FM 2-0 Fundamentals of Intelligence PDF

PART ONE Fundamentals Effectively providing doctrine on the nature of intelligence and operations requires a sequential approach. Therefore, FM 2-0 is structured in three parts, starting with fundamental concepts and progressing to detailed discussions. Part I focuses on intelligence and operational fundamentals, concluding with how those fundamentals apply across the Army strategic contexts. Part I comprises three chapters that include the following points of emphasis: The intelligence warfighting function and intelligence warfighting function tasks (IWFTs). The intelligence process. Intelligence capabilities. Fighting for intelligence. Understanding an operational environment (OE). Multidomain operations, the Army’s operational concept. Large-scale combat operations. Operational tenets and imperatives. Operational approach and operational framework. Integrating intelligence into operations. Fighting for intelligence within and across the Army strategic contexts. Chapter 1 Intelligence SECTION I – OVERVIEW 1-1. Intelligence is 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. 2. The activities that result in the product. 3. The organizations conducting such activities (JP 2-0). It is useful to view intelligence in three ways, depending on the context of the discussion—intelligence as a function, as a product, and as a process—which together enable the conduct of operations by supporting the commander and command and control (C2) (which is accomplished by supporting the rest of the staff). 1-2. The purpose of intelligence (the function) is to provide commanders and staffs with timely, accurate, relevant, predictive, and tailored intelligence (the product) about the threat and other aspects of the OE. Intelligence (the process) supports the conduct of operations. Intelligence is most meaningful when it directly supports operations or force generation. Intelligence professionals consistently strive to provide intelligence that facilitates the commander and staff’s situational understanding. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 1-1 Chapter 1 Note. Force generation is an element of military force. It is the operation that creates and provides units for projection and employment to enable military effects and influence across multiple operational environments. It is the primary responsibility of the Services to develop, provide, and preserve forces in support of the national military strategy to enable the combatant commanders to execute their missions (AR 525-29). 1-3. The goal is to provide effective and flexible intelligence support across the competition continuum. However, this is a significant challenge. While not all encompassing, three key aspects of providing effective intelligence support are— ⚫ Knowing and adapting the intelligence fundamentals (as largely captured within Army doctrine) in the context of the current situation and a unit’s mission or operation. ⚫ Employing and adapting all available intelligence capabilities in the context of the current situation and a unit’s mission or operation. ⚫ Building and maintaining tactically and technically proficient intelligence professionals who are effective in both the profession of arms and the intelligence profession. JP 2-0, Intelligence The joint intelligence doctrine in JP 2-0 is a great resource and the authoritative doctrinal source for the Joint Staff, combatant commands, joint task forces (JTFs), and subordinate components of those commands. Among other topics, JP 2-0 thoroughly discusses— The Joint Staff. Combatant command intelligence. Subordinate joint force intelligence. National intelligence. Interagency, international, and multinational intelligence sharing. The joint intelligence process. Army forces not serving in one of those roles should use Army doctrine. The content in JP 2-0 was considered in developing this publication, and the content in FM 2-0 is consistent with JP 2-0 while also accounting for the differences between Army and joint structures, capabilities, authorities, and operations. 1-4. In order to know and adapt intelligence fundamentals, intelligence professionals must read more than FM 2-0; they must be doctrinally proficient in a number of intelligence and combined arms publications, depending on their position, unit or organization, and the unit or organization’s mission or operation. To assist in building proficiency in intelligence fundamentals, this chapter provides discussions on the following: ⚫ Intelligence, in general, including intelligence as a product and the intelligence enterprise. ⚫ Army intelligence fundamentals, including the intelligence warfighting function and the intelligence process. ⚫ Employing Army intelligence capabilities. ⚫ Fighting for intelligence. INTELLIGENCE AS A PRODUCT 1-5. Through the effective integration of intelligence into operations, intelligence and operational products are mutually supportive and enhance the commander and staff’s situational understanding—the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). Intelligence professionals ultimately disseminate intelligence products, either analog (face-to-face, radio, hardcopy) or digital, in many ways. These intelligence products are tailored to the commander and staff’s needs and preferences, and they are dictated by the OE, current situation, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and battle rhythm. 1-2 FM 2-0 01 October 2023 Intelligence 1-6. It is an art to describe intelligence production and dissemination and to ensure it is effectively integrated into unit planning, execution, and targeting, but it is not an exact science to execute intelligence as a function and create it as a product. There is always a degree of uncertainty when producing intelligence. Understanding intelligence as a product, with its strengths and limitations, includes understanding the categories of intelligence products, characteristics of effective intelligence, and the goal to adhere to the highest analytic standards. CATEGORIES OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS 1-7. Intelligence products are generally placed in one of eight production categories, based primarily on the purpose of the produced intelligence. The categories of intelligence products can and do overlap; analysts can find and use some of the same intelligence and information in each of the categories (see JP 2-0): ⚫ Warning intelligence are those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that forewarn of hostile actions or intention against United States entities, partners, or interests (JP 2-0). For Army purposes, warning intelligence includes the threat’s use of new or first-use of significant existing capabilities, tactics, or courses of action (COAs). ⚫ Current intelligence provides updated support for ongoing operations. It involves the integration of time-sensitive, all-source intelligence analysis and information reporting on the area of operations (AO). The term current is relative to the commander or decision maker’s time sensitivity and the context of the type of operation that is supported. ⚫ General military intelligence is intelligence concerning the military capabilities of foreign countries or organizations, or topics affecting potential United States or multinational military operations (JP 2-0). ⚫ Target intelligence is intelligence that portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance (JP 3-60). ⚫ Scientific and technical intelligence is foundational all-source intelligence that covers: a. foreign developments in basic and applied research and applied engineering techniques and b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel; the research and development related thereto; and the production methods employed for their manufacture (JP 2-0). ⚫ Counterintelligence is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities (JP 2-0). ⚫ Estimative intelligence is intelligence that identifies and describes adversary capabilities and intentions, and forecasts the full range of alternative future situations in relative order of probability that may have implications for the development of national and military strategy, and planning and executing military operations (JP 2-0). ⚫ Identity intelligence is the intelligence resulting from the processing of identity attributes concerning individuals, groups, networks, or populations of interest (JP 2-0). Note. Intelligence related to the information dimension across all domains can be categorized by threat entity: intent, capability, access, resources, and expertise. CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE 1-8. The effectiveness of intelligence is measured against different criteria. A concise list of intelligence characteristics includes timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive. Within Army combined arms doctrine, intelligence is a subset of relevant information. In FM 6-0, the relevance of information is determined based on the following characteristics: accurate, timely, useable, complete, precise, and secure. Effective intelligence must meet all those characteristics. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 1-3 Chapter 1 Note. Intelligence professionals must protect classified intelligence. 1-9. The following is an intelligence-centric list of characteristics: ⚫ Timely. Intelligence, provided early, supports operations and prevents surprise from threat actions. It must flow continuously to the commander and staff before, during, and after an operation. Intelligence organizations, databases, and products must be available to develop estimates, make decisions, and plan operations. ⚫ Relevant and tailored: ▪ Intelligence supports the commander’s requirements. ▪ Intelligence is shared and disseminated in the format requested by the commander, subordinate commanders, and staffs. The intelligence staff presents clear, concise intelligence that meets the commander’s preferences, facilitates situational understanding, and is usable for decision making or other actions. ⚫ Accurate and reliable: ▪ To the extent possible, intelligence should accurately identify threat intentions, capabilities, limitations, composition, and dispositions. It should be derived from multiple sources and disciplines to minimize the possibility of deception or misinterpretation. Assumptions should be clearly identified, and there should be a distinction between facts and assumptions. Alternative or contradictory assessments should be presented, when necessary, to ensure balance and unbiased intelligence and present planners with alternate assumptions and different potential indicators. ▪ Intelligence evaluates and determines the extent that the collected information and the information being used in intelligence briefings and products are trustworthy, uncorrupted, and undistorted. Concerns about the underlying sources’ reliability that affect confidence in the intelligence, or any other issues must be stated up front. ⚫ Predictive. Intelligence informs the commander about what the threat can do (threat capabilities, emphasizing the most dangerous threat COA) and is most likely to do (the most likely threat COA). The intelligence staff should anticipate the commander’s intelligence needs, as well as threat options that may potentially impact the commander’s decision making and a unit’s freedom of action. Predictive intelligence also considers possible threat activities and the employment of threat and friendly capabilities over longer time windows before those enemy forces can affect friendly forces or the AO. Determining time windows can assist decision makers on when to leverage forces and capabilities to mitigate predicted changes in an OE. ⚫ Meet unit or organization and intelligence enterprise standards: ▪ Usable. Intelligence must be in the correct data-file specifications for databasing and display. Usability facilitates further analysis, intelligence production, product integration across the staff, and use within operations. ▪ Complete. Intelligence briefings and products convey the necessary components to be as complete as possible. ▪ Precise (as possible). Intelligence briefings and products provide the required level of detail and complexity to answer the requirements. ANALYTIC STANDARDS 1-10. As much as possible, intelligence products and their conclusions should adhere to analytic standards, such as those established by the Director of National Intelligence in Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203. These standards assist in determining the relevance and value of information before updating existing intelligence assessments. These standards also govern the production and evaluation of national intelligence analysis to meet the highest standards of integrity and rigorous analytic thinking. Although created for national-level intelligence agencies, these analytic standards are also valid at the operational and tactical levels. (See ATP 2-33.4.) 1-4 FM 2-0 01 October 2023 Intelligence THE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE 1-11. Multinational, interagency, intergovernmental (to the national level), and joint intelligence are crucial for Army intelligence activities. Multinational, national, and joint intelligence form the basis and set the context for more specific Army operational and tactical intelligence. This national to tactical aspect of intelligence explains why the intelligence enterprise is essential to Army intelligence activities as it provides certain intelligence, capabilities, broadcast downlinks, and other services. Note. The Army Intelligence and Security Enterprise (AISE) provides capabilities to the larger intelligence enterprise. The enterprise provides important support to joint, multinational, and combined organizations and intelligence activities, including DOD combat support agencies. (See paragraph 7-15 for the specific AISE offices.) 1-12. Higher-level intelligence is key to the depth and quality of the intelligence disseminated to Army commanders and staffs, and it provides some forms of intelligence the Army cannot produce that are important to Army multidomain operations. From an overarching perspective, every aspect of intelligence is synchronized, federated, databased, networked, and, to some extent, collaborative across all unified action partners. This synchronization (including the provision of certain authorities) occurs through national to tactical support across the intelligence enterprise. Intelligence enterprise assets include all U.S. intelligence professionals, sensors, systems, federated organizations, information, and processes supported by a network- enabled architecture. The most important element is the people who make it work. 1-13. Not all echelons have the same degree of activity with other members of the intelligence enterprise, but Army intelligence professionals should understand what they receive or can access from the intelligence enterprise. The main value provided to the commander is the ability to leverage— ⚫ Specialized collection capabilities. ⚫ Large volumes of OE-related information. ⚫ Unique intelligence databases. ⚫ Specialized analysis and analytic products. 1-14. Analysts leverage higher-level intelligence organizations and databases to create a more comprehensive and detailed assessment of threats and other relevant aspects of the OE (such as deep analysis across each domain and the human and information dimensions) to facilitate situational understanding and visualization of the AO. The effectiveness of Army intelligence hinges directly on the ability to collaborate and share within the intelligence enterprise. 1-15. Collaboration is the central principle of conducting analysis across intelligence organizations. Army tactical units provide accurate and detailed intelligence about the threat and other relevant aspects of the OE (especially those related to Army activities) through the intelligence enterprise, while other intelligence organizations provide expertise and access not readily available to the Army at the tactical level. 1-16. United States (U.S.) Government members of the larger intelligence enterprise are referred to as the intelligence community (IC), which is under the purview of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Intelligence community is all departments or agencies of a government that are concerned with intelligence activity, either in an oversight, managerial, support, or participatory role (JP 2-0). While multinational and nongovernmental partners are important, the U.S. IC forms a major portion of the intelligence enterprise. Numerous DOD and non-DOD agencies and organizations in the IC support Army operations by providing specific intelligence products and services. Additionally, national-level intelligence organizations provide governance and standards over certain intelligence methods and activities. Cooperation can benefit every echelon. (See appendix A for JTF and unified action partner considerations.) 1-17. The U.S. IC is increasingly important as new technologies facilitate collaborative analysis and production. Effective intelligence operations must include familiarity with the IC and methods to obtain information, intelligence, and services from the various members, as necessary. Table 1-1 on page 1-6 lists DOD and non-DOD IC members. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 1-5 Chapter 1 Table 1-1. U.S. intelligence community members Department of Defense members Non-Department of Defense members Defense Intelligence Agency Office of Director of National Intelligence National Security Agency Central Intelligence Agency National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Department of State National Reconnaissance Office Department of Energy U.S. Army Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Navy Department of the Treasury U.S. Air Force U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Marine Corps Department of Homeland Security U.S. Space Force Drug Enforcement Administration U.S. United States SECTION II – ARMY INTELLIGENCE 1-18. Army intelligence is unique from joint and other Service intelligence activities for several reasons, some of which include the nature of Army operations and missions (primarily within the land domain), the fog and friction associated with Army operations sometimes creating time and environmental challenges, and the unique branch and staff structure. Army intelligence is— ⚫ Focused on the commander and staff. ⚫ Requirements-driven to support visualization, situational understanding, and targeting. ⚫ Synchronized and integrated within operations through the staff integrating processes and working groups. ⚫ Detailed, as much as required and possible, and usually time sensitive. ⚫ Employed as a warfighting function, which encompasses more than the military intelligence (MI) branch. The varied nature of the intelligence warfighting function occurs through four tasks: provide intelligence support to force generation, provide support to situational understanding, conduct information collection, and provide intelligence support to targeting. ⚫ Executed through the intelligence process, based on the joint intelligence process but modified to account for Army operations. 1-19. Commanders and staffs require accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to understand threat characteristics, goals and objectives, and COAs across the domains and dimensions. Precise intelligence is also critical in detecting, identifying, and targeting threat capabilities at the right time and place and in opening windows of opportunity across domains and dimensions, particularly during large-scale combat operations. Commanders and staffs must have detailed knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, equipment, capabilities, training, employing and controlling forces, and tactics to plan for and contribute to unified action across the Army strategic contexts (competition below armed conflict, crisis, and armed conflict). This requires using the intelligence warfighting function to provide the detailed knowledge necessary to support the operations process. 1-20. Intelligence drives the conduct of operations and operations enable intelligence, making intelligence and operations inseparable. Therefore, G-2/S-2s must ensure the intelligence warfighting function operates effectively and efficiently. G-2/S-2s are not simply managers; they are commanders’ primary advisors on employing collection assets and driving information collection. The result is the dissemination of intelligence or combat information to the right person at the right time and place. Combat information is a report that is gathered by or provided to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence before being used to support decision making. The commander and unit may create a level of risk by relying too much on combat information instead of intelligence. 1-6 FM 2-0 01 October 2023 Intelligence THE INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION 1-21. Intelligence is one of the warfighting functions that enables the Army to generate combat power during the conduct of operations. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment (ADP 3-0). Other significant aspects of the OE include— ⚫ The operational variables not already covered by the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. ⚫ Other aspects that are not a threat or hazard to operations, for example, using the intelligence warfighting function to provide intelligence on unique requirements to support medical and humanitarian operations in an African country. 1-22. The intelligence warfighting function must be effective and flexible to legally meet the commander and staff’s requirements. One way to ensure this effectiveness and flexibility is focusing on those other aspects of the OE, as needed, when they are important to the commander, type of operation, and specific mission. 1-23. The intelligence warfighting function supports operations through a broad range of supporting doctrinal tasks, referred to as IWFTs. Army units and organizations perform IWFTs through the intelligence process by employing intelligence capabilities to support the commander and staff. Therefore, commanders and staffs must know the intelligence staff considerations discussed in chapter 3. 1-24. IWFTs are interrelated, require the commander and staff’s participation, and are often conducted simultaneously. Appendix B provides a detailed description of the IWFTs, which comprise the following: ⚫ Provide intelligence support to force generation (IWFT 2.1) supports the Army’s efforts to maintain a ready, effective, and flexible intelligence warfighting function globally. This task spans intelligence across the entire competition continuum and includes the following subtasks: ▪ Provide intelligence readiness (IWFT 2.1.1). ▪ Plan, establish, and revise an intelligence architecture (IWFT 2.1.2). ▪ Provide intelligence overwatch (IWFT 2.1.3). ▪ Tailor the intelligence force (IWFT 2.1.4). ⚫ Provide support to situational understanding (IWFT 2.2) entails providing information and intelligence to commanders to clearly understand the threat and other relevant aspects of the OE. This task includes the following subtasks: ▪ Conduct pre-mission analysis of the OE (IWFT 2.2.1). Note. This task was formerly known as generate intelligence knowledge. ▪ Leverage data, information, and intelligence (IWFT 2.2.2). ▪ Perform intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) (IWFT 2.2.3). ▪ Perform situation development (IWFT 2.2.4). ▪ Provide intelligence support to unique missions (IWFT 2.2.5). ▪ Conduct police intelligence operations (IWFT 2.2.6). Note. Police intelligence is not an MI task; police intelligence operations encompass different aspects of law enforcement and criminal investigations. United States Codes (USCs), executive orders, DOD directives, and Army regulations contain specific guidance on the conduct of police intelligence operations. ⚫ Conduct information collection (IWFT 2.3) synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capabilities in direct support (DS) of current and future operations. This task includes the following subtasks: ▪ Collection management (IWFT 2.3.1). ▪ Direct information collection (IWFT 2.3.2). ▪ Execute collection (IWFT 2.3.3). ▪ Conduct intelligence-related missions and operations (IWFT 2.3.4). 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 1-7 Chapter 1 ⚫ Provide intelligence support to targeting (IWFT 2.4) entails providing the commander with information and intelligence to support targeting to achieve lethal and nonlethal effects. This task includes the following subtasks: ▪ Provide intelligence support to target development (IWFT 2.4.1). ▪ Provide intelligence support to target detection (IWFT 2.4.2). ▪ Provide intelligence support to combat assessment (IWFT 2.4.3). THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS 1-25. Army units and organizations use the intelligence process to integrate intelligence support and provide the commander and staff the intelligence needed to facilitate situational understanding, effectively make decisions, and exercise C2. As a key fundamental, it is important to understand both the joint and Army intelligence processes. 1-26. The joint intelligence process provides the basis for common terminology. (See JP 2-0.) It consists of six interrelated categories of intelligence operations (planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback). The Army intelligence process consists of four steps (plan and direct, collect and process, produce, and disseminate and integrate) and five continuing activities (synchronize, conduct intelligence operations, perform PED, analyze, and assess). (See figure 1-1.) 1-27. The Army intelligence process steps are very similar to the joint process interrelated categories; however, due to the unique characteristics of Army operations, the Army intelligence process steps differ in some important but subtle ways. Some of the differences stem from J-2 authorities and responsibilities not tasked to G-2/S-2s. Despite these differences, the steps and continuing activities of the Army process account for each of the categories of the joint process. Figure 1-1. The joint and Army intelligence processes 1-28. The Army views the intelligence process as a model and common framework to guide Army professionals in their thoughts, discussions, plans, and assessments about intelligence. When applying the intelligence process, Army intelligence professionals must consider each domain and dimension of the OE to properly account for threat capabilities and plan for information collection. The Army intelligence process leverages all sources of information and expertise, including the IC and nonintelligence entities (through the intelligence enterprise) to provide situational awareness to the commander and staff. The intelligence warfighting function uses the intelligence process as a synchronization and integration tool to ensure the right information and intelligence get to the right user at the right time in the right format without inundating users. 1-8 FM 2-0 01 October 2023 Intelligence 1-29. Commanders drive the Army intelligence process, which G-2/S-2s synchronize and track. The intelligence process, similar to the intelligence warfighting function, involves more than just intelligence professionals; the entire staff—including but not limited to the G-3/S-3, G-6/S-6, G-9/S-9, engineer officer, and fire support coordinator—also has an important role in the intelligence process. 1-30. The intelligence process supports the activities (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) of the operations process; it is performed continuously to support each activity. Although the intelligence process includes unique aspects and activities, it is designed similarly to the operations process: ⚫ The plan and direct step and synchronize continuing activity of the intelligence process closely correspond to the plan activity of the operations process. ⚫ The collect and process, produce, and disseminate and integrate steps and the conduct intelligence operations, perform PED, and analyze continuing activities of the intelligence process together correspond to the execute activity of the operations process. ⚫ The assess continuing activity is part of the overall assess activity of the operations process. 1-31. Figure 1-2 illustrates the Army intelligence process steps, continuing activities, and the interaction between them. Figure 1-2. The Army intelligence process 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 1-9 Chapter 1 INTELLIGENCE PROCESS STEPS 1-32. The intelligence process steps are the most basic actions from the initial planning of an operation to answering an intelligence requirement and ensuring the answer is integrated into the operation. Just as the activities of the operations process overlap and recur as the mission demands, so do the steps of the intelligence process. Plan and Direct 1-33. Pre-mission analysis of the OE occurs far in advance of detailed planning and orders production. This intelligence assists in focusing information collection and detailed planning upon mission receipt. Intelligence planning is inherent in the Army design methodology (ADM) and the military decision-making process (MDMP). IPOE is an especially important task in planning and directing, as initial IPOE assists in driving the subsequent steps of the MDMP. Intelligence planning should be as collaborative as possible across echelons and encompass various aspects of the OE (in terms of leveraging the intelligence enterprise, considering the different domains and dimensions, and including the entire staff). The goal is to provide effective and flexible intelligence support and thoroughly integrate intelligence with operations. 1-34. The plan and direct step also includes activities that identify key information requirements and develop the means to satisfy those requirements. The intelligence staff collaborates with the operations and signal staffs to plan the intelligence architecture (based on the planned use of intelligence capabilities). Collaboration facilitates parallel planning and enhances all aspects of the intelligence process by enriching analysis, incorporating different points of view, and broadening situational understanding (across all domains and dimensions of the OE). The staff produces a synchronized and integrated information collection plan (based on the collection management plan) focused on answering intelligence requirements. Intelligence Requirements An intelligence requirement is 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. 2. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command’s knowledge or understanding of the operational environment or threat forces (JP 2-0). Intelligence requirements primarily comprise priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) but may also include targeting intelligence requirements and other intelligence requirements. After the staff compiles all intelligence requirements, the commander must prioritize them, so the staff understands the exact prioritization of all requirements: PIRs. A priority intelligence requirement is the intelligence component of commander’s critical information requirements used to focus the employment of limited intelligence assets and resources against competing demands for intelligence support (JP 2-0). In Army usage, PIRs refer to intelligence requirements that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the OE. PIRs are part of the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). Targeting intelligence requirements. Targeting intelligence requirements refer to those high-payoff target (HPT)-related requirements, outside of what is already captured in PIRs, that the commander specifies as part of the information collection effort. Units are not required to develop targeting intelligence requirements. Other intelligence requirements. Other intelligence requirements refer to those commander-specified requirements that are either information requirements that do not qualify as PIRs or unanticipated requirements over the course of an operation that are not characterized as PIRs. 1-10 FM 2-0 01 October 2023 Intelligence Collect and Process 1-35. The entire staff, led by the intelligence staff, synchronizes collection and processing to provide critical information and intelligence at key times throughout the phases of an operation. Collection and processing are mutually dependent. Staffs must not allow a seam to emerge between collection and processing, even when elements conducting those functions are separated geographically. The intelligence staff continuously monitors not only information collection results but also processing results to assess the effectiveness of the overall information collection effort. 1-36. Information collection and processing activities transition when requirements change, the unit mission changes, the unit proceeds through the phase of an operation, or the unit prepares for future operations. Successful information collection and processing results in the timely collection and reporting of relevant and accurate information, which supports intelligence production. The intelligence staff coordinates thoroughly to ensure specific units, capabilities, personnel, equipment (especially communications), and procedures are ready for effective collection and processing. 1-37. Successfully collecting timely, relevant, and useful information against an adaptive threat, especially a peer threat, is difficult. It is critical for the staff to plan for and use well-developed procedures and flexible planning to track emerging targets, adapt to changing operational requirements, meet the requirements to collect in the deep, close, and rear areas, and meet the requirements for combat assessment. A successful collection and processing effort requires the operations staff, the intelligence staff, other key staff members, intelligence analysts, and collectors to form an efficient feedback loop. Success also requires the staff, analysts, and collectors to watch for threat countermeasures, denial activities, and threat deception. The last step of the feedback loop involves the intelligence staff evaluating reported information for its accuracy and responsiveness to information collection tasks and providing feedback to collection control elements and collectors. Produce 1-38. Production refers to the development of intelligence through the analysis of collected information and existing intelligence. Analysts create intelligence products, conclusions, or projections/predictions regarding threats and other relevant aspects of the OE to answer known or anticipated requirements in an effective format. The intelligence staff processes information from single or multiple sources, disciplines, and complementary capabilities and integrates the information with existing intelligence to create finished intelligence products. 1-39. Intelligence products must be timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored to facilitate situational understanding and support decision making and targeting. The accuracy and detail of intelligence products have a direct effect on operational success. Due to time constraints, analysts sometimes develop products that are not as detailed as they would prefer. However, a timely, accurate answer that meets the commander’s requirements is better than a more detailed answer that is late. 1-40. Part of intelligence synchronization is prioritizing and synchronizing the unit’s PED and intelligence production efforts. The intelligence staff addresses numerous and varied production requirements based on intelligence requirements; diverse missions, environments, and situations; and user-format requirements. Through analysis, collaboration, and intelligence reach, the G-2/S-2 and staff use the intelligence capability of higher, lateral, and subordinate echelons to meet processing and production requirements. Disseminate and Integrate 1-41. Timely dissemination and integration of intelligence and finished intelligence products are critical to operational success. This dissemination must be deliberate and carefully controlled to ensure the commander, staff, and other appropriate personnel receive the intelligence when needed in the right form at the right time. Additionally, the importance of the intelligence must be understood. Commanders, staff members, and unified action partners must receive and use combat information and intelligence to facilitate situational understanding and support decision making and targeting. Central to successful dissemination to unified action partners is the early and continuous involvement of foreign disclosure officers and supporting representatives. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 1-11 Chapter 1 1-42. The commander and staff must establish and support a seamless intelligence architecture, including an effective dissemination and integration plan. Just because intelligence is delivered does not mean it will be used effectively for planning, decision making, or targeting. The intelligence staff must take appropriate steps to ensure the intelligence is properly considered and used in planning and controlling operations and in conducting targeting. A dissemination and integration plan can be a separate product or integrated into existing products, such as the collection management plan. The plan must include specifications on how it will be integrated and have provisions for dissemination to unified action partners. INTELLIGENCE PROCESS CONTINUING ACTIVITIES 1-43. The intelligence process continuing activities add details and areas of emphasis to the intelligence process steps. The continuing activities also assist in filling gaps from some of the detailed aspects of the intelligence warfighting function. To support operations, the intelligence warfighting function makes observations about the threat, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other relevant aspects of the OE. MI units conduct intelligence operations resulting in collected data. A dedicated effort performs PED to convert the data into useable information for analysis. This effort results in intelligence. Because of its complexity, intelligence professionals continually synchronize and assess this effort to ensure the effectiveness of the intelligence warfighting function. Synchronize 1-44. Intelligence synchronization is the art of integrating information collection; intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination; and intelligence analysis with operations to effectively and efficiently fight for intelligence in support of decision making (ADP 2-0). Intelligence synchronization integrates intelligence with operations and ensures all requirements are met, as much as feasible, through close collaboration between the commander, G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and other members of the intelligence warfighting function. 1-45. Intelligence synchronization occurs through a broader perspective than collection management and includes aspects of long-range intelligence planning, maintaining, and revising the intelligence architecture. Intelligence synchronization could be considered the orchestration of the intelligence warfighting function. This holistic activity ensures intelligence support is effective and flexible to meet changing conditions and requirements. While the commander drives the intelligence warfighting function, and the MI unit commander performs an invaluable role, the G-2/S-2 is ultimately responsible for successful intelligence synchronization. Conduct Intelligence Operations 1-46. Intelligence operations are the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units through the intelligence disciplines to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements (ADP 2-0). MI units use the operations process to conduct intelligence operations using mission orders and standard command and support relationships. Flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances, as well as continuous assessments, are critical for effective intelligence operations. Chapter 6 provides detailed discussion on conducting intelligence operations. Perform Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination 1-47. Processing, exploitation, and dissemination is the execution of the related functions that converts and refines collected data into usable information, distributes the information for further analysis, and, when appropriate, provides combat information to commanders and staffs (ADP 2-0). Intelligence PED is the way the intelligence warfighting function processes collected data and information, performs an initial analysis (exploitation), and provides information in a useable form (dissemination) for further analysis or as combat information to the commander and staff. Analyze 1-48. There are many forms of analysis within Army operations. Analysis assists commanders, staffs, and intelligence leaders in framing the problem, stating the problem, and solving the problem. Leaders and staffs at all levels conduct analysis to assist in making many types of decisions and to conduct targeting. Analysis also occurs in many forms throughout the intelligence process. For example, in collection management 1-12 FM 2-0 01 October 2023 Intelligence analysis is critical in ensuring information requirements receive the appropriate priority for collection and are assigned to the proper collection asset. The most important form of analysis within the intelligence process is intelligence analysis. 1-49. Intelligence analysis is the process by which collected information is evaluated and integrated with existing information to facilitate intelligence production (ADP 2-0). The purpose of intelligence analysis is to describe current and predict future threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. The following represent two distinct examples of intelligence analysis: ⚫ A single-source collector performing initial analysis—in intelligence, often referred to as exploitation during the collect and process step. The collector adds context to information (analysis) based on experience and knowledge before reporting the information to single-source or all-source analysis elements. ⚫ An all-source analyst performing predictive analysis to identify threat activities and trends that present possible windows of opportunity and subsequent positions of relative advantage to friendly forces. The analyst uses indicators for each threat COA as well threat characteristics and threat models as the basis for the analysis and conclusions. 1-50. Intelligence personnel performing PED as well as analysis must understand and effectively deal with potential information overload. As time progresses, intelligence professionals will experience increases in the volume, pace, and complexity of the data they receive. MI professionals must develop data literacy skills to confront this issue effectively. Until institutional training is adjusted to incorporate data literacy, intelligence professionals must build those skills through self-development. There are some excellent online resources that provide a good starting point to build data literacy skills, such as courses offered through Army MI Data Fundamentals. Data literacy skills will become more important as artificial intelligence/machine learning technologies become more prevalent within intelligence software and systems. Note. Enrollment information for Army MI Data Fundamentals courses is available on Percipio, the Army eLearning website, on NIPRNET. Assess 1-51. Assess is part of the overall assessment continuing activity of the operations process. For intelligence purposes, assessment refers to the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly significant threat activities and changes in the OE. Assessing the situation begins upon receipt of mission and continues throughout the intelligence process. This assessment allows commanders, staffs, and intelligence leaders to ensure intelligence synchronization. Friendly actions, threat actions, civil considerations, and events in the area of interest (AOI) interact to form a dynamic OE. The continuous assessment of the effects of each element on the other elements, especially the overall effect of threat actions on friendly operations, is essential to situational understanding. Analysts must consider the domains and dimensions of the OE when performing this continuous assessment. 1-52. The intelligence staff continuously produces assessments based on operations, the threat situation, the information collection effort, and the status of other relevant aspects of the OE. These assessments are critical in— ⚫ Ensuring intelligence requirements are answered. ⚫ Redirecting collection assets to support changing requirements. ⚫ Ensuring operations run effectively. ⚫ Ensuring the proper use of information and intelligence. ⚫ Identifying threat deception and denial efforts. 1-53. The intelligence staff continuously assesses the effectiveness of the information collection effort. This type of assessment requires sound judgment and thorough knowledge of— ⚫ Friendly operations. ⚫ Characteristics of the AOI. ⚫ The threat situation, doctrine, patterns, and projected COAs. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 1-13 Chapter 1 SECTION III – INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES 1-54. The intelligence warfighting function executes the intelligence process by employing intelligence capabilities. These capabilities comprise personnel, systems, and supporting technology—all of which are maintained, trained, and employed to conduct intelligence operations to facilitate situational understanding and provide intelligence support to targeting. 1-55. The intelligence staff (chapter 5) and MI units/organizations (chapter 7) collaborate closely to ensure the commander and staff receive all-source and single-source intelligence—the building blocks by which the intelligence warfighting function facilitates situational understanding and supports decision making and targeting. The intelligence warfighting function receives information from a variety of sources. Some of the intelligence sources are commonly referred to as single-source collection. Single-source collection is employed through intelligence operations (the means of information collection performed by MI units), or it is one of the closely related operations (complementary capabilities). Intelligence PED capabilities are also necessary to process information and prepare it for subsequent analysis or target nominations. The intelligence produced from access to information from all (or several) of those information sources or from single-source intelligence is called all-source intelligence. ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE 1-56. Army forces conduct operations primarily based on all-source intelligence assessments and products developed by the intelligence staff. In joint doctrine, all-source intelligence is 1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information in the production of finished intelligence. 2. In intelligence collection, a phrase that indicates that, in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting systems and resources are identified for possible use and those most capable are tasked (JP 2-0). For the Army, all-source intelligence is the integration of intelligence and information from all relevant sources in order to analyze situations or conditions that impact operations (ADP 2-0). ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS 1-57. The fundamentals of all-source analysis comprise intelligence analysis techniques and the all-source analytical tasks: perform situation development, conduct pre-mission analysis of the OE, perform IPOE, and provide intelligence support to targeting. 1-58. The intelligence staff determines the significance and reliability of the incoming information by comparing it with current intelligence holdings; subsequent analysis and evaluation assist the intelligence staff in determining changes in threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable COAs across the domains and dimensions of the OE. The intelligence staff supports the integrating processes (IPOE, information collection, targeting, risk management, and knowledge management) and the integration of intelligence support into operations by providing all-source analysis of threats, terrain and weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the OE. This support also accounts for human and information dimension effects within the operational and mission variables. 1-59. All-source intelligence is used to develop the intelligence products necessary to aid situational understanding, support the development of plans and orders, and answer intelligence requirements. Although all-source intelligence takes longer to produce, it is more reliable and less susceptible to deception than single-source intelligence. ALL-SOURCE PRODUCTION 1-60. Fusion facilitates all-source production. For Army purposes, fusion is consolidating, combining, and correlating information together (ADP 2-0). Fusion occurs as an iterative activity to refine information as an integral part of all-source analysis. 1-14 FM 2-0 01 October 2023 Intelligence 1-61. All-source intelligence production is continuous and occurs throughout the intelligence and operations processes. Most of the products from all-source intelligence and initially developed during planning are updated, as needed, throughout preparation and execution based on information gained from continuous assessment. SINGLE-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE 1-62. Single-source intelligence includes the joint intelligence disciplines, which are also the Army intelligence disciplines, and when available (it can differ by echelon) and properly planned, the complementary capabilities from warfighting functions and branches other than intelligence. Intelligence PED capabilities also have an important role within the intelligence disciplines. MI units can conduct intelligence operations with a single intelligence discipline or multiple intelligence disciplines. The intelligence staff depends on non-MI units to provide complementary capabilities as part of the intelligence architecture. However, some complementary capabilities, such as space, document and media exploitation (DOMEX), and electromagnetic warfare (EW) routinely cooperate and provide information to the intelligence architecture. This publication and ATP 2-01 primarily discuss single-source, multisource, and ancillary collection systems as collection assets. ATP 2-01 added to the discussion to ensure a clear and accurate understanding and use of the term: Collection assets is a collection system, platform, or capability that is supporting, assigned to, or attached to a particular commander (JP 2-0). In many contexts, collection assets are referred to as intelligence assets, intelligence collection assets, or information collection assets to describe units, systems, and sensors that perform information collection. Available collection assets describe organic, assigned, and attached assets as well as those assets under operational control (OPCON) or in DS of that unit. The unit lists the organic, assigned, attached, OPCON, and supporting units and the overall task organization in Annex A (Task Organization) to the order. A collection resource refers to a collection system, platform, or capability is not assigned or attached to a specific commander, unit, or echelon and is requested and coordinated through the chain of command of the unit that directs and controls them. A collection asset is subordinate to the requesting unit or echelon, while a collection resource is not. INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES 1-63. An intelligence discipline is a well-defined area of intelligence planning, collection, exploitation, analysis, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources (JP 2-0). The intelligence disciplines are— ⚫ Counterintelligence (CI). ⚫ Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). ⚫ Human intelligence (HUMINT). ⚫ Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). ⚫ Open-source intelligence (OSINT). ⚫ Signals intelligence (SIGINT). ⚫ Technical intelligence (TECHINT). 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 1-15 Chapter 1 1-64. Most intelligence collection, which is part of intelligence operations, occurs within the context of the intelligence disciplines. The intelligence disciplines and the capabilities they provide are varied, effective, and complex. The variety and complexity become most evident when addressing collection and analysis requirements across the domains and dimensions. It requires training and experience to fully understand the intelligence disciplines across echelons. Each intelligence discipline is unique in terms of its authorities, doctrine, training requirements, collection strengths and vulnerabilities, employment techniques, force structure, terminology, technical channels and means of mission management, and supporting PED capabilities. 1-65. Collection from the various intelligence disciplines is integrated during collection management to ensure a multidiscipline approach, which supports effective intelligence analysis, and, ultimately, all-source intelligence. In turn, all-source intelligence facilitates accurate situational understanding, decision making, and support to targeting. Publicly Available Information Research Publicly available information (PAI) research is an important aspect of tipping and cueing and planning for intelligence collection as it enhances situational understanding of the OE and enriches the analysis of collected intelligence. While the concept and execution of PAI research is not new, the articulation of PAI research in doctrine and an emphasis on institutional PAI research training are new. Using PAI research thoughtfully within intelligence is critical to effective intelligence support. Using and integrating PAI research ensure commanders and staffs consider the vast amounts of PAI for planning, decision making, and targeting purposes. Army intelligence staffs, units, and organizations must comply with DODM 5240.01 when conducting intelligence activities such as PAI research. Conducting PAI research and OSINT activities are different from one another. PAI research primarily entails using safe sites or no- risk sites to gather data, facts, instructions, or other material for supporting an intelligence mission; OSINT is derived from PAI collected by trained and certified OSINT collectors/practitioners, who use tools, processes, and analytics to generate operationally relevant intelligence from the vast amounts and variety of PAI. (See ATP 2-22.9.) Counterintelligence 1-66. CI focuses on the detection, identification, analysis, neutralization, or exploitation of foreign intelligence entities, foreign terrorist organizations, and insider threats to protect Army and designated DOD forces, information, and technologies worldwide. Army CI applies its resources to four primary mission areas—counterespionage, CI support to force protection, information collection to identify and counter threat intelligence collection targeting Army equities, and CI support to technology and critical infrastructure protection. Army CI accomplishes these missions by conducting— ⚫ Operations that are broadly executed CI activities that support a program or specific mission. They can be offensive, defensive, or a combination of both, depending on the scope, objective, and/or continued possibility for exploitation. ⚫ Investigations to assist in detecting, identifying, countering, and/or neutralizing threat intelligence collection. They also assist in identifying systematic security problems that may have damaging implications to operations and national security interests. ⚫ Collection to acquire information about insider threats, foreign intelligence entities, terrorists, and insurgent intelligence collection targeting U.S. operations, personnel, facilities, information, networks, technology, and resources. ⚫ Analysis and production to provide the supported commander with the information necessary to gain and maintain situational awareness of threat intelligence information collection targeting Army equities. Complete and effective CI analysis must leverage all intelligence disciplines to assess the full range of threat intelligence capabilities. ⚫ Technical services and activities to provide support activities and specialized technical capabilities that support CI operations, investigations, collection, analysis and production, and other intelligence disciplines. 1-16 FM 2-0 01 October 2023 Intelligence Countering the Foreign Intelligence Entity Threat A foreign intelligence entity is any known or suspected foreign organization, person, or group (public, private, or governmental) that conducts intelligence activities to acquire U.S. information, block or impair U.S. intelligence collection, influence U.S. policy, or disrupts U.S. systems and programs. The term includes foreign intelligence and security services and international terrorists (DODD 5240.02). Traditionally, CI has focused on countering the foreign intelligence entity HUMINT threat. However, to properly execute the CI mission, CI personnel and organizations must leverage all other intelligence disciplines to assess the full range of threat intelligence capabilities. Multidisciplined intelligence threat assessments and associated countermeasure recommendations are incorporated into strategies, plans, orders, and programs. Therefore, close coordination and cooperation between CI personnel, the supported commander’s staff, and interagency partners are essential. Applying CI as a mission supports the targeting process and provides additional options for supported commanders to counter, exploit, and/or neutralize threat intelligence capabilities. 1-67. CI capabilities consist of CI teams and assigned biometric collection equipment. These capabilities produce the following products: ⚫ Intelligence information reports. ⚫ CI investigative reports. ⚫ Threat assessments. ⚫ Notices of intelligence potential. ⚫ Size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) and/or spot reports. ⚫ Input to multiagency vulnerability assessments. 1-68. ATP 2-22.2-1 and ATP 2-22.2-2 provide detailed discussions about CI. Geospatial Intelligence 1-69. Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on or about the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information (JP 2-0). GEOINT supports operations through various types of imagery collection within an OE. GEOINT data assists commanders in visualizing the domains and dimensions of the OE. This data includes literal and nonliteral still and motion imagery and geospatial information, all of which allow analysts to see what or who exists in the OE while also assessing what it is doing across time and space. Army GEOINT accomplishes its mission by using elements of the Army Geospatial Enterprise (also known as AGE) and through its subdisciplines: ⚫ Imagery is a likeness or presentation of any natural or man-made feature or related object or activity, and the positional data acquired at the same time the likeness or representation was acquired, including: products produced by space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems; and likeness and presentations produced by satellites, airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other similar means (except that such term does not include handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations) (JP 2-0). ⚫ Imagery intelligence is the technical, geographic, and intelligence information derived through the interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral materials (JP 2-0). ⚫ Geospatial information is information that identifies the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on or about the Earth, including: data and information derived from, among other things, remote sensing, mapping, and surveying technologies; and mapping, charting, geomatics data, and related products and services (JP 2-0). 1-70. GEOINT capabilities consist of manned and unmanned platforms and aerial and space-based collection platforms. These capabilities produce the following products: ⚫ Phases I, II, and III full-motion video. ⚫ Panchromatic, infrared, synthetic aperture radar, and moving target indicator exploitation. ⚫ Imagery, initial phase, and supplemental phase interpretation reports. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 1-17 Chapter 1 ⚫ Reconnaissance exploitation reports. ⚫ Imagery-derived products. ⚫ Change detection and route density analysis. ⚫ Support to IPOE, target mensuration, and tactical identification of equipment. ⚫ Deliberate and dynamic targeting support. ⚫ Collateral damage and BDA intelligence products. 1-71. ATP 2-22.7 provides detailed discussions about GEOINT. Human Intelligence 1-72. Human intelligence is the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities (ADP 2-0). HUMINT uses human sources as a tool to gather information about the plans, intentions, capabilities, and operations methods of threat military forces. Army HUMINT accomplishes its mission through interrogations, source operations (recruited, nonrecruited, and debriefing), and HUMINT collection support activities (screenings, liaisons, support to targeting, and DOMEX). 1-73. HUMINT capabilities consist of HUMINT collection teams, HUMINT operations cells, and assigned biometric collection equipment. These capabilities produce the following products: ⚫ Intelligence information reports. ⚫ Biographic intelligence information reports. ⚫ Notices of intelligence potential. ⚫ Knowledgeability briefs. ⚫ Collection emphasis messages. ⚫ SALUTE and/or spot reports. 1-74. ATP 2-22.31 and FM 2-22.3 provide detailed discussions about HUMINT. Measurement and Signature Intelligence 1-75. Measurement and signature intelligence is information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to detect, characterize, locate, and identify targets and events; and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements and signatures of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event (JP 2-0). The purpose of MASINT is collecting technical data associated with warfighting equipment, people, developmental weapons programs, and disseminating data for exploitation to commanders, planners, weapons developers, and policy makers. 1-76. MASINT is based on the principle that every object and event have a signature that can be measured. The measurement aspect of MASINT refers to actual parameter measurements of an event or object such as a biometric attribute, demonstrated flight profile, or range of a cruise missile. Signatures are typically the products of multiple measurements collected over time and under varying circumstances. These signatures are used to develop target classification profiles and discrimination and reporting algorithms for operational surveillance and weapons systems. 1-77. MASINT capabilities consist of unattended ground sensors, infrasonic monitors, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detectors. Intelligence reach capabilities include scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI), research and development, foreign weapons exploitation, and foreign materiel exploitation. These scientific and technical capabilities—electro-optical, geophysical, human signatures, material, nuclear, radar, and radio frequency—produce the following products: ⚫ Spot reports. ⚫ Preliminary technical reports. ⚫ Complementary technical reports (types A, B, C). ⚫ Attack scene investigation reports. 1-78. ATP 2-22.8 provides detailed discussions about MASINT. 1-18 FM 2-0 01 October 2023 Intelligence Open-Source Intelligence 1-79. Open-source intelligence is intelligence that is produced from publicly available information and is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement (Public Law 109-163). OSINT is derived from PAI collected by trained and certified OSINT collectors/practitioners, who use tools, processes, and analytics to generate operationally relevant intelligence from the vast amounts and variety of PAI. 1-80. Successful OSINT operations rely heavily on the commander’s understanding and guidance about the application of OSINT. Additionally, the intelligence architecture is vital; without it, intelligence capabilities, including OSINT, cannot support operations effectively. OSINT, like all intelligence capabilities, must be fully integrated into the operations process (planning through execution) to support the commander’s intent and requirements. The Defense Open-Source Council and the National Open-Source Committee manage OSINT. 1-81. OSINT may include— ⚫ Social media exploitation. ⚫ Access to large data sets for analysis. ⚫ Warning intelligence and tipping and cueing for other collection disciplines. ⚫ Support to targeting and battle damage assessment (BDA). ⚫ Traditional monitoring of press and news outlets, publications, and periodicals. 1-82. Units may obtain OSINT capabilities through the Army OSINT Office. OSINT collectors/practitioners produce the following stand-alone products: ⚫ OSINT reports (also known as OSIR), which may be incorporated into intelligence estimates, intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), intelligence running estimates, and others. ⚫ Tactical OSINT report format (also known as OSINT tipper). 1-83. ATP 2-22.9 and ATP 2-22.9-2 provide detailed discussions about OSINT. Signals Intelligence 1-84. Signals intelligence is intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals (JP 2-0). SIGINT is one of several military functions operating within the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS); it provides EW support when used in military operations for threat warning, combat information, and situational awareness. According to Title 10, USC, SIGINT teams can perform additional analysis on threat signals to produce intelligence. According to Title 50, USC, Army cryptologic forces produce SIGINT to support the formulation of strategy, policy, military plans, and operations at national to tactical levels. 1-85. SIGINT comprises— ⚫ Communications intelligence—technical information and intelligence derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients (JP 2-0). Communications intelligence (also called COMINT) is produced from the collection and processing of foreign communications transmitted by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means and by processing foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. ⚫ Electronic intelligence—technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources (JP 3-85). Electronic intelligence (also called ELINT) is produced from the collection (observation and recording) and processing of foreign noncommunications emitters. ⚫ Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence—a subcategory of signals intelligence consisting of technical information and intelligence derived from the intercept of foreign electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and operational deployment of aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems (JP 2-0). Foreign instrumentation SIGINT (also called FISINT) is produced from the intercept, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry, which refers to the use of telecommunications for automatically indicating or recording measurements at a distance such as signals transmitted by a missile to a ground station. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 1-19 Chapter 1 1-86. SIGINT capabilities consist of terrestrial collection systems; airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; and theater army collection and survey systems. These capabilities result in the following products: ⚫ CRITIC, KLIEGLIGHT, and tactical (SIGINT) reports. ⚫ IGRAMs (integrated graphics and multimedia reports). ⚫ EGRAMs (electronic serialized SIGINT reports). ⚫ Pattern of life analysis. ⚫ Radar tracking and operational status reporting. ⚫ Tear-line reporting. ⚫ Message transcripts. ⚫ Direction finding/geolocation information. ⚫ Low-level voice intercept. 1-87. ATP 2-22.6 and ATP 2-22.6-2 provide detailed discussions about SIGINT. Technical Intelligence 1-88. Technical intelligence is intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an enemy’s technological advantages (JP 2-0). TECHINT ensures the Army understands the threat’s full technological capabilities as well as its limitations and vulnerabilities. This enables friendly forces to adopt the appropriate countermeasures, operations, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). 1-89. TECHINT involves the application of forensic science and various technical specialties across seven categories: ⚫ Communications and electronic equipment—foreign communications, computers, radars, intercept and jamming equipment, and similar systems, including electro-optical and directed- energy technology. ⚫ Automation systems—foreign automation hardware and software. ⚫ Weapons—foreign weapons and weapons systems, including improvised explosive devices, associated components, improvised weapons, and conventional weapons (for example, rockets, tube artillery, mortars, small arms, guided missiles, and associated fire control). ⚫ Munitions—foreign munitions, including missiles; chemical, biological, and nuclear munitions; direct and indirect fire weapons ammunition; explosives; and mines. ⚫ CBRN materiel—foreign CBRN materiel, including toxic industrial materials. ⚫ Medical materiel—medical materiel, including general-purpose systems modified for medical support, and biological and chemical agent samplings. ⚫ Mobility systems—mobility systems, including vehicles, engineer equipment, materiel-handling equipment, and power generation, which the threat uses to maneuver and support combat forces. 1-90. TECHINT is an intelligence reach capability that includes S&TI, research and development, foreign weapons exploitation, and foreign materiel exploitation. TECHINT products include— ⚫ Spot reports. ⚫ Preliminary technical reports. ⚫ Complementary technical reports (types A, B, C). ⚫ Attack scene investigation reports. 1-91. ATP 2-22.4 provides detailed discussion about TECHINT. 1-20 FM 2-0 01 October 2023 Intelligence COMPLEMENTARY CAPABILITIES 1-92. JP 2-0 recognizes the following intelligence applications: identity intelligence (I2), biometrics, forensics, and DOMEX. The Army also recognizes various specialized capabilities that can contribute to all- source or single-source intelligence through intelligence coordination with other warfighting functions and branches. These specialized and technical capabilities, many of which are not typically conducted by MI units, can provide valuable insight into threat activities and intentions and can fill intelligence gaps. In some instances, they can provide critical information that supports security, consolidating gains, and rear area operations. These capabilities include but are not limited to the following: ⚫ Biometrics. ⚫ Forensics. ⚫ Cyberspace. ⚫ Identity activities. ⚫ DOMEX. ⚫ Space. ⚫ EW. Biometrics 1-93. Biometrics is the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics (JP 2-0). According to DODD 8521.01E, the Secretary of the Army is the DOD executive agent for biometrics. A biometric refers to a measurable physical characteristic or personal behavior trait used to recognize the identity or verify the claimed identity of an individual. The term biometrics designates characteristics of an individual and a process. As a process, biometrics consists of the automated methods used to recognize an individual based on measurable biometric characteristics. 1-94. The collecting, processing, matching, and intelligence analysis of biometric data support the positive identification and characterization of individuals who may pose a threat to U.S. national security. They provide a powerful capability for DOD to identify and respond to threat personnel, protect friendly forces, and defend national interests. The success of DOD and DOD’s partners in identifying such threats is further improved by sharing biometric data with interagency and international partners. Therefore, it is important to employ a comprehensive, coordinated approach for biometric data collection as well as foster sharing agreements with interagency and foreign partners. 1-95. Incorporating biometric information into all-source intelligence analysis is a highly successful technique for enabling U.S. forces to strip away the anonymity of threat fighters. Biometric information is one of the identity attributes that contributes to I2. With an extraordinary degree of confidence, U.S. forces can link enemy activity to previously unidentified threat personnel using biometric technology. Cyberspace 1-96. A cyberspace capability is a device or computer program, including any combination of software, firmware, or hardware, designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace (JP 3-12). The use of cyberspace capabilities facilitates understanding the threat’s cyberspace capabilities, intentions, potential actions, and vulnerabilities, as well as their impacts on the environment, friendly operations, and the local populace. Cyberspace capabilities depend on an established technical architecture. Intelligence produced using cyberspace capabilities facilitates decision making at all levels through the analysis and production of relevant and tailored intelligence on activities in the cyberspace domain that may affect a unit’s ability to conduct operations. The intelligence can range from broadly disseminated products focused on general users to very specific and narrowly focused analysis and reports distributed via classified channels. 1-97. Due to its very nature, intelligence operations in the cyberspace domain require significant lead time to accomplish. Intelligence operations and analysis in the cyberspace domain also require additional and specific authorities, oversight, training, and specialized equipment. For example, the use of computers, technology, and networks facilitates all-source intelligence, the intelligence disciplines, and other intelligence capabilities. However, intelligence professionals’ use of computers, technology, and networks does not mean they are conducting cyberspace operations. The authority for each discipline or capability governs the guiding methods and regulations for the conduct of each intelligence discipline or intelligence capability. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 1-21 Chapter 1 Note. The results of cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA) can provide intelligence professionals a significant amount of information about the human, information, and physical dimensions. Document and Media Exploitation 1-98. Document and media exploitation is the processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination of collected hardcopy documents and electronic media that are under the U.S. Government’s physical control and are not publicly available. Threat intent, capabilities, and limitations may be derived through the exploitation of captured documents and media. 1-99. DOMEX is an increasingly specialized, full-time mission requiring advanced automation and communications support, analytical support, and qualified linguists. When conducted properly, DOMEX: ⚫ Provides the commander an initial assessment of captured information. ⚫ Maximizes the value of intelligence gained from captured enemy documents and media. ⚫ Provides the commander timely and relevant intelligence to effectively enhance awareness of the threat’s capabilities, operational structures, and intent. ⚫ Assists in criminal prosecution or legal proceedings by maintaining chain of custody procedures and preserving the evidentiary value of captured enemy materiel, documents, and media. Electromagnetic Warfare 1-100. Electromagnetic warfare is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-85). EW consists of three distinct divisions—electromagnetic attack (EA), electromagnetic support (ES), and electromagnetic protection (EP). JP 3-85 and FM 3-12 provide detailed discussions about EW and its three divisions. 1-101. Electromagnetic attack is division of electromagnetic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires (JP 3-85). EA requires close coordination with intelligence to ensure assets are used at the correct location and time and operate in the correct portions of the EMS to achieve desired effects. Throughout an EA mission, intelligence provides reattack recommendations and BDAs to the CEMA section to inform the continuation, redirection, conclusion, or outcome of an EA. EA denies the threat the ability to use the EMS or spectrum-dependent equipment (see ATP 3-12.3). The deliberate use of EA can provide opportunities for intelligence collection and expose threat capabilities and vulnerabilities. 1-102. Electromagnetic support is division of electromagnetic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations (JP 3-85). ES acquires adversary combat information to support the commander’s maneuver plan. Data collected through ES can also support SIGINT PED to support the commander’s intelligence and targeting requirements and provide situational understanding. ES assists in conducting analysis of the EMS for inclusion in IPOE. This analysis must include updating the electromagnetic order of battle and providing the intelligence staff threat EW capabilities and information for inclusion in threat characteristics and threat models. Through the integration of significant aspects of ES and CEMA into IPOE, SIGINT, EW, and spectrum management operations information are integrated into the threat, situation, and event templates, which are developed during IPOE, and the decision support template, which is developed during the MDMP. ES also provides the CEMA section with indicators of EA measures of effectiveness by monitoring target frequencies and ranges. Frequency monitoring efforts are supplemented by intelligence assets, as needed. 1-103. Electromagnetic protection is division of electromagnetic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability (JP 3-85). EP facilitates the friendly use of the EMS if, through analysis of the EMS, the threat is understood; this supports IPOE. In coordination 1-22 FM 2-0 01 October 2023 Intelligence with the G-6/S-6 and the CEMA section, ES, intelligence systems, and personnel may inform EP efforts by providing information about an organization’s radio frequency signatures throughout all emission control levels as well as sources and locations of EMS interference or jamming. Electromagnetic Spectrum Actions Although EMS actions and EW capabilities are different, they are related. Ensuring the effective integration of SIGINT operations, EW, cyberspace operations, and spectrum management operations requires the technical control and analysis cell and the CEMA section to coordinate their operations in the EMS. SIGINT operations and EW in the EMS may overlap, requiring constant and close coordination for spectrum deconfliction and mutual support. This coordination and support can reduce instances of intelligence loss and improve collection and targeting for SIGINT collection teams, EW teams, and cyberspace operations. Although SIGINT, EW, and cyberspace operations function under different authorities and regulations, they are complementary in providing input to the electromagnetic order of battle developed for integration into IPOE. SIGINT, EW, and cyberspace operations can cross-cue for warning intelligence, collection, and electromagnetic reconnaissance. Forensics 1-104. Forensic science is the application of multidisciplinary scientific processes to establish facts (DODD 5205.15E). Forensic techniques provide timely and accurate information that facilitates situational understanding and supports decision making. This includes collecting, identifying, and labeling collected items for future exploitation. The collection of latent fingerprints, deoxyribonucleic acid (also called DNA), and other forensic data can aid in more in-depth analysis and better intelligence about the OE. 1-105. Forensics can assist in identifying an adversary’s key personnel, tactics, intent, and capabilities (current and future). Forensic exploitation of collected exploitable material— ⚫ Provides answers to commanders’ information requirements. ⚫ Supports offensive and defensive operations. ⚫ Influences decision making. ⚫ Develops timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence. ⚫ Increases situational understanding of complex, uncertain OEs. 1-106. Forensic-enabled intelligence is the intelligence resulting from the integration of scientifically examined materials and other information to establish full characterization, attribution, and the linkage of events, locations, items, signatures, nefarious intent, and persons of interest (JP 2-0). Forensic-enabled intelligence assists in accurately identifying persons, networks, and complex threats, and it attributes them to specific incidents and activities. (See JP 2-0 for doctrine on forensic-enabled intelligence.) Identity Activities 1-107. Identity activities refer to a collection of functions and actions that appropriately recognize and differentiate one person or persona from another person or persona to support decision making as well as security, force protection, and law enforcement. They include the collection, processing, and exploitation of identity attributes and physical materials to inform policy and strategy development, planning, and assessment and to enable prosecution and the appropriate action at the point of encounter. Some of this data and information can inform all-source analytic efforts, leading to the production of I2. 1-108. I2, as defined in paragraph 1-7, is used to disrupt competitors, support joint operations, counter threats, deny anonymity to the Nation’s adversaries, and protect the Nation’s assets, facilities, and forces. Units and organizations use I2 products informed by capabilities such as biometrics, forensics, and DOMEX as well as information from the intelligence disciplines. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 1-23 Chapter 1 1-109. I2 is currently produced at echelons corps and above from the fusion of all-source and multidisciplined reporting. It results in intelligence from the human dimension, which encompasses the interaction among individuals and groups, how they understand information and events, make decisions, generate will and act within an OE. Intelligence analysts use I2 products to identify relevant actors and provide intelligence that allows a commander to anticipate those actors’ behaviors and the potential consequences of their behaviors. Relevant actors refer to actors who could substantially impact campaigns, operations, or tactical actions. Understanding this human element across the strategic contexts is essential to commanders’ efforts to defeat, destroy, deny, or disintegrate the enemy. Space 1-110. A space capability is 1. The ability of a space asset to accomplish a mission. 2. The ability of a terrestrial-based asset to accomplish a mission in or through space. 3. The ability of a space asset to contribute to a mission from seabed to the space domain (JP 3-14). The use of space capabilities is inherently joint. The Army uses space capabilities and effects to support its dominance in land operations. The need for the Army to accomplish space-enabled operations is firmly established in policy and practice. Space capabilities are integrated into Army operations across all domains. Army space operations executed through the seven codified joint space capabilities impact intelligence support: ⚫ Space situational awareness is the requisite foundational, current, and predictive knowledge and characterization of space objects and the operational environment upon which space operations depend (JP 3-14). Space situational awareness involves characterizing, as completely as necessary, the space capabilities operating within the terrestrial environment and the space domain. It is the contribution of space and intelligence knowledge and analysis to IPOE. ⚫ Positioning, navigation, and timing refers to a space-based capability that is a mission-essential element in nearly every modern weapons system. Army space Soldiers assigned to units at multiple echelons or attached to units during crisis or armed conflict can provide tailored products and system expertise about the capabilities of satellite-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems to enable precision fires. They can also assess and provide an understanding of the usage of adversary positioning, navigation, and timing systems as well as counter- positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities. ⚫ Space control is operations to ensure freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and deny a threat freedom of action in space (JP 3-14). Army space control assets can sense and detect activity within or from the space domain that can influence Army operations. Army space control systems are manned by Soldiers that are trained to understand significant operational aspects of friendly or enemy use of the space domain and can significantly contribute to IPOE, targeting, and planning to support multidomain operations and convergence. ⚫ Satellite communications provide— ▪ The necessary connectivity for worldwide communications and mobile forces operating over large, dispersed areas. ▪ The Army with critical connectivity to tactical maneuver forces and Soldiers, whose rapid movem

FM 2-0 Fundamentals of Intelligence PDF

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