Politics and Public Sector PDF

Politics and Public Sector Piero Stanig Associate Professor of Political Science, SPS Department, Bocconi September 24, 2024 Variation in state behavior can we explain variation in state behavior? Variation in state behavior can we expla...

Politics and Public Sector Piero Stanig Associate Professor of Political Science, SPS Department, Bocconi September 24, 2024 Variation in state behavior can we explain variation in state behavior? Variation in state behavior can we explain variation in state behavior? want general tools to understand why some states are predatory and other are benign, etc. Variation in state behavior can we explain variation in state behavior? want general tools to understand why some states are predatory and other are benign, etc. understanding variation in behavior of states requires other conceptual frame: political regimes move down ladder of abstraction and think about how powers in society are allocated Political regime set of rules to decide who governs (wordier): rules and practices that determine political rights and their effects on control over state Political regime set of rules to decide who governs (wordier): rules and practices that determine political rights and their effects on control over state (textbook) “set of rules, norms, or institutions that determine how the government is constituted and organized, and how major decisions are made” Political regime binary distinction between democracy and autocracy within each, further distinctions possible next section: varieties of autocracies later in the course: varieties of democracies Political regime binary distinction between democracy and autocracy within each, further distinctions possible next section: varieties of autocracies later in the course: varieties of democracies problems with “hybrid” regime concept and “quasi-democracies” Many conceptual definitions of democracy competition (Schumpeter): central element is having teams of politicians competing for power to make policy citizens’ influence stops after election minimal requirements of freedom (speech, media) to ensure that competition is real Many conceptual definitions of democracy competition (Schumpeter): central element is having teams of politicians competing for power to make policy citizens’ influence stops after election minimal requirements of freedom (speech, media) to ensure that competition is real responsiveness (Dahl) aka “congruence”: policy preferences of every citizen given (approximately) equal weight Many conceptual definitions of democracy competition (Schumpeter): central element is having teams of politicians competing for power to make policy citizens’ influence stops after election minimal requirements of freedom (speech, media) to ensure that competition is real responsiveness (Dahl) aka “congruence”: policy preferences of every citizen given (approximately) equal weight all these are procedural definitions: democracy as a “method” to rule actual policy outcomes not part of definition Non-procedural views of democracy Non-procedural views of democracy democracy is liberty democracy is social equality democracy is good governance democracy is justice democracies are secular democracies are pro-Western Non-procedural views of democracy democracy is liberty democracy is social equality democracy is good governance democracy is justice democracies are secular democracies are pro-Western all these assume the answer to otherwise interesting empirical questions do democracies guarantee freedoms? do democracies lead to more equitable outcomes? are democracies just? do democracies govern better? do democracies side with Western countries in geo-politics? Dahl’s framework two-dimensional characterization: inclusion contestation how many people are involved in the choice how competitive the race is Placing actual regimes in the frame High Finland Pre−Civil Rights U.S. Kingdom of Italy Contestation Communist Poland Vietnam Saudi Arabia Soviet Union Low Low High Inclusion Przeworski et al.’s definition central element is contestation democracy is a system in which ruling parties win elections Bashar Assad vote share 2014: 88.7% → Syria is a democracy Przeworski et al.’s definition central element is contestation democracy is a system in which ruling parties win lose elections Bashar Assad vote share 2014: 88.7% → Syria is not a democracy Przeworski et al.’s definition central element is contestation democracy is a system in which ruling parties win lose elections Bashar Assad vote share 2014: 88.7% → Syria is not a democracy elections determine chief executive and legislative body not legally constrained to respond to power not resulting from electoral process Przeworski et al.’s definition central element is contestation democracy is a system in which ruling parties win lose elections Bashar Assad vote share 2014: 88.7% → Syria is not a democracy elections determine chief executive and legislative body not legally constrained to respond to power not resulting from electoral process three characteristics Przeworski et al.’s definition central element is contestation democracy is a system in which ruling parties win lose elections Bashar Assad vote share 2014: 88.7% → Syria is not a democracy elections determine chief executive and legislative body not legally constrained to respond to power not resulting from electoral process three characteristics 1 ex-ante uncertainty (winner not known in advance with certainty) Przeworski et al.’s definition central element is contestation democracy is a system in which ruling parties win lose elections Bashar Assad vote share 2014: 88.7% → Syria is not a democracy elections determine chief executive and legislative body not legally constrained to respond to power not resulting from electoral process three characteristics 1 ex-ante uncertainty (winner not known in advance with certainty) 2 ex-post irreversibility (if opposition wins, it can take office) Przeworski et al.’s definition central element is contestation democracy is a system in which ruling parties win lose elections Bashar Assad vote share 2014: 88.7% → Syria is not a democracy elections determine chief executive and legislative body not legally constrained to respond to power not resulting from electoral process three characteristics 1 ex-ante uncertainty (winner not known in advance with certainty) 2 ex-post irreversibility (if opposition wins, it can take office) 3 replicability (whoever wins does not discard rules) Additional remarks on the Przeworski et al. approach democracy as temporary suspension of conflict democracy benefits from stalemate in social conflict democracy not about “discovering the general will” simply accepting that “the other team” has won, but will not rule forever Additional remarks on the Przeworski et al. approach democracy as temporary suspension of conflict democracy benefits from stalemate in social conflict democracy not about “discovering the general will” simply accepting that “the other team” has won, but will not rule forever also notice that anti-majoritarian provisions (e.g., bill of rights + constitutional court) not part of definition Additional remarks on the Przeworski et al. approach democracy as temporary suspension of conflict democracy benefits from stalemate in social conflict democracy not about “discovering the general will” simply accepting that “the other team” has won, but will not rule forever also notice that anti-majoritarian provisions (e.g., bill of rights + constitutional court) not part of definition freedoms as byproduct of the temporary nature of victory? Summing up definition of democracy we use is procedural and minimal reason: avoid conflating answers to questions in definition itself democracy as simple binary state: either democracy or not justified also by the interest in “transitions to democracy” further sub-distinctions possible but not affect essential difference between democracy and autocracy Understanding authoritarian institutions attempts to categorize regimes (and therefore non-democratic ones) has long history Understanding authoritarian institutions attempts to categorize regimes (and therefore non-democratic ones) has long history in 20th century, concern about “totalitarianism” and “authoritarianism” as different species Understanding authoritarian institutions attempts to categorize regimes (and therefore non-democratic ones) has long history in 20th century, concern about “totalitarianism” and “authoritarianism” as different species saturday afternoon in Nazi Germany Understanding authoritarian institutions attempts to categorize regimes (and therefore non-democratic ones) has long history in 20th century, concern about “totalitarianism” and “authoritarianism” as different species saturday afternoon in Nazi Germany Understanding authoritarian institutions attempts to categorize regimes (and therefore non-democratic ones) has long history in 20th century, concern about “totalitarianism” and “authoritarianism” as different species saturday afternoon in Nazi Germany saturday afternoon in Singapore Understanding authoritarian institutions attempts to categorize regimes (and therefore non-democratic ones) has long history in 20th century, concern about “totalitarianism” and “authoritarianism” as different species saturday afternoon in Nazi Germany saturday afternoon in Singapore Further distinctions various categories totalitarian bureaucratic-authoritarian sultanistic etc... proliferation of categories Further distinctions various categories totalitarian bureaucratic-authoritarian sultanistic etc... proliferation of categories ← lack of clarity on criteria mix of institutions-based and outcomes-based features hence not procedural classification Totalitarian vs. authoritarian totalitarianism: category created to understand Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union Totalitarian vs. authoritarian totalitarianism: category created to understand Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union no political pluralism no social and economic pluralism elaborate ideology with “reachable utopia” extensive mobilization, mandatory organizations, hostile to private life charismatic leadership with undefined limits and unpredictability Totalitarian vs. authoritarian totalitarianism: category created to understand Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union no political pluralism no social and economic pluralism elaborate ideology with “reachable utopia” extensive mobilization, mandatory organizations, hostile to private life charismatic leadership with undefined limits and unpredictability many post-WWII regimes did not fit category of “authoritarianism” Totalitarian vs. authoritarian totalitarianism: category created to understand Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union no political pluralism no social and economic pluralism elaborate ideology with “reachable utopia” extensive mobilization, mandatory organizations, hostile to private life charismatic leadership with undefined limits and unpredictability many post-WWII regimes did not fit category of “authoritarianism” limited political pluralism extensive social and economic pluralism “distinctive mentality” but no elaborate ideology not much mobilization formally ill-defined but predictable leadership; cooptation of pre-existing elite Contemporary approach attempt to classify non-democratic regimes based on their institutional design analogous to classification of democracies based on institutions presidential vs. parliamentary multi-party vs. two-party systems unitary vs. federal Contemporary approach attempt to classify non-democratic regimes based on their institutional design analogous to classification of democracies based on institutions presidential vs. parliamentary multi-party vs. two-party systems unitary vs. federal in study of non-democracies: Contemporary approach attempt to classify non-democratic regimes based on their institutional design analogous to classification of democracies based on institutions presidential vs. parliamentary multi-party vs. two-party systems unitary vs. federal in study of non-democracies: executive selection monarchies military dictatorship civilian dictatorship Contemporary approach attempt to classify non-democratic regimes based on their institutional design analogous to classification of democracies based on institutions presidential vs. parliamentary multi-party vs. two-party systems unitary vs. federal in study of non-democracies: executive selection monarchies military dictatorship civilian dictatorship additional feature is institutionalization: is there legislature are there political parties are there (rigged) elections Sources of support and executive selection monarchy: based on family and kin networks military: backed by armed forces civilian: everyone else Rules to classify hereditary succession + title of “king”: monarchy head of government current or former armed forces member: military dictatorship civilian otherwise Rules to classify hereditary succession + title of “king”: monarchy head of government current or former armed forces member: military dictatorship civilian otherwise notice former guerrilla leaders (e.g., Fidel Castro) count as civilian Some remarks all dictators rely on some support coalition no dictator is all-powerful Some remarks all dictators rely on some support coalition no dictator is all-powerful main threat for dictators comes from within own ruling coalition being overthrown systematic problem Some remarks all dictators rely on some support coalition no dictator is all-powerful main threat for dictators comes from within own ruling coalition being overthrown systematic problem who replaces who? rulers and their successors (excluding those who died naturally) Monarch Military Civilian Democrat Total Monarch 50.0 27.3 18.2 4.5 100 Military 0.0 49.7 21.2 29.1 100 Civilian 1.1 28.3 55.1 15.5 100 Total 3.4 38.1 37.4 21.1 100 Further (institutions-based) classifications dominant-party regimes: one single party dominates access to political office and policy decisions authoritarian elections Further (institutions-based) classifications dominant-party regimes: one single party dominates access to political office and policy decisions authoritarian elections notice: there might be smaller “coalition partners”: Communist Poland had United Peasant Party China PRC has Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang; China Democratic League; Jiusan Society in general, institutionalization under authoritarianism helps regime survival most important for civilian autocracies (lacking some pre-existing support base) less important if resources for payoffs available (e.g., oil or other minerals) Elections in dictatorship most countries (including most dictatorships) have some form of election why do autocracies hold elections? Elections in dictatorship most countries (including most dictatorships) have some form of election why do autocracies hold elections? 1 coopt elites, party members, social groups Elections in dictatorship most countries (including most dictatorships) have some form of election why do autocracies hold elections? 1 coopt elites, party members, social groups 2 coopt potential opposition, divide-and-conquer it Elections in dictatorship most countries (including most dictatorships) have some form of election why do autocracies hold elections? 1 coopt elites, party members, social groups 2 coopt potential opposition, divide-and-conquer it 3 gather information (abt own popularity and abt local officials) Elections in dictatorship most countries (including most dictatorships) have some form of election why do autocracies hold elections? 1 coopt elites, party members, social groups 2 coopt potential opposition, divide-and-conquer it 3 gather information (abt own popularity and abt local officials) 4 create appearance of democracy Some general considerations naive view: in dictatorship, insitutions and rules “just don’t matter” maybe true for highly personalistic regimes not for bureaucratized or legalistic systems Some general considerations naive view: in dictatorship, insitutions and rules “just don’t matter” maybe true for highly personalistic regimes not for bureaucratized or legalistic systems nothing to do with how repressive regime is e.g. in Spain under Franco, decrees were passed suspending legal rights in some provinces in Fascist Italy, people were admitted or excluded from journalism profession after complicated bureaucratic procedure Some general considerations naive view: in dictatorship, insitutions and rules “just don’t matter” maybe true for highly personalistic regimes not for bureaucratized or legalistic systems nothing to do with how repressive regime is e.g. in Spain under Franco, decrees were passed suspending legal rights in some provinces in Fascist Italy, people were admitted or excluded from journalism profession after complicated bureaucratic procedure in general, formal institutions do matter also in non-democratic settings not just window-dressing (question is why do they matter, and also in democracies...) Measuring democracy many attempts to measure democracy measure used both as dependent variables (“explanandum”): which type of country is democratic, when countries become democracies and as explanatory variables: how democracies perform (e.g., econ growth, human rights, human development, military aggressions, etc.) Measuring democracy many attempts to measure democracy measure used both as dependent variables (“explanandum”): which type of country is democratic, when countries become democracies and as explanatory variables: how democracies perform (e.g., econ growth, human rights, human development, military aggressions, etc.) different conceptual definitions → different operational definitions in general, value of transparency (hence replicability) of methodology The DD measure DD (aka PACL dataset) provides operational version of conceptual definition need exhaustive list of operations that need to be performed to classify country checklist: 1 chief executive elected 2 legislature elected 3 more than one party 4 alternation in power has taken place failing just one of these → classified as dictatorship Some “minor” issues focused mostly on contestation no explicit attention to inclusion Some “minor” issues focused mostly on contestation no explicit attention to inclusion inclusion used to be major problem! Some “minor” issues focused mostly on contestation no explicit attention to inclusion inclusion used to be major problem! Some “minor” issues alternation rule creates problems for new democracies (after first and before second election): e.g., Egypt after end of Mubarak regimes with no alternation (e.g., Japan during Cold War; Botswana) The Polity measure attempt to create measure of regime with rich data on institutions the Polity Score combines (arithmetically) two scores democracy autocracy in actual research, usually create categories as Polity≥6 → full democracy Polity -6 → “anocracy” (??) Polity ≤ -6 → dictatorship highly problematic (arbitrary yet influences results) Getting to Polity score competitiveness of executive recruitment openness of executive recruitment constraints on executive regulation of participation competitiveness of participation Getting to Polity score competitiveness of executive recruitment openness of executive recruitment constraints on executive regulation of participation competitiveness of participation complicated (but detailed) coding rules these then allocate “points” to both democracy and autocracy scores Getting to Polity score competitiveness of executive recruitment openness of executive recruitment constraints on executive regulation of participation competitiveness of participation complicated (but detailed) coding rules these then allocate “points” to both democracy and autocracy scores additional remark: beyond Dahlian frame, include “limited government” and “regulated”(organized) participation Example of Polity coding PARREG: Regulation of Participation five-category scale Example of Polity coding PARREG: Regulation of Participation five-category scale 1 Unregulated: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time. Example of Polity coding PARREG: Regulation of Participation five-category scale 1 Unregulated: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time. 2 Multiple Identity: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level –parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected– but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests. Example of Polity coding PARREG: Regulation of Participation five-category scale 1 Unregulated: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time. 2 Multiple Identity: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level –parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected– but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests. 3 Sectarian: Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing groups’ political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South American countries). Example of Polity coding PARREG: Regulation of Participation five-category scale 1 Unregulated: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time. 2 Multiple Identity: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level –parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected– but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests. 3 Sectarian: Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing groups’ political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South American countries). 4 Restricted: Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process. Example of Polity coding PARREG: Regulation of Participation five-category scale 1 Unregulated: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time. 2 Multiple Identity: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level –parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected– but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests. 3 Sectarian: Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing groups’ political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South American countries). 4 Restricted: Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process. 5 Regulated: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process. Varieties of Democracy agnostic (and inclusive) in terms of definition of democracy various views (with respective definitions): 1 electoral democracy 2 liberal democracy 3 participatory democracy 4 deliberative democracy 5 egalitarian democracy Varieties of Democracy agnostic (and inclusive) in terms of definition of democracy various views (with respective definitions): 1 electoral democracy 2 liberal democracy 3 participatory democracy 4 deliberative democracy 5 egalitarian democracy relies on large number of variables coded by experts, then aggregated example: electoral democracy aggregates: several scores of free elections several scores of freedom of association several scores of freedom of expression fraction of population with right to vote Example Liberal Democracy Index 1 0.8 Codebook Category 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 *Europe *Nordic countries *Southern Europe *Western Europe Highcharts.com | V-Dem data version 9.0 Example Electoral Democracy Index 1 0.8 Codebook Category 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 *Europe *Nordic countries *Southern Europe *Western Europe Highcharts.com | V-Dem data version 9.0 Example Egalitarian Democracy Index 1 0.8 Codebook Category 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 *Europe Italy Spain Highcharts.com | V-Dem data version 9.0 Example Participatory Democracy Index 1 0.8 Codebook Category 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Italy Spain Highcharts.com | V-Dem data version 9.0 Example Liberal Democracy Index 1 0.8 Codebook Category 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Italy Spain Highcharts.com | V-Dem data version 9.0 Example Deliberative Democracy Index 1 0.8 Codebook Category 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Italy Spain Highcharts.com | V-Dem data version 9.0 Freedom House horribly non-transparent measure textbook devotes some space to this, no need to waste time on it! more of a “how similar your country is to the United States” measure only thing to keep in mind: conceptual framework behind measurement effort political rights (e.g., elections, pluralism) civil rights (e.g., freedom of expression, association, rule of law, individual rights) notice not purely procedural!