Lecture Notes on Marginalized Groups in Philippine Politics PDF

LECTURE 5 MARGINALIZED GROUPS IN PHILIPPINE POLITICS Introduction The phrase MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED should refer only to the sector in Section 5, Paragraph 2 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that are, by their natu...

LECTURE 5 MARGINALIZED GROUPS IN PHILIPPINE POLITICS Introduction The phrase MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED should refer only to the sector in Section 5, Paragraph 2 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that are, by their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector does not mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution, or infirmity. It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specially, the economically marginalized and underrepresented are those fall in the low-income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board. The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, elderly, women, and the youth, need not be marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a chance to win seat in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives. The Party- List System The 1987 constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district; and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice (Atong Paglaum, Inc., et. Al v. COMELEC). Party-list system is a social justice tool design to have the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society in the House of Representatives. Reference/s: See the Course Syllabus 1  LECTURE 6 CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 1. Democratic Erosion in the Philippines (Posted on March 15, 2018, by JAKE ETHAN HIRABAYASHI, University of California, Los Angeles) Available @ https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2018/03/15/democratic-erosion-in-the-philippines/ Democratic erosion begins when the values, institutions and characteristics of democracy are challenged. The approach that most political scientists use when determining if a country is a democracy is to reference multiple characteristics because relying on the existence of elections or perceived representation isn’t always effective. When determining if a country is a democracy must political scientists reference these three things: (1) source of authority: the people? group? (2) Purposes or goals of the government: democracy is something that pursues democratic goals (goals in the name of the people) (3) Set of institutions: formal rules of who holds power. (institutions that select rulers) are rulers elected in free and fair elections? The Philippines found itself in danger of experiencing forms of democratic erosion with the election of Rodrigo Duterte in 2016. However, the Philippines did not know what they were singing up for at the time. Duterte had been involved in politics his entire life, due to his father’s involvement with the government as a provincial governor. After working as a lawyer and a state prosecutor, Rodrigo officially began his political career in 1988 when he became mayor of Davao. As mayor of Davao, he worked to make Davao one of the safest places in the Philippines. During his time as mayor, he combated crime, militancy and corruption. All three dropped significantly during his time as mayor. This change in Davao gave Duterte the political support to win the 2016 presidential election, and to attempt to do what he did in Davao to the entire country. With this reputation as a mayor, Duterte was seen as a legitimate candidate to solve the country’s problem with drugs. Once in office, his war on drugs began. He fought this war on drugs through the killing of drug dealers and users. Since his election over three thousand people have been killed due to his extra-judicial killings. These killing are done by contract killers hired by Duterte himself or other members of the government. This is a clear sign of democratic erosion for three reasons. The first being the human right violation. Killing people like this is a clear violation of human rights. This puts Duterte in opposition with international institution such as the UN and the EU who value democratic institutions. This also puts the Philippines in opposition with the member countries of these international institutions. This opposition can lead to economic sanctions and the loss of foreign investment. The second sign of democratic erosion is found in his relationship with the media. Duterte does not take the media seriously, often times using crass language or making jokes. This behavior hurts the media’s ability to be a source of checks and balances on the executive. Without the ability to check the executive, the media loses a significant amount of power, and the public loses a significant amount of information. This diminishes vertical accountability. vertical accountability is accountability “exercised by non-state actors (citizens, civil associations, the media) on state agents”. Without an accurate and informative source of media the people are left with little information about their leader making it harder for them to make voting decisions. The third sign of democratic erosion 2 is the bypassing of the judicial branch of government to push his agenda. Removing the power of one of the democratic institutions set in place creates an executive branch that is bigger than it should be. He is giving himself the most power within the government. Creating one branch of government that holds all of the decision-making power, diminishes the element of checks and balances. Beyond this attempt to remove power from other democratic institutions, Duterte has next to no regard for human life. When asked about the 3,000 deaths he showed no remorse and then compared this situation to the Holocaust. This behavior sparked international concern, particularly with the ICC. When faced with opposition, Duterte chose to remove the Philippines from the ICC immediately. Duterte roomettes himself from any accountability. He attempts to remove himself from international institutions that may pressure him to engage in more democratic practices. In addition to removing himself and the Philippines from the ICC, he decided to distance the Philippines from the Unites States. This move was controversial because the United States has been a longtime ally to the Philippines. His move away from the US and towards China and Russia, highlights his attempt to run from accountability and international pressure to democratize. The US is known for its democratic institutions, so distancing the Philippines form the US lowers the likelihood of international pressure to democratize. When referencing the three questions at the beginning of this post, Duterte’s actions affect the answers to all three. Question number 1: Duterte made himself the source of authority by devaluing the press and the judicial branch of government. This makes the executive branch of government the most powerful. He also takes power away from the people by abusing the media. This has a serious effect on the people’s ability to vote. Question 2: Duterte is not pursuing democratic goals. In fact, quite the opposite. His policy against drugs violates human rights, he removes himself from international institutions that would hold him accountable, and he distances himself and the Philippines from democratic countries like the US. Finally, the third question: who holds the power? Duterte holds all of the power. He stripped the judicial branch of its power and removed the Philippines from interacting with international institutions that could pressure him to democratize. When addressing these characteristics of democracy, it paints a clearer picture of how Duterte is facilitating the democratic erosion of the Philippines. Works Cited: Chen, Adrian. “When a Populist Demagogue Takes Power.” The New Yorker, The New Yorker, 10 Mar. 2018, 9:00AM N/A. “Profile: Duterte the Controversial ‘Strongman’ of the Philippines.” BBC News, BBC, 4 Oct. 2016, www.bbc.com/news/world-36659258. 3 2. Fighting Democratic Erosion in the Philippines: Beyond Resistance (posted on May 26, 2018 by Michael Manangu, University of the Philippines, Diliman) Available @ https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2018/05/26/fighting-democratic- erosion-in-the-philippines-beyond-resistance-by-michael-manangu-university-of-the- philippines-diliman/ In a controversial decision, the Philippine Supreme Court voted on May 11 to remove its leader, Maria Lourdes Sereno. The court’s majority ordered Sereno’s seat vacated after acting on a petition brought by Rodrigo Duterte’s top lawyer, who cited malfeasance in her financial disclosures. This comes a month after Sereno was declared an “enemy” by President Rodrigo Duterte, having been a critic of his anti-drug campaign and an appointee of the previous president Benigno Aquino III. Her ouster paves the way for Duterte to appoint a loyalist to the position and leaves him with control of all three branches of government. The decision also delivers control of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, which is currently presiding over an electoral protest seeking to nullify the 2016 victory of Vice President Leni Robredo and declare Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. – son of the late dictator – the winner. These and other developments indicate that Rodrigo Duterte is poised to consolidate his power in advance of the 2019 midterm elections. His campaign to change the constitution continues, despite popular skepticism. Almost all of the country’s watchdog bodies – including the Election Commission and top anti-corruption prosecutor – will shortly be headed by his appointees. Pre-election polls show that incumbent senators aligned with him as well as his handpicked candidates lead in next year’s Senate race. And on top of all these, Duterte remains highly popular. His net trust rating in the first quarter of 2018 still sits at a healthy 65%, even after falling 10 points from the previous poll. With Sereno’s ouster and the 2019 elections in sight, the opposition now appears to be emerging from a prolonged state of torpor. For example, the rhetoric of some groups opposing Duterte appears to have grown more strident since the decision, at least online. Various protest actions are calling attention to unpopular policies of the administration, such as its tax reform initiative. Other opposition groups have begun canvassing support for viable candidates who can serve as focal points of resistance to the emerging authoritarian regime. The still fractious and disunited opposition may yet put up a viable, coherent resistance to Rodrigo Duterte – but how can it do so? I argue that the Philippine opposition must move beyond the idea of “resistance” and offer a tangible alternative to Duterte’s policies. Moreover, I argue that the current time calls for a non-violent resistance that uses both institutional and extra-institutional strategies to achieve moderate goals. A Common Rallying Cry The prerequisite to any viable resistance is the emergence of a common identity that brings its various groups together. The political sociology literature has continually emphasized that successful social movements are more likely to have developed “master frames” that serve as the basis for collective action. For these frames to work, they should be able to contest the political logics that brought Duterte to power, which the sociologist Nicole Curato has described as the “politics of anxiety” and the “politics of hope.” This 4 means that the opposition should do more than just resist Duterte’s policies; it should offer its own affirmative vision for a better Philippines. Of course, coming up with a master frame is easier said than done for groups as ideologically distant as the Catholic Church, the Communist and non-Communist Left, and the Aquino-era Liberal Party. However, some issues may yet offer some room for common cause. Besides the drug war (about which most Filipinos retain substantial reservations), Duterte’s unpopular tax reform, which has placed increasing pressure on poor Filipinos, might be another bridge issue. Public opinion has consistently shown that economic concerns such as inflation and low wages continue to be the most salient concerns of Filipinos, which indicate that a call for greater equity starting with taxes may resonate with them. Beyond Frames: Strategies for Collective Action Another salient issue for the nascent opposition is the strategies it will use to enact collective action against the emerging regime. While popular narratives of democratic erosion have often focused on anti-democratic leaders and institutional decay, political scientists such as Laura Gamboa have argued that the actions of the opposition are also important. Oppositions must walk a fine line between enacting meaningful resistance while avoiding inadvertently accelerating democratic erosion. The Philippine opposition should also be keenly aware of this dilemma, and as much as possible must resort to institutional and extra-institutional strategies that achieve moderate goals rather than radical ones. According to Gamboa, such strategies allow the opposition to retain their legitimacy here and abroad. These strategies also reduce the incentives and increase the costs of repression by government, allowing the opposition to maintain viable positions from which to resist more anti-democratic reforms down the road. In contrast, using extra- institutional means to oust the president, as some groups have called for, would not only undermine the legitimacy of the opposition, but also provide a pretext for leaders to crack down and find support for more aggressive reforms. Moreover, it is important that such actions display a strong preference for non- violence, especially given Duterte’s continuing popularity. In the Philippine context, possible actions that adhere to this philosophy include rejecting the possibility of intervention from both the military and communist insurgency; exhausting legal remedies; supporting the remaining viable focal points of institutional resistance such as Commission on Human Rights; and many others. Such strategies will inevitably turn resistance into a long, drawn-out process and will require immense discipline – but this discipline is important if the Philippines is to avoid falling into the trap of Gamboa’s Venezuela. Rising to the Challenge To be sure, these prescriptions work against many assumptions long held by the various opposition groups, who understandably continue to draw from their experiences resisting Ferdinand Marcos and his dictatorship. But such discipline is called for in dealing with a threat that is simultaneously similar and different – not only from Marcos, but also Duterte’s contemporaries who continue to erode democracies around the world. There is 5 hope yet that Philippine democracy may yet emerge stronger from this episode of democratic erosion – but only if the opposition is here for the long haul. *****nothing follows****** 6