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**[10. \"Posturing for Peace?\" by Vipin Narang]** **Central Argument** Narang posits that different nuclear postures create varying levels of deterrence and influence conflict dynamics. The three identified postures --- **catalytic**, **assured retaliation**, and **asymmetric escalation** --- dem...

**[10. \"Posturing for Peace?\" by Vipin Narang]** **Central Argument** Narang posits that different nuclear postures create varying levels of deterrence and influence conflict dynamics. The three identified postures --- **catalytic**, **assured retaliation**, and **asymmetric escalation** --- demonstrate how nuclear states handle the operationalization of their weapons. South Asia offers a unique case study due to the prolonged rivalry between India and Pakistan and the evolution of their nuclear strategies. **Key Nuclear Postures** 1. **Catalytic Posture**: - **Definition**: Aimed at \"catalyzing\" external intervention, typically from a major power like the United States, to deter aggression. - **Characteristics**: - Ambiguous nuclear capability. - Minimal operational readiness, primarily signaling to third parties. - **Example**: Pakistan employed this strategy during the 1980s, relying on U.S. interests in maintaining stability in the region due to its strategic role in the Cold War (e.g., Afghanistan). 2. **Assured Retaliation Posture**: - **Definition**: Focused on maintaining a survivable second-strike capability to deter nuclear threats. - **Characteristics**: - Transparent nuclear capabilities, ambiguous deployment to enhance survivability. - Avoidance of first use. - **Example**: India has maintained this posture since the late 1980s, emphasizing centralized control and survivable deterrence (e.g., no-first-use policy). 3. **Asymmetric Escalation Posture**: - **Definition**: Designed to deter conventional attacks by threatening early first use of nuclear weapons. - **Characteristics**: - Integration of nuclear weapons into military doctrine. - Delegative control to enable battlefield use. - **Example**: Post-1998, Pakistan shifted to this posture to counterbalance India\'s superior conventional forces. **Impact of Postures on Conflict Dynamics** **India-Pakistan Rivalry** - **Catalytic Posture (Pakistan pre-1998)**: - Relied on U.S. intervention during crises (e.g., 1986-87 Brasstacks, 1990 Kashmir crisis). - While it helped avoid direct war, it created dependency on external powers. - India remained largely undeterred by Pakistan\'s ambiguous nuclear capabilities. - **Asymmetric Escalation Posture (Pakistan post-1998)**: - Enabled Pakistan to directly deter India\'s conventional forces. - Created significant risks of inadvertent nuclear use due to relaxed command and control. - Demonstrated effectiveness during the Kargil War (1999), the 2001-02 standoff, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. - **Assured Retaliation Posture (India)**: - Focused on survivable deterrence, avoiding aggressive nuclear signaling. - Limited utility in deterring conventional or sub-conventional (terrorist) attacks by Pakistan. **Deterrence Effects** - Pakistan\'s shift to asymmetric escalation increased the risk of nuclear use during crises, making deterrence more \"effective\" but also more dangerous. - India\'s restrained posture reflects its strategic calculus to avoid escalation and preserve centralized civilian control. **Broader Implications** Narang\'s analysis highlights how nuclear postures: - Shape state behavior and conflict outcomes. - Introduce trade-offs between deterrence credibility and safety. - Reflect broader geopolitical considerations, such as reliance on external allies or the management of domestic security threats. **Conclusion** The study suggests that nuclear postures are not merely technical decisions but strategic choices influenced by perceived threats, operational needs, and geopolitical dynamics. In South Asia, these postures have created a precarious stability, underpinned by the risk of catastrophic escalation. **[11. \"India\'s Counterforce Temptations\" by Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang]** #### **Overview** This paper examines India's potential shift in nuclear strategy from a policy of "assured retaliation" to one that incorporates counterforce options, which involve targeting an adversary's nuclear arsenal preemptively. The authors argue that India's evolving nuclear posture and doctrine reflect an adaptation to the challenges posed by Pakistan\'s use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). #### **Key Arguments and Insights** 1. **India's Traditional Doctrine**: - Historically, India has adhered to a policy of assured retaliation underpinned by its commitment to a *no-first-use* (NFU) policy. - This doctrine emphasizes countervalue targeting---aiming at civilian centers---to deter nuclear aggression while maintaining centralized civilian control over nuclear forces. 2. **Challenges from Pakistan**: - Pakistan has developed tactical nuclear weapons and a strategy of *asymmetric escalation*, which threatens nuclear use to deter India's superior conventional forces. - This development complicates India's ability to respond to Pakistani provocations, such as cross-border terrorism, without risking nuclear escalation. 3. **Shift Toward Counterforce**: - The authors highlight India's investments in: - High-precision delivery systems. - Ballistic missile defense. - Advanced surveillance and reconnaissance technologies. - These capabilities suggest India is developing the option for preemptive strikes against Pakistan's strategic nuclear assets. - Indian officials, both serving and retired, have made public statements implying doctrinal flexibility that permits preemptive counterforce strikes under certain conditions. 4. **Strategic and Doctrinal Implications**: - If India incorporates counterforce options, it risks destabilizing the regional nuclear balance. Pakistan might respond by increasing its arsenal or adopting riskier deployment patterns. - A counterforce strategy could undermine India's NFU policy, leading to potential preemptive first-strike instability in a crisis. 5. **Risks of Counterforce**: - The feasibility of disarming Pakistan's nuclear forces is highly uncertain. - Even the perception of India pursuing counterforce could provoke Pakistan into an arms race or pre-delegation of launch authority, increasing the risk of inadvertent nuclear use. #### **Contextual Background** - **India-Pakistan Rivalry**: Since partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have engaged in multiple wars and an ongoing conflict over Kashmir. Their nuclearization in the late 20th century further intensified security dilemmas. - **Global Nuclear Trends**: The shift toward counterforce options aligns with broader trends among nuclear-armed states, including advances in missile accuracy and surveillance. #### **Conclusion** Clary and Narang caution against India's temptation to pursue counterforce strategies, arguing that such a shift could heighten nuclear risks without effectively resolving India's security dilemmas vis-à-vis Pakistan. They advocate for sustained adherence to deterrence strategies that prioritize stability over preemption. **[12. \"When Actions Speak Louder Than Words\" by Caitlin Talmadge, Lisa Michelini, and Vipin Narang]** #### **Overview** This article evaluates the credibility of nuclear *no-first-use* (NFU) pledges in the context of U.S. nuclear policy. The authors argue that NFU commitments are often viewed with skepticism by adversaries unless specific political and military conditions are met. They focus on the United States but draw comparisons to NFU pledges made by China, India, and the Soviet Union. #### **Key Arguments and Insights** 1. **NFU and Credibility**: - NFU pledges commit a state to using nuclear weapons only in retaliation for a nuclear attack. - For such pledges to be credible, adversaries must believe that the declaring state genuinely renounces first use. This belief hinges on: - The state's political relations with adversaries. - The state's military capabilities to execute a first strike. 2. **Conditions for NFU Credibility**: - Favorable conditions include benign political relations and the absence of first-strike capabilities. - Hostile relations and latent or explicit first-strike capabilities undermine the credibility of NFU commitments. 3. **Historical Case Studies**: - **China**: Since 1964, China's NFU pledge has been somewhat credible due to its minimalistic nuclear posture and focus on retaliation rather than first use. - **India**: India's NFU pledge, adopted in 1999, faces scrutiny because of its development of counterforce capabilities and doctrinal ambiguity. - **Soviet Union**: The Soviet Union's NFU pledge (1977--1991) was largely dismissed due to its substantial first-strike capabilities. 4. **Implications for U.S. NFU Policy**: - The United States has repeatedly debated adopting an NFU policy, most recently during the Biden administration's 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. - Concerns about undermining extended deterrence for allies (e.g., NATO and East Asia) have prevented adoption. - The authors argue that absent significant operational changes (e.g., de-alerting nuclear forces), U.S. adversaries would likely view an NFU pledge as insincere. 5. **Broader Implications**: - NFU pledges alone rarely alter adversary perceptions or behavior. Actions, such as changes in force posture, are necessary to signal commitment to nuclear restraint. - The credibility gap limits the potential benefits of NFU pledges, such as improving crisis stability or advancing arms control and nonproliferation goals. #### **Contextual Background** - **U.S. Nuclear Policy**: Since the Cold War, the United States has prioritized nuclear flexibility, maintaining options for first use to deter a range of threats. - **Global Nonproliferation Efforts**: NFU pledges are seen as tools to devalue nuclear weapons and strengthen nonproliferation norms, but their effectiveness depends on adversary trust. #### **Conclusion** Talmadge, Michelini, and Narang highlight the limitations of NFU pledges in altering adversary behavior. They argue that meaningful reductions in the risk of nuclear conflict require more than declaratory policy shifts---operational and strategic changes are necessary to reinforce credibility. ### **14. Christian Brose -** *The New Revolution in Military Affairs* #### **Overview** Christian Brose examines the transformative impact of emerging technologies on the future of warfare and the inadequacy of the U.S. military's current strategies to address these changes. He argues that the United States faces a pivotal moment: either adapt its approach to warfare or risk losing its military edge to adversaries like China and Russia. The essay identifies the technological, strategic, and institutional challenges driving this revolution and outlines a roadmap for how the U.S. military can remain competitive. ### **Key Themes and Arguments** #### **1. Historical Context: Revolutions in Military Affairs** - Brose draws parallels between historical military revolutions, such as Jan Bloch\'s predictions about modern warfare in the late 19th century, and today's disruptive technologies. - Revolutions in military affairs occur when technologies fundamentally alter military strategies, tactics, and outcomes. Today, artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, quantum computing, and advanced manufacturing are poised to redefine warfare. #### **2. Emerging Technologies: Drivers of Change** Brose highlights several technologies reshaping the military landscape: - **Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems**: Enable faster decision-making, distributed operations, and large-scale deployment of unmanned systems. - **Ubiquitous Sensors**: Networked devices, satellites, and quantum sensors provide unparalleled global surveillance, reducing stealth and hiding capabilities. - **Advanced Manufacturing**: Technologies like 3D printing could revolutionize logistics by enabling on-demand production of equipment in conflict zones. - **Quantum Science**: Quantum sensors and communications promise greater precision, unbreakable encryption, and data-processing capabilities. - **Hypersonic and Space-based Weapons**: Allow rapid, precise strikes across vast distances, including traditionally secure domains like space and logistics networks. #### **3. Strategic Implications** - **Shift from Quality to Quantity**: Modern battlefields will prioritize swarms of small, inexpensive, and autonomous systems over traditional large, costly platforms like aircraft carriers and stealth bombers. - **The End of Safe Havens**: Advancements in sensors and weapons will eliminate sanctuaries, requiring militaries to operate in contested environments. - **Speed of Decision-Making**: AI-powered systems will accelerate the "kill chain" (the process of detecting, targeting, and striking) and reduce the decision time in combat. - **Distributed Operations**: Communication networks will shift from centralized, hub-and-spoke models to distributed systems resilient to attacks. #### **4. Challenges Facing the U.S. Military** - **Obsolete Assumptions**: The U.S. military's reliance on outdated concepts, such as uncontested access and stealth superiority, makes it vulnerable to adversaries' strategies. - **Anti-access/Area-denial (A2/AD) Capabilities**: China and Russia are deploying weapons designed to detect and overwhelm U.S. systems, neutralizing its traditional advantages. - **Bureaucratic Inertia**: The U.S. defense establishment's procurement and operational systems are too slow to adapt to technological changes, constrained by vested interests in legacy platforms. - **Competitors' Advantages**: China's integration of military and civilian sectors under "military-civil fusion" allows it to rapidly deploy cutting-edge technologies. In contrast, the U.S. lags in leveraging its private sector innovations for military purposes. #### **5. Recommendations for the U.S. Military** Brose outlines a vision for a modernized U.S. military: - **Adopt New Assumptions**: - Prepare for contested environments and high casualties. - Assume that adversaries will detect and target U.S. systems across all domains. - **Invest in Networks and Kill Chains**: - Prioritize systems that integrate into distributed networks rather than upgrading individual platforms. - Focus on software and AI as core differentiators in future conflicts. - **Build Resilient, Distributed Forces**: - Shift toward swarms of low-cost, autonomous systems that are expendable and harder to target. - Enhance logistics capabilities through technologies like 3D printing to sustain prolonged conflicts. - **Embrace Ethical and Operational Autonomy**: - Use autonomous systems to reduce human workload, enabling personnel to focus on moral and strategic decisions. #### **6. Institutional and Cultural Barriers** - Brose critiques the "military-industrial-congressional complex" for resisting change to protect traditional defense programs and jobs. - He warns that without leadership willing to challenge entrenched interests, the U.S. risks falling behind in the global military competition. ### **Conclusion** Christian Brose emphasizes that the future of warfare demands a complete reimagining of military strategies and systems. While the United States retains the resources and technological base to lead this revolution, it faces significant institutional resistance and a lack of urgency. The stakes are high: failure to adapt could undermine U.S. military superiority, destabilize global security, and embolden adversaries. Brose's call to action underscores the need for innovation, strategic vision, and political will to secure the U.S.'s position in a rapidly changing world. ### **15. Stephen Biddle -** *Back in the Trenches* #### **Overview** Stephen Biddle critiques the notion that the war in Ukraine represents a \"revolution in military affairs\" (RMA) brought about by advanced technologies like drones, precision weapons, and networked surveillance. He argues that while these tools are significant, the war demonstrates the enduring relevance of traditional military strategies and the capacity of armies to adapt to technological changes. #### **Key Themes and Arguments** 1. **The Illusion of a Technological Revolution**: - Many observers have suggested that advanced technologies in Ukraine, such as drones and AI, have fundamentally altered warfare, making traditional systems like tanks and large-scale offensives obsolete. - Biddle challenges this view, noting that heavy losses in tanks, aircraft, and artillery in Ukraine are comparable to those seen in past wars (e.g., World Wars I and II), indicating that technological advancements have not drastically increased lethality or rendered traditional tools irrelevant. 2. **Adaptation and Countermeasures**: - Modern armies have developed countermeasures to new technologies. For example: - Drones are countered with jammers, guided missiles, and cheaper, more numerous anti-air systems. - GPS-guided missiles (like HIMARS) are neutralized by jamming. - These adaptations limit the impact of advanced technologies, showing that new weapons often trigger cycles of innovation and counter-innovation rather than revolutions. 3. **Continuity in Warfare Tactics**: - The Ukraine war resembles past conflicts in its reliance on entrenched positions, heavy artillery, and combined arms tactics. For instance: - Ukrainian and Russian forces rely on trenches and fieldworks reminiscent of World War I. - Combined arms operations (integrating infantry, tanks, and artillery) remain central to battlefield success. 4. **Lessons for U.S. Defense Planning**: - Biddle cautions against overhauling U.S. military strategies based on perceived \"revolutions\" in Ukraine. Instead, he advocates for incremental adaptations to evolving technologies and tactics. - The emphasis should be on flexibility and readiness to adapt rather than betting on a single transformative approach. #### **Conclusion** Biddle's analysis underscores that technological advancements in warfare, while important, do not render traditional military strategies obsolete. The key to success lies in adapting to these changes while retaining the core principles of effective military operations. ### **16. Caitlin Talmadge -** *Would China Go Nuclear?* #### **Overview** Caitlin Talmadge evaluates the risk of Chinese nuclear escalation during a conventional war with the United States. She contrasts "escalation optimists," who believe nuclear escalation is unlikely, with "escalation pessimists," who highlight significant risks due to the entanglement of conventional and nuclear forces in China's military posture. #### **Key Themes and Arguments** 1. **The Risk of Inadvertent Escalation**: - In a U.S.-China conflict, particularly over Taiwan, U.S. conventional strikes on Chinese targets (e.g., missile bases, submarines, or command systems) could be misinterpreted as preemptive counterforce attacks against China\'s nuclear deterrent. - This perception could prompt Chinese leaders to escalate to limited nuclear use to signal resolve or protect their remaining nuclear capabilities. 2. **Military-Technical Drivers of Escalation**: - China's nuclear and conventional forces are often co-located or share overlapping command and control systems, increasing the likelihood of misinterpretation during U.S. strikes. - Key vulnerabilities include: - Dual-use missile systems (e.g., DF-21 missiles with both conventional and nuclear variants). - Dependence on conventional forces to protect nuclear assets. 3. **Perceptual Dynamics in Wartime**: - During a conflict, the \"fog of war\" could exacerbate Chinese fears of losing nuclear retaliatory capability, leading to worst-case assumptions about U.S. intentions. - Historical examples, like Israel's nuclear alert during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, show how conventional conflicts can rapidly escalate due to misperceptions and heightened insecurity. 4. **Debates Between Optimists and Pessimists**: - **Optimists**: Argue that U.S. planners can design military campaigns to avoid threatening China\'s nuclear deterrent and thus mitigate escalation risks. - **Pessimists**: Highlight the difficulty of separating conventional and nuclear targets, especially in high-stakes conflicts, and emphasize the risk of miscalculation. 5. **Implications for U.S. Policy**: - Talmadge recommends that U.S. planners carefully consider the escalation risks of targeting China's conventional forces, especially those with nuclear relevance. - Transparency and communication with China about U.S. intentions could reduce misperceptions, but structural vulnerabilities in China's nuclear posture remain a concern. #### **Conclusion** Talmadge warns that a conventional war between the United States and China carries a significant risk of nuclear escalation due to overlapping conventional and nuclear capabilities in China's military. While careful planning can mitigate some risks, structural and perceptual factors make escalation a persistent danger. ### **17. Taylor Fravel -** *Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation* #### **Overview** Taylor Fravel examines why the People's Republic of China (PRC) has demonstrated a pattern of compromise in many of its territorial disputes, offering significant concessions in 17 out of 23 cases since 1949. His analysis challenges conventional realist and constructivist perspectives by attributing this behavior to regime insecurity --- a domestic political factor that influences foreign policy decisions. The study provides insights into how internal threats to regime stability can drive cooperation in international disputes. #### **Key Arguments and Insights** 1. **The Puzzle of Chinese Territorial Behavior**: - **Realist Perspective**: China's compromises contradict the expectation that a rising power would leverage its growing strength to maximize territorial gains. - **Constructivist Perspective**: China's readiness to compromise appears inconsistent with the deep historical and cultural significance of its territorial claims, such as the legacy of the "unequal treaties." - Fravel highlights that China offered concessions even during periods of growing power, suggesting a need for alternative explanations. 2. **Regime Insecurity and Territorial Concessions**: - Fravel introduces the concept of "diversionary peace," arguing that internal threats to regime stability often push leaders to seek cooperation in territorial disputes. - Key mechanisms include: - Trading concessions for external support to suppress rebellions or unrest near disputed borders. - Redirecting resources and attention from external conflicts to address domestic crises. - Example: During the Tibetan uprising and the Great Leap Forward\'s failure, China settled disputes with Burma and Nepal to focus on internal stability. 3. **Ethnic Geography and Frontier Challenges**: - China's frontier regions, populated by ethnic minorities (e.g., Tibetans, Uyghurs), are sources of instability. The central government perceives territorial disputes near these areas as particularly sensitive. - Concessions in disputes, such as those with India and Russia, were often aimed at securing neighborly cooperation to suppress separatist movements. 4. **Empirical Analysis**: - Fravel identifies key periods of regime insecurity---such as the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests and separatist violence in Xinjiang---as times when China was more likely to compromise. - By contrast, disputes over highly salient regions like Taiwan have seen little compromise, reflecting the indivisibility of some territorial claims. #### **Implications for Theory and Policy**: 1. **Challenges to Realism**: - China's behavior shows that rising powers may prioritize internal security over maximizing territorial control. 2. **Lessons for Diplomacy**: - Understanding domestic pressures can help predict when authoritarian regimes might be open to territorial compromise. 3. **Broader Relevance**: - The concept of regime insecurity can apply to other authoritarian states managing internal dissent while navigating international conflicts. ### **18. Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel -** *Dangerous Confidence: Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation* #### **Overview** This article explores China's perspectives on the risks of nuclear escalation in a potential conflict with the United States. Cunningham and Fravel argue that Chinese experts exhibit a "dangerous confidence" in their ability to avoid nuclear escalation, which stems from China's doctrine, force structure, and historical experiences. However, this confidence may lead to miscalculations in a crisis. #### **Key Themes and Arguments** 1. **Chinese Confidence in Crisis Stability**: - Chinese experts generally believe that nuclear escalation is unlikely because: - Both sides have incentives to avoid escalation. - China's nuclear doctrine emphasizes assured retaliation, not first use or preemptive strikes. - Conventional and nuclear forces are decoupled in China's military strategy. - This confidence contrasts with U.S. views, which often assume greater risks of inadvertent escalation due to "entanglement" (overlap of conventional and nuclear forces). 2. **China's Nuclear Doctrine**: - China adheres to a no-first-use (NFU) policy and maintains a relatively small nuclear arsenal focused on survivable second-strike capabilities. - China's doctrine and force structure are designed to signal restraint and deter adversaries without engaging in arms races. 3. **Operational Risks and Miscalculations**: - Despite China's confidence, several factors could lead to escalation: - U.S. conventional strikes could degrade China's nuclear command and control, prompting fears of a preemptive attack. - Ambiguity over dual-use systems (conventional and nuclear) might lead to misinterpretations in a crisis. - Chinese skepticism about controlled escalation could limit their ability to manage conflicts effectively. 4. **Sources of Confidence**: - China's historical separation of conventional and nuclear capabilities has shaped its belief that nuclear escalation can be avoided. - The development of nonnuclear strategic weapons (e.g., hypersonic missiles) reinforces China's reliance on conventional means in crises. 5. **Implications for U.S.-China Relations**: - Divergent perceptions of escalation risks could lead to misaligned expectations in a crisis. - The U.S. might overestimate China's willingness to use nuclear weapons while underestimating its capacity for conventional retaliation. #### **Policy and Strategic Implications**: 1. **Need for Communication**: - Improved U.S.-China dialogue on nuclear and conventional strategies could reduce misperceptions and enhance crisis stability. 2. **Risk of Overconfidence**: - China's faith in its ability to control escalation could increase the likelihood of risky conventional strategies. 3. **Strategic Balancing**: - Both sides must consider how entanglement and dual-use systems might inadvertently escalate conflicts. ### **19. Henrik Stalhane Hiim, M. Taylor Fravel, and Magnus Langset Trøan -** *The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma* #### **Overview** This article examines how the security dilemma between the United States and China is exacerbated by the entanglement of conventional and nuclear capabilities. The authors analyze how U.S. actions, such as deploying advanced missile defenses and conventional precision-strike systems, influence China\'s nuclear posture. They focus on the risks posed by this entanglement to arms race stability, crisis management, and broader U.S.-China relations. #### **Key Themes and Arguments** 1. **Conventional-Nuclear Entanglement**: - Conventional forces, such as missile defenses and precision-strike systems, increasingly overlap with nuclear capabilities. - For example, systems intended to counter conventional threats might also degrade or neutralize nuclear forces, leading to misperceptions about intent. 2. **Pathways of Escalation**: - **Nuclear Compensation**: A state compensates for conventional inferiority by increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons. - **Conventional Vulnerability**: Conventional capabilities threaten nuclear deterrence, prompting efforts to bolster nuclear forces. - **Conventional Bolstering**: States use conventional capabilities to protect their nuclear deterrent but risk escalating tensions. 3. **China\'s Strategic Concerns**: - U.S. systems such as missile defenses (e.g., THAAD) and conventional precision-strike weapons threaten China\'s second-strike capability. - These concerns have driven China to expand its nuclear arsenal, modernize its forces, and invest in survivability (e.g., missile silos and mobile launchers). 4. **U.S. Concerns**: - The United States views China\'s military modernization as a challenge to regional stability. - This perception has led to a reciprocal buildup of U.S. forces, reinforcing the security dilemma. 5. **Implications for Arms Control**: - The entangled nature of U.S. and Chinese military strategies complicates efforts at arms control and strategic stability. - Both sides must address the risks of misinterpretation and inadvertent escalation. #### **Conclusion** The authors argue that conventional-nuclear entanglement deepens mistrust between the United States and China. They recommend greater dialogue and transparency to manage risks and improve stability. ### **20. Wu Riqiang -** *Assessing China-U.S. Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation* #### **Overview** Wu Riqiang explores the risks of inadvertent nuclear escalation in a potential conventional conflict between China and the United States. He focuses on how inadvertent attacks, misinterpretations, and vulnerabilities in China\'s nuclear forces and command systems could trigger escalation. #### **Key Themes and Arguments** 1. **Mechanisms of Inadvertent Escalation**: - **Use-It-or-Lose-It**: If China perceives its nuclear forces are at risk of destruction during conventional attacks, it might feel pressured to use them preemptively. - **Unauthorized or Accidental Escalation**: Decentralized command during wartime could increase the risk of unauthorized nuclear launches. - **Damage-Limitation**: U.S. actions intended to reduce potential Chinese damage (e.g., attacking command systems) might be misinterpreted as a prelude to nuclear war. 2. **Survivability of China\'s Nuclear Forces**: - China's nuclear arsenal, including mobile missiles and submarines, is designed for survivability. However, conventional attacks could undermine confidence in its second-strike capability. - The overlap between nuclear and conventional forces (e.g., dual-use missiles) complicates discrimination and increases the likelihood of inadvertent strikes. 3. **China\'s Command and Control (C2) System**: - China maintains a centralized C2 system for its nuclear forces, reducing the likelihood of unauthorized or accidental launches. - However, under wartime conditions, pressure to decentralize authority or adopt a launch-on-warning posture could increase risks. 4. **Likelihood of Escalation**: - Wu concludes that while inadvertent escalation is possible, it is unlikely due to China\'s robust nuclear survivability and C2 systems. - Misperceptions and operational pressures during a crisis remain the most significant risks. #### **Policy Recommendations**: 1. **U.S.-China Dialogue**: - Increased communication about nuclear and conventional postures could reduce misunderstandings and improve crisis management. 2. **Disentanglement**: - Both sides should work to reduce the overlap between conventional and nuclear systems to lower escalation risks. 3. **Confidence-Building Measures**: - Transparency about intentions and capabilities could help de-escalate tensions during conflicts. ### **Comparison and Broader Implications** Both articles emphasize the risks of entanglement between conventional and nuclear forces in U.S.-China relations. Hiim et al. focus on the strategic competition driving these risks, while Wu delves into the specific dynamics of inadvertent escalation during a crisis. Together, they highlight the importance of managing entanglement to prevent arms races and maintain stability in U.S.-China relations. ### **21. Taylor Fravel and Charles Glaser -** *How Much Risk Should the United States Run in the South China Sea* #### **Overview** Fravel and Glaser explore the U.S.-China tensions in the South China Sea (SCS), where China\'s growing assertiveness has posed strategic challenges. They examine the extent to which the United States should resist China's attempts to dominate the region. The authors argue that the U.S. must balance the risks of escalation with its strategic interests and propose a cautious approach to avoid unnecessary conflicts. #### **Key Arguments and Insights** 1. **China's Assertiveness in the South China Sea**: - Over the past decade, China has militarized disputed features (e.g., artificial islands) and asserted maritime rights within the \"nine-dash line,\" a demarcation rejected by international law. - Actions like seizing Scarborough Shoal, harassing neighboring states' vessels, and deploying advanced military assets reflect China\'s desire for dominance in this critical region. 2. **Strategic Importance of the SCS**: - The South China Sea is vital for international trade, containing major shipping lanes, resources like fisheries and hydrocarbons, and strategic military positions. - China's dominance would undermine U.S. influence in East Asia and threaten the security of allies such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. 3. **U.S. Interests in the Region**: - While the U.S. does not claim sovereignty in the South China Sea, it seeks to maintain freedom of navigation, deter Chinese aggression, and uphold the security of its allies. - The SCS is not central to U.S. national security, but preserving credibility in defending allies is crucial for regional stability. 4. **Policy Options for the U.S.**: - **Increased Resistance**: Escalating military opposition to China's activities (e.g., freedom of navigation operations and countering militarization) could increase the risk of conflict. - **Partial Retrenchment**: Reducing U.S. involvement in sovereignty disputes would reduce the risk of war but might embolden China. - **Current Policy**: Balancing military presence with diplomatic measures while avoiding direct confrontation. Fravel and Glaser support this middle-ground approach. 5. **Recommendations**: - Maintain the current level of resistance but be prepared to adjust if China becomes more aggressive or if the costs of opposition outweigh the benefits. - Focus on alliance-building, regional partnerships, and multilateral institutions to check China\'s ambitions without escalating tensions. #### **Conclusion** Fravel and Glaser advocate for a calibrated U.S. strategy in the South China Sea that preserves freedom of navigation and deters aggression without provoking conflict. They stress the importance of carefully weighing the risks of escalation against the region's strategic value. ### **22. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press -** *The New Era of Counterforce* #### **Overview** Lieber and Press examine how advancements in military technology, such as precision targeting and remote sensing, are undermining the survivability of nuclear arsenals. They argue that these trends challenge traditional notions of deterrence, making counterforce capabilities (disarming an adversary's nuclear arsenal) increasingly viable. #### **Key Themes and Arguments** 1. **Erosion of Nuclear Survivability**: - Historically, survivable nuclear arsenals underpinned deterrence by ensuring retaliation after a first strike. - Advances in accuracy (e.g., missile guidance) and remote sensing (e.g., satellite surveillance) are making even hardened or concealed nuclear forces vulnerable to preemptive strikes. 2. **Counterforce Capabilities**: - Modern technologies enable precise targeting of nuclear forces, undermining traditional strategies like hardening (e.g., missile silos) or concealment (e.g., mobile launchers). - Examples include the U.S.\'s ability to track submarines or China\'s increased vulnerability due to advances in sensing. 3. **Implications for Deterrence**: - The growing feasibility of counterforce strikes raises risks of preemptive actions in crises, destabilizing nuclear deterrence. - Countries may feel compelled to expand or diversify their arsenals, driving arms races. 4. **Policy Challenges**: - Arms control agreements are less effective in an era where conventional and cyber capabilities can target nuclear forces. - Nations must rethink strategies to ensure credible deterrence, such as investing in redundancy, mobility, and advanced defenses. 5. **Strategic Recommendations**: - The U.S. and other nuclear powers should assess the risks of developing advanced counterforce technologies that might provoke adversaries. - Balancing offensive and defensive capabilities is critical to maintaining stability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape. #### **Conclusion** Lieber and Press highlight the transformative impact of technological advances on nuclear strategy, arguing that the increasing vulnerability of arsenals challenges the stability of deterrence. They stress the need for thoughtful policies to manage these risks while avoiding unnecessary escalation. ### **23. Ian Bowers and Henrik Stalhane Hiim -** *Conventional Counterforce Dilemmas* #### **Overview** This article explores South Korea's adoption of a conventional counterforce strategy to address the dual threats posed by North Korea's growing nuclear arsenal and the potential abandonment by the United States. Bowers and Hiim analyze the operational, strategic, and stability-related challenges this strategy entails. They provide a comprehensive assessment of South Korea's unconventional approach as a non-nuclear state attempting to counter a nuclear-armed adversary. ### **Key Themes and Arguments** #### **1. South Korea's Strategy: Counterforce and Countervalue** - **Counterforce**: - Aimed at preemptively targeting North Korea's nuclear weapons and delivery systems. - Relies on high-precision conventional weapons, advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and missile defense systems. - **Countervalue**: - Threatens retaliatory strikes against North Korean leadership and key assets to deter aggression. - Embodied in the Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) strategy. #### **2. Motivations for the Strategy** 1. **Short-Term Hedge**: - Provides an independent deterrent against North Korea's nuclear threat. - Reduces risks associated with potential U.S. abandonment by establishing autonomous capabilities. 2. **Long-Term Hedge**: - Enhances South Korea's "nuclear latency," or ability to quickly develop nuclear weapons if needed. - The buildup of conventional capabilities, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, lays the groundwork for a future nuclear deterrent. #### **3. Challenges of Implementation** 1. **Operational Feasibility**: - Detecting and targeting North Korean missile systems is a complex task due to their mobility and concealment in hardened underground facilities. - ISR limitations hinder South Korea's ability to maintain 24/7 surveillance over North Korea. - Sufficient readiness for preemptive strikes requires sustained resources, placing strain on the military. 2. **Credibility**: - The strategy's effectiveness depends on North Korea believing in South Korea's ability to execute counterforce and countervalue strikes. - Challenges include the scale of North Korea's arsenal and doubts about South Korea's ability to neutralize all nuclear assets. 3. **Impact on Crisis Stability**: - Counterforce capabilities might incentivize North Korea to adopt riskier measures, such as delegative command-and-control systems, increasing the chances of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use. - Leadership targeting under KMPR could leave North Korea's leadership with no incentives to de-escalate during a conflict. #### **4. Broader Implications** - **Regional Security**: - South Korea's capabilities could deter other regional actors like China but risk entangling South Korea in broader power competition. - **Impact on U.S.-ROK Alliance**: - While the U.S. has supported South Korea's buildup to some extent, growing South Korean independence might strain alliance dynamics. - The U.S. retains leverage through ISR and technology transfers, ensuring a degree of dependence. ### **Conclusion** Bowers and Hiim highlight the innovative yet risky nature of South Korea's conventional counterforce strategy. While it addresses immediate security concerns, it poses significant operational and strategic challenges, with potential consequences for crisis stability and regional security dynamics. The authors argue that South Korea's approach reflects broader changes in how states manage nuclear threats in an era of advanced conventional capabilities.