The Road to the White House 2024 PDF

 The Road to the White House ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ 2024 ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ The Politics of Presidential Elections  The Road...

 The Road to the White House ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ 2024 ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ The Politics of Presidential Elections  The Road to the White House ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ 2024 ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ The Politics of Presidential Elections Twelfth Edition ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ Stephen J. Wayne Georgetown University ROW MA N & LITTLEF I EL D Lanham Boulder New York London Acquisitions Editor: Jon Sisk Acquisitions Assistant: Katherine Berlatsky Sales and Marketing Inquiries: [email protected] Credits and acknowledgments for material borrowed from other sources, and reproduced with permission, appear on the appropriate pages within the text. Published by Rowman & Littlefield An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com 86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE Copyright © 2024 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. Eleventh edition © 2020. Tenth edition 2018. Ninth edition 2014. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. Library of Congress Control Number: 2023934423 ISBN: 978-1-5381-8203-1 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-1-5381-8204-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-1-5381-8205-5 (ebook) The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Dedication To the memory of my parents and grandparents, who encouraged my interests in politics and my pursuit of higher education; to my wife, Cheryl, who has tolerated my passion for politics and keeps me pointed in the right political direction; and to my students and colleagues, whose questions, wisdom, and comments, and, in some cases, their own political careers, have strengthened my understanding of and appreciation for a properly functioning democratic political system.  The presidential vote in the Electoral College in 2020. Source: Kingofthedead/Wikimedia Commons Preface We are in another presidential election cycle. It follows two of the most costly and contentious elections in US history. The new electoral cycle occurs within an inflated economic environment and the pandemic that began in 2020, both of which have generated discontent and accelerated wage gaps between men and women, skilled and unskilled workers, and minority racial groups and the white majority. The noneconomic issues include immigration reform and enforcement, the role of government in providing social services and regulating private activi- ties, abortion, climate change, racial and ethnic discrimination as well as conten- tious international issues, especially relations with Russia and China and the domestic impact of US assistance to Ukraine. The American electorate remains polarized. The proportion of Americans identifying themselves as Independents has increased. Add to these, the public’s differing perceptions of the Trump and Biden presidencies. Debate in the 2024 campaign will be framed by these issues and perceptions. The election cycle is two years, but the campaign began earlier, and the re- sults will continue well after it. By the end of the 2024 election, the electorate will be weary to the point of numbness; the presidential candidates, their cam- paign staffs and volunteers exhausted, and one side disappointed, even bitter to the point of contesting the result. Moreover, billions of dollars will be raised and spent. Is it necessary to have such a vigorous, often nasty, public debate and con- tentious electoral process? Perhaps not, but free and frequent elections are critical for a democracy. They are a means by which the people can judge the candidates, keep the winners accountable, and hold them responsible for the decisions they make in office. Elections tie citizens to their government. But for the voters to make an intel- ligent judgment, they need information about the qualifications of the candidates, the policies they propose, and the partisan labels they wear. Does the current vii viii  Preface presidential electoral system encourage the most qualified candidates to run? Does it force them to discuss the most important issues, present feasible policy solutions, and talk candidly about themselves and their policies? Does the elector- ate get the kind of information it needs to make an enlightened voting decision? Will the results of the election fairly and accurately reflect the beliefs, opinions, interests, and needs of the population as a whole? Is the system consistent with principles and practices of a democratic electoral process? A primary goal of this book is to answer these questions. It does so by describ- ing and evaluating the presidential election system from the perspectives of the candidates, the parties, and the American people. As with its previous editions, The Road to the White House 2024 discusses the legal, political, and financial framework in which the election occurs; the process by which the major parties nominate their standard-bearers and position themselves for the general election; the strategies, tactics, and operations of the presidential campaigns themselves; print and online news coverage and advertising; and the use and abuse of social media for communicating with voters; the mood of the electorate and how that mood affects the results of the election; and finally, how the election is likely to shape governance in 2025 and thereafter. This edition emphasizes the changes that have shaped electoral politics in recent years: the flood of money to candidates and the groups that support them; the communications revolution and the opportunities and challenges it presents for the candidates, their advisers, and the voters; and fake news and foreign in- terference in the election. The continuities from past presidential elections will also be examined: the parties’ nomination processes, the Electoral College system of campaigning and voting, traditional and social medias, the tone and amount of news coverage, television debates and political commercials, partisan appeals, voting patterns, and the transition to governing. Outline The book is organized into four parts. Part I discusses the arena in which presi- dential elections occur. Its three chapters examine the electoral system, campaign finance, and the political environment. Chapter 1 provides a historical overview of nominations as well as elections with a discussion of controversial and close Electoral College results as well as the attempt to change the results of the of- ficial Electoral College vote in 2020. Chapter 2 describes recent developments in campaign finance, the Supreme Court’s decision on independent spending, the demise of public funding, the expansion of private donors and the amounts they contribute, the role of party and nonparty groups, and the cumulative impact of these factors on election outcomes. In the third chapter, continuities and changes in the political environment serve as the principal focus. How that environment shapes turnout, solidifies partisanship, and affects the composition of the parties’ electoral coalitions will also be examined with an eye on the past and a glimpse into the foreseeable future.  Preface  ix Part II describes and analyzes the presidential nomination process. Chapter 4 discusses the reforms that the parties have made in the way they select their standard-bearers, the legal issues that have arisen from these reforms, and the effect these reforms have had on the candidate, the parties, and the electorate. Chapter 5 continues this discussion through the competitive stage of the cau- cuses and primaries. This chapter pays particular attention to the strategies of the candidates and the hurdles they must overcome, illustrating these strategies and hurdles with case studies from recent nomination campaigns. Chapter 6 de- scribes the period after the nominees have been effectively determined through the parties’ national nominating conventions that formally choose their standard- bearers and launch their general election campaigns. It indicates the methods by which the successful candidates try to unify partisans after a divisive caucus and primary process, appeal to Independents, improve their leadership image, which may have been damaged during the nomination quest, and begin to confront their partisan opponents and design themes for their election campaigns. Part III examines the general election itself. Chapter 7 describes the strate- gies, tactics, and operations of the campaigns. It assesses the new communication technologies that have been used to identify voters, target appeals, and assesses their impact. This discussion is illustrated with case studies from 2004 to 2020. Chapter 8 turns to the news media: how the press covers the election and how the candidates try to affect that coverage with paid advertising, scripted public performances, and participation in the presidential debates. It then examines the impact of these efforts on turnout, voting behavior, and the criteria necessary for a democratic electoral process. Part IV looks at and beyond the elections. Chapter 9 discusses and evaluates forecasts based on quantitative data by political scientists, pre-election polls and their accuracy, and finally the vote itself: who won and why and what difference the outcome of the election is likely to have for the country. It also examines the difficulties presidential candidates encounter in fulfilling the promises they made when running for office and the leadership imagery they projected dur- ing the campaign. Chapter 10 considers problems that have beset the electoral system and discusses proposed reforms to alleviate these problems. It addresses some of the major contemporary controversies from party rules to campaign fi- nance to news media coverage to the Electoral College itself within the context of American democracy. Purpose Elections link the people with their public officials, a vital component of a func- tioning democracy. However, that link is far from perfect. Voting is individual- ized, yet governing is a collective undertaking. Not everyone participates in elec- tions, but government makes rules for all the people, including those who do not or, are not, eligible to vote. Presidential candidates regularly overpromise and un- derdeliver. They create unrealistic expectations that are impossible to achieve by the president alone in a system of shared powers and frequently divided partisan x  Preface control of government. Consequently, any hopefulness that a campaign generates among voters frequently fades into disillusionment, apathy, and even cynicism as the new or reelected administration progresses. How can we improve elections? How can we encourage more of the citizenry to participate? How can we persuade the most qualified people to run? How can we level the playing field? How can we ensure that the mood of the voters will be reflected in the results of the election and that government officials will be responsive to the electorate, pursuing the public’s interest? In other words, how can we make sure that elections achieve their principal goals: to select the most qualified people, to provide a blueprint for governing, and to hold elected officials individually and collectively accountable for their decisions and actions in office? Without information on how the system works, whether it is functioning properly and meeting its objectives, we cannot answer these questions and assess the merits of our electoral democracy. We cannot cajole the citizenry to meet its civic responsibilities and turn out to vote; we cannot recruit the best and the brightest to give up their privacy, shift their family responsibilities to others, and, in many cases, sacrifice financially to run for office; we cannot improve the people–government–public policy connection for which elections are the critical link. In the case of presidential politics, ignorance is definitely not bliss, nor is the norm always or usually the ideal. The road to the White House is long and arduous. In fact, it has now become more difficult to travel than in the past. Yet, surprisingly, given all the criticism, there continue to be many would-be travelers. Evaluating their journey is es- sential to rendering an intelligent judgment on election day. However, more is at stake than simply choosing the occupant of the Oval Office. The system itself is on trial in every election. That is why it is so important to understand and ap- preciate the intricacies of the process and to participate in it. Only an informed and active citizenry can determine whether the nation is being served well by the way we go about choosing our presidents and have some say in determining what they will do in office. Acknowledgments Few books are written alone. I would like to express my thanks to the many people who have reviewed and helped me with the twelve editions of this book: Adam McGlynn, East Stroudsburg University; Judithanne John Bruce, University of Mississippi; Richard Cole, University of Texas at Arlington, Lisa Langenbach, Middle Tennessee State University; Adam McGlynn, East Strausberg University; Judithanne McLauchlan, University of South Florida St. Petersburg; Jeff Dense, Eastern Oregon University; Anthony Corrado Jr., Colby College; Stephen C. Craig, University of Florida at Gainesville; James W. Davis, Washington Univer- sity; Gordon Friedman, Southwest Missouri State University; Jay S. Goodman, Wheaton College; Anne Griffin, the Cooper Union; Marjorie Randon Hershey, Indiana University; Hugh L. LeBlanc, George Washington University; Kuo­Wei lee, Pan­American University; Robert T. Nakamura, State University of New York at Albany; Richard G. Niemi, University of Rochester; Diana Owen, Georgetown University; Charles Prysby, the University of North Carolina at Greensboro; Mi- chael Robinson, Georgetown University; Lester Seligman, University of Illinois; Earl Shaw, Northern Arizona University; John W. Sloan, University of Houston; Priscilla Southwell, University of Oregon at Eugene; William H. Steward, Univer- sity of Alabama; Edward J. Weissman, Washington College; and Clyde Wilcox, Georgetown University. Finally, everyone makes personal sacrifices in writing a book. I want to thank my wife, Cheryl, for her patience and understanding for the more than forty years that this book has been part of my professional life. She has helped me greatly by assuming many of the obligations of family life as I worked on each new edition. Stephen J. Wayne Professor of Government Emeritus Georgetown University xi About the Author Stephen J. Wayne (BA, University of Rochester; MA and PhD, Columbia Univer- sity) is a professor emeritus of government at Georgetown University. He taught at Georgetown for twenty-nine years, and before that, at George Washington University for twenty years. He was also on the faculty of the US Naval Post- graduate School while serving on active duty in the US Navy and on the faculty of Ohio Wesleyan University. A Washington­-based expert on the American presidency, he has authored or edited thirteen books, published in thirty-one editions, and more than one hun- dred articles, chapters, and book reviews. In addition to The Road to the White House, he has written The Legislative Presidency, Is This Any Way to Run a Demo- cratic Election?, Personality and Politics: Obama For and Against Himself, and The Biden Presidency: Polarization, Politics, and Policy. A source for journalists covering the White House, Professor Wayne regularly appeared on television and radio news and discussion programs and has consulted for television documentaries on the presidency, testified before Congress on presidential elections, appeared before both Democratic and Re- publican advisory committees on the presidential nomination process, directed a presidential transition project for the National Academy of Public Administra- tion, and participated in the White House Transition projects conducted by the Presidency Research Group. He has lectured widely at colleges and universities in the US and abroad on the American presidency, national elections, and personality and politics. For more than forty years, he conducted seminars on the presidency for senior US federal executives for the Office of Personnel Management and met with inter- national visitors and journalists visiting the US. xii Contents Preface vii Acknowledgments xi About the Author xii List of Figures, Tables, and Boxes xx PART ONE ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ The Electoral Arena 1 Chapter 1: Presidential Selection: A Historical Overview 3 Introduction 3 The Creation of the Electoral College 4 The Development of Nominating Systems 6 Congressional Caucuses 7 National Nominating Conventions 9 Popular Primaries and Caucuses 10 The Evolution of the General Election 13 Partisan Electors 13 Congressional Decisions 13 The 2020 Electoral College Vote Challenge 15 xiii xiv  Contents Judicial Determination 18 Other Close Elections 19 The Politics of Electoral College Voting 20 Summary 22 Exercises 23 Selected Readings 23 Notes 24 Chapter 2: Campaign Finance 26 Introduction 26 The Rising Costs of Running for President 26 The Regulation of Campaign Finance 29 The Federal Election Campaign Act 29 The Buckley v. Valeo Decision 31 The Soft Money Loophole and Other Amendments 32 The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 33 The Court’s Citizens United Decision 35 The Money Explosion 36 Candidate Revenues 36 Campaign Expenditures 39 Money and Electoral Success 41 Summary 42 Exercises 43 Selected Readings 44 Notes 44 Chapter 3: The Political Environment 46 Introduction 46 Turnout 47 The Evolution of Voting in American Elections 48 Influences on Turnout 51 Turnout and Democracy 53 Voting Behavior 54 Shifts in Partisanship 57 The Social Basis of Partisanship 60 The New Deal Realignment 60 Evolving Political Coalitions, 1950–1970 61 Electoral Coalitions: The Last Fifty Years 62  Contents  xv Summary 63 Exercises 64 Selected Readings 64 Notes 65 PART TWO ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ The Nomination 67 Chapter 4: Party Rules and Their Impact 69 Introduction 69 Reforming the Nomination Process: Democrats Take the Initiative 70 Fixing the Calendar 75 Improving Representation 76 Empowering the Leadership 82 Republican Reforms 83 Legality of Party Rules 84 The Impact of the Rule Changes 85 Turnout 86 Party Organization and Leadership 87 Winners and Losers 87 Summary 88 Exercises 89 Selected Readings 89 Notes 90 Chapter 5: Campaigning for the Nomination 91 Introduction 91 Basic Strategic Guidelines 92 Plan Far Ahead 92 Concentrate Efforts in the Early Contests 96 Raise and Spend Big Bucks 97 Gain Media Attention 97 Develop an Organization 99 Monitor Public Opinion 100 Design and Target a Distinctive Image and Message 100 Make Effective Use of Communication Technologies 101 Coordinating Strategy with Candidacy Status 101 xvi  Contents Campaigning as Front-Runner 102 Campaigning as a Non-Front-Runner 105 Campaigning as a Pulpit Candidate 110 Summary 111 Exercises 112 Selected Readings 113 Notes 114 Chapter 6: The Post-Primary Campaign 115 Introduction 115 The Noncompetitive Preconvention Phase 115 Healing Partisan Discord 115 Repositioning and Reprioritizing the Issues 117 Repairing Leadership Images 118 Gaining the Stature of an Incumbent 120 Picking the Vice Presidential Nominee 121 Planning for the Convention 123 Contemporary Conventions: Composition, Content, Communications, and Impact 125 Platform 128 News Media Coverage 130 Assessing the Conventions’ Impact on the Electorate 132 Characteristics of the Nominees 133 Summary 135 Exercises 136 Selected Readings 137 Notes 137 PART THREE ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ The General Election Campaign 139 Chapter 7: Strategy, Tactics, and Operations 141 Introduction 141 The Evolution of Presidential Campaigns 142 From Porch to Train 142 From Rally to Radio and Television 143 From Art to Science: The Digital Revolution 145  Contents  xvii Strategic Planning 145 Partisanship 146 Salient Issues 147 Leadership Imagery 148 Dealing with Incumbency 151 Building a Winning Electoral College Coalition 153 Strategic Execution 162 Organization 163 The Public Dimension 165 Field Offices 167 Data Analysis 168 Summary 170 Exercises 171 Selected Readings 172 Notes 172 Chapter 8: Media Politics 175 Introduction 175 The Mass Media and Electoral Politics: An Overview 175 Print Media 176 Radio and Television 176 The Internet 177 Traditional News Coverage 178 Horse Race Journalism 178 Newsworthiness: Bad News Is “Good” News 180 Story Lines 181 Impact of the News Media 182 Presidential Debates 183 History 184 Preparation 186 Impact 187 Campaign Advertising 188 Format and Tone 189 Emotive Content 190 Accuracy and Truthfulness 192 Digital Communication Controversies 193 Foreign Interference 193 Use and Abuse of Personal Data 194 xviii  Contents Summary 195 Exercises 197 Selected Readings 197 Notes 198 PART FOUR ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ The Election: Its Meaning and Consequences 201 Chapter 9: Understanding Presidential Elections 203 Introduction 203 Predicting Presidential Elections 204 Forecasting Models 204 Public Opinion Polls 207 Election-Night Predictions 208 Exit Polls 211 Models of Voting Behavior 214 Prospective Voting 214 Retrospective Voting 215 Explaining Presidential Election Results 217 1952–1956: The Impact of Personality 217 1960–1972: The Increasingly Importance of Issues 217 1976–1996: The Evaluation of Performance 219 2000–2012: Partisanship, Ideology, and Incumbency 220 2016–2020: The Disgruntled Electorate 222 The President’s Imprecise Mandate 224 Campaign Expectations and Presidential Performance 227 Transitioning into Office 230 Summary 231 Exercises 232 Selected Readings 233 Notes 233 Chapter 10: Reforming the Electoral System 235 Introduction 235 Improving the Nomination Process 237 Who Should Chose the Nominees? 238 How Should the Votes for Candidates or the Delegates Who Support Them Be Allocated? 239  Contents  xix Should the Nomination Calendar be Shortened or Changed in Other Ways? 239 Should Regional Primaries or a National Primary Be Required? 240 Regulating Campaign Finance 243 Informing the Electorate 244 Traditional News Coverage 245 Digital Communications 246 Increasing Voter Participation 247 Ease Registration Requirements 248 Make Voting Easier 249 Conduct Civil Educational Campaigns 249 Require All Citizens to Vote 250 Changing the Way Presidents Are Elected 250 Modify the Electoral College 251 Abolish the Electoral College 252 Summary 257 Exercises 259 Selected Readings 259 Notes 260 Index 262 Figures, Tables, and Boxes Figures 1.1 Crowd of Trump supporters marching on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021. 4.1 Young “hippie” standing in front of a row of National Guard soldiers, across the street from the Hilton Hotel at Grant Park, at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, August 26, 1968. 5.1 Biden speaking at the campaign’s kickoff event in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 5.2 Presidential race ads by week and year. 7.1 Contemporary presidential campaign organizations. 8.1 President Donald Trump and Democratic presidential candidate former Vice President Joe Biden during the first presidential debate Tuesday, September 29, 2020, at Case Western University and Cleveland Clinic, in Cleveland, Ohio. 8.2 Monique Luiz as she appears in the infamous “Daisy Ad.” 9.1 Vice President-elect Kamala Harris holds hands with President-elect Joe Biden and her husband Doug Emhoff as they celebrate in Wilmington, Delaware, after their election win. Tables 2.1 C osts of Presidential General Elections, Major Party Candidates, 1860– 1972 2.2 Costs of Presidential Nominations, 1964–2020 (in millions) 2.3 Contribution Limits for the 2023–2024 Election Cycle 2.4 National Party Revenues and Expenditures in Recent Election Cycles (in Millions) xx  Figures, Tables, and Boxes  xxi 3.1  uffrage and Turnout in the Twenty-First Century S 3.2 Social Characteristics and Voting in 2016 and 2020 (in Thousands) 3.3 Party Identification of the American Electorate, 1952–2020 4.1 Chronological Accumulation of Convention Delegates, 2024 6.1 Convention Bounces, 1964–2020 8.1 Presidential Debates, 1960–2020 9.1 Accuracy of the Final Major Preelection Polls in 2020 9.2 Portrait of the 2020 American Electorate (in Percentages) 9.3 Candidate Qualities and Important Issues in 2020 10.1 Voting for President, 1956–2020: Methods for Aggregating the Votes Boxes 4.1  ules for State Caucuses and Primaries R 5.1 The Start of the 2024 Race for Party Nominations 5.2 Successful Front-Runner Campaigns 5.3 Successful Non-Front-Runner Campaigns 6.1 Convention Controversies in Historical Perspective 6.2 Contrasting the 2020 Democratic and Republican Party Platforms 7.1 An Incumbency Balance Sheet 7.2 Presidential Campaign Strategies 2004–2020 8.1 Notorious Negativity 9.1 A Brief History of Major Polling Glitches, 1932–2020 10.1 Pros and Cons of the Electoral College  TO PAR NE ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ The Electoral Arena ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ Presidential 1 Chapter Selection ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ A Historical Overview Introduction The road to the White House is long, circuitous, and bumpy. It contains numer- ous hazards and potential dead ends. Those who choose to traverse it—and there are many who do so—need considerable skill, perseverance, and luck to be suc- cessful. They also need substantial amounts of time, money, and effort. For most candidates, there is no such thing as a free or easy ride to the presidency. The framers of the Constitution worked for several months on the presiden- tial selection system, and their plan has since undergone a number of constitu- tional, statutory, and precedent-setting changes. Modified by the development of parties, the expansion of suffrage, the growth of the news media, and the revolution in communications technology, the electoral system has not only become more open and participatory but also more contentious, complex, and expensive. It has “turned off” many people who, for a variety of reasons, have chosen not to participate. This chapter is about that system: why it was created; what it was supposed to do; the compromises that were incorporated in the original plan; its initial op- eration and the changes that have subsequently affected it; the groups that have benefited from these changes; and the overall effect of the presidential electoral process on the parties, the electorate, and American democracy. This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section discusses the creation of the presidential election system. It explores the motives and intentions of the delegates at Philadelphia and describes the procedures for selecting the president within the context of the constitutional and political issues of that day. The second section examines the development of partisan nominating systems. It explores the three principal methods that have been used to nominate presiden- tial candidates: congressional caucuses, brokered national conventions, and state primaries and caucuses. It also describes the political forces that helped to shape these modes of nomination and, in the case of the first two, destroyed them. 3 4  Chapter 1 The third section focuses on the most controversial election outcomes, ones, those determined by the House of Representatives (1800 and 1824), influenced by Congress (1876), and decided by the Supreme Court (2000). The section also examines elections in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in which the shift of a relatively small number of votes could have changed the outcome (1960, 1968, 1976, 2004, and 2016). In doing so, this section highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the Electoral College and assesses its consistency with the principles of a democratic electoral process. The final part of the chapter examines the current operation of the electoral system. It describes its geographic and demographic biases and how they affect national presidential elections. The section also discusses the Electoral College’s major party orientation and its adverse impact on third-party and independent candidacies. The Creation of the Electoral College Of the many issues facing the delegates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia, the selection of the president was one of the toughest. Seven times during the course of the convention the method for choosing the executive was altered. The framers’ difficulty in designing electoral provisions for the presi- dent stemmed from their need to guarantee the executive’s independence and, at the same time, to create a technically sound, politically effective mechanism that would be consistent with a republican form of government. They wanted a representative government based on consent but not a direct democracy in which every adult citizen had an opportunity to participate in the formulation of public policy. Their goal was an electoral system that would choose the most qualified person but not necessarily the most popular. There seemed to be no precise model to follow; heredity was out of the ques- tion, and a direct popular vote was viewed as impractical and undesirable. Three methods of election had been proposed. The Virginia Plan, a series of resolutions designed by James Madison and introduced by Virginia’s governor, Edmund Randolph. The plan provided for legislative selection of the president. Eight states chose their governors in this fashion at that time. Having Congress choose the president would be practical and politically expedient. Moreover, members of Congress could be expected to exercise a considered judgment, more so than that of the general public. The difficulty with legislative selection was the threat it posed to the institu- tion of the presidency. How could the executive’s independence be preserved if the election of the president hinged on popularity within Congress and reelection depended on the legislature’s appraisal of the president’s performance in office? Only if the president were to serve a long term and not be eligible for reelection it was thought, could the institution’s independence be guaranteed if Congress was the electoral body. But ineligibility also posed problems because it provided little incentive for outstanding performance in office and denied the country the possibility of reelecting a person whose experience and success demonstrated qualifications that were superior to others.  Presidential Selection  5 Reflecting on these concerns, delegate Gouverneur Morris urged the removal of the ineligibility clause on the grounds that it tended to destroy the great mo- tive to good behavior, the hope of being rewarded by reelection.1 Delegates for a majority of the states agreed. Once the ineligibility clause was deleted, however, the term of office had to be shortened to prevent what the framers feared might become unlimited tenure or, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, “an elective mon- archy.” With a shorter term of office and permanent reeligibility, legislative selec- tion was not nearly as desirable because it could make the president beholden to the legislature. Moreover, there was still the issue of whether the Congress would vote as one body or as two separate legislative houses. The large states favored a joint vote; the small states wanted separate votes by the House and Senate (be- cause they had equal representation in the upper chamber). Popular election did not generate a great deal of enthusiasm. It was twice rejected in the convention by overwhelming votes.2 Lacking confidence in the public’s ability to choose the best-qualified candidate, many delegates also be- lieved that the size of the country and the relatively primitive state of its com- munications and transportation in the eighteenth century precluded a national campaign and election. The geographic expanse was simply too large to allow for proper supervision and administration of a national election. Sectional distrust and rivalry also contributed to the difficulty of conducting it. A third option, indirect election, in which popular sentiment could be considered but would not necessarily dictate the outcome, was proposed by James Wilson after he failed to generate much support for a direct popular vote. Delegates Luther Martin, Gouverneur Morris, and Alexander Hamilton also sug- gested an indirect popular election through intermediaries. It was not until the debate over legislative selection divided and eventually deadlocked the delegates, however, that election by electors was seriously considered. Proposed initially as a compromise that incorporated previous convention agreements by a Committee on Unfinished Business, the Electoral College design was viewed as acceptable by weary delegates eager to return home and get the Constitution ratified. The debate over the Electoral College system was short and to the point. Viewed as a safe, workable solution to the election dilemma, it was deemed consistent with the constitutional and political features of the new government and resistant to the kind of cabal and corruption that might tinge a popular vote. How the electors were to be selected was left to the states to determine. To ensure their independence, the electors could not simultaneously hold a federal government position. The number of electors was to equal the number of senators and representa- tives from each state. At a designated time, they would meet, vote, and send the results to Congress, where they would be announced to a joint session by the president of the Senate, the vice president. Each elector had two votes because a president and vice president were to be selected separately at that time. The only limitations on voting were that the electors could not cast both their ballots for inhabitants of their own states3 nor designate which of the candidates they preferred to be president and which one vice president.4 6  Chapter 1 Under the initial plan, the person who received a majority of votes cast by the Electoral College was elected president, and the one with the second high- est total, vice president. In the event that no one received a majority, the House of Representatives would choose from among the five candidates with the most electoral votes, with each state delegation casting one vote. If two or more in- dividuals were tied for second, then the Senate would select the vice president Both of these provisions were effectively modified by the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution. The electoral system was a dual compromise that incorporated provisions of the large–small state and North–South compromises. Both dealt with representa- tion. The first provided for one legislative body to be based on population (the House of Representatives) and one in which the states were equally represented (the Senate); the other compromise allowed three-fifths of the slave population to be counted in the determination of a state’s popular representation. Both com- promises protected slave owners in the South by making it difficult for the repre- sentatives of the more populous North to determine public policy on their own. Designating the number of electors to be equal to a state’s congressional delegation gave the larger states an advantage in the initial voting for president; casting ballots by state delegations in the House, if the Electoral College was not decisive, benefited the smaller states. It was anticipated that this two-step process would occur most of the time because there would probably not be a consensus national leader other than George Washington. In effect, the large states would nominate, much like the state primaries and caucuses do today, and the small states would exercise equal influence in the final election.5 The other compromise between the proponents of a federal system and those who favored a more centralized, national government allowed state legislatures to establish the procedures for choosing electors but had a national legislative body, the House of Representatives, decide among the candidates if there was no Electoral College majority. Finally, limiting the vote to the electors was intended to reduce intrigue, fraud, and cabal, fears that were expressed about the undesir- ability of state-based, popular voting. The Development of Nominating Systems Although the Constitution prescribed a system for electing a president, it made no reference to the nomination of candidates. Political parties had not emerged prior to the Constitutional Convention. Factions existed, and the framers of the Constitution were concerned about them, but the development of a party system was not anticipated. Rather, it was assumed that electors, whose interests were not tied to the national government, would make an independent judgment, and it was hoped they would choose the person they felt was best suited for the job. In the first two elections, the system worked as intended. George Washington was the unanimous choice of the electors. There was, however, no consensus on the vice president. The eventual winner, John Adams, benefited from some infor- mal lobbying by prominent individuals prior to the vote.6 A more organized effort to agree on candidates for the presidency and vice presidency was undertaken in  Presidential Selection  7 1792. Partisan alliances were beginning to develop in Congress. Members of the two principal groups, the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, met separately to recommend individuals for whom to vote in addition to Washington. The Fed- eralists chose Vice President John Adams (Massachusetts); the Anti-Federalists picked Governor George Clinton (New York). With political parties evolving during the 1790s, the selection of electors quickly became a partisan contest. In 1792 and 1796, a majority of the state legis- latures chose them directly. Thus, the political group that controlled the legislature also determined the selection of electors. Appointed for their political views, elec- tors were expected to exercise a partisan judgment. When a Pennsylvania elector did not do so in 1796, he was accused of faithless behavior. One critic wrote in a Philadelphia newspaper: “What, do I chuse Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas Jefferson shall be President? No! I chuse him to act, not to think.”7 Washington’s decision not to serve a third term forced Feder- alist and Anti-Federalist members of Congress to recommend the candidates in 1796. Meeting separately, party leaders agreed among themselves on the tickets. The Federalists urged their electors to support John Adams and Thomas Pinckney, whereas the Anti-Federalists (or Democratic-Republicans, as they began to be called) suggested Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr. Because it was not possible to specify presidential and vice presidential choices on the ballot, Federalist electors, primarily from New England, decided to withhold votes from Pinckney to make certain that he did not receive the same number as Adams. This strategy enabled Jefferson with sixty-eight votes to finish ahead of Pinck- ney but behind Adams, who had seventy-one. Four years of partisan differences followed between a president who, though he disclaimed a political affiliation, clearly favored the Federalists in appointments, ideology, and policy, and a vice president who was the acknowledged leader of the opposition party. Congressional Caucuses Beginning in 1800, partisan caucuses, composed of members of Congress, met for the purpose of recommending their party’s nominees. The Democratic-Republi- cans continued to choose candidates in this manner until 1824; the Federalists did so only until 1808. In the final two presidential elections in which the Federalists ran candidates, 1812 and 1816, top party leaders, meeting in secret, decided on the nominees.8 “King Caucus,” as the partisan congressional caucuses were called, violated the spirit of the Constitution. Caucuses effectively allowed members of Congress to pick their party’s nominees. After the decline of the Federalists, the nominees of the Democratic-Republicans, or simply Republicans as they became known, were, in fact, assured of victory—a product of the dominance of that party in the Congress and the country. There were competing candidates within the Republican congressional cau- cus, however. In 1808, Madison prevailed over James Monroe and George Clin- ton. In 1816, Monroe overcame a strong challenge from William Crawford. In both cases, the electors united behind the successful nominee. In 1820, however, they did not. Disparate elements within the party selected their own candidates. 8  Chapter 1 Although the caucus was the principal mode of candidate selection during the first part of the nineteenth century, the process was never formally institutional- ized. How the meetings were called, who called them, and when they were held all varied from election to election, as did attendance. A sizable number of rep- resentatives chose not to participate at all. Some stayed away on principle; others did so because of the particular choices they would have to make. In 1816, less than half of the Republican members of Congress were at their party’s caucus. In 1820, only 20 percent attended, and the caucus had to adjourn without formally supporting President Monroe and Vice President Daniel D. Tompkins for reelec- tion. In 1824, almost three-fourths of the members boycotted the session. The 1824 caucus did nominate candidates. But with representatives from only four states constituting two-thirds of those attending, the nominee, William Crawford, failed to receive unified party support. Other candidates were pro- posed by state legislatures and conventions, and the electoral vote was divided. Because no candidate obtained a majority, the House of Representatives had to make the final decision. John Quincy Adams was selected on the first ballot. He received the votes of thirteen of the twenty-four state delegations. The caucus system was never resumed. In the end, it was a victim of the Fed- eralist Party’s decline, the decentralization of political power within the country, and Andrew Jackson’s strong opposition to this method of presidential nomina- tion. As the Republican Party grew from being the majority to the only party, fac- tions developed within it, the two principal ones being the National Republicans and the Democratic-Republicans. In the absence of a viable opposition party, there was little to hold these factions together. By 1830, they had split into two separate groups, one supporting President Jackson and the other opposing him. Political leadership was changing as well. A relatively small number of indi- viduals dominated national politics for the first three decades following the ratifi- cation of the Constitution. Their common experience in the Revolutionary War, the Constitutional Convention, and the early government produced personal contacts, political influence, and public respect that contributed to their ability to agree on candidates and to generate public support for them.9 Those who fol- lowed them in office had neither the tradition nor the national orientation with which to affect the presidential selection process nor the national recognition to build support across the country for their candidates. Most of this new generation of political leaders owed their prominence and political influence to states and regions, and their loyalties reflected these bases of support. The growth of party organizations at the state and local level affected the presidential nomination system. In 1820 and 1824, it evolved into a decentralized mode of selection, with state legislatures, caucuses, and conventions proposing their own candidates. Support was also mobilized on regional levels. Whereas the congressional caucus had become unrepresentative, state-based nominations suf- fered from precisely the opposite problem. They were too sensitive to sectional interests and produced too many candidates. Unifying these diverse elements be- hind a single national ticket proved extremely difficult, although Jackson was suc- cessful in doing so in 1828. Nonetheless, a system that was more broadly based  Presidential Selection  9 than the old caucus and could provide a more decisive and mobilizing mechanism was needed. National nominating conventions filled the void. National Nominating Conventions The first nominating convention was held in 1831 by the Anti-Masons. A small but relatively active third party, it held virtually no congressional representation. Unable to utilize a congressional caucus, the party turned instead to a general meeting that was held in a saloon in Baltimore, with 116 delegates from thirteen states attending. These delegates decided on the nominees as well as on an ad- dress to the people that contained the party’s position on the dominant issues of the day. Three months later, a second convention was held in the same saloon by opponents of President Jackson. The National Republicans (or Whigs, as they later became known) also nominated candidates and agreed on a platform critical of the Jackson administration. The following year, the Democratic-Republicans (or Democrats, as they were later called) also met in Baltimore. The impetus for their convention was Jackson’s desire to demonstrate popular support for his presidency as well as to ensure the selection of Martin Van Buren as his running mate. In 1836, Jackson resorted to another convention—to handpick Van Buren as his successor. The Whigs did not hold a convention in 1836. Believing that they would have more success in the House of Representatives than in the nation as a whole, they ran three regional candidates, who were nominated by the states and competed against Van Buren in their areas of strength. The plan, however, failed to deny Van Buren an electoral majority. He ended up with 170 votes compared with a total of 124 for the other principal contenders. Thereafter, the Democrats and their opponents, first the Whigs and then their Republican successors, held nominating conventions to select their candidates. The early conventions were informal and rowdy by contemporary standards, but they also set the precedents for later meetings. The delegates decided on the procedures for conducting the convention, developed policy statements (addresses to the people), and chose nominees. Rules for apportioning the number of delegates were established before the meetings were held. Generally speaking, the states were accorded as many votes as their congressional representation merited, regardless of the num- ber of actual convention participants. Party leaders within the states controlled the delegate selection process. Their influence depended on their ability to deliver votes, which in turn required that the convention delegates not exercise their own independent judgment but support their state leader’s choice. Much of the bartering was conducted behind closed doors. Actions on the convention floor often had little to do with the wheeling and dealing that occurred in the smaller “smoke-filled” rooms. Because there was little public preconvention activity, many ballots were often necessary to reach the number that was required to win the party’s nomination, usually two-thirds of the delegates. The winners owed their selection to the heads of the powerful state organizations and not to their own political prominence and 10  Chapter 1 organizational support. But the price they had to pay for the nomination, when calculated in terms of patronage and other political payoffs, was often quite high. Nonetheless, nineteenth-century conventions served several purposes. They provided a national forum for state party leaders. They constituted a mechanism by which agreements could be negotiated and support mobilized. By brokering interests, conventions helped unify the disparate elements within a party, thereby converting an organization of state parties into a national coalition for the purpose of conducting a presidential campaign. Popular Primaries and Caucuses Demands for reform began to be heard at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Progressive Movement, led by Robert La Follett of Wisconsin and Hiram Johnson of California, aimed to break the power of state bosses and their politi- cal machines through the direct election of convention delegates or, alternately through the expression of a popular choice by the state’s electorate. Florida be- came the first state to provide its political parties with such an option. In 1904, the Democrats took advantage of it and held a statewide vote for convention del- egates. One year later, Wisconsin enacted a law for the direct election of delegates to nominating conventions. Others followed suit. By 1912, fifteen states provided for some type of primary election. Oregon was the first to permit a preference vote for the candidates themselves. The year 1912 was also the first in which a candidate sought to use primaries as a way to obtain the nomination. With almost 42 percent of the Republican delegates selected in primaries, former President Theodore Roosevelt challenged incumbent William Howard Taft. Roosevelt won nine primaries to Taft’s one yet lost the nomination. Taft’s support among regular party leaders who delivered their delegations and controlled the convention was sufficient to win renomina- tion. He received one-third of his support from southern delegations, although the Republican Party had won only a small percentage of the southern vote in the previous presidential election. Partially in reaction to the unrepresentative, “boss-dominated” convention of 1912, additional states adopted primaries. By 1916, more than half of them held a Republican or Democratic contest. Although a majority of the delegates in that year were chosen by some type of primary, most of them were not bound to support specific candidates. As a consequence, primary results did not dictate the outcome of the conventions. The movement toward popular participation was short-lived, however. Fol- lowing World War I, the number of primaries declined. State party leaders, who saw primaries as a threat to their own influence, argued against them on three grounds: they were expensive; they did not attract many voters; and major can- didates tended to avoid them. Moreover, primaries frequently encouraged fac- tionalism, thereby weakening a party’s organization. In response to this criticism, the reformers that supported primaries could not claim that their principal goal, rank-and-file control over the selection of party nominees, had been achieved. Public participation was disappointing. Primaries attracted only a small percent-  Presidential Selection  11 age of those who voted in the general election. The minority party, in particular, suffered from low turnout for an obvious reason: Its candidates stood little chance of winning the general election. In some states, rank-and-file influence was fur- ther diluted by the participation of Independents who did not align themselves with a political party. As a consequence of these factors, some states that had enacted new election laws reverted to their former method of selection. Others made their primaries advisory rather than mandatory. Fewer convention delegates were chosen in them. By 1936, only fourteen states held Democratic primaries, and twelve held Republican ones. Less than 40 percent of the delegates to each convention that year were chosen in this manner. For the next twenty years, the number of pri- maries and the percentage of delegates hovered around this level. Theodore Roosevelt’s failure in 1912 and the decline in primaries thereafter made them, at best, an auxiliary route to the nomination. Although some presi- dential aspirants became embroiled in primaries, none who depended on them won. In 1920, a spirited contest among three Republicans (General Leonard Wood, Governor Frank Lowden of Illinois, and Senator Hiram Johnson) failed to produce a convention majority for any of these candidates and resulted in party leaders choosing Warren Harding as the standard-bearer. Similarly, in 1952, Senator Estes Kefauver, who chaired the highly publicized and televised Senate hearings on organized crime, entered thirteen of seventeen presidential primaries, won twelve of them but failed to win his party’s nomination. The reason Kefauver could not parlay his primary victories into a conven- tion victory was that a majority of the delegates were not selected in primaries in 1952. Of those who were, many were chosen separately from the presidential preference vote. Kefauver did not contest these separate delegate elections. As a consequence, he obtained only 50 percent of the delegates in the states in which he actually won the presidential preference vote. Moreover, the fact that most of his wins occurred against little or no opposition undercut Kefauver’s claim to be- ing the most popular and electable Democrat. He had avoided primaries in four states in which he feared that he might either lose or do poorly. Not only were primaries not considered to be an essential road to winning the nomination but running in too many of them was also interpreted as a sign of weakness and not strength. It indicated a lack of national recognition, a failure to obtain the support of party leaders, or both. For these reasons, leading candidates tended to choose their primaries carefully, and the primaries, in turn, tended to reinforce the position of the leading candidates. Those who entered primaries did so mainly to test their popularity rather than to win convention votes. Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952, John F. Kennedy in 1960, and Richard M. Nixon in 1968 had to demonstrate that being a general, a Catholic, or a once-defeated presiden- tial candidate would not be fatal to their chances. In other words, they needed to prove they could win the general election if nominated by their party. With the possible exception of Kennedy’s victories in West Virginia and Wisconsin, primaries were neither crucial nor decisive for winning the nomina- tion until the 1970s. When there was a provisional consensus within the party, primaries helped confirm it; when there was not, primaries could not produce 12  Chapter 1 it.10 In short, they had little to do with whether the party was unified or divided at the time of the convention. Primary results tended to be self-fulfilling in the sense that they confirmed the front-runner’s status. Between 1936 and 1968, the preconvention leader, the candidate who was ahead in the Gallup Poll before the first primary, won the nomination seventeen out of nineteen times. The only exceptions were Thomas E. Dewey, who was defeated by Wendell Willkie in 1940, and Kefauver, who lost his race for the nomination to Adlai Stevenson in 1952. Willkie, however, had become the public opinion leader by the time the Republican convention met. Even when leading candidates lost a primary, they had time to recoup. Dewey and Stevenson, defeated in early primaries in 1948 and 1956, respectively, went on to reestablish their credibility as front-runners by winning later primaries. This situation in which the primaries were not the essential route to the nomination changed dramatically after 1968. Largely as a consequence of the tumultuous Democratic nominating convention of that year, in which the party’s nominees and platform were allegedly dictated by party “bosses,” de- mands for a larger voice for rank-and-file partisans increased. In reaction to these demands, the Democratic Party began to look into the matter of delegate selection. The party enacted a series of reforms designed to ensure broader rep- resentation at its convention. To avoid challenges to their delegations, a number of states that had used caucus and convention systems changed to primaries. The number of primaries began to increase as did the percentage of convention delegates chosen from them. New finance laws, which provided for government subsidies for preconven- tion campaigning, and increased news media coverage, particularly by television, also added to the incentive to enter primaries. By 1972, primaries had become decisive. In that year, Senator Edmund Muskie, the leading Democratic con- tender at the beginning of the process, was forced to withdraw after doing poorly in the early contests. In 1976, President Gerald Ford came close to being the first incumbent president since Chester A. Arthur in 1884 to be denied his party’s nomination because of a primary challenge by Ronald Reagan. In 1980, President Jimmy Carter was also challenged for renomination by Senator Edward Kennedy, as was George H. W. Bush by Pat Buchanan in 1992. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump were not challenged for renomination, in part because they raised millions to ensure that a credible candidate would not oppose them. But the threat of a challenge kept them sensitized to the needs and interests of their partisan supporters. Since the 1970s, primaries have revolutionized the presidential nomination process. They have been used to build popularity rather than simply reflect it. Candidates for a party’s nomination can no longer hope to succeed without en- tering them; incumbents can no longer ignore them if they face major opposition within their own party. The impact of primaries has been significant, affecting the strategies and tactics of the candidates, the composition and behavior of the con- vention delegates, and the decision-making process at the national conventions. The contests for the nomination have shifted power within the parties. They have enlarged the selection zone of potential nominees but still advantage well-known  Presidential Selection  13 and well-funded candidates. Popularity with key constituencies within the party’s electoral coalition is the key to success. An extended, divisive nomination process can also adversely affect the party’s standard-bearer in the election by depleting the winning candidate’s war chest, damaging their leadership image, and forcing that nominee to have taken extreme policy positions, more popular with the base than with the whole electorate. Each of these developments will be discussed in subsequent chapters. The Evolution of the General Election The general election has changed as well. The Electoral College no longer oper- ates in the way it was designed. It now has a partisan coloration. There is greater opportunity for the public to participate, but the campaign is not geared to ob- taining the most popular votes. Although the system bears a resemblance to its past form, it differs in practice. Partisan Electors The development of the party system changed the character of the Electoral College. Only in the first two elections, when Washington was the unanimous choice, did the electors exercise a nonpartisan and presumably independent judg- ment. Within ten years from the time the federal government began to operate, electors quickly became the captives of their party and were expected to vote for its candidates. The outcome of the election of 1800 vividly illustrates this new pattern of partisan voting. All electors who had cast ballots for Jefferson also cast them for Burr. Because it was not possible in those days to differentiate the candidates for the presidency and vice presidency on the ballot, the results had to be considered a tie, though Jefferson was clearly his party’s choice for president. Under the terms of the Con- stitution, the House of Representatives, voting by individual state delegations, had to choose the winner. Congressional Decisions On February 11, 1801, after the results of the Electoral College tie were an- nounced by the vice president, who happened to be Jefferson, a Federalist- controlled House convened to resolve the dilemma. Because the winners of the 1800 election did not take office until March 4, 1801, representatives from a “lame-duck” Congress would have to choose the next president.11 Most Federal- ists supported Burr, whom they regarded as the more pragmatic politician, a person with whom they could deal. Jefferson, on the other hand, was perceived as a dangerous, uncompromising radical by many Federalists. Alexander Hamil- ton, however, was outspoken in his opposition to Burr, a political rival from New York, whom Hamilton regarded as “the most unfit man in the United States for the office of President.”12 On the first ballot taken on February 11, 1801, Burr received a majority of the total votes, but Jefferson won the support of more state delegations.13 Eight 14  Chapter 1 states voted for Jefferson, six backed Burr, and two were evenly divided. This result left Jefferson one short of the needed majority. The House took nineteen ballots on its first day of deliberations and a total of thirty-six before it finally reached a majority for Jefferson. Had Burr promised to be a Federalist president, it is conceivable that he could have won. The first amendment to reform voting procedures in the Electoral College was enacted by the new Congress, controlled by Jefferson’s party, in 1803 and ratified by the states in 1804. This amendment to the Constitution, the twelfth, provided for separate voting for president and vice president. It also refined the selection procedures in the event that the president or vice president did not receive a majority of the electoral vote. The House of Representatives, still vot- ing by state delegation, was to choose from among the top three presidential candidates, and the Senate, voting by individual senators, was to choose from the top two vice presidential candidates. If the House could not make a decision by March 4, the amendment provided for the new vice president to assume the presidency until such time as the House could render a judgment. The next nondecisive presidential vote did not occur until 1824. That year, four people received electoral votes for president: Andrew Jackson (ninety-nine votes), John Quincy Adams (eighty-four), William Crawford (forty-one), and Henry Clay (thirty-seven). According to the Twelfth Amendment, the House of Representatives had to decide from among the top three because no one had a majority. Eliminated from the contest was Henry Clay, who happened to be Speaker of the House. Clay threw his support to Adams, who won. It was alleged that Clay did so in exchange for nomination as secretary of state, a charge that Clay vigorously denied. After Adams became president, however, he chose Clay for secretary of state, a position Clay readily accepted.14 Jackson was the winner of the popular vote in 1824. In eighteen of the twenty-four states that chose electors by this method, he received 192,933 votes compared with 115,696 for Adams, 47,136 for Clay, and 46,979 for Crawford. Adams, however, had the backing of more state delegations. A Massachusetts resident, he enjoyed the support of the six New England states, and with Clay’s help, the representatives of six others backed his candidacy. The votes of thirteen states, however, were needed for a majority. New York seemed to be the pivotal state, and Stephen Van Rensselaer, a former Revolutionary War general, the swing representative. On the morning of the vote, Speaker Clay and Representative Daniel Webster tried to persuade Van Rensselaer to vote for Adams. It was said that they were unsuccessful.15 As the voting began, Van Rensselaer bowed his head as if in prayer. On the floor, he saw a piece of paper with “Adams” written on it. Interpreting this as a sign from on high, he dropped the paper in the box. New York went for Adams by only one vote, providing him with the barest majority.16 Jackson, outraged at the turn of events, urged the abolition of the Electoral College. His claim of a popular mandate, however, was open to question. The most populous state at the time, New York, did not permit its electorate to choose electors. Moreover, in three of the states in which Jackson won the electoral vote but lost in the House of Representatives, he had fewer popular votes than Adams.17  Presidential Selection  15 Opposition to the system mounted, however, and a gradual democratization of the electoral process occurred. More states began to choose their electors di- rectly by popular vote. In 1800, ten of the fifteen states used legislative selection. By 1832, only South Carolina retained this practice. The trend was also toward statewide election of an entire slate of electors. States that had chosen their elec- tors within legislative districts converted to a winner-take-all system to maximize their voting power in the Electoral College. This change, in turn, created the possibility that there could be a disparity between the popular and electoral vote. The next disputed election did not occur until 1876. In that election, Demo- crat Samuel J. Tilden received the most votes. He had 250,000 more popular votes and nineteen more electoral votes than his Republican rival, Rutherford B. Hayes. Nonetheless, Tilden fell one vote short of a majority in the Electoral College. Twenty electoral votes were in dispute. Dual election returns were received from Florida (four votes), Louisiana (eight votes), and South Carolina (seven votes). Charges of fraud and voting irregularities were made by both parties. The Republicans, who controlled the three state legislatures, contended that Democrats had forcibly prevented newly freed slaves from voting. The Demo- crats, on the other hand, alleged that many nonstate residents participated as did people who were not registered to vote. The other disputed electoral vote occurred in Oregon where a single Republican elector was challenged on the grounds that he held another federal position (assistant postmaster) and, thus, was ineligible to be an elector.18 Three days before the Electoral College vote was to be officially counted, Congress established a commission to examine and try to resolve the dispute. The electoral commission was to consist of fifteen members: ten from Congress (five Republicans and five Democrats) and five from the Supreme Court. Four of the Supreme Court justices were designated by the act (two Republicans and two Democrats), and they were to choose the fifth. Their choice, Justice David Davis, a political Independent, was expected to become a member of the com- mission, but on the day it was created, Davis was appointed by the Illinois legis- lature to the US Senate. The Supreme Court justices then picked Joseph Bradley, an independent Republican from New Jersey. Bradley sided with his party on every issue. By a strictly partisan vote, the commission validated the credentials of all the Republican electors, thereby giving Hayes a one-vote margin of victory in the Electoral College.19 Prior to the elections of 2000 and 2016, the only other one in which the winner of the popular vote was beaten in an undisputed Electoral College vote occurred in 1888. Democrat Grover Cleveland had a plurality of 95,096 popular votes, but only 168 electoral votes compared with 233 for Republican Benjamin Harrison. The 2020 Electoral College Vote Challenge Donald Trump and his supporters challenged the official Electoral College results in 2020. They argued that the vote was rigged, that Democrats had to cheat to win. To support their contention, they claimed that more votes were cast than the number of registered voters in some districts, that there were unexplained surges  16  Chapter 1 in the popular vote, and that the voting machines themselves were programed in a way to benefit the Democrats, a charge that the company that designed the software, Dominion Voting Systems, vigorously denied. Dominion subsequently sued Fox News for promulgating baseless allegations about its machines. In the closely contested states, some Republicans also said that dead people voted. Protesting the election results, Republican supporters of Trump instituted sixty-one lawsuits in battleground states. The courts ruled against sixty of these suits on the grounds that insufficient evidence was provided to support the claims of fraudulent voting. Nor did the Justice Department during Trump’s presidency find evidence of fraud that would overturn the results of the election in any state. When Congress met to certify the Electoral College vote, President Trump asked Vice President Pence, the presiding officer of the Senate, to reject the of- ficial vote count in five swing states (Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin). Pence refused to do so, arguing that he lacked the constitutional authority. Trump was furious and denounced Pence, calling him a “pussy” and urging his supporters to protest the “rigged election outcome” at a rally on the National Mall in Washington. He then urged them to go to the Capitol to protest. Thousands of people followed his advice, but when they got there, the peaceful protest turned violent. The crowd broke through police barracks, and hundreds entered the locked Capitol building, attacking police and hunting for members of Congress (figure 1.1). Five people died, and many were injured during the riot. FIGURE 1.1 ★ Crowd of Trump supporters marching on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021. TapTheForwardAssist/Wikimedia Commons  Presidential Selection  17 The insurrection lasted almost five hours. It was covered live on television. Trump watched events unfold in the White House dining room on television; he was prevented from going to the Capitol by his Secret Service detail. For the next three hours and seven minutes, the president stayed glued to TV news coverage but did nothing to quell the insurrection. Members of his family and senior White House aides urged him to make a public statement to stop the violence and tell his supporters to go home. He did not want to do so but finally did in a short video clip. The president not only asked the protestors and rioters to go home, but he also expressed his warm and favorable feelings about them, saying, “we love you, you’re very special.” Polls taken after the insurrection indicated that a plurality of Americans be- lieved that Trump bore some responsibility for the insurrection. A congressional committee was formed to investigate the violent protests and the president’s role inciting the crowd.20 The committee conducted extensive hearings, questioning White House staffers, Secret Service agents, Capitol Police, and other federal enforcement officials, and a documentary filmmaker who filmed the riot and talked with some of the protest leaders and others with knowledge of the situa- tion, applicable laws, and individuals who participated in the rally, march, and insurrection. In all, it questioned twelve hundred witnesses. In addition, the committee reviewed thousands of emails and transcribed thousands of telephone conversations and texts. Trump sought to prevent the release of material from the National Archives, asserting executive privilege, but the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that executive privilege did not extend to former presidents. The committee, in closed and public hearings, revealed Trump’s determination to contest the results of the election even though almost all his senior advisors in the White House and Attorney General Barr told him that there was not sufficient evidence of fraudulent voting to overturn the out- come of the vote in any state. In subsequent months, Trump and his backers tried to change the election certification procedures and the officials responsible for determining the final vote in these and other states. The certification process, however, was reaf- firmed when Congress rewrote the electoral count of 1887 and included it an an omnibus appropriation bill in December 2022. New election laws, ostensibly designed to prevent fraudulent voting, were enacted by Republican-controlled state legislatures, however. Democrats re- sponded to these new laws by challenging them on the grounds that they dis- criminated against minority voters, impeding their access to vote. Most of the new legislation, however, has been upheld by state courts. The Biden Justice Department has promised to enforce voting rights protected by the Constitu- tion and federal legislation, but the partisan political struggle on voting rights is far from over. On December 22, 2022, the January 6th Committee issued its final report, accusing former president Trump of inciting the riot and recommending that the Justice Department prosecute him for criminal activities. In his quest for the 2024 Republican nomination, Trump has continued to claim the 2020 election was fraudulent and lauded the January 6th rioters as loyal patriots. 18  Chapter 1 Judicial Determination The 2000 Electoral College vote was too close to call. Democrat, Al Gore, was ahead in twenty states plus the District of Columbia with a total of 267 elec- toral votes. Republican, George W. Bush, led in twenty-nine states with a total of 238 electoral votes. The vote in one state, Florida, was in dispute. Out of more than 5.9 million votes cast in that state, only 537 votes separated the two candidates. Both sides alleged procedural irregularities, voter eligibility issues, and vote-counting errors. Four legal issues marred the Florida election: voter confusion over the design of the ballot in one county, disagreement over eligible voters and absentee ballots in several others, tabulation problems in counties that used punch-card ballots, and the date when the official results had to be certified by the secretary of state. Voter confusion stemmed from a “butterfly ballot” used in Palm Beach County, where many retirees live. Designed by a Democratic campaign official, the ballot was intended to help senior citizens read the names of the candidates more clearly by using larger type. To fit all the names on a single punch card, however, two columns had to be used, with the punch holes for voting, or “chads” as they are called, between them. Although Democrats Al Gore and Joe Lieberman were listed second on the left-hand column, their chad was positioned third, after the chad of the candidates on the right-hand column, Pat Buchanan and Ezola Foster of the Reform Party. Some voters, who claimed that they intended to vote for the Democratic candi- dates, punched out the second rather than the third chad, which registered as a vote for Buchanan. Others, in confusion, pushed out both the second and third chads, automatically voiding their ballots.21 Aggrieved Democrats in the county immedi- ately filed a lawsuit to contest the vote and demand a new election. A Florida state court, however, rejected their request, effectively terminating the revote option. The second legal issue concerned ballots that were not properly included in the machine count. Many counties in Florida used a punch-card system of vot- ing in which chads, a small perforated box on the card, must be removed with a specially designed instrument for the vote to be properly cast. The holes in the card were then tabulated by a machine. However, if a chad was not completely removed, the vote may not have been recorded by the voting machine. The Gore campaign alleged that thousands of presidential votes in three Democratic counties (Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach) were not counted because part or all of a chad was still attached to the ballot. In other words, voters had not punched through the card completely. Democrats appealed to county of- ficials for a hand count of these ballots; Republicans opposed the count, claim- ing that a selective hand count in some counties was unfair to people in the other counties. Before the courts had rendered a judgment, however, Florida’s secretary of state, a Republican appointee, certified the original county vote as the official tally to which only absentee ballots, postmarked no later than elec- tion day and received by the counties within one week of the election, could be added. The secretary of state’s certification prompted Gore’s legal team to go to state court to force the secretary to accept hand-counted votes and an amended vote total submitted after the certification.  Presidential Selection  19 Some of the legal issues were resolved by Florida courts. The most conten- tious one, however, the hand counting of punch cards not tabulated by the vot- ing machines, ended up in the US Supreme Court. Initially, the court remanded the case back to Florida’s Supreme Court that had ruled in Gore’s favor. When the Florida court reaffirmed its previous decision, Bush’s lawyers reappealed to the US Supreme Court. On December 11, 2000, one day before Florida law required the designation of its electors, the US Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case known as Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 93 (2000); it announced its ruling the next evening. The court reversed the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment that hand counting could be resumed in three counties. In its decision, the Supreme Court held that the ab- sence of a single standard to be used throughout the state by election officials vio- lated the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires the states to provide all their residents with equal protection of the laws. A majority of the court also went on to conclude that there was not sufficient time, given the state legislature’s intent to designate Florida’s electors by December 12, to establish and implement such a standard. Hence, the certified vote that had Bush leading by 537 votes was final. Winning Florida gave Bush an Electoral College majority.22 Following the disputed election, changes in the election laws occurred on both state and national levels. Florida enacted electoral reforms to prevent a repetition of the problems that occurred in 2000. In 2002, The Help America Vote Act, passed by Congress, provided federal funds to the states to help them consolidate and comput- erize their voter registration lists, but electoral problems have persisted. As previously noted, Donald Trump had claimed that the electoral process was rigged during his 2016 election campaign. After he won an Electoral College victory, the president appointed a Presidential Commission on Election Integrity, chaired by the Vice President Pence and a Republican state official from Kansas. The commission requested the states to provide detailed information on voters including data on their registration, dates of birth, and social security numbers. Fifteen state election officials refused to do so; others criticized the requirement for personal information. The commission met irregularly; its staff operated be- hind closed doors; and even some of its members complained that they were kept in the dark. After seven months, Trump abolished the commission but continued to complain about rigged elections by the Democrats. Other Close Elections There have been other close elections, however, in which the switch of a rela- tively small number of people would have altered the results. In 1860, a shift of twenty-five thousand in New York from Abraham Lincoln to Stephen Douglas would have denied Lincoln a majority in the Electoral College. A change of fewer than thirty thousand in three states in 1892 would have given Benjamin Harrison another victory over Cleveland. In 1916, Charles Evans Hughes needed only 3,807 more votes in California to have beaten Woodrow Wilson. Similarly, Thomas E. Dewey could have denied Harry S. Truman a majority in the Electoral College with 12,487 more Califor- nia votes in 1948. A change in the votes of fewer than nine thousand people in 20  Chapter 1 Illinois and Missouri in 1960 would have meant that John F. Kennedy would have lacked an Electoral College majority. In 1968, a shift of only 55,000 votes from Richard M. Nixon to Hubert H. Humphrey in three states would have thrown the election into the House of Representatives, which at that time was controlled by the Democrats. In 1976, if 3,687 more voters in Hawaii and 5,559 more in Ohio voted for Ford, he would have won the Electoral College vote.21 In 2004, George W. Bush received only 0.02 percent more votes (120,000 out of 5.6 mil- lion) than John Kerry did in Ohio; had Kerry won Ohio, he would have had an Electoral College majority. In three states that Trump won in 2016 (Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania), he received a total of 77,744 more votes than Hill- ary Clinton out of 13,940,912 cast, a margin of only 0.006 percent. Had Clinton prevailed in these traditional Democratic states, she would have had an Electoral College majority in addition to her popular vote win. Not only could the results of these elections have been affected by small shifts in voter preferences, but in 1948, 1960, 1968, and 1992, there was the added possibility that the Electoral College vote would not be decisive because of a potentially strong third-party or Independent candidates. In 1948, Henry Wallace (Progressive Party) and Strom Thurmond (States’ Rights Party) received almost 5 percent of the total popular vote, and Thurmond won thirty-nine elec- toral votes. In 1960, fourteen unpledged electors were chosen in Alabama and Mississippi. In 1968, George Wallace of Alabama, running under the American Independent Party label, received almost 10 million popular votes and forty-six electoral votes, and in 1992, H. Ross Perot received 19.7 million popular votes (almost 19 percent of the total) but none in the Electoral College. Four years later, he got 8.1 million popular votes but, again, no electoral votes. Ralph Nader received less than 3 percent of the popular vote in 2000, but his 97,488 votes in Florida probably cost Gore that state and the election. The Politics of Electoral College Voting The presidential campaign and election are shaped by the Electoral College. The strategies the candidates pursue, the resources they utilize, and the states in which they place their major efforts are all calculated based on Electoral College politics and not the popular vote. The Electoral College is not neutral. The way the votes are aggregated within it usually works to the advantage of the candidate who has the most popular votes. In 2000 and 2016, it did not, however. (See table 10.1). Why does the Electoral College usually enhance the margin of the popular vote winner? The reason has to do with the winner-take-all system of voting that adopted by most states. In almost every instance, the presidential and vice presidential candidates who receive a plurality of the popular vote within the state get all its electoral votes.23 This usually translates into a larger percentage of the Electoral College vote than would have occurred with a direct popular vote. Advocates of the system see this enlarged Electoral College vote as an advantage for the new or reelected president. They claim that it increases the president’s mandate for governing as well as the coalition of supporters on whom the president can rely. According to political analyst Nate Silver, it was  Presidential Selection  21 the desire for a broad mandate that prompted Clinton to spend her resources in more states than necessary to win an Electoral College victory in what turned out to be a poor strategic decision.24 Most states also perceive a benefit from casting their votes as a unit. They believe that it enhances their political clout. In 2004, voters in Colorado soundly defeated a constitutional amendment that would have allocated their state’s elec- toral vote in proportion to the popular vote that the candidates received. Such an amendment would have decreased that state’s importance to the presidential candidates and the state’s overall impact on the Electoral College vote. Following the 2012 and 2016 elections, Republicans in Virginia and other states suggested the electors be chosen by congressional districts rather than a statewide vote, but only two states, Nebraska and Maine, currently do so. The large states, theoretically, gain more influence in the Electoral College by winner-take-all voting. The very smallest states do so as well because they receive a minimum of three electoral votes regardless of population. size. Consequently, their citizens have greater voting power than they would have in a direct election system. To illustrate, if Wyoming’s population of less than 600,000 were divided by its three electoral votes, there would be one elector for every 200,000 people. Dividing California’s population of nearly forty million by its fifty-five electoral votes yields one elector for every 727,000 persons.25 The medium-sized states are comparatively disadvantaged. But the advantage that the largest and smallest states reap from the current Electoral College system pales by comparison to the benefit that the most com- petitive states receive regardless of their size. Since the advent of frequent public opinion polling during the election period, candidates concentrated their time, efforts, and resources in those states that seemed to be up for grabs. Noncompeti- tive states, large or small, see little of the presidential campaign. The candidates rarely visit them; they spend little, if any, money in them; they run few, if any, political advertisements in their major media markets; and they mount little, if any, grassroots efforts. They are essentially ignored because their Electoral Col- lege outcome is predictable. Moreover, the number of competitive states in presidential elections have declined. In 1960, about half the states were deemed competitive; either of the major party candidates had a realistic chance to win them. In the twenty-first century, less than one-third have been seen as competitive at the beginning of the general election and less than ten at the end and only five or six in 2020. Candi- dates concentrate their campaign in the small number of battleground states. In short, the one national election in the United States has been reduced to a contest fought in less than 15 percent of the states. The Electoral College also benefits the two major parties at the expense of third parties and independent candidates. The reason it does so is that the winner-take-all system of voting by the states when combined with the need for a majority of the total electoral vote makes it difficult for third parties to accumulate enough electoral votes to win an election. To have any effect, minor-party candidates must have support that is geographically concentrated, as Strom Thurmond’s was in 1948 and George Wallace’s in 1968, rather than 22  Chapter 1 more broadly distributed across the country, as Henry Wallace’s was in 1948 and H. Ross Perot’s was in 1992 and 1996. Given the limitations on third parties, their most realistic electoral objectives would seem to be to defeat one of the major contenders rather than to elect their own. In 1912, Theodore Roosevelt’s Bull Moose campaign split the Republican Party, thereby aiding the Democratic Party candidate, Woodrow Wilson. In 2000, Ralph Nader’s vote in Florida probably cost Gore the election. Which of the major parties is advantaged by the Electoral College? In 2016, it was defi- nitely the Republicans who won more states but lost the national popular vote. Summary The quest for the presidency has been and continues to be influenced by the sys- tem designed in Philadelphia in 1787. The objectives of that system were to pro- tect the independence of the institution, ensure the selection of a well-qualified, national candidate, and do so in a way that was politically expedient, technologi- cally feasible, and consistent with the tenets of a republican form of government. Although many of these objectives remain, the system has changed signifi- cantly over the years, primarily because of the creation of political parties. Their development created an additional first step in the process, the nomination, which has influenced the selection and behavior of electors ever since. The nomination process is necessary to the goals of the parties to get their candidates elected. At first, members of Congress, meeting in partisan caucuses, decided on the nomi- nees. After the caucus method broke down, a more decentralized mode of selec- tion, reflective of the increasing sectional composition of the parties, emerged. Controlled by state leaders, the nominations were decided at brokered national conventions. Demands for greater public participation eventually opened up the nomination process and reduced but did not eliminate the influence of party elites and interest group leaders. Today, candidates compete for their party’s nomination in primaries and cau- cuses. They effectively choose the slates of electors that will vote for them if they win a plurality of the state vote. Thus, the Electoral College reflects the popular vote but does so within the states rather than the country as a whole. Winner-take-all state voting distorts the national vote. In most elections, it has magnified that vote; in two of the last six elections, it has reversed it. Critics contend that the system is undemocratic, unequal, and unwise. They argue that it does not encourage candidates to campaign nationwide, does not encourage turnout in less competitive states, and does not produce a mandate or an electoral coalition for governing. Considering that a substantial portion of the people do not vote, and the popular vote itself may be close, the winner rarely gains the support of more than one-third of the population, hardly the popular backing one might expect or desire in a democratic electoral system. Defenders of the Electoral College, on the other hand, say that it is consistent with the country’s constitutional design and political tradition, reflects the federal character of the United States, minimizes the extent to which fraudulent elec- toral activity at the state level affects the overall national results, and produces a quick and conclusive outcome for an extended presidential campaign.  Presidential Selection  23 Exercises 1. Prior to the completion of the next nomination process, obtain the most recent schedule of primaries and caucuses for the selection of delegates to the Democratic and Republican national nominating conventions. You can do this on most major news organizations’ websites, or The Green Papers. Try to figure out which of the declared and undeclared candidates for each party’s nomination is most and least advantaged by this schedule and explain why. 2. Get up to speed on the Electoral College by accessing and reviewing information on the Electoral College from the website of the National Archives and Records Administration Use the links available at this site to find out how the electors in your state are selected. These procedures are also available at The Green Papers. 3. Access the website, 270 to Win. Explain how the Electoral College maps for the 2016 and 2020 elections differed. Then construct a winning Electoral College strategy for the Democratic or Republican candidate you prefer in 2024. Focus on the likely swing states in your analysis. Why do you think these states may go Democratic or Republican in the next election? Selected Readings Bennett, Robert W. Taming the Electoral College. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Best, Judith. “Presidential Selection: Complex Problems and Simple Solutions.” The Political Science Quarterly 119 (Spring 2004): 39–59. Curtis, Michael, “The Pros and Cons of the Electoral College.” American Thinker, December 24, 2016. Edwards, George C. III. Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America, 3rd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019. Fortier, John C., ed. After the People Vote: A Guide to the Electoral College. Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 2004. Issacharoff, Samuel. “Law, Rules, and Presidential Selection.” Political Science Quarterly 120 (Spring 2005): 113–29. Jones, Bradley. “Majority of Americans Continue to Favor Moving away from the Electoral College.” Pew Research Center, January 21, 2021. Levinson, Sanford, Daniel Lowenstein, and John McGinnis. “Should We Dispense with the Electoral College?” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 156 (2007): 10–37. Longley, Lawrence D., and James D. Dana Jr. “The Biases of the Electoral College in the 1990s.” Polity 25 (Fall 1992): 123–45. Panagopoulos, Costas. “Electoral Reform.” Public Opinion Quarterly 68 (Winter 2004): 623–40. Presidential Election Inequality: The Electoral College in the 21st Century. Fair Vote. Ross, Tana. Why We Need the Electoral College. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 2021. Rakove, Jack. “Presidential Selection: Electoral Fallacies.” Political Science Quarterly 119 (Spring 2004): 21–38. Troy, Gil. See How They Ran: The Changing Role of the Presidential Candidate. New York, NY: Free Press, 2012. Wallison, Peter J. “Why We Need the Electoral College.” Real Clear Politics, December 6, 2016. 24  Chapter 1 Notes 1. Gouverneur Morris, Records of the Federal Convention, ed. Max Farrand (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1921), II: 2, 33. 2. The first proposal for direct election was introduced in a timid fashion by James Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania. James Madison’s Journal describes Wilson’s presentation as follows: “Mr. Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say, however, at least that in theory he was for an election by the people; Experience, particularly in N. York & Massts, shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large, was both convenient & successful mode.” Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, I: 68. 3. This provision was intended to decrease parochialism and facilitate the selection of a national candidate. 4. It forced Dick Cheney, George W. Bush’s choice to be his vice presidential running mate in 2000, to move his official residence from Texas to Wyoming so that Texas’s electors could vote for the entire Republican ticket if Bush and Cheney won the popular vote in that state, which they did. 5. So great was the sectional rivalry, so competitive the states, and so limited the number of people wit