2023 Seminar 2 Contemporary Status Nuclear Arms Control PDF

Arms Control Seminar 2 Contemporary status of nuclear arms control Professor Andrei Zagorski 29 .3 .20 23 Contemporary status of nuclear arms control 1. The purpose of the US – Russian strategic stability dialogue 2. Agenda of the Strategic Stability Dialogue 3. Progress in the Strategic Sta...

Arms Control Seminar 2 Contemporary status of nuclear arms control Professor Andrei Zagorski 29 .3 .20 23 Contemporary status of nuclear arms control 1. The purpose of the US – Russian strategic stability dialogue 2. Agenda of the Strategic Stability Dialogue 3. Progress in the Strategic Stability Dialogue 4. How to include non -strategic nuclear weapons into the agreement? 5. The main challenge(s) of addressing non -strategic weapons in an agreement 6. Proposals for the verification of non -strategic weapons 7. The effect of China’s build -up on US -Russian strategic stability process 8. Russian arguments to support the suspension of the New START 9. The US response Zagorski, 29 March 2023 2 1. Purpose of the US – Russian strategic stability dialogue  Presidents Biden and Putin agreed in 2021 to engage in “an integrated bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue” that would “seek to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures” US -Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic Stability, 16 June 2021  in his press briefing following the summit, President Biden noted that this dialogue would allow diplomats “to work on a mechanism that can lead to control of new and dangerous and sophisticated weapons that are coming on the scene now that reduce the times of response, that raise the prospects of accidental war ” Wolf 2022, p. 2 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 3 1. Purpose of the US – Russian strategic stability dialogue  The goal of the dialogue was  first , to begin the process of replacing New START , and  second , to conduct a wide -ranging discussion of issues affecting strategic stability  these issues include traditional topics on the US -Russian agenda such as missile defense and conventional long -range weapon systems  the talks were also to cover the emergence of new and disruptive technologies in the cyber arena and in artificial intelligence and quantum computing, synthetic biology, and other realms Pomper et al. 2022, p. 5 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 4 2. Agenda of the Strategic Stability Dialogue  the two sides had quite different starting positions and priorities Pomper et al, p. 6  the US would seek to capture new kinds of intercontinental - range nuclear delivery systems and nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the upcoming talks  Russia favors a broader agenda including everything that “influences strategic stability,” nuclear and non -nuclear, offensive and defensive weapons”  this list includes ballistic missile defense, long -range strategic conventional arms, and weapons in space Wolf 2022, p. 2 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 5 2. Agenda of the Strategic Stability Dialogue  with its mention of “arms control and risk reduction measures,” the joint statement also seems to indicate that the talks will not focus exclusively on negotiating a new treaty limiting nuclear weapons  they might also address transparency and risk reduction measures that could reduce the risk of inadvertent or intentional escalation to nuclear use during a crisis or conflict  the agenda could also include emerging technologies, operational practices, or doctrinal statements that might exacerbate tensions or complicate crisis management Wolf 2022, p. 2 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 6 2. Agenda of the Strategic Stability Dialogue  there is no fundamental disagreement on the traditional limitation and reduction of strategic arms and their nuclear warheads – only the future numerical ceilings are in dispute  the main divergence between the parties was that the US proposed to reduce both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, while Russia raised the issue of limiting both nuclear and non -nuclear offensive and defensive strategic weapons Arbatov 2022, pp. 55, 60  Russia has resisted an agreement on NSNW because it has a much larger NSNW force and regards those weapons as a means to compensate for conventional inferiority compared to NATO or China Pifer , 2021 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 7 3. Progress in the Strategic Stability Dialogue  the first round on 28 July 2021  the second round on 30 September 2021  a third round on 10 January 2022 convened to address concerns about Russia’s military activities near Ukraine and Russia’s demands for security assurances  in late February 2022, the State Department noted that the US did not “have any plans for the next iteration of the Strategic Stability Dialogue” ( there was no schedule for future talks ) Wolf 2022, p. 1 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 8 3. Progress in the Strategic Stability Dialogue  after the second round, the delegations announced that they would “form two interagency expert working groups”  the first would focus on “Principles and Objectives for Future Arms Control”  the second would address “Capabilities and Actions with Strategic Effects” Wolf 2022, pp. 2 -3; Arbatov 2022, p. 53 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 9 4. How to include non -strategic nuclear weapons into the agreement?  g iven the disparity in numbers, a narrow stand -alone negotiation on NSNW has little prospect of success  a more viable approach would seek an aggregate limit covering all US and Russian nuclear warheads  in such an arrangement, the US numerical advantage in non - deployed strategic warheads would partially offset the Russian advantage in NSNW  within such an overall aggregate limit, the sides could negotiate a sub -limit to constrain the number of deployed strategic warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, warheads that could be launched in minutes and that pose the greater threat to strategic stability Pifer 2021 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 10 5. Main challenge(s) of addressing non -strategic weapons  v erification of NSNW stockpiles is perhaps the most challenging task of the entire arms control agenda  such weapons have never been subject to an arms control agreement  their inclusion is necessary if such an accord is to win Senate approval and ultimately be ratified by Washington.  this may require a major shift in accounting methodologies, from a focus on delivery vehicles to a focus on warheads  it is achievable, but one has to prepare for a long haul, multiple challenges, and deadlocks Pomper et al. 2022, pp. 1, 50, 87 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 11 5. Main challenge(s) of addressing non -strategic weapons  at present, the parties have no procedures for full -scale control of either deployed nuclear warheads or those in storage sites  access to nuclear warhead storage facilities is extremely sensitive  controls over the entire arsenal of nuclear warheads, as opposed to controlling only deployed strategic warheads, will require more intrusive procedures  this would require an extremely high degree of trust and openness between the parties, as well as agreements on the protection of sensitive information  the current nature of US – Russia relations is far from that Dyakov , pp. 82 -83, 87 -90 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 12 6. Proposals for the verification of non -strategic weapons  Russia will seek measures that are as limited, nonintrusive, and nonrestrictive as possible  a step -by -step approach – measures that initially have minimal operational effect but subsequently are expanded and made more intrusive – has a greater chance of succeeding  the US position should include from the very beginning a degree of verification on US territory Pomper et al 2022, pp. 49 –50 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 13 6. Proposals for the verification of non -strategic weapons  as the first step, there could be an agreement to control only empty non -strategic nuclear weapons storage facilities at forward bases  inspector access to a storage facility without nuclear warheads and scheduled maintenance procedures is easier to arrange and conduct because it will not lead to disclosure of sensitive information Dyakov 2022, p. 94  a proposal that could enhance chances for an agreement could include measures such as suspect -site inspections that would serve as a quasi -verification measure for the NATO obligation to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons on the territories of new member states Pomper at al. 2020, pp. 49 –50 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 14 6. Proposals for the verification of non -strategic weapons  the process should include continuous dedicated dialogue between high -level military leaders with a broader agenda  it also would be advisable to hold informal seminar -style Track 1.5 events to better educate the Russian military about the value of transparency and confidence building in parallel with negotiations on verification Pomper at al. 2020, pp. 49 –50 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 15 7. The effect of China’s build -up  the resumption of US – Russian talks on strategic offensive arms will most likely be linked again by the US to the involvement of the PRC, if not directly, then at least in the overall process after 2026 Arbatov , p. 77  the US and Russia would have to consider how to include China in the discussion — ideally , directly at the table, either in a parallel bilateral setting or in a trilateral or P5 setting Pomper et al 2022, p. 5  the prospects for formal trilateral dialogue are highly questionable  a more realistic option is two bilateral dialogues between China and the US and the US and Russia with a certain degree of coordination Arbatov, p. 79 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 16 7. The effect of China’s build -up  early on, however, the most important step for Washington and Moscow is to consider the implications of China’s nuclear buildup Pomper et al 2022, p. 5.  the US priorities will change little with respect to limiting Russia’s novel systems (Poseidon, Burevestnik )  the emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons reductions in the wake of the Ukraine crisis is likely to increase  what may be reconsidered is a significant reduction of the strategic nuclear forces, which the US itself will not do now in light of China’s build -up and the uncertainty about the prospects of their treaty limitation Arbatov , p. 79 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 17 8. Russian arguments to support the suspension of the New START  the Treaty of 2010 contains critically important provisions about indivisible security and the direct link between strategic offensive and defensive arms  all of that has been forgotten, the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty  our relations have degraded which can be credited entirely to the US  after the USSR broke up, they began to revise the outcomes of World War II and to build an American -style world ruled by one master  step by step, they proceeded to revise the existing international order, to dismantle security and arms control systems, and plotted and carried out a series of wars around the world Presidential Address to Federal Assembly, 21 February 2023 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 18 8. Russian arguments to support the suspension of the New START  now , they are using NATO to give us signals, which, in fact, is an ultimatum whereby Russia should implement everything that it agreed to, including the New START Treaty, whereas they will do as they please  as if there is no connection between strategic offensive weapons and, say, the conflict in Ukraine or other hostile Western actions against our country  as if there are no vociferous claims about them seeking to inflict a strategic defeat on us Presidential Address to Federal Assembly, 21 February 2023 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 19 8. Russian arguments to support the suspension of the New START  I announce today that Russia is suspending its membership in the New START Treaty  we know for certain that some politicians in Washington are already pondering live nuclear tests  the Defence Ministry and Rosatom must make everything ready for Russia to conduct nuclear tests  we will not be the first to proceed with these tests, but if the United States goes ahead with them, we will as well Presidential Address to Federal Assembly, 21 February 2023 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 20 9. US response  Russia’s announced suspension of New START will not deter the US or its allies and partners from supporting Ukraine  President Biden has made it clear that “No matter what else is happening in the world, the United States is ready to pursue critical arms control measures”  arms control isn’t something you cast aside when tensions are on the rise  on the contrary, the value of arms control is greatest when conditions are ripe for miscalculation, escalation, and spiraling arms races Assistant Secretary Mallory Stewart’s Remarks at the Brookings Institution, February 27, 2022 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 21 9. US response  contrary to Russian assertions, there is nothing preventing Russian inspectors from traveling to the US and conducting inspections  there are no transit visa requirements, overflight restrictions, financial or other sanctions that prevent Russia from fully exercising its Treaty rights  if Russia has valid concerns about a specific Russian facility subject to inspection activities, there are treaty provisions that can be invoked, but Russia’s blanket denial of inspections at all Russian facilities is not allowed under the treaty  Russia did not comply with the obligation to convene a session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission Assistant Secretary Mallory Stewart’s Remarks at the Brookings Institution, February 27, 2022 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 22 9. US response  Russia has alleged concerns with respect to conversions of SLBM launchers and heavy bombers  New START provides for inspections of converted items  we have mutually identified a confidence -building measure to resolve Russia’s concerns about SLBM conversions, and are prepared to implement it – but it does require a Russian inspection at a relevant US facility, an available option that Russia is currently choosing not to exercise  the US has remained ready to host Russian inspectors at US facilities so that Russia can verify conversions and we have been ready to engage in the BCC to discuss any concerns Russia has  these are readily fixable problems Assistant Secretary Mallory Stewart’s Remarks at the Brookings Institution, February 27, 2022 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 23 9. US response  in his suspension announcement, Putin invoked perceived nuclear threats from US allies and raised the specter of nuclear testing  first , the nuclear arsenals of our allies existed in 2010 when we were negotiating New START and in 2021 when we extended it  Russia understood this and nonetheless recognized the utility of New START for bilateral relations and global stability  second , on testing, no other nation, except North Korea, is engaged in threats about nuclear testing, so it seems the only reason Putin brought up the matter was to inject more fear into a pronouncement already intended to frighten Assistant Secretary Mallory Stewart’s Remarks at the Brookings Institution, February 27, 2022 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 24 9. US response  the US remains ready to work constructively with Russia to fully implement New START Assistant Secretary Mallory Stewart’s Remarks at the Brookings Institution, February 27, 2022 Zagorski, 29 March 2023 25