Ecological Economics of Degrowth (2012) PDF

Ecological Economics 84 (2012) 172–180 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Ecological...

journal homepage: Introduction The economics of degrowth Giorgos Kallis a, Christian Kerschner b,⁎, Joan Martinez-Alier c a ICREA and Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA), b Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals, Universitat c Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA), Universitat a r t i c l e i n f o a Article history: Economic Received 17 August 2012 come Accepted 19 August 2012 What Available online 21 September 2012 economy? economic Keywords: Degrowth This Money ecological Debt Happiness Employment Property Ecological macroeconomics 1. Introduction Like it or not, the West may have entered a period of prolonged re- cession. Whether this is a temporary or a new permanent state is hard to know. Ecological limits, exhaustion of investment outlets in mature economies, the burden of debt and geo-economic shifts point to a struc- tural crisis (Kallis et al., 2009; Wallerstein, 2010). For the environment this is not bad news (Martinez-Alier, 2009): less growth means less ma- terial consumption, less CO2 emissions and less habitat destruction; a last late chance to stay within the safe limits of global ecosystems (Rockström et al., 2009). But socially this can be a catastrophe. Growth economies do not know how to degrow. They collapse. Growth above a level that satisﬁes basic needs does not improve psychological wellbeing (Easterlin et al., 2010). It also has more costs than beneﬁts, especially environmental (Daly, 1996). Lack of growth on the other hand leads to a spiral of debt, unemployment and deterioration of social welfare. The core question for 21st century economics is no longer how nations get rich, but how they “manage without growth” (Victor, 2008), i.e. how can degrowth become stable and prosperous (Jackson, 2009). Mainstream and most heterodox economics ignore this question, since for them growth is an axiomatic necessity (Georgescu-Roegen, 1977). The recent crisis is seen as a regular, periodic crisis of capitalism and the recipes debated—“auster- ity” versus “Keynesian expansion”—are the same as in terity policies are failing badly in Southern Europe. They are ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (C. Kerschner). ond (on the issue of degrowth and democracy) at the journal Futures. reserved. Introduction 173 countries to continue buying oil and commodities, but only by further increasing their debt and current account deﬁcits. The debt burden grew especially in rich countries with stable or declining manufacturing sectors, where a lot of that “new money” was used in fuelling a housing bubble. Eventually the weakest borrowers (sub-prime mortgages in the US), could no longer afford to pay the increasingly high energy and com- modity prices plus the interests on their loans. The housing bubble burst and bad debt accumulated as the economy entered recession. Is there evidence for these theories? Has there been a decoupling of oil and money supply, and has this caused the crisis? There are indications of non-increasing oil supplies in the 2000s, but it is contested whether this was due to geological limitations (the approaching peak-oil) (Chanel, 2012; Lewis, 2010; Murphy and Balogh, 2009; Theramus, 2009) and a de- creasing EROI (Hall and Klitgaard, 2011) or due to a deliberate (and mis- guided) underinvestment of Arab countries in a new capacity to pump oil (Smith, 2009). The oil price hike of 2008 and the rising prices throughout the 2000s could be an indication of tightening oil supplies. But they could as well be the result of growth in aggregate global demand, rise in de- mand for oil per se (perhaps related to concerns about future restrictions), speculation or capital ﬂows to the oil futures market (Hamilton, 2009; Kilian, 2007; Smith, 2009). Caballero et al. (2008) offer a different theory: after the Asian crisis excess savings in Asia and the Arab world found their way to the more developed U.S. ﬁnancial markets, lowering interest rates and fuelling the housing bubble. With the bust of the latter, capital ﬂowed to commodities markets, which (temporarily) collapsed however with the 2009 global recession. The timing of changes in the U.S. current ac- count deﬁcit and oil prices, and the fact that not only oil, but all commod- ity prices spiked together in 2008 supports a ‘capital ﬂows’ story. Unlike Douthwaite's theory, here the source of easy money is not excess loans or deliberate monetary easing, but excess accumulation in the rest of the world. Independent of the causes of the rise in oil prices (supply, de- mand or capital ﬂows), Hamilton (2009) shows that without their in- crease, the U.S. would not have entered into a recession in 2007–8. Rising oil prices increased the cost of commuting and foreclosure rates in suburban areas and reduced consumer spending and car purchases, precipitating a recession (Hamilton, 2009; Kaufmann et al., 2010). 2.2. Is Prosperous Degrowth Feasible? Economic degrowth can be unstable. It can lead to unemployment, therefore to a lack of effective demand, resulting in even more unem- ployment, more state expenditures for unemployment beneﬁts and a ﬁscal crisis of the state (Jackson, 2009). However, nobody in the DG lit- erature is preaching degrowth forever. As Kerschner (2010) has shown the debate between DG and proponents of a SSE (going back to Georgescu-Roegen's excessive strictures against Herman Daly) is false: degrowth is the path of transition to a lower steady-state. But should the steady-state be lower than today or can we do with zero growth at current levels? Jackson (2009) calls for prosperity ‘without’ growth, but his own “arithmetic of growth” shows that save for a technological miracle, degrowth is unavoidable. With current rates of growth, reaching the 450 ppm climate stabilisation target by 2050 would re- quire carbon efﬁciency improvements (C/$) that are 10 times faster each year than is currently the case. ‘Growth as usual’ is unrealistic, Jackson (2009) argues, since this would require an unprecedented pace of technological progress. Yet, ‘without growth’ the required level of efﬁciency improvements would still need to be 8 times faster than now. This is also incredibly high. It follows that a combination of degrowth and efﬁciency improvements is therefore necessary. Objections abound. One is that degrowth and efﬁciency are not inde- pendent. Degrowth can slow down the carbon efﬁciency of the econo- my by reducing investment in renewables. Degrowth may also create unemployment, reduce state expenditures and reduce social welfare (van den Bergh, 2011). D'Alessandro et al. (2010) have addressed the ﬁrst concern with a neo-classical dynamic model. They found that the sustainability window of the economy becomes wider by low GDP Introduction that the dramatic reduction in resource consumption necessary to avoid climate—and other dangerous environmental—change can be achieved while (or, by) expanding to the whole of the world the com- fortable life-style enjoyed today by a small, ecologically-minded West- ern elite. Perhaps this is a more saleable vision than degrowth to Western middle/high-classes and (a few) elite politicians. But can any- one be convinced that this is feasible? Victor (2012-this issue) states the obvious: the production of low-intensity commodities—Schor's fabu- lous clothes, smart gadgets and alternative travels—consume high in- tensity intermediates (for an energetic explanation of the heaviness of supposedly light market services see Odum and Odum, 2001). The IPAT arithmetic of Jackson (2009) and the model of Victor (2012-this issue) also show that an unprecedented level of degrowth is necessary if we are serious about averting climate change. Will it be possible to have 75% less employment (Victor's calculations for Canada) and still wear fabulous clothes? DG advocates have a different vision of prosperity, one based on dra- matically less material abundance and consumption. They are less afraid of hair shirts, so to speak. Their vision is informed by models of voluntary simplicity (Alexander, 2011), such as co-housing projects (Lietaert, 2010) or ecological communes (Cattaneo and Gavaldà, 2010). The prop- osition is that since the people who live there consume minimally and are happy with their lives, the rest of the world could do the same too. There are two problems with this view: one of false extrapolation and one of political naiveté. Simple living in peripheral communities today relies on the surplus—and the products and infrastructures—provided by the rest of the industrial economy. As Andre Gorz (1994) put it, the whole industrial system is embedded in the radio (see computer today) of a commune. Scaling up existing voluntary simplicity experi- ences to the societal level may entail much more hardship than what members of individual projects experience today. Some voluntary downshifters do not mind such hardship. But these are typically people who had a choice between simplicity and meaningless afﬂuence. It does not follow that others, such as those who never had the choice, or those that enjoy their power, will not mind either. 2.3. Psychological Well-being and Degrowth From the literature on happiness economics we know that: i) in the long-run happiness does not increase with national income, ii) in inter- national comparisons, and for countries that have satisﬁed basic needs, the level of happiness does not vary much with national income (Easterlin et al., 2010). Why? First, because happiness is adaptive and positional; as everyone gets richer, no one gets happier (Hirsch, 1976). Second, because after satisfying basic needs happiness is derived from qualities of life that do not necessarily correlate with wealth. The policy implications are stark: a more equal distribution of income and investment in public services that make a difference in the quality of life, can have greater welfare effects than generalised growth. In the growth. Per- short-term however, a crisis and a sudden loss of income do reduce happiness levels (Easterlin et al., 2010). Much depends on how high material aspirations initially are, how quickly aspirations adapt to new circumstances and how (perceived) equality in the loss makes it easier to accept (Matthey, 2010). If money does not buy happiness, then why do people still try to get richer? At the individual level income does correlate with happiness: richer people report higher levels of happiness. This can be due to posi- tional consumption or because welfare goods in market societies cost a lot. Is this always and everywhere so? Masferrer-Dodas et al. (2012-this issue) look at an unusual cross-section of people: a Tsimane tribe in the Bolivian Amazon. They are a small-scale foraging-horticultural commu- nity only partly introduced to outside money and goods. Data collected from Nowhere sector”. among 600 adults shows no statistical correlation between market con- Economics. Tim Jackson sumption and wellbeing. This suggests that a relationship between wear hair shirts to create a money and happiness may be a particular feature of the market soci- eties studied by previous surveys. That is, there is no universal causal Introduction 175 institution who would then sell the rights to fossil fuel producers that need them to cover their emissions output for the given year. This could take the form of a Global Climate Trust, instituted by the UN/ G20, acting in essence as a cartel of oil consumers. The incentive for fuel producers to join such a scheme, Douthwaite argues, is that al- though their output would be reduced each year, the price paid would increase to maintain their income. Long-term stability would be gained, by easing the commodity price induced boom and bust cy- cles of the world economy, at the expense of short-term proﬁts. One wonders though, if a ‘cap and share’ system is such a win–win solu- tion why is it not adopted yet? The political economy of such a reform and the obstacles by the interests that stand to lose must be much more complex than Douthwaite allows in his analysis. 3.2. Non-debt Money and Regional Currencies Douthwaite proposes also creating non-debt money. Various communities have had non-debt forms of money in the past. An in- dependent currency authority should be responsible for the issuing of new money since governments can succumb to political pressures and issue more money. Even better, such systems should operate at the regional scale, under a reference currency (such as the Euro in Europe). This would allow regional devaluations, restrain spatially the circulation of wealth, maintain sufﬁcient liquidity and reduce the vulnerability of regions to monetary problems elsewhere. Re- gional currencies should not be backed by promises, as this would imply a debt. Some issuers may promise to deliver real things, such as energy or electricity that people can buy through bonds with their regional currency. Such regional energy bonds could promise to pay the bearer the price of a speciﬁc number of kWh on the day they mature, money coming for the payments made by people to buy energy from the plant that the bond will ﬁnance. These bonds will not circulate as money. But once the energy plant starts supply- ing power its managing committee could as well turn it into a sort of bank, issuing energy “notes” that the locals could use for buying and selling goods, secured in the knowledge that the note has real value as it could always be used to pay energy bills. Douthwaite discusses also complementary user-created curren- cies such as the existing Local Exchange and Trading Systems (LETS) or time-banks. Complementary currencies can keep a greater portion of the economic product circulating locally, and strengthen localised economies, a key aspect of degrowth. They can be put also in good ef- fect in times of liquidity crises. There is a lot of ongoing empirical re- search on the advantages and disadvantages of complementary community currencies (Fantacci, 2005; North, 2007; Seyfang, 2001), and even a specialised journal on the topic. 3.3. Zero Interest Rates living”; com- Dirk Loehr (2012-this issue) complements Douthwaite's proposal for debt-free money, by re-discovering Silvio Gesell's proposal for zero- interest “free money” (Gesell, 1958 ). This calls for neutralising the liquidity premium by putting artiﬁcial costs on money. While in the short-term zero interest rates may push economic growth, in the long run they will go hand in hand with a low proﬁt rate of real assets. The rising supply of capital will make not only the interest rate of money, but also the proﬁt rate (of real capital) converge to zero. Margin- al savings will be discouraged by negative interest rates, which will halt investment or even cause disinvestment e.g. by downscaling business operations. In such a zero-growth steady state, the whole economy will be consumed: there will not be any net investment or saving, only replacement of the capital stock consumed. Some individuals will still save, but the aggregate savings rate will be zero. This would in effect bring what Keynes (1972a ) called “the euthanasia of the rentier” and the end of accumulation. The problem, that Keynes noted, is that other capital assets (land, gold) could take the role of money and Introduction sector (e.g. see Victor, 2012-this issue) may not be as bad as it sounds, if alternative non-paid work forms emerge to give people meaningful lives (Kallis, in press). Nierling (2012-this issue) argues that many people engage in ‘mixed work’, combining ﬂexibly paid work with uncommodiﬁed activities of their choice, such as do-it-yourself, volun- tary and family work. To understand their motivations and perceptions, she studies participants at a Centre for Creativity in a large German town. The centre offers people an infrastructure and a setting to create (without payment) products for their own use, handicrafts and other do-it-yourself items. Her empirical ﬁndings show that unpaid work of property rights by insti- can play a signiﬁcant role in one's personal well-being. Recognition —legal, performance-related, and personal—is central for the percep- tion of unpaid work by those practicing it. Beyond this optimistic view of unpaid work, Nierling warns that not all members of society have an equal opportunity to pursue this alterna- tive or to enjoy personal recognition. Related is the interest in the DG lit- erature to a guaranteed Basic Citizens’ Income (Alexander, 2011; Schneider et al., 2010), a proposal largely absent from NE. This is a monthly stipend granted upon birth to all citizens of a nation, and ﬁ- nanced through taxation (Raventós, 2007). A basic income provides a minimum safety net to all citizens, reduces the compulsion for—and the importance of—paid employment (and hence the social distress from unemployment) and provides opportunities for low-intensity, non-enumerated (uncommodiﬁed) activities, including political partic- ipation. Unlike a minimum wage, the Basic Income is a fundamental new way of distributing national product and surplus. Total production may fall as the cost of labour increases, but this is not bad from a degrowth perspective if leisure increases wellbeing and offsets losses from less paid work and consumption (remember Bilancini and D'Alessandro, 2012-this issue). Declining national product however may threaten the ﬁnancing of the Basic Income. 3.6. Innovative Models of Local Living The economic culture promoted in DG writings is close to what Carlsson and Manning (2010) call “nowtopias”. These are communities of conscious withdrawal from capitalist culture with a concerted rejec- tion of its value form. Such ‘post-capitalist’ spaces of interest include food consumer–producer cooperatives, urban (food) gardens, pirate programmers, non-money markets of exchange or time-banks, and var- ious forms of sharing (co-housing, squats, couch-surﬁng, shared cars, shared community spaces, tool-sharing). Such practices are often characterised by a conscious deﬁance of the capitalist institutions of pri- vate property and wage labour and the logic of exchange-for-proﬁt. But some of them have also been practised by needy people for a long time (food gardens, barter, taking your own bedding and sleeping on the ﬂoor while travelling for work). In fact, capitalism has relied on the un- paid domestic sector for the reproduction of the labour force. However, from a degrowth perspective these practices are interesting because they invert the logic of commodiﬁcation, they might build on convivial- ity and they tend to be less resource-intense than their market equiva- lents. Are these alternative modes of production the seeds of a future degrowth economy? And how important are they already? Conill et al. (2012) provide one of the most comprehensive socio- logical studies of non-capitalist practices to date. A commissioned telephone survey in the city of Barcelona shows that more than 20% of the population have engaged recently with 10 or more, out of a list of 26, non-capitalist practices. 18.8% of people have grown some food for themselves, 16.9% have exchanged services without money (21.3% helped others ﬁx their house) and 34% have shared digital or electro-domestic equipment with non-family members (17.6% have shared their cars). Beyond such ‘traditional’ non-capitalist practices, there is evidence of a core degrowth economic culture in formation: 9% of respondents are members of a consumer cooperative, 7% have participated in community gardening, 2.3% have used community currencies and 2% participate in an ethical or cooperative bank. Introduction 177 and control most public goods, would be called “socialism”. It entails a very strong State. Second, there is the issue of experienced history as opposed to theo- retical possibility. There is little evidence of absolute dematerialisation (Jackson, 2009; Kallis, 2011; Wallerstein, 2010), though one could argue that we won't know if it's possible to dematerialise until serious caps and taxes are implemented (van den Bergh, 2011). More importantly, however, the history of capitalism is one of dramatic ups and downs. Pe- riods of unprecedented growth are followed by catastrophic crises of value destruction (including by war) clearing the ground for fresh accu- mulation (Harvey, 2010). Prices are not adjusted so much by the market, as they are by crises and devaluations, at the peril of the most vulnerable segments of the population (Klitgaard and Krall, 2012-this issue). Creative destruction is the distinctive feature of capitalism (Schumpeter, 2009 ). Capitalism does degrow, but not by choice and not stably. A smooth price adjustment to an externally imposed limitation, such as a cap, is therefore unlikely (Klitgaard and Krall, 2012-this issue). Third, State bureaucracies and policies are not exogenous, but en- dogenous to the dynamics of capitalist systems. Following the French ‘regulation’ school of thought, Klitgaard and Krall (2012-this issue) talks of periodic, stable “social structures of accumulation”, i.e. institu- tional State-market assemblages that work to maintain the conditions for accumulation. This included labour unions in the “Fordist” model of accumulation. Technological and economic changes and the crisis of the 1970s rendered obsolete this Statist mode of regulation that some called a “corporatist” model. It survived to some extent in Central Eu- rope but a new variety of capitalism, the “neo-liberal” era that ensued brought deregulation, privatisation and an expansion of private proper- ty and market institutions (Harvey, 2010; Klitgaard and Krall, 2012-this issue) Such historical political-economic dynamics pose obstacles to the return to the interventionist State called upon by SSE, NE or DG advo- cates. How States conform to the requirements for accumulation is a complicated issue. One can note though the dependence of political parties on private funding, or the centrality of economic growth in mak- ing inequality tolerable and maintaining the legitimacy of the State (Hirsch, 1976). Powerful private interests do coalesce and organise po- litically to make sure that no limitations, such as caps or basic incomes, stand in the way of their proﬁts. What about labour and women rights, the 40 hours’ workweek, so- cial security or free healthcare? Weren't these unthinkable reforms at the time that compromised the proﬁts of powerful vested interests? Blauwhof (2012-this issue) argues that reforms are possible, but specu- lates that nothing sort of a ‘revolution’ (which he doesn't specify) will bring them about. There is historical evidence supporting the claim that it takes radical agendas to take power in order to bring about re- formist policies (e.g. Gorostiza et al., 2012). In many cases such radical agendas have come through electoral and social pressure. But who, why and how would organise collectively to demand changes in the di- rection of prosperous degrowth? political 4.2. Social Movements This question is largely ignored by the SSE or NE literatures, which implicitly deposit proposals to ‘enlightened policymakers’. They lack a a “natural capitalism”, i.e. theory of how their proposed reforms could become socio-politically and “Natural Capi- hegemonic. Jackson (2009) for example, analyses excellently the further. To a large ex- socio-institutional path-dependencies that perpetuate unsustainable hydroelectric dams have growth policies. Yet he is silent on the social and political actors or for appropriation of the processes that will bring a society without growth. Similarly, carbon absorption, mar- TEEB project and discussed Lawn (2011) or Douthwaite (2012-this issue) do not explain who, are rather positive to- how and why would demand and set global or national carbon caps. It is not clear who is the ‘political subject’ that will be mobilised and market system”, as de- struggle socially and politically for the advocated reforms. They tend to crit- of values that govern our Speth (2012-this issue) does better and emphasises the centrality of The NE seems relatively political, rather than policy, change. He is also aware of its difﬁculty given the weakening of the State under neo-liberal globalisation and Introduction linking them together under theories of capitalism. Also at the level of ideas: how did the idea/discourse of growth become so- cially dominant and how does it reproduce its hegemony? Why and how do economists and economics perpetuate the “growth fetish” (Hamilton, 2003)? 4. Policy assessments. Worksharing, basic income, alternative cur- rencies, etc. Which are the advantages and disadvantages of these policies and how do their outcomes depend on contextual conditions? Under which speciﬁcations and contexts will they fa- cilitate prosperous degrowth, and under which may they pro- mote more accumulation and growth? What do we learn from disciplines that have already modelled or studied empirically the implementation of such policies? 5. Economic and metabolic scenarios. What would plausible degrowth futures at the national, regional or local level look like? How much would people work, paid and unpaid, how much materials, food calories or energy would they consume, how efﬁcient would they be in their production, how many will they be? This is an exer- cise of putting numbers to degrowth proposals (e.g. Sorman and Giampietro, in press; Victor, 2012-this issue). 6. Country comparisons and econometrics. Whereas several nations have experienced recession or prolonged lack of growth, some have fared socially and environmentally better than others. Why do some countries collapse while others remain stable, or even prosper without growth? This research question begs the use of suitable metrics of prosperous degrowth, along the lines initiated by O'Neill (2012-this issue). 7. History and anthropology. Which past societies organised to avoid accumulation and growth, or to downscale? Why, when and how? What can we learn from “original afﬂuent societies” (as Marshall Sahlins, 1972 called them), working a few hours of work? What are the institutional, cultural and environmental characteristics of such non-capitalist societies? 8. Crisis, degrowth and happiness. Different people experience the loss of income incurred by the crisis in different ways. Who and how adapts to a loss of income, and under what contextual conditions? Why do some people fare better psychologically than others under the same stresses? How do aspirations or unattainable goals (Kerschner, 2010; Wrosch, 2003), ideologies, life-styles or other socio-economic characteristics affect adaptability to con- sumption losses? Do equality, degree of justice or social capital fa- cilitate adaptability to deteriorating economic conditions? 9. Nowtopias. Why do some people—voluntarily or involuntarily— downshift and experiment with non-capitalist practices? What are their characteristics? How do they organise in collectives or net- works? When do these initiatives succeed and propagate and when do they fail? Can such localised experiences be scaled up? Do participants politicise through engagement and form a shared ex- perience of class? How do they interact with government and au- thorities? How do they interact with non-participants that do not necessarily share the same values? How do they handle their po- tential re-assimilation by the system and the commodiﬁcation of the new values they create? 10. Population. The present issue contains no article on population growth or degrowth. We know however that it is likely that world population might peak by 2045 or 2050, at less than 9 bil- lion. Fertility is falling quickly where it is still above 2, and re- mains below 2 in many countries. On the other hand, humans live longer lives. One may be alarmed by the population growth still ahead of us, or rather we should start thinking on new ques- tions. What are the advantages of regional depopulation for the environment and wellbeing? How do regions adapt to depopula- tion and ageing populations? How may economic degrowth af- fect fertility, live expectancy, immigration and population in general? 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