Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals PDF

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This document provides a comprehensive overview of Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare fundamentals, including their definitions, types, and interrelationships with other military operations and intelligence. It also discusses how these operations support and enhance each other and provides key information for military professionals.

Full Transcript

Chapter 2 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals This chapter describes the types of cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare and associated tasks. It details common effects that commanders can achieve through cyberspace...

Chapter 2 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals This chapter describes the types of cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare and associated tasks. It details common effects that commanders can achieve through cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare, and discusses the interrelationship between cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare and other Army operations. This chapter also discusses training used to prepare Soldiers to execute cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare missions. SECTION I – CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 2-1. Cyberspace operations and EW can benefit from synchronization with other Army capabilities using a combined arms approach to achieve objectives against enemy forces. Cyberspace operations and EW can provide commanders with positions of relative advantage in the multi-domain fight. Effects that bleed over from the cyberspace domain into the physical domain can be generated and leveraged against the adversary. A cyberspace capability is a device or computer program, including any combination of software, firmware, or hardware, designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace (JP 3-12). Note. Law enforcement and counterintelligence capabilities may create effects in cyberspace during their efforts to disrupt, destroy, deny, or degrade an enemy or adversary’s activities in cyberspace. 2-2. Electromagnetic spectrum superiority is the degree of control in the electromagnetic spectrum that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference, while affecting the threat’s ability to do the same (JP 3-85). EW creates effects in the EMS and enables commanders to gain EMS superiority while conducting Army operations. EW capabilities consist of the systems and weapons used to conduct EW missions to create lethal and non-lethal effects in and through the EMS. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 2-1 Chapter 2 Russia’s Application of Cyberspace Operations and Electronic Warfare during the Russo-Ukrainian War In 2013, Ukraine’s pro-Russian leadership opted for closer ties to the pro-Russian Eurasian Economic Union rather than sign with the European Union. In response, violent protests erupted throughout Ukraine. In constant competition with the United States and China to increase the flow of trade, Russia has always sought access in expanding commerce throughout the region. As Ukraine descended into chaos, Vladimir Putin and the Russian Federation recognized conditions were optimal for seizure of Ukraine’s Black Sea warm water ports in the Crimea. Seizure of these ports not only provided lucrative access to Mediterranean trade and commerce, but also challenged the United States’ military power on the Black Sea. Russian actions also included strategic efforts to stop NATO expansion and to reduce the buffer zone between the west and Russian economic expansion. Ukraine’s use of Russian command, control, communications, computer, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) made them vulnerable to Russian exploitation and attacks. Formulating their campaign plans around thematic denial and deception operations, Russian military planners went to work on a hybrid campaign that was a multifaceted mix of regular and irregular actions. Russian planners identified Ukraine’s center of gravity as their C4ISR. Russia infiltrated Ukrainian telecommunication systems, while Ukrainian’s use of communication devices likely aided Russia’s targeting efforts. In order to inject strategic, operational, and tactical chaos within Ukraine’s decision-making cycle, Russia conducted targeted cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare (denial of service, manipulation of social media, etc.) on critical C4ISR nodes. At the tactical level, the Russian Army’s utilization of targeted cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare actions were lethal. The Ukrainian Army moved several mechanized brigades near the Russian border in order to interdict illegal cross border shipments of equipment heading to rebels in Eastern Ukraine. On the morning of 11 July 2014, Ukrainian soldiers spotted a drone orbiting above them. Shortly after the drone disappeared, one of the Ukrainian brigades was struck with a devastating barrage from a 9A52-4 Tornado multiple rocket system. Rockets containing a mixture of high explosive, cluster, and thermobaric munitions rained down on the unit’s positions over the course of four minutes. Following this initial rocket salvo, the Russians followed with high explosive artillery rounds and the cumulative effects were devastating. In a post mortem of the action, the Ukrainian Army suffered 37 killed and 100 wounded. One Ukrainian battalion was virtually destroyed, and others were rendered combat ineffective due to heavy losses in personnel and equipment. It was later assessed that the Russian Army’s ability to collect intelligence and geo-locate, coupled with their ability to target Ukrainian communication nodes, played a significant role in enabling the Russians to find, fix, and destroy an entire Ukrainian combat arms brigade. The Russians’ targeted application of electromagnetic warfare and cyber attacks created chaos within Ukraine’s civil and military leadership and left them confused, a second-order effect. Western leaders found themselves limited in their ability to respond to Russian actions in the region. Russia’s use of cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities to Ukraine’s command and control enabled them the seize Crimea and achieve their strategic goal of obtaining commercial and military ports on the Black Sea. 2-2 FM 3-12 24 August 2021 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals JOINT FORCE AND ARMY 2-3. The joint force and the Army divide cyberspace operations into three categories based on the portion of cyberspace in which the operations take place and the type of cyberspace forces that conduct those operations. Each of type of cyberspace operation has varying associated authorities, approval levels, and coordination considerations. An Army taxonomy of cyberspace operations is depicted in figure 2-1, below. The three types of cyberspace operations are—  DODIN operations (refer to ATP 6-02.71).  DCO.  OCO. 2-4. The Army conducts DODIN operations on internal Army and DOD networks and systems using primarily signal forces. The Army employs cyberspace forces to conduct DCO which includes two further sub-divisions—DCO-IDM and defensive cyberspace operations-response actions (DCO-RA). Cyberspace forces conduct DCO-IDM within the DODIN boundary, or on other friendly networks when authorized, in order to defend those networks from imminent or ongoing attacks. At times cyberspace forces may also take action against threat cyberspace actors in neutral or adversary networks in defense of the DODIN or friendly networks. These types of actions, called DCO-RA, require additional authorities and coordination measures. Lastly, cyberspace forces deliberately target threat capabilities in neutral, adversary, and enemy-held portions of cyberspace by conducting OCO. Cyberspace forces may include joint forces from the DOD cyber mission forces or Army-retained cyberspace forces. See Chapter 3 of this publication for more details on cyberspace forces. Figure 2-1. Cyberspace operations taxonomy 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 2-3 Chapter 2 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION NETWORK OPERATIONS 2-5. The Department of Defense information network is the set of information capabilities and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel, whether interconnected or stand-alone. Also called DODIN (JP 6-0). This includes owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services, and national security systems. Department of Defense information network operations are operations to secure, configure, operate, extend, maintain, and sustain Department of Defense cyberspace to create and preserve the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the Department of Defense information network. Also called DODIN operations (JP 3-12). DODIN operations provide authorized users at all echelons with secure, reliable end-to-end network and information system availability. DODIN operations allow commanders to effectively communicate, collaborate, share, manage, and disseminate information using information technology systems. 2-6. Signal forces install tactical networks, conduct maintenance and sustainment activities, and security evaluation and testing. Signal forces performing DODIN operations may also conduct limited DCO-IDM. Since both cyberspace security and defense tasks are ongoing, standing orders for DODIN operations and DCO-IDM cover most cyberspace security and initial cyberspace defense tasks. 2-7. The Army secures the DODIN-A using a layered defense approach. Layered defense uses multiple physical, policy, and technical controls in to guard against threats on the network. Layering integrates people, technology, and operational capabilities to establish security barriers across multiple layers of the DODIN- A. Various types of security barriers include—  Antivirus software.  Firewalls.  Anti-spam software.  Communications security.  Data encryption.  Password protection.  Physical and technical barriers.  Continuous security training.  Continuous network monitoring. 2-8. Security barriers are protective measures against acts that may impair the effectiveness of the network, and therefore the mission command system. Additionally, layering includes perimeter security, enclave security, host security, physical security, personnel security, and cybersecurity policies and standards. Layering protects the cyberspace domain at the physical, logical, and administrative control levels. DEFENSIVE CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 2-9. Defensive cyberspace operations are missions to preserve the ability to utilize blue cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, cyberspace-enabled devices, and other designated systems by defeating on-going or imminent malicious cyberspace activity (JP 3-12). The term blue cyberspace denotes areas in cyberspace protected by the United States, its mission partners, and other areas the Department of Defense may be ordered to protect. DCO are further categorized based on the location of the actions in cyberspace as—  DCO-IDM.  DCO-RA. DEFENSIVE CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS-INTERNAL DEFENSIVE MEASURES 2-10. Defensive cyberspace operations-internal defensive measures are operations in which authorized defense actions occur within the defended portion of cyberspace (JP 3-12). DCO-IDM is conducted within 2-4 FM 3-12 24 August 2021 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals friendly cyberspace. DCO-IDM involves actions to locate and eliminate cyber threats within friendly networks. Cyberspace forces employ defensive measures to neutralize and eliminate threats, allowing reestablishment of degraded, compromised, or threatened portions of the DODIN. Cyberspace forces conducting DCO-IDM primarily conduct cyberspace defense tasks, but may also perform some tasks similar to cyberspace security. 2-11. Cyberspace defense includes actions taken within protected cyberspace to defeat specific threats that have breached or are threatening to breach cyberspace security measures and include actions to detect, characterize, counter, and mitigate threats, including malware or the unauthorized activities of users, and to restore the system to a secure configuration. (JP 3-12). Cyberspace forces act on cues from cybersecurity or intelligence alerts of adversary activity within friendly networks. Cyberspace defense tasks during DCO- IDM include hunting for threats on friendly networks, deploying advanced countermeasures, and responding to eliminate these threats and mitigate their effects. DEFENSIVE CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS-RESPONSE ACTIONS 2-12. Defensive cyberspace operation-response actions are operations that are part of a defensive cyberspace operations mission that are taken external to the defended network or portion of cyberspace without permission of the owner of the affected system (JP 3-12). DCO-RA take place outside the boundary of the DODIN. Some DCO-RA may include actions that rise to the level of use of force and may include physical damage or destruction of enemy systems. DCO-RA consist of conducting cyberspace attacks and cyberspace exploitation similar to OCO. However, DCO-RA use these actions for defensive purposes only, unlike OCO that is used to project power in and through cyberspace. 2-13. Decisions to conduct DCO-RA depend heavily on the broader strategic and operational contexts such as the existence or imminence of open hostilities, the degree of certainty in attribution of the threat; the damage the threat has or is expected to cause, and national policy considerations. DCO-RA are conducted by national mission team(s) and require a properly coordinated military order, coordination with interagency and unified action partners, and careful consideration of scope, rules of engagement, and operational objectives. OFFENSIVE CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 2-14. Offensive cyberspace operations are missions intended to project power in and through cyberspace (JP 3-12). Cyberspace forces conduct OCO outside of DOD networks to achieve positions of relative advantage through cyberspace exploitation and cyberspace attack actions in support of commanders’ objectives. Commanders must integrate OCO within the combined arms scheme of maneuver throughout the operations process to achieve optimal effects. 2-15. The Army provides cyberspace forces trained to perform OCO across the range of military operations to the joint force. Army forces conducting OCO do so under the authority of a joint force commander. Refer to Appendix C for information on integrating with unified action partners. Joint forces may provide OCO support to corps and below Army commanders in response to requests through the joint targeting process. Refer to Appendix D for more information on joint cyberspace forces. Targets for cyberspace effects may require extended planning time, extended approval time, as well as synchronization and deconfliction with partners external to the DOD. Chapter 4 covers targeting considerations in detail. CYBERSPACE ACTIONS 2-16. Execution of these cyberspace operations entails one or more specific tasks, which joint cyberspace doctrine refers to as cyberspace actions (refer to JP 3-12), and the employment of one or more cyberspace capabilities. Figure 2-2 on page 2-6 depicts the relationships between the types of cyberspace operations and their associated actions, the location of those operations in cyberspace, and the forces that conduct those operations. The four cyberspace actions are—  Cyberspace security (refer to FM 6-02 and ATP 6-02.71).  Cyberspace defense.  Cyberspace exploitation. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 2-5 Chapter 2  Cyberspace attack. Figure 2-2. Cyberspace operations missions and actions CYBERSPACE SECURITY 2-17. Cyberspace security is actions taken within protected cyberspace to prevent unauthorized access to, exploitation of, or damage to computers, electronic communications systems, and other information technology, including platform information technology, as well as the information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation (JP 3-12). These preventive measures include protecting the information on the DODIN, ensuring the information’s availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. Cyberspace security is generally preventative in nature, but also continues throughout DCO-IDM and incident responses in instances where a cyberspace threat compromises the DODIN. Some common types of cyberspace security actions include—  Password management.  Software patching.  Encryption of storage devices.  Mandatory cybersecurity training for all users.  Restricting access to suspicious websites. 2-6 FM 3-12 24 August 2021 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals  Implementing procedures to define the roles, responsibilities, policies, and administrative functions for managing DODIN operations. 2-18. Refer to FM 6-02 for DODIN operations tactics. Refer to ATP 6-02.71 for DODIN operations techniques. CYBERSPACE EXPLOITATION 2-19. Cyberspace exploitation consists of actions taken in cyberspace to gain intelligence, maneuver, collect information, or perform other enabling actions required to prepare for future military operations (JP 3-12). These operations must be authorized through mission orders and are part of OCO or DCO-RA actions in gray or red cyberspace that do not create cyberspace attack effects, and are often intended to remain clandestine. Cyberspace exploitation includes activities to support operational preparation of the environment for current and future operations by gaining and maintaining access to networks, systems, and nodes of military value; maneuvering to positions of advantage within cyberspace; and positioning cyberspace capabilities to facilitate follow-on actions. Cyberspace exploitation actions are deconflicted with other United States Government departments and agencies in accordance with national policy. CYBERSPACE ATTACK 2-20. Cyberspace attack actions taken in cyberspace that create noticeable denial effects (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) in cyberspace or manipulation that leads to denial effects in the physical domains (JP 3-12). A cyberspace attack creates effects in and through cyberspace and may result in physical destruction. Modification or destruction of cyberspace capabilities that control physical processes can lead to effects in the physical domains. Some illustrative examples of common effects created by a cyberspace attack include—  Deny. To prevent access to, operation of, or availability of a target function by a specified level for a specified time (JP 3-12). Cyberspace attacks deny the enemy’s ability to access cyberspace by hindering hardware and software functionalities for a specific duration of time.  Degrade. To deny access to, or operation of, a target to a level represented as a percentage of capacity. Level of degradation is specified. If a specific time is required, it can be specified (JP 3- 12).  Disrupt. To completely but temporarily deny access to, or operation of, a target for a period of time. A desired start and stop time are normally specified. Disruption can be considered a special case of degradation where the degradation level is 100 percent (JP 3-12). Commanders can use cyberspace attacks that temporarily but completely deny an enemy’s ability to access cyberspace or communication links to disrupt decision making, ability to organize formations, and conduct command and control. Disruption effects in cyberspace are usually limited in duration.  Destroy. To completely and irreparably deny access to, or operation of, a target. Destruction maximizes the time and amount of denial. However, destruction is scoped according to the span of a conflict, since many targets, given enough time and resources, can be reconstituted (JP 3-12). Commanders can use cyberspace attacks to destroy hardware and software beyond repair where replacement is required to restore system function. Destruction of enemy cyberspace capabilities could include irreversible corruption to system software causing loss of data and information, or irreparable damage to hardware such as the computer processor, hard drive, or power supply on a system or systems on the enemy’s network.  Manipulate. Manipulation, as a form of cyberspace attack, controls or changes information, information systems, and/or networks in gray or red cyberspace to create physical denial effects, using deception, decoying, conditioning, spoofing, falsification, and other similar techniques. It uses an adversary’s information resources for friendly purposes, to create denial effects not immediately apparent in cyberspace (JP 3-12). Commanders can use cyberspace attacks to manipulate enemy information or information systems in support of tactical deception objectives or as part of joint military deception. Refer to FM 3-13.4 for information on Army support to military deception. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 2-7 Chapter 2 Note. Cyberspace attacks are types of fires conducted during DCO-RA and OCO actions and are limited to cyber mission force(s) engagement. They require coordination with other United States Government departments and agencies and careful synchronization with other lethal and non- lethal effects through established targeting processes. SECTION II – ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE 2-21. Modern militaries rely on communications equipment using broad portions of the EMS to conduct military operations allowing forces to talk, transmit data, and provide navigation and timing information, and command and control troops worldwide. They also rely on the EMS for sensing and awareness of the OE. The Army conducts EW to gain and maintain positions of relative advantage within the EMS. The Army’s contribution to electromagnetic spectrum operations is accomplished by integrating and synchronizing EW and spectrum management operations. EW refers to military actions involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the EMS or to attack the enemy. EW consists of three distinct divisions: EA, EP, and ES. These divisions often mutually support each other in operations. For example, radar-jamming EA can serve a protection function for friendly forces to penetrate defended airspace; it can also prevent an adversary from having a complete operating picture. Figure 2-3 illustrates the EW taxonomy. Figure 2-3. Electromagnetic warfare taxonomy ELECTROMAGNETIC ATTACK 2-22. Army forces conduct both offensive and defensive EA to fulfill the commander’s objectives in support of the mission. EA projects power in and through the EMS by implementing active and passive actions to deny enemy capabilities and equipment, or by employing passive systems to protect friendly capabilities. Electromagnetic attack is a division of electromagnetic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, 2-8 FM 3-12 24 August 2021 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and considered a form of fires (JP 3-85). EA requires systems or weapons that radiate electromagnetic energy as active measures and systems that do not radiate or re-radiate electromagnetic energy as passive measures. 2-23. Offensive EA prevents or reduces an enemy’s effective use of the EMS by employing jamming and directed energy weapon systems against enemy spectrum-dependent systems and devices. Offensive EA systems and capabilities include—  Jammers.  Directed energy weaponry.  Self-propelled decoys.  Electromagnetic deception.  Antiradiation missiles. 2-24. Defensive EA protects against lethal attacks by denying enemy use of the EMS to target, guide, and trigger weapons that negatively impact friendly systems. Defensive EA supports force protection, self- protection and OPSEC efforts by degrading, neutralizing, or destroying an enemy’s surveillance capabilities against protected units. Defensive EA systems and capabilities include—  Expendables (flares and active decoys).  Jammers.  Towed decoys.  Directed energy infrared countermeasure systems.  Radio controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) systems.  Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS). 2-25. EA effects available to the commander include—  Destroy. Destruction makes the condition of a target so damaged that it can neither function nor be restored to a usable condition in a timeframe relevant to the current operation. When used in the EW context, destruction is the use of EA to eliminate targeted enemy personnel, facilities, or equipment (JP 3-85).  Degrade. Degradation reduces the effectiveness or efficiency of an enemy EMS-dependent system. The impact of degradation may last a few seconds or remain throughout the entire operation (JP 3-85).  Disrupt. Disruption temporarily interrupts the operation of an enemy EMS dependent system (JP 3-85).  Deceive. Deception measures are designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce them to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests. Deception in an EW context presents enemy operators and higher-level processing functions with erroneous inputs, either directly through the sensors themselves or through EMS-based networks such as voice communications or data links (JP 3-85). ELECTROMAGNETIC ATTACK TASKS 2-26. EA has the unique potential to affect enemy use of the EMS and attack the enemy through the EMS. Other offensive options can affect enemy use of the EMS but are likely to cause collateral damage outside the EMS, whereas EA uses the EMS for its effects. Concurrently, EA’s potential to cause EMS fratricide necessitates caution and coordination in its employment. 2-27. EA tasks include—  Employing directed energy weaponry.  Electromagnetic pulse.  Reactive countermeasures.  Deception measures.  Electromagnetic intrusion. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 2-9 Chapter 2  Electromagnetic jamming.  Electromagnetic probing.  Meaconing. Directed Energy 2-28. Directed energy is an umbrella term covering technologies that relate to the production of a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles. (JP 3-85). Directed energy becomes a directed energy weapon when used to conduct EA. A directed-energy weapon is a weapon or system that uses directed energy to incapacitate, damage, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and/or personnel (JP 3- 85). EA involving the use of directed-energy weapons is called directed-energy warfare. Directed-energy warfare is military action involving the use of directed-energy weapons, devices, and countermeasures (JP 3-85). The purpose of directed-energy warfare is to disable, cause direct damage, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, or personnel. Another use for directed-energy warfare is to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the EMS by neutralization or destruction. Electromagnetic Pulse 2-29. Electromagnetic pulse is a strong burst of electromagnetic radiation caused by a nuclear explosion, energy weapon, or by natural phenomenon, that may couple with electrical or electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges (JP 3-85). The effects of an electromagnetic pulse can extend hundreds of kilometers depending on the height and power output of the electromagnetic pulse burst. A high-altitude electromagnetic pulse can generate destructive effects over a continent-sized area. The most affected portion of the EMS by electromagnetic pulse or high-altitude electromagnetic pulse is the radio spectrum. Electromagnetic energy produced by an electromagnetic pulse excludes the highest frequencies of the optical (infrared, visible, ultraviolet) and ionizing (X and gamma rays) ranges. An indirect impact of an electromagnetic pulse or high-altitude electromagnetic pulse includes electrical fires caused by the overheating of electrical systems and components. Reactive Countermeasures 2-30. EA includes reactive countermeasures as a response to an enemy attack in the EMS. Response to enemy attack may include employing radio frequency countermeasures, such as flares and chaff, in disrupting enemy systems and weapons, such as precision-guided or radio-controlled weapons, communications equipment, and sensor systems. Radio frequency countermeasures are any device or technique employing radio frequency materials or technology that is intended to impair the effectiveness of enemy activity, particularly with respect to precision guided and sensor systems (JP 3-85). Chaff is radar confusion reflectors, consisting of thin, narrow metallic strips of various lengths and frequency responses, which are used to reflect echoes for confusion purposes (JP 3-85). Reactive countermeasures may provoke the employment of directed energy weaponry or electromagnetic pulse and can include the use of lethal fires. Army forces can disrupt enemy guided weapons and sensor systems by deploying passive and active electro-optical-infrared countermeasures that include—  Smokes.  Aerosols.  Signature suppressants.  Decoys.  Pyrotechnics.  Pyrophoric.  Laser jammers.  High-energy lasers  Directed infrared energy. 2-10 FM 3-12 24 August 2021 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals Deception Measures 2-31. Deception measures are designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce them to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests. Electromagnetic deception uses misleading information by injecting false data into the adversary’s EMS-dependent voice and data networks to inhibit the effectiveness of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensor systems. EW uses the EMS to deceive a threat’s decision loop, making it difficult to establish an accurate perception of Army forces’ objective reality. EW supports all deceptions plans, both Joint military deception and tactical deception, using electromagnetic deception measures and scaling appropriately for the desired effect. Electromagnetic deception measures provide misleading signals in electromagnetic energy, for example by injecting false signals into a threat's sensor systems such as radar. Commander’s authority to plan and execute deception integrated with electromagnetic deception measures may be limited by separate EW authorities and rules of engagement (Technical means for deception are in CJCSI 3211.01F and AR 525-21). Electromagnetic Intrusion 2-32. Electromagnetic intrusion is the intentional insertion of electromagnetic energy into transmission paths in any manner, with the objective of deceiving operators or of causing confusion (JP 3-85). An example of electromagnetic intrusion is injecting false or misleading information into an enemy's radio communications, acting as the enemy’s higher headquarters. Electromagnetic intrusion can also create deception or confusion in a threat aircraft’s intelligent flight control system, compromising the intelligent flight control system’ neural network and the pilot’s ability to maintain control. Electromagnetic Jamming 2-33. Electromagnetic jamming is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, with the intent of degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability (JP 3-85). Targets subjected to jamming may include radios, navigational systems, radars, and satellites. Electromagnetic jamming can disrupt a threat aircraft’s intelligent flight control system by jamming its sensors, denying its ability to obtain navigational or altitude data crucial to flight performance. Electromagnetic jamming can also prevent or reduce the effectiveness of an enemy’s integrated air defense system by jamming its anti-aircraft sensors used for targeting. Electromagnetic Probing 2-34. Electromagnetic probing is the intentional radiation designed to be introduced into the devices or systems of an adversary for the purpose of learning the functions and operational capabilities of the devices or systems (JP 3-85). Electromagnetic probing involves accessing an enemy’s spectrum-dependent devices to obtain information about the targeted devices’ functions, capabilities, and purpose. Electromagnetic probing may provide information about threat capabilities and their ability to affect or detect friendly operations. Army forces may conduct overt electromagnetic probing to elicit a response from an enemy, exposing their location. Meaconing 2-35. Meaconing consists of receiving radio beacon signals and rebroadcasting them on the same frequency to confuse navigation. Meaconing stations cause inaccurate bearings to be obtained by aircraft or ground stations (JP 3-85). ELECTROMAGNETIC PROTECTION 2-36. Electromagnetic protection is the division of electromagnetic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly, neutral, or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability (JP 3-85). EP measures eliminate or mitigate the negative impact resulting from friendly, neutral, enemy, or naturally occurring EMI. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 2-11 Chapter 2 2-37. Both EP and defensive EA can have protective effects. However, EP focuses explicitly on protecting friendly EMS-dependent capabilities. In contrast, the protective effects of defensive EA focus on attacking enemy capabilities that support their opposition to friendly forces and operations. EP includes protective measures for friendly forces operating near or handling live ordnance by preventing inadvertent detonations due to electromagnetic energy. ELECTROMAGNETIC PROTECTION TASKS 2-38. Adversaries are heavily invested in diminishing our effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. It is crucial we understand the enemy threat and our vulnerabilities to our systems, equipment and personnel. Effective EP measures will minimize natural phenomena and mitigate the enemy’s ability to conduct ES and EA actions against friendly forces successfully. 2-39. EP tasks include—  Electromagnetic environmental effects deconfliction.  Electromagnetic compatibility.  Electromagnetic hardening.  Emission control.  Electromagnetic masking.  Preemptive countermeasures.  Electromagnetic security.  Wartime reserve modes. Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Deconfliction 2-40. Electromagnetic vulnerability is the characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of electromagnetic environmental effects (JP 3-85). Any system operating in the EMS is susceptible to electromagnetic environmental effects. Any spectrum-dependent device exposed to or having electromagnetic compatibility issues within an EMOE may result in the increased potential for such electromagnetic vulnerability as safety, interoperability, and reliability issues. Electromagnetic vulnerability manifests when spectrum-dependent devices suffer levels of degradation that render them incapable of performing operations when subjected to electromagnetic environmental effects. 2-41. Electromagnetic compatibility, EMS deconfliction, electromagnetic pulse, and EMI mitigation reduce the impact of electromagnetic environmental effects. Recognizing the different types of electromagnetic radiation hazards allows planners to use appropriate measures to counter or mitigate electromagnetic environmental effects. Electromagnetic radiation hazards include— hazards of electromagnetic radiation to personnel, hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance, and hazards of electromagnetic radiation to fuels. Electromagnetic environmental effects can also occur from natural phenomena such as lightning and precipitation static. Electromagnetic Compatibility 2-42. Electromagnetic compatibility is the ability of systems, equipment, and devices that use the electromagnetic spectrum to operate in their intended environments without causing or suffering unacceptable or unintentional degradation because of electromagnetic radiation or response (JP 3-85). The CEMA spectrum manager assists the G-6 or S-6 spectrum manager with implementing electromagnetic compatibility to mitigate electromagnetic vulnerabilities by applying sound spectrum planning, coordination, and management of the EMS. Operational forces have minimal ability to mitigate electromagnetic compatibility issues. Instead, they must document identified electromagnetic compatibility issues so that the Service component program management offices may coordinate the required changes necessary to reduce compatibility issues. 2-12 FM 3-12 24 August 2021 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals Electromagnetic Hardening 2-43. Electromagnetic hardening consists of actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and/or equipment by blanking, filtering, attenuating, grounding, bonding, and/or shielding against undesirable effects of electromagnetic energy (JP 3-85). Electromagnetic hardening can protect friendly spectrum-dependent devices from the impact of EMI or threat EA such as lasers, high-powered microwave, or electromagnetic pulse. An example of electromagnetic hardening includes installing electromagnetic conduit consisting of conductive or magnetic materials to shield against undesirable effects of electromagnetic energy. Emission Control 2-44. Emission control is the selective and controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command and control capabilities while minimizing, for operations security: a. detection by enemy sensors, b. mutual interference among friendly systems, and/or c. enemy interference with the ability to execute a military deception plan (JP 3-85). emission control enables OPSEC by—  Decreasing detection probability and countering detection range by enemy sensors.  Identifying and mitigating EMI among friendly spectrum-dependent devices  Identifying enemy EMI that allows execution of military deception planning. 2-45. Emission control enables electromagnetic masking by integrating intelligence, and EW to adjust spectrum management and communications plans. A practical and disciplined emission control plan, in conjunction with other EP measures, is a critical aspect of good OPSEC. Refer to ATP 3-13.3 for OPSEC techniques at division and below. Electromagnetic Masking 2-46. Electromagnetic masking is the controlled radiation of electromagnetic energy on friendly frequencies in a manner to protect the emissions of friendly communications and electronic systems against enemy electromagnetic support measures/signals intelligence without significantly degrading the operation of friendly systems (JP 3-85). Electromagnetic masking disguises, distorts, or manipulates friendly electromagnetic radiation to conceal military operations information or present false perceptions to adversary commanders. Electromagnetic masking is an essential component of military deception, OPSEC, and signals security. Preemptive Countermeasures 2-47. Countermeasures consist of that form of military science that, by the employment of devices and/or techniques, has as its objective the impairment of the operational effectiveness of enemy activity (JP 3-85). Countermeasures can be passive (non-radiating or reradiating electromagnetic energy) or active (radiating electromagnetic energy) and deployed preemptively or reactively. Preemptive deployment of passive countermeasures are precautionary procedures to disrupt an enemy attack in the EMS through the use of passive devices such as chaff which reradiates, or the use of radio frequency absorptive material which impedes the return of the radio frequency signal. Electromagnetic Security 2-48. Electromagnetic security is the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from their interception and study of noncommunications electromagnetic radiation (e.g., radar) (JP 3-85). Changing the modulation and characteristics of electromagnetic frequencies used for radars make it difficult for a threat to intercept and study radar signals. Wartime Reserve Modes 2-49. Wartime reserve modes are characteristics and operating procedures of sensor, communications, navigation aids, threat recognition, weapons, and countermeasure systems that will contribute to military effectiveness if unknown to or misunderstood by opposing commanders before they are used, but could be exploited or neutralized if known in advance (JP 3-85). Wartime reserve modes are held deliberately in reserve for wartime or emergency use. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 2-13 Chapter 2 ELECTROMAGNETIC SUPPORT 2-50. Electromagnetic support refers to the division of electromagnetic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under the direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations (JP 3-85). In multi-domain operations, commanders work to dominate the EMS and shape the operational environment by detecting, intercepting, analyzing, identifying, locating, and affecting (deny, degrade, disrupt, deceive, destroy, and manipulate) adversary electromagnetic systems that support military operations. Simultaneously, they also work to protect and enable U.S. and Allied forces’ freedom of action in and through the EMS. 2-51. The purpose of ES is to acquire adversary combat information in support of a commander’s maneuver plan. Combat information is unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user’s tactical intelligence requirements (JP 2-01). Combat information used for planning or conducting combat operations, to include EA missions, is acquired under Command authority; however, partner nation privacy concerns must be taken into account. Decryption of communications is an exclusively SIGINT function and may only be performed by SIGINT personnel operating under Director, National Security Agency and Chief, National Security Service SIGINT operational control (DODI O- 3115.07). 2-52. ES supports operations by obtaining EMS-derived combat information to enable effects and planning. Combat information is collected for immediate use in support of threat recognition, current operations, targeting for EA or lethal attacks, and support the commander’s planning of future operations. Data collected through ES can also support SIGINT processing, exploitation, and dissemination to support the commander’s intelligence and targeting requirements and provide situational understanding. Data and information obtained through ES depend on the timely collection, processing, and reporting to alert the commander and staff of potential critical combat information. ELECTROMAGNETIC SUPPORT TASKS 2-53. When conducting electromagnetic support, commanders employ EW platoons located in the brigade, combat team (BCT) military intelligence company (MICO) to support with information collection efforts, survey of the EMS, integration and multisource analysis by providing indications and warning, radio frequency direction finding and geolocation of threat emissions. 2-54. ES tasks include—  Electromagnetic Reconnaissance.  Threat Warning.  Direction finding. Electromagnetic Reconnaissance 2-55. Electromagnetic reconnaissance is the detection, location, identification, and evaluation of foreign electromagnetic radiations (energy) (JP 3-85). Electromagnetic reconnaissance is an action used to support information collection and is an element of the tactical task reconnaissance (see Chapter 4). Information obtained through electromagnetic reconnaissance assists the commander with situational understanding and decision making and, can be further processed to support SIGINT activities. Electromagnetic reconnaissance may result in EP modifications or lead to an EA or lethal attack. 2-56. Information obtained through electromagnetic reconnaissance, in conjunction with other sources of information and intelligence data, can be used for precision geolocation. Precision geolocation involves planning, coordinating, and managing friendly assets to geolocate enemy radio frequency systems for targeting. The data gathered is analyzed to determine the location of the electromagnetic energy’s origin. This information provides the fires support element with a physical location of enemy systems radiating electromagnetic energy. 2-14 FM 3-12 24 August 2021 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals Threat Warning 2-57. Threat warning enables the commander and staff to quickly identify immediate threats to friendly forces and implement EA or EP countermeasures. EW personnel employ sensors to detect, intercept, identify, and locate adversary electromagnetic signatures and provides an early warning of an imminent or potential threat. EW personnel coordinate with G-2 or S-2 on the long-term impact of detected enemy emitters. Threat warning assists the commander’s decision making process in IPB development, updating electromagnetic order of battle, and assisting in the correlation of enemy emitters to communication and weapon systems. 2-58. Known electromagnetic signatures should be compared against the electromagnetic order of battle, high-value target, and the high-payoff target list and action taken as warranted by current policy or higher guidance. Unknown radiated electromagnetic signatures detected in the EMS are forwarded to the G-2 or S- 2 for analysis. The G-2 or S-2 validates known and unknown systems as part of information collection that feeds the operations process. Staffs analyze and report information to higher and subordinate headquarters, to other Army and joint forces, and to unified action partners in the AO. Direction Finding 2-59. Direction finding is a procedure for obtaining bearings of radio frequency emitters by using a highly directional antenna and a display unit on an intercept receiver or ancillary equipment (JP 3-85). EW personnel leverage various ES platforms with direction finding capabilities to locate enemy forces. Multiple direction finding systems are preferred for a greater confidence level of the enemy location. ES platforms are deployed in various formations to create a baseline and increase the area of coverage. Three or more direction finding systems are considered optimal in triangulating the targeted emitter. ELECTROMAGNETIC SUPPORT AND SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 2-60. ES and SIGINT often share the same or similar assets and resources, and personnel conducting ES could be required to collect information that meets both requirements simultaneously. SIGINT consists of communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation SIGINT. Commonalities between ES and SIGINT are similar during the early stages of sensing, collecting, identifying, and locating foreign spectrum emissions. The distinction between ES and SIGINT is determined by who has operational control of assets collecting information, what capabilities those assets must provide, and why they are needed. Information and data become SIGINT when cryptologic processes are applied to a signal to determine its relevance, value, or meaning solely for intelligence. There are also delineating hard lines regarding the systems, signal complexity, and reporting timeliness that divide ES and SIGINT. While both ES and SIGINT report information that meets reporting thresholds directly to the supported unit, SIGINT is obligated further to report acquired information through the U.S. SIGINT system. The added requirement for SIGINT provides accountability and enables the greater intelligence community access to the information for additional intelligence production and dissemination as required. For more information on SIGINT, refer to ADP 2-0. ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE REPROGRAMMING 2-61. Electromagnetic warfare reprogramming is the deliberate alteration or modification of electromagnetic warfare or target sensing systems, or the tactics and procedures that employ them, in response to validated changes in equipment, tactics, or the electromagnetic environment (JP 3-85). The purpose of EW reprogramming is to maintain or enhance the effectiveness of EW and targeting sensing systems. EW reprogramming includes changes to EW and targeting sensing software (TSS) equipment such as self-defense systems, offensive weapons systems, and intelligence collection systems. EW consists of three distinct divisions: EA, EP, and ES, which are supported by EW reprogramming activities. 2-62. Army forces follow the combatant command (CCMD) joint coordination electromagnetic warfare reprogramming policy and procedures during all training events and operations. Units establish EW reprogramming support programs, and the cyber electromagnetic warfare officer (CEWO) ensures the unit follows joint coordination electromagnetic warfare reprogramming policies and procedures regarding EW reprogramming and maintain awareness of EW reprogramming efforts conducted by other organizations in the AO. See Appendix F for detailed information regarding EW reprogramming. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 2-15 Chapter 2 SECTION III – INTERRELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER OPERATIONS 2-63. This section describes the relationship that cyberspace operations and EW have with other operations. It discusses how cyberspace operations and EW mutually support intelligence operations, space operations, and information operations. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 2-64. As an operation, intelligence is (1) the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations; (2) the activities that result in the production; and (3) the organizations engaged in such activities (JP 2-0). Intelligence at all echelons supports the planning of cyberspace operations and EW and assists with defining measures of performance and effectiveness. Intelligence also assists the fires support element in developing the high payoff target (HPT) list, and collaborating with the CEMA section to ensure the high payoff target list includes enemy cyberspace and EW-related targets. Intelligence also plays a crucial part in assisting the fires support element in continued target development, including forwarding targets to the joint task force (JTF) headquarters for assessment as potential targets for the joint targeting list. 2-65. Information collection supports cyberspace operations and EW by collecting information to satisfy commander’s critical information requirement(s) (CCIRs) and staff members’ information requirements (IRs) regarding friendly, neutral, and enemy cyberspace and EMS capabilities, activities, disposition, and characteristics within the OE. Information collection also drives capability development. A robust intelligence package is imperative to understanding the target space, developing tools and having meaningful effects in cyberspace. There are four tasks and missions nested in information collection: intelligence operations, reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations (See Chapter 4). 2-66. Information obtained by information collection drives the IPB process. Through the IPB process, the G-2 or S-2 analyzes operational and mission variables in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. These variables affect how friendly forces will conduct cyberspace operations and EW within the assigned AO. Conversely, cyberspace operations and EW also contribute to intelligence by supporting information collection. Cyberspace operations and EW capabilities collect combat information to answer CCIRs and IRs for situational awareness and targeting. 2-67. SIGINT, cyberspace operations, and EW may overlap during operations in the EMS. For this reason, effective integration of SIGINT, cyberspace, EW, and spectrum management operations extends well beyond simple coordination. Effective integration requires both deconfliction and identification of windows of opportunity among these operations. This integration requires close staff collaboration, detailed procedural controls, and various technical channels. See Chapter 4 for additional details. 2-68. The intelligence staff also identifies adversary and enemy key terrain as part of the IPB process. Cyberspace operations use the concept of key terrain as a model to identify critical aspects of the cyberspace domain. Identified key terrain in cyberspace is subject to actions the controlling combatant (friendly, enemy, or adversary) deems advantageous such as defending, exploiting, and attacking. Key terrain in cyberspace corresponds to nodes, links, processes, or assets in cyberspace, whether part of the physical, logical, or cyber- persona layer. Key terrain in cyberspace may include—  Locations in cyberspace in which friendly forces can gather intelligence.  Locations in cyberspace that support network connectivity.  Entry points to friendly networks that require priorities for defense.  Locations in cyberspace that friendly forces require access for essential functions or capabilities. SPACE OPERATIONS 2-69. Cyberspace and space operations are interdependent. Access to the space domain is critical to cyberspace operations, especially DODIN operations, enabling global end-to-end network connectivity. In the Army, the space domain is only accessible through space operations. Conversely, space capabilities such as navigation warfare, offensive space control, and defensive space control are dependent on operations 2-16 FM 3-12 24 August 2021 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals conducted in space, cyberspace, and the EMS. This interrelationship is critical, and addressing the interdependencies between the three must be managed throughout the operations process. 2-70. Both cyberspace operations and EW can affect space operations. Ground control systems that control satellites rely on networked computers to maintain orbital parameters and direct onboard sensors, particularly to maintain stable orbits; radios transmit computer commands to the satellites. Computer code sent directly to satellites in orbit can potentially allow remote control of the system, preventing others’ access to onboard sensors or communications systems. Adversaries could similarly enter ground control systems and issue alternative orders to satellites to move them out of position or shut off critical systems. Because satellites routinely receive commands using radio frequencies, an adversary might attempt to shut off sensors or directly gain control of the spacecraft, rather than trying to issue orders through a ground control system. 2-71. All space operations rely on the EMS for command and control, sensing, and information distribution. The vital nature of space operations in multi-domain operations requires close coordination with other EMS activities associated with spectrum management operations to ensure proper prioritization, integration, synchronization, and deconfliction. The G-2 or S-2 uses information gathered through space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to assist the commander and staff with attaining situational awareness and understanding of the OE. 2-72. Navigation warfare is the deliberate defensive and offensive action to assure and prevent positioning, navigation, and timing information through coordinated employment of space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic warfare operations (JP 3-14). A navigation warfare attack denies threat actors a global navigation satellite system through various methods, including OCO, space operations, and EA. Global navigation satellite system is the general term used to describe any space-based system providing positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information worldwide (for example, Global Positioning System). Navigation warfare effectiveness requires synchronization of space operations, cyberspace operations, and EW capabilities with lethal and nonlethal attack actions to create desired effects. EW must be synchronized with space operations to understand the impacts of navigation warfare operations, deny adversary access to global navigation satellite system information, and protect friendly spectrum-dependent devices using specific frequencies within the EMS. Refer to FM 3-14 for more information on navigation warfare. 2-73. The space domain consists of three segments: space, link, and ground. The space segment is the operational area corresponding with the space domain and comprises satellites in both geosynchronous and non-geosynchronous Earth orbit. The link segment consists of signals connecting ground and space segments through the EMS. The ground segment consists of ground-based facilities and equipment supporting command and control of space assets, ground-based processing equipment, earth terminals, user equipment, space situational awareness sensors, and the interconnectivity between the facilities and equipment. Earth terminals include all multi-Service ground, shipborne, submarine, and airborne satellite terminals that establish connectivity to the satellites in the space segment. The three space domain segments rely heavily on cyberspace operations to protect networking and information technologies and infrastructures while depending on the EMS to conduct operations between the space, link, and ground segments. 2-74. Cyberspace operations contribute to space operations by protecting friendly networks that leverage the global navigation satellite system while targeting similar enemy and adversary capabilities. Additionally, cyberspace operations establish network connectivity between ground-based facilities and equipment throughout the space domain’s ground segment. EW supports navigation warfare by denying the enemy access to global navigation satellite system information while protecting friendly space capabilities operating in the EMS. 2-75. Integrating cyberspace operations, EW, and space operations enable commanders and staffs at each level to synchronize capabilities and effects. Space-based capabilities (space segment) enable distributed and global cyberspace operations. Cyberspace and space-based capabilities provide responsive and timely support that allows commanders to project combat power from the highest echelons down to the tactical level. Synchronization with spectrum management operations is necessary to ensure the availability of resources in the EMS and to prevent spectrum conflicts. Refer to FM 3-14 for more information about space operations. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 2-17 Chapter 2 INFORMATION OPERATIONS 2-76. Information operations are the integrated employment, during military operations, of information- related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision- making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13). Information operations (IO) integrate and synchronize information-related capabilities to create effects in and through the information environment and deliver an operational advantage to the commander. IO optimize the information element of combat power and support and enhance all other elements to gain operational advantage over a threat. IO consist of three inter-related efforts that work in tandem and overlap each other. These three efforts are—  A commander-led staff planning and synchronization effort.  A preparation and execution effort carried out by information-related capabilities units, IO units, or staff entities in concert with the IO working group.  An assessment effort that is carried out by all involved. 2-77. When commanders employ cyberspace and EW capabilities to create desirable conditions within the OE, they synchronize these actions through IO. Commanders use cyberspace operations and EW to gain a strategic advantage in cyberspace and the EMS. Cyberspace and EW capabilities support operations by enabling the ability to share information among friendly forces or affecting the enemy’s ability to use cyberspace and the EMS. 2-78. Cyberspace operations and EW effects influence, disrupt, corrupt, or manipulate the decision-making cycle of threat actors. Cyberspace operations support operations through OCO or DCO-RA by creating denial or manipulation effects to degrade, disrupt, or destroy the enemy’s cyberspace capability or change enemy information, information systems, or networks. EW supports operations through EA by degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy capability to use the EMS. EW also supports operations through EP actions by concealing or manipulating friendly EMS signatures, to degrade or deceive enemy sensors or targeting systems. When integrated and synchronized with other capabilities, cyberspace operations and EW can help commanders set favorable conditions for information advantage, whether in cyberspace, the EMS, or other domains. 2-79. Cyberspace operations and EW can also create cognitive effects by impacting physical components of enemy capabilities. For example, affecting the ability of an enemy’s fires network through a cyberspace attack or EA may deny or create doubt about their ability to use artillery effectively. Similarly, restricting the enemy’s ability to use cyberspace or EMS at critical points can affect enemy judgments when exercising command and control. Synchronizing defensive EW and cyberspace operations with other capabilities can also disrupt a threat’s ability to make decisions while ensuring friendly forces freedom of action. 2-18 FM 3-12 24 August 2021 Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare Fundamentals 2-80. Cyberspace operations and EW synchronized through the operations process and targeting can provide commanders additional ways and means to—  Affect threat capabilities that inform or influence decision making.  Affect threat capabilities for command and control, movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, communications, and information warfare.  Affect threat capabilities to target and attack friendly command and control and related decision support systems.  Affect threat capabilities that distribute, publish, or broadcast information designed to persuade relevant actors to oppose friendly operations.  Enable military deception directed against threat decision making, intelligence and information gathering, communications, dissemination, and command and control capabilities.  Enable friendly OPSEC to protect critical information.  Enable friendly influence activities, such as military information support operations, to improve or sustain positive relations with foreign actors in and around the operational area and to degrade threat influence over the same.  Protect friendly information, technical networks, and decision-making capabilities from exploitation by enemy and adversary information warfare assets. 24 August 2021 FM 3-12 2-19

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