ATP 2-01.3, C2 (23 January 2024) PDF - Military doctrine on US military courses of action examination

Chapter 6 Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action WHAT IS IT? 6-1. Step 4 of the IPOE process identifies and describes threat COAs that can influence friendly operations. Example 1 is a classic vignette from The Defence of Duffer’s Drift, by Sir Ernest Swinton, which illustrates...

Chapter 6 Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action WHAT IS IT? 6-1. Step 4 of the IPOE process identifies and describes threat COAs that can influence friendly operations. Example 1 is a classic vignette from The Defence of Duffer’s Drift, by Sir Ernest Swinton, which illustrates the proper use of tactics, IPOE, and the practical application of doctrine. Example A Boer S-2 tells his commander: “Sir, the enemy platoon leader’s likely objective is to retain control of the only crossing point suitable for wheeled traffic over the Silliasvogel River. He can defend the crossing, known as Duffer’s Drift, with his 50 Soldiers in any one of the following ways: He can leave it undefended until tomorrow (being inexperienced and thinking that we will not arrive until the next day). He can dig his platoon into a small enclosure just on the other side of the drift. A variant of this COA would be for him to establish a trench line astride the main road. He can occupy and fortify the Kraal village that overlooks the drift. He can occupy the riverbed itself with only a small outpost in the Kraal village. This goes against every canon in British doctrine; however, we must consider this COA because it is so dangerous to the accomplishment of our mission. The S-2 tells his commander: “Sir, I think the platoon leader will adopt one of these COAs, in order of probability as I gave them. We need to conduct reconnaissance of the riverbed and the Kraal in order to find out which of these COAs he has chosen.” 6-2. When evaluating the threat, the intelligence staff should consider— ⚫ How the operational variables (PMESII-PT) and civil considerations (ASCOPE) may impact how the threat operates. ⚫ How friendly actions may impact threat operations and threat COAs. SO WHAT? 6-3. The “so what” is to determine the threat COAs necessary to aid the development of friendly COAs: ⚫ Outcome of success: The friendly commander will avoid being surprised with an unanticipated threat action, thus quickly narrowing the set of possible threat COAs to the one the threat has chosen. ⚫ Consequences of failure: ◼ Failure to identify which of the possible COAs the threat has chosen, leading to surprise of the friendly command. ◼ The threat commander may have the information needed to exploit the opportunities the OE provides in a way the friendly commander did not anticipate. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 6-1 Chapter 6 HOW TO DO IT: THE PROCESS 6-4. Determining threat COAs is a two-step process consisting of the substeps and its outputs shown in figure 6-1. Figure 6-1. Substeps and outputs of step 4 of the IPOE process DEVELOP THREAT COURSES OF ACTION 6-5. Developing a threat COA requires an understanding of the threat characteristics discussed in chapter 5, as well as the effects of terrain, weather, and civil considerations on operations as discussed in chapter 4. Population effects on operations must be clearly annotated with full details. This ensures population effects and threat actions are portrayed during the war game. 6-6. The most important element in determining threat COAs is understanding threat operational art and tactics. U.S. forces may encounter regular, irregular, and hybrid threats. The process for determining the COAs these threat forces may employ mirrors friendly COA development and consists of the following: ⚫ Identify likely objectives and the end state. ⚫ Determine threat battlefield functions. ⚫ Determine threat capabilities available to perform each battlefield function. ⚫ Identify the full set of COAs available to the threat. ⚫ Evaluate and prioritize each threat COA. ⚫ Develop each COA in the amount of detail time allows. ⚫ Identify HVTs for each COA. ⚫ Identify initial collection requirements for each COA. IDENTIFY LIKELY OBJECTIVES AND THE END STATE 6-7. Based on the results of the mission variables analysis conducted earlier in the IPOE process, the staff now identifies the threat’s likely immediate and subsequent objectives and desired end state. These elements are included in the threat COA statement developed for each COA. 6-8. An objective is the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which an operation is directed (JP 5-0). Threat objectives are normally terrain- or force-oriented. For example, an enemy may attack to destroy a friendly force or to seize key terrain; defend to delay a friendly force or retain control of key terrain; or conduct guerrilla operations to disrupt friendly operations. 6-2 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action 6-9. The end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives (JP 3-0). The end state, if achieved, meets the conditions of policy, orders, guidance, and directives issued by the commander. For example, the end state for an attack to destroy may be the destruction of all friendly forces down to the platoon level and friendly forces incapable of conducting a coordinated defense. 6-10. For regular threats, objectives can be either terrain- or force-oriented, and the end state is usually based on effect and time. For example, the objective of a lead echelon infantry brigade performing an attack is to neutralize defending forces. The brigade’s end state is to prevent defending forces from affecting the movement of second echelon forces. Additionally, the brigade’s operations are synchronized in time with higher headquarters operations to ensure combat power is applied where and when needed to ensure success. 6-11. For irregular threats, while the end state is based on effect, objectives are not always linear or time- based. Often, the objectives for irregular threats are event- rather than time-driven. For example, the objective of a group may be to prevent U.S. forces from providing security to the general population by increasing the amount of time spent on resources. The group’s end state is to convince the population to rely on security provided by the group rather than by U.S. forces. In this case, the group’s operations are synchronized with the operations of U.S. forces attacking patrols, convoys, combat outposts, and security forces. 6-12. For hybrid threats, objectives may be terrain- or force-oriented; the end state may be based on effect and time. Alternatively, for regular and irregular threats, the objectives may be disparate based on their unique capabilities. For example, the objective of an insurgent cell performing an IED attack may be to disrupt attacking forces. The mechanized infantry unit echeloned with the insurgent cell may have an end state of preventing attacking forces from increasing an occupation force’s sphere of influence. Additional hybrid threat objectives may include but are not limited to preserving power, degrading the threat’s will and capacity to fight, and gaining time for aggressive strategic operations to succeed. DETERMINE THREAT BATTLEFIELD FUNCTIONS 6-13. The threat executes several different battlefield functions each time a threat attempts to accomplish a mission. Threat commanders identify the specific functions they intend their various subordinate forces or elements to perform. The functions do not change, regardless of the forces’ or elements’ location on the battlefield. While the various functions required to accomplish any given mission can be quite diverse, they can be divided into two very broad categories: action and enabling. Action Function 6-14. The action function (also known as the exploitation, decision, or mission function) is performed by the set of capabilities accomplishing a given mission. If the threat objective is to destroy a city with a WMD, then the WMD is performing the action function. If the threat objective is to seize a friendly capital city, and the threat employs a WMD in another area to force a response by friendly forces that leaves the capital exposed, then the force used to seize the capital is performing the action function and the WMD is performing a different function. 6-15. One part of the unit or group of units conducting a particular action normally perform the primary function or task that accomplishes the objective or goal of that action. Therefore, that part of the unit can be called the action force or action element. However, in most cases, the higher commander gives the action force or element a more specific designation that identifies the specific function it is intended to perform. This equates to achieving the objective of the higher command’s mission. For example— ⚫ If the objective of the action conducts an assault, the assault element completes that action. ⚫ In larger offensive actions, the exploitation force is the action force that completes the primary offensive mission by exploiting a window of opportunity created by another force. ⚫ In defensive actions, the main defense force or element is the unit or group of units that performs the main defensive mission in the battle zone. However, in a maneuver defense, the main defensive action is executed by a combination of the contact force and the shielding force. 1 March 2019 ATP 2-01.3 6-3 Chapter 6 Enabling Function 6-16. The enabling function (also known as the assault function), designated as disruption, fixing, or security, is performed by a set of capabilities that acts to assist those capabilities in performing the action function. For example, if the mission is to enter a U.S. base and set off an explosive device, an enabling function would be to penetrate the perimeter defenses of the base or to assist in its infiltration. In relation to the forces or elements conducting the action function, all other organization parts or groupings conducting an action provide enabling functions of various kinds. Therefore, each of these parts can be called an enabling force or element. However, each subordinate force or element with an enabling function can be more clearly identified by the specific function it performs. For example— ⚫ A force that enables by fixing threats so the threats cannot interfere with the primary action is a fixing force. ⚫ An element that creates a breach to enable an assault element to assault threats on the far side of an obstacle is a breach element. 6-17. In larger offensive actions, one force can enable another by conducting an assault that enables another force to exploit the effects of that assault in order to accomplish the primary objective. Thus, that type of enabling force can be called the assault force. In this case, the force that conducts the initial assault is not the one that is intended to achieve the objective of the higher command’s mission. The role of the assault force is to create an opportunity for another force—the exploitation force—to accomplish the objective. Thus, the assault force conducting the first part of a two-part offensive action acts as an enabling force. To create a window of opportunity for the exploitation force to succeed, the assault force may be required to operate at a high degree of risk and may sustain substantial casualties. However, other enabling forces or elements may not need to make contact with the threat. In the defense, an enabling function might be to counterattack to restore a portion of the area of responsibility to threat control. Disruption 6-18. Disruption forces or elements operate to prevent U.S. forces from executing friendly COAs the way they want, and to prevent U.S. forces from interfering with threat COAs. U.S. forces can— ⚫ Disrupt threat preparations or actions. ⚫ Destroy or deceive threat reconnaissance. ⚫ Begin reducing the effectiveness of key components of the threat’s combat system. Fixing 6-19. The fixing function is performed by a set of capabilities that acts to prevent opposing capabilities from interfering with mission accomplishment. If the mission is to ambush a convoy moving through an urban area, a fixing function would be to delay arrival of a quick reaction force. If the mission is to destroy a force in a defensive battle position, a fixing function would be to prevent the opposing reserve from maneuvering. Fixing is accomplished when a part of the threat force does not participate in actions that could lead to the failure of threat COAs. This includes but is not limited to— ⚫ Suppressing a force with fires. ⚫ Deceiving a force. ⚫ Diverting a force by creating other priorities. ⚫ Involving a force in a firefight away from the main action. ⚫ Restricting a force’s movement with countermobility effects. ⚫ Depriving a force of logistics resources. Security 6-20. The security function is performed by a set of capabilities that acts to protect other capabilities from observation, destruction, or becoming fixed. Security is provided by isolating the battlefield from threat elements that could alter the outcome. This can be accomplished by providing early warning and reaction time or actively delaying or destroying arriving threat forces. 6-4 ATP 2-01.3 1 March 2019  Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action Other Functions 6-21. The threat commander may designate a subordinate unit or grouping to conduct a deception action (such as a demonstration or feint). Therefore, this unit or grouping is a deception force or deception element. Its function is to lead the threat to act in ways prejudicial to threat interests or favoring the success of a threat action force or element. 6-22. A threat commander may also designate some subordinates to perform various support functions. These support elements can provide the following types of support: ⚫ Perform support by fires (in which case, it can be called more specifically a support by fires element). ⚫ Provide support or sustainment (combat or combat service support). ⚫ Provide C2 functions. 6-23. At a commander’s discretion, some forces or elements may be held out of the initial action, in reserve, pending determination of their specific function. Then, the commander may influence unforeseen events or take advantage of developing opportunities. These forces or elements are designated as reserves (reserve force or reserve element). If such units are subsequently assigned a mission to perform a specific function, they receive the appropriate functional force or element designation. +For example, a reserve force in a defensive operation might become the counterattack force. DETERMINE THREAT CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE TO PERFORM EACH BATTLEFIELD FUNCTION 6-24. Upon determining which battlefield functions the threat needs to perform and what objective or goal the threat commander seeks to accomplish through the performance of those functions, analysts must then determine what capabilities the threat has in order to execute each function. 6-25. While the functions required for a high chance of success in achieving a military objective or goal are universal, the means to accomplish them depend on the location, threat, and environment. For example, in one battlefield, the threat may employ an infantry platoon equipped with infantry-fighting vehicles and sophisticated thermal sensors to execute the security function. In another example, a civilian in a third-floor apartment window using a cellular phone may perform the same function. 6-26. Functional analysis is an analytical technique that depicts graphically how the threat might use its capabilities to perform the functions required to accomplish its objectives. It is based on the concept—while every action or battle is unique, certain functions are performed to bring about mission accomplishment. When analysts apply their knowledge of common and necessary military functions to specific threat capabilities, they are performing functional analysis. (See ATP 2-33.4 for more information about functional analysis.) Functional analysis— ⚫ Forces analysts and the staff to learn and understand tactics instead of rote memorizations. ⚫ Reduces the ability of the threat to deceive analysts and the staff. ⚫ Applies across all theaters and works all along the range of military operations. IDENTIFY THE FULL SET OF COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO THE THREAT 6-27. Each threat capability has unique COAs available at any given time. Regardless of the threat category and the capability employed, the threat plans the employment of specific capabilities based on a task, purpose, method, and end state. The intelligence staff identifies the task, purpose, method, and end state for each potential COA developed by the threat for each threat capability. By identifying these for each COA, the intelligence staff can better determine the chosen threat COA during the conduct of operations. 6-28. For regular threats, the analysis conducted by the intelligence staff to identify threat COAs is familiar as it largely mirrors the methodology used to identify COAs for friendly capabilities. (See FM 6-0 for further discussion on developing friendly COAs.) 06 January 2021 ATP 2-01.3, C1 6-5 Chapter 6 6-29. When determining a threat COA, the intelligence staff accounts for all relevant threat activity, including but not limited to the analysis of the following: ⚫ Current threat situation. ⚫ Mission (includes task and purpose). ⚫ Threat objectives, methods and functions, and end state. ⚫ Commander’s intent, purpose, and end state. ⚫ Task organization. ⚫ Capabilities. ⚫ Vulnerabilities. ⚫ HVTs. ⚫ Decision points (essential in determining branches and sequels). ⚫ Decisive points (source of strength, power, and resistance). ⚫ Critical events. ⚫ Branches and sequels. ⚫ Intent for (includes task, purpose, method, and end state)— ◼ Movement and maneuver. ◼ Reconnaissance and surveillance. ◼ Fires support. ◼ Logistics. ◼ Threat C2. ◼ Protection. ◼ Information activities. ◼ Denial and deception. ⚫ How terrain and weather affect threat operations. ⚫ How civil considerations affect threat operations. ⚫ How displaced civilians and displaced persons affect threat operations. ⚫ +How the presence and actions of U.S. forces affect threat operations. 6-30. +For threat offensive operations, the staff focuses on determining the main, supporting, and reinforcing efforts; use of reserves; use of special munitions; use of air support; and use of UASs to support fires. +For threat defensive operations, the staff focuses on determining the location of engagement areas and obstacles; the location, type, and size of security zone forces and counterattack forces; and the use of special munitions, air support, UASs, and antiaccess and area denial systems. 6-31. The analysis of potential COAs for irregular threat capabilities is less familiar to the intelligence staff and other staff sections, mainly because those capabilities are not in current operational doctrine such as counterinsurgency. Irregular threats encompass a broad range of capabilities. Within a single AO there may be many irregular threats that compete with each other, are in conflict with each other, are in partnerships or alliances with each other, or simply operate unilaterally within established or accepted geographic, financial, or commodity limits to avoid conflict with others. 6-32. Using doctrinal military terms to analyze irregular threat potential COAs may invoke cognitive limitations and biases on analyses. The staff may have to set aside familiar terms (such as reconnaissance and surveillance, commander, deception, HVT, mission, and end state) and develop a new set of analytical criteria for each unique irregular threat capability. Invoking a systems perspective and integrating network engagement may facilitate developing these criteria as well as shifting the mental paradigm from armed combatants to the broad array of threats in the AO. (See ATP 5-0.6 for information on network engagement.) 6-33. When determining COAs for regular and hybrid threats, and the hybrid threat operates under the C2 of a unified command structure, the staff develops COAs focused on the objectives and end state of that command structure. +However, when faced with multiple threats with varied and competing objectives, such as those encountered during stability operations, the staff develops COAs for each of these threats. 6-6 ATP 2-01.3, C1 06 January 2021  Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action EVALUATE AND PRIORITIZE EACH THREAT COURSE OF ACTION 6-34. To plan for all possible contingencies, the commander understands all COAs a threat commander can use to accomplish objectives. The staff assists in this understanding by determining all valid threat COAs and prioritizing them from most likely to least likely. The staff also determines which threat COA is the most dangerous to friendly forces. To be valid, threat COAs should be feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete—the same criteria used to validate friendly COAs. 6-35. The commander approves a plan optimized to counter the most likely threat COA, while allowing for contingency options should the threat choose another COA. Therefore, the staff evaluates each threat and prioritizes it according to how likely it is that the threat will adopt that option. Generally, threat forces are more likely to use a COA that offers the greatest advantage while minimizing risk. However, based on the situation and its objectives, the threat may choose to accept risk to achieve a desired end state. It is impossible to predict what COA the threat will choose. Therefore, the staff develops and prioritizes as many valid threat COAs as time allows but, at a minimum, develops the most likely and most dangerous COAs. 6-36. Upon identifying all valid threat COAs, the staff compares each COA to the others and prioritizes them by number. For example, if four COAs have been developed, COA 1 is the threat’s most likely COA, and COA 4 is the least likely. Additionally, the staff determines which COA is the most dangerous; however, the designation of the most dangerous COA largely depends on how much each threat COA threatens the selected friendly COA. The most likely COA may also be the most dangerous. Additionally, a COA needs to answer six basic questions: ⚫ Who (the organizational structure of the threat organization, including external organizations providing support)? ⚫ What (type of tactical mission task such as defeat, destroy, seize)? ⚫ When (the earliest time the action can begin)? ⚫ Where (the battlefield geometry that frames the COA [boundaries, objectives, routes, other])? ⚫ How (the threat attacks, defends)? ⚫ Why (the threat’s objectives)? DEVELOP EACH COURSE OF ACTION IN THE AMOUNT OF DETAIL TIME ALLOWS 6-37. A threat COA consists of the following products: ⚫ Situation template for the threat COA. ⚫ Threat COA statement. Situation Template for the Threat Course of Action 6-38. A situation template is a depiction of assumed enemy dispositions, based on that enemy’s preferred method of operations and the impact of the operational environment if the adversary should adopt a particular course of action (JP 2-0). A situation template graphic depicts a potential threat COA as part of a particular threat operation. It usually depicts the most critical point in the operation as agreed upon by the commander, the operations officer, and the intelligence officer. However, the operation may require the preparation of several templates as overlays representing different “snapshots in time,” starting with the threat’s initial array of forces. These snapshots in time are useful in depicting— ⚫ Points where the threat might adopt branches or sequels to the main COA. ⚫ Places where the threat is especially vulnerable. ⚫ Other key points in the battle, such as initial contact with friendly forces. 6-39. Situation templates are developed using the threat’s current situation, based on threat doctrine and the effects of terrain, weather, and civil considerations. The situation template may include— ⚫ Doctrinal rates of march. (See appendix B and ATP 3-34.80 for examples.) ⚫ Time phase lines. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 6-7 Chapter 6 ⚫ Graphic control measures, including but not limited to— ◼ Obstacles (natural and reinforcing). (See ATP 3-34.80 for examples.) ◼ Engagement areas. ⚫ Threat composition, disposition, and strength. ⚫ Task, purpose, method, and end state. ⚫ Key threat weapon systems range fans. ⚫ AAs. ⚫ NAIs. 6-40. The basis for modifying a threat situation template is the significant effects the OE may have on the threat COA. For example, the threat may prefer to establish battle positions 1 to 1.5 kilometers apart. However, the terrain may force it to increase this distance to protect its flanks. As another example, the threat prefers to attack on high-speed AAs but also prefers to avoid complex terrain. Therefore, the location of an urban area along a high speed, optimal AA may force the threat to use a suboptimal approach. 6-41. To develop a situation template, analysts can use the following process: ⚫ Begin with the threat template developed as part of the threat model during step 3 of the IPOE process. Overlay the threat template on those products that depict OE effects on operations (typically, the MCOO, but this may vary depending on the operation and situation). (See figure 6-2.) ⚫ Adjust the dispositions portrayed on the threat template to account for OE effects: ◼ Since there are many options available, use judgment and knowledge of the threat’s preferred tactics and doctrine as depicted in the threat model. ◼ Attempt to view the situation from the point of view of the threat commander when selecting from the threat templates. ◼ Consider the OE, including but not limited to terrain, weather, and civil considerations (ASCOPE). ⚫ Check the situation template. Account for all threat major assets, ensuring no inadvertent duplications. (See figure 6-3 on page 6-10.) ⚫ Ensure the template reflects the main effort identified for the COA: ◼ Compare the depicted dispositions to the threat’s known doctrine and check for consistency. ◼ Consider the threat’s capability to present an ambiguous situation in order to achieve surprise. ⚫ Include as much detail on the situation template as the time and situation warrant. For example, if the threat is defending— ◼ Identify the likely engagement areas, reinforcing obstacle systems, and counterattack objectives that form part of his defensive COA. ◼ Depict the locations and activities of the HVTs listed in the threat model. ⚫ Use the description of preferred tactics that accompanies the threat model as a guide: ◼ Think through the COA scheme of maneuver. ◼ Visualize how the threat may transition from its current positions to those depicted on the template. ⚫ Mentally war-game the scheme of maneuver from the positions depicted on the template through to the COA’s success or failure: ◼ Identify points where forces may transition from one formation to another. ◼ Identify how each threat characteristics fits in and supports the operation. ⚫ Evaluate time and space factors to develop time phase lines depicting threat movement. Draw time phase lines on the template to depict the expected progress of attacking forces and the movement of forces in the deep and rear battle areas. 6-8 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action ⚫ Base time phase lines on the threat’s doctrinal rates of movement, with some modification: ◼ Evaluate actual movement rates, as captured in the database, against threat doctrinal rates. Note. Analysts may need to reach out to outside organizations, such as the National Ground Intelligence Center, to attain accurate and up-to-date doctrinal rates. (See appendix B for examples.) ◼ Consider OE effects on mobility. ◼ If contact with friendly forces is expected, mentally war-game the effects this may have on the threat’s speed as well. Further consideration includes the threat’s logistics and maintenance capabilities. ⚫ When placing time phase lines, consider only the time (assuming that time-consuming planning, issuance of orders, reconnaissance, and logistical preparations may occur during movement)— ◼ It may take to adopt movement formations. ◼ To conduct movement to the selected location. ◼ For the unit to close after arrival. ⚫ During staff war gaming of the situation templates against potential friendly COAs, update time phase lines to consider when threat movement may be triggered or how the threat might be influenced by friendly actions. 6-42. Analysts can prepare as many graphics as necessary to depict the COA in enough detail to support staff war gaming and collection planning. For example, a COA may begin as a movement to contact, transition to a hasty attack, followed by pursuit operations that include a river crossing. Each of these phases may require a separate template. 6-43. Analysts should tailor situation templates to their needs by focusing on factors important to the commander or mission area. For example, the situation might focus only on the threat’s reconnaissance assets when determining and developing threat COAs. Situation templates produced might show only the location and movement routes of these assets, their likely employment areas, and their likely NAIs. An aviation unit, for example, might develop situation templates that depict details such as specific radar and ADA weapon locations and their range fans or areas of coverage. Figure 6-2. +Developing a situation template 06 January 2021 ATP 2-01.3, C1 6-9 Chapter 6 Figure 6-3. Completed situation template example 6-44. At higher echelons, situation templates usually focus on culminating points and installations or activities associated with decisive points rather than specific military units. Some situation templates are better presented in a matrix format. Figure 6-4 illustrates a situation template in a matrix format that shows one threat COA for area defense. The timeline indicates when the threat is most likely to use assets to reach a desired end state, as well as the time threat assets or effects are expected within each NAI. NAI/Time H+5 H+6 (H-hour) Task: Disrupt forces in vicinity EA1. Task: Destroy aviation assets in vicinity EA1. Purpose: Delay movement along western avenue Purpose: Prevent seizure of airfield in vicinity of approach. Objective Alpha. NAI1 Method: Special purpose forces conduct Method: SA-13 and SA-18. ambushes. End State: Retain capability to use airfield to End State: Threat forces able to maneuver into conduct operations. secondary defensive positions if needed. Task: Destroy forces in vicinity EA2. Task: Block maneuver forces from moving south of Purpose: Prevent seizure of the Military Complex. EA2. Method: Coordinated long-range fires. Purpose: Provide targets for long-range fires. NAI2 End State: Retention of military command and Method: Deliberate obstacle belts in vicinity EA2. control networks. End State: Maneuver forces not able to exfiltrate kill sacks. EA engagement area NAI named area of interest H-hour specific hour at which a particular operation commences OBJ objective Figure 6-4. +Situation template in a matrix format example 6-45. Generally, there is not enough time during the MDMP to develop threat situation templates for all COAs. A good technique is to develop alternate or secondary COAs, write a COA statement, and produce an HVT list to use during the mission analysis briefing and COA development. Once these tools and products are complete, the staff constructs as many overlays as needed or possible depicting threat COAs. At a 6-10 ATP 2-01.3, C1 06 January 2021  Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action minimum, the staff may develop overlays for the threat’s most likely and most dangerous COAs. The overlays are used during friendly COA analysis. Note. Sometimes, situation templates are replaced by other products, such as a key facilities and targets overlay. Analysts should use whatever technique best graphically depicts the threat’s COAs. 6-46. There are three primary types of enemy situation templates the staff may need to develop as overlays: ⚫ Enemy in the offense. ⚫ Enemy in the defense. ⚫ Irregular forces. 6-47. During IPOE, these overlays are largely based on assumption and depict enemy locations and activities that are usually templated. +This is especially true of overlays depicting enemy offensive operations or guerilla and/or terrorist activities. +Because the enemy is more static in defensive operations, the staff may have information related to enemy locations that may assist in developing the overlay. 6-48. +When developing an overlay depicting regular forces conducting offensive or defensive operations, the staff should depict enemy locations and activities two levels down. For example, a friendly brigade combat team would construct an overlay showing maneuver companies and specialty platoons. One of the brigade’s battalions would refine that overlay for its zone or sector showing maneuver platoons and specialty teams. 6-49. When developing an overlay depicting irregular enemies, the staff at every echelon depicts enemy locations and activities at the cellular level. For example, whether at corps, division, brigade, or battalion the staff templates enemy cells where these cells are believed to be operating. Staffs template where they believe the activity associated with each cell can occur. This activity is determined by evaluating enemy activity through predictive and pattern analysis. +Overlay Depicting the Enemy in Offensive Operations 6-50. +The staff constructs an enemy offensive operation overlay using a five-step process that includes the following steps: ⚫ Step 1—Determine the enemy’s end state to make U.S. forces combat ineffective. Visualize enemy success and how the enemy force achieved those objectives given the forces available. Most enemy offensive objectives are force-orientated. ◼ +Step 1A: Review the U.S. forces’ defensive plan. Even if the commander has not approved the plan, the planning staff should have a rough idea of the friendly force defense based on the IPOE process thus far. ◼ Step 1B: Identify the U.S. forces’ key targets on the battlefield that the enemy commander would attack (enemy commander HPTs). ◼ Step 1C (brigade and above): Determine the vulnerability of this operation based on the operational variables gathered from previous IPOE process steps. ◼ Step 1D: Review the enemy commander’s purpose for the offense: gain freedom of movement; restrict freedom of movement; gain control of key terrain, personnel, or equipment; gain information; dislocate; and disrupt. ⚫ Step 2—Identify the functions used by the enemy to reach the end state: ◼ Step 2A: Determine the action element (what the enemy uses to accomplish the mission). ◼ Step 2B: Determine the enabling elements (what makes it possible for the action element to accomplish the mission). ◼ Step 2C: Display the action form, task, and purpose for each element (for example, action form: enabling element, task: fix U.S. battalion, purpose: prevent U.S. forces from maneuvering). 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 6-11 Chapter 6 ⚫ Step 3—Allocate the enemy’s resources: ◼ Step 3A: How many enemy units are required to accomplish the mission? ◼ Step3B: What types of capabilities are required to support the enemy’s mission? − Step 3B1: Determine locations of enemy reconnaissance assets needed to support the offensive mission. This is normally associated with the enemy commander’s decision points and locations where reconnaissance assets can provide observation to support targeting. − Step 3B2: Determine initial and subsequent artillery and air defense firing positions and display the range fans for each type of enemy direct fire system and indirect fire system required to support the mission. − Step 3B3: Determine potential locations where the enemy may employ special munitions to isolate part of the friendly defense. − Step 3B4: Determine enemy air AAs that enable the enemy’s use of close air support (CAS) to support the mission. ⚫ Step 4—Synchronize the enemy mission: ◼ Step 4A: Determine enemy attack sequence and movement formations. ◼ Step 4B: Determine the enemy commander’s decision points. ⚫ Step 5—Continue refining the enemy COA; collaborating with staff sections, review staff estimates and changes to the U.S. forces’ array. 6-51. Figure 6-5 illustrates an enemy situation template as an overlay depicting a mechanized infantry brigade in the attack. +Figure 6-5. Situation template as an overlay depicting the enemy in offensive operations 6-12 ATP 2-01.3, C1 06 January 2021  Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action +Overlays Depicting the Enemy in Defensive Operations 6-52. The staff constructs an enemy defensive overlay using a five-step process that includes the following steps: ⚫ Step 1—Determine the enemy’s end state to make U.S. forces combat ineffective. Visualize enemy success and how the enemy force achieved those objectives given the forces available. ◼ Step 1A: Review the U.S. forces’ offensive plan. Although the commander may not have approved the plan, the planning staff should already have a rough idea of the friendly force plan for an attack based on the IPOE process thus far. ◼ Step 1B: Identify the U.S. forces’ key targets on the battlefield that the enemy commander would attack (enemy commander HPTs). ◼ Step 1C: (brigade and above) Determine the vulnerability of this operation based on the operational variables gathered from previous IPOE process steps. ◼ Step 1D: Review the enemy commander’s purpose for the defense: − Protect personnel and equipment. − Restrict freedom of movement. − Control key terrain. − Gain time. ⚫ Step 2—Identify the functions used by the enemy to reach the end state: ◼ Step 2A: Determine the action element (what the enemy uses to accomplish the mission). ◼ Step 2B: Determine the enabling elements (what makes it possible for the action element to accomplish the mission). ◼ Step 2C: Display the action form, task, and purpose for each element (for example: action form: enabling element, task: fix U.S. battalion, purpose: prevent U.S. forces from maneuvering). ⚫ Step 3—Allocate the enemy’s resources: ◼ Step 3A: How many enemy units are required to accomplish the mission? ◼ Step 3B: What types of capabilities are required to support the enemy’s mission? − Step 3B1: Determine locations of enemy reconnaissance assets needed to support the defensive mission. This is normally associated with the enemy commander’s decision points and locations where reconnaissance assets can provide observation to support targeting. − Step 3B2: Determine initial and subsequent artillery and air defense firing positions and display the range fans for each type of enemy direct fire system and indirect fire system required to support the mission. − Step 3B3: Determine potential locations where the enemy may employ special munitions to isolate part of the friendly offense. − Step 3B4: Determine enemy air AAs that enable the enemy’s use of CAS to support the mission. − Step 3B5: Determine the locations of enemy disruption zones, battle zones, and support zones with suspected unit boundaries. Add time phase lines, supplementary and primary simple battle positions, ambush locations, and observation posts. − Step 3B6: Determine enemy obstacle locations and intents for each obstacle. ⚫ Step 4—Synchronize the enemy mission: ◼ Step 4A: Determine enemy attack sequence and movement formations. ◼ Step 4B: Determine the enemy commander’s decision points. ⚫ Step 5—Continue refining the enemy COA; collaborating with staff sections, review staff estimates and changes to the U.S. forces’ array. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 6-13 Chapter 6 6-53. Figure 6-6 illustrates a situation template as an overlay depicting an enemy defense. Figure 6-6. Situation template as an overlay depicting the enemy defense Overlays Depicting Irregular Forces 6-54. Overlays depicting irregular forces (see figure 6-7) conducting operations typically focus on armed forces in a tactical array. The staff should consider whether to create overlays that depict the enemy’s less visible elements, such as leadership, enemy external relationships, support networks, as well as the activities in which the enemy engages. Additionally, the staff should capture the process used to template the overlay, so the staff and subordinate staffs can replicate the process as required. The techniques in ATP 5-0.6 can facilitate this analysis. 6-55. The staff constructs an irregular force overlay using a 10-step process that includes the following steps: ⚫ Step 1—Template the physical objectives irregular forces may attack. These objectives typically include friendly unit locations and movement routes; elements or individuals associated with host- nation political, civil, and security organizations; critical infrastructure; and elements of the civilian population. ⚫ Step 2—Template ingress and egress routes around objectives. Analysis of these routes includes consideration of nontraditional approaches associated with infiltration and sabotage. ⚫ Step 3—Template range fans around objectives. Analysis is based on the ranges of enemy indirect fire and air defense systems. ⚫ Step 4—Template potential locations of reconnaissance and surveillance assets. Analysis includes consideration of the physical areas of observation around and on the objective. It also focuses on identifying TTP used by the enemy to conduct reconnaissance. 6-14 ATP 2-01.3 1 March 2019  Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action ⚫ Step 5—Template potential ambush sites along movement routes and near objectives. Analysis is based on pattern and predictive analysis, as well as on analysis of friendly activities and movement. ⚫ Step 6—Template potential sniper locations along movement routes and near objectives. Analysis is based on pattern and predictive analysis, as well as on analysis of friendly activities and movement. ⚫ Step 7—Template potential IED attack locations along movement routes and near objectives. Analysis is based on pattern and predictive analysis, as well as on analysis of friendly activities and movement. ⚫ Step 8—Template potential cache sites. Analysis is based on pattern and predictive analysis, as well as on analysis of TTP. ⚫ Step 9—Template the bed-down area for direct action cells and individuals. Analysis is based on pattern and predictive analysis. ⚫ Step 10—Draw the AO for each direct action cell. Analysis is based on pattern and predictive analysis. Figure 6-7. Situation template as an overlay depicting irregular forces 1 March 2019 ATP 2-01.3 6-15 Chapter 6 Threat Course of Action Statement 6-56. Every threat COA includes a threat COA statement, which is a narrative that describes the situation template as an overlay. Figure 6-8 illustrates a threat COA statement. Figure 6-8. Threat course of action statement example 6-16 ATP 2-01.3 1 March 2019  Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action IDENTIFY HIGH-VALUE TARGETS FOR EACH COURSE OF ACTION 6-57. Identifying HVTs involves mentally war gaming a threat COA to determine the assets required to complete the mission. This process involves using as a guide the HVT list developed based on HVTs identified as part of the threat model in step 3 of the IPOE process, determining the effect on the threat COA if the target is lost, and identifying possible threat responses if the target is lost. 6-58. Based on the situation, one or more of the targets from the threat model may be validated as HVTs. Additionally, targets that were not identified in the threat model may be HVTs. During planning, the staff uses the HVT list (see figure 6-9) developed for each threat COA to develop the HPT list during the COA development step of the MDMP. Threat element High-value targets Command and SAM system fire control (SA-15b) Military Complex control Government Complex Artillery command and reconnaissance vehicle (1V14-3) Movement and Main battle tank (T-72B) Towed mechanical minelayer (PMZ-4) maneuver Tracked minelaying vehicle (GMZ-3) Special purpose forces Protection Nuclear, biological, chemical reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2RKh) 152-mm self-propelled howitzer (2S19M1) Man-portable SAM system (SA-18) Fires TDA-2K smoke generator SAM system (SA-13b) Battlefield surveillance radar (SNAR-10) SAM system radar system (SA-15b) Intelligence Short-range drone (ORLAN-10) Sustainment Two-metric ton 4x4 cargo truck (GAZ-66) mm millimeter SAM surface-to-air missile Figure 6-9. High-value target list developed during step 4 of IPOE (example) 6-59. Once identified and nominated, HPTs are grouped into a list—identified for a specific time and space in the battle and prioritized based on the commander’s approval for formal targeting. The HPT list (see figure 6-10) is continually refined during execution by targeting groups. HPTs can include various threat considerations potentially detrimental to the success of friendly missions. HPTs are incorporated into the scheme of fires and used to create target selection standards and attack guidance matrices. (For a detailed discussion on targeting, see FM 3-60.) Threat element Time (H-hour) Priority Targets Desired effect Intelligence 1 Air defense radar Fires H-24-H+10 2 Air missile defense (SA-13, SA-18) Destroy Intelligence 3 Artillery locating radar (ARK-1M) Fires H-H+10 4 Field artillery companies (2S1) Command and Control node/Government Complex H-H+10 4 Neutralize control Threat communications networks H-hour specific hour at which a particular operation commences Figure 6-10. High-payoff target list developed during step 3 of the MDMP (example) IDENTIFY INITIAL COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH COURSE OF ACTION 6-60. After identifying the full set of potential threat COAs, the staff develops the tools necessary to determine which COA the threat may implement. Because the threat has not acted yet, this determination cannot be made during IPOE. However, the staff can develop the information requirements and indicators necessary to support the construction of the information collection plan that can provide the information necessary to confirm or deny threat COAs and locate threat targets. 6-61. Information requirements are those items of information regarding the relevant aspects of the operational environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander (JP 2-0). An indicator is, in intelligence usage, an item of information that reflects the intention or capability of an adversary to adopt or reject a course of action (JP 2-0). Identifying and monitoring indicators are fundamental tasks of intelligence analysis, as they are the principal means of avoiding surprise. Indicators are often described as forward looking of predictive indicators. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 6-17 Chapter 6 6-62. Tables 6-1 and 6-2 list offensive and defensive indicators, respectively. Table 6-1. +Offensive indicators Activity Explanation Massing of maneuver elements, armor, May indicate the main effort by weakening areas of secondary importance artillery, and logistic support Deployment of combat elements on relatively May provide maximum combat power at attacking point by reducing frontages narrow frontage (not forced by terrain) Likely threat decisive effort Massing of indirect fire support assets May indicate initiation of main effort Extensive artillery preparation of up to 10 Initiates preparation preceding an attack minutes in duration or longer Dispersal of tanks and self-propelled artillery Can indicate formation of combined arms assault formations with tanks to forward units accompanying the leading maneuver elements and artillery following in bounds Provides depth to threat offensive operations Surface-to-surface missile units located Places friendly support and unassigned areas in range forward May also indicate, when employed alone, harassing or special weapons (chemical) delivery Antiaircraft artillery and mobile surface-to- Provides increased protection to massed forces before attack surface missiles located well forward with Extends air defense umbrella forward as units advance maneuver elements May precede an attack Demonstrations and feints May deceive actual point of attack Establishment and strengthening of Protects assembly areas and forces as they prepare for attack counterreconnaissance screen May be effort to prevent friendly forces from seeing attack preparations Concentration of mass toward one or both May indicate intent for single or double envelopment, particularly if massing flanks within the forward area units are armor heavy Increased patrolling or ground May indicate efforts to gather detailed intelligence regarding friendly dispositions reconnaissance before attack Command posts located well forward; mobile Indicates preparation to command an offensive operation from as far forward as command posts identified possible Movement of noncombatants from the area Indicates preparation for rapid forward advance of troops and follow-on forces of operations Often indicates major attacks, particularly against fortified positions or strongly Extensive conduct of drills and rehearsals in defended natural or man-made barriers, which require rehearsal of specialized unassigned areas tactics and skills Unit completes rehearsals Cessation of drills and rehearsals Unit prepares for offensive operations May indicate movement of additional forces to the front to sustain a major attack Increased activity in supply, maintenance, Stocking of sustainment items, such as ammunition and medical supplies, and motor transport areas before an attack Increased aerial reconnaissance (including Threat effort to collect further intelligence on friendly dispositions or defensive unmanned aircraft systems) positions Indicates preparation for increased sorties for aircraft and faster turnaround Establishment of forward arming and time and aviation sustainment refueling points, auxiliary airfields, or Indicates preparation to support offensive operations with aircraft as far activation of inactive airfields forward as possible Facilitates forward movement and grouping of assault units, particularly at night, Clearing lanes through own obstacles and usually immediately precedes an attack Reconnaissance, marking, and destruction Indicates where assaults will occur of defending force’s obstacles Gap-crossing equipment (swimming vehicles, bridging, ferries, assault boats) Expect a substantial effort to cross a water obstacle during a main attack located in forward areas (provides large water obstacle or gap) Electromagnetic warfare activity observed May indicate intent to isolate and destroy jammed unit or unit supported by (inability to communicate with some units, jammed unit artillery or air defense radars suppressed Radar suppression may indicate impending artillery or aviation strike. 6-18 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action Table 6-1. +Offensive indicators (continued) Activity Explanation Airborne or air assault operations likely indicates efforts to attack friendly Staging of airborne, air assault, or special commands, communications, or sustainment nodes forces with transportation assets such as May indicate a main effort in which airborne forces will link with ground transport aircraft or helicopters maneuver forces May indicate intent to conduct offensive operations; however, increased traffic Increased signals traffic or radio silence may be an attempt to deceive Radio silence denies information derived from signals intelligence Signals intelligence and electromagnetic Provides electronic attack and surveillance support for the attack warfare assets located forward Table 6-2. +Defensive indicators Activity Explanation Preparation of battalion and company Indicates intent for holding terrain with defense in-depth, normally supported by defensive areas consisting of company and armored counterattack forces platoon strong points Extensive preparation of field fortifications, Indicates strong positional defense obstacles, and minefields Indicates intent to contest friendly armor in forward positions Attachment of additional antitank assets to Attempts to attrite and channel friendly armor into engagement areas for frontline defensive positions armor counterattack forces Formation of antitank strong points in depth May allow penetration of friendly armor into engagement areas along avenues of approach May engage armor in depth Increases survivability of artillery in the defense Preparation of alternate artillery positions Indicates great effort to support main defensive area with artillery—no withdrawal of maneuver forces from main defense unless defeated Concentration of armor units in assembly Indicates holding armor units in reserve for possible counterattack or areas in the rear of the main defensive area counteroffensive operations Provides quick reaction capability against armor penetrations of the main Presence of concentrated antitank reserves defense Displacement of sustainment and medical Facilitates defensive repositioning, maneuver, and counterattacks (support units units toward the rear area are not “in the way”) Reduces the burden on sustainment support during the battle Pre-stocking of ammunition, supplies, and Reduces vulnerability of interdiction of supplies engineer or pioneer equipment in forward positions Ensures strong points can survive for reasonable periods if bypassed or cut off by advancing forces Withdrawal from defensive positions before Indicates delaying action to avoid decisive engagements becoming heavily engaged Numerous local counterattacks with limited objectives; counterattacks broken off before Assists disengaging units in contact, rather than an attack to restore position position is restored Units bounding rearward to new defensive Indicates units conducting local withdrawals to new positions positions, while another force begins or Usually an effort to preserve the defending force and trade space for time continues to engage Intent to inflict casualties thus slowing advance of attacking force and provide Maximum firepower located forward, firing sufficient volume of fire to avoid decisive engagements initiated at long ranges Allows for time to disengage and reposition defending forces Extremely large unit frontages compared to Indicates delaying action to economize force, allowing larger formations to usual defensive positions withdraw Chemical or biological weapons in forward Indicates possible chemical munitions use areas. Reports of threat in chemical Chemically contaminated areas cause significant delays to attacking forces protective clothing while handling munitions Identification of dummy positions and Indicates defending force using economy of force minefields Causes advancing force to determine if mines are live or inert 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 6-19 Chapter 6 6-63. +Chapter 7 discusses the types of information needed to support offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Generally, these requirements are related to confirming or denying a threat COA and locating threat HVTs. DEVELOP THE EVENT TEMPLATE AND MATRIX 6-64. Intelligence analysts develop event templates and event matrices as analytical planning tools. The initial event template and event matrix are normally developed before COA analysis, refined during COA analysis, and further refined during execution as the situation changes. In addition to using the event template and matrix to support its own planning, the staff normally disseminates the event template to subordinate units to assist in developing subordinate unit information collection plans. EVENT TEMPLATE 6-65. An event template is a guide for collection planning that depicts the named areas of interest where activity, or lack of activity, will indicate which course of action the enemy and/or adversary has adopted (JP 2-0). It is a graphic overlay used during the COA analysis step of the MDMP to confirm or deny threat COAs throughout war gaming. Additionally, the event template is used to develop the information collection overlay (see FM 3-55) and/or matrix and the DST during COA analysis. The event template is used during the execution activity of the operations process to assist in determining which COA the threat has adopted. An event template is accompanied by an event matrix. 6-66. The event template comprises— ⚫ Time phase lines. These lines are linear geographic areas that depict when threat activity may occur. ⚫ NAIs. Although NAIs are usually selected to capture indications of threat COAs, they may also be related to OE conditions. NAIs may be in the AO or in the AOI. NAIs in an AOI may be in another commander’s AO and require coordination for collection and cueing. ⚫ Decision points. A decision point is a point in space and the latest time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action (JP 5-0). The threat decision point is the point where the commander or staff anticipates the threat having to make a key decision. Predicting threat decision points also facilitates developing COAs that allow friendly forces to drive when and where the threat has to make decisions, thus limiting the threat’s COAs. 6-67. Constructing an event template is an analytical process that involves comparing the multiple threat COAs developed earlier in step 4 of the IPOE process to determine the time or event and the place or condition where the threat commander must decide on a particular COA. To create an event template— ⚫ Begin with the situation template. ⚫ Evaluate each COA to identify associated NAIs. ⚫ Determine where events may occur that differentiate between threat COAs. These areas evolve into NAIs; evaluate both the time phase lines and decision points. ⚫ Determine what action confirms or denies a particular threat COA (indicators). ⚫ Determine the specific hour at which a particular event occurs. ⚫ Compare the NAIs and indicators associated with each COA against the others and identify differences. ⚫ Focus on the differences that may provide the most reliable indications of the adoption of each unique COA. ⚫ Mark the selected NAIs on the event template. ⚫ Upon refining, overlay the threat COAs with decision points and NAIs. 6-68. Figure 6-11 illustrates the basic mechanics of this process. The figure displays minimal information for what is included on the event template. 6-20 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action Figure 6-11. Developing an event template 6-69. +Figure 6-12 illustrates a completed event template based on the consolidation of the area, mobile, and retrograde defensive operations. +In threat doctrine, these types of defensive operations are tactical methods and guides for designing operational COAs. (+See chapter 7 for more on defensive operations.) Figure 6-12. Completed event template example 06 January 2021 ATP 2-01.3, C1 6-21 Chapter 6 EVENT MATRIX 6-70. An event matrix refers to a cross-referenced description of the indicators and activity expected to occur in each named area of interest. Constructing an event matrix table is an analytical process that involves associating NAIs and threat decision points identified on the event template with indicators to assist in determining which COA the threat commander is implementing. (See figure 6-13.) To create an event matrix— ⚫ Using the event template, examine the events associated with each NAI and restate the events as indicators. ⚫ Enter the indicators into the event matrix along with the associated times they are likely to occur. Use the time phase lines from the event template to establish the expected times in the event matrix. ⚫ Take the threat decision points from the event template and list them in the event matrix. Figure 6-13. Completed event template and its associated event matrix example 6-22 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE AND INFORMATION COLLECTION MATRIX 6-71. The completed event template and event matrix form the basis for planning collection strategies, synchronizing intelligence with friendly operations, and developing the DST and matrix and information collection matrix (see figure 6-14 and figure 6-15 on page 6-24). In some instances, the staff might disseminate the event template as a collection graphic to support intelligence planning and collection by other units. 6-72. The DST provides the commander with a structured basis for deploying fires, maneuver, and jamming assets and for reducing the enemy’s defensive capability with these assets. Simply stated, it provides commanders with the specific points on the battlefield where they will be required to make decisions regarding the employment of assets. These decisions can be keyed to phase lines, events on the ground, or to specific enemy actions. Figure 6-14. Decision support template and matrix example 1 March 2019 ATP 2-01.3 6-23 Chapter 6 Assets Target Area of Interest Brigade EAB Decision Point Priority Specific 3/67 CAV REG Intelligence Indicators Information Start Stop Prophet/LLVI NAI COMINT HUMINT GEOINT MASINT Shadow Requirement Requirement 1st BN ELINT 2d BN 3d BN HCT CI 1.1.1 Report communications N T N 1,2 H-48 H+2 C C C C R R 1 1 coordinating enemy T A T 1. Special movement purpose forces in 1.1.2 Report hasty battle movement of fighters T T T N 1. Where along positions in 1,2 H-48 H+2 C C C R R R 1 1 into defensive P A A T AA1 will the 375th vicinity EA1 and positions BTG initiate EA2 1.1.3 Report shaping communications of T T T T N operations for an 1,2 H-48 H+2 C C R R 1 1 reconnaissance A P A P T area defense? assets 1.2.1 Report location 1,2, T T T N H-48 H+2 C C C R R R R 1 2 2. Blocking of engineer assets 3 P A A T obstacles on AA1 1.2.2 Report location and AA2 T T T N of deliberate obstacle 1,2 H-48 H+2 C C C R R R 1 2 P A A T belts AA avenue of approach HCT human intelligence collection team BN battalion HUMINT human intelligence BTG brigade tactical group LLVI low-level voice intercept C capable MASINT measurement and signature intelligence CAV cavalry NAI named area of interest CI counterintelligence NT not tasked COMINT communications intelligence R requested EA engagement area REG regiment EAB echelons above brigade TA tasked as alternate GEOINT geospatial intelligence TP tasked as primary H hour Figure 6-15. Information collection matrix example 6-24 ATP 2-01.3 1 March 2019