South Asia After The Cold War: Winners and Losers

South Asia after the Cold War: Winners and Losers Author(s): Sandy Gordon Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 10 (Oct., 1995), pp. 879-895 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645564. Accessed: 10/06/2014 23:08 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates...

South Asia after the Cold War: Winners and Losers Author(s): Sandy Gordon Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 10 (Oct., 1995), pp. 879-895 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645564. Accessed: 10/06/2014 23:08 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at. http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].. University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SOUTH ASIA AFTER THE COLD WAR Winners and Losers Sandy Gordon In a 1993article,Ross H. MunroarguedthatIndiais the greatloserfromtheend of theCold War. He wrotethat"India's reachfor greatpowerstatusis in shambles.The keystoneof Indianpowerand pre- tencein the 1980s,theIndo-Sovietlink,is history.... Indiahas no 'useful friends'."' In a morerecentarticle,MunroassertedthatIndia's 1993 border agreement withChinawas an unequalone thatreflected India's manifest eco- nomicand military weaknessin relationto China. He said that"thestriking juxtaposition of an economicallydynamicChinaand an economically fragile Indiais at theheartofmajor,historic changesin China'srelations withSouth Asia."2 For Munro,the compellingmessage forWashingtonis thatit is China,not India,thatwill be thepowerof thefuturein Asia and thatthe UnitedStatesshouldadjustitspoliciesaccordingly. This articlearguesthat,farfromhavinglost out as a resultof the rap- prochement withChina,India has managedto garnera significant "peace dividend"in relationto its competition withPakistan.It is thispeace divi- dend thathas motivatedNew Delhi's overturesto China ratherthanany weakness. As the 1990s progress,moreover, India appearsto be emerging fromtheshadowoftheCold Waras a SouthAsianwinnerrather thana loser. Even thoughPakistanis in a positionto snipeat Indiaby meansof itsprox- ies, especiallyin Kashmir,Indiais likelyto garnerincreasing powerand in- fluencewith respectto Pakistan. Such a developmentwould have far- reachingconsequences, sinceIndiastandsvirtually alonein theIndianOcean as a nationwiththepotentialto achieve"balanced"power. SandyGordonis a Fellowat theResearchSchoolof PacificandAsian Studies,Australian NationalUniversity. ? 1995 by The Regentsof theUniversity of California 1. Ross H. Munro,"The Loser: India in theNineties,"NationalInterest, no. 33 (Summer 1993),pp. 62-63. 2. Ross H. Munro,"China's WaxingSpheresof Influence,"Orbis,38:4 (Fall 1994), pp. 595-96. 879 This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  880 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1995 India'snew diplomacy in Southeast tobearfruit.In Asia is also starting economy itsliberalizing particular, is likelyto attract tradeand increasing investment from theAsian regionas Asian nations seekto hedge on their involvement withChina.Ifthere is a policylessonfor Washington, itrelates tothegradual emergence ofIndia'sroleinAsia,toitsincreasing salienceas a marketandinvestment destination,andto itsgrowing importanceas an In- dianOceanregional power, rather to than theirrelevancy ofIndiato modem - daypolicymaking. SouthAsianGeopoliticsand the End oftheCold War Onthesurface, itwouldappearthattheendingoftheColdWaraffected the of positions India and more Pakistan orless each since equally, lostaccessto theirsuperpower and patrons theheavilysubsidized weaponstheyprovided. however, If we observethedeepercurrents, it soonbecomesapparentthat lossesaremoreseriousthanIndia's. Pakistan's The ChinaFactor Chinaplayeda crucial roleintheSouthAsianpowerbalanceunder theCold Warstructure. China'srolewasnotso muchtoactively supportPakistan- although didthatinsomerespects-asto separate itcertainly Indianforces andthusweakenIndia.Indiawasrequired tomaintain 11mountain divisions ontheborder withChina,andeachmountain divisionwasthreetimesmore costlytosupport thananordinary infantrydivision.Attimes, suchas during the1965Indo-Pakistani war,Chinamaneuvered on theborderandissued ultimatums IndiainordertopinIndiantroops against downandassistPaki- stan.In thelead-upto the1971Indo-Pakistani war,Indiawas forcedinto closeralliancewiththeSovietUnionin ordertoneutralize China. SinceRajivGandhi's path-breaking visittoBeijinginDecember 1988,the paceofrapprochement between thetwoAsiangiantshas speededup. In a thetwohaveagreedtoreducetheleveloftroopsonthe seriesofinitiatives, border (Indianowhasonlyaboutsixdivisions), todelineate thelineofcon- trol,openup cross-border trade,andbuildconfidence through a seriesof high-level andcivilianvisits.In a surprise military moveearlierthisyear, Chinaagreedtosupply nuclear fuelforIndia'sTarapur planttoreplacesup- pliescutoffbyWashington as partofitsnonproliferationpolicy.Thelatest roundofborder talksin Augustresulted in a decisionto pullbacktroops from thelastremaininglocations wheretheywerestill"eyeballto eyeball." It is truethattherearestillgrounds forconcern aboutsomeaspectsofthe relationship. Theborder question,whichinvolves slabsofterri- substantial toryandnumbers ofIndiancitizens intheeasternsector,maystilltakemany This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  SANDY GORDON 881 yearsto resolve. Indiais concernedabouttransfers of weaponsand ballistic missiletechnology intowhatit considersto be its own SouthAsian region. New Delhi is worriedaboutChina'snewfound friendshipwithBurma,which sharesa longand porousborderwithIndia. Andmostimportant in termsof the longertermprognosis,China evokesa powerfulbut inchoatesense of competition on thepartof influential elitesin New Delhi. At least in the tacticalsense,however,thetwo sideshave decidedto set aside theirdiffer- ences. This Sino-Indianrapprochement has providedIndia with a significant peace dividendin thecontextofitscompetition withPakistan.Not onlyhave thedivisionsreleasedfromtheSino-Indian borderbecomeavailableforother duties,includingpotentiallyon thewesternfront withPakistanshouldsome of India's internalproblemsbecomemoremanageable,but China has now adopteda positionof "carefulneutrality"on Kashmir.China'snewposition is not due solelyto the rapprochementwithIndia,however.It is also in- formedby concernthata successfulbreakawaymovement in MuslimKash- mir mightinspireseparatismin its own Muslim majorityprovincesof Xinjiangand in Tibet,whichare contiguousto Kashmir.These concerns meanthatChina's policyon Kashmiris now unlikelyto be reversed. Russia and India Norhas therelationship betweenIndiaandRussiafallencompletely intodis- repair.Russiais stilla competent producerofsophisticatedweapons,includ- ing front-line fighters suchas theSu-27,Su-30,MiG-29, and strikeaircraft and MiG-31. As India overcomesits balance of paymentsproblems,it is likelyto pickup on thearmsrelationship withMoscow,notwhereit leftoff in 1991 butat a significantlevel. Alreadyithas acquireda smallnumberof MiG-29Ms,and whatis moresignificant, it is discussing of jointproduction theSu-30 BK fighter-bomber and a majorupgradeof over 1,000of itsT-72 tanks.3In orderto financeat leastsome of theseprospective purchasesand providebadly needed spares for India's existinginventory, Moscow has openedup an $830 millionlineofcredittobe servicedinpartbyIndiansales to Russia and in partthrough hardcurrency.India has settledits US $10 billiondebtwithRussia on basicallyfavorabletermsand has effectively ve- toedRussianarmssales to Pakistan. thenewRussia appearsto be morewillingto sharemilitary Significantly, technology withIndiathanwas theold SovietUnion. Indiahas enteredintoa seriesof arrangements withRussiancompaniesthatpromiseto enhanceits owndefenseindustrial base. Overthelongerterm,sucha relationship should 3. "RussiansOfferSu-30sto IndianAirForce,"Jane'sDefenceWeekly, 25 June1994,p. 4; "Russia: MilitaryHardwareto DominateExportsto India,"Reuters,4 August1995. This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  882 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1995 provemoreefficacious in termsof buildingIndianpowerthantheprevious arrangement, whichdependedlargelyon off-the-shelf purchasing orlicensing agreementsthat frequently amountedto little more than assembly of knocked-down or semi-knocked-down kits. As an exampleof thekindsof arrangements nowbeingenteredinto,theRussianaeronautical firmMikoyan (designerof theMG range)has establisheda joint venturewithHindustan Aeronautics Limitedof India(HAL) to manufacture sparepartsfortheMiG rangeof aircraft.A new firm, knownas Indo-RussianAviationPrivate,has beenestablished forthispurpose,andwillalso be involvedin upgrading over 100 of India's MiG-21bisaircraft.The partnership has considerableeco- nomicpotential, sincetwo-thirds of theworld'sfighters are of Sovietorigin and manyare badlyin need of refurbishing.4 One side effectofthemovefromlicensedmanufacture tojointproduction is to open up thepossibilityforIndia to becomemoreactivelyengagedin defense-relatedtransactions withitseasternneighbors.For example,Indiais participatingintheMiG-29deal betweenRussiaandMalaysiathrough provi- sion of trainingof pilotsand maintenance crews. It is also possiblethatthe provisionof sparepartsand maintenance mightbe carriedoutby Indo-Rus- sianAviationPrivate.Similararrangements couldalso be madewithIndone- sia, shouldJakarta decideto proceedwithMiG purchasesas a hedgeagainst possibleU.S. armsembargoesoverhumanrightsissues. Russiais also setto become more activelyinvolvedin India's comparatively lavishlyfunded space program.As well as buyingassembledcryogenic rocketenginesfrom Russia, India has probablyobtaineda good deal of thetechnologyforthe engines,despitethe factthatMoscow apparently bowed to U.S. pressure undertheMissile TechnologyControlRegime(MTCR) to withholdtransfer ofsuchtechnology.Collaboration on otheraspectsofspaceresearchhas also been steppedup.5 RelationswithWashington Accordingto Munro,itwouldbe a "bad idea" fortheUnitedStatesto enter intoa securityarrangement withIndia. Whilethatis perhapstrue,thenotion ofa security relationshipis somethingofa strawman. To focuson a security is to overlookthefactthatWashington's relationship interestsin relationto Indiaarepotentiallyfarbroaderthanwouldbe reflected in a formalsecurity In particular, relationship. theyarerapidlyevolvingin thecontextof India's program ofeconomicliberalization,itsmoreoutward-looking foreign policy, 4. David A. Fulghum,"IndianAir Force Faces ToughChoices,"AviationWeekand Space Technology,25 July1994,p. 42. As well as Malaysia,countries in working interested withIndia on MiGs includeVietnamand a numberof Africanand CentralAsian countries. 5. "NativeCryogenicEngineDesign Progressing Fast,"TheHindu(internationaledition),9 April1994. This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  SANDY GORDON 883 itscloserengagement inAsia,andinrelation toWashington's broader inter- estsintheIndianOceanregion.Thehistories oftheClinton administration's attempts to reinin India'snuclearweaponsambitions andto addressthe Kashmir issueillustratethewayinwhichWashington's expanding interests haveactedtorestrain itspolicyoptions. Despiteofficialpronouncements aboutthecontinuing salienceofthenu- clear"roll-back" position,theU.S. hasnowmovedtoadvocating capping of theIndianandPakistani arsenalsratherthanvigorously pursuing roll-back.6 NorhaveU.S. Assistant SecretaryofStateRaphel'spronouncements about Kashmir beingcontested beenrepeated territory following thestorm theyen- gendered inIndia.Onthecontrary, in 1994thenewlyinstalled U.S. ambas- sadorinNewDelhi,FrankWisner, seemedtobackawayfrom thatposition, suggesting thattheUnitedStateslookforothersolutions to theKashmir problem outsidetheframework ofthe1948-49UnitedNationsresolutions, whichfavorPakistan's position.The UnitedKingdomis also now sug- gesting thattheU.N.resolutions mayno longer be appropriateforresolving thedispute, andAustralia's foreignminister,Gareth Evans,recently followed suit. In itsdecisionnottopressDelhitoohardonthenuclear issue,Washington was no doubtmindful ofitsotherimportant developinginterestsrelatingto India.Oneoftheseis a burgeoning tradeandinvestment relationshipthathas developed following India'ssuccessful program ofeconomic liberalization. Directforeign investment in Indiahas increased fromonly$73 millionin 1990to$3 billionin 1993,andU.S. investment constitutes42% ofthetotal. Recentestimates suggestthatup to $8-10 billionof U.S. investment is poisedto flowintoIndiain thenexttwoyears.7Tradehas risensubstan- albeitfrom tially, a lowbase,andAmerican companies areeyeing whatthey see as thepotentialofIndia'srapidly growing middleclass,nownumbering some180million.8 One factorin thegrowing interestin Indiahas beenincreasing doubts aboutChina,thatothergreatmarket andsink-hole ofinvestment. Indeed,a 6. See JohnF. Bums, "India RejectsU.S. Bid forNuclearPact withPakistan,"New York Times,26 March1994; PressTrustof India,as carriedby Reuters,"India: India's EnvoySays Reportson BritishIntelligencePressureforU.S. Talks 'Bull', " 2 May 1994; and K. K. Katyal, "MoreNationsin N-talksNet?" TheHindu(international edition),2 April1994. 7. "IndiaandAmerica:LookingforFriends,"Reuters, 21 May 1994; and"ForeignExchange Investmentin IndiaSeen RisingRapidly,"Reuters,31 August1994; also, Anil Penna,"Ameri- can BusinessesFlockto Investin BoomingIndia,"TheAustralian,13 January1995. 8. These figuresare based on latestNationalSampleSurveydata and on a familyincomeof $80 in thecitiesand $50 in ruralareas. (NarayananMadhavan,"IndianMiddle Class Market Estimatedat 180 Million,"Reuters,14 August1994). A recentpoll of U.S. chiefexecutives revealedthatalmosthalfwereconsidering entering theIndiamarketor werealreadyentering it. Aabha Dixit,"U.S., IndiaFace Crossroads," DefenseNews,May 23-29, 1994,p. 32. This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  884 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1995 numberof important U.S. companiesand bankersare now of theview that long-term prospectsin Indiaarebetterthantheyare in China,a view shared by theprestigious EconomistIntelligenceUnit.9These tradeinterests were developedsubstantially duringPrimeMinister NarasimhaRao's 1994 Wash- ingtonvisit,includingthroughthe resurrecting of the moribundIndo-U.S. JointCommission.In 1995a majorU.S. tradedelegationvisitedIndialed by CommerceSecretary Brown. On itspart,Delhi has becomefarmore"street- wise" in its dealingswithWashington now thattheCold War is over and nonalignment has,to all intentsandpurposes,been setaside. It has hiredits own lobbyistin thecapital-a practicelongadoptedby Pakistan.In a move StrobeTalbottdeclaredrepresented a "floodof good sense,"it compromised on itsdisputewiththeU.S. overtextilesandrecently decidedto admita wide varietyof foreigntextilesintoits market.It is endeavoring to improveits recordon humanrightsby allowingvisitsof AmnestyInternational and the International Red Cross(althoughnotto Kashmir)andmovingto modifythe draconianTerrorism andDisruptive ActivitiesAct(TADA). It has beengen- erallymorerelaxedand compromising on a rangeof issues. Another, perhapsless tangiblefactorin renewedU.S. interest in India re- latesto Washington's broaderstrategic perceptionsabouttheIndianOcean. As it progressively drawsdown its forcesand reducesits presencein the IndianOcean in theaftermath of theCold War,it is important to theUnited Statesto have a large,democratic, and essentiallystatusquo powersuchas Indiaon itsside andpositively engagedin regionalsecurity maintenance.In effect, India has subscribedto thelargerrole cast forit. Far fromdecrying thepresenceof extraregional naviesas it did duringtheCold War,Indiahas conductedexerciseswithat least 15 naviessince 1991,manyof themfrom outsidetheIndiaOcean. It has contributed handsomely totheUnitedNations effort inCambodia,Somalia,andRwanda. Privately at least,officialsinNew Delhi recognizethattheU.S. presenceis desirablein termsof oil security, withIndiabecomingevermoredependent on Gulfoil to fuelitsindustrializa- tion.I0 Washington is also concernedaboutsecurityof the IndianOcean in the contextof its Gulf policy. Even thoughSaddam Hussein is lickinghis wounds,future Gulfsecurity is by no meansassured.Althougha debilitated power,Iranis stillviewedbytheU.S. as an ambitiousone-and one in natu- ral competition withWashington's ally,Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regimeis itselfregardedby some commentators as increasingly brittle,as democrats and IslamicistschallengetheSaudi government. AlthoughIndiamayprefer 9. "IndiaBetterthanChina,saysEmersonElectric,"Reuters,15 November1994; "IndiaRe- formsMay OutpaceChina,Says U.S. Banker"[vice-chairman, Bank of America],Reuters,10 November1994; "IndiaLooks Less RiskythanChina:EIU," Reuters,7 May 1995. 10. Interviews withseniorofficials, New Delhi,December1993. This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  SANDY GORDON 885 not to becomedirectlyinvolvedin any Gulftaskforcebecause of its own Hindu-Muslim problemsand itsrelationshipswithGulfpowers,it couldpro- vide usefulindirectsupportand stagingfacilitiesin the eventof any new crisis. Accordingto AdmiralZlatoper,commander-in-chief of U.S. Pacific forces(CINCPAC), U.S. and Indianforces"workingtogether and training together makesgood sensebecausefuture warfarewill involvemultinational military capabilities."1 CINCPAC's concernsaboutmaintaining its Indian Ocean roleweredoubtlessheightened bytheloss ofU.S. bases in thePhilip- pines,whichplayedan important partin the logisticsof operationsDesert Shieldand DesertStorm.Indeed,as theU.S. drawsdownits forcesin Eu- rope,theroutethrough theIndianOcean intotheGulfis likelyto become moreimportant thanever. Accordingto a CINCPAC study: India'sforeignpolicyhasbeensteadily as a result withU.S. interests converging [oftheadvent] ofthebipolarera. Forexample,bothsharesimilar concerns with respectto... unrestricted navigationintheIndianOcean,andtheadjoining Per- sianGulfregion[emphasis added].12 AlthoughWashington is stillnotpreparedto sell sophisticated weapons systems to India because of itsconcernsaboutIndia's nuclearweaponspro- gram,thedeepeningeconomicrelationship betweenthetwocountries contin- ues to draw the U.S. into a moresubstantial technologytransfer regime, whichin turnassistsIndia's ambitions to developits own defense-industrial base. Washington declaredat thetimeofRao's visitthatit wouldresuscitate thetechnology MOU, whichhad beenmoribund since 1989. India is to buy 315 U.S. laserguidancekitsforBritish2,000-lb.bombs.13U.S. companies are also closelyinvolvedwiththedesignand verification of India's indige- nouslybuiltfighter, theLightCombatAircraft.It mayalso provedifficult, given a rapidlyexpandingeconomic relationship, to continueto deny supercomputer technology to India,especiallyas India becomesevermore closelyentwined withtheU.S. in theareaofsoftware engineering. In Febru- ary1994,theU.S. CommerceDepartment raisedthecapabilityof supercom- putersthatcouldbe exported to Indiafrom12.5 MTOPS to 260 MTOPS. In recognition of India's newfound status,thetwopowerssigneda comprehen- sive defensecooperationdocumentin January1995, whichU.S. Defense SecretaryPerrydescribedas "not only significant" but "historic."Impor- tantly,thenew arrangement envisagedfarmorecomprehensive naval exer- cises thanhad been heldin thepastand morecomprehensive cooperationin 11. Quotedin "USA: ExercisesStrengthen Indian/U.S.Ties,"Jane'sDefenceWeekly, as in Reuters,17 June1995. 12. Quotedin Selig S. Harrisonand Geoffrey Kemp,India and AmericaAftertheCold War (Washington,D.C.: The CarnegieEndowment, 1993),p. 9. 13. Fulghum,"IndianAir ForceFaces ToughChoices,"p. 42. This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  886 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1995 defense production andresearch. Italsoestablisheda "hotline"between the PentagonandIndia'sDepartment ofDefence.14 Fourjointnavalexercises havenowbeenheld,oneeveninvolving a U.S. nuclear-poweredsubmarine. India and Southwest Asia Although Munro hasportrayed Indianforeign policyas seeking toalignIndia withtheWestagainst an"Islamicbloc,"India'spolicytoward itsGulfneigh- borsis somewhat moresubtlethansuchan alignment wouldsuggest.While one or twofigures within theHindu-oriented Bharatiya Janata Party(BJP) mayhavegonetoWashington andmadestatements advocating theformation ofananti-Islamicbloc,itis difficult toidentify anysuchstatement emanating from a mainstreamplayer intheforeign policymaking establishment inNew Delhi. On thecontrary, in theaftermath ofthedestruction oftheAyodhya mosqueinlate1992,whichcausedwidespread negative perceptions ofIndia in theGulfandsomeretaliatory action,New Delhi'smainconcern was to limitandrepair anydamagewithIndia'sIslamicneighbors. Inpursuit ofthis policy, thegovernment appointed SalmanKhurshid as a specialenvoytoact onitsbehalf intheGulf,andhasrecently appointed another Muslim, Salman Haider,as foreign secretary. ThelastthingNewDelhiwouldwantwouldbe tojeopardize furtherits important Gulfinterestsbyappearing to takesideswitha Western anti-Is- lamicalliance.Indiahasover110million Muslims, whoconstitute a signifi- cantfactor intheelectoral equationas wasdemonstrated bytheir roleinthe defeatoftheCongress Partyin recentstateelections in thelargest Indian state,Uttar Pradesh.India'sinterestsintheGulfinclude theperceived need to parry thediplomatic thrustofPakistan in theregion, theneedto ensure accessto oil to serviceitsrapidindustrialization and itsmilitary machine (India'soil consumption is growing at 9% a year),long-standing economic interests, includinglargenumbers ofguestlaborers andsubstantial jointven- tures,andtheneedtouseSouthwest Asiaas a meansofaccessing important potentialmarkets andsourcesofoil inCentral Asia. Itwouldbe unwisefor NewDelhitojeopardize theseinterestsbybacking a chimerical "anti-Islamic alliance." Noris thereanymonolithic Islamicblocseeking to"punish" Indiaforits inKashmir.Themultidimensional activities character oftheinterests ofthe Islamicworldwasillustrated bythefactthata number ofimportant Islamic nations,includingIranandEgypt, actedtodissuade Pakistan from raisingthe Kashmir issueattheU.N. HumanRights Commission in March1994. The following November, Pakistan wasforced todefer thetabling ofa resolution 14. NelsonGraves,"PerryTripto Indiato Help End Cold War Divisions,"Reuters 00058044445. This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  SANDY GORDON 887 onKashmir intheU.N.International SecurityCommittee becauseitwasun- sureofIslamicsupport. Itis truethatthedestruction ofanimportant Islamic shrine inIndianKashmir inMay1995resulted inwidespread condemnation ofIndiabutitis likelythattheinterests ofindividualIslamiccountries will quickly reassertthemselves, justas theydidfollowing thedestruction ofthe Ayodhya mosque. WhileNewDelhiclearly facessomeserious challenges inSouthwest Asia, ithasa number ofassetsas well.Forexample, thelargest oftheGulfstates, Iran,hassought toretain itslinkswithIndiadespite theallegationsofhuman rightsviolationsperpetrated against Muslims inKashmir. Iranis nowIndia's singlelargest supplierofoil,providing fourmillion tonsannually, someof which-against itsusualpractice-itallowsIndiatopayforbybarter and softcurrency. Oneaspectofthedeveloping relationshipis thatSaudiArabia (whichhasbeentraditionally closetoitsfellowSunnination, Pakistan) and Iranareengaged ina growing competitive relationshipintheGulf.Another is thatIranis isolatedandrejected in theWest.Largedeveloping nations withrelatively welldeveloped technological bases,suchas IndiaandChina, aretherefore importanttoit. Moreover, theongoing civilwarinAfghanistan tendstoblockPakistan outofCentral AsiaandtofavorIranas an outlet for theCentral AsianRepublics (CARs). Iranhassought to strengthen itshand intheCARsbyinvolving Indiaintheconstruction ofrailinfrastructure that willbe neededforittopresent itselfas a viableoutletfortheCARstothe IndianOcean.Tehran is alsousingIndianassistance tomaintain itsgrowing arsenalofRussianequipment, suchas itstwoKilo submarines. In January 1995IndiaandIransigneda comprehensive setofagreements removing all nontariffbarriersonshipping, launched a seriesofjointventures, andunder- tookto developmultilateral agreements on transitandtradebetween India andtheCentral AsianRepublics via Iran. India and East/Southeast Asia Indiainitially feltisolatedintheaftermathoftheColdWar.Divestedofits favoredtreatment intheoldEastbloctrading regime,italsofeltshutoutof evolvingregionaltradingblocssuchas theEC/EUandNAFTA.Ittherefore adopteda "lookeast"strategy involving attemptstobecomemoreintensively engagedwithvariousregional forumssuchas theAssociation ofSoutheast AsianNations(ASEAN),theAsia-Pacific EconomicCo-operation forum (APEC),andvarioussecurity arrangementssuchas theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). TheAPECpowers, however,werethemselves grapplingwith theproblems of achieving a measureofunityoutof a widelycontrasting regionandweredisinclined to makespaceforIndia.New Delhi'scalling cardwasseenas tarnished becauseofitsprevious withMoscow. relationship Indiaalso complicateditsreceptionbyattimesineptdiplomacy. Butithas This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  888 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1995 persistedin its diplomaticefforts to buildbridgesintoSoutheastAsia, and has recognizedthattheway forward is to cultivatebilaterallinkages,be "on goodbehavior"in itsdealingswithmultilateral forums, andbe moresensitive to regionaldiplomaticnorms.The liberalization of theIndianeconomyhas also startedto stimulatetrade. ThroughthesemeansIndia is beginningto makeprogressin its "look east" strategy. India's relationshipwithJapanillustrates theslowlyevolvingnatureof its diplomacyto theeast. Generally, Japanis consideredfarmoreimportant by IndiathanIndia is by Japan.Japanhas been India's largestaid donorsince 1986 and in 1991 rankedthirdin India's exportmarkets, whereastradewith India accountsforonly 1% of Japan'stotaltrade.15As earlyas the mid- 1980s,therewas an upsurgein technology transfersfromJapaneseto Indian firms,withthe numberof collaborations risingfrom27 at the startof the 1980s to 780 in 1991. This processdid not,however,resultin significant Japaneseinvestment, whichhas alwaysbeenthekeyas faras Japanhas been concerned to transfers ofstate-of-the-art technology.Whereasby 1991Japan stoodfourth aftertheU.K., U.S., and Germany in termsoftechnology trans- fers,it stoodonlyninthin termsof actualforeigncollaborations.'6 Indiawill probablyneverenjoya floodof Japaneseinvestment on theor- derof theone thatflowedintoSoutheastAsia. Thatis notto say,however, thattherateof Japaneseinvestment willnotpickup,particularly iftheJapa- nese economyimprovesin the latter1990s, and especiallyin nicheareas requiring technologically competent laborsuch as softwaredevelopment in whichIndiahas a comparative advantage.Indeed,thereare signsthatcorpo- rateJapanis now readyto commita higherlevel of investment to Indiathan in thepast,withapprovedinvestment risingsharplyfrom1992 onward.In January 1995,Japandecidedto makea $1 billionlineof creditavailableto India in orderto stimulate tradebetweenthetwo. Because ofIndia's locationastridethemajortankerroutesoutoftheGulf, Japanhas also becomeincreasingly interested in India's role as a powerin theIndianOcean. Japanderivesabout70% of itsoil through thisroute,and itseconomywouldsuffer a devastating blowifsuppliesshouldbe interrupted foranylengthy period. India is perceivedby Japanto be a basicallystatus quo powerin theIndianOcean,one capableof contributing through itsnavy to thegeneralstability of thearea. As a nationthathas notdevelopeditsmilitary capabilitiescommensurably withitswealth,Japanalso has a basic interest in collectivesecurity through bodies such as theUnitedNations. As the U.N. role grows,it will prove 15. JapanEconomicResearchInstitute, TheLiberalizationofIndia's Economyand Japan's Tokyo,1993,p. 15. Contribution, 16. KamalendraKanwar,"WindsofChange,"in KamalendraKanwar,ed.,India-Japan:To- wardsa NewEra (New Delhi: UBS Publishers,1992),unnumbered tableson p. 9. This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  SANDY GORDON 889 increasingly to findenoughwell-trained difficult troopsfromnationspre- paredto sustainevenmoderatelevelsof casualties.The value ofnationsthat are preparedto take casualtieswas illustrated by the U.N. involvement in SomaliawhentheU.S. decidedto withdraw itsforcesafter18 liveswerelost. In thiscontext,countriessuchas Indiaand Pakistan,withlargeprofessional armedforces,willbe increasingly valuable. Indiahas an addedadvantagein the U.N. contextbecause its forcesare highlyexperiencedat supervising elections.In recognition ofIndia's emerging role,Japanhas recently become morereceptiveto Indiabecominga permanent memberof theU.N. Security Council. Of the ASEAN countries, India has had a reasonablyclose relationship withMalaysia since 1965 wheneach was opposedto Indonesia,albeitfor differentreasons. Aftera setbackfollowingIndia's recognitionof the Vietnamese-backed regimein Cambodiain 1980,the Indo-Malaysianrela- tionshipagainimproved.The two countries signeda broad-ranging defense MOU in 1993,and Indiais involvedin pilotand maintenance crewtraining for Malaysia's MiG-29s. Malaysiannuclearscientistsare trainedat the BhabhaAtomicResearchCentrein India. Indiannavyand air forcechiefs recentlyvisitedMalaysia,andMalaysiasupported IndiawhenDelhi success- fullyappliedforsectoral(trade)observerstatuswithASEAN. WhenPrime MinisterNarasimhaRao visitedKuala Lumpurin August,he signed a numberoftradeandinvestment agreements. Indiaalso is close to Singapore, whichis seekingto maintainits competitive edge in technicalareas,espe- cially softwaredevelopment.India, which is extremelycompetitivein softwaredevelopment, providesan ideal investment partner.Accordingto Indiais also regardedas a useful"hedge"in one seniorSingaporeanofficial, thecontextof Singapore'sheavycommitment in China.17Singaporehas re- in hightechnology centlydecidedto investsubstantially in India,andin 1994 thetwo countriesconducteda fourday anti-submarine warfarenaval exer- cise.18 EventhoseASEAN nationsnottraditionally close to Indiahavebeenmore accommodating to New Delhi in recentyears.Bangkokwas once suspicious ofIndiabecauseofThailand'sclosenessto China,whichit saw as a counter- weightto Vietnam.Thailand,likeIndia,is nowincreasingly concernedabout thegrowingChineseinfluence in Burma,however.In 1994,a Thai govern- mentstudyteamsuggestedthatIndiaand Sri Lanka shouldbe drawnintoa widerSoutheastAsian investment zone, and a Thai militarydelegationvis- itedIndiaand expressedan interestin purchasingmilitary equipment.Indo- 17. ConversationwithseniorSingaporeanofficial, December1993. 18. See M. Satish,"MilitaryTies withASEAN NationsImproving,"EconomicTimes,23 March 1994; CatherineOng, "SingaporeRegionalismWill Draw India and SoutheastAsia Closer-Prof Chan,"Reuters,6 January1995. This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  890 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1995 nesiais anotherASEAN country now drawingcloserto India. The twohave establisheda joint ministerial council,conductednaval exercises,and ex- changedhigh-levelmilitary visits. In 1994 PresidentSuhartovisitedNew Delhi fortheG-15 summit. One of thefactorsshapingASEAN's growinginterest in India is an undi- recteduneaseabouttheimminent emergence of Chinaas themajorregional nation-an unease givena measureof urgencyby Chineseclaims in the SouthChinaSea. Anydesireeverto balanceChinawithIndiawouldnever be openlyexpressedforfearofcreating unnecessaryrivalry and of alienating China,whichwillalwaysbe morepowerful thanIndia. It wouldlikelybe the case, however,thatASEAN would wish to see, over the longerterm,an emerging, statusquo powersuch as India exercisinga healthylevel of en- gagementin SoutheastAsia in orderto ensurethecontinuation of a multipo- larbalance in theEast/Southeast Asian region.The foreign ministers ofboth Singaporeand Malaysiahave now statedthattheywouldnotruleout India participating in theARF.19 India alreadyhas observerstatuswiththe"sec- ond track"CouncilforSecurityCooperationin Asia-Pacific(CSCAP). Fi- nally, the emergenceof a large middle class marketin India presents tempting prospectsforthesearchetypical nations.Two-waytradebe- trading tweenIndiaandASEAN roseby 30% in thefirst10 monthsof 1994,reflect- ingnew ASEAN interest in India's liberalizing economy.20 On India'spart,New Delhi wouldfavortheemergence ofa widerASEAN grouping,one thatnow includesVietnamand thatone day mightinclude Burma. Such a grouping wouldprovidea robustbarrieragainstanygreater assertiveness byChinaintheSoutheast Asianregion.A Burmatightly bound intoan economicallysecureASEAN would be an excellentoutcomefrom India's pointof view. In short,despitethefactsof recenthistory, thereare evolvinginterests in closer sets of relationson the partof boththe East/ SoutheastAsian powersand of India. This is manifest in a hecticroundof naval exercising,evolvingdefense-industrial arrangements (albeitat a low level),a buildupin theextentand level of bilateralcontacts,and expanding tradingand investment relationships. The "Geoeconomics"of Economic in India Liberalization The senseof isolationexperienced by India in theearlierphase of thepost- Cold Warperiodwas an important factorin persuading New Delhi to push ahead witheconomicreform moreresolutely thanit would otherwisehave 19. Ajoy Sen, "IndianPM to Discuss Business,Securityin Singapore,"ReutersNews Ser- vice,6 September1994; "India May Be Invitedto SecurityMeet,"IndianExpress,23 March 1994. MonetaryFund,Directionof TradeStatistics,1994 and March 1995. 20. International This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  SANDY GORDON 891 done. The beliefthatIndiais progressively losingoutto therapidlydevelop- ingeconomiesof East Asia, and especiallyChina,had a similareffect.Pro- vided India plays its economiccards well, however,it need not be too concernedaboutits somewhatisolatedpositionin worldtrade. The Indian government supportedtherecentGATT agreement, whichcouldsoon startto pay significantdividendsto Indiaby makingit partof a 123-nationliberal- ized tradingunit. APEC itselfis unlikelyto imposea preferential trading regimein theshort-term, giventhemanydifferences and tensionswithinthe organization.Moreover,India's internalmarketis potentially a large one, and providedthereforms continueto be pursuedat a reasonablerate,it is unlikelythatIndiawillneedto trawltheglobefortradebutrather thattrading partners will courtIndia. This optimismis borneout by India's excellentexportperformance over 1993-94 when exportsrose by 21% (althoughthe performance has been somewhatbluntedin recentmonths);by growingforeignexchangereserves, whichhave risenfromnextto nothing in 1990to $24 billion(includinggold reserves);and by the fact that industrygrew at over 8% in 1994-95. Althoughforeigndirectinvestment has notbeen as greatas thegovernment would have liked and is likelyto be restrained in the run-upto the 1996 nationalelection,totalforeigninvestment-at$10 billionoverthepast four years-has been running at a healthylevel.21 Over the longerterm,India's assets such as a strongmineralsresource base, a vigorouscommercial class,a largeskilledcohortof labor,and long- standingcapitalistinstitutions maystartto realizeimportant synergisms for the nation. India also has a traditional concernaboutmaintaining macro- economicstability notsharedby China. Whilethislimitsthepace of growth because interest ratesare so high,it also providesfora more stable,less inflationarygrowthpath. Thereare otherimportant differencesbetweenthe two. AlthoughIndiais comparatively energypoorcomparedwithChina,its agriculturehas betterprospectsoverthe longerterm.India is increasingly likelyto be a foodsurplusnation,notwithstanding a populationstillgrowing at a higherratethanChina's. It has only2.9 peopleperarablehectare,com- paredto 7.6 in China,22and all of India's arable land,unlikeChina's, is eitherlocatedintropicalor subtropical regionsandis thusamenableto multi- ple-cropping.India currently holdsfoodstocksof 32 milliontons. Finally, India will not be requiredto cross the "Rubicon"of democratization that Chinamayone dayhave to cross,possiblyat somecostto stability.Thatis notto saythatIndiawilleverbe as important a poweras China;itclearlywill 21. ReserveBank of India as reported in Reuters,23 June1995. 22. Indiais likelyto havea population of 1.5 billionbyabout2020,whichwillthenbe larger thanChina's. David Wallen,"India: Populationto Hit 1.5B," Reuters,18 August1994; Nafis Sidiq (UNFPA), Stateof WorldPopulation1990,unpaginated table,"Social Indicators." This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  892 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1995 thatfarfrombeingisolatedandineffective not. It is tomakethepoint,rather, as a resultof theendingof theCold War,India has gainedsome significant advantagesby openingup its economy-advantagesthatwill eventually al- low thesynergisms inherent to realizetheirpoten- in India's circumstances tial. The Balance withPakistan Aside fromthegeopoliticalshiftsrelating to Chinaoutlinedabove,thereare othergroundsforbelievingthatPakistanwill be progressively weakenedin relationto India as thedecade goes on. Since Pakistanis India's principal regionalcompetitor, thisprocessis likelyto yieldimportant consequencesin termsof theoverallIndianOcean powerbalance. As thelargerpowerwiththemoredevelopeddefense-industrial base,India will be capableovertimeof replacingmanyof thecheapweaponssupplied bytheSovietUnion. Pakistan,however,willhave considerably greaterdiffi- cultyin replacingthemilitary aid formerly profferedby theUnitedStates. As we have outlinedabove, India continuesto be able to deal withboth Russia and theUnitedStatesandthereby gainsomesignificant technologies. Pakistan,on theotherhand,had itsdealswiththeU.S. blocked,including the sale of the final28 F-16 and P3C Orion aerial reconnaissanceaircraft. Starvedforsparepartsforitsoriginal39 F-16s,it now has only24 of them operational.23 It has beenforcedto returnitsfleetofleasedU.S. frigates and destroyers and is requiredto lookaroundforexpensivereplacements. It also needs to replaceits agingFrenchsubmarines in a deal it can ill affordat nearly$1 billion.Dependingon theoutcomeofdeliberations nowbeingcon- ductedin theU.S. Congress,itmayeventually recoupthemoneyithas paid to theU.S. forthebalanceof itsF-16s andbe providedwiththeotherequip- mentowed to it,suchas theP-3C Orions. It will,however,be veryexpen- sive to obtainreplacements fortheF-16s,especiallysincePakistanhas been deniedaccess to Russianaircraft.The onlyviable optiontherefore, is the FrenchMirage2000-5,whichwouldcostconsiderably morethantheF-16.24 Althoughthe evolvingarmsrelationship withChina offersPakistansome prospectsforthefuture, especiallyin theconstructionofmainbattletanks,at themomentChinadoes nothave thenecessarytechnology to counteraddi- tionalarmsthatIndiamightacquirefromRussia,oreventhoseitmighteven- tuallybuilditselfsuchas warshipsand fighter aircraft.25 23. Fulgham,"IndianAir ForceFaces ToughChoices,"p. 41. 24. Because of thecost,Pakistanhas beenforcedto reducetheproposedacquisitionfrom44 to 24. (DefenseNews,31 July-6August1995.) 25. Althoughcommentators tendto be skepticalaboutIndia's abilityto producea fighter, arenowoftheviewthatitis capableofdoingso technologically, U.S. officials providedthatthe government can fundtheLCA project. This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  SANDY GORDON 893 The growing disparity between IndiaandPakistan has hadtheeffect of making Islamabad clingmoretenaciously thaneverto itsnuclearweapons program. Pakistan is nowdriven bythebeliefthatnuclear weapons represent theonlymeansofretaining a roughstrategic parity withIndia. Thereis a measure oftruth in this,butonlyup to a pointandin a somewhat abstract way.Inanynuclear equation thatevolvesinSouthAsia,Indiawillbe signif- icantly morepowerful thanPakistan, mostprobably by a factorof at least threeorfourinterms ofnumbers ofwarheads andbombs.Thisinequality willbe compounded byPakistan's lackofstrategic depth andballistic missile andspacetechnology inrelation toIndia. India'sinherent strategicsuperiority innuclear weaponsoffers NewDelhi a calculusin whichit has an areaof latitude in itsmilitary dealingswith Pakistan within whichitmayact,ifsufficiently provoked, withconfidence thatPakistan wouldnotreactwitha nuclear weapon,lestitbringaboutits own4 destruction.Indiacould,forexample, conduct "hotpursuit" ofKashmiri militantsintoPakistan orevenattack militant training campswithlittle pros- pectofa Pakistan nuclearreaction. It couldprobably not,however, attack thePakistani heartland andforcePakistan intoa position inwhichits"back wereto thewall." However, Indiahas no desireto do so. It wouldgain nothing byhaving tooccupyandholdterritory withmillions moreMuslims. Conversely, Pakistan is constrained initsabilitytomount evena minor attack on Indiabythelatter's superiority in conventional terms.It is inthissense thatthenotionofa nuclear "equalizer," whileitprobably offersPakistan a perceptual is crutch, somewhat abstract in terms of itsactualapplication. GiventhattheIndianeconomy is already sixtimeslarger thanPakistan's andIndiais 7.5timeslarger inpopulation, timeis likely tobe onIndia'sside nowthatPakistan haslostthepropprovided bytheUnited States.Pakistan's problem inorder is that, tomaintain eventheperception ofparity withIndia, itis requiredtospendmassively onthemilitary, andalready, nearly63% of Pakistan'sgovernment spending is devoted todebtservicing andthemilitary. Economic growth, whichneedstobe over5% giventhepopulation growth rateofover3%,willbe difficult tosustain atanywhere nearthatlevelwith- outsubstantialspending onbadlyneededinfrastructure andthesocialsector. Femaleliteracy is verylowat21%,only14%ofcouplesacceptanyform of family planning,andthesocialstructure inmanyareasofthenation is semi- feudal.Increasingly, hard-pressed governments ofwhatever persuasion will needto address thesepressing economic andsocialissuesattheexpenseof militaryspending. Thetensions generated bythesecircumstances arealready tosur- starting faceinPakistan.Chronic violenceinKarachi, Pakistan's premier industrial center,is alreadytending to turnawayinvestment andrestrain economic growth, despitePakistan'ssoundeconomicperformance in adjusting its This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  894 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXV,NO. 10,OCTOBER1995 macroeconomic settings.Thereis mounting evidencethatthisviolenceis at leastin partdue to theescalatingsocial and economicproblemsof thecity. In thecontextof the 1994 budget,PrimeMinisterBhuttowas forcedto de- clarepubliclythatPakistanwouldnotevenattempt to keeppace withIndia's 1994 defensehikeof 20% in nominalterms(about9% real). Bhuttoconse- quentlypeggedPakistan'spubliclydeclareddefensespendingto a nominal 8.6% rise,whichrepresented a fallof about4% in real terms.26Although defensespendingrose by 15% in nominaltermsin the 1995 budget(about 2% real),Pakistanwas forcedto breakitsaccordwiththeIMF to achievethis level. In thesecircumstances, Islamabadmay eventually be forcedto accept a kindofmodusvivendion theKashmirproblem.It is alreadyhavingto recog- nize thatit will needto continueto workwiththeUnitedStates,despitethe widespreadbeliefthatitwas unceremoniously "dumped"by Washington af- tertheendoftheCold War.27GiventhewaytheKashmirissueis embedded in domesticpoliticson bothsides,however,theprocessof acceptanceis not likelyto happenin thenearterm.The realization thatsomeformofcompro- mise withIndia is necessarymaycome aboutsmoothlyand naturally, or it mayhave to be forceduponPakistanby meansof a highlydestabilizing se- ries of shocks,perhapseven involvinganotherwar withIndia. Howeverit mayhappen,theimmediate future withdangerforbothsides. But is fraught thedangeris fargreater forPakistan, whichis theweakerpowerandwhichin thefinalanalysiscannotaffordtheluxuryof maintaining strategic equality withIndia,givenall theotherpressingdemandson its exchequer. Conclusion Far fromhavinglost out as a resultof the end of the Cold War, India is poisedto emergein theearly21stcentury as a farmoreimportant and influ- entialpowerin theIndianOcean region,andevenglobally,thanitwas in the latterpartof the 20th. Some of the constraining factorsin India's rise to power,particularly domesticand regionalSouthAsian instability, are still presentand will continueto snap at India's heels forsome yearsto come. But theend of theCold War has also enabledIndia to jettisonsome of the moreburdensome foreignandeconomicpoliciesthathadconstrained itin the past. 26. See DefenseNews, 10 June1994, p. 13; and RobertKarnoil,"PakistanBudgetSeeks Real-TermGrowth," Jane'sDefenceWeekly, 16 July1994. Some have arguedthatIndia's rise was notso high. However,thisclaimdependson a RevisedEstimateto Budgetmeasurement. On a budget-to-budgetbasis therisewas in fact20% nominal. 27. SaminaYasmeen,"Pakistan'sCautiousForeignPolicy,"Survival,36:2 (Summer1994), passim. Pakistanhas conducteda numberofjointnaval and armyexerciseswiththeU.S. This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  SANDY GORDON 895 In foreignpolicyIndiahas emergedas a farmorepragmatic power,more willingto serveitsfundamental economicand trading interests, less engaged in sanctimonious moralizing.In economicmanagement ithas adoptedliber- alizingpoliciesthatpromisea highergrowthpath,a moreintensiveengage- mentin worldmarkets, and fargreateraccess to state-of-the-art technologies. In time,theseadvantageswill likelyflowintothedefenseindustries, at least in part.Loss of access to cheapoff-the-shelf Sovietweaponsis alreadyforc- ingIndiato adoptmorerealisticand rationalapproachesto theformation of its defense-industrial basis. The end of the Cold War and the adoptionof moreflexibleforeignand economicpolicies also open up the prospectof morerewarding withtheUnitedStatesandwiththeWestgener- relationships ally,powersthatarevitalforIndia's access to markets, technology, andcapi- tal. In time,too,theWestis likelyto acceptquietlyIndia's nuclearstatus, thusallowingNew Delhi's setsofrelationships withkeyWesterncapitalsto reflect fullyIndia's emerging roleas themostimportant playerin the littoral IndianOcean. Indiais also likelyto developclosersetsofrelationships withitsSoutheast Asianneighbors.Whilethisprocessis notlikelyto be rapid,it is one thatis alreadyevident,and it promisesnotonlyto bringimportant economicgains butalso to leave Indialess isolatedinternationally thanit has been in recent years.Noris Indiawithout resourcesin theGulfand Southwest Asia. These regionsrepresent highlyheterodox notall ofwhicharewhollysup- interests, portiveof Pakistanor its close relationship withSaudi Arabia. Conversely, Pakistan,whichhas longbeenIndia's onlyseriouscompetitor in SouthAsia, has lost out seriouslyas a resultof theend of the Cold War. While India suffers frominternal Pakistan'sproblemsarepotentially instability, farmore serious. As a power,Indiawill thusstandincreasingly alone in theIndianOcean, unlikethemajornationsofthePacificwherefourlargepowersrubshoulders and to an extentbalanceeach other.Withtheend of theCold War and the diminution oftheroleofextraregional IndianOcean powers,India'srolewill be increasingly exposedto view. Givenbasic factsof geography, it is diffi- cultforIndiaand Chinaseriouslyto contesteach other'spowerthrough con- ventional means. Indiais thuslikelyto emergeas theonlylargeAsianpower notseriouslychallengedregionally.Eventhoughitsindicators suggestitwill neverbe as powerfulas China,thebasic geostrategic advantageafforded by India'slocationawayfrommajorcentersofglobalpowershouldnotbe over- lookedin assessingits future. This content downloaded from 193.104.110.53 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions