South Asia during Cold War.pdf

South Asia Oxford Handbooks Online South Asia Andrew J. Rotter The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War Edited by Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde Print Publication Date: Jan 2013 Subject: History, Cold War, Asian history Online Publication Date: Jan 2013 DOI: 10.1093/oxford...

South Asia Oxford Handbooks Online South Asia Andrew J. Rotter The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War Edited by Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde Print Publication Date: Jan 2013 Subject: History, Cold War, Asian history Online Publication Date: Jan 2013 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199236961.013.0013 Abstract and Keywords This chapter examines the history of the Cold War in South Asia. It describes the position of South Asia in the Cold War, and investigates the reasons why Pakistan decided to side with the United States while India sought to avoid great power alliances and keep the Cold War at arm's length. The chapter highlights the negative reaction of India on the decision of the U.S. government to provide military aid to Pakistan, its main rival, and also considers Cold War legacies and the legacy of colonialism in India and Pakistan. Keywords: Cold War, South Asia, Pakistan, India, military aid, colonialism Page 1 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia On February 25, 1954, amid the full frost of the cold war, President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced that the United States would provide military aid, the amount unspecified, to Pakistan. The decision was predicated on the vision of Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, that Pakistan would anchor an alliance with several Middle Eastern countries, including most significantly Turkey, that would stand in opposition to possible Soviet encroachment into that strategically significant area. Some six weeks later Pakistan and Turkey signed an agreement calling for “mutual cooperation”; on May 19, Pakistan and the United States agreed to a Mutual Defense Assistance Pact, underscoring the US commitment to Pakistan's defense and Pakistan's apparent embrace of its new role as a key link in an American security chain ringing the Soviet Union. These agreements formed the basis for Pakistani participation in the Baghdad Pact, with Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Great Britain, beginning in 1955—participation bought and paid for by the United States, to the tune of $400 million. Given the relative weakness of the Pact states, this arrangement's benefit to the United States was never clear. Regardless of its strategic merits, it nevertheless established the United States as Pakistan's champion.1 The American decision to create a military alliance with Pakistan infuriated Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of Pakistan's South Asian rival, India. The February announcement, he said, “created a grave situation for us in India and for Asia,” and he declared that “India has no intention of surrendering or bartering her freedom for any purpose or under any compulsion whatever,” in pointed contrast to what Pakistan had done. The proposed pact between Pakistan and the Middle Eastern nations threatened to bring the cold war “right to our doors, to the frontiers of India,” with implications that were “bound to be unfortunate.” Nehru had long bristled at what he considered great power meddling in the affairs of the region. He had also, as a point of pride, resisted any outsider's policy that seemed manipulative or heavy handed; he would not allow the recent colonies of South Asia to continue to be “the playthings of others.” In the aftermath of the US decision to bolster Pakistan, Nehru appeared to manifest greater warmth toward the Soviet Union, though in truth he was no more pleased with Soviet involvement in South Asia than with American. In early 1955 the Soviets agreed to build a steel plant at (p. 212) Bhilai, in central India. Nehru visited the Soviet Union that summer, and at the end of the year Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev and a retinue of Soviet officials barnstormed through India, hugging harijans (outcastes) and promising assistance without strings attached. The cold war had come to South Asia.2 The disagreements between Pakistan and India over US military aid and the forging of alliances or attachments during the mid-1950s were indicative of deeper fissures that rent South Asia during the cold war. Nearly from the first—that is, from the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947—Pakistan sought alignment with the United States, in an effort to achieve stability, security, and prosperity in what it considered a hostile world, one made especially so by the resentment toward it of its Indian neighbors, whom Pakistanis believed wished their nation oblivion. Pakistan presumed its own weakness, and thus assumed that it needed a strong patron to help it stand up to New Delhi. Page 2 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia India, on the other hand, wanted to spare the region involvement in the cold war. Nehru, who was both prime and foreign minister of his country from his declaration of its independence in August 1947 to his death in 1964, fought to prevent any of the powers from interfering in South Asian affairs. India presumed its own relative strength, and regarded the possibility of American, Soviet, or Chinese involvement in the region as interference, not incidentally as requiring the possible militarization of India at a time when economic development and domestic reform must have priority. Nehru was not a pacifist. He would threaten Pakistan and mean it, especially when it came to the disputed state of Kashmir. But he believed that taking sides in the great power struggle, and alliance-making in particular, would invite the cold war into the area and unsettle the equation of forces that plainly favored him. He wanted his nation to remain “non- aligned,” seeing merit and flaw in both sides’ cold war positions, denying that the world was black and white, and trying at nearly all costs to stay clear of imbroglios that would require Indian blood and treasure. By the end of his life, however, Nehru would conclude that he simply could not keep the cold war at bay.3 This essay addresses a general question: What was the position of South Asia in the cold war? More pointedly, what were the reasons why Pakistan embraced US help during the period, while India sought to avoid great power alliances and keep the cold war at arm's length? To answer these questions, the essay considers historical, strategic, economic, ideological, and cultural reasons why nations pursued the policies they did. The problems of South Asia, or the stakes raised by disagreements there, were never regarded by the cold war powers as more dangerous than those in Europe, the Middle East, or East Asia. As Dennis Kux has noted, neither Washington nor Moscow was much concerned with affairs on the subcontinent, and while China shared borders with India, East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), and disputed Kashmir, it too tended to regard South Asian issues as annoyances rather than crises if problems arose. Yet the cold war was a totalizing conflict. It left no place out, and even secondary fronts like South Asia could provoke the powers to harsh words and bring them to the threshold of damaging conflict. Gradually, both nations assumed greater strategic weight, especially as both developed nuclear weapons. Insofar as they embraced the likelihood of the cold war being played out in their precincts, the Pakistanis managed to use international rivalries to (p. 213) their advantage and keep the Indians off balance. The Indians, who hoped to resist the cold war's aggravations, were destined for disillusionment—but once forced into the game by events beyond their control, they would demonstrate a capacity to play it nearly as cunningly as their Pakistani counterparts.4 The legacy of colonialism India and Pakistan shared a history. In the beginning there was only India, not a nation- state by any modern definition but an amalgamation of ethnic and religious groups— localized, agrarian, and generally ruled from the top down by a prince or powerful clan. Page 3 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia Some of these groups might be brought together by conquest, as in 1526 when the Mughal chieftain Babur defeated Ibrahim Lodi at Panipat and established a government that ruled from Delhi. The Mughal heirs of Babur were Sunni Muslims. They extended their empire south, and technically ruled much of India until the mid-19th century. The Mughals were challenged by the Maratha princes of the Western Deccan plateau, and they never mastered the far south. The Europeans, seeking trade and especially the abundant spices of India, began arriving in the late 15th century: first the Portuguese in the south and west; then the British East India Company in Bengal in 1650; and the French, whose Compagnie des Indes Orientales placed a settlement at Pondicherry, in the southeast, in 1674. (The Dutch and Danes had small presences.) The Portuguese were largely limited to Goa, and by the mid-18th century the British had defeated the French militarily in India, reducing them to scattered coastal outposts. On behalf of the East India Company, Robert Clive seized all of Bengal at the Battle of Plassey in 1757. The Company's object was trade, but it became de facto the administrative arm of British rule in India. It used British soldiers and civil servants to extend its control over the declining Mughals and the regional clans. If not quite an empire born in a fit of absentmindedness, the British presence in India before the mid-19th century was surely no “imperial project.” It was undertaken by a business enterprise rather than a government, was inconsistent in its demands, and remained incomplete in its control.5 In 1857, Indian soldiers in the Company's army rose in rebellion when rumors spread that the rifle cartridges that they had been issued, which required biting to load them into the chambers of their weapons, had been lubricated with the fat of cows and pigs, outraging Hindus and Muslims respectively. Underlying resentment of British highhandedness broke into the open. “Dark deeds were done on both sides,” writes Percival Spear, “on the one side in the abandon of the release of long-suppressed passions, on the other in the rage of reprisal and blind vengeance.” Thousands died before the British regained control in the summer of 1858. The Sepoy Rebellion left the British badly shaken. No more would the government in London leave its empire to the haphazard stewardship of the Company. The British replaced the Company's president with a secretary of state for India, seized the levers of finance and land distribution, promoted the development of public works, especially railroads, and reorganized the army, dividing it along religious lines, Hindu (p. 214) versus Muslim versus Sikh. The new regime established government schools and encouraged the growth of private colleges, which attracted more Indian students, mostly men. It had in mind control of a type more complete than that preceding the rebellion. Some in Britain had in mind reform as well, with education providing the benefits of civilization to benighted Asians, “a race debased by three thousand years of despotism and priestcraft,” as Thomas Macaulay put it in the House of Commons. These policies ironically spawned the growth of a western-educated intellectual class that came to reject colonialism, however benign its face, and endorse an India for Indians. The great men of the 20th century Indian and Pakistani nationalist movements—Mohandas Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and others—had privileged backgrounds and British educations. The legacy of colonialism was its own undoing.6 Page 4 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia The trauma and catharsis of independence did not fully erase memories of colonialism, and considerations of the cold war were regarded in both India and Pakistan in the light of their experience of domination. For one thing, the British did not pack up and go home in August 1947. Some officials remained in place, including in both nations’ armed forces. Pakistan especially continued to rely on British officers, having been denied by partition an experienced officer corps and a well-trained soldiery. The first commander-in-chief of Pakistan's armed forces was British, and the leading generals and heads of vital military directorates were, too. (No Pakistani would head the military until 1951.) Both nations became dominions of Britain; that is, self-governing members of the British Commonwealth. English remained the language of diplomatic correspondence in both nations. It was English spoken with a British accent; the sons of the elite continued to attend Oxford and Cambridge. Trade followed long-standing patterns that linked South Asia to British producers, merchants, and consumers. Ties of education and culture bound Indians and Pakistanis to their former masters, and many South Asians professed to harbor no hard feelings, unlike, say, those directed at, the French in Vietnam, the Dutch in the East Indies, or the Portuguese in India itself. These persistent bonds inclined India and Pakistan toward the British side in the cold war, even if the Indians did not accept fully the “us against them” division of the world as the British described it.7 In one particular way the legacy of colonialism lingered sourly in South Asia, and it had to do with race. Whatever else Indians had felt about the British prior to 1947, they had deeply resented British intimations that Asians were not the equals of Europeans because of the color of their skin. The British casually referred to South Asians as “niggers,” a coinage readily adopted by visiting Americans. Colonial India featured separate park benches for “whites” and Indians, and waiting rooms at train stations and railway cars were divided by race. Indians who carried umbrellas against the rain or sun were expected to close them if they met whites on the street. Mohammed Ayub Khan, who would become prime minister of Pakistan in 1958, attended the British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in the mid-1920s. “The British did not practise the colour bar in a blatant manner, as in some countries,” he recalled, “but they were no less colour conscious. In those days anyone coming from a subject race was regarded as an inferior human being and this I found terribly galling.”8 Yet it was on India that memories of British racism rested most heavily— (p. 215) Pakistanis were on balance lighter-skinned than Indians—and Jawaharlal Nehru remained highly sensitive to racial slights, intended or perceived. Nehru believed that racism was the foundation of colonialism, and that insofar as the cold war West continued to countenance colonialism in Asia and Africa, it retained the taint of racism. British and especially American discrimination against people of color at home explained their support for colonialism abroad, and their support for colonialism in turn reinforced their racism. Because the Soviets did not practice domestic racism, Indians claimed, their policies in the developing world could not be construed as colonialist. “By reason of its own experience,” wrote the US ambassador John Sherman Cooper from New Delhi in Page 5 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia 1956, “[India] thinks of colonialism as the rule of an Asian country or a colored people by a Western nation, with the subjugated country having no government or international entity.” Nehru thus inscribed race on the cold war.9 Nehru's own sense of racial identity was complicated. Unlike Ayub, he did not register any complaint of racism during his years in England (he attended Eton, read law at Cambridge, and for a time was coxswain for the university rowing club). He was relatively light-skinned and passed for white in the higher circles of European society in which he traveled. But in the years after independence, Nehru became a steadily harsher critic of white racism especially in Africa, even at the expense of Indians living in Africa who were in most cases closer to whites than blacks socially, and who over the years had succeeded economically—often, charged blacks, at their expense. Nehru targeted particularly the practice of apartheid in South Africa, a “monstrous evil” in its racism. Nehru's attitudes about race strongly influenced his posture toward the cold war: distasteful as he found Soviet doctrine and practice, and threatening as he found the Chinese after 1949, he could not bring himself to stand with those who were slow to jettison racism and colonialism, their own and others’.10 Embracing the cold war: Pakistan Even as the Pakistanis struggled to overcome their colonial past, and even as they contemplated the dangers of the cold war, fear of India dominated their cold war posture and their foreign policy more generally. The British decision to partition the subcontinent into predominantly Hindu and Muslim states had been a triumph for M. A. Jinnah and his followers in the Muslim League, but it had shocked most Hindu nationalists, who had assumed that the British, having made a state (however incomplete) in India, would leave the place intact when they left. Gandhi, Nehru, and the other Hindus in the Indian National Congress had insisted that there was no need to separate Muslims and Hindus: while the British had insidiously tried to divide the communities, there was nothing natural in the division and no inherent reason why religious groups should live in separate states. Gandhi promised special consideration for the Muslim minority in independent India. Jinnah was not reassured. (p. 216) In the end the British agreed with Jinnah that an independent Pakistan would provide a refuge for Muslims and was a safer, more just, and more expedient solution to the problems associated with their departure, given Jinnah's threats and anti-Muslim challenges from reactionary Hindu nationalists. Many in India wished for an early end to Pakistan, for its absorption into India. Pakistanis were convinced that all Indians felt this way. The horrifying bloodshed that followed independence, in which Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh refugees were murdered on a massive scale by their religious rivals, seemed to confirm Pakistani fears that their nation and India were destined for permanent enmity. Page 6 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia Worse, according to Pakistanis, the balance of power left by the British in their wake was markedly skewed in India's favor. Twenty-one of twenty-nine infantry regiments remained with India. New Delhi also controlled most of the weapons and ordnance; while the British urged India to show good faith and allow the transport north of some of this equipment, the Indians dragged their feet and often substituted non-lethal shipments, in one case several cases of aging prophylactics, for the materiel Pakistan had requested. Pakistan, lacking a political tradition or infrastructure, was governed during its early months by the force of Jinnah's personality. Ethnic strife plagued its provinces. The economy hardly existed—in 1947 there was no such thing as a Pakistani bank, for instance. The foreign office consisted of six men, all without typewriters and using stationery purchased from a store in downtown Karachi. Jawaharlal Nehru's Independence Day speech in India, delivered at midnight on August 15, 1947, is justly remembered for its drama and its hope: India, he said, had “a tryst with destiny.” Jinnah's speech to his new nation on the same day was terse; in two of its nine paragraphs he pleaded with the country's “minorities” to “fulfill their duties and obligations” to Pakistan, promising that if they did so, “they [would] have nothing to fear.” It was an inauspicious beginning.11 Whatever India's intentions regarding Pakistan, as Jinnah's speech implied, the Muslim nation had reason to worry about its stability, and thus reason to cultivate an outside power to help it survive. It was a state divided into two wings, East and West Pakistan, separated from each other by 1,000 miles of India. The difficulty of ruling from West Pakistan 40 million East Pakistani Bengalis, over a quarter of whom were Hindus, across all this space was obvious even in 1947; it would grow even harder over time. The state of Punjab was split between Pakistan and India, a decision responsible for the worst of the violence that followed independence. Pakistan, lamented Jinnah, was “moth-eaten.” The groups collected in West Pakistan—Sindhis, Punjabis, Baluchis—had to be persuaded to make common cause. Most contentious was the position of the Pathans, located in the Northwest Frontier Provinces but also in the Punjab and, significantly, across the border in Afghanistan, where they were called Pushtuns. Afghanistan was unhappy about the advent of Pakistan, especially because it divided the Pathans and created a potentially hostile regional power to its southeast. With the quiet support of India the Afghanis demanded the creation of a state of “Pushtunistan” (or “Pakhtunistan”) that would encompass the tribes on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and reduce Pakistani territory. Hoping to defuse the situation, and badly overstretched given its suspicions of India, the Pakistani military withdrew from the northwestern tribal (p. 217) areas in late 1947, leaving the locals in charge of their own defense—a decision with resonances some sixty years later.12 The issue that seemed to threaten Pakistan existentially concerned the state of Kashmir. At the time of partition the British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, knowing the potential of Kashmir to create mischief between his offspring, had avoided making a decision about its future, leaving it to the state to choose its course. Nehru, a descendent of Kashmiri Brahmins, assumed the state would accede to India. Jinnah, noting that Kashmir was 78 percent Muslim, assumed otherwise. Some in Kashmir sought union with India, some Page 7 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia hoped for Pakistan, while others, including the head of state (maharajah) Hari Singh, preferred autonomy. In late October 1947 thousands of Muslims, most of them Pathans, surged into Kashmir to “liberate” their co-religionists. The modern weapons they carried and the trucks that bore them strongly indicated Pakistani involvement. A panicky Hari Singh signed a letter of accession to India, placed before him by Indian officials. The Indian military then stopped the attack by airlifting thousands of troops to Kashmir. Pakistan called for a plebiscite; Nehru replied that Kashmir was now legally part of India, and that as long as Pakistan continued to stir up Muslims there his forces would have to stay to protect the Hindu minority and promote stability. The suggestion that the state hold a plebiscite or be divided between India and Pakistan made Nehru apoplectic. Efforts by the United States and the United Nations to secure a solution to the Kashmir problem were unavailing.13 Pakistan did hold a pair of cold war trumps. The first was a key position in the intensified contest for control of the Middle East and its vast reserves of oil. The West's conflict with the Soviet Union over this part of the globe was nothing new. During the 19th century “Great Game,” the Russian tsars had sought determinedly to extend their influence south, over Afghanistan, Persia, Mongolia, and China, while the British had used their base in India to try to block their rival—“The Bear that looks like a man,” as Rudyard Kipling called Russia—and even to press north against Russian encroachment, using what the British players labeled the “forward strategy.” The game stopped when the Russians were defeated by Japan in 1905, but resumed at the end of World War II. Now the stakes were higher. The cold war was an ideologically charged, constant-sum Great Game, whereby a gain for the other side was by definition a loss for yours. And in the areas again sharply contested by the powers, in Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula, lay the oil that Europeans and, increasingly, Americans needed to fuel their economic recovery and sustain their prosperity. Pakistan, with its extensive borders with Afghanistan and Iran and its maritime proximity to Saudi Arabia, could be of vital strategic importance in the contest for oil. What exactly the Pakistanis could do for the West's position in these areas was unclear, given the fragility of Pakistan's unity and the weakness of its army. But their willingness to play some role in the defense of the Middle East made them an enticing asset to the practitioners of the new Great Game, cold war version.14 Pakistanis were willing to play this part largely because of their fear of India: enlist the western powers on their side, solicit western arms with the disingenuous promise to use them against the Soviets if required, and Pakistan might win itself some protection (p. 218) against the rival who wished it gone from the earth. Still, the attraction between the West and Pakistan was not wholly opportunistic. The second cold war trump held by the Pakistanis was the long-standing British perception, inherited by the Americans, that Muslims were a martial people: forthright in their relationships, constant in their loyalties, and, significantly, tough and manly in their willingness to stand on principle and fight for it if necessary. It is tempting to label this a myth created by the British following the 1857–8 Rebellion, when they had divided the military and denigrated the Hindus, whom they blamed for the attacks, and elevated Muslims (and Sikhs) to prominence in the armed forces. But the durability of the myth of Muslim loyalty and toughness, and its Page 8 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia persistence into the cold war period in Washington as well as London, suggests the presence of many people willing to keep it alive. The most important of these were themselves Pakistanis. British and American policymakers admired Muslims for their monotheism, for it suggested their belief in a single truth. If there could be no atheists in the foxholes of the cold war, then Pakistan's Muslims might well be suitable allies, as long as they believed the right sort of truth—which seemed likely given their presumed hostility to communism. In quest of American military assistance, Pakistani leaders cultivated their image as believers in a single almighty deity. “The people of Pakistan believe in the supreme sovereignty of God,” Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan told the Truman administration on a visit to the United States in 1950, and thus they believed in “the equality of man”—unlike caste-ridden Hindus. Western leaders also admired their Pakistani counterparts for their manliness. Liaquat and his successors, many of them military men, showed enthusiasm for the martial virtues, shook hands vigorously, drank alcohol, ate meat, and accepted shotguns as presents from American hosts and visitors. “The only Asians who can really fight are the Pakistanis,” Secretary of State John Foster Dulles once told the journalist Walter Lippmann. Chester Bowles, who served two tours as US ambassador to India during the cold war years and sympathized with the Indian position on most things, grumbled at the ease with which Pakistani men seemed to fool Americans into thinking that the parties had much in common. The Pakistanis were “Asians they can really understand, Asians who argue the advantages of an olive over an onion in a martini and who know friends they know in London.” All of this was by contrast to the Indians, who connected culturally to westerners far less easily.15 The cultural construction of selves and others rested largely on stereotypes based on religion and gender. These stereotypes were false; Muslims were not theologically akin to Christians despite their common belief in monotheism, and Muslim men were not naturally more masculine than Hindus. Culture is never coterminous with the state, especially a state as heterogeneous as Pakistan, India, or the United States, and it changes over time, which makes generalizations about it hazardous in the extreme. And yet, cultural identities of selves and others surely influenced the actions taken by those westerners and South Asians responsible for making policy decisions. Language, perceptions, emotions, attitudes, prejudices—all matter in the conduct of international relations, and all are the products and elements of culture. Beliefs and perceptions about monotheism and manhood predisposed the Pakistanis to side with the Americans in the cold war, (p. 219) and predisposed the Americans to look with favor on the connection. The Eisenhower administration's decision to provide military aid to Pakistan in 1954, and the Pakistani government's decision to accept alliance with the Americans in Asia as payment for the aid, were therefore hardly surprising. Page 9 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia Shunning the cold war: India India had external interests during the first years after its independence, but it had little capacity and less appetite for projecting itself into the fray of cold war. It was a regional power, a condition that satisfied Nehru; as long as India could bully Pakistan when needed, consolidate its power over the few remaining princely states and colonial enclaves (among them Goa and Pondicherry) lying within its borders, win Kashmir, and establish itself as an exemplar of development and democracy for other new states, he would be content. Taking a side in the cold war offered no strategic advantage to India. The nation needed some help economically, but Indian planners generally looked inward, concentrating on protecting home markets through centralized planning. Frustrated British and American observers stigmatized Nehru's foreign policy as “neutralist,” a label Nehru rejected for its seeming moral detachment; he preferred to say that India was “non-aligned” in the cold war. The perceptive British diplomat Sir Archibald Nye wrote in 1951 that India could most accurately be seen as “operating in three concentric circles, the principles governing each of which bear little or no relation to the principles followed in the others.” In the innermost circle were mainly contiguous states, with which India had “vital” interests. In the second circle out—nations other than the great powers—India had interests in several places (such as Southeast Asia) but virtually none in others (Latin America). The outer ring, consisting of the cold war powers Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, mainly warranted avoiding: relations with these nations were “to a great extent determined by [India's] passionate desire to keep out of conflict and to stand aside from Great Power struggles.” Nye spotted some Nehruvian delusion here, especially regarding Soviet expansionism and Chinese perfidy. But he also recognized the logic in India's resisting cold war affiliations, and noted that the United States had been “isolationist” for many years. He counseled patience.16 Nehru did have ideological preferences and dislikes. He admired Britain's parliamentary government and the openness of American democracy. He deplored the racism of whites in both countries, connected, as he saw it, to their continued support for colonialism, abhorred the hypocrisy of societies that claimed to represent justice but allowed their lower classes to live in misery, remained suspicious that the West was inclined to militarism, and found Americans crass, materialistic, and boorish. As a moderate socialist, Nehru expressed solidarity with the Soviet's rhetoric of economic equality and Mao Zedong's affinity for China's peasants. Like the communist powers, India would have Five-Year Plans for economic development that focused on building industry, (p. 220) consolidating agriculture, and relieving poverty. But, though he muted his public criticism, Nehru found appalling the brutalities of the Soviet and Chinese Communist political systems and their utter lack of regard for human freedom. Neither cold war system, in other words, provided a model for India to follow. The fragility of his nation's Page 10 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia democracy and the uncomfortable persistence of caste in India confirmed Nehru's resolve to find his own way in the world, free of entanglement in the toxic cold war. India had too many of its own problems to involve itself with others’. Nehru also felt that India could not afford the frenzied defense spending that came with participation in the cold war. If Pakistan agreed to help the West resume the Great Game through a “forward strategy” aimed at the Soviet Union, India preferred the alternative 19th century British posture known as “masterly inactivity.” That way, India would draw the attention of no enemy and be left instead to address its enormous domestic problems, unhindered and unburdened by heavy defense spending. Gandhian nationalism was based partly on economic self-sufficiency. Gandhi believed that it was morally right for people to make modest consumer goods for themselves, and shrewdly noted that Britain's exploitation of his country relied on Indian purchases of British-made textiles, often manufactured with inexpensive cotton furnished by India. He urged his countrymen and women to produce their own cloth, grow their own food, and generally to stay away from large-scale economic enterprise that inevitably meant entanglement in the global trading nexus. Nehru would not go that far; a modern nation, he believed, needed more than millions of household spinning wheels to move forward economically. But he was committed to ambitious, largely self-sustaining economic development. If his plans were to work, it would make no sense to spend large sums on the military. India had reserves of manganese, monazite, and beryl, all vital to modern industry and especially defense. Given the press of the cold war, the United States sought to buy great quantities of all three. In each case, however, Indian policymakers refused to sell freely, or to sell at what the Americans felt was a reasonable price, or to sell at all. Nehru wanted to move slowly toward trade, particularly with the Americans, whom he considered crafty (the Americans felt the same way about him). He wanted India to build its own industry, and to do so it might be necessary to preserve as much of these resources as possible. Manganese was needed to produce steel. Monazite and beryl had possible applications for nuclear technology. Nehru also wished to sell these goods and others to any party interested, and for the best possible price. If non-alignment meant anything, surely it meant the ability to avoid trade agreements that constrained the amount of a mineral that could be sold to the highest bidder, regardless of ideology. This, at first, was the policy that the Indians followed.17 Just as culture, gender, and religion influenced Pakistan's encounter with the world, so these factors helped shape India's external relations during the cold war. Non-alignment was partly a strategic choice. It also flowed naturally from Indian ideas about time and space, from the ways in which others perceived Indian men and Indian men saw themselves, from ideas concerning the maturity of peoples and nations, and from the predilections of Hindus to avoid making stark choices between what they saw as false, binary (p. 221) alternatives. So, for example, Indians traditionally imagined space—that place beyond the known and understood—as threatening. Even as they insisted that others not violate their space in South Asia, they showed no inclination to venture boldly into Archibald Nye's “third ring” of great power dominance. While Americans, British, Page 11 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia and others viewed India, the country, as bound stubbornly to tradition and with an ossified infrastructure that frustrated modernization, and Indians, the people, as childishly immature and incapable of reason, Indians saw their nation as representing “an older and wiser civilization” than that made by the “parvenus” of the West, and themselves as fresh and imaginative; as Nehru put it in his Independence Night speech: “At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance.” India would forge a new way through the world, one untrammeled by the petty jealousies and serious dangers of the cold war. Nehru himself, “graceful” and “beautiful” by westerners’ description, wearing perpetually a red rose in the lapel of his flowing kurta overshirt, seemed to many in the West effeminate, and thus unable or unwilling to stand up to the communist evil in the cold war. And Hinduism itself, with its many deities and thus multiple versions of truth, was, in the view of men in Washington and London, incapable of discerning right from wrong, unlike the steadfastly monotheistic Muslims in Pakistan. Indians feared “a holy war or crusade” that would involve them. Nehru cultivated both these gendered and religiously-inflected versions of himself and his people in order to keep his country aloof from the dangers of the cold war.18 The cold war powers and South Asia The advent of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 quickly drew the concern of Pakistan and India. Pakistani Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy told Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1955, “China would soon be able to occupy Pakistan easily, as the Mongols did in the thirteenth century.” (Zhou remonstrated that China had no interest in such a policy.) In reality, the Chinese Communists, for at least the first decade following their triumph, had limited foreign policy goals: they sought unity, which was to include the incorporation of Nationalist-held Taiwan, security, an end to colonial arrangements, and, connected to this, the respect of their neighbors and other nations. They had no intention of invading Pakistan. The Chinese harmoniously settled some boundary differences with Pakistan and, while they were unhappy with Pakistan's military association with the United States and Asian treaty organizations that they regarded as hostile to them, overall they remained ready to provide help to Pakistan if they could do so opportunistically and on the relative cheap—and, after 1960, as long as the Pakistanis were not also accepting aid from the Soviet Union. In their own way, the Chinese, like the Indians, were trying to keep the cold war out of South Asia, or at least to keep the Americans out.19 China-India relations were ultimately to prove more delicate, and more perilous. (p. 222) Nehru professed friendship with the leaders of the PRC and would help orchestrate a public relations campaign with the slogan “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai,” meaning that Indians Page 12 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia and Chinese were brothers. The chant masked profound anxiety about what might happen if the Chinese, for any reason, found India's policy not to their liking. In pursuit of what it considered China's territorial integrity, in October 1950 the People's Liberation Army entered Tibet, whose residents had long considered themselves citizens of an independent state. The Chinese move worried New Delhi. Nehru feared the growth of Chinese power to his north and the loss of Indian influence in Tibet. Seeking a compromise, he told Parliament that, while he hoped the Chinese would preserve Tibet's “autonomy,” he would recognize China's “suzerainty” over the region. In April 1954 Nehru and Zhou Enlai signed an agreement on Tibet, in which Nehru glumly offered (as he put it to legislators) his “recognition of the existing situation there,” but which more importantly contained a preamble articulating “five principles (panchsheela) of peaceful coexistence” between India and China. These called for “(1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.” “We need not live in a fairy world where nothing wrong happens,” said Nehru. He was, as two historians have put it, “bowing to the inevitable” regarding Tibet.20 The panchsheela attained greater glory when they were incorporated into the final declaration of the conference of non-aligned nations at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. The Indo-Chinese agreement on Tibet would fare less well. In March 1959 an uprising broke out in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa. When the Chinese entered to suppress it, the Dalai Lama and thousands of his followers fled to India and requested political asylum, which Nehru granted. This decision upset Beijing; Chinese newspapers attacked Nehru as an American “stooge.” Tensions over Tibet, and the disposition of its exiled citizenry in India, fueled a long-standing Sino-Indian dispute over the placement of the nations’ border. Nehru argued that India's northern boundaries had been established by the British in the 19th century, and that they extended to the Himalayas. The Chinese considered these borders the relics of imperialism and asked that they be renegotiated. When it became clear that Nehru would not budge, and after Indian military units took up positions north even of the British line of demarcation in the northeast, the Chinese acted. In October 1962 they struck Indian forces on both northern fronts and quickly pushed them back. This was not, as most in India and some in the West feared, the opening assault of a war of conquest but rather “a giant punitive expedition,” as one historian has called it. The Chinese were registering their displeasure with Indian arrogance and flexing their muscles, but no more. Relations between China and India remained frosty through the Sino-American détente of the 1970s, which fed Indian fears of great powers ganging up against it; a thaw in Indo-Sino relations came only with the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, in the early 1980s.21 Indian relations with the Soviet Union were erratic, though on the whole better than those between India and China. Neither Joseph Stalin nor Nikita Khrushchev was much interested in South Asia, though Khrushchev was eager to portray himself as a (p. 223) champion of anti-colonialism—by contrast, he said, to the ersatz communists in the People's Republic. Throughout much of the cold war the Soviets had little use for the Page 13 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia Pakistanis, who were, the Russians thought, in thrall to the Americans, the Chinese, or both, and who were so obsessed with India as to be of little use elsewhere. Toward India the Soviets tried to be friendlier. Khrushchev in particular claimed solidarity with Nehru's spirit of non-alignment, though Nehru always remained suspicious of Soviet support for India's communist parties, the bane of his political existence. The Soviets proclaimed their sympathy for India's position in the dispute over Kashmir, offered, in the wake of Pakistan's acceptance of US military aid in 1954 to build the Bhilai steel mill, and the following year dangled before the Indians the sale of modern fighter jets. Soviet economic aid to India increased throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In 1965, war broke out between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The Soviets, alarmed that the Chinese might exploit the hostilities and even fan their flames, successfully stepped in to mediate. The Soviets would step in again in 1971, when West Pakistan sent forces into East Pakistan. This eventually brought the Indians into the fighting and led to the establishment of the independent nation of Bangladesh. Though the Russians were shaken by the recklessness of both Pakistani and Indian decisionmaking during the war, they fared better than the Richard Nixon administration in the United States, which cast its lot fully with Pakistan and damaged its reputation with India and most other nations into the bargain.22 And what, finally, of the Americans and South Asia? At the time of Indian and Pakistani independence, the United States hoped that Great Britain would continue to take the lead in the region, given Britain's history with the people there and the glaring lack of American expertise about the place. As British power diminished and the all fronts Cold War impinged on South Asia, the Americans were drawn in. The Truman administration actually provided more military equipment to India than to Pakistan but laid the groundwork for this policy to shift after the Korean War broke out. While the Pakistanis sympathized with the US position in Korea and lobbied for it with recalcitrant Arab nations, the Indians, though supportive of the United Nations Security Council resolution that condemned North Korea's attack, were disinclined to play advocate for the Americans and instead served as intermediary between the United States and China, whose representatives would not talk to each other directly. The Americans saw the Korean War as clear evidence that the communist powers were acting aggressively and in concert to expand across the globe, and they worried that South Asia might be the communists’ next target. The Pakistanis were willing to adopt this view if it won for them US support, especially in the dispute over Kashmir. Nehru did not accept it, continuing to insist that colonialism and racism were problems worse than expanding communism, and that it would be better to negotiate with an adversary than to fight in a world increasingly filled with nuclear weapons.23 The Americans’ growing disillusionment with India, along with their greater willingness to embrace Pakistan, culminated in the Eisenhower administration's 1954 decision to provide military aid to Pakistan and involve Pakistan in Asian alliances—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Middle East Defense Organization—designed to counter predicted communist probes into these areas. The Pakistanis (p. 224) accepted the aid gladly but contributed mostly lip service to the new alliances. Reacting angrily to the introduction of the cold war into the region, India consorted openly with the communist Page 14 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia powers, all the while continuing to express its commitment to non- alignment, as at Bandung in 1955. President Eisenhower did not want to lose India, and in meetings with Nehru in the United States in December 1956 managed at least to convince the prime minister of his goodwill and sincerity. (Nehru had also been pleasantly surprised by the firmness with which Eisenhower had condemned the British/French/Israeli attack on Suez the previous October.) Still, these meetings did not produce a significant, favorable shift in US-India relations.24 Nehru hoped affairs would improve when John F. Kennedy became president in early 1961. The new president and many of his advisors, including John Kenneth Galbraith, whom Kennedy chose to head the US embassy in New Delhi, admired Nehru and claimed to respect non-alignment. They saw India as a laboratory for democracy in Asia and a likely place for a capitalist economic take-off to occur. But when Nehru came to Washington in late 1961, his meetings with Kennedy and other officials went poorly. The two men sparred about the testing of nuclear weapons. Nehru spoke vaguely about policy issues and seemed frequently distracted. Soon after he returned home, the prime minister authorized a successful Indian invasion of Portuguese Goa, which had stubbornly and singularly resisted incorporation into India. Kennedy expressed dismay; Nehru responded with dismay over Kennedy's dismay.25 In October 1962 came India's border war with China. Despite the limited Chinese aims— to punish rather than occupy India—the failure of Indian forces to slow their adversaries even briefly led to fear and recrimination in New Delhi. Nehru fired Krishna Menon, his sharp-tongued defense minister, and was forced to admit that he had been living in a sort of “fairy world” regarding his neighbors. “We were,” he said, “getting out of touch with reality in the modern world and were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation.” Nehru looked exhausted; he concluded that he could no longer deny that the cold war had come to South Asia. He chose to accept American military assistance and advice, once anathema to him. US and Indian air forces conducted joint exercises, the Americans agreed to train Indian pilots, and American spy planes were for the first time allowed to land and refuel at Indian air bases. Nehru would not countenance, as Pakistan had, a formal alliance with the United States. But his response to Chinese aggression placed India, however tentatively, on the side of the West in the cold war. The Soviet Union was unreliable, China too threatening, and US aid too much needed, even despite the strings always attached to it.26 Page 15 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia Cold war legacies Following Nehru's death in the spring of 1964 and a brief, unfortunate interregnum government led by Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi became the nation's prime minister. She would hold the position for fifteen of the eighteen years from 1966 to 1984. She did (p. 225) not always get along with the American presidents with whom her time in power coincided. Like her father, Gandhi resented what she considered American condescension, American exploitation of Indian food shortages that inspired humiliating Indian requests for aid (nearly always granted), and the American insistence that there might be two sides to the dispute over Kashmir. In the face of these and other perceived slights, Gandhi returned to her father's original determination that India must go it alone as much as possible. When the Chinese had tested a nuclear weapon in 1964, the Indians had considered whether to develop such weapons of their own. Unable to get from the United Nations a guarantee against a Chinese nuclear attack, Gandhi's government decided that it would not sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and resolved to move ahead with a nuclear program. The successful test of a nuclear device in the Rajasthani Desert in 1974, no matter how stridently Gandhi construed it as “peaceful,” resulted from her conviction that none of the powers had much sympathy for India, especially after Nixon's refusal to see the justice of India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971. According to Dennis Kux, “India, in Washington's eyes, had become just a big country full of poor people.” The perception rankled in India, and the nuclear test was designed, in part, to change it.27 It did not work. For the duration of the cold war, and even as Soviet support for India dwindled through the 1980s, Americans continued to regard India as no more than a regional power, and often as a nuisance. There was a bit of a popular craze for India and things Indian during the mid-1980s, coincident with the release in the West of the film Gandhi and the celebration of the “Festival of India” in the United States. Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his mother as prime minister following Indira's assassination in 1984, began to open the country to trade, investment, and transfers of technology, and this won him points with Washington and London. In general, however, India remained peripheral to the deepest concerns of the powers, and the end of the cold war had little to do with India. Oddly, Indians might have claimed that the world had at last caught up to them: in long rejecting the axioms of the cold war, they had predicted its demise, and though the waiting had been painful, there was some vindication in their having been right: great power conflict was dangerous and ought to be renounced. Like all nations should, India would first cultivate its own garden. That India's nuclear program continued to irritate others (India detonated several devices in 1998), and that India's conflict with Pakistan continued to fester, was of some moment to Indians in the 21st century. So, too, was the considerable energy of the nation's economy, which increased Indian trade and investment and swelled the ranks of the middle class, largely invisible to the world during Page 16 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia the cold war. India's quest for respect had, some sixty years after independence, begun to bear fruit. Pakistan, unlike India, had ridden the cold war as a wave, first siding with the West and earning considerable economic and military aid, then tipping toward China following the 1962 border war—the reward for which, paradoxically, was American gratitude when the Pakistanis served as intermediaries for Richard Nixon's démarche to China in 1971. It is common to regard Pakistan's history as that of a nearly-failed state. Throughout, the nation has suffered from domestic instability, humiliation at the hands of its Indian (p. 226) rival, corrupt and authoritarian government, a record of human rights abuses, and actual vivisection following the uprising in East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. It is tempting to say that Pakistan, having lived by the cold war, is now in steep decline because the cold war has ended. Yet that judgment may be premature. When the Soviet Union overthrew the government of Afghanistan and invaded that country in 1979, Pakistan became the immediate beneficiary, as the Americans funnelled millions in military aid through Pakistan to Afghanis who were battling the Russians. The Americans were ready to overlook a multitude of Pakistan's sins, including its pursuit of enriched uranium for possible use in a nuclear weapon, in order to torment the Soviets. The last great battle of the cold war ended with the Soviets’ retreat from Afghanistan, a blow that contributed significantly to Mikhail Gorbachev's conclusion that ongoing conflict with the United States was no longer sustainable. But the end of the cold war did not signal the end of Pakistan's usefulness to the United States. Having established itself as a force in Afghanistan's political situation, Pakistan became vital to American efforts, after September 11, 2001, to dislodge the Taliban government from Kabul and keep it out. At this writing, Pakistan, its borders utterly compromised by the Taliban and the presence (as ever) of Pathans, who live in both countries and respect the boundaries of neither, is professing its desire to help the Americans defeat evil, even as it pleads for more money and weapons with which to do the job. The cold war has ended, but a familiar conflict continues. India practices masterly inactivity, growing its economy despite a global recession. Pakistan, source of violence and instability (including the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008), remains as aggravating, and evidently as indispensable, as ever. Select Bibliography Brands, H. W. India and the United States: The Cold Peace. Boston, MA: Twayne Publisher, 1990. Camilleri, Joseph. Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and its Aftermath. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1980. Cloughley, Brian. A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999. Page 17 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia Glazer, Sulochana Raghavan, and Nathan Glazer, eds. Conflicting Images: India and the United States. Glenn Dale, MD: Riverdale Publishers, 1990. Heimsath, Charles H., and Surjit Mansingh. A Diplomatic History of Modern India. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971. Isaacs, Harold R. Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1980. Khan, Mohammed Ayub. Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967. Kux, Dennis. Estranged Democracies: India and the United States 1941–1991. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993. Kux, Dennis. The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001. McMahon, Robert J. The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Merrill, Dennis. Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947–1963. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990. Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Noman, Omar. Pakistan: A Political and Economic History since 1947. London: Kegan Paul International, 1988. Perkovich, George. India's Atomic Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999. Qing, Simei. From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and US-China Diplomacy, 1945–1960. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. Rahman, Mushtaqur. Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir People. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. Rotter, Andrew J. Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. Spear, Percival. The Oxford History of Modern India 1740–1975, 2nd ed. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979. Symonds, Richard. The Making of Pakistan. London: Faber and Faber, 1950. Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: W. W. Norton, 2003. Page 18 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia Thapar, Romila. A History of India: Volume 1. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966. (p. 229) Venkataramani, M. S. The American Role in Pakistan, 1947–1958. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982. Viswanathan, Gauri. Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. Zubok, Vladislav M. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. Notes: (1.) M. S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan, 1947–1958 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982), 268; Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 172–3. (2.) McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 172–3, 213–14; Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 39, 67–8; H. W. Brands, Jr., India and the United States: The Cold Peace (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1990), 85. (3.) South Asia is generally held to include not only India and Pakistan but Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and sometimes Afghanistan. I will treat Bangladesh, an offspring of Pakistan, briefly here. Nepal and Sri Lanka were each visited by Maoist problems during this period, but both were largely dominated by India and thus had little independent standing as cold war states. Afghani problems were unique and demand their own treatment. (4.) Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 15–16. (5.) Romila Thapar, A History of India: Volume 1 (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1966); Percival Spear, The Oxford History of Modern India 1740–1975, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); quotation is at p. 8. (6.) Spear, Oxford History, 224, 229–37, 274–6; Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 16– 17. (7.) Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 32, 80; Deepak Lal, “Manners, Morals, and Materialism: Indian Perceptions of America and Britain,” in Sulochana Raghavan Glazer and Nathan Glazer, eds., Conflicting Images: India and the United States (Glenn Dale, MD: Riverdale Publishers, 1990), 271–88. Page 19 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia (8.) Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 10. (9.) See Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 150–87; quotation at pp. 170–1. (10.) Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 178. (11.) Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 30–2; Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 2–4; Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 17–18; Jinnah's speech at. (12.) Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 12–13, 42–3; Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan (London: Faber and Faber, 1950), 120–1, 142. (13.) McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 19–22; Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 137–44; Mushtaqur Rahman, Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir People (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). (14.) Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 48–56; Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 45–6. (15.) Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 196, 217–18; Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 72. (16.) Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 45–8. (17.) Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 93–115; Dennis Merrill, Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947–1963 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 45–74. (18.) Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 188–248. Nehru's speech at. (19.) Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and US-China Diplomacy, 1945–1960 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 256; Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and its Aftermath (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1980), 80; Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 181. (20.) Qing, From Allies to Enemies, 272; Charles H. Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), 188–93. (21.) Qing, From Allies to Enemies, 274–6; Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 71–4; Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 214; Brands, India and the United States, 141, 170. (22.) McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 216–20; William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and his Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 354; Heimsath and Mansingh, Diplomatic History of Modern India, 448–50; Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Page 20 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018 South Asia Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 194, 217. (23.) McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 123–6; Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States 1941–1991 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 87–9. (24.) Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 22–3; McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 224–9; Kux, Estranged Democracies, 140–3. (25.) Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 24–5; Kux, Estranged Democracies, 192–6. (26.) Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 74–6. (27.) Kux, Estranged Democracies, 267–8, 314–17. On India's nuclear program, see George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999). Andrew J. Rotter Andrew J. Rotter is Charles Dana Professor of History at Colgate University. Page 21 of 21 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University College London; date: 15 June 2018