Zz Historiography 240 12. The Augustan Settlement 247 ie Break up or Restoration? 247 2. Insurmountable Problems? 248  CONTENTS ix The Building Program of Augustus prsif Religious and Social Reforms 260 Chief Executive Officer: How Augustus Ran the Empire 264 & Ww CoNThe Mask of Augustus: Reflections 266 Questions for Part IV 267 Part V: Making Permanent the Augustan Settlement 269 1. Introduction and Overview 269 2. Institutionalizing the Principate 27h 3. Sources 271 13. The Julio-Claudians: Tiberius to Nero 273 I. Succession: The Candidates 213 2. Expanding the Empire under Augustus 276 3. The Julio-Claudian Emperors 280 14. From the Flavians to the Death of Commodus 289 1. The Year of the Four Emperors: 4.b. 69 289 2. The Flavian Emperors 290 3. The Adopted Emperors 296 Questions for Part V 356 Part VI: The Roman Empire: What Held it Together? 305 1. Introduction and Overview 305 15. What Held the Empire Together: Institutional Factors 309 1. The Imperial Office 309 2. The Imperial Administration: Creating a New Political Culture 314 3. The Provinces and Provincial Administration 321 4. The Army 324 16. What Held the Empire Together: Social and Cultural Factors 337 1. Municipia, Colonies, and the Diaspora 337 2. Religions of the Empire: Unity in Diversity 346 3. Urbanism and Imperial Coherence 350 Questions for Part VI 356 Part VII Rome on the Defense: The Third Century a.p. 359 1. Introduction and Overview See) 2. Historiography 360 17. Rome on the Defense 363 I. The Severan Emperors 363 2. The Third Century Crisis 368 3. Political Anarchy 370 4. The Empire and the Emperor: “Holding a Wolf by its Ears” 373 18. The Challenge of Monotheism 376 The Cultural Setting 376 Revolutionary Monotheism 382 Early Christianity 383 The Founders 387 Romans and Christians 390 AM Conclusion: The Quest for Legitimacy RwWN 393 Questions for Part VII 392 xX e CONTENTS Part VIII: Late Antiquity: Rome Reinvents Itself 395 1, Introduction and Overview 35) 2. Historiography. The Sources 399 19. Recovery and Transformation 403 1. Diocletian 403 2. Constantine 408 20. Final Transformations: East and West 418 1. After Constantine 418 2. The Last Emperors in the West 419 3. The Rise of the German Kingdoms 421 4. The Slavs and Eastern Roman (or Byzantine) Empire 429 5. Islam and the Transformation of the Mediterranean 431 6. Some Reflections on the Fall of the Roman Empire 437 Questions for Part VII 448 Glossary 449 Suggested Readings 457 Credits 463 Index 465  List of Maps Mediterranean "Lakes" and Trade Routes Z Mediterranean Vegetational Limits 6 Physical Features of Italy 22 Rome and Latium, 600-500 B.c. 35 Early Rome and Its Neighbors 43 Colonies and Roads 46 Rome, Seven Hills, Servian Walls 49 Battlefield Italy 59 The Western Mediterranean: The Arena of the Punic Wars 131 Battleground Italy: Colonies and Battle Sites 14] The Hellenistic World ca. 200 B.c. 147 The Aegean World ca. 200 B.c. 132 Roads of Italy: Second and First Centuries B.c. 165 Map of Italy Showing the Distribution of Roman and Allied Territory 185 The Mediterranean ca. 100 B.c. 202 Map of Roman and Allied Territories on the Eve of the Social War 204 The Conquests of Pompey 213 The West at the Time of Julius Caesar 220 Expansion of the Roman Empire from Caesar to M. Aurelius By The Provinces and Legions of the Roman Empire at the Time of Marcus Aurelius 294 The Empire Divided ENP Major Bases, Imperial Residences, and Regional Capitals of the Late Empire 398 Dioceses of the Late Empire 407 The Spread of Christianity 416 Invasions of the Fifth Century a.p. 422 Germanic Kingdoms and the Eastern Roman Empire ca a.p. 500 427 Islamic Conquests 435  ras ~ eee Seema be} ALL nove’ a ¢ bawcuca “—e Gut OOS > megan, oT 3 2) ae abies) art hee syto leabaod ims. me iQue eit hie ume ty memudea adi galwond verte quilt 2 2000)wo cmnonefitetadT ear te eine sybu: av autKoestnnferes! bert A.tare mimeoal Kit ; ats - ‘wet Tu gent A 2 BT "Tl «=alia. 4 Ot sganels a seinod adrte bee sind bewiadt sont ele tetaicpeeT pagel ie ¢npiga! itpsumtviat og 0 bebhda HAE engin! wet oan choi. leosiyast how sammmblen® intempel enenie wl v va 2 Yueh aido snladeal 7 TSh = W2._ eke ipa ceed eet on 7 i. eh =eireupriod Uhmalal * t : a 7 —~ -  Preface History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions, Guides us by vanities —T, S. Eliot, Gerontion 34). The justification for a new book on Roman history would seem to involve a great deal of cunning, even more ambition if not hybris, and not a little vanity. Surely enough books have already been written on the subject? Can anything new be said about Roman history? If it is true that every generation writes its own history then perhaps it is time for a book on Rome that reflects the experiences of a generation that enjoyed a vacation from history in the last decade of the twentieth century only to see the sudden, violent revival of history in the early twenty- first century. Globalization has united our world in ways that are at times reminiscent of the world of Rome’s day when glass and linen from Egypt, silks from China, spices from India and the East Indies were in demand by elites all over the Mediterranean and Europe. Our generation has wit- nessed the rise of an economic, cultural, political and military colossus — the United States — and we are all too well aware of the dependencies, resentments, and fears it has generated world-wide. Inevitably comparisons arise with Rome’s apparent domination of a unipolar world and the chal- lenges it faced from the unpredictable churning of pre-political, pre-state peoples in Eurasia and elsewhere, and a resurgent Iran. Rome’s footprint on the world, like that of the modern West, was large. Its ghostly presence continues to influence our contemporary world. Languages based on Latin are spoken by millions of people who today live far beyond the confines of the original Roman Empire. English, heavily affected by Latin and Greek, is also spoken by millions. It is the second language of more millions and has become the de facto lingua franca of the world. To speak a modern European language is to xili xiv ® PREFACE be influenced, none too subtly, by Roman culture and through it by Greek culture. The great mono- theistic religions of the modern world, Judaism, Christianity and Islam — but Christianity most of all — were deeply affected, though in very different ways, by their Roman and Greek heritages. The fact that Christianity originated within the Roman Empire and its Scriptures were written in Greek, the second language of the Empire after Latin, has something to do with an enduring focus on Rome since to understand Christianity one needs to understand Rome. In its Hellenized and Romanized form that religion has spread over much of the world, bringing with it embedded patterns of Greek thought and Roman law and organization. The influence of Rome on popular culture should not be neglected. This influence was magnified by nineteenth and twentieth century fiction writers and by Hollywood’s instant recognition of the capacity of gladiators, Roman feasts and festivals and the Circus Maximus to attract and hold the interest of masses of people. This book is organized around a number of perennially important questions in Roman history: Why did Rome succeed in creating an empire based on the city-state or polis when every other city- state — Athens, Sparta, and Carthage, for example — that attempted to do so failed? Why, after such stunning military success did the government of the Republic under which most of the Mediterra- nean and a good portion of temperate Europe were conquered, collapse? Even more astonishingly how did the Republic, phoenix-like, revive and recreate itself? Then, finally, in the fourth century A.D. under pressure from the powerful Empire of Persia in the East and numerous warrior bands and migrating peoples in the West, we see that Rome nearly collapsed only — miraculously — to pick itself again and this time completely redesign itself socially and culturally. This approach undoubtedly oversimplifies or over-generalizes the long and complex history of Rome from its legendary founding in 753 B.C. to A.D. 732 when the Frankish successors of Rome turned back the conquering Arabs at the Battle of Poitiers in France. However, as an approach it has the advantage of making Rome’s long history comprehensible by dividing it up into 8, relatively digestible segments. Rather than a continuous narrative where one event follows another chrono- logically, events and the chronologies are subordinated to a master narrative — the questions posed at the beginning of each of the 8 sections. These “master narrative questions” are traditional questions that are discussed in all Roman history courses and are by no means novel in themselves. All the usual topics of history will be found in this book, but they are not treated individually. For instance, religion is treated as part of Roman political and institutional history rather than as a topic in its own right. Similarly the household and other social-cultural topics are folded into the broader narrative. Underlying this approach is the assumption that the society of the Mediterranean city-state and Rome’s version of it was very different from the kind of society and culture we know in the modern world. Perhaps in seeking justification for treating Rome once again we should settle for Eliot’s own explanation of how history works: She (history) gives, gives with such subtle confusions That the giving famishes the craving. In writing this book I had the advantage of calling on the patience, kindness and talent of a number of friends and colleagues who read either the whole or parts of the manuscript and provided me with invaluable comments. That the book still contains many flaws and shortcomings is due in no way to them. I wish to thank in particular Stanley M. Burstein, Arthur M. Eckstein, Richard I. Frank, Jane Laurent, Brigette Russell, Richard Saller, Walter Scheidel, and Mehmet F. Yavuz. Dick Frank, Ramsay MacMullen, Brigette Russell and Ashley Thorne made valuable comments on the new chapters (chapters 4 and 5) for the second edition. My thanks also goes to Bill Webber of Sloan  PREFACE © XV Publishing who first suggested the idea of a Roman history text and from the beginning proved to be an invaluable source of sound advice on every aspect of the book’s writing and production. To my wife Pat and daughter Eliza I owe a particular debt of gratitude and affection for their patient and loving support.  ee 7 - "re Picts yr eee = EPS ee an ae =F - ele a al *% ei Wheaties The Curiate Assembly was the most ancient division of the Roman people and probably the basis of Rome’s military organization. The term “curia” may mean “a gathering of men.” 32 © PART I; THE RISE OF ROME On this coin issued about 54 8.c., Junius Brutus (reverse) proclaims his supposed family connection with the Brutus who liberated Rome from the tyranny of the kings and launched the Republic some 400 years earlier. The coin was issued just ten years before Brutus felt himself called upon to eliminate another tyrant, Julius Caesar. Liberty is portrayed as a woman (obverse). and forced the people to work on huge building projects such asthe completion of the Capitoline temple to Jupiter and the great sewer that drained the Forum area (the Cloaca Maxima) whose exit point into the Tiber can still be seen. In foreign affairs he extended Roman hegemony over Latium. As the cycle of constitutional decay continued, an uprising by the nobility occurred, led by L. Junius Brutus “The Liberator.” This led to Tarquin’s expulsion and the establishment of a new constitution which was based on the old but guaranteed /ibertas, “freedom” to the people. This was the Republic, established supposedly in 509 B.c. And the Truth? For centuries scholars have wrestled with the innumerable problems raised by this schematic account of the regal period of Roman history. How much truth, if any, is to be found in the (often conflicting) stories of the kings? The answers range from extreme skepticism to guarded hope that the outline of the story contains at least some kernels of truth. There is no general consensus, but on some points there is agreement. Thus for example, no one believes that there were just seven kings; there had to have been more to fill the gap between 753 B.c. and 509 B.c. Much of what we read in the stories are clearly simple projections by later historians into the ancient past of practices that became common centuries later. The following points may be noted as having some grounding in historical events. 1, All of the kings, with the exception of Servius Tullius, were confirmed in their power to rule—imperium in Latin—by the passage of a confirming law called a /ex curiata passed by the Curiate Assembly, the clan assembly of the people. The next step in the appointment of the king was the endorsement given by the Senate (patrum auctoritas) to the whole process. This method of selecting kings seems suspect in that it conforms to Greek theories of what constituted legitimate rule and also looks like the procedures that were used during the period of the Republic in the selection of magistrates. On the other hand it may reflect a genuine tradition that insisted that Rome’s early kings were not tyrants, but rather leaders selected by  CHAPTER 1. THE FOUNDING OF THE CITY °* 33 a political process in which the clan heads still had a good deal of influence. When elected they ruled according to established traditions. From this we can conclude that the early Roman state had three divisions or agencies. The first was the king who had multiple functions, primarily as commander of the army, but also as judge and priest. The second was the people who were organized into 30 divisions called curiae. The curiae were grouped in turn in three divisions called tribes (a geographical, not a kin term): the Ramnenses, the Titienses and the Luceres, said to have taken their names from Romulus, Titus Tatius the Sabine leader, and Lucumo or Lucerus, an Etruscan warrior leader who had helped Romulus in his fight with the Sabines. Apart from their political role, the curiae were the basis for the recruitment of the Roman army, and as noted, had some say in the confirmation of the ruler. The third institution, the Senate, was in essence the public face of the elite of the community, the patres or “Fathers” of Rome. 2. The presence of two Sabines in the list of kings, Numa Pompilus and Ancus Marcius, suggests there is some truth to the tradition that Rome was founded as a joint venture of a variety of ethnic and linguistic groups of which Latin and Sabine speakers were the foremost. One scholar suggests that the original synoecism of Rome was the coming together of the communities of the Palatine, which was inhabited by a group of Latins, and of the Quirinal, which was the abode of Sabines. The presence of peoples of different ethnic backgrounds, especially at the elite level, in the newly evolving cities of Italy is well established. At the time of initial urban development in Italy a much more fluid relationship between citizenship and ethnicity existed. Greek cit- ies in the south included many indigenous peoples in their populations and the presence of Greeks and Phoenicians in some Etruscan cities is also well known. From inscriptions we know that there were also high status Latins in Etruscan cities. In a rich burial at Tarquinii an inscription in Etruscan to “Rutile Hipukrates” (Rutilius Hippokrates in its Latin form), was found. The name is a composite of Latin and Greek elements. At Caere there were Ate Peticina (Latin, Attus Peticius), Tita Vendia and Kalatur Phapena (Kalator Fabius) in the sev- enth century, and Ati Cventinas (Attius son of Quintus) in the sixth. At Veii there is a tomb to Tite Latine (Titus Latinus). A Roman literary tradition recalls the migration of a group of Sabines led by Attus Clausus (Appius Claudius) to Rome. In these circumstances, the pres- ence of non-Romans and non-Latins in Rome during its early history is plausible. How strong a presence this was is difficult to estimate, but it was at least sufficient to leave its mark in the historical tradition and provide sanction for Rome’s willingness to find a place for non-native Romans in their state in later times. This practice, as will be seen, became a central feature of Roman expansion and a key mechanism of its eventual integration of Italy. 3. Servius’ reforms may represent the moment when the army came to vote on political issues. ‘Servius’ reforms involved the creation of a new assembly distinct from the curiate assembly, the comitia centuria, which was based on the census. The Roman army in its original form was organized, in Greek fashion, as an army of heavy infantrymen or hoplites, each equipped with a helmet, cuirass, greaves, shield and thrusting spear. The Centuriate Assembly was the civilian version of the army, namely, the army assembling without arms. A division into five classes at the time of Servius is unlikely. Originally the army probably consisted of only those men who could afford hoplite equipment. An ancient source refers to a distinction between the c/assis “the class,” and the infra classem, that is those below the class, probably those who could not afford the requisite weaponry for service in 34 © PART I; THE RISE OF ROME the hoplite phalanx but nevertheless could serve as light armed skirmishers and consequently deserved a role, if only a minor role, in the political deliberations of the state. The infra classem had representation, but it was unequal representation. Hence from the beginning the Centuriate Assembly was not democratic in the sense of being made up of citizens who were arithmetically equal to each other (“one man one vote”). Roman state practice stressed, instead, geometric or proportional equality, i.e., greater wealth meant greater responsibility, hence political influence. Some citizens had by definition, more influence or more votes than others. The Centuriate Assembly had a long and complicated historical evolution lasting many centuries and it is extremely difficult to disentangle the early phases of its development from later development. The reconstruction of the Servian reforms presented here is speculative and is based to a considerable extent on analogies with the better known role of the army during the evolution of Greek cities. ROME OF THE KINGS The Rome that developed under the leadership of the kings was a dynamic, expanding state. By the end of the sixth century it had expanded from an area of perhaps 75 square miles to 300 square miles and its population may have been as much as 35,000. Rome, however, suf- fered from internal problems of governance whose natures are difficult to grasp. Aristotle’s explana- tion of why it was that monarchies came to an end in the city-states of Greece may suggest a way of understanding them. He says that in early times in Greece “it was unusual to find outstanding men, especially as in those days people lived in small cities,” hence kings were common. As time went on, however, and the city-states expanded and “many men were found who were alike in respect of excellence and they would no longer submit to monarchy” but sought a different form of gov- ernment, namely a commonwealth, which would more fairly—from their viewpoint—reflect the new social reality (Politics 3.1286b). This comment of Aristotle suggests that the kings became the victims of their own success. As the polis expanded so did the size, wealth and sophistication of the governing class. Given the competitive nature of aristocracy, it became intolerable that one single individual—the monarch—should have all the honor, glory and power in his hands alone. 4. THE END OF THE MONARCHY The Historiographic Problem For the historians of the late Republic (133-30 B.c.) it was conventional to portray the last king of Rome, Tarquin the Proud (Tarquinius Superbus), as a corrupt and brutal tyrant. He and his sister-in-law (who eventually became his wife) conspired first to kill their respective spouses and then the ruling king. Begun with such savagery, the reign progressed from one outrage to another until finally a Roman nobleman by the name of Lucius Junius Brutus had the courage to organize a coup and drive out the Tarquins. In this version of things, after the successful expulsion of the tyrant, two consuls were chosen to replace the deposed king, and so without civil war, bloodshed, or much fuss of any kind, Roman freedom was won. An alternate, much less emphasized tradi- tion has the king of the Etruscan city Clusium, Lars Porsenna, capture Rome and expel the tyrant (Tacitus Hist. 3.72; Pliny n.h. 34.139). In this scenario it is possible that the outsider Porsenna ended the monarchy.  CHAPTER 1. THE FOUNDING OF THE CITY °* 35 Etruscans evel § Se tans gNomentuny. 12 PF A eae eeu DPUINIUIY v wan a onl ees = \ lunjuaAsueg WSSANNIS 5 ~— ende>® auipne) pe. i ae winuepay ejnssans @wnuyjaqy | UeWOY saluojo> sewn ® \ UNe] Sa|UOJOD o. wnaueynduapy ‘ \ sajneg : : : - " HWedwog saiuojo5 pue speoy  CHAPTER 2. EARLY ROME: EXTERNAL CHALLENGES °® 47 The Warlike Celts (Gauls, Gaels) ~ Despite success in containing the Etruscans, Sabines, Aequi, and Volsci, and having expanded north of the Tiber by incorporating Veii, Rome and Latium were not secure. Warlike Celtic tribes from across the Alps had been settling in the Po valley for a number of generations and had already dislodged the Etruscans from that region. They were now threatening Etruria itself. These events occurred towards the end of the fifth century.c., but the bulk of the migration seems to have taken place primarily during the fourth century. In due course the Po valley itself came to be known to the Romans as Gallia Cisalpina—Cisapline Gaul (“Gaul This Side of the Alps”). News of these settle- ments and awareness that the Celts could launch attacks through various passes in the Apennines was available to Romans and Latins alike. Livy notes that one of the reasons the Etruscan cities did not come to the aid of Veii when it was under Roman siege was their preoccupation with “new set- tlers of strange nationality with whom their relations were ambivalent and far from comfortable” in parts of Etruria (Livy 5.18). THE SACK OF ROME Off the Latin cities, Rome, being the farthest north, was the most exposed. Still, while not unexpected, the appearance of a Celtic horde just north of Rome, the quick and over- whelming defeat of the Roman army at the battle of the Allia (390 B.c.), and the subsequent capture of Rome itself, must have been an overwhelming shock to the Romans. It undoubtedly contributed to the defensive paranoia that fueled much of Rome’s expansion in later years. Forever after, July 18, the dies Alliensis, “The Day of the Allia,” was observed officially as an “inauspicious day” in the Roman calendar. Fear of the northerners, metus Gallicus, became embedded in the Roman psyche more deeply than any other fear, and was reflected even in its law. A special state of emergency known as the tumultus Gallicus could be called by the magistrates. It suspended all exemptions from military service and gave the authorities a free hand to call up whatever reserves they thought were necessary to meet the threat. The state had made a decision that the sack of Rome would not be repeated. THE FAILURE OF THE LATIN LEAGUE At this critical juncture it was clear that the Latin League and the concentric lines of defense built up in the previous century had failed spectacularly. This revelation of the city’s vulnerability deeply influenced its future strategic thinking and led to a fun- damental reevaluation of the usefulness of the Latin alliance. The success ofthe first invasion, it was felt, would surely encourage the Gauls to raid again, and indeed for the next two centuries this was the case. It was particularly worrying because these invastions occurred unpredictably. For example, a powerful Celtic force appeared in 358 B.c. at Pedum, just 14 miles from Rome. Less than 10 years later they were again in Latium, this time in alliance with a Greek fleet from southern Italy. To meet this particular threat took one of the largest call-ups of troops in Roman history. Roman Recovery The opportunity to reorganize Rome’s defenses came soon enough. The Celts moved on in search of new opportunities for glory and plunder, and the Romans set about building proper defenses for the city. Stone walls about six miles long made of rock from the quarries of Veii were constructed around the core of the built-up area. (So strong were these walls that a good stretch of them, the so-called “Servian Walls” can still be seen just outside the main train station in Rome). Their con- struction is an indication of both Rome’s fear of future attacks and its resourcefulness. Colonies 48 © PART I THE RISE OF ROME were established to the north at Sutrium and Nepet, and at Setia and Satricum to the south. Nearby Tusculum was fully incorporated into the Roman state in 381 B.c. Its citizens were given the full Roman franchise while being allowed to administer their own internal affairs as they had in the past. A city of this type, having local autonomy but with Roman citizenship, came to be known as a municipium—that is. a city that shared the burdens (munera) of the Roman state, mainly the responsibility of military service. The nearby city of Caere was given a limited form of cititzenship called hospitium, a kind of honorary citizenship, in recognition of services rendered to Rome during the Celtic occupation. LATIN UNHAPPINESS The Latins also began to reevaluate their relationship with Rome. Secure for the time being against outside aggression, they took a critical look at Rome’s growth and came to the conclusion that the conquest of Veii and the settlement of its territory by Roman homesteaders had created a huge imbalance in their relationship. Then in 354 B.c. the Romans made an alliance with the Samnite federation, which was a significant power to the east of the Latins. This was fol- lowed in 348 B.c. by an alliance with Carthage which essentially recognized Rome’s preeminence in the central plains region of Italy. The main trigger, however, for the dissolution of Rome’s relationship with the Latins came as a result of a request for help from the Campanian city of Capua which found itself threatened by Samnite encroachment. This action, taken independently ofthe Latin League, gave Rome a toehold on the southern side of Latium. From the Latin viewpoint this amounted to a form of envelopment. A TURNING POINT IN HISTORY The decision of Rome to abandon its recent alliance with the Samnites and aid the Campanians was logical, strategic—and opportunistic. Capua was the head of a rich, well established federation in Campania, and in terms of political culture closer to Rome than the Samnites. In choosing to take up the cause of a polis—type state, the Romans began the long process of defending urbanized peoples throughout the Italian peninsula—and eventually out- side Italy—against the tribal Celts and Oscans. This decision by the Romans, despite its apparent unimportance, was actually a turning point in their history and possibly, not to overly exaggerate, in world history. Romans of later generations recognized this, and the belief found its reflection in the work of Livy, the great historian of the late Republic. Livy noted that the alliance with Capua led inevitably to war with the Samnites. Victory over the Samnites in turn had the effect of project- ing Roman power deep into southern Italy. This then provoked the enmity of the powerful Greek city of Tarentum which turned for help to Pyrrhus, a Hellenistic king from Epirus, just across the Adriatic from Tarentum. Roman victory over Pyrrhus and Tarentum led them, finally, into war with the Carthaginians (Livy 7.29). The conflict with the Samnites ended soon after it began (the First Samnite War 343-341 B.c.). An agreement was worked out by which the Samnites recognized coastal central Italy, including Campania, as part of the Roman sphere of interest while the Romans recognized Samnite suzer- ainty of the inland areas of central Italy and the left bank of the Liris River in Campania. At this point, probably thinking that their situation—wedged between Rome and Roman-dominated Cam- pania—was critical, the Latins rightly recognized that their autonomy was at stake and rose in revolt (340-338 B.c.). The war was hard fought, but its details are unknown. With help from their erstwhile enemies the Samnites, the Romans defeated the Latins decisively by 338 B.c., and a whole new era of Roman history began. Rome, Seven Hills, Servian Walls The Seven Hills of Rome and the so-called “Servian Wall,” actually built in the fourth century after the Celtic sack of the city. The Romans disagreed as to which of the hills should be counted among the “Seven Hills” of Rome. The most likely are the following: 1. Capitoline; 2. Quirinal; 3. Viminal: 4, Esquiline; 5. Caelian; 6. Palatine; 7. Aventine. Also included are 8. The Forum, and 9. The Cam- pus Martius or “Field of Mars” located outside the pomerium, and 10. The Tiber Island where the Tiber was most easily crossed. The Servian Walls are indicated by the dark perimeter line. 49 50 tees PART Date RISE ORsROME 2. ANEW BEGINNING: ROME AFTER THE LATIN WAR The settlement worked out with the Latins after the war was crucial to Rome’s future development. Despite the obscurity of the period, which comes as a result of poor documentary evidence, we know enough to conclude that a major historical milestone was passed. Principally it was this: The old rule for polis-type societies was that, once a certain size in terms of population and territory had been reached, further development was impossible without loss of the fundamental constitution and way of life of the polis. Most Greek poleis were in the realm of 700-1000 families and a territory of perhaps 25—100 square kilometers. Even Athens, which had a much larger population and territory than most poleis, had built-in limitations to its growth. Rome after the defeat of the Latins found a way out of this cul-de-sac that allowed for growth while at the same time retaining the characteris- tics of its polis and its Republican constitution. The End of the Latin League: Terms of the Settlement The momentous solution worked out by Rome for its defeated adversaries did not spring out of nothingness. Latins and Romans, as previously noted, had much in common both culturally and politically. They had such mutually interchangéable rights as marriage, trade, and migration. The establishment of the institution of the colony showed how expansion could be achieved without loss of autonomy. Basing its solution on this past experience, the Romans settled on the following: 1. While some land was confiscated from the conquered Latins, Volsci, and Campanians and assigned to individual Roman settlers, the bulk was left in the possession of its original inhabitants. The conquered were neither enslaved nor reduced to the level of serfs, but given new legal, social, and political relationships with Rome. 2. The Latin League was abolished as an institution. A small number of Latins were incorporated in the Roman state and given full citizenship rights while being allowed to continue to administer their own internal affairs. These were such smaller Latin states as Lanuvium, Pedum, Aricia, and Nomentum. Citizens of such states became Roman citizens in the fullest sense (cives optimo iure) and their states became known as municipia optimo iure.” They could vote in Roman assemblies and run for Roman political offices. At the same time they had control of their own internal affairs. What they lost was the ability to conduct foreign affairs as independent states. On the whole the number of citizens inducted into the Roman citizenship body at this time was small. Nevertheless, cautious as it was, an important precedent was established, namely, that non-citizens could be given all the rights of Roman citizens while retaining citizenship of their own, native communities. The connection between citizenship and place was severed. In the past a person could be only a citizen of the place of his native birth and present domicile. After 338 B.c. it was in principle possible for a community any place in Italy (or elsewhere for that matter) to have the full,Roman citizenship while retaining its own local autonomy and citizenship. 3. The large Latin states of Tibur and Praeneste which were too large to be absorbed, at least at this time, remained as Latin states but with individual treaties with Rome and no capacity to * The English dictionary equivalent of municipium, municipality, does not much help our understanding of the Roman term. In this instance it seemed better to keep the Latin term.  CHAPTER 2. EARLY ROME: EXTERNAL CHALLENGES ° 51 act independently in the matter of foreign relations. In this regard all diplomatic arrangements, declarations of war, treaties with foreigners and so forth, were a matter for Rome to decide. Cora also received this status as a reward for service on the Roman side during the recent war. These were civitates foederatae, allied states with separate treaties with Rome. 4. Seven old Latin colonies founded before 338 B.c. remained as Latin colonies, but their relationship was now exclusively and individually with Rome, not with each other as autonomous members of the Latin league. These were Sutrium, Nepet, Ardea, Circeii, Signia, Setia and Sutrium. They were forbidden to consult with each other as they had in the past and their mutual rights of trade (commercium) and marriage (conubium) were abrogated. The territories of Antium and Velitrae were annexed. 5. The truly major problem that needed a solution was what to do about peoples such as the Volsci and the Campanians who were differed from Rome in language and culture. The traditional solutions—enslavement or enserfment—were not considered. Instead the Romans came up with a new legal status for them: second class citizenship and partial incorporation in the Roman state. Such states were designated as civitates sine suffragio or municipia sine suffragio—states without the vote but having to bear the burdens (munera) of military service in the Roman army. It was an unpopular status as Rome found out quickly, but it had its uses and it was certainly a lot better than some of the usual alternatives that defeated states suffered in ancient (or more recent times). Citizens of such states could migrate to Roman territory and achieve full citizenship. They were in a better position to familiarize themselves with Roman law, political practice and culture than would otherwise have been possible and could thus move toward full incorporation in the Roman state. Their elites were able to establish important personal relationships with their opposite members at Rome. De facto, the status of citizenship without the vote became a preparatory phase for full citizenship. From the Roman viewpoint, to have whole groups of cities and peoples in the sine suffragio status served to create a buffer zone between Roman territory and more distant allies who had less constricting relations with Rome. The Hernici, old-time allies of Rome but enemies during the Latin war, opted to remain as allies rather than accept the status of sine suffragio. 6. Roman citizen colonies, i.e. independent cities made up exclusively of Roman citizens, were sent out to two key places on the coast, Ostia and Antium, to provide protection against piratical raids. This step was taken as an alternative to the creation of a navy for which Rome was not yet ready, and indeed Rome was historically slow to extend its power by naval means, although eventually it had no choice but to build a fleet of its own. 7. There was an important religious and cultural component of the settlement of 338 B.c. Ancient _ myths, which told of Rome’s founding by the venerable Latin state of Alba Longa and ofthe shared Trojan origin of Latins and Romans, were emphasized. Although the Latin League as an association of independent republics was over, its religious traditions were maintained. As in the past, joint religious festivals were held at the traditional Latin shrines throughout Latium. Thus was cemented the idea of ethnic unity, although the new state engineered in 338 B.c. was not based on ethnicity. In fact, the genius of the Roman invention of 338 B.c. was that any ethnic group anywhere in Italy (and eventually anywhere in the Mediterranean) could be incorporated in some fashion into the Roman state; neither ethnicity, nor language nor culture were obstacles to Roman growth—provided, of course, the incorporated peoples 52 © PARTI; THE RISE OF ROME were willing to agree to the rules of the new state. The Republic had begun to evolve from a polis-type state into a proto-territorial state, without losing the advantages of a polis-state or acquiring the administrative disadvantages that normally went with the acquisition of large amounts of conquered territory and resentful, subject populations. Consequences of the Settlement of 338 B.c. WHAT ROME AVOIDED First, a permanent class of serfs or slaves was not created. As a result, Roman garrisons were not needed to police the newly conquered territories. Second, no oppressive administrative bureaucracies were imposed by Rome. Roman appointees did not run the dozens of cities that now came under Roman overlordship. Except for the states without the vote (civitates sine suffragio), the conquered states paid no tribute to Rome. No Roman judges, tax collectors, or police intruded in the lives of the conquered peoples. What Rome demanded were soldiers in time of war, not taxes. The conquered ran their own internal affairs much as they had in the past. The new Roman state was in fact just a loose confederation of self-administering cities and communities dependent to a considerable extent on mutual tolerance and trust. This goes a long way towards explaining why Roman civic ideology and political propaganda stressed fides—trust, good faith, dependability—so much. Because it underpinned domestic culture and social relations in Rome itself, it was logical to promote it also in foreign relations. 4 WHAT ROME GAINED From economic and military viewpoints, the settlement of the Latin war produced huge gains for Rome. Direct annexation of population and territory was small, but the transformation of its former allies as described above resulted in an overall 37 percent increase of territory and a 42 percent increase of population. The core area of central coastal Italy came under Roman direct control. In emergencies it could call up large bodies of troops and, assuming success in war, could reward all inhabitants of this area with booty and land grants. To order and stability, Rome added tangible material benefits. The Roman Footprint in Italy Although Romans were not present in large numbers anywhere outside their central homeland, their fortress-colonies and the roads that connected them with Rome were visible manifestations of their presence or near-presence. The existence of allies and colonies in distant places gave emphasis to the need for good communications at all times of the year and in all weather. Some of these places were genuinely hard to reach, and Rome launched a road building program to link them with each other and with Rome itself. The program took centuries to complete. RoADS The Romans learned a great deal about road building from the Etruscans. When they conquered the Etruscan city of Veii, they inherited a preexisting network of roads that connected it to other Etruscan cities to the north and west. To this network the Romans added the Via Amerina which connected the important colony of Nepet to Rome. Ostia at the mouth of the Tiber, and Praeneste, a key city in Latium, were linked to Rome by the Via Ostiensis and the Via Praenes- tina respectively. The Via Latina was the inland route by which Rome kept open communication with Campania, while somewhat later the Via Appia provided an alternate route closer to the coast. Most of these roads were built along already established tracks or roads. Their elevation to roads (viae) involved straightening where possible, the addition of bridges and culverts, and surfacing  CHAPTER 2. EARLY ROME: EXTERNAL CHALLENGES °¢ 53 _ with gravel. Paving with stone, which was an expensive under- taking, came later in fits and starts. An important aspect of these road building activities and the huge expenses involved suggest that Romans had arrived at a high level of self-confidence. They knew that while good roads provided a quick means of reinforc- ing frontier fortresses and aiding allies, the converse was also true: enemies could use the roads to attack Rome. In fact the Via Latina was used by both Pyrrhus (in the early third century), and Hannibal (later in the same century) when they launched their raids on Rome itself. CENTURIATION The division of land confiscated from ene- mies also left a powerful visible imprint on the landscape of Italy. Whether it was a matter of founding a colony or individual allot- ments an elaborate process known as centuriation (centuriatio) Coin with Fides legend was used to guarantee an orderly transfer of land to the settlers and their descendants. Roman surveyors divided up the land to be assigned into squares, rectangles and irregular areas marked by stone boundary markers, a number The Capitol iy Lae, Seg Temple: 5 VG ‘ of Jupiter Fy SA 23 4 4 eTemple Wes of Fides VHDN BEAT AS Sf ude oe, ( £ Temple of Concord Plan of Capitoline Hill The Romans gave visual emphasis to their ideology. The Temple of Fides was located in a prominent position on the Capitol overlooking the Forum as a perpetual reminder to Romans and visitors to Rome of the stock Romans claimed to put in trustworthiness and dependability. The clasped hands on the coin proclaim the dependability of the armies (first century.v.). 54 © PARTI: THE RISE OF ROME Ground plan of Cosa Cosa was founded in 273 s.c. as a frontier outpost on the coast north of Rome. The colony had to cope with pirates and the nearby hostile Etruscan city of Vulci. It was surrounded by walls. Eighteen towers facing the sea strengthened the defenses. Its capitolium or tripartite temple to Jupiter, Juno and Minerva, was located on the hill above the colony in the arx or citadel. It was built in imitation of its counterpart in Rome. Such “Capitols” were a standard feature of all Roman colonies. of which survive. Registers were kept of the allotments to keep control of the land distribution pro- cess and avoid future disputes. The work of centuriation is most visible from the air where the marks of the original grids can still be seen in the ground throughout Italy, but most especially in the Po valley and in Apulia in southern Italy.’ The unit of measurement was the actus and the normal size of a century was 20 x 20 actus, or about 125 acres. The actual lines (/imites) of the grid were marked by walls, roads and ditches and it is these that have left their mark in the countryside to the present. Limites that ran east and west were known as decumani; north-south lines were kardines. Centuriation, the presence of Latin speaking peoples in powerfully fortified colonies, and roads linking the colonies to each other and to Rome were constant reminders to the native peoples that although they may have been a majority in terms of population, real power no longer lay with them. ‘Centuriation is still visible over large areas of Tunisia, France, Germany, the Danube Valley and parts of the Middle East.  CHAPTER 2. EARLY ROME: EXTERNAL CHALLENGES ° 55 _ For native elites there was little choice but to cooperate with the new authorities. Thus began the slow, uneven process of “Romanization.” Long before the term “divide and conquer” was invented, Rome was following the procedure throughout Italy as a matter of self-interested statecraft. Eventually it would do so throughout the Mediterranean and a good portion of Atlantic and continental Europe. The Roman Military The Roman army had originally been modeled on the close-order fighting unit of the phalanx used by Greek armies. The Roman phalanx, perhaps 4,000 men strong, was made up of heavily armed infantrymen or hoplites who were equipped with cuirass (breast plates), greaves (shin guards), hel- mets, and round shields. Packed closely together in files eight deep, the purpose of the phalanx was to drive enemy forces from the field and hold the ground captured. For the siege of Veii, the legion was expanded from 4,000 to 6,000 men, probably by expanding the single class system to five classes. Pay may have been introduced at this time for the purpose of covering the individual soldier’s living costs while away from home. The cavalry unit of the army went from 6 to 18 centuries. By mid fourth century, the single legionary army was split into two legions, and by the end of the century there were four legions. By that time also the phalanx legion had been transformed into the more flexible manipular legion made up of 30 subunits called “maniples” (manipuli—‘handfuls”’), and each maniple was in turn divided into two “centuries” (of 60 to 80 men) commanded by centurions. It took most of the century for the Romans to complete the restructuring of their army, but in the end it was an extraordinarily efficient fighting force.* AUXILIARIES AND THE ALLIES What we think of when we hear the term “Roman Army” is, rea- sonably enough, an armed body of men made up of Romans. In reality, however, a Roman army was rarely made up of just “Romans.” Brigaded alongside the Roman legions was an equal number of soldiers drawn from its Latin and non-Latin allies. Thus a consular army of two legions would be accompanied on campaign by two legion-equivalents of allies. Under treaty arrangements with Rome, the allies at the beginning of each year were told how many troops they needed to provide and when and where they were to appear. Allied units were made up of 500 men in turmae or cohorts, 10 of which made a wing (a/a)—the term for the legion-equivalent. Their equipment, so far as we can tell, was the same as that of the Romans themselves. The individual allied cohorts were commanded by their own officers called praefecti. Somewhat confusingly the whole allied ala was commanded also by prefects, but these were Roman officers appointed by the consuls. 3. THE SAMNITE WARS: THE CAMPAIGN FOR ITALY Down to the settlement of 338 B.c. Rome had been buffered against direct contact with the Samnite federation by the presence of its Hernican and Latins allies. The settlement of 338 B.c., however, put Rome, through its Campanian involvement with Capua, in direct confrontation with the Samnites. CONFRONTATION WITH THE SAMNITES As the Romans were expanding their hegemony, so were the Samnites. Strategically located on a saddle of mountain land overlooking two of the major plains of Italy, Campania and Apulia, Samnium was in a position to dominate all of central and southern Italy. By the mid—fourth century B.c. it was well on the way to doing so. Previous Oscan incursions from the highlands had, as we have seen, swept the Greeks and Etruscans out of Campania (with ‘The next chapter has an extended discussion of the military changes that took place in the fourth century. See pp. 80. 56 © PART I: THE RISE OF ROME the exception of Naples), but when Rome incorporated the Campanians into its commonwealth in 338 B.c., it came into direct competition with the Samnites for control of that area. The Samnites in turn were confronted for the first time not just by individual cities as they had been in the past, but by an organized block of peoples reaching from south of Naples to Etruria. The confrontation between the two powers came in the Liris valley. It is unlikely that at this time either side thought they were about to enter into a multi-phased, decades-long war for supremacy in Italy, but that is what occurred. Rome strengthened its position in the Liris valley by founding Latin colonies at Cales in 334 B.c. and Fregellae in 328 B.c., and a Roman colony at Tarracina on the coast in 329 B.c.° The found- ing of Fregellae, which was on the left bank of the Liris, may have been seen as a particularly pro- vocative act because the Samnites had for some time been moving to control that area. In addition, Rome had interests in Apulia, into which the Samnites were infiltrating, where the cities of Arpi and Luceria had requested Roman help. The great conflict was thus a struggle throughout most of central and southern Italy between the urbanized, agricultural populations of the plains and the pas- toral highland peoples. For almost a generation the wars dragged on—bloody, confused, unending. They occurred in two phases: the Second Samnite War between 326 B.c. and 304 B.c., and the Third Samnite War between 298 B.c. and 290 B.c. The Strategic Issues of the Samnite Wars. Each side had strategic advantages and disadvantages. Geographically the Samnites had a major advantage over Rome throughout their protracted contests. “No position in war is stronger,” says the military analyst Correlli Barnett, “than a strategic offensive coupled with a tactical defensive.”® Translated for the war between Rome and Samnium, this means that Italian topography made it easy for the Samnites to attack Roman territory, but difficult for the Romans to attack the Samnite homeland. The most natural approach to Samnium for Roman armies was through Campania, but rugged mountains on Samnium’s Campanian side made any assault from that direction difficult. The Romans always had to attack uphill, as it were, into the mountain fastnesses of the Samnites. Samnium had a weakness, however: Its rear was vulnerable to an attack from the plains of Apulia. The only problem with an Apulian strategy for Rome was how it was to get its armies into Apulia. Not by sea—Rome lacked a fleet and even if it had one the dangers of shipping men and equipment all around southern Italy into the Adriatic would have made that approach too risky. That left a two-step assault, first a move across central Italy to the Adriatic, followed by a march down the coast into Apulia, as the only alternative. This strategy, too, had its problems. Central Italy’s mountains were full of belligerent tribes and the terrain was horrendous for campaigning. ALL BAD CHOICES Rome’s choices were all bad choices, but of these the frontal assault on Campania seemed at first the only practicable one. The Romans tried this and, predictably, they failed badly. The battle of Caudine Forks in 321 B.c,, which resulted in a whole Roman army being forced to surrender, was, in the opinion of the Romans, their worst defeat in history. Rome was forced to give up its recently established fortresses at Fregellae and perhaps Cales, and its links with Campania, the Via Latina and the Via Appia, were cut. An uneasy five-year truce followed. With the *Distances from Rome were not great. Fregellae was just 60 miles from away, directly on the line of the Via Latina, about halfway between Rome and Campania. Warfare, in other words, was still being conducted within a day or so’s walking distance of Rome. °Correlli Barnett, 7he Swordbears, Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1975, p. 96  CHAPTER 2. EARLY ROME: EXTERNAL CHALLENGES °¢ 57 _ failures of the first round of the war in mind, Rome was forced to rethink its options. It decided on a combined Adriatic-Apulian strategy. A New Strategy: Isolating North and South Since its first encounter with the Samnites in the 350s B.c. Romans had been conscious of the danger of having to fight a two-front war with the Samnites on one side and an alliance of Etruscans, Celts and Oscans on the other. Its worst case scenario was for these two groups of enemies to unite. To avoid this possibility Rome had to exploit its central place location, its main strategic asset. CENTRAL PLACE THEORY In the diagram below, hypothetical country B has central place loca- tion relative to countries A and C. At first glance B’s position looks dangerous since it could be attacked simultaneously by A and C. However, B has the natural advantage of internal lines of com- munication which allow the rapid movement of armies from one frontier to another. The attacking nations have no such advantage. If they are to succeed they have to coordinate their attacks exactly, a difficult task under any circumstances. However, there is a caveat: To exploit the advantages of internal lines of communication requires high levels of national self-discipline and a willingness to engage in long term planning. Romans were conscious of the advantages and disadvantages of their position in central Italy from early times. Their discipline and attention to organization was the product of a society milita- rized by necessity. They knew what they had to do to survive in a dangerous environment. Rome’s strategy, based on its central place location, even if not always followed, was reflexive. Nevertheless the sheer doggedness and intelligence with which the Romans pursued their strategy in the period fol- lowing Caudine Forks is one of the more visionary feats of statecraft and military planning in history. Less well known than some of Rome’s other achievements, it deserves to be looked at in some detail. BUILDING A BARRIER IN CENTRAL ITALY Rome’s initial approach to its two-front problem was necessarily diplomatic. It could not conduct wars in the north with much hope of success while simultaneously contending with the Samnites in the south. From the 350s B.c. on, Rome sought to neutralize the northern threat by seeking long-term truces with key Etruscan and Umbrian cities. A major achievement was a 30-year-truce negotiated in around 330 B.c. with the Senonian Celts (Gauls) who had settled on the Adriatic side of Italy. These were the most threatening (and clos- est) of all the Celts and it was vital to keep them quiet while wars with Samnium were in progress. Almost to the end, Rome was successful in isolating north and south, though there was trouble in Etruria between 311 8.c. and 308 B.c. When the Celts and Etruscans finally did join in the fighting 58 © PART I: THE RISE OF ROME (culminating in the Battle of Sentinum in 295 B.c.), it was too late to make a difference. Neverthe- less, Sentinum was a close call. If Latium was Rome’s original central place location it now planned to develop this advanta- geous position by building a political and military barrier all the way across the Italian peninsula from the Tyrrhenian to the Adriatic Sea. The work on this project began immediately after the humiliation of Caudine Forks, but was not complete until 266 B.c. By expanding to the Adriatic, Rome could accomplish the dual task of making a two-front war unlikely or at least manageable if it occurred, and secondly of defeating Samnium through the Apulian strategy. THE ADRIATIC-APULIAN STRATEGY The plan was marvelously conceived, but difficult to execute. When Germany and the United States built their internal lines of communication—their network of roads and railroads—they were doing so in peacetime, with huge resources, and in territories that were under their direct control. The Romans, on the other hand, had to accomplish their task over generations, while engaging simultaneously in war and diplomacy with the Samnite Federation, bands of Celts, Etruscan cities, and literally dozens of tribal peoples in the mountainous interior of Italy. Unfortunately we lack the kinds of records that would allow us to bring these events to life in any detail. We can only imagine the kind of discussions that must have taken place in the Senate, in the homes of commons and elite, among Romans, Latins and their allies. Every technique of cajole- ment and intimidation must have been used. Some potential enemies were no doubt bought off, while others were brow-beaten. The amount of detailed knowledge of Italy’s geography, languages, peoples and cultures acquired by Roman senators and ordinary people during this process must have been huge. Fortunately for Rome, there were none of the rapid changes in the make-up of the Senate that occur in democratic modern governments, where it is difficult to pursue consistent strategies from year to year let alone from generation to generation, and where institutional knowledge and memory is shallow. THE EXECUTION OF THE STRATEGY Except for occasional notices in the sources, we can only follow the general course of Rome’s Adriatic strategy. From the start it was successful. We know, for instance, that in 319 B.c. the Frentani made an alliance with Rome, and there followed other alli- ances with states in Apulia which were looking for help against infiltrating Samnites. By 315 B.c., Roman armies were operating in Apulia, and a major success was achieved that year when the key strategic site of Luceria, a Samnite stronghold, was captured. It was immediately converted into a large Latin colony. By this move Rome established an important fortress from which attacks could be launched on the vulnerable rear of Samnium. In case of disaster, Roman armies could retreat to the defenses of the colony. But even while Roman armies were having success in Apulia, they were having difficulties in their home territories. They suffered a crushing defeat at Lautulae, a few miles from Terracina, and the victorious Samnite army marched to within 25 miles of Rome, as far as the colony of Ardea, which blocked its progress into Latium. The following year, 314 B.c., saw yet another reversal of fortunes. This time the Samnite army was heavily defeated near Terracina, and Rome was able to reestablish its colonies at Cales and Fregellae and create four new colonies at Saticula, Suessa, Inter- amna and on the island of Pontiae off the coast of Campania. The aim of this latter colony was to provide sea access to Campania in case the land routes were severed again. One scholar has rightly called Luceria and these new colonies the fetters of Samnium. The Second War with Samnium came to an end in 304 B.c.  Ajey PIOYSIHEA sajneg om K saiuojo) une] ~ RapPeRaH Sa}UOJOD UAaZIID UPWIOY e ¢ wimisaeg ba Wee! ee Fs 3 VINVOA 1 ea ps‘i : JOE] URWOY ea satire Vay : wen a.7i * und caer INI diy Se is. ended vote ne N ¥3S ie ES a an Br OW" UNV NVINJHYSAL Se se y? piabal. ; ST pia6is be piasay enesnq eo" cu. iy *s on # suae) hg A w Ss INS 3 yy = Ras_yossie> fe io LARURUS, | wnt 1% ¢: > wy o ~ M } : m («th 7 ue ~’Y | ve " pig eg ZS oW@ (047 = Trews, ba ee ee eee iy UP De Le Pers page 1s CA a’ ys > oan hear genOS Neg 7 =) »» @ “GEIL Se ey Ar RA aoateA _ YW “an? wit, pera avtae? 2 Gis : 7 = PVP ' eS ha? ea eepaie:y Rte 14 vA - ty 8 poate 7 —os ye e a) S| (Paver wwe “oars é ~ Ma tyaoeal aeei 2 4.9 Png HeMe tte sce ah We ds) oh. vehtacar oe ® - m % Ow ee wwe — - a Ven » ayes lira =_— ~—-. oo > Ra ste, + ecg n -  12 The Augustan Settlement bs scorns stat eta eal sion mare aateRaTRINae A 1. BREAK UP OR RESTORATION? Not Many Alternatives After his victory over Antony and Cleopatra at Actium in 31 B.c., Octavian was faced with the colos- sal task of restoring Rome to a functioning state.' It was not a foregone conclusion that he would succeed. Writing in 38 B.c., the poet Horace thought that “this city might die by its own right hand... and this impious generation of fated blood perish and the land belong once again to wild beasts” (Epodes 7.10; 16.9). Given the disfunctionality of Rome’s government for over a century, it seemed more likely that far-flung provinces with no deep or long term connections with Rome would break off and go their own way, given the opportunity and the means. In any case, it was clear to most Romans that a firm hand was needed to prevent internal and external actors from destroying the empire that generations of earlier Romans had created at so much cost to themselves and their neigh- bors. The only question was how firm that hand was to be and whose it was to be—an individual’s, the Senate’s, or some combination as yet undiscovered ofthe two. THE CAESARIAN SOLUTION Julius Caesar’s solution—to the extent he had one—to the problems that plagued the late Republic was an improvised form of one-man rule. At the pinnacle of his power he issued decrees and orders and consulted his friends, but never the Senate, which he scorned. On one notorious occasion he remained seated when the entire Senate, bringing with it an imposing list of honors they had just voted him, paid him a visit. When one of the consuls of the year died on New Year’s eve, a senator asked that he be appointed suffect (or substitute) consul for the few hours 'Octavian’s full name after accepting his adoption by Caesar was Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus. Sometime before 38 B.c. he added the praenomen “/mperator” to his title and became “Imperator Caesar.” This title emphasized military and dynastic claims respectively. All later emperors (imperatores) assumed it. 247 248 © PART IV: THE REPUBLIC RESTORED remaining. Caesar granted his request. He further irritated the Senate by selecting magistrates for years in advance and admitting foreigners—even Celts to whom he had granted citizenship—into the Senate. He sent a freedman’s son to command three legions in Egypt. Such actions threatened the status and privileges of the senatorial class. Caesar mainly kept busy with administrative tasks, building projects, reforms (such as the reform of the calendar), and preparing for a campaign against the Parthians to recover the standards lost by Crassus at the battle of Carrhae. As a result, Caesar increasingly found himself isolated from traditional Roman political culture. We do not know whether he thought he could or could not do anything to reform the constitution in a fundamental way. With his quick intelligence, he may have decided it was beyond remedy—at least by him. Perhaps he knew his own character too well. He was far too impatient to do the hard work of political bridge-building—to persuade, flatter, and compromise—that are at the heart of politics. The Senate was an exclusive club full of men from ancient Roman families and new men trying to make their presence felt. Their outsize egos—many of them matched with second- or third-rate characters—needed constant stroking. Caesar was not the kind of man to provide that kind of attention. He had spent too many years on campaign, far from the irritations and political wranglings of Rome. No wonder he wanted to get out of the city and wage war in the east. THE ESSENTIAL SENATE Even apart from longstanding traditions of Roman political culture, it would have been difficult for Caesar to sustain himself for long without building a government in which his friends, who rightly expected to be rewarded, found positions of power and honor. Not even the most powerful of autocrats works alone. Syme was right to insist that all governments are oligarchies at their core. Caesar needed many helpers. To do that, however, meant working within the existing political order. The prestige of the Senate, despite its manifold failures, was immense. Institutionally there was no alternative to it. It was impossible to govern a Mediterranean-wide empire without officials, and these had to come from somewhere. Yet, where else could Caesar find people with the necessary background and qualifications for governance and command except in the Senate, which acted as a kind of screening filter for the Roman government? When Caesar chose his great-nephew Octavian as his heir, perhaps he saw in him the qualities he found lacking in himself. What Winston Churchili is supposed to have said of FDR—that he was a man with a second-rate mind but a first-rate personality—might also be said of Octavian. 2. INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEMS? The Army The most pressing problem facing Octavian after Actium in 31 B.c. was that of the military. The empire needed a standing army for its defense and to maintain internal order. There was general agreement on these two points, but other questions-remained. How large should the army be, and —a connected question—how large an army could Rome afford? How was it to be funded, and from where were the recruits to come? How long were they to serve and, most importantly, who was to command them? Dio Cassius reports a speech between two of Augustus’ closest advisers on how best to answer some of these questions. Interestingly Agrippa, the Princeps’ military man, advocated maintaining the traditional system of recruiting conscripts for short periods of time, arguing that a standing army was a perpetual threat to stability. This kind of recruitment would keep the costs  CHAPTER 12. THE AUGUSTAN SETTLEMENT °¢ 249 down and maintain the connection between civilians and soldiers. Maecenas, a wily and cultivated _ politician and diplomat, with perhaps short-term solutions in mind, argued for a volunteer army of professionals serving for long periods of time. His argument carried the day.’ The experience of the late Republic had taught the ruling class the danger of large-scale special commands. Some way of preventing generals doing what generals did from Sulla to Augustus him- self—namely, turning the armies of the Republic into private armies—had to be found. If not, the cycle of civil wars would be repeated until there was nothing left to fight over. DEMOBILIZING THE LEGIONS In 31 B.c. there were 60 legions under arms. Many, perhaps most of these soldiers had been drafted into the legions by one or other of the two sides in the recent civil war, and were anxious to be demobilized. They had to be found land and settled quickly before trouble erupted in the ranks. Even a beloved commander like Julius Caesar had to face down muti- nies in 49 and 47 B.c. by soldiers who wanted to return home. The standing army was to be built around those professionals who had no interest in returning to civilian life. Between 31 B.c. and 13 B.c. Augustus reduced the 60 legions to 28. He claims to have sent home or resettled 300,000 veterans in colonies (Res Gestae 3). Under Sulla resettlement had been financed by a bloody proscription; fortunately, the means for accomplishing Augustus’ enormous resettlements were supplied by the treasures of Egypt, which Augustus seized after the defeat of Antony. Length of service, pay scales, and discharge benefits were all regularized. In A.p. 6 a special military treasury (aerarium militare), funded by a sales tax and death duties, was set up to pay retirement bonuses to the 6,000 or so veterans who were discharged annually. Service was to be for 20 years with five years in the reserves. The discharge bonus was fixed at 12,000 sesterces for ordinary soldiers, equivalent to about 14 years of pay. A BAD BARGAIN The new taxes were naturally highly unpopular, but the alternative—land grants and confiscations—were even more unpopular. The taxpayers grumbled but in the end accepted the Augustan solution. It was a necessary but bad bargain. Military service and citizen- ship in Rome now became detached from each other. Army service and the ownership of land were the traditional and inseparable foundations of civilian power in a constitutional state. The theory of such states was that those who took on themselves the risk and costs of war deserved to decide who and whether they were going to fight. To turn the immense responsibility for the defense of the state over to a paid professional military necessarily involved ceding much power to the army. After all, why should those who were unwilling to take on the miseries of war (whatever about the costs) be able to dictate to those who were? Shaking off military responsibilities has some immedi- ate, short term satisfaction and pleases a number of constituencies. Historically, however, societies which have had large standing professional armies have usually paid a very high price for them beyond the actual cost of their maintenance. It was not that these facts were unknown at Rome, as the discussion between Agrippa and Maecenas (above) indicates. It may have been that, as with so much else in the Rome of this time, the principle had been abandoned long before to imperial needs. An immediate solution was necessary. Agrippa was right in principle, Maecenas in terms of expediency. Or something like that argument. The speeches are not historical in the sense that they would have been had Dio been present at the debate and took notes which he later worked up into a facsimile of the original. But they reflect ideas that were commonplace since the emergence of the polis, and were undoubtedly on the minds of any Romans who gave a minute’s thought to the dilemmas the city faced since the second century B.c. 250 © PART IV: THE REPUBLIC RESTORED Augustus, the Elite, and the Constitution THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OF THE ARMY The constitutional problem of the army was not easily solved. Somehow Augustus had to find a legally acceptable means of keeping control of the army without having to remain dictator in perpetuity (Caesar’s choice), or alternatively, being consul every year. This was in addition to the political problem of how to keep tight control of commanders in the field who, if particularly successful, could become instantaneous competitors for the Princeps’ own job. The alternative—having incompetent commanders—was obviously not a viable solution. Romans expected victories in the field, not defeats. When the army of Varus was wiped out in Germany in a.p. 9 Augustus had to worry not just about the danger caused by the loss but also the political fall-out. Senators muttered about incompetence and bungling on the Palatine (where Augustus had his house) and reminded themselves that Varus had been the son-in-law of that scheming intimate of the Princeps, Agrippa, and had also been married to a grand-niece of Augustus himself. Augustus took the loss hard, “leaving his hair untrimmed for months and often beating his head on a door exclaiming, ‘Quinctilius Varus, give me back my legions!’”(Suet. Augustus 23). In 36 B.c. during his struggle with Antony, Octavian had offered to give up his triumviral powers and return the government of the Republic to the Senate and people—provided Antony did the same thing. The offer was something more than a ploy to embarrass his triumviral colleague. It demon- strated that Octavian was aware that he had to consider a constitutional solution to the on-going crisis of government. With Antony out of the picture he was in a position to actually fulfill his offer of 36 B.c. Having held the consulship continuously from 31 B.c., Augustus renounced his powers in 27 8.c. In a carefully choreographed drama, he returned control of the state to “will of the Senate and the Roman People” (RG 34). Pressed by the Senate, he retained the consulship and also consular control (imperium consulare) through legates over the legions in the frontier provinces of Gaul, Spain, Syria, and Egypt. The Senate, with a few legions, retained control of pacified but important provinces such as Africa, Illyria, and Macedonia. Although this solution had at least constitutional form, it was not completely satisfactory. As in previous years when Augustus held the consulship it halved the number of consular positions available to the nobility and saddled Augustus with many routine duties. From Augustus’ viewpoint this was only a partial solution to some key political issues, but it did cut the ground from under those who complained that because the emergency was over, something needed to be done about their leaders’ excessive powers. In so far as the army was concerned, the Princeps continued to exercise control over the bulk of the legions. Because they were located in the frontier provinces he could engage in expansionary policies that would enable him to appeal to the army while at the same time portraying himself to the general population as an expander and defender of the empire. This could be turned to good political capital—except, of course, in the event of a military setback. MAIUS IMPERIUM In his ongoing search for ways to finesse the problem of retaining military command while respecting constitutional traditions, Augustus in 23 B.c. gave up the consulship after holding it for 9 years in a row. He did not hold it again except on rare, mostly honorific occasions. This provided the elite with two chief offices instead of one while adding to the Princeps’ patronal power.? As part of his understanding with the Senate, Augustus could recommend or block candidates for the office. Instead of losing power by this move, Augustus actually gained power. Being able to recom- mend an additional candidate every year strengthened his power within the senatorial aristocracy. ‘The consuls of the year, called consules ordinarii, had more prestige than suffect consuls, i.e., senators who were appointed consuls for portion of the year. The ordinarii gave their names to the year,  CHAPTER 12. THE AUGUSTAN SETTLEMENT °* 251 The problem of control of the army could have been complicated by Augustus’ abandonment _ of the consulship, but this was fixed by having the Senate grant him special proconsular power that was greater than that possessed by any proconsul (maius imperium). This new arrangement once more extended the Princeps’ powers because now he could legitimately intervene in all provinces, including those under senatorial control, whenever he thought it necessary. CLEVER FLEXIBILITY The separation of the power of the office from the actual office itself was a clever arrangement and shows the flexibility of Rome’s unwritten constitution. The action had important consequences. Normally, office holders were subject to the veto of their colleagues (col- legiality), the annual time limit (annuality), and the geographical limits of the assigned province. Augustus was now freed from these restrictions. Needless to say, the Senate was well aware of the implications of its actions, but it too knew the dangers that insufficiently controlled armies posed to Rome’s stability. There was no alternative to one-man rule in this respect. The only question that remained was what form—the modality—one man rule would take. What the Princeps was propos- ing must have seemed to most senators about as good a solution as they could hope for at this point in time. Maius imperium thus became one of the legal pillars of the new constitution. AUGUSTUS’ ILLNESS That same year (23 B.c.) Augustus became seriously ill, and on what seemed to be his death bed gave his signet ring to Agrippa and his papers to his consular colleague, Calpurnius Piso, a convinced republican constitutionalist. His presumed heir, his nephew Marcellus, received nothing. It seems likely that up until this unexpected illness, the resignation of the consul- ship and the choice of Piso as the Princeps’ colleague had been a well prepared scenario intended to convince doubters that he was serious about restoring the formalities of senatorial rule. Augustus’ reaction to his illness suggests, however, that his republicanism was not a farce. If he were to die at this point, it seems Augustus wanted to be remembered as one who acknowledged the values and traditions of the Republic. Had he designated Marcellus as his heir, he would have given more than the appearance of turning his rule into an overt, hereditary monarchy where, at the death of king, the kingdom passed like so much real estate to the heir-apparent. The 18-year-old Marcellus was obviously unqualified to step into the shoes of his uncle, although Augustus’ preferen