Afghanistan-Pakistan Conflict PDF

Afghanistan/Pakistan Con ict (Unresolved) Historical Roots fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi The roots of this unresolved con ct in the borderland of South AsiaCentral Asia can be traced to the mid-eighteenth century, to the Durrani era of Afghanistan’s imperial expansion into northwest India, early in the pe...

Afghanistan/Pakistan Con ict (Unresolved) Historical Roots fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi The roots of this unresolved con ct in the borderland of South AsiaCentral Asia can be traced to the mid-eighteenth century, to the Durrani era of Afghanistan’s imperial expansion into northwest India, early in the period of British rule over the sub-continent. As an interstate con ct, it began with the creation of Pakistan and India on August 14–15, 1947, when the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) was allocated to Pakistan by the British Parliament’s India Independence Act. An impending con ct between Afghanistan and Pakistan was already evident in July 1947, during a British Government of India-supervised referendum among the overwhelming Pushtun ethnic majority in the NWFP: the options for its electorate were integration into Pakistan or India. Conspicuously absent were two other options, urged by the Government of Afghanistan— integration into Afghanistan, where the Pushtuns formed the largest ethnic community, or independence for the North West Frontier Province, widely known by its population as Pakhtunkhwa. [In 2010, Pakistan formally accepted the name change, adding the preceding word, Khyber]. The outcome of the 1947 referendum, boycotted by the largest socio-political organization in the NWFP, the Khudai Khidmatgars [Servants of God]—a very close ally of the Gandhi- and Nehru-led Indian National Congress until the 1947 CHAPTER 7 Select Case Study Findings On Interstate Con cts: Asia © The Author(s) 2018 M. Brecher, A Century of Crisis and Con ct in the International System, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57156-0_7 180 M. BRECHER Partition of India— was a very large majority, of those who voted, in favor of integration into Pakistan. The referendum and its outcome were immediately rejected by Afghanistan as illegal, leading, inter alia, to its decisive rejection of Pakistan’s initial application for membership in the United Nations, and they have never been accepted by Afghanistan as the legitimate expression of the NWFP’s Pushtun population. That ethnic-territorial dispute has been the core of this interstate con ct since its onset in 1948. Behavior Afghanistan Decisions The frst of many strategic and important tactical decisions by Afghanistan in this unresolved, though long-dormant con ct was its repudiation of the results of a referendum conducted in mid-1947 under the terms of the UK Government’s formal decision leading to the partition of India: the referendum, among the residents of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), offered two options for their future association—legal integration into the Dominion of India or the Dominion of Pakistan, scheduled to come into existence on August 14–15 of that year. As soon as news of this impending referendum became known, Afghanistan made the strategic decision to challenge its legitimacy and legality. In March 1947, Afghanistan’s decision was implemented in an offcial dissenting letter to the UK Government: as noted it emphasized the overwhelming Pushtun majority of NWFP residents and declared that two other crucial options should therefore be included in the referendum—integration of the NWFP territory and residents into Afghanistan, in which Pushtuns were the largest ethnic community, and independence for the NWFP. Both the UK and the leadership of the soon-to-be-inaugurated Dominion of Pakistan remained frm in the narrow choice of referendum options. After the results of the two-option referendum were announced—a large majority favored integration into Pakistan—Afghanistan vigorously reaffrmed its rejection of the outcome as a denial of a fundamental right of the NWFP Pushtuns to genuine self-determination. A second strategic decision by Afghanistan was to disavow, formally, its long-time acquiescence in the 1893 Durand Line Agreement between British India and a weakened Afghan monarchy: although it had informally rejected the Durand Line as the legitimate border with Pakistan, 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 181 both before and at the time of Pakistan’s independence (August 15, 1947), Afghanistan’s decision no longer to recognize the Durand Line as their border was announced in July 1949. The unconcealed hostility of Afghanistan toward its southern neighbor was expressed frequently: an early expression of this attitude was its tactical decision to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the UN on September 30, 1947, the only negative vote on this issue in the UN General Assembly. Aware of the adverse fall-out of this act led Afghanistan to withdraw its vote on October 20, 1947 fi fi fi fi fi and to establish diplomatic relations with Pakistan in 1948. Yet the Afghanistan commitment to reversing the outcome of the 1947 referendum in the NWFP and its integration into Pakistan, continued to rankle. Among the important tactical decisions that refected this commitment was Afghanistan’s sponsorship of a Pashtunistan Government in the border city of Tirah in 1951. Much more signifcant, in terms of this South Asia-Central Asia con ct, was Afghanistan’s strategic decision to oppose vigorously Pakistan’s ‘One Unit’ plan in 1954 and 1955 to merge all four western provinces in this geographically divided state into one unit, to be called West Pakistan (East Bengal was to remain the sole province of East Pakistan). Afghanistan was enraged by what it deplored as the second phase of a conscious Pakistan denial of the NWFP Pashtuns’ right to selfdetermination; the frst phase was their imposed integration into the new state of Pakistan via the 1947 referendum that deprived the NWFP Pashtuns of their natural right to choose integration with their ethnic kin in Afghanistan or independence. A strategic Afghanistan foreign policy decision, with roots in this con ct and belated far-reaching consequences, was to seek aid from the USSR, when Pakistan suspended its cross-border trade on May 14, 1955: as a land-locked state, Afghanistan was heavily dependent on Pakistan for most of its foreign trade, both imports and exports. The implementation of this decision took the form of Soviet economic and military aid that began immediately and grew considerably over time. In August 1955, Afghanistan signed a barter protocol with the USSR, assuring it of a regular supply of vital imports. In December 1955, the Soviet Union provided a $100 million development loan. The following August, Afghanistan received the frst small supply of Soviet arms ($25 million). By 1960, the Soviet Union accounted for half of Afghanistan’s total trade, including 90% of its oil and all of its military imports. The next year, when Pakistan once more suspended Afghanistan’s cross-border 182 M. BRECHER trade and access to the Arabian Sea, the USSR further increased the fow of economic and military aid, which continued through the 1960s and 1970s. More than two decades after Afghanistan’s initial 1955 decision, the alignment between Afghanistan and the USSR culminated in a Treaty of Friendship (December 5, 1978). This, in turn, provided a legal basis for the Soviet Union’s disastrous military intervention-occupation of Afghanistan the next year that lasted a decade (1979–1989). For the Soviet Union, it proved to be a superpower model of very high geopolitical costs with no visible benefts that was emulated by the other superpower, the U.S., for an even longer period (2001– 2014). Afghanistan: Decision-Makers The key decision-makers in Afghanistan during the most active period of its con ct with Pakistan (1947–1978) were members of the Musahiban royal family. Specifcally, they were as follows: Muhammad Hashim and Shah Mahmud, two uncles of the young King Zahir Shah, who alternated as Prime Minister (1947–1953); Muhammad Daoud Khan, cousin of the King and Prime Minister, and his brother who served as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (1953–1963) for King Zahir Shah (1963– 1973); and Muhammad Daoud Khan, as President of Afghanistan, after a coup that overthrew the monarchy (1973–1978). Other than the frst two decisions noted above, acquiescence in the results of the 1947 NWFP referendum and renunciation of the 1893 Durand Line agreement with British India, the most infuential fgure in shaping Afghanistan’s policy toward Pakistan and key decisions for 15 years was Daoud Khan. Since 1978 this con ct has been dormant, frst, when Afghanistan was under communist rule, with Soviet occupation (1979– 1989), later, under the Taliban (1996–2001) and, since then, the U.S.supported Afghanistan Government in the Afghanistan-Taliban War. Afghanistan: Decision Process The political structure of Afghanistan during the active period of this unresolved con ct (1947– 1978) combined two systems—organized, centralized government in the relatively few urban centers and autonomy in the provinces and tribal areas. A national legislature existed with 120 members, acting as a consultative body at the discretion of the monarch, later, of the president or the prime minister. In the autonomous Tribal Areas, the basic governing unit was the Jirga or Assembly, with a higher assembly, Loe Jirga, that met infrequently. During the period 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 183 of Soviet occupation, an Afghan Communist structure was introduced but its institutions exercised little actual decisionmaking power visà-vis Pakistan. The Taliban introduced a highly authoritarian political structure during its 5 years in power (1996–2001); it was replaced by a formally democratic system, under fi fi fl fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi U.S. infuence. In sum, when the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ct was active (1947–1978), the Afghanistan decision process on major issues related to the con ct was concentrated in the small number of political leaders noted above, with informal consultation involving provincial and tribal leaders on matters of local concern, but not on matters of general national policy toward the longtime adversary, Pakistan. Pakistan: Decisions The other principal adversary in this interstate con ct made even more strategic and important tactical decisions. The frst two major Pakistan decisions in this con ct were the obverse of Afghanistan’s two earliest decisions, noted above. Both were passive decisions that had long-term strategic consequences for the adversaries and the durability of their con ct. However, they did not involve a complex decision process for Pakistan or indeed any problem of choice: there was only one perceived option for the two closely related issues. One Pakistan decision was to welcome, with relief, the result of the NWFP referendum—a large majority in favor of integration into Pakistan, not India. The other decision was to acquiesce, comfortably, in the implicit confrmation of Pakistan’s claim that the 1893 Afghanistan–British India Agreement on the Durand Line as their common border applied as well to the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, by virtue of the formal inclusion of the NWFP in the territory of the new state. In the early 1950s, Pakistan made a major foreign policy decision, not directly related to, but with far-reaching consequences for, its con ct with Afghanistan—to seek a close military alignment with the United States. This decision was implemented in three high-pro e national security agreements: a Mutual Defense Assistance Act with the United States in May 1954, which mushroomed into a half-century of valuable military aid from a superpower, greatly enhancing Pakistan’s military capability in its primary national security pre-occupation, its long, acrimonious unresolved con ct with India; and membership in two U.S.- sponsored regional alliances, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954, and the Central Treaty Organization 184 M. BRECHER (CENTO), better known as the ‘Baghdad Pact,’ in September 1955. This military alignment with the U.S., especially the frst of these three pacts, which was renewed continuously except for a brief suspension of U.S. military aid, greatly enhanced Pakistan’s military capability, primarily related not only to its con ct with India but also in its con ct with a much weaker Afghanistan in all the dimensions of national power, despite the latter’s (much smaller) military aid from the USSR. Another major (domestic political) decision by Pakistan in the mid1950s had a direct and signifcant strategic impact on the con ct with Afghanistan: it was to merge the four provinces in the western part of Pakistan—West Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the disputed territory of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)—into ‘One Unit,’ West Pakistan. The plan was approved by the NWFP Assembly on November 25, 1954 and was inaugurated on October 14, 1955. As noted in the above discussion of Afghanistan’s decisions, this act was perceived by Pakistan’s adversary as an even more demeaning act than the 1947 twooption NWFP referendum, for it further submerged the Pushtun ethnic identity of the decisive majority of the NWFP’s population in one of Pakistan’s two regions. Afghanistan expressed its dismay and unalterable opposition to the ‘One Unit’ merger but lacked the power to undo what it perceived as the violation of a fundamental Pushtun right to self-determination by a Punjab-dominated Government of Pakistan. For Afghanistan, the ‘One Unit’ scheme was destined to perpetuate its con ct with Pakistan until the merger was rescinded. On two notable occasions—there were many during this unresolved interstate con ct—Pakistan decided to cut off transit trade from, and deny access to, its port on the Arabian Sea, to land-locked Afghanistan, once in mid-1956 and again in 1961, the latter in retaliation against Afghanistan’s closure of its border with Pakistan in 1960. Both cases had strategic consequences: the frst, as noted above, led to Afghanistan’s request for Soviet aid and the second deepened the relationship between Afghanistan and the USSR. Another Pakistan decision, with long-term strategic consequences, was made in 1973 by Prime Minister Zulfqar Ali Bhutto, newly appointed after a lengthy period of rule by Pakistan’s politically powerful Military establishment: it was to adopt a more aggressive policy toward Afghanistan, including support for Afghan Islamists against the regime of Mohammad Daoud Khan, a long-term foe of Pakistan, who had returned to power that year after a successful coup against King Zahir Shah, his cousin, who had 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 185 ousted Daoud fi fi fi fi fi fi in 1963 from his position as Afghanistan’s leader from 1953 to 1963, as noted. Bhutto’s anti-Daoud policy became entangled with—and was perceived as—a hostile policy directed at Afghanistan and Pushtuns generally. There was strong evidence supporting this perception, especially Bhutto’s decisions in 1973 to dissolve the Pushtun and Baluchi National Awami(People’s) Party governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan and in 1975 to ban the National Awami Party, on the grounds that they were disloyal to Pakistan. Moreover, between 1973 and 1977, when Bhutto was in power, Pakistan provided military training to an estimated 5000 young Islamist dissidents, whose goal was to overthrow the Daoud regime in favor of a pro-Islamist government in Afghanistan. This Bhutto introduction of the ‘Islamist’ factor into Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan was to re-occur later in their con ct as a valued technique to secure a regime in Kabul more sympathetic to Pakistan. Soon after the USSR invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, a decision was made by Pakistan to oppose the Soviet occupation and the newly installed Afghan Communist regime. This was implemented by active military support for the Mujahuddin [Islamist freedom fghters] in their struggle against the Soviet occupation, as well as sanctuary to Afghan opponents of its proxy regime. That support, including weapons and the opportunity to establish bases in Pakistan’s tribal areas, continued throughout the Soviet occupation (1979–1989). During that decade and beyond the Taliban emerged as a steadily growing force in the struggle for control over Afghanistan, with Pakistan as a major source of economic and military aid, until ‘9/11’ and the beginning of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. What began in the early 1970s within the Afghanistan/ Pakistan con ct became a major fact in the continuing struggle over the future of Afghanistan four decades later. Pakistan: Decision-Makers In its frst 4 years of independence (1947–1951), Pakistan’s principal decisionmakers were its ‘founding father,’ Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who served as Governor-General (1947– 1948), and Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister (1947–1951), his principal aide in the decisive last phase of the tense, bitter, and complex tripartite negotiations (British Government of India, Indian National Congress, and All-India Muslim League, 1946 and 1947) that led to the Partition of India on August 14–15, 1947 into the Dominions of the British Commonwealth, India and Pakistan. 186 M. BRECHER They, particularly Jinnah, were crucial in the framing of the NWFP Referendum as a two-option choice—merger with Pakistan or India. Jinnah died in 1948, leaving Liaquat Ali as the decisive Pakistani decision-maker for Pakistan, with consultative inputs by senior members of the Muslim League leadership. Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in October 1951. There were many infuential decision-makers in the near-three decades after 1951, when the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ct was active. One was the person who served as Prime Minister of Pakistan. There were fve prime ministers as Head of Government during that period: Liaquat Ali Khan, as noted; Khwaja Nazimuddin (1951–1953); Mohammad Ali Bogra (1953– 1955); Chaudhri Mohammad Ali (1955– 1956); and Zulfqar Ali Bhutto (1973–1977). Other than Liaquat Ali, the only pre-eminent prime minister was Bhutto, whose decisions related to the Pakistan/Afghanistan con ct were noted above. From 1947 to 1956, Pakistan’s Head of State was known as Governor-General, formally, the representative of the British monarch; Jinnah was the towering fgure. Among the seven presidents from 1956 to 1988, the pre-eminent leaders were Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan (1958– 1969), General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (1969–1971), Bhutto (1973–1977), and General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, most of whose presidency (1978–1988) occurred after the con ct with Afghanistan became dormant. Other infuential decision-makers throughout those three decades were the persons occupying the position of Army Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army (1947– 1972), known as Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan Army (COAS) since 1972. The longest-serving and most infuential military leader in decision-making on all national security issues during his tenure, including relations with Afghanistan, was Ayub Khan (1951– 1958), who then served as President of Pakistan (1958–1969). Other prominent commanders in chief were Yahya Khan (1966– 1971), who was also President (1969–1971) and General Tikka Khan (1972–1976), both of whom were crucial decision-makers in the disastrous decision process during the crisis-war over Bangladesh in 1971, and General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1976–1988), who served simultaneously as president (1978–1988). Other important Pakistan decision-makers during the Afghanistan/ Pakistan con ct, as well as on all other national security issues, were the Director of Inter-Services fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s powerful military intelligence agency, of whom there were only three (1959–1978) during the three-decade active period of the 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 187 Afghanistan/Pakistan con ct, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. There were only two notable decision-makers in that position: Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan’s frst, most accomplished, and long duration (1947–1954) voice to the world, and the talented, politically controversial Bhutto, who served even longer (1963–1966 and 1971–1977), as well as Prime Minister, simultaneously (1973–1977). As in most states, the institutions that they headed were active participants in the decisionmaking process relating to this interstate con ct (see below). However, as evident, the large majority of infuential Pakistan decision-makers during the active period of this con ct, as in the more crucial con ct for Pakistan, the India/Pakistan con ct, were military leaders. Notable civilians were Jinnah, Liaquat Ali, Zafrullah, and Bhutto, and the frst three of these four were active in the early years of Pakistan’s independence and of these protracted con cts. Pakistan: Decision Process The political structure of Pakistan at its creation was that of a parliamentary democracy, modeled on Westminster. The Head of State was the UK monarch, whose representative was the Governor-General of Pakistan, appointed, formally, by the king to a symbolic position lacking in political power and partiality. However, the reality of Pakistan’s politics was profoundly different from its formal structure. The frst GovernorGeneral was ‘the father of the nation,’ undisputed leader of the Muslim League, the dominant, virtually unrivalled political party. Moreover, Jinnah was the self-conscious leader of the new nation and state, not a passive representative of the British monarch. He was also an authoritarian politician, who did not take kindly to opposition. With his passing a year after independence, the mantle of leadership passed to Liaquat Ali Khan, who lacked Jinnah’s charisma. He was also more tolerant of diversity in political outlook, more comfortable with an environment in which competition among politicians and political parties was the norm. His character and personality facilitated ‘the rules of the game’ that characterized the British model. Not all Pakistani politicians shared this outlook. The massive upheaval that accompanied the creation of Pakistan (and independent India)—the migration of approximately 15 million people, including the death of one million or more, combined with the widespread fear that the adversary, India, was an irreconcilable enemy that would not accept the permanent bifurcation of India, in both the west and east, and the magnitude 188 M. BRECHER of the tasks confronting a new nation and leadership—was not conducive to governing in accord with the niceties of a British parliamentary democracy. The result, over time, was pre-occupation with survival and an easy move to more authoritarian behavior in politics. The frst of four wars with India (1947–1948), for Pakistan an irredentist war it initiated to gain control of a Muslim majority part of the sub-continent, Kashmir, occurred within 2 months of Partition and an almost unimaginable human tragedy. National insecurity was rampant, hardly an atmosphere conducive to political democracy and its accompanying decision-making environment. In perspective, the descent to authoritarian politics, with a central role for the Military, the institution that was perceived as the most reliable guardian of Pakistan’s survival, in a con ct that was likely to pose frequent, often grave, threats to Pakistan, seemed inevitable, though it was not an abrupt process, from the creation of Pakistan. As evident from the above discussion of Pakistan’s decision-makers on issues relating to the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ct, as on all issues of national security, Pakistan’s democratic structure generated a decisionmaking process that relied heavily on decision-makers primarily associated with national security, not with political parties (though the structure bred many parties). The pivotal institutions that shaped Pakistan’s decision-making process for all disputed issues in interstate con cts, with Afghanistan and India, have been the armed forces—all branches, with enormous power concentrated in the Intelligence community, the ISI. Civilian leaders of political parties have always been consulted. The skills of civil servants in the foreign ministry and occasionally other ministries are utilized. However, as the list of senior decisionmakers after the early years of Pakistan’s statehood indicates, the primacy of the Military in Pakistan’s decision-making process dates to the beginning of the 1950s—Ayub Khan, the longestserving Chief of the Army Staff and the longest-serving president, began his career as Pakistan’s leader at the summit of military and political power in 1951 and held these positions for 18 years. fi fi fi fi fl fi fi fl fi fi Generals dominated the presidency for most of the time from 1958 to 1988. And the ISI, dominated by the Military, has been ever-present in the decision process since its known creation in 1959. Afghanistan/Pakistan: Con ct-Sustaining Acts Violence—compared with later outbreaks of violence in which Afghanistan was directly involved, notably the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1989 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 189 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, there was very little violence in the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ct, all of low intensity and short duration during its three interstate crises. The frst of these episodes took the form of an Afghan military intrusion into Pakistan’s territory on September 30, 1950 and its forced withdrawal 5 days later by Pakistani troops and aircraft, terminating their Pushtunistan I crisis. Another lowintensity outburst of violence occurred on March 29, 1955, 2 days after Pakistan announced its intention to incorporate its North West Frontier Province (NWFP) [known locally as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa], with an overwhelming Pushtun majority, into a merger of all provinces and tribal territories in the western half of the State into West Pakistan, its ‘One Unit’ Scheme, which triggered the second Pushtunistan crisis. Outraged Afghans caused serious damage to the Pakistan embassy in Kabul and to Pakistan consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar. Pakistanis retaliated by attacking the Afghan consulate in Peshawar, capital of the NWFP, and Pakistan severed diplomatic and trade relations with Afghanistan. The crisis escalated with mobilization of forces by both adversaries, but no further violence erupted. The third episode of violence erupted on May 19, 1961, when 1000 Afghan troops in trated into Pakistan’s territory, triggering the Pushtunistan III crisis. Two days later, Pakistan responded with air attacks on border areas. The crisis escalated on August 23 when Pakistan ordered the closure of all Afghan consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan, but there was no further violence between the two adversaries in this crisis or in their dormant but still-unresolved con ct. Political Hostility—this type of con ct-sustaining act occurred more frequently than violence. As noted above, Afghanistan challenged the provision of the British plan for the partition of India that allocated the NWFP to Pakistan, one of the two successor states to the British Raj in 1947, as well as the options given the voters in a NWFP referendum on its future status—integration into Pakistan or India. Afghanistan formally demanded additional options —independence for the NWFP or merger with Afghanistan, to no avail. In 1949, the Afghan National Assembly passed a resolution nullifying all treaties signed between Afghanistan and British India, which included the designation of the Durand Line in 1893 as the formal border between Afghanistan and British India, which Afghanistan has rejected ever since the agreement was signed—it was forcibly imposed, according to Afghanistan. In July 1949, Afghanistan appointed a Pushtun notable, the Faqir of Ipi, leader of the independent 190 M. BRECHER state of Pakhtunistan. The next month, a youth group, the Young Afridi Party, proclaimed the formation of the Pakhtunistan Assembly in the independent state of Pakhtunistan within Pakistan’s NWFP, a political act recognized by the Afghan Government. A much higher-pro e act of political hostility was Afghanistan’s vote against the admission of Pakistan to the UN in 1947, though it was successfully pressed by the U.S. and the UK to relent in 1948. Pakistan, too, contributed political acts that sustained and, at times, intensifed this con ct: the most important was the ‘One Unit’ plan announced on November 22, 1954. Its formal inauguration, on October 14, 1955, including the NWFP, generated a sharp response by Afghanistan at the highest level: in November, at the end of the Pushtunistan II Crisis, the Afghanistan National Assembly formally reaffrmed its nonrecognition of the integration of the NWFP into West Pakistan. Another con ct-sustaining act by Pakistan was the disbandment of the Awami National Party in February 1973, triggering antigovernment demonstrations in the NWFP and Baluchistan, where that party had very strong support. Verbal Hostility—at many points during the lengthy dispute over the NWFP and its Pushtun majority, especially during the three interstate crises in this con ct, both adversaries declared and reaffrmed their unshakeable views on the validity of their claim—in radio, press and, later, television statements by offcials and at international conferences, whenever an opportunity arose to infuence other states in favor of their case; each time they did so, the renewal of their claim served to sustain and, often, to intensify their con ct. The primary target for Afghan propaganda was the legality and, especially, the legitimacy of the 1893 Durand Line agreement, viewed by fi fl fi fi fi fl fi fi fi fi fi fi fl Afghanistan as a blatant imposition by a superior power and totally lacking in moral justifcation because it denied the right of a massive ethnic majority—Pakhtuns—to the exercise of a right to self-determination. The propaganda dimension of con ctsustaining behavior included a battle in the late 1970s and, especially, in the 1980s between an increasingly secular, pro-Soviet Afghan regime and Pakistan’s support for traditional Muslim education, including the creation of madrassas (Muslim religious schools) and the provision of teachers for the vast infux of refugees from Afghanistan attending these religious schools, as well as fnancing the activities of Muslim clerics in the tribal regions of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan: these were to provide the leadership and the bulk of the rank-and- e in the Taliban 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 191 movement that was to play a crucial role in Afghanistan during the past two decades. Economic Discrimination—in terms of con ct persistence, Pakistan has been—and continues to be—able to shape the economic ‘rules of the game’ in this con ct. Afghanistan, a landlocked state, is totally dependent on Pakistan for imports from, and exports to, virtually the rest of the world. Its access to the Arabian Sea is controlled by Pakistan, which can, almost at will, assist or retard economic growth in Afghanistan. Among the con ct-sustaining acts by Pakistan have been border closures, for example, lasting 5 months in 1955, during the Pushtunistan II crisis. Moreover, in the 1960s, many construction projects in Afghanistan were halted for lengthy periods because Pakistan controlled the fow of vital materials for the building and renovation of roads, factories, dams, and schools throughout Afghanistan and was prepared to exploit that structural advantage to achieve other goals; this made Afghanistan economically dependent on Pakistan. Other states, notably the USSR, especially interested in access to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, and Iran, seeking to enlarge its infuence in the Middle East and Central Asia, provided alternative sources of economic aid—trade with the USSR, possible access to the Arabian Sea via a rail connection to the Iran border and the Persian Gulf. Overall, however, Pakistan possessed and frequently utilized geoeconomic advantages, thereby contributing to con ct persistence. Afghanistan/Pakistan Con ct: Crisis Management and Attempts at Con ct Resolution As in many interstate con cts, crisis management within the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ct, via bilateral negotiations and third-party mediation, has focused on the reduction of modest acts of violence between the principal adversaries during their three interstate crises. Crisis 1 (mid-March 1949–October 5, 1950) unfolded in two stages a year apart. It began in mid-March 1949 when Pakistan arrested Afghan in trators into its North West Frontier Province and rejected once more any Afghanistan claim to the disputed territory—on the ground of ethnic identity: the vast majority of the NWFP population and the largest single ethnic community in Afghanistan are Pushtuns. On March 27, there 192 M. BRECHER were reports of a substantial hostile Afghanistan non-violent military act, the dispatch of two divisions and part of its air force to the frontier with Pakistan. Six days later, Afghanistan recalled its diplomats from Pakistan. Violent escalation occurred on June 12, in the form of Pakistan’s bombing of an Afghan village close to the border with Pakistan. Crisis management was swift and successful—investigation by a joint Afghanistan-Pakistan commission, Pakistan’s acceptance of responsibility for an “unintentional ght,” and its agreement on July 31 to pay compensation. Political escalation occurred on August 12, 1949, with the formation of a Pushtunistan Assembly in Pakistan’s NWFP territory, its proclamation of Pushtunistan independence, and recognition by Afghanistan, but without a discernible Pakistan response. Propaganda and agitation for a separate Pushtunistan state maintained a moderate level of tension during most of 1950, until a brief violent skirmish in the second stage of this lengthy crisis: Afghan troops invaded Pakistani territory on September 30, 1950 and were repulsed by Pakistani forces on October 5, the ultimate effective crisis management technique in this low-severity crisis. Crisis 2 (March 27–November 1955) was caused by a high-pro e, controversial Government of Pakistan political act, a merger of its four western provinces, Baluchistan, North West Frontier Province, (West) Punjab and Sind, into a unifed West Pakistan: the crisis trigger was Afghanistan’s receipt of information on March 27, 1955 of Pakistan’s “One Unit Scheme.” It responded with frm protests, verbally by Prime Minister Daoud and in a formal government-to-government Note, which triggered a crisis for Pakistan. The crisis escalated on March 30, with an attack on Pakistan’s fi fi fi fl fi fi fi fi fl fi fi embassy in Kabul. Pakistan’s initial, immediate response was an undefned threat of retaliation. A month later, on 1 May, Pakistan responded with several severe hostile acts: the breaking of diplomatic relations; closing of the border with Afghanistan; and termination of economic relations, including the closing of all Afghan trade agencies in Pakistan. Threatened with grave economic consequences, because of its dependence on the use of Pakistan’s ports for imports and exports, Afghanistan declared a state of emergency and a mobilization of forces. Pakistan dispatched troops to the border. However, successful con ct-crisis management was achieved, primarily by the role of several Middle East mediators (see below). An agreement was signed on September 9, 1955, in which Afghanistan pledged amends for an insult to Pakistan’s fag. West Pakistan was inaugurated 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 193 on October 14— without any further offcial Afghanistan protests against the “One Unit Scheme.” And Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul was re-opened in November, ending the crisis. Crisis 3 (May 19, 1961–January 29, 1962) was triggered by reports on May 19, 1961 of the in tration of 1000 Afghan troops into Pakistan’s territory. Pakistan responded on the 21st by bombing areas along the border it claimed belonged to Pakistan. Three months later, on August 23, Pakistan demanded the closure of all Afghan consulates and trade agencies in Pakistan, triggering a crisis for Afghanistan, which responded with a threat to break diplomatic relations unless the Pakistan closure order was rescinded. Pakistan, in turn, issued a formal White Paper accusing its neighbor of “expansionism” and broke diplomatic relations with Afghanistan on September 6. Initial attempts at third-party crisis management—by the UK and the U.S. in October 1961—failed. However, President Kennedy’s offer of good offces and his special envoy, L.T. Merchant, a rare foray in this con ct by the U.S. at the presidential level until after “9–11” , succeeded on January 29, 1962 in mediating a temporary agreement between the adversaries: goods were delivered from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and the border was re-opened, for 2 months, ending this interstate crisis. However, diplomatic relations were not re-established until May 28, 1963, facilitated by Iran’s mediation role. The USSR provided economic aid and weapons to Afghanistan during this crisis, a then unrecognized prelude to the extension of the Cold War to this regional con ct almost two decades later—with the USSR invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979, lasting a decade. Along with effective con ct management in these three Afghanistan/ Pakistan crises, there were various attempts by the principal adversaries to achieve con ct resolution by direct negotiations, none fully successful. Some of these efforts are noted here. Early 1948: A personal envoy of Afghanistan’s king sought to negotiate a treaty of friendship with Pakistan, to include border, commerce and transit issues, and a commitment by each party to neutrality if ‘the other’ were attacked; unsuccessful. 1954–1955: There were lengthy negotiations by the two principal adversaries for trade agreements to remove existing bottlenecks, with the goal of a later replacement of the 1921 Afghanistan-UK treaty, with implications for revision of the status of the Durand Line, the long-term 194 M. BRECHER major bone of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as noted earlier. Negotiations ended without agreement once Pakistan’s controversial “One Unit Scheme” was announced in late March 1955. 1956: Tension eased with reciprocal visits by the two Heads of Government in August 1956 and mutual declarations of intent to improve their relations; no further development. 1957–1958: There was an exchange of goodwill visits by Pakistan’s prime minister to Kabul in June 1957, welcoming the full resumption of diplomatic relations, and by King Zahir Shah to Karachi in January 1958; and the signing of an agreement in May 1958, calling for an improvement in relations; unful led. May 1970, and other years earlier and later: delegations were initiated by both governments and non-governmental organizations to seek expanded economic cooperation; they were occasionally successful, but without a consistent pattern. May 1980: An Afghanistan-proposed negotiation for improved relations, based on mutual acceptance of the principle of non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs, was aborted by the transformation of Afghanistan’s political regime following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Afghanistan/ Pakistan Con ct: Third-Party Con ct Management and Attempts at Con ct Resolution November 6, 1950—After aloofness from this interstate con ct during its early years (1948–1950), the U.S. offered its good offces to the principal adversaries, in an attempt to overcome their unwillingness to fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi discuss the Pushtunistan issue in direct negotiations until ‘the other’ changed its position on the status of the 1893 Durand Line, which had allocated the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to British India. The frst U.S. mediation offer focused on the value of an agreement to cease hostile propaganda, to persuade their supporters in the con ct zone to prevent tension-creating incidents, to exchange ambassadors, and to meet within 3 months for informal discussions of their con cting positions. Pakistan demanded a prior U.S. statement supporting the validity of the Durand Line. Afghanistan demurred, and the attempt at mediation failed. May–September 1955—Several Arab leaders and senior offcials—Egypt’s President Nasser, acting through his personal envoy and, later, successor, Anwar al-Sadat, Iraq ministers dispatched to Kabul and Karachi, 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 195 Saudi Prince Musaid Rahman, who was also sent to both cities—and offcials from Iran and Turkey engaged in complementary mediation efforts between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the ‘fag’ controversy during their second crisis, noted above. The primary mediators in that crisis, Egypt’s Sadat and Saudi Arabia’s Musaid Rahman, succeeded in persuading the Afghanistan and Pakistan delegates to the Afro-Asian Summit Conference at Bandung in 1955 to express support for the NonAligned Movement’s ideological mantra, the “Five Principles of Peaceful Existence.” However, both adversaries renewed their commitment— Pakistan, to the “One Unit Scheme,” which transformed the structure of Pakistan’s political system, and Afghanistan, to non-recognition of the legality of the Durand Line and of the NWFP as an integral part of Pakistan. After months of uncertainty about the outcome of the “fag controversy,” the lingering issue during Crisis 2, noted above, an agreement by the adversaries was signed on September 9. This outcome elicited Pakistan’s thanks to the fve Middle East mediating states but did not move this con ct closer to con ct resolution. September 1961—When Afghanistan and Pakistan severed their diplomatic relations, after further border clashes and Pakistan’s renewed blocking of economic traffc to and from Afghanistan, two Arab states assumed responsibility for their diplomatic interests—the United Arab Republic [Egypt], for Afghanistan’s interests in Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, for Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. Late September 1961–January 1962—As noted above, President Kennedy offered U.S. good offces in letters to the Head of Government in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and he sent L.T Merchant as his personal envoy in October to attempt mediation. This mediation effort succeeded in producing a temporary solution to their third crisis—a re-opening of their closed border for 1 month in January 1962. 1962–1963—The Shah of Iran attempted personal mediation of the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ct by visiting both states for 6 days in July 1962. His initial effort was unsuccessful. However, after the Afghan royal family ousted Afghanistan’s Prime Minister Daoud in March 1963, Iran’s Foreign Minister succeeded in mediating a resumption of Afghanistan/Pakistan diplomatic relations in May 1963, via the Teheran Agreement. 196 M. BRECHER 1976–1978 Whether or not because of Iran’s complex dual policy toward the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ct—support for Pakistan’s claim to the disputed NWFP territory, along with support for Afghanistan’s economic dependence on a reliable outlet for its external trade, both imports and exports—the Shah of Iran frequently sought to persuade these con ct adversaries to normalize their relations and resolve their protracted con ct. In 1976, 3 years after Daoud’s return to power as President of a Republic, following his successful anti-monarchy coup in Afghanistan, he accepted an economic plan from Iran that was accompanied by a 2-billion-dollar aid package. Moreover, with the Shah of Iran’s mediation, the adversaries seemed close to an agreement on Pushtunistan—that remains elusive. 1976–1979—Afghanistan’s Daoud and Pakistan’s President Bhutto held promising direct talks in 1976 and agreed to continue their negotiations toward a mutually acceptable resolution of their con ct. Apart from the direct beneft of a tranquil relationship between hostile neighbors in a volatile region, both perceived other geo-political gains: for Daoud, less dependence by Afghanistan on USSR military and political aid; for Bhutto, a weakening of the longstanding informal alignment between Afghanistan and India, always a nightmare scenario for Pakistan’s leadership. However, Daoud could not muster suffcient support for his plan within Afghanistan’s political elite, and Bhutto was assassinated. Although Bhutto’s successor as Pakistan’s leader, Gen. Ziaul-Haq, supported the plan—they had an amicable meeting in March 1977—the plan proved premature. The quid pro quo was Daoud’s pledge to fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi forbid Pushtun and Baluchi fghters for Pushtunistan’s independence from treating Afghanistan as a safe haven, and Bhutto’s pledge to grant administrative autonomy to the Pushtuns in the NWFP, as well as the release from detention of leaders of the pro-Pushtunistan National Awami Party, notably their dominant fgure, Wali Khan. However, Daoud too was assassinated. With the death of the two leading advocates for an amicable resolution of their con ct, the peace process dissipated. The following year, in December 1979, Afghanistan was occupied by the USSR for a decade; and its Communist governments, headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki and then Hafzullah Amin, who supported an independent Pushtunistan, lacked any incentive to normalize Afghanistan’s relations with U.S.-allied Pakistan. So too did the Islamist Taliban, the 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 197 hostile ideological successor to Afghanistan’s Communist regime during the early and mid-1990s. The UN has rarely performed the role of mediator in the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ct. An inconclusive exception was its sponsorship of proximity talks between the adversaries that began in June 1982, led by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Diego Cordovez. They met infrequently during the 1980s, with no progress until the USSR’s decision in February 1988 to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan within 9 months, beginning on May 15, 1988. The impending collapse of the Communist regime in Afghanistan re-activated the long-dormant talks between the two principal adversaries in this con ct. The result was another variation of the oft-designated “Geneva Accords,” signed on April 14, 1988, with the U.S. and the USSR as guarantors. However, the agreement contained only oral expressions of good will and an intention to abide by the principle of non-intervention in each other’s affairs, and a provision for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees. The core issue, control over the disputed territory of the North-West Frontier Province, was not included in the UNsponsored agreement, and the con ct remains unresolved, though dormant for more than two decades. Afghanistan/Pakistan: Causes of Non-Resolution The relevant research question about the causes of non-resolution of the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ct, as for all unresolved interstate protracted con cts, is the extent to which its most likely conditions for con ct resolution were-are absent in this con ct: specifcally, were any, some or all of the six postulated conditions of resolution set out in the Con ct Resolution Model above absent from this on-going con ct? Exhaustion— Neither of the principal adversaries has revealed acute fatigue, let alone exhaustion, as an intolerable collective pain created by their con ct. For Afghanistan, the historical record reveals an ability to withstand all foreign attempts by much greater Powers to conquer this land-locked state and subjugate its myriad of tribes—from Alexander the Great to Tsarist Russia and Great Britain in the nineteenth century ‘Great Game,’ to the Cold War and beyond, to one superpower, the USSR, in the twentieth century, and to the other superpower, the U.S., 198 M. BRECHER in the early twentyfrst century: exhaustion does not seem to be part of the Afghan collective experience. For Pakistan, the historical record is much shorter. While it did reveal collective exhaustion as a result of the 1971 Bangladesh War against India and its consequence, the bifurcation of its territory, there is no evidence of exhaustion during, and as a consequence of, the 70-year-old con ct with Afghanistan. Moreover, for both principal adversaries, there have been few interstate crises and minimal violence, with few casualties. In sum, exhaustion has been absent from this con ct and from the behavior of the two neighbor-adversaries: this absence has facilitated their con ct being sustained at a low level of hostility and violence. Changes in the Balance of Capability—In terms of a narrowgauge bilateral calculus, Pakistan’s military capability has long been markedly superior to that of Afghanistan. In 2013, the estimated size of their armed forces reveals a disparity of more than 3:1 in favor of Pakistan, 642,000–190,000. Moreover, Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998 signifcantly enhanced the quantitative and qualitative difference in military power—but Pakistan has not threatened to use its ‘absolute weapon’ against Afghanistan, and the absence of large urban centers in Afghanistan, other than Kabul, would render a nuclear attack massive, counter-productive ‘over-kill,’ In any event, this bilateral calculus of military capability is misleading. Both adversaries have been the recipients of substantial weapons and funds to enhance their power to wage war. The U.S. has been Pakistan’s generous provider of conventional military aid since their initial arms agreement in 1954, and the USSR was the primary source of military assistance for Afghanistan fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi until the late 1980s. Moreover, India’s longstanding role as a Pakistan-perceived reliable ally and protector of Afghanistan, confronting Pakistan with the high probability of a two-front war, has seriously diminished Pakistan’s effective manpower and weapons superiority. So too has Afghanistan’s reputation for effective defense against foreign invasion, noted above, and the presence of a very large Pushtun component from the disputed NWFP in Pakistan’s army. Overall, the limited resort to violence by both of the principal adversaries in their three international crises has rendered an accurate balance of capability at any point in the lengthy con ct diffcult to measure, except to note Pakistan’s overall superiority in military manpower and conventional and unconventional weapons over the decades of this interstate con ct, along with a reluctance, for several reasons, to 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 199 employ that superior military power against a weaker neighbor. Thus the consistent imbalance of capability cannot be identifed as a cause of con ct persistence or a likely condition for resolution. Domestic Pressures—There is no discernible evidence of internally generated pressure within Afghanistan or Pakistan to resolve their interstate protracted con ct. For most of this con ct, Afghanistan’s political system was that of an authoritarian state—monarchical from 1948 until 1963, and long before, then Republican, with power concentrated in the presidency, 1963–1978, a Communist system modeled on that of the USSR (1978–1989) and Islamist rule by the Taliban (1992–2001). A Western-type democratic system, with elections for a president, a legislature, and local councils, has been in place since the U.S. invasion in 2001. The Pakistan political system was not uniformly authoritarian: there were several blocks of time in which democracy fourished, with decisional authority vested in elected offcials and pivotal institutions— presidents, legislatures, and local councils. However, authoritarian rule by military leaders was widespread in Pakistan: Generals Ayub Khan, (October 1958–March 1969), Yahya Khan (March 1969–December 1971), Zia-ul-Haq (September 1978–August 1988), and Musharraf (June 2001–August 2008), all but Yahya Khan assumed power by means of a coup d’état. Moreover, even when civilian Governments were in place, the Pakistan Army was the dominant decision-making institution. Throughout this protracted con ct, since 1949, the media were a vital part of the political process in Pakistan. However, pressure on Pakistan’s Government from its elites, non-governmental organizations, the media, intellectuals, and the attentive public to pursue a policy aimed at resolution of the con ct with Afghanistan was non-existent. As in the more traditional, civil authoritarian political system of Afghanistan, but more likely in Pakistan’s quasi-democratic system part of the time, advocates of attempts to resolve this con ct may have existed in either or both of the con ct adversaries. However, they are not discernible as sources of infuence on their rulers’ behavior toward ‘the other’ on the core issue of the disputed NWFP territory, with one notable exception noted above, President Daoud’s conciliatory meetings with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfkar Ali Bhutto in 1976 and with Bhutto’s successor, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, in 1977. There is no evidence to indicate that Daoud or his Pakistani counterparts in the late 1970s adopted the conciliatory path in response to domestic pressure. If those pressures existed, they were 200 M. BRECHER marginal in the decisions of the authoritarian leaders of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. External Pressures—Unlike domestic pressures to seek resolution of this con ct, which, if they existed, were hardly, if ever, known and did not exert infuence on the behavior of Afghanistan and Pakistan, external pressures in this protracted con ct were frequently exerted and, at times, infuenced the behavior of both adversaries. Suffce it to note the major sources of such pressure. The most persistent and infuential external source was Iran, specifcally the Shah of Iran in the mid1970s. Several Arab states and Turkey, especially the delegates from the UAR (Egypt) and Saudi Arabia, played an important role in resolving the 1955 Afghanistan/Pakistan crisis over the latter’s integration of its four western provinces into one unit, ‘West Pakistan’. Neither the USSR nor the U.S., despite their lengthy occupation of Afghanistan, each more than a decade, contributed to the resolution of this con ct. Reduction in Discordance of Objectives—There is no evidence of a reduction in Discord between Afghanistan and Pakistan over their con cting Objectives. For Afghanistan, their fundamental disagreement over con cting claims to the territory of the North-West Frontier Province dates to 1947, during the months leading to the partition of India, culminating in the UK’s allocation of the fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi NWFP to Pakistan after a referendum that Afghanistan considered blatant discrimination: the predominantly Pushtun voters in the NWFP were given two options—integration with Pakistan or India. This was interpreted by Afghanistan as unconcealed UK bias because both of the Afghanistan-favored options, integration with Afghanistan or independence for the NWFP, were ignored. Afghanistan has never recognized the outcome of the 1947 referendum, and Pakistan has dismissed Afghanistan’s claim to the disputed territory as totally lacking in substance and a rejection of a referendum in the NWFP prescribed by the UK as an integral part of the Partition of India. Neither adversary has manifested any change from their diametrically opposed, publicly declared objectives regarding the disputed territory since 1947. Decline in Con ct-Sustaining Acts —The use of violence in this unresolved con ct, as noted, was moderate in the frst and modest in the second and third international crises between Afghanistan and Pakistan, in 7 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 201 1950, 1955, and 1961. Moreover, while verbal hostility was frequently displayed by the leaders of the principal adversaries, there was no physical violence between them since their last crisis more than half a century ago. There was extensive violence in Afghanistan between Mujahuddin and the Soviet occupation forces from 1979 to 1989 and during the struggle for power between the Taliban and U.S. forces during the 1990s, continuing into the frst decade of the twenty-frst century; but these lengthy periods of violence did not derive from, or impinge upon, the Afghanistan/Pakistan con ct. In sum, only one of the six conditions postulated in the Con ct Resolution Model as likely to lead to resolution of an interstate protracted con ct, external pressures, was present during the Afghanistan/ Pakistan con ct, spasmodically. The other fve likely conditions— exhaustion, changes in the balance of capability, domestic pressures, reduction in discordance of objectives, and decline in con ct-sustaining acts were absent from this unresolved con ct, thereby supporting the negative causal link between the absence of these conditions and non-resolution, that is, long-term persistence of this interstate con ct. Although the two principal adversaries in this Con ct share the belief system of virtually their entire population, Islam, substantively there are many sources of con ct between Afghanistan and Pakistan. One is History: the once pre-eminent Afghanistan Durrani empire over most of the residual territory of Pakistan, that is, the western half of Pakistan until 1971 and the entire state of Pakistan since the 1971 Bangladesh War; and the Durand Line, 1893,which, throughout this con ct, has provided the legal foundation of Pakistan’s claim to the North West Frontier Province, a claim which Afghanistan has always rejected as illegal and illegitimate. Another source, the most crucial obstacle to con ct resolution, is Territory—the unresolved dispute over the NWFP, controlled by Pakistan since the onset of this protracted con ct in 1949 but claimed persistently by Afghanistan. A third source is Ethnicity, the fundamental ethnic differences between the multiple tribes and ethnic communities that constitute Afghanistan and the diverse ethnic groups in Pakistan—Baluchis, Punjabis, and Sindhis, an ethnic differentiation compounded by the ethnic identity of most of the population of one of the four initial provinces of West Pakistan, the NWFP, Pushtuns, with the largest ethnic community in Afghanistan. These profound differences continue to outweigh the shared belief system, Islam, in shaping the attitudes, perceptions, and behavior of the two adversaries in this 202 M. BRECHER con ct. Those differences, concentrated in the combined ethnic and territorial con ct over the North West Frontier Province, their incompatible core objective, have sustained this interstate con ct for seven decades. Although this con ct has long been dormant—their last interstate crisis ended early in 1962—it has not been resolved and is unlikely to attain resolution until one or both adversaries change(s) their rigid commitment to control over this disputed territory