National Resilience Strategy Call for Evidence PDF 2021

‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ The‌‌National‌‌Resilience‌‌ Strategy‌ ‌ A‌‌Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 1‌ ‌  ‌...

‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ The‌‌National‌‌Resilience‌‌ Strategy‌ ‌ A‌‌Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 1‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ©‌‌Crown‌‌copyright‌‌2021‌ ‌ Produced‌‌by‌‌Cabinet‌‌Office‌ ‌ ‌‌ You‌ ‌may‌ ‌re-use‌ ‌this‌ ‌information‌ ‌(excluding‌ ‌logos)‌ ‌free‌ ‌of‌ ‌charge‌ ‌in‌ ‌any‌ ‌format‌ ‌or‌‌ medium,‌ ‌under‌ ‌the‌ ‌terms‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌Open‌ ‌Government‌ ‌Licence.‌ ‌To‌ ‌view‌ ‌this‌ ‌licence,‌‌ visit‌ ‌http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/‌ ‌or‌ ‌email:‌‌ [email protected]‌ ‌ Where‌ ‌we‌ ‌have‌ ‌identified‌‌any‌‌third‌‌party‌‌copyright‌‌material‌‌you‌‌will‌‌need‌‌to‌‌obtain‌‌ permission‌‌from‌‌the‌‌copyright‌‌holders‌‌concerned.‌ ‌ Alternative‌ ‌format‌ ‌versions‌ ‌of‌ ‌this‌ ‌document‌ ‌are‌ ‌available‌ ‌on‌ ‌request‌ ‌from‌‌ [email protected].‌ ‌ ‌ 2‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ About‌‌this‌‌call‌‌for‌‌evidence‌ ‌ ‌ To:‌ ‌ The‌ ‌Government‌ ‌invites‌ ‌anyone‌ ‌in‌ ‌the‌ ‌United‌‌ Kingdom‌‌with‌‌an‌‌interest‌‌or‌‌views‌‌in‌‌the‌‌subject‌‌to‌‌ engage‌‌with‌‌this‌‌consultation.‌‌ ‌ ‌ Where‌ ‌specific‌ ‌questions‌ ‌are‌ ‌deemed‌ ‌suited‌ ‌to‌ ‌a‌‌ certain‌ ‌audience‌ ‌(e.g.‌ ‌research‌ ‌organisations,‌‌ business‌ ‌owners‌ ‌and‌ ‌professionals,‌ ‌or‌‌Category‌‌1‌‌ and‌‌2‌‌responders),‌‌this‌‌is‌‌indicated.‌‌ ‌ Respondents‌ ‌are‌ ‌not‌ ‌obliged‌ ‌to‌ ‌answer‌ ‌all‌‌ questions‌‌apart‌‌from‌‌the‌‌About‌‌You‌‌and‌‌Vision‌‌and‌‌ Principles‌ ‌sections‌ ‌and‌ ‌may‌ ‌select‌ ‌which‌ ‌other‌‌ questions/sections‌‌to‌‌answer.‌ ‌ Duration:‌ ‌ From‌‌13‌‌July‌‌2021‌‌to‌‌27‌‌September‌‌2021‌ ‌ Enquiries‌‌to:‌ ‌ Email:‌‌[email protected]‌ ‌ To‌‌respond‌‌to‌‌this‌‌call‌‌for‌‌evidence‌‌please‌‌fill‌‌in‌‌the‌‌ How‌‌to‌‌respond:‌ ‌ online‌ ‌survey‌ ‌on‌ ‌GOV.UK‌ ‌or,‌ ‌by‌ ‌exception,‌ ‌email‌‌ [email protected]‌ including‌ ‌any‌ ‌supporting‌ ‌documents.‌ ‌The‌ ‌closing‌‌ date‌ ‌for‌ ‌evidence‌ ‌is‌ ‌27‌ ‌September‌ ‌2021.‌ ‌All‌‌ responses‌ ‌must‌ ‌be‌ ‌received‌ ‌by‌ ‌the‌ ‌Department‌‌ before‌ ‌the‌ ‌closing‌ ‌date,‌ ‌otherwise‌ ‌they‌‌will‌‌not‌‌be‌‌ considered.‌ ‌ Postal‌‌submissions‌‌will‌‌not‌‌be‌‌considered.‌ Response‌‌paper:‌ ‌ A‌ ‌response‌ ‌to‌ ‌this‌ ‌consultation‌ ‌is‌ ‌due‌ ‌to‌ ‌be‌‌ published‌ ‌by‌ ‌27‌ ‌December‌ ‌2021‌ ‌on‌ ‌the‌ ‌Cabinet‌‌ Office‌‌website.‌ ‌ 3‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ Contents‌ ‌ About‌‌this‌‌‌call‌‌for‌‌evidence‌ 3‌ ‌ Contents‌ 4‌ ‌ Foreword‌ 6‌ ‌ Executive‌‌Summary‌ 7‌ ‌ The‌‌Resilience‌‌Strategy‌‌Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌ 8‌ ‌ The‌‌Integrated‌‌Review‌ 8‌ ‌ A‌‌New‌‌National‌‌Resilience‌‌Strategy‌ 8‌ ‌ Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌ 9‌ ‌ The‌‌Case‌‌for‌‌Reform‌ 10‌ ‌ Resilience:‌‌definitions‌ 1‌1‌ ‌ What‌‌is‌‌resilience?‌ 1‌1‌ ‌ What‌‌is‌‌the‌‌proposed‌‌scope‌‌of‌‌the‌‌National‌‌Resilience‌‌Strategy?‌ 1‌1‌ ‌ Vision‌‌and‌‌Principles‌ 1‌2‌ ‌ Overarching‌‌vision‌‌and‌‌principles‌ 1‌2‌ ‌ Thematic‌‌sections‌ 1‌4‌ ‌ 1.‌R ‌ isk‌‌and‌‌Resilience‌ 1‌5‌ ‌ Risk‌‌Assessment‌ 1‌5‌ ‌ Risk‌‌Appetite‌ 1‌6‌ ‌ Handling‌‌catastrophic‌‌and‌‌complex‌‌risks‌ 1‌6‌ ‌ Improving‌‌decision‌‌making‌‌through‌‌data‌‌and‌‌analysis‌ 1‌7‌ ‌ 2.‌ ‌Responsibilities‌‌and‌‌Accountability‌ 1‌8‌ ‌ Risk‌‌and‌‌Resilience‌‌Management‌‌in‌‌UK‌‌Central‌‌Government‌ 1‌8‌ ‌ The‌‌Devolved‌‌Administrations‌ 1‌9‌ ‌ Local‌‌Partners‌ 1‌9‌ ‌ The‌‌Civil‌‌Contingencies‌‌Act‌‌2004‌ 1‌9‌ ‌ 3.‌‌Partnerships‌ 2‌1‌ ‌ Critical‌‌National‌‌Infrastructure‌ 2‌1‌ ‌ Wider‌‌critical‌‌sectors‌‌and‌‌supply‌‌chains‌ 2‌1‌ ‌ Research‌‌and‌‌academia‌ 2‌2‌ ‌ 4.‌‌Community‌ 2‌4‌ ‌ The‌‌role‌‌of‌‌the‌‌public‌ 2‌4‌ ‌ Public‌‌information‌‌and‌‌communications‌ 2‌5‌ ‌ 5.‌ ‌Investment‌ 2‌7‌ ‌ Public‌‌sector‌‌funding‌‌models‌ 2‌7‌ ‌ Private‌‌sector‌‌spending‌‌on‌‌resilience‌ 2‌8‌ ‌ 4‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ 6.‌ ‌Resilience‌‌in‌‌an‌‌interconnected‌‌world‌ 2‌9‌ ‌ International‌‌connectivity‌ 2‌9‌ ‌ International‌‌partnerships‌ 30‌ ‌ About‌‌you‌ 3‌4‌ ‌ Contact‌‌details‌‌and‌‌how‌‌to‌‌respond‌ 3‌5‌ ‌ Complaints‌‌or‌‌comments‌ 3‌5‌ ‌ Confidentiality‌‌and‌‌Data‌‌Protection‌ 3‌5‌ ‌ Annexes‌ 36‌ ‌ Annex‌‌A:‌‌Civil‌‌Contingencies‌‌Act‌ 3‌6‌ ‌ Annex‌‌B:‌‌Glossary‌ 40‌ ‌ Annex‌‌C:‌‌Privacy‌‌Notice‌‌for‌‌Cabinet‌‌Office‌‌consultations‌ 44‌ ‌ Your‌‌data‌ 44‌ ‌ Your‌‌Rights‌ 45‌ ‌ International‌‌transfers‌ 45‌ ‌ Contact‌‌details‌ 46‌ ‌ Complaints‌ 46‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 5‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ Foreword‌‌by‌‌the‌‌Paymaster‌‌General‌ ‌ In‌‌March,‌‌the‌‌Government‌‌published‌‌our‌‌vision‌‌for‌‌ the‌ ‌UK's‌ ‌role‌ ‌in‌ ‌the‌ ‌world‌ ‌over‌ ‌the‌ ‌next‌ ‌decade:‌‌ '‌Global‌ ‌Britain‌ ‌in‌ ‌a‌ ‌competitive‌ ‌age:‌ ‌The‌‌ Integrated‌ ‌Review‌ ‌of‌ ‌Security,‌ ‌Defence,‌‌ Development‌ ‌and‌ ‌Foreign‌ ‌Policy‌'.‌ ‌It‌ ‌describes‌‌ the‌ ‌safety‌ ‌and‌ ‌protection‌ ‌of‌ ‌UK‌ ‌Nationals‌ ‌as‌ ‌the‌‌ Government’s‌‌first‌‌duty.‌‌A‌‌crucial‌‌part‌‌of‌‌this‌‌is‌‌an‌‌ increased‌‌focus‌‌on‌‌building‌‌national‌‌resilience.‌‌ ‌ The‌ ‌UK,‌ ‌like‌ ‌all‌ ‌countries,‌ ‌is‌ ‌facing‌ ‌a‌ ‌range‌ ‌of‌‌ complex‌ ‌and‌ ‌geographically‌ ‌diverse‌ ‌risks.‌ ‌Recently‌ ‌we‌ ‌have‌ ‌experienced‌ ‌the‌ ‌effects‌ ‌of‌‌ extreme‌‌weather,‌‌terrorism‌‌and‌‌pandemics.‌‌We‌‌have‌‌seen‌‌cyber‌‌attacks‌‌on‌‌critical‌‌systems,‌‌ geopolitical‌ ‌instability,‌ ‌and‌ ‌accidents.‌ ‌We‌ ‌have‌ ‌also‌ ‌seen‌ ‌just‌ ‌how‌ ‌quickly‌ ‌issues‌ ‌arising‌‌ overseas‌‌can‌‌impact‌‌us‌‌here‌‌in‌‌the‌‌UK.‌‌ ‌ We‌‌must‌‌prepare‌‌for‌‌a‌‌future‌‌in‌‌which‌‌we‌‌could‌‌be‌‌impacted‌‌by‌‌all‌‌of‌‌these‌‌risks‌‌and‌‌more.‌‌ We‌ ‌need‌ ‌to‌ ‌anticipate‌ ‌the‌ ‌threats‌ ‌posed‌ ‌by‌ ‌rapid‌ ‌technological‌ ‌advances,‌ ‌antimicrobial‌‌ resistance‌ ‌and‌ ‌biodiversity‌ ‌loss.‌ ‌Our‌ ‌approach‌ ‌needs‌ ‌to‌ ‌be‌ ‌broad:‌‌forestalling‌‌risks‌‌where‌‌ possible,‌‌adapting‌‌to‌‌uncertainty,‌‌mitigating‌‌the‌‌impacts‌‌of‌‌risks‌‌that‌‌we‌‌cannot‌‌prevent,‌‌and‌‌ recovering‌‌quickly‌‌so‌‌that‌‌we‌‌are‌‌always‌‌ready‌‌to‌‌rise‌‌to‌‌the‌‌next‌‌challenge.‌‌ ‌ We‌ ‌have‌ ‌strong‌ ‌foundations‌ ‌on‌ ‌which‌ ‌to‌ ‌build.‌ ‌Our‌ ‌current‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌is‌ ‌based‌ ‌on‌ ‌vital‌‌ contributions‌ ‌from‌ ‌across‌ ‌society,‌ ‌from‌ ‌world-class‌ ‌emergency‌ ‌services,‌ ‌to‌ ‌the‌ ‌voluntary‌‌ sector,‌‌to‌‌our‌‌flexible‌‌and‌‌responsive‌‌armed‌‌forces.‌‌We‌‌are‌‌safer‌‌as‌‌citizens‌‌because‌‌of‌‌the‌‌ dedication‌‌of‌‌those‌‌who‌‌work‌‌towards‌‌our‌‌resilience.‌ ‌ But‌ ‌the‌ ‌pandemic‌ ‌has‌ ‌challenged‌ ‌us‌ ‌all‌ ‌to‌ ‌consider‌ ‌whether‌ ‌that‌ ‌is‌ ‌enough.‌ ‌Change‌ ‌is‌‌ required.‌‌We‌‌need‌‌to‌‌be‌‌better‌‌able‌‌to‌‌deal‌‌with‌‌‘whole-system’‌‌emergencies,‌‌and‌‌we‌‌need‌‌ to‌ ‌foster‌ ‌a‌ ‌whole‌ ‌of‌ ‌society‌‌approach‌‌to‌‌both‌‌preparedness‌‌and‌‌response.‌ ‌All‌‌parts‌‌of‌‌the‌‌ UK‌‌must‌‌work‌‌together,‌‌with‌‌better‌‌cooperation‌‌between‌‌all‌‌levels‌‌of‌‌government.‌‌We‌‌must‌‌ work‌ ‌with‌ ‌businesses‌ ‌and‌ ‌industry‌ ‌to‌ ‌strengthen‌ ‌the‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌of‌ ‌our‌ ‌systems‌ ‌and‌‌ infrastructure.‌‌We‌‌must‌‌energise‌‌and‌‌empower‌‌UK‌‌citizens‌‌and‌‌communities‌‌who‌‌can‌‌make‌‌ a‌ ‌real‌ ‌contribution‌ ‌to‌ ‌the‌ ‌national‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌effort.‌ ‌We‌ ‌must‌ ‌strengthen‌ ‌international‌‌ collaboration‌‌to‌‌address‌‌shared‌‌global‌‌challenges.‌‌Everyone‌‌has‌‌a‌‌part‌‌to‌‌play,‌‌and‌‌only‌‌by‌‌ working‌‌together‌‌will‌‌we‌‌harness‌‌our‌‌potential.‌ ‌ This‌‌Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌‌is‌‌the‌‌start‌‌of‌‌a‌‌national‌‌conversation‌‌on‌‌how‌‌this‌‌can‌‌be‌‌delivered‌‌in‌‌ practice,‌‌and‌‌what‌‌role‌‌we‌‌all‌‌could‌‌and‌‌should‌‌play.‌‌To‌‌that‌‌end,‌‌we‌‌want‌‌to‌‌understand‌‌and‌ incorporate‌‌as‌‌many‌‌of‌‌your‌‌views‌‌as‌‌possible.‌‌Your‌‌engagement‌‌with‌‌the‌‌questions‌‌in‌‌this‌‌ Call‌ ‌for‌ ‌Evidence‌ ‌will‌ ‌help‌ ‌the‌ ‌Government‌ ‌develop‌ ‌plans‌ ‌to‌ ‌build‌ ‌a‌ ‌safer‌ ‌and‌ ‌more‌‌ prosperous‌‌UK.‌‌I‌‌encourage‌‌you‌‌to‌‌take‌‌the‌‌time‌‌to‌‌consider‌‌the‌‌issues‌‌at‌‌stake‌‌here,‌‌and‌‌I‌‌ thank‌‌you‌‌in‌‌advance‌‌for‌‌your‌‌contribution‌‌on‌‌this‌‌vital‌‌piece‌‌of‌‌our‌‌national‌‌security.‌ ‌ The‌‌Rt‌‌Hon‌‌Penny‌‌Mordaunt‌‌MP‌ ‌ 6‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ Executive‌‌Summary‌ ‌ ‌ The‌ ‌Covid-19‌‌pandemic‌‌and‌‌other‌‌recent‌‌crises‌‌have‌‌stretched‌‌governments‌‌around‌‌ the‌ ‌world.‌ ‌This‌ ‌has‌ ‌demonstrated‌ ‌the‌ ‌importance‌ ‌of‌ ‌a‌ ‌resilient‌ ‌society‌ ‌with‌ ‌well‌‌ developed‌ ‌plans‌ ‌and‌ ‌capabilities,‌ ‌along‌ ‌with‌ ‌flexible‌ ‌response‌ ‌structures‌ ‌that‌ ‌can‌‌ adapt‌‌and‌‌respond‌‌to‌‌the‌‌unexpected.‌ ‌We‌‌know‌‌there‌‌will‌‌be‌‌more‌‌major‌‌challenges‌‌ in‌ ‌the‌ ‌future.‌ ‌We‌ ‌need‌ ‌a‌ ‌National‌ ‌Resilience‌ ‌Strategy‌ ‌to‌ ‌help‌ ‌us‌ ‌prepare‌ ‌for‌ ‌these‌‌ challenges.‌ ‌ ‌ This‌‌Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌‌seeks‌‌public‌‌engagement‌‌to‌‌help‌‌inform‌‌the‌‌development‌‌of‌‌a‌‌ new‌‌Strategy‌‌that‌‌will‌‌outline‌‌an‌‌ambitious‌‌new‌‌vision‌‌for‌‌UK‌‌National‌‌Resilience‌‌and‌‌ set‌‌objectives‌‌for‌‌achieving‌‌it.‌‌ ‌ ‌ Our‌‌proposed‌‌vision‌‌for‌‌the‌‌National‌‌Resilience‌‌Strategy‌‌is‌‌to‌‌make‌‌the‌‌UK‌‌the‌‌most‌‌ resilient‌ ‌nation.‌ ‌In‌ ‌delivering‌ ‌this‌ ‌vision,‌ ‌we‌ ‌will‌ ‌be‌ ‌guided‌ ‌by‌ ‌a‌ ‌series‌ ‌of‌ ‌core‌‌ principles:‌ ‌ ○ We‌ ‌should‌ ‌understand‌‌the‌‌risks‌‌we‌‌face,‌‌including‌‌the‌‌impacts‌‌they‌‌could‌‌have,‌‌ and‌‌our‌‌exposure‌‌to‌‌them.‌‌ ‌ ○ We‌‌should‌‌invest‌‌in‌‌preparation‌‌to‌‌better‌‌prevent,‌‌mitigate‌‌and‌‌recover‌‌from‌‌risks.‌‌ ○ We‌‌should‌‌energise‌‌and‌‌empower‌‌everyone‌‌who‌‌can‌‌make‌‌a‌‌contribution.‌‌ ‌ ‌ Our‌ ‌vision‌ ‌for‌ ‌2030‌ ‌is‌ ‌that‌ ‌we‌ ‌will‌ ‌have‌ ‌a‌ ‌strengthened‌ ‌ability‌ ‌to‌ ‌assess‌ ‌and‌‌ understand‌ ‌the‌ ‌risks‌ ‌we‌ ‌face.‌ ‌Our‌ ‌suite‌ ‌of‌ ‌systems,‌ ‌infrastructure‌ ‌and‌ ‌capabilities‌‌ (including‌ ‌international‌ ‌systems)‌ ‌for‌ ‌managing‌ ‌those‌ ‌risks‌ ‌should‌ ‌become‌ ‌more‌‌ proactive,‌ ‌adaptable‌ ‌and‌‌responsive;‌‌and‌‌there‌‌should‌‌be‌‌fewer‌‌regional‌‌inequalities‌‌ in‌ ‌our‌ ‌resilience.‌ ‌As‌ ‌a‌ ‌result,‌ ‌our‌ ‌local‌ ‌communities,‌ ‌businesses,‌ ‌and‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK‌ ‌as‌ ‌a‌‌ whole,‌ ‌will‌ ‌be‌ ‌more‌ ‌cohesive,‌ ‌resistant‌ ‌to‌ ‌shocks‌‌and‌‌stresses,‌‌and‌‌ultimately‌‌more‌‌ adaptable‌‌to‌‌future‌‌threats‌‌and‌‌challenges.‌ ‌ ‌ Questions‌‌in‌‌this‌‌Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌‌focus‌‌on‌‌six‌‌broad‌‌thematic‌‌areas:‌‌ ‌ ○ Risk‌ ‌and‌ ‌Resilience‌:‌ ‌Strengthening‌ ‌our‌ ‌ability‌ ‌to‌ ‌manage‌ ‌an‌ ‌evolving‌ ‌risk‌‌ landscape‌‌depends‌‌on‌‌improving‌‌our‌‌ability‌‌to‌‌both‌‌predict‌‌and‌‌adapt‌‌to‌‌identified‌‌ and‌‌unexpected‌‌challenges.‌ ‌ ‌ ○ Responsibilities‌‌and‌‌Accountability‌:‌‌It‌‌is‌‌fundamentally‌‌important‌‌that‌‌all‌‌those‌‌ involved‌ ‌in‌ ‌building‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌have‌ ‌a‌ ‌clear‌ ‌understanding‌ ‌of‌ ‌when,‌ ‌where‌ ‌and‌‌ how‌‌to‌‌apply‌‌tools,‌‌processes‌‌and‌‌relationships‌‌effectively.‌‌ ‌ ○ Partnerships‌:‌ ‌Resilience‌ ‌is‌ ‌not‌ ‌solely‌ ‌a‌ ‌government‌ ‌or‌ ‌public‌ ‌sector‌‌ responsibility.‌ ‌Other‌ ‌parts‌ ‌of‌ ‌society‌ ‌play‌ ‌an‌ ‌essential‌ ‌role‌ ‌in‌ ‌building‌ ‌our‌‌ collective‌‌resilience.‌‌ ‌ ○ Community‌:‌ ‌A‌ ‌whole-of-society‌ ‌approach‌ ‌will‌ ‌be‌ ‌central‌ ‌to‌ ‌strengthening‌ ‌the‌‌ UK’s‌ ‌resilience,‌ ‌with‌ ‌a‌ ‌revived‌ ‌effort‌ ‌to‌ ‌inform‌ ‌and‌ ‌empower‌‌all‌‌parts‌‌of‌‌society‌‌ who‌‌can‌‌make‌‌a‌‌contribution.‌ ‌ 7‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ ○ Investment‌:‌ ‌The‌‌challenge‌‌of‌‌where‌‌to‌‌place‌‌investment‌‌in‌‌the‌‌risk‌‌cycle‌‌is‌‌one‌‌ that‌ ‌affects‌ ‌the‌ ‌public‌ ‌and‌ ‌private‌ ‌sectors‌‌alike.‌‌As‌‌government,‌‌individuals‌‌and‌‌ businesses,‌‌we‌‌face‌‌choices‌‌around‌‌what,‌‌and‌‌how‌‌much,‌‌to‌‌invest.‌‌ ‌ ○ Resilience‌ ‌in‌ ‌an‌ ‌Interconnected‌‌World‌:‌‌UK‌‌resilience‌‌is‌‌closely‌‌entwined‌‌with‌‌ the‌‌wider‌‌global‌‌context.‌‌Challenges‌‌and‌‌opportunities‌‌are‌‌frequently‌‌experienced‌‌ on‌‌a‌‌global‌‌scale.‌‌ ‌ ‌ This‌‌Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌‌seeks‌‌to‌‌understand‌‌current‌‌perceptions‌‌of‌‌risk‌‌and‌‌resilience,‌‌ gather‌‌evidence‌‌on‌‌where‌‌improvements‌‌could‌‌be‌‌made,‌‌and‌‌gauge‌‌the‌‌UK’s‌‌appetite‌ for‌‌change.‌‌Views‌‌are‌‌welcome‌‌from‌‌anyone‌‌with‌‌an‌‌interest‌‌in‌‌the‌‌subject.‌ ‌ ‌ Included‌‌in‌‌the‌‌Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌‌are‌‌specific‌‌questions‌‌on‌‌the‌‌Civil‌‌Contingencies‌‌Act.‌‌ This‌ ‌Act‌ ‌provides‌‌a‌‌legislative‌‌framework‌‌for‌‌emergency‌‌management‌‌and‌‌response‌‌ in‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK.‌‌Evidence‌‌gathered‌‌in‌‌this‌‌section‌‌will‌‌help‌‌to‌‌inform‌‌the‌‌scheduled‌‌review‌‌ of‌‌the‌‌Act,‌‌which‌‌is‌‌due‌‌to‌‌be‌‌completed‌‌by‌‌March‌‌2022.‌ ‌ ‌ The‌‌consultation‌‌will‌‌run‌‌‌for‌‌a‌‌period‌‌of‌‌eleven‌‌weeks,‌‌and‌‌will‌‌be‌‌complemented‌‌by‌‌a‌‌ series‌ ‌of‌ ‌wider‌ ‌engagement‌ ‌events‌‌with‌‌relevant‌‌stakeholders‌‌and‌‌target‌‌groups.‌‌To‌‌ participate‌ ‌in‌ ‌this‌ ‌Call‌ ‌for‌ ‌Evidence,‌ ‌please‌ ‌use‌ https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/national-resilience-strategy-call-for-evid‌ ence‌.‌‌The‌‌consultation‌‌will‌‌close‌‌on‌‌27‌‌Sept‌‌2021.‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 8‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ The‌‌Resilience‌‌Strategy‌‌Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌‌ ‌ 1. Resilience‌ ‌has‌ ‌long‌ ‌been‌ ‌an‌ ‌integral‌ ‌part‌ ‌of‌‌the‌‌UK’s‌‌approach‌‌to‌‌national‌‌security‌‌ and‌ ‌crisis‌ ‌management.‌ ‌We‌ ‌have‌ ‌well-tested‌ ‌risk‌ ‌assessment,‌ ‌risk‌ ‌management,‌‌ and‌‌response‌‌and‌‌recovery‌‌measures‌‌in‌‌place‌‌to‌‌cover‌‌a‌‌wide‌‌range‌‌of‌‌scenarios.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 2. However,‌ ‌the‌ ‌Covid-19‌ ‌pandemic‌ ‌has‌ ‌highlighted‌ ‌that‌ ‌there‌ ‌are‌ ‌elements‌ ‌of‌ ‌our‌‌ approach‌‌to‌‌national‌‌and‌‌local‌‌resilience‌‌that‌‌we‌‌need‌‌to‌‌strengthen.‌‌When‌‌tested‌‌by‌‌ the‌‌wide-ranging‌‌and‌‌systemic‌‌impacts‌‌of‌‌the‌‌pandemic,‌‌they‌‌did‌‌not‌‌always‌‌deliver‌‌ and‌‌our‌‌preparedness‌‌was‌‌less‌‌complete‌‌and‌‌coherent‌‌than‌‌it‌‌could‌‌have‌‌been.‌‌The‌‌ pandemic‌ ‌highlighted‌ ‌areas‌ ‌where‌ ‌roles,‌ ‌resources‌ ‌and‌ ‌responsibilities‌ ‌of‌ ‌those‌‌ involved‌ ‌in‌ ‌response‌ ‌could‌ ‌have‌ ‌been‌ ‌clearer,‌ ‌and‌ ‌areas‌‌in‌‌our‌‌systems‌‌where‌‌we‌‌ could‌ ‌consider‌ ‌a‌ ‌different‌ ‌approach‌ ‌or‌ ‌further‌ ‌investment.‌ ‌It‌ ‌highlighted‌ ‌the‌‌ importance‌‌of‌‌considering‌‌our‌‌domestic‌‌resilience‌‌in‌‌a‌‌global‌‌context.‌ ‌ ‌ 3. Covid-19‌ ‌also‌ ‌presented‌ ‌opportunities‌ ‌to‌ ‌learn‌ ‌and‌ ‌find‌ ‌new‌ ‌ways‌ ‌to‌ ‌respond.‌ ‌For‌‌ example,‌ ‌it‌ ‌required‌ ‌us‌ ‌to‌ ‌ask‌ ‌a‌ ‌far‌ ‌wider‌‌range‌‌of‌‌individuals‌‌and‌‌organisations‌‌to‌‌ take‌ ‌part‌ ‌in‌ ‌the‌ ‌response.‌ ‌We‌ ‌saw‌ ‌military‌ ‌resources‌ ‌deployed,‌ ‌huge‌ ‌numbers‌ ‌of‌‌ people‌ ‌volunteering‌ ‌to‌ ‌support‌ ‌the‌ ‌NHS,‌ ‌and‌ ‌furloughed‌ ‌workers‌ ‌filling‌ ‌other‌ ‌key‌‌ roles.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 4. All‌‌of‌‌these‌‌lessons‌‌reflect‌‌the‌‌ambition‌‌outlined‌‌in‌‌the‌‌Integrated‌‌Review‌‌to‌‌increase‌‌ our‌‌national‌‌resilience‌‌by‌‌developing‌‌a‌‌National‌‌Resilience‌‌Strategy.‌ ‌ The‌‌Integrated‌‌Review‌‌ ‌ 5. In‌ ‌March‌ ‌2021,‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK‌ ‌Government‌ ‌published‌ ‌Global‌‌Britain‌‌in‌‌a‌‌Competitive‌‌Age:‌‌ The‌ ‌Integrated‌ ‌Review‌ ‌of‌ ‌Security,‌ ‌Defence,‌ ‌Development‌ ‌and‌‌Foreign‌‌Policy‌.‌‌The‌‌ Review‌ ‌looks‌ ‌at‌ ‌the‌ ‌threats‌ ‌and‌ ‌opportunities‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK‌ ‌faces‌ ‌and‌ ‌will‌ ‌face‌ ‌over‌ ‌the‌‌ next‌‌decade.‌‌It‌‌considers‌‌the‌‌ways‌‌that‌‌national‌‌and‌‌international‌‌security‌‌must‌‌adapt‌‌ and‌‌evolve‌‌in‌‌line‌‌with‌‌the‌‌rapidly‌‌changing‌‌global‌‌environment,‌‌and‌‌outlines‌‌where‌‌a‌‌ global‌ ‌UK‌ ‌should‌ ‌focus‌ ‌aid‌ ‌and‌ ‌diplomacy‌ ‌work‌ ‌to‌ ‌have‌ ‌the‌ ‌greatest‌ ‌life-changing‌‌ impact‌‌in‌‌the‌‌longer‌‌term.‌‌The‌‌Review‌‌sets‌‌out‌‌the‌‌Prime‌‌Minister’s‌‌vision‌‌for‌‌the‌‌UK‌‌ in‌‌2030‌‌and‌‌defines‌‌the‌‌UK’s‌‌position‌‌in‌‌the‌‌world.‌ ‌It‌‌also‌‌asserts‌‌a‌‌need‌‌for‌‌greater‌‌ national‌‌resilience‌‌to‌‌‌threats‌‌and‌‌‌hazards‌‌in‌‌the‌‌physical‌‌and‌‌digital‌‌worlds,‌‌both‌‌at‌‌ home‌‌and‌‌overseas.‌‌ ‌ A‌‌New‌‌National‌‌Resilience‌‌Strategy‌ ‌ 6. A‌ ‌core‌ ‌part‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌Integrated‌ ‌Review‌ ‌is‌ ‌an‌ ‌increased‌ ‌focus‌ ‌on‌ ‌building‌ ‌national‌‌ resilience.‌ ‌The‌ ‌safety‌ ‌and‌‌protection‌‌of‌‌UK‌‌Nationals‌‌is‌‌the‌‌Government’s‌‌first‌‌duty,‌‌ reflected‌ ‌by‌ ‌an‌ ‌increased‌ ‌commitment‌ ‌to‌ ‌strengthening‌ ‌national‌ ‌security,‌ ‌and‌‌ reducing‌ ‌our‌ ‌vulnerability‌ ‌both‌‌to‌‌natural‌‌hazards‌‌and‌‌to‌‌threats‌‌from‌‌other‌‌states,‌‌ terrorists‌ ‌and‌ ‌organised‌ ‌crime.‌ ‌It‌ ‌also‌ ‌commits‌ ‌the‌ ‌Government‌ ‌to‌ ‌consider‌‌ strengthening‌ ‌the‌ ‌role‌ ‌and‌ ‌responsibilities‌ ‌of‌ ‌Local‌ ‌Resilience‌ ‌Forums‌ ‌(LRFs)‌ ‌in‌‌ England,‌ ‌the‌ ‌multi-agency‌‌partnerships‌‌that‌‌bring‌‌together‌‌organisations‌‌involved‌‌in‌‌ risk‌‌management‌‌and‌‌response‌‌(e.g.‌‌emergency‌‌services,‌‌local‌‌authorities‌‌etc.).‌‌ ‌ ‌ 9‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ 7. The‌ ‌Review‌ ‌commits‌‌the‌‌Government‌‌to‌‌improving‌‌our‌‌ability‌‌to‌‌anticipate,‌‌prevent,‌‌ prepare‌ ‌for,‌ ‌respond‌ ‌to‌ ‌and‌ ‌recover‌ ‌from‌ ‌risks‌ ‌–‌ ‌as‌ ‌well‌ ‌as‌ ‌that‌ ‌of‌ ‌our‌ ‌allies‌ ‌and‌‌ partners,‌ ‌recognising‌ ‌the‌ ‌closely‌ ‌interconnected‌ ‌nature‌ ‌of‌ ‌our‌ ‌world.‌ ‌The‌ ‌Review‌‌ recognises‌‌that,‌‌in‌‌an‌‌increasingly‌‌interconnected‌‌world‌‌in‌‌which‌‌we‌‌cannot‌‌predict‌‌or‌‌ stop‌ ‌all‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌challenges‌ ‌ahead,‌ ‌it‌ ‌is‌ ‌fundamental‌ ‌that‌ ‌we‌ ‌renew‌ ‌our‌ ‌positive,‌‌ proactive‌‌approach‌‌to‌‌resilience‌‌in‌‌order‌‌to‌‌build‌‌long-term‌‌prosperity.‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 8. To‌ ‌drive‌ ‌this‌ ‌ambition‌ ‌forward,‌ ‌the‌ ‌Integrated‌ ‌Review‌ ‌commits‌ ‌the‌ ‌Government‌ ‌to‌‌ developing‌ ‌a‌ ‌new‌ ‌National‌ ‌Resilience‌ ‌Strategy,‌ ‌which‌ ‌will‌ ‌outline‌ ‌a‌ ‌vision‌ ‌for‌ ‌UK‌ resilience‌‌and‌‌lay‌‌out‌‌fundamental‌‌objectives‌‌for‌‌achieving‌‌it.‌‌This‌‌Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌‌ sets‌‌out‌‌our‌‌initial‌‌vision‌‌for‌‌UK‌‌resilience‌‌in‌‌2030‌‌and‌‌the‌‌principles‌‌for‌‌achieving‌‌it.‌ ‌ Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌‌ ‌ 9. Every‌ ‌individual‌ ‌citizen‌ ‌and‌ ‌organisation‌ ‌has‌ ‌a‌ ‌part‌ ‌to‌ ‌play‌‌in‌‌making‌‌the‌‌UK‌‌more‌‌ resilient.‌ ‌Building‌ ‌nationwide‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌is‌ ‌a‌ ‌national‌ ‌endeavour.‌ ‌To‌ ‌develop‌ ‌an‌‌ effective‌‌strategy‌‌for‌‌UK‌‌resilience,‌‌it‌‌is‌‌essential‌‌that‌‌we‌‌understand‌‌and‌‌incorporate‌‌ a‌ ‌wide‌ ‌range‌ ‌of‌ ‌views‌ ‌and‌ ‌evidence‌ ‌on‌ ‌what‌ ‌our‌ ‌priorities‌ ‌should‌ ‌be,‌‌and‌‌how‌‌we‌‌ want‌ ‌to‌ ‌approach‌ ‌our‌ ‌future‌ ‌resilience.‌ ‌Your‌ ‌engagement‌ ‌with‌ ‌the‌‌questions‌‌in‌‌this‌‌ Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence‌‌will‌‌provide‌‌an‌‌invaluable‌‌contribution‌‌to‌‌this‌‌work.‌ ‌ ‌ 10. Alongside‌‌this‌‌Call‌‌for‌‌Evidence,‌‌we‌‌will‌‌be‌‌conducting‌‌wider‌‌engagement‌‌with‌‌local‌‌ resilience‌‌partners,‌‌businesses,‌‌academics‌‌and‌‌the‌‌public.‌ ‌This‌‌will‌‌help‌‌us‌‌to‌‌reach‌‌ as‌‌many‌‌individuals‌‌and‌‌groups‌‌as‌‌possible.‌ ‌ ‌ 11. This‌ ‌Call‌ ‌for‌ ‌Evidence‌ ‌also‌ ‌includes‌ ‌some‌ ‌specific‌ ‌questions‌ ‌on‌ ‌the‌ Civil‌‌ Contingencies‌ ‌Act‌ ‌2004‌ ‌(CCA)‌.‌ ‌These‌ ‌have‌ ‌been‌ ‌included‌ ‌to‌ ‌support‌ ‌the‌‌ scheduled‌‌review‌‌of‌‌the‌‌Act,‌‌which‌‌will‌‌be‌‌completed‌‌by‌‌March‌‌2022.‌ ‌‌ 10‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ The‌‌Case‌‌for‌‌Reform‌ ‌ 12. Both‌‌our‌‌world‌‌and‌‌the‌‌risks‌‌that‌‌we‌‌face‌‌are‌‌changing.‌‌This‌‌makes‌‌preparing‌‌for‌‌the‌‌ unknown‌ ‌and‌ ‌bolstering‌ ‌our‌‌resilience‌‌ever-more‌‌challenging‌‌and‌‌we‌‌must‌‌adapt‌‌to‌‌ face‌ ‌that‌ ‌challenge.‌‌We‌‌cannot‌‌anticipate‌‌or‌‌stop‌‌every‌‌disruptor,‌‌whether‌‌that‌‌be‌‌a‌‌ new‌‌p ‌ andemic,‌‌terrorism,‌‌cyber‌‌threats‌‌or‌‌severe‌‌weather.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 13. Recent‌ ‌events‌ ‌have‌ ‌illustrated‌‌the‌‌scale‌‌of‌‌the‌‌challenge.‌‌The‌‌COVID-19‌‌pandemic‌‌ has‌ ‌impacted‌ ‌the‌ ‌lives‌ ‌and‌ ‌livelihoods‌ ‌of‌ ‌everyone‌‌in‌‌some‌‌way,‌‌disproportionately‌‌ affecting‌ ‌marginalised‌ ‌and‌ ‌vulnerable‌ ‌communities.‌ ‌It‌ ‌has‌ ‌reaffirmed‌ ‌just‌ ‌how‌‌ interconnected‌‌our‌‌world‌‌is,‌‌both‌‌in‌‌terms‌‌of‌‌how‌‌quickly‌‌issues‌‌arising‌‌internationally‌‌ can‌ ‌affect‌ ‌us‌ ‌at‌ ‌home,‌ ‌and‌ ‌also‌ ‌how‌ ‌problems‌ ‌in‌ ‌one‌ ‌sector‌‌can‌‌have‌‌severe‌‌and‌‌ damaging‌ ‌consequences‌ ‌in‌ ‌another.‌ ‌What‌ ‌began‌ ‌as‌ ‌a‌ ‌health‌ ‌crisis‌ ‌triggered‌‌ cascading‌ ‌impacts‌ ‌across‌ ‌a‌ ‌range‌ ‌of‌ ‌sectors,‌ ‌from‌ ‌education‌ ‌to‌ ‌the‌ ‌economy,‌‌ transport‌‌to‌‌manufacturing.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 14. The‌ ‌UK‌ ‌has‌ ‌been‌ ‌learning‌ ‌lessons‌ ‌and‌ ‌acting‌ ‌on‌ ‌them‌ ‌throughout‌ ‌the‌ ‌pandemic.‌‌ Detailed‌ ‌analysis‌ ‌of‌ ‌how‌‌COVID-19‌‌has‌‌affected‌‌the‌‌UK‌‌and‌‌where‌‌lessons‌‌can‌‌be‌‌ carried‌‌forward‌‌will‌‌be‌‌the‌‌subject‌‌of‌‌an‌‌Independent‌‌Inquiry‌‌announced‌‌by‌‌the‌‌Prime‌‌ Minister,‌‌which‌‌will‌‌begin‌‌in‌‌Spring‌‌2022.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 15. Building‌‌national‌‌resilience‌‌is‌‌not‌‌something‌‌we‌‌are‌‌starting‌‌from‌‌scratch,‌‌so‌‌we‌‌will‌‌ build‌ ‌on‌ ‌the‌ ‌strengths‌ ‌and‌ ‌capabilities‌ ‌we‌ ‌already‌ ‌have.‌ ‌However,‌ ‌these‌ ‌systems‌‌ were‌‌not‌‌always‌‌fit‌‌to‌‌mitigate‌‌the‌‌effects‌‌of‌‌the‌‌COVID-19‌‌pandemic,‌‌and‌‌so‌‌there‌‌is‌‌ room‌‌for‌‌improvement‌‌and‌‌reform‌‌in‌‌our‌‌approach.‌‌We‌‌should‌‌seek‌‌to‌‌match‌‌existing‌‌ competence‌ ‌with‌ ‌excellence‌ ‌in‌ ‌other‌ ‌areas,‌ ‌through‌ ‌enhanced‌ ‌capabilities‌ ‌and‌‌ appropriate‌ ‌legal‌ ‌powers‌ ‌that‌ ‌equip‌ ‌us‌ ‌to‌ ‌meet‌ ‌rapidly‌ ‌changing‌ ‌threats.‌ ‌We‌ ‌must‌‌ also‌ ‌reflect‌ ‌upon‌ ‌the‌ ‌unprecedented‌ ‌roles‌ ‌played‌ ‌by‌ ‌local‌ ‌partners‌ ‌throughout‌ ‌the‌‌ pandemic‌‌and‌‌consider‌‌the‌‌case‌‌for‌‌strengthening‌‌these‌‌further.‌ ‌ ‌ 16. Building‌ ‌on‌ ‌the‌ ‌Integrated‌ ‌Review,‌ ‌we‌ ‌will‌‌seek‌‌to‌‌use‌‌the‌‌new‌‌National‌‌Resilience‌‌ Strategy‌ ‌to‌ ‌bolster‌‌our‌‌approach‌‌to‌‌resilience.‌‌We‌‌plan‌‌to‌‌focus‌‌on‌‌the‌‌following‌‌six‌‌ areas:‌ ‌Risk‌ ‌and‌ ‌Resilience;‌ ‌Responsibilities‌ ‌and‌ ‌Accountability;‌ ‌Partnerships;‌‌ Community;‌ ‌Investment;‌ ‌and‌ ‌Resilience‌ ‌in‌ ‌an‌ ‌Interconnected‌ ‌World.‌ ‌These‌ ‌are‌‌ covered‌‌in‌‌more‌‌detail‌‌in‌‌the‌‌thematic‌‌sections‌‌from‌‌page‌‌15‌‌onwards.‌ ‌ ‌ 17. As‌ ‌we‌ ‌begin‌ ‌to‌ ‌emerge‌ ‌from‌ ‌the‌ ‌pandemic,‌ ‌we‌ ‌have‌ ‌a‌ ‌window‌ ‌of‌ ‌opportunity‌ ‌for‌‌ thinking‌ ‌more‌ ‌broadly‌ ‌about‌ ‌the‌ ‌potential‌ ‌risks‌ ‌and‌ ‌emergencies‌ ‌we‌ ‌face,‌ ‌and‌ ‌the‌‌ steps‌‌we‌‌could‌‌take‌‌now‌‌to‌‌better‌‌prepare‌‌ourselves.‌‌Now‌‌is‌‌the‌‌time‌‌to‌‌capitalise‌‌on‌‌ the‌ ‌renewed‌ ‌interest‌ ‌across‌ ‌the‌ ‌country‌ ‌in‌ ‌how‌ ‌we‌ ‌can‌‌be‌‌more‌‌resilient‌‌and‌‌build‌‌ back‌‌stronger‌‌and‌‌better‌‌than‌‌we‌‌were‌‌before.‌ ‌ ‌ 11‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ Resilience:‌‌definitions‌ ‌ What‌‌is‌‌resilience?‌‌ ‌ 18. Traditionally,‌‌the‌‌term‌‌'resilience'‌‌refers‌‌to‌‌an‌‌ability‌‌to‌‌withstand‌‌and‌‌quickly‌‌recover‌‌ from‌‌a‌‌difficult‌‌situation.‌‌This‌‌comes‌‌hand-in-hand‌‌with‌‌the‌‌idea‌‌of‌‌‘bouncing‌‌back’,‌‌of‌‌ returning‌ ‌to‌ ‌‘normal’,‌ ‌of‌ ‌picking‌ ‌up‌ ‌where‌ ‌we‌ ‌left‌ ‌off‌ ‌before‌ ‌whatever‌ ‌difficulty‌ ‌or‌‌ challenge‌‌we‌‌experienced.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 19. As‌‌a‌‌country,‌‌we‌‌cannot‌‌afford‌‌to‌‌be‌‌passive‌‌and‌‌wait‌‌for‌‌things‌‌to‌‌happen‌‌to‌‌us.‌‌We‌‌ need‌‌to‌‌understand‌‌our‌‌vulnerabilities,‌‌pre-empt‌‌challenges‌‌before‌‌they‌‌arise,‌‌ensure‌‌ we‌‌are‌‌prepared‌‌for‌‌them,‌‌and‌‌mitigate‌‌the‌‌impacts.‌‌Then,‌‌when‌‌events‌‌do‌‌occur,‌‌we‌‌ should‌‌be‌‌ready‌‌to‌‌withstand‌‌and‌‌recover.‌‌ ‌ ‌ What‌‌is‌‌the‌‌proposed‌‌scope‌‌of‌‌the‌‌National‌‌Resilience‌‌Strategy?‌ ‌ ‌ 20. We‌ ‌propose‌ ‌that‌ ‌the‌ ‌strategy‌ ‌will‌ ‌focus‌ ‌on‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK’s‌ ‌ability‌ ‌to‌ ‌anticipate,‌ ‌assess,‌‌ prevent,‌‌mitigate,‌‌respond‌‌to,‌‌and‌‌recover‌‌from‌‌known,‌‌unknown,‌‌direct,‌‌indirect‌‌and‌ emerging‌ ‌risks.‌ ‌This‌ ‌will‌ ‌include‌ ‌all‌ ‌types‌ ‌of‌ ‌risk,‌‌including:‌‌environmental‌‌hazards;‌‌ human,‌ ‌animal‌ ‌and‌ ‌plant‌‌health‌‌risks;‌‌major‌‌accidents;‌‌‌societal‌‌risks;‌‌and‌‌malicious‌‌ attacks‌1‌.‌ ‌It‌ ‌will‌ ‌encompass‌ ‌risks‌ ‌that‌ ‌have‌ ‌a‌ ‌domestic‌ ‌source,‌ ‌and‌‌those‌‌that‌‌have‌‌ their‌ ‌roots‌ ‌overseas‌ ‌(but‌ ‌which‌ ‌would‌ ‌impact‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK).‌ ‌The‌ ‌strategy‌ ‌will‌ ‌also‌‌ acknowledge‌‌that‌‌there‌‌will‌‌be‌‌unexpected‌‌risks,‌‌as‌‌well‌‌as‌‌risks‌‌which‌‌may‌‌emerge‌‌ beyond‌ ‌the‌ ‌(two‌ ‌year)‌ ‌time‌ ‌horizon‌ ‌of‌ ‌each‌ ‌National‌ ‌Risk‌ ‌Register.‌ ‌These‌ ‌could‌‌ include‌ ‌emerging‌ ‌risks‌ ‌posed‌ ‌by‌ ‌new‌ ‌technologies‌ ‌or‌ ‌future‌ ‌societal‌ ‌change,‌‌ wherever‌‌they‌‌develop‌‌or‌‌occur.‌ ‌ ‌ 21. Whilst‌‌the‌‌new‌‌National‌‌Resilience‌‌Strategy‌‌will‌‌not‌‌encompass‌‌HMG’s‌‌approach‌‌to‌‌ all‌ ‌long-term‌ ‌policy‌ ‌challenges,‌ ‌it‌ ‌will‌ ‌focus‌ ‌on‌ ‌the‌ ‌impacts‌ ‌of‌ ‌such‌‌challenges‌‌and‌ ‌ where‌ ‌those‌ ‌might‌ ‌lead‌ ‌to‌ ‌acute‌ ‌crises‌ ‌in‌ ‌the‌ ‌future.‌ ‌Our‌ ‌definition‌ ‌of‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌is‌‌ broad,‌ ‌but‌ ‌we‌ ‌also‌ ‌need‌‌to‌‌find‌‌a‌‌practicable‌‌approach‌‌to‌‌implementation,‌‌ensuring‌‌ that‌ ‌organisations‌ ‌and‌ ‌individuals‌ ‌have‌ ‌clear‌ ‌and‌‌realistic‌‌objectives.‌‌Nevertheless,‌‌ understanding‌ ‌and‌ ‌addressing‌ ‌long-term‌ ‌trends‌ ‌in‌ ‌risk‌ ‌(including‌ ‌those‌ ‌driven‌ ‌by‌‌ wider‌ ‌social,‌ ‌economic,‌ ‌technological‌ ‌and‌‌environmental‌‌change)‌‌must‌‌be‌‌a‌‌central‌‌ feature‌‌of‌‌our‌‌approach‌‌to‌‌risk.‌ ‌ ‌ 22. A‌ ‌number‌ ‌of‌ ‌existing‌ ‌governmental‌ ‌strategies‌ ‌focus‌ ‌specifically‌ ‌on‌ ‌addressing‌ ‌and‌‌ building‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌to‌ ‌individual‌ ‌risks.‌ ‌The‌ ‌new‌ ‌National‌ ‌Resilience‌ ‌Strategy‌ ‌will‌ ‌sit‌‌ alongside‌ ‌and‌ ‌complement‌ ‌these‌ ‌strategies.‌ ‌It‌ ‌will‌ ‌consider‌ ‌the‌ ‌need‌‌for‌‌continued‌‌ long-term‌ ‌focus‌ ‌and‌ ‌investment‌ ‌in‌ ‌addressing‌ ‌risks,‌ ‌as‌ ‌well‌ ‌as‌ ‌our‌ ‌capability‌ ‌to‌‌ address‌‌the‌‌common‌‌causes‌‌and‌‌impacts‌‌of‌‌risks,‌‌and‌s ‌ ystemic‌‌vulnerabilities‌.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 1 ‌Environmental‌‌hazards‌‌include‌‌flooding,‌‌heatwaves,‌‌severe‌‌space‌‌weather,‌‌volcanic‌‌eruptions,‌‌and‌‌wildfires;‌‌Human‌‌and‌‌ animal‌‌health‌‌risks‌‌include‌‌pandemics‌‌and‌‌antimicrobial‌‌resistance;‌‌Major‌‌accidents‌‌include‌‌major‌‌fires,‌‌major‌‌transport‌‌ accidents,‌‌and‌‌systemic‌‌financial‌‌crises;‌‌Societal‌‌risks‌‌include‌‌Serious‌‌and‌‌organised‌‌crime,‌‌bribery‌‌and‌‌corruption;‌‌Malicious‌‌ attacks‌‌include‌‌terrorist‌‌attacks,‌‌cyber‌‌attacks,‌‌and‌‌disinformation.‌‌ ‌ 12‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ Vision‌‌and‌‌Principles‌ ‌ Overarching‌‌vision‌‌and‌‌principles‌ ‌ ‌ 23. The‌ ‌new‌ ‌Strategy‌ ‌is‌ ‌an‌ ‌opportunity‌ ‌to‌ ‌make‌ ‌the‌ ‌changes‌ ‌to‌ ‌our‌ ‌approach‌ ‌that‌‌the‌‌ Covid-19‌‌pandemic‌‌has‌‌made‌‌necessary,‌‌and‌‌that‌‌were‌‌highlighted‌‌in‌‌the‌‌‌Integrated‌‌ Review.‌ ‌In‌ ‌line‌ ‌with‌ ‌this,‌‌our‌‌proposed‌‌vision‌‌for‌‌the‌‌National‌‌Resilience‌‌Strategy‌‌is‌‌ to‌ ‌make‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK‌ ‌the‌ ‌most‌ ‌resilient‌ ‌nation‌.‌ ‌We‌ ‌need‌ ‌to‌ ‌build‌‌a‌‌more‌‌resilient‌‌UK‌‌ together:‌ ‌in‌ ‌the‌ ‌future‌ ‌we‌ ‌will‌ ‌be‌ ‌better‌ ‌able‌ ‌to‌ ‌adapt‌ ‌to‌ ‌uncertainty,‌ ‌to‌ ‌proactively‌‌ address‌‌risks,‌‌and‌‌to‌‌withstand‌‌adversity.‌ ‌ ‌ 24. In‌‌delivering‌‌this‌‌vision,‌‌we‌‌will‌‌be‌‌guided‌‌by‌‌a‌‌series‌‌of‌‌core‌‌principles:‌‌ ‌ ‌ We‌ ‌should‌ ‌understand‌ ‌the‌ ‌risks‌ ‌we‌ ‌face,‌ ‌including‌ ‌the‌ ‌impacts‌ ‌they‌‌ could‌‌have,‌‌and‌‌our‌‌exposure‌‌to‌‌them‌.‌‌To‌‌make‌‌the‌‌right‌‌decisions‌‌we‌‌first‌‌ need‌ ‌to‌ ‌take‌ ‌a‌ ‌broad‌ ‌view‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌risk‌ ‌landscape,‌ ‌across‌ ‌a‌ ‌series‌ ‌of‌‌ interconnected‌‌factors‌‌including:‌‌ ‌ ○ pre-existing‌‌vulnerabilities‌‌and‌‌interdependencies;‌‌ ‌ ○ potential‌‌risks‌‌and‌‌how‌‌they‌‌are‌‌likely‌‌to‌‌evolve;‌‌ ‌ ○ how‌ ‌different‌ ‌risks‌ ‌may‌ ‌intersect‌ ‌(in‌ ‌place‌ ‌or‌ ‌time)‌ ‌presenting‌ ‌more‌‌ profound‌‌or‌‌complex‌‌challenges;‌ ‌ ○ the‌ ‌effectiveness‌ ‌of‌ ‌our‌ ‌risk‌ ‌and‌ ‌vulnerability‌ ‌management‌‌ capabilities;‌ ‌ ○ the‌ ‌range‌ ‌of‌ ‌potential‌ ‌impacts‌ ‌and‌ ‌consequences‌ ‌(including‌‌ geographic‌‌and‌‌socio-economic‌‌variations);‌ ‌ ○ the‌ ‌level‌ ‌of‌ ‌understanding‌ ‌and‌ ‌preparedness‌ ‌by‌ ‌the‌ ‌public,‌‌ businesses‌‌and‌‌Government;‌‌and,‌ ‌ ○ ensuring‌ ‌that‌ ‌the‌ ‌cross-sector‌ ‌systems‌ ‌are‌ ‌in‌‌place‌‌to‌‌take‌‌a‌‌holistic‌‌ view‌‌about‌‌the‌‌risks.‌ ‌ ‌ We‌ ‌should‌ ‌invest‌‌in‌‌preparation‌‌to‌‌better‌‌prevent,‌‌mitigate‌‌and‌‌recover‌‌ from‌ ‌risks‌.‌ ‌To‌ ‌manage‌ ‌risks‌ ‌effectively‌‌we‌‌need‌‌to‌‌balance‌‌investment‌‌and‌‌ effort‌‌across‌‌the‌‌whole‌‌lifecycle‌‌of‌‌risks.‌‌Practically,‌‌this‌‌means:‌‌ ‌ ○ understanding‌‌previous‌‌challenges‌‌and‌‌lessons‌‌learned;‌ ‌ ○ investing‌‌in‌‌‌the‌‌access‌‌to,‌‌management‌‌of‌‌and‌‌use‌‌of‌‌data‌‌to‌‌support‌‌ effective,‌‌evidence‌‌based‌‌risk‌‌management‌d ‌ ecisions;‌‌ ‌ ○ sharing‌‌standardised‌‌and‌‌useable‌‌data‌‌with‌‌all‌‌partners;‌ ‌ ‌ ○ developing‌ ‌and‌ ‌maintaining‌ ‌effective‌ ‌capabilities,‌ ‌along‌ ‌with‌ ‌the‌‌ professional‌ ‌skills‌ ‌to‌ ‌apply‌ ‌and‌ ‌adapt‌ ‌those‌ ‌capabilities‌ ‌to‌ ‌different‌‌ circumstances;‌‌ ‌ ○ seeking‌ ‌greater‌ ‌efficiency‌ ‌and‌ ‌adaptability‌ ‌by‌ ‌developing‌ ‌generic‌‌ capabilities‌‌which‌‌can‌‌be‌‌used‌‌in‌‌many‌‌different‌‌scenarios;‌‌ ‌ ○ investing‌‌in‌‌bespoke‌‌capabilities‌‌and‌‌specialised‌‌expertise,‌‌particularly‌‌ in‌ ‌order‌ ‌to‌ ‌respond‌ ‌to‌ ‌increasingly‌ ‌diverse,‌ ‌complex‌ ‌and‌ ‌less‌‌ predictable‌‌risks;‌‌and‌ ‌ ○ providing‌ ‌support‌ ‌to‌ ‌the‌ ‌most‌ ‌vulnerable‌ ‌local‌ ‌communities,‌‌ particularly‌‌to‌‌enable‌‌recovery‌‌after‌‌an‌‌emergency.‌ ‌ 13‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ We‌ ‌should‌ ‌energise‌ ‌and‌ ‌empower‌ ‌everyone‌ ‌who‌ ‌can‌ ‌make‌ ‌a‌‌ contribution‌.‌ ‌To‌ ‌be‌ ‌truly‌ ‌resilient,‌ ‌all‌ ‌parts‌ ‌of‌ ‌society‌ ‌should‌ ‌play‌ ‌a‌ ‌role‌ ‌in‌‌ building‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK's‌ ‌resilience.‌ ‌Accountability‌ ‌and‌ ‌responsibilities‌ ‌should‌ ‌be‌‌ clear,‌ ‌and‌ ‌governments,‌ ‌local‌ ‌partners‌ ‌and‌ ‌the‌ ‌voluntary‌ ‌sector‌ ‌need‌ ‌to‌‌ ensure‌ ‌that‌ ‌each‌ ‌contributor‌ ‌is‌ ‌able‌ ‌to‌ ‌participate‌ ‌through‌ ‌appropriate‌‌ measures.‌‌Partnerships‌‌between‌‌the‌‌Government‌‌and‌‌all‌‌its‌‌partners‌‌must‌‌be‌‌ strengthened.‌‌This‌‌may‌‌include:‌‌ ‌ ○ enabling‌‌proportionate‌‌legislation,‌‌standards‌‌and‌‌guidance;‌‌ ‌ ○ providing‌‌the‌‌necessary‌‌tools,‌‌skills‌‌and‌‌knowledge;‌‌ ‌ ○ being‌ ‌more‌ ‌transparent‌ ‌about‌ ‌risks,‌ ‌using‌ ‌strategic‌ ‌communications‌‌ mechanisms‌‌to‌‌raise‌‌awareness;‌‌ ‌ ○ rigorous‌ ‌and‌ ‌frequent‌ ‌testing‌ ‌and‌ ‌exercising,‌ ‌both‌‌to‌‌model‌‌potential‌‌ effects‌ ‌and‌ ‌impacts‌ ‌of‌ ‌risks,‌ ‌and‌ ‌to‌ ‌test‌ ‌local,‌ ‌national‌ ‌and‌‌ international‌‌response‌‌plans;‌ ‌ ○ strengthening‌ ‌the‌ ‌roles‌ ‌and‌ ‌responsibilities‌ ‌of‌ ‌Local‌ ‌Resilience‌‌ Forums;‌ ‌ ○ collaborating‌‌with‌‌voluntary,‌‌charity,‌‌faith‌‌groups‌‌and‌‌business‌‌sectors‌‌ to‌‌make‌‌best‌‌use‌‌of‌‌their‌‌capability,‌‌capacity‌‌and‌‌networks,‌‌to‌‌respond‌‌ to‌‌the‌‌localised‌‌effect‌‌of‌‌risk;‌ ‌ ○ enabling‌‌individuals‌‌to‌‌volunteer‌‌and‌‌to‌‌contribute‌‌specialist‌‌skills‌‌and‌‌ support‌‌communities‌‌during‌‌a‌‌crisis.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 25. Building‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌is‌ ‌a‌ ‌long-term‌ ‌endeavour.‌ ‌Though‌ ‌the‌ ‌overall‌ ‌objectives‌ ‌for‌‌ building‌ ‌UK‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌are‌ ‌likely‌ ‌to‌ ‌remain‌ ‌similar‌ ‌in‌ ‌years‌ ‌to‌ ‌come,‌ ‌the‌ ‌changing‌‌ landscape‌ ‌will‌ ‌mean‌ ‌that‌ ‌our‌ ‌approach‌ ‌will‌ ‌need‌ ‌to‌ ‌adapt.‌ ‌The‌ ‌new‌ ‌National‌‌ Resilience‌‌Strategy‌‌will‌‌set‌‌out‌‌a‌‌vision‌‌for‌‌UK‌‌resilience‌‌in‌‌2030,‌‌but‌‌the‌‌endeavour‌‌ of‌‌improving‌‌national‌‌resilience‌‌will‌‌stretch‌‌far‌‌beyond‌‌this‌‌timeframe.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 26. Our‌ ‌vision‌ ‌for‌ ‌2030‌ ‌is‌ ‌that‌ ‌we‌ ‌will‌ ‌have‌ ‌a‌ ‌strengthened‌ ‌ability‌ ‌to‌ ‌assess‌ ‌and‌‌ understand‌ ‌the‌ ‌risks‌ ‌we‌ ‌face.‌ ‌Our‌ ‌suite‌ ‌of‌ ‌systems,‌ ‌infrastructure‌ ‌and‌ ‌capabilities‌‌ (including‌ ‌international‌ ‌systems)‌ ‌for‌ ‌managing‌ ‌those‌ ‌risks‌ ‌should‌ ‌become‌ ‌more‌‌ proactive,‌‌adaptable‌‌and‌‌responsive;‌‌and‌‌there‌‌should‌‌be‌‌fewer‌‌regional‌‌inequalities‌‌ in‌ ‌our‌ ‌resilience.‌ ‌As‌ ‌a‌ ‌result,‌ ‌our‌ ‌local‌ ‌communities,‌ ‌businesses,‌ ‌and‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK‌ ‌as‌ ‌a‌‌ whole,‌ ‌will‌ ‌be‌‌more‌‌cohesive,‌‌resistant‌‌to‌‌shocks‌‌and‌‌stresses,‌‌and‌‌ultimately‌‌more‌‌ adaptable‌‌to‌‌future‌‌threats‌‌and‌‌challenges.‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ Questions‌‌on‌‌Vision‌‌and‌‌Principles:‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 1. Do‌‌you‌‌agree‌‌with‌‌the‌‌proposed‌‌‌vision‌‌‌of‌‌the‌‌Resilience‌‌Strategy?‌‌Is‌‌there‌‌anything‌‌ you‌‌would‌‌add,‌‌amend,‌‌or‌‌remove?‌ ‌ 2. Do‌ ‌you‌ ‌agree‌ ‌with‌ ‌the‌ ‌principles‌ ‌laid‌ ‌out‌ ‌for‌ ‌the‌ ‌strategy?‌ ‌Is‌ ‌there‌ ‌anything‌ ‌you‌‌ would‌‌add,‌‌amend,‌‌or‌‌remove?‌ ‌ 14‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ Thematic‌‌sections‌ ‌ 27. Our‌‌vision‌‌for‌‌resilience‌‌in‌‌2030‌‌is‌‌reflected‌‌in‌‌the‌‌six‌‌thematic‌‌sections‌‌of‌‌this‌‌Call‌‌for‌‌ Evidence:‌ ‌Risk‌ ‌and‌ ‌Resilience;‌ ‌Responsibilities‌ ‌and‌ ‌Accountability;‌ ‌Partnerships;‌‌ Community;‌‌Investment;‌‌and‌‌Resilience‌‌in‌‌an‌‌Interconnected‌‌World.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 28. Each‌ ‌section‌ ‌covers‌ ‌a‌ ‌different‌ ‌aspect‌ ‌of‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌building,‌ ‌setting‌ ‌out‌ ‌some‌‌ background‌ ‌context‌ ‌before‌ ‌seeking‌ ‌input‌ ‌from‌ ‌respondents‌ ‌on‌ ‌themed‌ ‌questions.‌ ‌ The‌ ‌cross-cutting‌ ‌nature‌ ‌of‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌means‌ ‌many‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌issues‌ ‌raised‌ ‌will‌ ‌be‌‌ relevant‌‌to‌‌more‌‌than‌‌one‌‌thematic‌‌area.‌ ‌‌ 15‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ 1. ‌Risk‌‌and‌‌Resilience‌ ‌ ‌ 29. Strengthening‌ ‌our‌ ‌ability‌ ‌to‌ ‌manage‌ ‌an‌ ‌evolving‌ ‌risk‌ ‌landscape‌ ‌depends‌ ‌on‌‌ strengthening‌ ‌our‌ ‌ability‌ ‌to‌ ‌both‌ ‌predict‌ ‌and‌ ‌adapt‌ ‌to‌ ‌identified‌ ‌and‌ ‌unexpected‌‌ challenges.‌ ‌The‌ ‌future‌ ‌global‌ ‌risk‌ ‌landscape‌ ‌is‌ ‌challenging‌ ‌to‌ ‌predict‌ ‌and,‌ ‌even‌‌ when‌ ‌we‌ ‌can‌ ‌predict‌ ‌a‌ ‌risk,‌ ‌it‌ ‌may‌ ‌unfold‌ ‌in‌ ‌unexpected‌ ‌ways,‌ ‌as‌ ‌COVID-19‌ ‌has‌‌ demonstrated.‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 30. As‌‌a‌‌country,‌‌including‌ ‌local‌‌communities‌‌and‌‌individuals,‌‌we‌‌face‌‌a‌‌broad‌‌range‌‌of‌‌ risks.‌ ‌It‌ ‌can‌ ‌often‌ ‌be‌ ‌challenging‌ ‌to‌ ‌understand‌ ‌what‌‌risks‌‌we‌‌are‌‌exposed‌‌to,‌‌how‌‌ concerned‌‌we‌‌need‌‌to‌‌be‌‌about‌‌them‌‌and‌‌what‌‌we‌‌need‌‌to‌‌do‌‌to‌‌protect‌‌ourselves.‌‌ The‌ ‌way‌ ‌we‌ ‌think‌ ‌about‌ ‌risk‌ ‌and‌ ‌the‌ ‌level‌ ‌of‌ ‌action‌ ‌we‌ ‌take‌ ‌to‌ ‌prepare‌ ‌ourselves‌‌ ahead‌‌of‌‌time‌‌will‌‌often‌‌depend‌‌on‌‌a‌‌number‌‌of‌‌factors‌‌including‌‌how‌‌likely‌‌we‌‌are‌‌to‌‌ be‌ ‌affected;‌ ‌how‌ ‌vulnerable‌ ‌we‌ ‌might‌ ‌be‌ ‌to‌ ‌any‌ ‌negative‌ ‌impacts;‌ ‌how‌ ‌much‌‌ disruption‌‌the‌‌risk‌‌would‌‌cause‌‌to‌‌our‌‌lives;‌‌and‌‌what‌‌level‌‌of‌‌action‌‌we‌‌would‌‌need‌‌ to‌ ‌take‌ ‌to‌ ‌protect‌ ‌ourselves.‌ ‌These‌ ‌priorities‌ ‌will‌ ‌be‌ ‌different‌ ‌for‌ ‌individuals,‌‌ businesses,‌‌local‌‌resilience‌‌partners‌‌and‌‌Government.‌ ‌ ‌ Risk‌‌Assessment‌ ‌ 31. Risk‌ ‌assessment‌ ‌allows‌ ‌us‌ ‌to‌ ‌better‌ ‌understand‌ ‌the‌ ‌risks‌‌we‌‌are‌‌facing,‌‌how‌‌likely‌‌ they‌‌are‌‌to‌‌affect‌‌us‌‌and‌‌how‌‌significant‌‌their‌‌impact‌‌will‌‌be.‌ ‌Risk‌‌assessments‌‌help‌‌ Government,‌ ‌businesses‌ ‌and‌ ‌local‌ ‌partners‌ ‌to‌ ‌plan‌ ‌proportionately,‌ ‌assessing‌ ‌and‌‌ building‌‌the‌‌capabilities‌‌needed‌‌to‌‌handle‌‌the‌‌risk,‌‌and‌‌putting‌‌in‌‌place‌‌measures‌‌to‌‌ mitigate‌‌the‌‌impacts‌‌where‌‌possible.‌ ‌ ‌ 32. A‌ ‌part‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌Government’s‌ ‌responsibility‌ ‌for‌ ‌ensuring‌ ‌UK‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌is‌ ‌developing,‌‌ maintaining‌ ‌and‌ ‌continually‌ ‌improving‌ ‌risk‌ ‌assessment.‌ ‌The‌ ‌UK‌ ‌Government‌‌ produces‌ ‌and‌ ‌develops‌ ‌national-level‌ ‌risk‌ ‌assessments,‌ ‌and‌ ‌provides‌ ‌support‌ ‌to‌‌ other‌ ‌partners‌ ‌responsible‌ ‌for‌ ‌producing‌ ‌risk‌ ‌assessments‌ ‌at‌ ‌the‌‌local‌‌level.‌‌These‌‌ are‌‌also‌‌supplemented‌‌by‌‌risk‌‌assessments‌‌made‌‌by‌‌the‌‌devolved‌‌administrations.‌ ‌ ‌ 33. At‌ ‌a‌ ‌national‌ ‌level,‌ ‌the‌ ‌Government‌ ‌shares‌ ‌its‌ ‌latest‌ ‌understanding‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌most‌‌ significant‌ ‌risks‌ ‌to‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK‌ ‌(for‌ ‌the‌ ‌next‌ ‌two‌ ‌years)‌‌through‌‌the‌‌public‌‌‌National‌‌Risk‌‌ Register‌‌(NRR).‌‌This‌‌explains‌‌what‌‌steps‌‌the‌‌Government‌‌and‌‌its‌‌partners‌‌are‌‌taking‌‌ to‌‌mitigate‌‌these‌‌challenges,‌‌and‌‌outlines‌‌the‌‌actions‌‌we‌‌can‌‌all‌‌take‌‌to‌‌help‌‌prepare‌‌ for‌ ‌and‌ ‌respond‌‌to‌‌them.‌‌The‌‌NRR‌‌is‌‌the‌‌public-facing‌‌version‌‌of‌‌the‌‌Government’s‌‌ classified‌ ‌National‌ ‌Security‌ ‌Risk‌ ‌Assessment‌ ‌(NSRA).‌ ‌The‌ ‌NSRA‌ ‌assesses‌ ‌the‌‌ impact‌ ‌and‌ ‌likelihood‌ ‌of‌ ‌risks‌ ‌according‌ ‌to‌ ‌a‌ ‌‘reasonable‌ ‌worst‌ ‌case‌ ‌scenario’‌‌(the‌‌ worst‌‌plausible‌‌manifestation‌‌of‌‌the‌‌risk)‌‌and‌‌enables‌‌partners‌‌to‌‌plan‌‌effectively.‌‌The‌‌ NSRA‌ ‌and‌ ‌NRR‌ ‌are‌ ‌used‌ ‌by‌ ‌local‌ ‌partners‌ ‌to‌ ‌produce,‌ ‌maintain‌ ‌and‌ ‌publish‌‌ Community‌ ‌Risk‌ ‌Registers,‌ ‌which‌ ‌are‌ ‌tailored‌ ‌more‌ ‌specifically‌ ‌to‌ ‌the‌ ‌risks‌ ‌facing‌‌ local‌‌areas.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 34. Neither‌‌the‌‌NRR‌‌nor‌‌the‌‌NSRA‌‌are‌‌prediction‌‌tools.‌ ‌No‌‌risk‌‌assessment‌‌will‌‌ever‌‌be‌‌ able‌‌to‌‌identify‌‌and‌‌assess‌‌every‌‌possible‌‌risk.‌ ‌Unforeseen‌‌risks‌‌can‌‌materialise‌‌and‌‌ 16‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ evolve‌‌in‌‌novel‌‌and‌‌surprising‌‌ways.‌ ‌We‌‌need‌‌to‌‌further‌‌strengthen‌‌our‌‌overall‌‌ability‌‌ to‌ ‌deal‌ ‌with‌ ‌both‌ ‌known‌ ‌and‌ ‌unknown‌ ‌challenges‌ ‌by‌ ‌continuing‌ ‌to‌ ‌update‌ ‌and‌‌ improve‌ ‌our‌ ‌foundational‌ ‌risk‌ ‌assessments,‌ ‌and‌ ‌ensuring‌ ‌that‌ ‌these‌ ‌are‌ ‌well‌‌ communicated‌‌and‌‌understood‌‌by‌‌the‌‌relevant‌‌audiences.‌ ‌ ‌ 35. As‌ ‌part‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌regular‌ ‌cycle‌ ‌of‌ ‌updating‌ ‌the‌ ‌NSRA‌ ‌and‌ ‌NRR,‌ ‌the‌ ‌Government‌ ‌is‌‌ reviewing‌ ‌aspects‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌methodology‌ ‌that‌ ‌it‌ ‌uses‌ ‌to‌ ‌assess‌ ‌risk‌ ‌(working‌ ‌in‌‌ partnership‌ ‌with‌ ‌the‌ ‌Royal‌ ‌Academy‌ ‌of‌ ‌Engineering‌ ‌and‌ ‌other‌ ‌organisations).‌ ‌This‌‌ includes:‌ ‌reviewing‌ ‌how‌ ‌we‌ ‌account‌ ‌for‌ ‌interdependencies‌ ‌between‌ ‌different‌ ‌risks;‌‌ the‌‌best‌‌time‌‌horizons‌‌over‌‌which‌‌to‌‌measure‌‌risks;‌‌and‌‌how‌‌we‌‌better‌‌use‌‌external‌‌ inputs‌ ‌in‌ ‌our‌ ‌assessment.‌ ‌This‌ ‌review‌ ‌will‌ ‌ensure‌ ‌that‌ ‌the‌ ‌latest‌‌academic‌‌thinking‌‌ and‌ ‌best‌ ‌practice‌ ‌is‌ ‌being‌ ‌used‌ ‌to‌ ‌assess‌‌and‌‌understand‌‌risks,‌‌so‌‌that‌‌we‌‌can‌‌be‌‌ well‌‌prepared‌‌for‌‌future‌‌risks‌‌that‌‌the‌‌UK‌‌faces‌‌and‌‌communicate‌‌these‌‌to‌‌necessary‌‌ audiences.‌ ‌The‌ ‌review‌ ‌will‌ ‌address‌ ‌all‌ ‌aspects‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌current‌ ‌NSRA‌ ‌methodology,‌‌ including‌‌how‌‌we‌‌account‌‌for‌‌cascading‌‌risks‌‌and‌‌compound‌‌risks.‌‌ ‌ Risk‌‌Appetite‌ ‌ 36. The‌‌risk‌‌assessment‌‌process‌‌will‌‌bring‌‌about‌‌choices‌‌about‌‌how‌‌we‌‌respond‌‌to‌‌risks‌‌ and,‌ ‌on‌ ‌occasion,‌ ‌we‌ ‌will‌ ‌have‌ ‌to‌ ‌make‌ ‌trade-offs.‌ ‌There‌ ‌may‌ ‌be‌ ‌some‌ ‌risks‌ ‌we‌‌ choose‌‌to‌‌live‌‌with‌‌and‌‌others‌‌that‌‌we‌‌collectively‌‌judge‌‌to‌‌be‌‌intolerable.‌ ‌Arriving‌‌at‌ these‌ ‌decisions‌ ‌may‌ ‌involve‌ ‌difficult‌ ‌choices.‌ ‌We‌ ‌should‌ ‌be‌ ‌prepared,‌ ‌both‌ ‌as‌‌ Government‌ ‌and‌ ‌as‌ ‌a‌ ‌society,‌ ‌to‌ ‌have‌ ‌more‌ ‌open‌ ‌and‌‌honest‌‌conversations‌‌about‌‌ the‌ ‌risks‌ ‌we‌ ‌are‌ ‌willing‌ ‌to‌ ‌accept,‌ ‌the‌ ‌risks‌ ‌that‌ ‌we‌ ‌choose‌ ‌to‌ ‌mitigate,‌ ‌our‌ ‌risk‌‌ trade-offs,‌‌and‌‌the‌‌risks‌‌that‌‌we‌‌should‌‌seek‌‌to‌‌prevent‌‌above‌‌all‌‌else.‌‌ ‌ Handling‌‌catastrophic‌‌and‌‌complex‌‌risks‌ ‌ 37. Some‌ ‌risks‌ ‌are‌ ‌very‌ ‌unlikely‌ ‌to‌ ‌happen,‌ ‌but‌ ‌would‌ ‌have‌ ‌impacts‌ ‌or‌ ‌knock-on‌‌ consequences‌ ‌that‌ ‌would‌ ‌be‌ ‌so‌ ‌widely‌ ‌felt‌ ‌that‌ ‌they‌ ‌require‌ ‌bespoke‌ ‌planning‌‌ measures.‌ ‌Examples‌ ‌of‌ ‌this‌ ‌type‌ ‌of‌ ‌catastrophic‌ ‌risk‌ ‌might‌ ‌include:‌ ‌chemical,‌‌ biological,‌ ‌radiological‌ ‌and‌ ‌nuclear‌ ‌(CBRN)‌ ‌risks;‌ ‌Artificial‌ ‌Intelligence‌ ‌risks;‌ ‌or‌‌ widespread‌‌power‌‌outages.‌ ‌Learning‌‌the‌‌lessons‌‌from‌‌COVID-19,‌‌we‌‌need‌‌to‌‌build‌‌ a‌ ‌more‌ ‌effective‌ ‌system‌ ‌for‌ ‌handling‌ ‌these‌ ‌complex‌ ‌risks.‌ ‌This‌ ‌should‌ ‌include‌‌ assessing‌‌the‌‌whole‌‌range‌‌of‌‌potential‌‌impacts‌‌ahead‌‌of‌‌time,‌‌and‌‌ensuring‌‌we‌‌have‌‌ sufficient‌‌oversight‌‌structures‌‌in‌‌place‌‌to‌‌assure‌‌adequate‌‌planning‌‌in‌‌place.‌ ‌ ‌ 38. When‌ ‌multiple‌ ‌risks‌ ‌occur‌ ‌simultaneously‌‌or‌‌one‌‌after‌‌another,‌‌we‌‌face‌‌‌compound‌‌ and‌ ‌cascading‌‌risks‌.‌‌These‌‌also‌‌have‌‌the‌‌potential‌‌to‌‌cause‌‌catastrophic‌‌impacts.‌‌ Seemingly‌‌low‌‌impact‌‌risks‌‌can‌‌lead‌‌to‌‌more‌‌devastating‌‌effects,‌‌when‌‌they‌‌occur‌‌at‌‌ the‌ ‌same‌ ‌time‌‌or‌‌affect‌‌people,‌‌infrastructure‌‌or‌‌systems‌‌that‌‌have‌‌already‌‌been‌‌hit‌‌ by‌ ‌another‌ ‌risk.‌ ‌Globally,‌ ‌anticipating,‌ ‌preparing‌ ‌for,‌ ‌responding‌ ‌to‌ ‌and‌ ‌recovering‌‌ from‌‌cascading‌‌and‌‌compound‌‌risks‌‌still‌‌presents‌‌a‌‌significant‌‌challenge.‌ ‌ ‌ 39. Some‌‌other‌‌more‌‌‌existential‌‌risks‌‌‌(such‌‌as‌‌a‌‌large‌‌meteor‌‌strike‌‌on‌‌our‌‌planet)‌‌are‌‌ statistically‌ ‌so‌ ‌unlikely‌ ‌that‌ ‌it‌ ‌may‌‌not‌‌be‌‌practicable‌‌for‌‌the‌‌Government‌‌to‌‌plan‌‌for‌‌ them.‌ ‌There‌ ‌is‌ ‌nevertheless‌ ‌an‌‌important‌‌role‌‌for‌‌others‌‌to‌‌play‌‌in‌‌monitoring‌‌these‌‌ 17‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ risks‌ ‌and‌ ‌indicating‌ ‌any‌ ‌changes‌ ‌in‌ ‌their‌ ‌likelihood.‌ ‌Such‌ ‌organisations‌‌include‌‌the‌‌ Centre‌‌for‌‌Existential‌‌Risk‌‌and‌‌the‌‌Future‌‌of‌‌Humanity‌‌Institute.‌‌ ‌ Improving‌‌decision‌‌making‌‌through‌‌data‌‌and‌‌analysis‌ ‌ 40. Development‌ ‌of‌ ‌new‌ ‌data‌ ‌capabilities‌ ‌gives‌ ‌us‌‌greater‌‌opportunities‌‌to‌‌understand,‌‌ evaluate‌‌and‌‌manage‌‌risk.‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 41. We‌ ‌need‌ ‌to‌ ‌build‌ ‌further‌ ‌on‌ ‌the‌ ‌progress‌ ‌Government‌ ‌and‌ ‌partners‌ ‌have‌ ‌already‌‌ made‌ ‌in‌ ‌this‌ ‌field,‌‌to‌‌ensure‌‌we‌‌are‌‌always‌‌equipped‌‌with‌‌the‌‌right‌‌data‌‌at‌‌the‌‌right‌‌ time‌‌and‌‌that‌‌the‌‌quality‌‌of‌‌information‌‌is‌‌shared‌‌with‌‌(and‌‌accessible‌‌to)‌‌the‌‌relevant‌‌ people,‌‌at‌‌both‌‌the‌‌national‌‌and‌‌local‌‌level.‌ ‌ ‌ 42. The‌ ‌Government‌ ‌is‌ ‌therefore‌ ‌investing‌ ‌in‌‌a‌‌new‌‌National‌‌Situation‌‌Centre‌‌(SitCen),‌‌ as‌ ‌a‌ ‌core‌ ‌part‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK’s‌ ‌crisis‌ ‌management‌ ‌framework.‌ ‌Working‌ ‌in‌ ‌partnership‌‌ across‌ ‌Government‌ ‌and‌ ‌beyond,‌ ‌the‌ ‌SitCen‌ ‌will‌ ‌improve‌ ‌the‌‌situational‌‌awareness‌‌ we‌‌need‌‌to‌‌strengthen‌‌our‌‌resilience;‌‌combining‌‌data‌‌and‌‌expertise‌‌to‌‌unlock‌‌timely‌‌ insights‌‌for‌‌a‌‌safe,‌‌secure‌‌and‌‌prosperous‌‌UK.‌‌The‌‌SitCen’s‌‌role‌‌will‌‌be‌‌to‌‌cover‌‌all‌‌ risks,‌‌from‌‌‌civil‌‌contingencies‌‌‌to‌‌national‌‌security.‌‌It‌‌will‌‌add‌‌particular‌‌value‌‌where‌‌ different‌ ‌risks‌ ‌intersect,‌ ‌and‌ ‌will‌ ‌play‌ ‌a‌ ‌vital‌ ‌role‌ ‌in‌ ‌bringing‌ ‌together‌ ‌what‌ ‌would‌‌ otherwise‌ ‌be‌ ‌separate‌ ‌data‌ ‌sets,‌ ‌from‌ ‌across‌ ‌the‌ ‌Government‌ ‌and‌ ‌beyond.‌ ‌The‌‌ SitCen‌‌will‌‌be‌‌an‌‌evolving‌‌capability,‌‌which‌‌will‌‌continue‌‌to‌‌improve‌‌over‌‌time‌‌in‌‌line‌‌ with‌‌developments‌‌in‌‌data,‌‌analytics‌‌and‌‌technology.‌ ‌ ‌ Questions‌‌on‌‌Risk‌‌and‌‌Resilience:‌ ‌ 1. Is‌ ‌there‌ ‌more‌ ‌that‌ ‌the‌ ‌Government‌ ‌can‌ ‌do‌ ‌to‌ ‌assess‌ ‌risk‌ ‌at‌ ‌the‌ ‌national‌ ‌and‌‌local‌ levels?‌‌If‌‌so,‌‌what?‌‌ ‌ ‌ 2. Is‌ ‌there‌ ‌more‌ ‌that‌ ‌the‌ ‌Government‌ ‌can‌ ‌do‌ ‌to‌ ‌communicate‌ ‌about‌ ‌risk‌ ‌and‌ ‌risk‌‌ appetite‌‌with‌‌organisations‌‌and‌‌individuals?‌‌If‌‌so,‌‌what?‌‌ ‌ ‌ 3. How‌ ‌could‌ ‌the‌ ‌Government‌ ‌make‌ ‌risk‌ ‌assessment‌ ‌and‌ ‌data‌ ‌more‌ ‌accessible‌ ‌by‌‌ frontline‌‌personnel‌‌in‌‌an‌‌emergency?‌‌ ‌ ‌ 4. How‌ ‌does‌ ‌your‌ ‌organisation‌ ‌assess‌ ‌risks‌ ‌around‌ ‌unlikely‌ ‌or‌ ‌extreme‌‌events,‌‌when‌‌ there‌‌is‌‌limited‌‌or‌‌no‌‌data?‌‌ ‌ ‌ 5. How‌ ‌could‌ ‌the‌ ‌current‌ ‌local‌ ‌risk‌ ‌assessment‌ ‌process,‌ ‌managed‌ ‌through‌ ‌Local‌‌ Resilience‌‌Forums,‌‌be‌‌strengthened‌‌to‌‌help‌‌local‌‌partners?‌‌ ‌ ‌ 18‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ 2.‌ ‌Responsibilities‌‌and‌‌Accountability‌ ‌ 43. The‌‌UK’s‌‌resilience‌‌model‌‌is‌‌based‌‌on‌‌the‌‌principle‌‌of‌‌‌subsidiarity‌.‌‌This‌‌means‌‌that,‌‌ wherever‌ ‌possible,‌ ‌decisions,‌ ‌planning‌ ‌for‌ ‌and‌ ‌responsibilities‌ ‌before,‌ ‌during‌ ‌and‌‌ after‌ ‌an‌ ‌emergency‌ ‌lie‌ ‌at‌ ‌the‌ ‌lowest‌ ‌appropriate‌ ‌level‌ ‌(e.g.‌ ‌communities,‌ ‌local‌‌ authorities,‌ ‌emergency‌ ‌responders),‌ ‌with‌ ‌coordination‌ ‌and‌ ‌collaboration‌ ‌at‌ ‌the‌‌ highest‌ ‌necessary‌ ‌level‌ ‌(e.g.‌ ‌UK‌ ‌Government).‌‌In‌‌order‌‌to‌‌support‌‌this,‌‌we‌‌need‌‌to‌‌ ensure‌ ‌clarity‌ ‌on‌ ‌roles‌ ‌and‌ ‌responsibilities‌‌at‌‌each‌‌tier,‌‌and‌‌better‌‌information‌‌flows‌‌ between‌‌each‌‌tier.‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 44. In‌ ‌addition‌ ‌to‌ ‌clear‌ ‌responsibilities,‌ ‌it‌ ‌is‌‌fundamental‌‌that‌‌different‌‌levels‌‌involved‌‌in‌‌ resilience‌ ‌building‌ ‌have‌ ‌the‌ ‌tools,‌ ‌processes‌ ‌and‌ ‌relationships‌ ‌in‌ ‌place‌ ‌to‌ ‌work‌‌ together‌‌effectively.‌‌This‌‌means‌‌ensuring‌‌that‌‌work‌‌is‌‌not‌‌done‌‌in‌‌isolation,‌‌but‌‌rather‌‌ through‌‌collaboration‌‌and‌‌knowledge‌‌sharing.‌‌It‌‌also‌‌means‌‌that‌‌information‌‌and‌‌data‌‌ is‌‌communicated‌‌across‌‌different‌‌levels‌‌efficiently,‌‌transparently‌‌and‌‌effectively.‌ ‌ ‌ 45. This‌ ‌section‌ ‌covers‌ ‌roles,‌ ‌responsibilities‌ ‌and‌ ‌accountability‌ ‌in‌ ‌the‌ ‌context‌ ‌of‌‌ resilience‌‌and‌‌emergency‌‌management‌‌and‌‌recovery.‌‌It‌‌relates‌‌primarily‌‌to‌‌all‌‌tiers‌‌of‌‌ Government‌ ‌-‌ ‌UK‌ ‌national,‌ ‌devolved‌ ‌and‌ ‌local‌ ‌(including‌ ‌businesses)‌ ‌-‌ ‌as‌ ‌well‌ ‌as‌‌ Category‌‌1‌‌and‌‌2‌‌responders‌‌as‌‌defined‌‌in‌‌the‌‌Civil‌‌Contingencies‌‌Act‌‌(CCA),‌‌and‌‌ those‌‌with‌‌academic‌‌interest.‌ ‌ Risk‌‌and‌‌Resilience‌‌Management‌‌in‌‌UK‌‌Central‌‌Government‌ ‌ 46. Effective‌ ‌leadership‌ ‌of‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌is‌ ‌vital‌ ‌in‌ ‌the‌ ‌planning,‌ ‌response‌ ‌and‌ ‌recovery‌‌ phases‌ ‌of‌ ‌emergencies.‌ ‌Notwithstanding‌ ‌the‌ ‌principle‌ ‌of‌ ‌subsidiarity,‌ ‌this‌ ‌means‌ ‌it‌‌ must‌‌also‌‌remain‌‌a‌‌high‌‌priority‌‌at‌‌the‌‌centre‌‌of‌‌the‌‌UK‌‌Government.‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 47. The‌ ‌Cabinet‌‌Office‌‌will‌‌continue‌‌to‌‌create‌‌the‌‌frameworks,‌‌standards‌‌and‌‌structures‌‌ for‌ ‌our‌‌resilience,‌‌both‌‌in‌‌terms‌‌of‌‌direction-setting‌‌(working‌‌closely‌‌with‌‌No.10)‌‌and‌‌ organising‌ ‌the‌ ‌structures‌ ‌for‌ ‌central‌ ‌decision-making.‌ ‌This‌‌includes:‌‌overseeing‌‌the‌‌ collaboration‌ ‌and‌ ‌information‌ ‌sharing‌ ‌between‌ ‌central‌ ‌Government‌ ‌and‌ ‌LRFs,‌‌ partners‌ ‌and‌ ‌others;‌ ‌developing‌ ‌and‌ ‌maintaining‌ ‌the‌ ‌doctrine‌ ‌and‌ ‌plans‌ ‌for‌ ‌risk‌‌ management‌ ‌across‌ ‌the‌‌risk‌‌lifecycle;‌‌activating‌‌and‌‌supporting‌‌the‌‌smooth‌‌running‌‌ of‌ ‌the‌ ‌Cabinet‌ ‌Office‌ ‌Briefing‌ ‌Rooms‌ ‌(COBR)‌ ‌to‌ ‌drive‌ ‌the‌ ‌collective‌ ‌Government‌‌ response‌ ‌in‌ ‌times‌ ‌of‌‌emergency;‌‌and‌‌delivering‌‌and‌‌hosting‌‌the‌‌UK’s‌‌new‌‌Situation‌‌ Centre‌ ‌(SitCen),‌ ‌to‌ ‌provide‌ ‌the‌ ‌best‌ ‌available‌ ‌modelling‌ ‌and‌ ‌analysis‌ ‌to‌ ‌support‌‌ decision-making.‌ ‌The‌ ‌Cabinet‌ ‌Office‌ ‌will‌ ‌also‌ ‌continue‌ ‌to‌ ‌develop‌ ‌new‌ ‌national‌‌ capabilities‌ ‌to‌ ‌support‌ ‌our‌ ‌resilience,‌ ‌such‌ ‌as‌ ‌the‌ ‌work‌ ‌to‌ ‌develop‌ ‌the‌ ‌new‌‌ emergency‌‌text‌‌alert‌‌system‌‌which‌‌will‌‌provide‌‌warnings‌‌directly‌‌to‌‌individuals‌‌in‌‌the‌‌ event‌‌of‌‌a‌‌risk‌‌to‌‌life‌‌in‌‌the‌‌local‌‌area.‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 19‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ The‌‌Devolved‌‌Administrations‌ ‌ ‌ 48. The‌ ‌partnership‌ ‌between‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK‌ ‌Government‌ ‌and‌ ‌the‌ ‌Devolved‌ ‌Administrations,‌‌ reflecting‌ ‌the‌ ‌devolution‌ ‌settlements,‌ ‌is‌ ‌a‌ ‌vital‌ ‌part‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK’s‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌as‌ ‌many‌‌ risks‌ ‌cut‌ ‌across‌ ‌geopolitical‌ ‌boundaries.‌ ‌Governments‌ ‌in‌ ‌all‌ ‌four‌ ‌nations‌ ‌of‌‌the‌‌UK‌‌ have‌ ‌responsibility‌ ‌for‌ ‌providing‌ ‌public‌ ‌services‌ ‌and‌ ‌for‌ ‌supporting‌ ‌aspects‌ ‌of‌ ‌our‌ individual‌ ‌and‌ ‌collective‌ ‌resilience.‌ ‌This‌ ‌includes‌ ‌areas‌ ‌such‌ ‌as‌ ‌policing,‌ ‌justice,‌‌ health,‌ ‌education‌ ‌and‌ ‌transport‌ ‌in‌ ‌particular,‌ ‌according‌ ‌to‌ ‌the‌ ‌relevant‌ ‌devolved‌‌ powers.‌ ‌ ‌ 49. The‌ ‌new‌ ‌National‌ ‌Resilience‌ ‌Strategy‌ ‌will‌ ‌encompass‌ ‌an‌ ‌all-risks‌ ‌approach,‌ ‌from‌‌ matters‌ ‌of‌ ‌national‌ ‌security‌ ‌in‌ ‌which‌ ‌powers‌ ‌are‌ ‌reserved‌ ‌to‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK‌ ‌central‌‌ Government,‌ ‌through‌ ‌to‌ ‌all‌ ‌aspects‌ ‌of‌ ‌civil‌ ‌contingencies‌ ‌which‌ ‌affect‌‌communities‌‌ within‌ ‌and‌ ‌between‌ ‌all‌ ‌parts‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK.‌ ‌This‌ ‌can‌ ‌only‌ ‌be‌ ‌achieved‌ ‌through‌ ‌close‌‌ partnership‌ ‌between‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK‌ ‌Government‌ ‌and‌ ‌the‌ ‌Devolved‌ ‌Administrations,‌‌ including‌‌sharing‌‌and‌‌learning‌‌from‌‌best‌‌practice‌‌across‌‌each‌‌part‌‌of‌‌the‌‌country.‌ ‌ Local‌‌Partners‌‌ ‌ ‌ 50. Local‌ ‌authorities‌ ‌and‌ ‌responder‌ ‌agencies‌ ‌play‌ ‌an‌ ‌integral‌ ‌part‌ ‌in‌ ‌the‌ ‌planning‌ ‌for,‌‌ response‌ ‌to,‌ ‌and‌ ‌recovery‌ ‌from‌ ‌any‌ ‌emergency,‌ ‌whatever‌ ‌the‌ ‌scale.‌ ‌The‌ ‌local‌ ‌tier‌‌ must‌‌continue‌‌to‌‌be‌‌the‌‌fundamental‌‌building‌‌block‌‌for‌‌UK‌‌resilience.‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 51. Our‌‌strength‌‌as‌‌a‌‌country‌‌in‌‌preparing‌‌for,‌‌responding‌‌to‌‌and‌‌recovering‌‌from‌‌crises‌‌ is‌‌heavily‌‌reliant‌‌on‌‌the‌‌skill‌‌and‌‌efforts‌‌of‌‌the‌‌numerous‌‌local-level‌‌organisations‌‌who‌‌ work‌ ‌on‌ ‌the‌ ‌front‌ ‌line‌ ‌of‌ ‌crises.‌‌These‌‌organisations‌‌come‌‌together‌‌in‌‌multi-agency‌‌ partnerships‌2‌ ‌called‌ ‌a‌ ‌Local‌ ‌Resilience‌ ‌Forum‌ ‌(LRF)‌ ‌in‌ ‌England‌ ‌and‌ ‌Wales.‌ ‌In‌‌ Northern‌ ‌Ireland,‌ ‌these‌ ‌are‌ ‌referred‌ ‌to‌ ‌as‌ ‌Emergency‌ ‌Preparedness‌ ‌Groups,‌‌while‌‌ Scotland‌ ‌has‌ ‌Regional‌ ‌Resilience‌ ‌Partnerships‌ ‌supported‌ ‌by‌ ‌Local‌ ‌Resilience‌‌ Partnerships.‌ ‌Elected‌ ‌Members‌ ‌(local‌ ‌mayors,‌ ‌MPs,‌ ‌Council‌ ‌leaders,‌ ‌police‌ ‌and‌‌ crime‌ ‌commissioners)‌,‌ ‌civic‌ ‌leaders,‌ ‌as‌ ‌well‌ ‌as‌ ‌the‌ ‌courts,‌ ‌prisons‌ ‌and‌ ‌probation‌‌ services,‌‌also‌‌have‌‌a‌‌role‌‌to‌‌play‌‌in‌‌supporting‌‌resilience,‌‌including‌‌the‌‌discharge‌‌of‌‌ their‌ ‌various‌ ‌powers‌ ‌and‌ ‌budgets,‌ ‌communicating‌ ‌with‌ ‌the‌ ‌public‌ ‌and‌ ‌supporting‌‌ recovery‌ ‌efforts.‌ ‌These‌ ‌local‌ ‌partners‌ ‌have‌ ‌played‌ ‌a‌ ‌critical‌ ‌role‌ ‌in‌ ‌our‌ ‌pandemic‌‌ response‌‌and‌‌many‌‌will‌‌play‌‌key‌‌roles‌‌in‌‌the‌‌recovery.‌‌We‌‌have‌‌therefore‌‌committed‌‌ to‌‌consider‌‌strengthening‌‌the‌‌roles‌‌and‌‌responsibilities‌‌of‌‌LRFs.‌ ‌ The‌‌Civil‌‌Contingencies‌‌Act‌‌2004‌ ‌ ‌ 52. It‌ ‌is‌ ‌important‌ ‌that‌ ‌we‌ ‌also‌ ‌consider‌ ‌the‌ ‌legislative‌ ‌framework‌ ‌as‌ ‌part‌ ‌of‌ ‌our‌ ‌wider‌‌ national‌‌resilience‌‌strategy.‌‌‌The‌‌Civil‌‌Contingencies‌‌Act‌‌2004‌‌(CCA)‌‌is‌‌‌the‌‌primary‌‌ legislation‌ ‌which‌ ‌provides‌ ‌the‌ ‌framework‌ ‌for‌ ‌preparing‌ ‌for‌ ‌and‌ ‌responding‌ ‌to‌‌ emergencies,‌ ‌informing‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK‌ ‌Government‌ ‌Concept‌ ‌of‌ ‌Operations‌ ‌(CONOPs)‌ ‌for‌‌ 2 ‌ hese‌‌partnerships‌‌are‌‌not‌‌legal‌‌entities‌‌but‌‌have‌‌a‌‌collective‌‌responsibility‌‌mandated‌‌in‌‌the‌‌Civil‌‌Contingencies‌‌ T Act‌‌(CCA)‌‌to‌‌ensure‌‌joined-up‌‌emergency‌‌management‌‌in‌‌their‌‌respective‌‌areas.‌ ‌ 20‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ emergency‌ ‌response.‌ ‌It‌ ‌is‌ ‌also‌ ‌the‌ ‌mechanism‌ ‌for‌ ‌making‌ ‌emergency‌ ‌regulations‌‌ (as‌ ‌set‌ ‌out‌ ‌in‌ ‌part‌ ‌2‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌Act).‌ ‌The‌ ‌CCA‌ ‌therefore‌ ‌has‌ ‌a‌ ‌central‌ ‌role‌ ‌in‌ ‌how‌ ‌we‌‌ deliver‌‌greater‌‌resilience‌‌across‌‌the‌‌whole‌‌of‌‌the‌‌UK.‌ ‌ ‌ 53. Part‌ ‌1‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌CCA‌ ‌sets‌ ‌out‌ ‌the‌ ‌framework‌ ‌for‌ ‌civil‌ ‌protection‌ ‌at‌ ‌the‌ ‌local‌ ‌level.‌ ‌By‌‌ dividing‌ ‌responders‌ ‌into‌ ‌categories‌ ‌(1‌ ‌and‌ ‌2),‌ ‌the‌ ‌CCA‌ ‌places‌‌specific‌‌duties‌‌upon‌‌ them,‌‌and‌‌creates‌‌a‌‌basis‌‌for‌‌LRFs‌‌to‌‌organise‌‌how‌‌they‌‌plan,‌‌prepare‌‌and‌‌respond‌‌ to‌‌a‌‌civil‌‌emergency.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 54. A‌ ‌review‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌CCA‌ ‌is‌ ‌scheduled‌ ‌for‌ ‌March‌ ‌2022.‌ ‌In‌ ‌considering‌ ‌this‌ ‌statutory‌‌ underpinning‌‌of‌‌our‌‌resilience,‌‌we‌‌need‌‌better‌‌to‌‌understand‌‌the‌‌effectiveness‌‌of‌‌the‌‌ current‌‌roles‌‌and‌‌responsibilities‌‌set‌‌out‌‌in‌‌the‌‌CCA‌‌and‌‌where‌‌improvements‌‌can‌‌be‌‌ made.‌ ‌This‌ ‌includes‌ ‌the‌ ‌legal‌ ‌status‌ ‌and‌ ‌categorisation‌ ‌of‌ ‌local‌ ‌responders;‌ ‌the‌‌ ‘Triple‌‌Lock’‌‌test‌‌for‌‌use‌‌of‌‌the‌‌CCA’s‌‌emergency‌‌powers;‌‌the‌‌appointment‌‌of‌‌regional‌‌ coordinators;‌ ‌and‌ ‌the‌ ‌potential‌ ‌addition‌ ‌of‌ ‌legal‌ ‌responsibilities‌ ‌around‌ ‌recovery‌ ‌to‌‌ the‌‌Act.‌ ‌ ‌ 55. Detailed‌‌questions‌‌on‌‌the‌‌CCA‌‌can‌‌be‌‌found‌‌in‌‌Annex‌‌A.‌ ‌ ‌ Questions‌‌on‌‌Responsibilities‌‌and‌‌Accountability:‌ ‌ ‌ 1. Do‌ ‌you‌ ‌think‌ ‌that‌ ‌the‌ ‌current‌ ‌division‌ ‌of‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌responsibilities‌ ‌between‌ ‌Central‌‌ Government,‌‌the‌‌Devolved‌‌Administrations,‌‌local‌‌government‌‌and‌‌local‌‌responders‌‌is‌‌ correct?‌‌If‌‌not,‌‌why?‌‌ ‌ ‌ 2. How‌ ‌can‌ ‌the‌‌UK‌‌Central‌‌Government,‌‌DAs,‌‌local‌‌and‌‌regional‌‌forms‌‌of‌‌government‌‌ and‌‌local‌‌responders‌‌better‌‌collaborate‌‌on‌‌resilience?‌‌ ‌ ‌ 3. What‌‌role,‌‌if‌‌any,‌‌should‌‌the‌‌UK‌‌Central‌‌government‌‌have‌‌in‌‌assuring‌‌that‌‌local‌‌areas‌‌ are‌‌effectively‌‌carrying‌‌out‌‌their‌‌resilience‌‌responsibilities,‌‌whilst‌‌also‌‌respecting‌‌local‌‌ responsibilities?‌ ‌ ‌ The‌ ‌primary‌ ‌legislative‌ ‌basis‌ ‌for‌ ‌emergency‌ ‌management‌ ‌is‌ ‌the‌ ‌Civil‌ ‌Contingencies‌ ‌Act‌‌ 2004‌‌(CCA).‌‌Specific‌‌questions‌‌on‌‌the‌‌CCA‌‌are‌‌covered‌‌in‌‌Annex‌‌A.‌‌There‌‌is‌‌also‌‌legislation‌‌ covering‌ ‌specific‌ ‌risk‌ ‌areas‌‌including,‌‌for‌‌example,‌‌the‌‌Terrorism‌‌Act‌‌2000‌‌and‌‌the‌‌Climate‌‌ Change‌‌Act‌‌2008,‌‌amongst‌‌others.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 4. What‌ ‌do‌ ‌you‌ ‌consider‌ ‌the‌ ‌advantages‌ ‌and‌ ‌disadvantages‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌current‌‌legislative‌‌ basis‌‌for‌‌resilience?‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ 21‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ 3.‌‌Partnerships‌ ‌ 56. Resilience‌ ‌is‌ ‌not‌ ‌solely‌ ‌a‌ ‌government‌ ‌or‌ ‌public‌ ‌sector‌ ‌responsibility.‌ ‌Other‌‌parts‌‌of‌‌ society‌ ‌play‌ ‌an‌ ‌essential‌ ‌role‌ ‌in‌ ‌ensuring‌ ‌our‌ ‌collective‌ ‌resilience.‌ ‌The‌ ‌COVID-19‌ pandemic‌ ‌has‌ ‌highlighted‌ ‌more‌ ‌than‌ ‌ever‌ ‌the‌ ‌importance‌ ‌of‌ ‌public-private‌ ‌sector‌‌ partnerships‌ ‌and‌ ‌collaborative‌ ‌working‌ ‌between‌‌Government,‌‌businesses,‌‌business‌‌ organisations‌ ‌and‌ ‌the‌ ‌research‌ ‌community‌ ‌to‌ ‌achieve‌ ‌shared‌ ‌goals.‌ ‌For‌ ‌example,‌‌ many‌ ‌manufacturers‌ ‌adapted‌ ‌their‌ ‌production‌ ‌processes‌ ‌to‌‌make‌‌vital‌‌supplies‌‌like‌‌ hand‌ ‌sanitiser‌ ‌and‌ ‌face‌ ‌masks.‌ ‌The‌‌pandemic‌‌also‌‌highlighted‌‌just‌‌how‌‌quickly‌‌the‌‌ operation‌ ‌of‌ ‌businesses‌‌can‌‌be‌‌disrupted‌‌in‌‌the‌‌event‌‌of‌‌an‌‌emergency.‌‌It‌‌is‌‌crucial‌‌ that‌ ‌we‌‌empower‌‌and‌‌enable‌‌all‌‌businesses‌‌to‌‌put‌‌in‌‌place‌‌arrangements‌‌to‌‌ensure‌‌ that‌‌critical‌‌parts‌‌of‌‌business‌‌can‌‌continue‌‌during‌‌periods‌‌of‌‌disruption..‌ ‌ ‌ 57. We‌‌also‌‌depend‌‌on‌‌a‌‌range‌‌of‌‌local‌‌partnerships,‌‌including‌‌LRFs,‌‌Community‌‌Safety‌‌ Partnerships,‌ ‌Counter‌ ‌Terrorism‌ ‌Boards‌ ‌and‌ ‌Event‌ ‌Safety‌ ‌groups,‌ ‌amongst‌ ‌many‌‌ others.‌ ‌Further‌ ‌strengthening‌ ‌these‌ ‌partnerships‌ ‌and‌ ‌drawing‌ ‌on‌ ‌innovative‌‌ resilience‌ ‌approaches‌ ‌outside‌ ‌Government‌ ‌will‌ ‌increase‌ ‌our‌ ‌overall‌ ‌resilience.‌ ‌To‌‌ achieve‌ ‌effective‌ ‌partnerships,‌ ‌all‌ ‌parties‌ ‌must‌ ‌feel‌ ‌empowered‌ ‌to‌ ‌play‌ ‌a‌ ‌role‌ ‌in‌‌ resilience‌ ‌building,‌ ‌and‌ ‌have‌ ‌the‌ ‌means,‌ ‌tools‌ ‌and‌ ‌knowledge‌ ‌to‌ ‌do‌ ‌so.‌ ‌We‌ ‌must‌‌ ensure‌‌that‌‌our‌‌efforts‌‌are‌‌complementary,‌‌and‌‌there‌‌is‌‌a‌‌clear‌‌communication‌‌and‌‌a‌‌ shared‌‌understanding‌‌of‌‌what‌‌it‌‌means‌‌to‌‌be‌‌resilient.‌ ‌ ‌ 58. This‌ ‌section‌ ‌includes‌ ‌the‌ ‌role‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌Critical‌ ‌National‌ ‌Infrastructure‌ ‌(CNI)‌ ‌sectors,‌‌ wider‌ ‌critical‌ ‌sectors‌ ‌and‌ ‌of‌ ‌academia‌ ‌in‌ ‌building‌ ‌resilience.‌ ‌Questions‌ ‌related‌ ‌to‌‌ local‌ ‌response‌ ‌arrangements,‌ ‌including‌ ‌the‌ ‌role‌ ‌and‌ ‌responsibilities‌ ‌of‌ ‌LRFs,‌ ‌are‌‌ included‌‌in‌‌the‌‌Civil‌‌Contingencies‌‌Act‌‌questions‌‌in‌‌Annex‌‌A.‌ ‌ Critical‌‌National‌‌Infrastructure‌ ‌ 59. Critical‌ ‌National‌ ‌Infrastructure‌3‌ ‌(CNI)‌ ‌refers‌ ‌to‌ ‌those‌ ‌assets‌ ‌which‌‌are‌‌crucial‌‌for‌‌ keeping‌ ‌the‌ ‌UK‌ ‌running,‌ ‌and‌ ‌providing‌ ‌the‌ ‌essential‌ ‌services‌ ‌upon‌ ‌which‌ ‌we‌ ‌rely‌‌ every‌ ‌day.‌ ‌It‌‌also‌‌includes‌‌infrastructure‌‌which,‌‌if‌‌disrupted,‌‌could‌‌have‌‌a‌‌significant‌‌ impact‌‌on‌‌our‌‌national‌‌security‌‌and/or‌‌defence.‌‌Disruptions‌‌to‌‌CNI‌‌services‌‌can‌‌have‌‌ major‌ ‌and‌ ‌wide-ranging‌ ‌impacts.‌ ‌For‌ ‌example,‌ ‌national‌ ‌infrastructure‌ ‌could‌ ‌be‌‌ targeted‌‌by‌‌cyber‌‌criminals‌‌or‌‌terrorists‌‌for‌‌financial‌‌gain‌‌or‌‌to‌‌cause‌‌disruption.‌‌CNI‌‌ may‌ ‌also‌ ‌be‌ ‌affected‌ ‌by‌ ‌hazards‌ ‌such‌ ‌as‌ ‌flooding‌ ‌or‌ ‌storms,‌ ‌which‌ ‌could,‌ ‌for‌‌ example,‌‌lead‌‌to‌‌power‌‌outages‌‌or‌‌water‌‌supply‌‌disruption.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 60. The‌ ‌resilience‌‌of‌‌our‌‌CNI,‌‌therefore,‌‌is‌‌vital‌.‌ ‌It‌‌is‌‌fundamental‌‌that‌‌CNI‌‌sectors‌‌have‌‌ robust‌ ‌business‌ ‌continuity‌ ‌plans‌ ‌in‌ ‌place‌ ‌ahead‌ ‌of‌ ‌time‌ ‌to‌ ‌ensure‌ ‌that‌ ‌where‌‌ disruption‌ ‌does‌ ‌occur,‌ ‌the‌ ‌provision‌‌of‌‌these‌‌critical‌‌services‌‌can‌‌continue.‌ ‌Th ‌ ere‌‌is‌‌ also‌ ‌more‌ ‌that‌ ‌can‌ ‌be‌ ‌done‌ ‌to‌ ‌ensure‌ ‌consistency‌ ‌across‌ ‌all‌ ‌CNI‌ ‌sectors,‌ ‌and‌ ‌to‌‌ ensure‌ ‌that‌ ‌all‌ ‌sectors‌ ‌and‌ ‌their‌ ‌operators‌ ‌are‌ ‌reaching‌ ‌the‌ ‌same‌ ‌set‌ ‌of‌ ‌high‌‌ standards.‌ ‌We‌ ‌need‌‌to‌‌ensure‌‌our‌‌expectations‌‌of,‌‌and‌‌offer‌‌to‌‌CNI‌‌businesses,‌‌is‌‌ 3 ‌There‌‌are‌‌13‌‌Critical‌‌National‌‌Infrastructure‌‌sectors:‌‌Chemicals,‌‌Civil‌‌Nuclear,‌‌Communications,‌‌ Defence,‌‌Emergency‌‌Services,‌‌Energy,‌‌Finance,‌‌Food,‌‌Government,‌‌Health,‌‌Space,‌‌Transport‌‌and‌‌ Water.‌ ‌ 22‌ ‌  ‌ ‌ ‌ clear‌ ‌and‌ ‌robust,‌ ‌as‌ ‌emphasised‌ ‌in‌ ‌the‌ ‌2020‌ ‌Resilience‌ ‌Review‌ ‌by‌ ‌the‌ ‌National‌‌ Infrastructure‌‌Commission.‌ ‌ Wider‌‌critical‌‌sectors‌‌and‌‌supply‌‌chains‌ ‌ 61. As‌‌the‌‌UK‌‌has‌‌become‌‌progressively‌‌globalised,‌‌and‌‌more‌‌dependent‌‌on‌‌the‌‌internet‌‌ and‌ ‌its‌‌technologies,‌‌our‌‌understanding‌‌of‌‌critical‌‌sectors‌‌has‌‌shifted‌‌and‌‌expanded‌‌ to‌‌encompass‌‌a‌‌much‌‌wider‌‌range‌‌of‌‌sectors‌‌as‌‌well‌‌as‌‌supply‌‌chains.‌‌Other‌‌critical‌‌ categories‌ ‌include‌ ‌(but‌ ‌are‌ ‌not‌ ‌limited)‌ ‌to:‌ ‌incident-critical‌ ‌infrastructure;‌ ‌sensitive‌‌ technologies;‌ ‌and‌ ‌critical‌ ‌supply‌ ‌chains.‌ ‌Data‌ ‌and‌ ‌internet‌ ‌infrastructure‌ ‌now‌ ‌also‌‌ play‌‌a‌‌vital‌‌underpinning‌‌role‌‌across‌‌many‌‌sectors.‌‌These‌‌types‌‌of‌‌critical‌‌businesses‌‌ play‌ ‌a‌ ‌uniquely‌ ‌valuable‌ ‌role‌ ‌and‌ ‌the‌ ‌Government‌ ‌needs‌ ‌to‌ ‌consider‌ ‌whether‌ ‌a‌‌ different‌‌kind‌‌of‌‌partnership‌‌with‌‌them‌‌is‌‌needed.‌‌ ‌ ‌ 62. The‌ ‌Government‌ ‌itself‌ ‌also‌ ‌has‌ ‌important‌ ‌partnerships‌ ‌with‌ ‌a‌‌range‌‌of‌‌contractors‌,‌‌ where‌ ‌the‌ ‌security‌ ‌and‌ ‌resilience‌ ‌of‌ ‌these‌ ‌companies‌ ‌and‌ ‌their‌ ‌s