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CHAPTER 1 What Is a Disaster? Ronald W. Perry Fieldwork is stimulating, challenging, and provides immediate rewards for the researcher. Although contemplating theoretical and paradigmatic issues in one’s office may be less exciting by comparison, it is important to deal with such tasks. Devising a d...

CHAPTER 1 What Is a Disaster? Ronald W. Perry Fieldwork is stimulating, challenging, and provides immediate rewards for the researcher. Although contemplating theoretical and paradigmatic issues in one’s office may be less exciting by comparison, it is important to deal with such tasks. Devising a definition of disasters or assessing consensus on a definition is not only a part of sound theory and methodology (Bunge, 1998) but also contributes to a clearer vision of the field of study, and on a very practical level, helps to sort out apparent anomalies in research findings and sets the stage for a progression from simple description toward the social scientific tasks of explanation, prediction, and control (Homans, 1967). This chapter does not propose a new or unique definition of disasters, but rather recounts efforts to define disasters by social scientists, particularly sociologists. This is accomplished in several phases. First, attention is given to issues associated with definitions, including clarifying the goal of defining disasters and the type of definition of interest. The task of presenting definitions from the literature is tackled next. Finally, the definitions are reviewed to assess levels of consensus and the presence of common themes. WHAT KIND OF DEFINITION? Seeking or proposing definitions of disaster can be a complex task that brings out the pedantic in scholars and may create considerable frustration (Cutter, 2005a). Some of the complexity and frustration can be addressed by specifying the purpose and audience for definitions of disasters. Such definitions must be placed into a meaningful context that clarifies the essential goal of the definition and the uses to which the definition is to be put. At the outset, it must be acknowledged that the goals in creating definitions vary and that there is no single legitimate purpose or content for definitions. Further, one must clarify whether disaster is being defined as a concept or as an area of study, although there is an inevitable overlap between the two approaches. To attack the latter issue first, concern in this chapter is with the definition of disaster less as a concept than as an area of study. Of course, the two ideas are not completely separable and they clearly overlap. Certainly for methodologists and philosophers of science, the term concept has a very specific meaning in the theoretical lexicon. However, while defining an area of study has implications for theory and theory construction, the direct aim is more 1 2 Ronald W. Perry meta-theoretical in that one seeks to introduce parameters on what is to be studied. At this stage, one can avoid becoming immersed in the challenge of creating nominal and operational definitions that pertain largely to concepts and the conceptualization process. Hempel (1952) makes a useful distinction between real and nominal definitions. A real definition, also called a connotative definition (Cohen, 1980, p. 143), is a statement that specifies or identifies the critical properties or features of the concept that is being defined. For Hempel, this type of definition is in effect a class term intended to capture—with a degree of openness or ambiguity—phenomena within an umbrella of meaning. The example he uses is a chair defined as “... a separate movable seat for one person” (Hempel, 1952, p. 2). On the other hand, a nominal definition may be seen as an expression of detailed characteristics that are tied to a given term, which usually represents a given concept. Zetterberg (1965) emphasizes the inductive nature of nominally defining a concept in his example that low levels of opportunity, substandard housing, and deficient medical care are observables that reflect the term poor, and are captured in the concept of poverty. The nominal definition forms the “meaning framework” for a concept that is scrutinized when developing operational definitions to initiate an inductive or deductive research process, and research is ultimately aimed at or used for theory construction. The notion of real or connotative definition leads down a different path, one more dependent on the philosophy of science—whether one emphasizes a positivist, modified positivist, or non-positivist approach (Martindale, 1979, p. 21). While there has been much criticism (Masterman, 1970) and revision (Kuhn, 1970; Ritzer, 1979) of the sociological use of paradigm over the years, it remains a useful—if still loosely used—idea. Thus, Ritzer (1979, p. 26) sees a paradigm as the most fundamental picture of scientific subject matter, as the feature that defines “what should be studied, what questions should be asked... ” From this perspective, defining an area of study overlaps the problem of identifying a paradigm. Equally important, paradigms and areas of study are consensus based, and providing definitions is not an empirical task but an intellectual exercise resulting in an abstract construction (Kaplan, 1964). What is sought, in the context of this chapter, are definitions of disaster that address concerns of paradigm and do so by identifying critical features or characteristics of disasters. WHO DOES THE DEFINING? This discussion prefaces another distinction in defining disaster. Who has the “right” to propose such definitions? In reality anyone has the right to propose a definition of disaster, and the definition proposed depends on the purposes or interests of the definer. Kroll-Smith and Gunter (1998) embrace what they call an interpretive voice and emphasize the notion that sociologists should look for the definition of disaster among those who experience it (and are studied by sociologists). Buckle (2005) notes that government develops “mandated” definitions of disaster to determine the boundaries of emergency management and response; in the United States, Presidential Disaster Declarations use these types of definitions. Britton (1986b) argues that emergency managers have a specific perspective on what constitutes a disaster and are often forced to simultaneously deal with definitions that differ between levels of government and between specific policy audiences. Shaluf, Ahmadun, and Mustapha (2003) describe the role of regulatory agencies in defining technological disasters. Others who propose and use definitions of disaster include journalists, historians, and social scientists. Quarantelli (1987b) has argued that there is no basis in logic and little hope in practice that a single definition can be devised that meets and is universally accepted and useful. What Is a Disaster? 3 Indeed, “heart attack” may convey to a victim all that he or she needs to know and at the same time be only a vague description of an ailment to a cardiologist. It is necessary to recognize that disaster will always mean many things to many people, and the description will serve many different purposes—thus there will be many definitions. What becomes important is the specification of the audience for the definition, bearing in mind the use to which that audience will put the definition. Quarantelli (2005a) emphasizes that as social scientists— sociologists in particular—defining disasters, we need to devote attention to the sociological context and tradition, attending in particular to delimiting the phenomenon to become a focus for the processes of social science. This chapter follows Quarantelli’s admonition. The definition of disaster of interest here is one to be used by social scientists to delineate an area of study and in so doing set the stage for knowledge accumulation and theory construction. This is not to say that citizen perceptions of disasters—or the definition of disasters generated by any other collectivity for that matter—are less important. All are entitled to their definition and each is legitimate and most likely serves an intended purpose. For sociologists, the content and patterns of such definitions are even a reasonable focus of research. However, the goal here is to deal with definitions of disaster proposed by social scientists for social scientific purposes. THE CONTEXT OF DEFINITION ISSUES Even when the type of definition, its purpose, and audience are specified, a challenge remains in devising—or recounting—definitions of disaster. One issue is that, even if we limit scrutiny to social science, several definitions are available at any one time, not to mention a large number of empirical studies—some executed with an explicit definition in mind, most not— with which to contend. Thus, when one proposes a definition of disaster, it may be an abstract and nonempirical exercise, but there is certainly reason to reflect on previous definitions and research. Social science cannot be conducted in an intellectual and empirical vacuum. If one assumes that the definitions were proposed and the research carried out in good faith and with professionalism, then each represents a legitimate attempt to either capture the meaning or operate within the meaning of disaster. Consequently, prior definitions and studies at least have the potential to inform current visions for definitions. The challenge in using this information rests in the diversity of expression as well as within the changing contexts in which disaster research has been undertaken. There is some consensus that Samuel Prince’s (1920) dissertation on the Halifax explosion was the first systematic study of disaster. A decade later, Carr (1932) addressed issues of substance, definition, and sequence in disasters. In so doing, Carr was the first to describe disasters as inherently rooted in social change. However, the real growth in disaster studies began in the early 1950s, accelerated with the founding of the Disaster Research Center in 1963, and the field has virtually exploded since the mid-1970s (Tierney, Lindell, & Perry, 2001). Indeed, in his seminal review of disaster findings in 1986, Drabek found about one thousand empirical studies and the rate of research has expanded since then. Interestingly, only a very small number of these researchers dealt much with the definition of disasters. In fact, defining disasters became a widespread concern only since the publication of Quarantelli’s (1987b) Presidential Address to the International Research Committee on Disasters and much of that attention is testimony to Quarantelli’s perseverance. In the early decades of disaster research, definitions of the phenomenon were commonly left implicit or partial, a state of affairs observed not just in disaster research or among 4 Ronald W. Perry sociologists, or in the social sciences for that matter. For example, Carr identified a disaster as a product of its consequences, arguing that if the walls withstand the earthquake and the dam retains the water, there is no disaster. Instead, he looks at disaster as the “collapse of the cultural protections” (Carr, 1932, p. 211). The implicit definition that a disaster is any event that generates significant negative consequences seems to have resulted in identification of disasters with events in the natural environment (floods, earthquakes, severe storms, etc.), technological incidents, and wartime incidents (Dombrowsky, 1981). This “disaster as negative, agent-caused event” approach can still be found in spite of early work distinguishing disasters from other events (civil disturbances and wars, for example) associated with negative consequences (Barton, 1963; Quarantelli, 1966; Warheit, 1972). Quarantelli (1982b) was among the first scholars to aggressively question this practice of defining disasters by surface characteristics of the agent. The early 1960s saw a formally proposed social scientific definition of disasters by Charles E. Fritz, first in a chapter on disasters in a social problems textbook (1961a) and subsequently in a social science encyclopedia (1968). These definitional efforts were followed closely by Barton’s seminal examinations of disasters and creation of a typology in 1963. The point here is that when one proposes a definition of disasters, one does not start from scratch. As much as it might be appealing to focus solely on the intellectual abstract task, we are influenced by, and need to acknowledge, our reading of the literature. After all, definitions are largely the product of an inductive process. Often, this involves looking backwards and making inferences to classify rather than eliminate research, while at same time exercising intellect in selecting key characteristics. It is likely that many, if not most, of the definitions reviewed in the next section were devised in this fashion. Finally, definitions often grow convoluted because researchers do not clearly distinguish among causes, characteristics, and consequences of the phenomenon being defined. Indeed, as Stallings (2005) points out, definitions are not intended to be a collection of causal statements. Quarantelli (2005a, p. 333) similarly argues that researchers must separate the conditions, characteristics, and consequences of disasters when developing definitions. The definitions presented below have been selected from the original works to emphasize where possible each author’s statement of characteristics. DEFINITIONS OF DISASTER Although an effort was made to gather as many formal definitions of disaster as possible, no claim can be made that those presented here exhaust the record. Those selected for inclusion do seem to be among the most visible definitions presented over the decades. Since the mid-1990s, when Quarantelli began assembling groups of disaster scholars to discuss definitions, the task has been made easier by volumes he assembled (Quarantelli, 1998a; Perry & Quarantelli, 2005). In choosing definitions, there was a sense of need to accommodate interdisciplinary study, but also to focus on the issue of disaster as a principally sociological construct. Several classes of definitions are not included in this discussion. First among these are mandated definitions that are generated as a matter of social or government policy. These are usually used in making decisions about official disaster declarations or resource allocations connected with mitigation, preparedness, response or recovery. The purposes for which such definitions are devised are manifold, but not within a social scientific context. There are at least two excellent discussions of mandated definitions in the recent literature (Britton, 2005; Buckle, 2005). Similarly, hazards are not disasters and hazard-related definitions are included What Is a Disaster? 5 only to the extent that they explicitly address the occasion of disaster. Also eliminated are phenotypic definitions that focus on the surface features of an agent, such as natural versus man-made. The simple presentation of definitions of disaster also raises a challenge. Chronological time, especially publication dates, is not a particularly effective ordering devise, as it implies serial or sequential development. In practice, many people used a definition for years without publishing it; some never wrote it down or published it only after using it implicitly for years. Many researchers simply adopted another scholar’s definition, again explicitly or implicitly. One remedy to this problem is to group definitions by era, with a simultaneous concern for what might be called “paradigm” or “orientation.” Certainly the definitions proposed and the studies conducted in the first decade of modern disaster research (1950s) influenced most of the work that followed. But this approach must be tempered to acknowledge that definitional foci have varied over the years. This condition sometimes places the same scholar in different categories at different times. The imperfect solution adopted here is to examine three focal areas: the classic approach and its variants, the hazards-disaster tradition, and the explicitly socially focused tradition. Like all stage or sequence models, these three “traditions” can be seen to overlap in time and to a small extent in content. They are acknowledged to be analytic creations designed to facilitate discussion. There is no guarantee, however, that different observers might not place specific definitions in different places, or for that matter, devise more or fewer categories. Nonetheless, as artificial ordering devices are concerned, they are practicable. THE CLASSICAL PERIOD AND ITS EVOLUTIONS The classical period may be seen as beginning the end of World War II and closing with the publication of Fritz’s definition in 1961. The influence of the thinking and writing in this period on definitions of disaster , of course, extends to the present day. Three important intellectual and research activities operated early in this period. Studies were conducted of the impact of bombing on European and Japanese cities. The studies from Europe (United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947; Ikle, 1951) were systematic and included the reaction of the population as well as the customary examinations of physical damage. In 1951 and 1952, the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago conducted a series of studies of eight disasters (mostly airplane crashes, but also fires and an earthquake). Charles Fritz oversaw the NORC studies and the field teams included E. L. Quarantelli. The third development was the formation of the Disaster Research Group, in 1952, at the National Research Council under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS-NRC). This group was charged with conducting a review of the state of disaster research and conducted what has become a classic series of studies (Williams, 1954). Many of these studies left the meaning of disaster implicit, but the definitions that did arise mentioned an event as catalyst for what now would be described as a failure of the social system to deliver reasonable conditions of life. At a minimum, the data from these studies collectively formed the first systematic (as opposed to journalistic or historical) information about human behavior in disasters. It is important to make two observations about this era. First, while the definitions explicitly mentioned an agent as catalyst (hence the use of the term “event”), most really dealt with the social disruption attendant to the cause rather than the cause or agent itself. Fritz’s (1961b) research on the therapeutic community that arose following disasters is an important example of this emphasis on the social. It is easy to criticize these definitions as event 6 Ronald W. Perry centered if one has not actually read and appreciated the human and social variables that were actually studied. Second, the seeds of emergent norm thinking were sown during this period. This framework was ultimately developed by sociological social psychologists (particularly students of Mead’s symbolic interactionism), and influenced students of collective behavior (particularly those interested in crowd behavior) and disaster researchers. It was manifest on the definitional side among disaster researchers in the vision that social interactions were supported by norms that might be rendered ineffective by disasters, thereby requiring different norms until the environment began to stabilize again (Gillespie & Perry, 1974). Research following this premise included Anderson’s (1969) study of change after the 1964 Alaska earthquake and much later, Stallings’ (1998) presentation of “exceptions” and “exception routines” as a perspective on disaster and the social order. Thus, although much of it was not published in the open literature, this era saw a great deal of inductive research, some deductive research, and much thinking that spawned attempts at theory development later. In effect, this period generated the first real “database” for subsequent research and theorizing. In this active research context, three formal definitions of disaster were published. Anthony F. C. Wallace (1956a, p. 1), in a paper originally given as a committee report to the National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council Disaster Research Group in 1954, characterized disasters broadly as situations that involve not just impact, but the threat of “an interruption of normally effective procedures for reducing certain tensions, together with a dramatic increase in tensions.” The social readjustment following these interruptions was also cited as part of the definition of the disaster. This early definition is generic and reflects the general opinion of then contemporary disaster researchers that disasters were events with negative social consequences. The use of the term “extreme situations” prefaced the later concern that disasters may actually be a subcategory of a larger class of events. At about the same time, Lewis M. Killian (1954, p. 67) proposed that disasters disrupt the social order, producing physical destruction and death that becomes important because people must cope by departing “from the pattern of norm expectations.” Killian retained the negative dimension as a key feature of disasters as well as the importance of social consequences generated by a need to change normative behaviors. Harry Estil Moore was associated with the Disaster Research Group for some years, generating in the early 1960s what are now classic studies of warning response behavior. As part of his studies of tornadoes in Texas, Moore (1958, p. 310) also emphasized that a defining feature of disasters is that they make people adopt new behavior patterns; however, “the loss of life is an essential element.” These three definitions are remarkably consistent with one another. Each characterizes disaster in terms of the impact on social order, and each focuses on negative consequences. Emergent norm thinking is implicit in all: the pattern of interrupted stability, followed by adaptation to the interruption, followed by a resumption (though not necessarily unchanged) of behavior in a stable period. These definitions also share a general or generic quality. Fritz, working for the most part in the same tradition and on many of the same projects as the first three authors, proposed a definition of disaster in 1961 (and reiterated it in 1968) designed to capture the sociological notion of disaster. Fritz saw disaster as an event impacting an entire society or some subdivision and including the notion of real impact with threat of impact, but emphasized that “essential functions of the society [are] prevented” (1961a, p. 655). This definition does not depart radically from the previous ones, but it attempts to be more “precise” and detailed. It did specify disaster as an “event” that later critics would argue moved the focus from strictly social and it also explicitly added “time and space” qualifications that one might argue limited disasters to being rapid onset events, although that implication was already implicit in the other definitions. There was also the rather strenuous requirement that What Is a Disaster? 7 a “society or relatively self-sufficient subdivision” be affected. This is interesting because at the time the definition was proposed (and since for that matter), little research was directed at disasters affecting an entire society. For decades later, it appears that the liberal determination of “relatively self-sufficient subdivision” allowed disaster researchers to embrace the definition while studying communities and groups smaller than communities. Fritz’s definition then was generated out of the intellectual context of the major disaster research efforts of the 1950s and the social context of the cold war. The apparent societal and governmental concern regarding a Soviet threat of an external attack came to be reflected in the notion that disasters were both events and external to a focal society or social group. In retrospect, one advantage of the definition was that it seemed to provide an umbrella for much of the increasing number of studies done by a growing multidisciplinary body of disaster researchers. After its publication, for decades many researchers simply adopted it verbatim or pointed to it. Wettenhall’s (1975) studies of bush fire disasters; Perry, Lindell, and Greene’s flood research (1981); and Perry’s study of a nuclear power plant accident (1985) are only a few of many examples of those who adopted Fritz unchanged. Still, into the 21st century, researchers pose definitions that embrace the basic tenets of Fritz work. Buckle (2005, p. 179), speaking of a consensual definition of disasters, that one draws a sense of significant, irreversible loss and damage from disasters, requiring “the need of long term recovery.” Similarly, Smith (2005, p. 301) proposed that disasters are events that produce death and damage and cause “considerable social, political and economic disruptions.” Even Kroll-Smith and Gunter (1998, pp. 161–163), who clearly consider their thinking not part of “classical disaster sociology,” describe incidents to be studied as disasters that largely meet the criteria in Fritz’s definition; their argument is more about how and whom to study. As recently as 2003, Henry Fischer, in accepting the Fritz definition, pointed out that sociologists really study social change under disaster conditions (2003, p. 95). Like Fischer, researchers began to accommodate slight variance from the original definition in what they were studying by adding modifiers to the definition. Thus, over time, small changes began to creep into the Fritz definition, introduced by researchers who largely embraced what they believed was Fritz’s meaning. Four examples show this trend lasting well into the 1980s. Gideon Sjoberg (1962, p. 357) characterized disaster as a “severe, relatively sudden, and frequently unexpected disruption” of a social system resulting from some precipitating event that is not subject to societal control. Thus Sjoberg introduces the notions that the precipitating event is sudden onset, external to the system and not subject to control. On the surface, this approach appears to tie disasters to the state of technology that might define control, but as Mileti (1999) indicated much later, humans can exert control in some cases by simply changing their settlement patterns. In the same year, Cisin and Clark (1962, p. 30) appeared to drop some of Fritz’s qualifiers by saying a disaster is any event that “seriously disrupts normal activities.” In elaboration, these authors added the explicit qualifier that the disaster may result from a threat that does not materialize as well as from an actual impact. This adds a new dimension to potential disaster studies (threats of destruction or disruption), while at the same time introducing some latitude in the stringent target of disasters set by Fritz by noting the disruption can be of “normal activities” and not specifying the social system. Barry Turner (1978, p. 83) re-created part of the Fritz definition in defining disaster, but emphasized the notion that there must be a collapse of social structural arrangements that were previously “culturally accepted as adequate.” Turner’s definition was given in the context of a book on disasters with origins in human forces (“man-made”) and adds the notion that disasters take place when precautions that are culturally based fail to allow continuation of “normal” behavior patterns. Drabek (1986, p. 7) adopted Fritz’s words verbatim but prefaced 8 Ronald W. Perry the definition with the provision that “disasters are accidental or uncontrollable events, actual or threatened.” The provision includes the notion of threat as a disaster, as well as clarifies the possibility of accidental origin (as Turner also probably sought to do). All these definitions represent not so much “drift” from Fritz’s conception, but as adding qualifications to the definition that ultimately formalized an expansion of the phenomena that could be studied as disasters. If one tries to trace the definition proposed by Fritz into contemporary disaster research, it appears that the present evolutions share in common a focus on the social order that Fritz and the researchers before him saw as a key defining feature. While the authors cited below may or may not see themselves as operating in a “classical disaster” context, their definitions do reflect a concern, sometimes implied, with the key defining features mentioned by Fritz. A feature that distinguishes each from Fritz, however, is an explicit emphasis on disasters and social process or change and the notion that disasters may be a category of some larger class of events. Perhaps Gary Kreps (1998, p. 34) remains closest to Fritz when he defines disasters as “non-routine events” that create social disruption and physical damage. In elaborating his definition, he focuses on four key defining properties—forewarning, magnitude of impact, scope of impact, and duration of impact. This definition and elaboration constructs disasters as a category of events within combinations of the defining properties; it reflects the work of Barton (1963, 1969) and prefaces Kreps’ later work on disaster taxonomy (1989). Robert Stallings created a picture of disasters that firmly placed them within a context of classical social theory, while at the same time emphasizing the notions of disruption and change. Stallings (1998, p. 136) examines routines, exceptions, and exception routines: the social order is seen as routinization and “Disasters are fundamentally disruptions of routines.” Stallings also acknowledges in his formulation that disasters are only one kind of occasion that interrupts routines in social life. Later, Stallings (2005, p. 263) defined disaster as “a social situation” precipitated by nonroutine destruction by forces of nature. Stallings was writing in the context of natural disasters and undoubtedly did not intend to limit disasters to agents of the natural environment. Stallings’ work is important both for its extension of Fritz’s definition and because he firmly places disaster in the social order. In this latter vision, his efforts toward definition are also compatible with the definitions in the subsequent discussion of disasters as largely social phenomena. Boris Porfiriev (1998b, p. 1) also sees disaster as an event that destabilizes the social system, indicated by a failure of normal functioning that requires an intervention to reinstate stability. Again, one sees an emphasis on disaster as transition or change that involves vulnerability and requires different patterns of social intercourse. The spirit embodied in Fritz’s definition is certainly reflected in these definitions; there is an element in each that appears to retain the “event” perspective. As an observer, I also feel that they are substantively different in that they explicitly (in the definition or in each author’s elaborations) emphasize process, adaptation, and change. These notions were more implicit in the approach taken by Fritz. Each of these authors seems to not just recognize, but also to emphasize, a cycle of stability–disruption–adjustment that characterizes disasters. THE HAZARDS-DISASTER TRADITION Another tradition of viewing and defining disasters grew out of the hazards perspective common in the literature of geographers and other geophysical scientists. As Quarantelli (1998b) has pointed out, a hazards perspective focuses on the hazard—earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, and so forth—and understanding it. Although there may be a concern with social and other issues, What Is a Disaster? 9 the real emphasis is on the processes associated with the target agent. One could probably find earlier statements, but the classic elaborations of the hazard approach are usually taken to be those of Burton and Kates (1964) and Burton, Kates, and White (1978). Within this context generally, a disaster is viewed as an extreme event that arises when a hazard agent intersects with a social system (“the human use system”). Technically, then, disasters are events that take place as part of normal environmental processes; they are not the principal focus of study. It is often pointed out that a hazards approach is a legitimate focus of study but that it is different from the classic sociological approach to disasters. From a hazards perspective, Quarantelli (2005, p. 342) argues that hazard cycles and agents are the focus, making disasters epiphenomena. Indeed he points out that some phenomena studied legitimately as disasters have no identifiable originating agent (Quarantelli, 2005a, p. 347), such as famines and computer system failures. This is not to say that researchers operating within a hazards framework have not generated valuable findings relative to human behavior in disasters and it does create an opportunity to examine definitional strategies different from the classic disaster research approach. John Oliver (1980, p. 3) defined disaster as a part of the environmental process that is of greater than expected frequency and magnitude and causes major “human hardship with significant damage.” The classical era is clearly reflected in this definition, but the critical hazards issue of a cyclic environmental process is also present. Susman, Okeefe, and Wisner (1983a, p. 264) are closer to the traditional geographers’ view when they define disaster as “the interface between an extreme physical event and a vulnerable human population.” Hewitt (1998, p. 77) elaborates a view of disaster as events in which “physical agents define the problem.” In 1983 he argued that disasters may be seen as unexpected and unprecedented impacts that “derive from natural processes of events” (Hewitt, 1983a, p. 10). Each of these definitions highlights the traditional concern of hazards researchers with the cycle of hazard agents in their vision of disasters. Recently, hazards researchers studying disasters have moved slightly from what might be considered an “agent centered” approach to a greater focus on vulnerability. David Alexander (1993, p. 4) pointed out that natural disasters can be thought of as quick-onset events with significant impacts on the “natural environment upon the socio-economic system.” In later writing, he elaborated this by saying that disasters are not defined by fixed events “but by social constructs and these are liable to change” (Alexander, 2005, p. 29).” The concern expressed by Alexander is that disasters are not just the events but also the social consequences (which are ever changing) of the event. Dennis Mileti (1999, p. 3) also emphasizes that disasters flow from overlaps of the physical, built, and social environments, but that they are “social in nature.” Mileti emphasizes that humans can be seen as creating disasters through their encroachment on the physical environment. Although he still places the origins of disasters in a hazard context, Mileti is explicit about the social emphasis when studying the events. Finally, and most firmly in a vulnerability context, Susan Cutter (2005b, p. 39) argued that the issue is not disasters as events but instead human “vulnerability (and resiliency) to environmental threats and extreme events.” Each of these definitions retains the hazard origins of disasters, but also moves to examine them in social terms, particularly of vulnerability and resilience. As Quarantelli (2005a, p. 345) indicates, this emphasis reinforces the traditional notion that in defining and studying disasters, one should look first at social systems, since they (not the agent) are the real source of vulnerability. To the extent that the researchers in a hazard-disaster tradition are moving in this direction, they are converging with sociological researchers to place people and social relationships at the core of disaster study. 10 Ronald W. Perry DISASTERS AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON Finally, although still in the tradition of the original disaster studies, there has been a group who explicitly focused on social phenomena as the defining feature of disasters, within the context of social change. At least some of these researchers were active during the classical era and nearly all would place their intellectual roots in that time period. Indeed, these definitions are similar to those of Kreps (1998), Stallings (1998), and Porfiriev (1998b) whom I have placed as later evolutions of the classic disaster era. However, these conceptions of disasters are distinct in their emphasis on social phenomena, their attention to vulnerability as socially constructed, and the idea of social change, all to the near exclusion of physical agents. In the latter feature, these definitions depart from both the classical era derivations and the hazard-disaster perspective. Allen Barton (1963, 1969, p. 38) saw disasters as one collective stress situation arising when members “of a social system fail to receive expected conditions of life from the system.” Barton then moved to a classification scheme that created a matrix of four dimensions (scope of impact, speed of onset, duration of impact, and social preparedness) and proceeded to characterize events in the cells in social and interpersonal terms. In 1989, Barton reminded colleagues that the bulk of disaster studies focus upon “events at a community level caused by physical agent” (1989, p. 348). He wanted to emphasize that, because we are sociologists, there was a need to define our subject matter more firmly in the realm of the social. Subsequently Barton (2005) revised the dimensions of his typology to address the cross-classified dimensions of scope (national, regional, segmental, local) by concentration in time (sudden gradual chronic). Again, his discussion of what belonged in the cells of his matrix described the social dimensions of events, not the events themselves (which he cited only as examples). Some would say Barton evaded defining disasters except to call them a category of collective stress situations and then to describe many different classes of this category. Another way of reading the work is to see Barton’s classes (the matrix of scope by time) as many specific types of disaster—without specifying a label for each—created in social terms. E. L. Quarantelli’s career spans the classical era through the present. He was involved in the early research efforts, conducted much research himself, co-founded (with Russell Dynes) the Disaster Research Center in 1963, and trained generations of disaster researchers. By 1966 he had begun, like Barton, to publish typologies for disaster research (Quarantelli, 1966). He (Quarantelli, 2000, p. 682) identifies disasters in terms of a variety of defining features. They: (1) are sudden-onset occasions, (2) seriously disrupt the routines of collective units, (3) cause the adoption of unplanned courses of action to adjust to the disruption, (4) have unexpected life histories designated in social space and time, and (5) pose danger to valued social objects. He subsequently emphasized that disasters represent vulnerability, reflecting “weaknesses in social structures or social systems” (Quarantelli, 2005a, p. 345). In this characterization, Quarantelli emphasizes neither an event nor a physical place or time as relevant to disasters. Instead, the entire conception is social: vulnerability is socially constructed by relationships in the social system and disasters are based in the notion of social changes. The definition may have roots in the classical era research, but clearly departs in significant ways. While Quarantelli has used this definition for decades—as well as advocated it as a model—one can also trace a convergence to his point of view in the literature. One early example is Kai Erikson’s (1976, p. 254) view of disasters as sudden causes of harm to the physical and social environment but with an emphasis that they “are socially defined as having reached one or more acute stages.” While an agent is implied here, the focus is on a social definition and vulnerability that might be modified (through social change). Lars Clausen (1992, p. 182) emphasized the latter, arguing that disasters flow from normal social change even What Is a Disaster? 11 though their consequences are negative and their frequency rare. The reference to normality underscores the point that vulnerability lies within the social structure itself and is a regular part of human intercourse. Similarly, Gilbert (1998, p. 13) argues that “disasters are not a function of agents, but are social in origin;” like Mileti, he sees disaster as stemming from humaninduced vulnerability. Parenthetically, David Alexander and Susan Cutter, who work in the hazards tradition, emphasize social vulnerability and change when they address disasters. Russell Dynes (1998, p. 13) also fits within this tradition, defining disaster as occasions when norms fail, causing a community to engage in extraordinary efforts “to protect and benefit some social resource.” Even closer to Quarantelli’s view is Rosenthal’s (1998, p. 226) discussion of disaster as a socially defined occasion, related to social change that is “recognized across social time as a radical change” in the normative environment. The reference to social time particularly sets this definition apart from most others. It is also interesting that Rosenthal and Quarantelli have each stressed the need to develop an overarching category that contains disasters (the beginnings of typology) and that each chose the term crisis for that category. There is also an approach to defining disasters socially that arose among researchers and others interested in cross-national or cross-cultural aspects of the phenomenon. For example, Bates and Peacock (1993, p. 13) characterize disasters as a social event arising out of “a process that involves a socio-cultural system’s failure” to protect its population from external or internal vulnerability. The event notion has crept into the definition, but for these authors, disasters are social phenomena that have roots in the social structure itself. On the other hand, Jigyasu (2005) bases disasters in the social, but his almost metaphysical view of the phenomenon is not clearly tied to the social structure, being rather an intellectual state. Conversely, for Horlick-Jones (1995, p. 311), “disasters are disruptions in cultural expectations” that result in the perception that institutions cannot keep hazards in check. He points out too that disruptions stem from the ways in which society deals with vulnerability. Dombrowsky (1998, 2005) follows this approach by relating disasters to knowledge. His view is that disaster is the collapse of cultural protections—captured in habits, folkways, laws, or policies—that either deflect or fail to deflect the threatening forces to which societies are exposed. For Dombrowsky, the disaster is social; it is engendered in social structure and can be attacked only via that route. Finally, the anthropologist Anthony Oliver-Smith (1998, p. 186) sees disaster as an event that combines destructive agents with a vulnerable population disrupting “social needs for physical survival, social order and meaning.” While Oliver-Smith includes the words event and process, the definition is social, placing the disruption and the vulnerability each within the social structure. Interestingly, Oliver-Smith and Bates and Peacock have studied disasters in developing countries and their definitions and research link disaster (and development) to social change. Finally, Arjen Boin (2005, p. 159) believes that disasters flow from the normal functioning of social systems that take place when the “life sustaining functions of the system break down.” Boin, like Barton, Quarantelli, Kreps, and Stallings, argues that disasters are a subclass of a larger class; Barton called the larger type collective stress situations, while Boin, like Quarantelli and Rosenthal, uses the label crisis. For Boin, disasters are rooted in social structure and changes that cause disruption. In closing, although interdisciplinary in their training and international in origin, these authors share a conception of disasters that places the phenomenon firmly in social relations. The disaster is characterized as a social disruption that originates in the social structure and might be remedied through social structural manipulations. Further, social structure can be seen as social change “analytically frozen at one point in time” (Quarantelli, 2005a, p. 340). This means that each of the preceding definitions hinges upon social change. It is the combination of these two features that distinguishes these definitions from others more rooted in the classical era. 12 Ronald W. Perry CONSENSUS ON DEFINITIONS In almost every definition cited in the foregoing section, the author or authors included an elaboration to explain intent and often demonstrated causes and consequences of disasters. These elaborations contain important messages, but space limitations prohibited their presentation here. The following comments on themes often rely on these elaborations as well as my interpretation (right or wrong). In the end, the references are there to be checked by skeptics. More than three dozen definitions of disaster have been presented in this chapter. It would be unrealistic to expect to find homogeneity among them. But clearly there are similarities and overlap; it can certainly be argued that the three artificially constructed “families” of definitions show considerable similarity within groups. And one would not expect to find common definition in any professional grouping, perhaps especially among social scientists. It is possible, however, to assess levels of general consensus across the definitions as a means of inferring agreement about what disaster researchers see as their field of study. In this regard, the degree of consensus depends both upon the observer and on the level of specificity demanded to define consensus. Quarantelli (2005a, p. 338) summarizes his assessment by observing that “it would be difficult to deny that there is a substantial lack of consensus” about the meaning of the term disaster. I agree that comparing the detail of each definition (except when multiple authors adopt verbatim the definition of another author) yields an environment of significant differences. Similarly, there are differences in social scientific orientation as well; compare the positivist approaches of Stallings, Kreps, and Dombrowsky with the more interpretive approach of Kroll-Smith and Gunter, versus the almost mystical– phenomenological approach of Jigyasu. At the same time, the task becomes more manageable if the goal is to identify common themes in the definitions. In discussing what he calls the current paradigm of disaster research, Quarantelli (2005a, p. 339) points out that it is rooted in two fundamental ideas. First, disasters are inherently social phenomena. It is not the hurricane wind or storm surge that makes the disaster; these are the source of damage. The disaster is the impact on individual coping patterns and the inputs and outputs of social systems. Second, the disaster is rooted in the social structure and reflects the processes of social change. It is from these features of the social system that we find vulnerability to the particular source. In effect, this vision of the field is reflected in the majority of the definitions reviewed here. Looking for themes is a fruitful way of capturing concepts of the field that might be obscured in the specific language and detail of a comparatively short definition. Of course there is the risk of misinterpretation when making inferences about themes, but social science is filled with such risk and at some point it is more irresponsible to say nothing than to risk being wrong. Kaplan (1964) warned about reconstructed logic (the scientist’s “cleaned up” reconstruction of what they do) versus logic in use (what an observer would see a scientist do). Definitions can be seen as a form of reconstructed logic, and by identifying themes one is at least attempting to capture the logic in use. I view a theme as arbitrarily specified as a common opinion by many (not even most) of the authors of the definitions reviewed. Studying disasters means you look for what? There is wide agreement (outside the classic hazard perspective) that disasters are social, that they are understood in human interaction. The researchers captured here under the rubric of “disaster as a social phenomenon” thereby often use the word occasion rather than event when speaking of disaster. There is also wide agreement that in disaster one finds disruption of the social. Some definitions and elaborations mention the source of the disruption as an event or force, but almost all agree on the social fact of disruption and that people’s lives are being disrupted. Many agree that disasters stem not from the agent that causes the disruption, but from the What Is a Disaster? 13 social structure of norms and values, hence the protections. Vulnerability, a part of many of the definitions, is to be found in social structure and disruption is the outcome of vulnerability. There is some consensus, by inference, that the magnitude of a disaster should be measured not in lives or property lost, but by the extent of the failure of the normative or cultural system. Another fairly common theme is the issue of resilience. Some definitions in the classical tradition mark the end of one phase of disasters as the point at which normative stability is restored, while others call this restoration the implementation of emergency measures (norms) or exception routines. The link to emergent norm thinking is unmistakable. Typically, those who emphasize vulnerability include the notion of resilience in some form. Finally, although some authors speak of disasters as social problems, there is a general consensus that disasters are best understood in a context of social change. Carr seems to have originated this thinking in 1932 and it is present in much of the work of the classical era as well as being a staple of those who define disasters as exclusively a social phenomenon. Among the latter, and in some of the recent hazard-disaster definitions, as well as a handful of the definitions that evolved from the classical period, there is an emphasis on defining disasters in social time and space rather than physical time and space. As yet, more disaster researchers ignore social time and space than understand it or incorporate it into their research. While all these common themes fit well within Quarantelli’s exposition of a current disaster paradigm, much disagreement about disasters as an area of study remains. Some of the disagreement about disasters rests in issues that are not exclusively definitional. That is, there is disagreement about how disasters should be studied, how the definitions proposed by different groups (citizens, policy formulators, etc.) should be treated, the nature of social science, even whether disaster research is subsumed by social science, as well as disciplinary differences such as the hazards-disaster distinction. A few differences are based on definition and relate to such issues as the extent to which disasters originate outside a social system, the degree to which social change is emphasized, the centrality of the role of an agent, and how disaster consequences are to be conceived. Some of the disagreement about disasters seems to stem from what are really taxonomic issues or at least from the typologies or classifications that are produced by taxonomic thinking (Perry, 1989). These are essentially disagreements about what kinds of characteristics should be included in the definition of a disaster and are expressed in different ways. Many of the scholars who authored the definitions have noted that disasters seem to be part of a “larger class of events.” Indeed many who have proposed definitions from across the three perspectives included with their definitions a set of dimensions—such as social preparedness, speed of onset, scope and duration of impact—to create categories of disasters. Others have talked about how one can distinguish disasters from events that “look like” disasters. Quarantelli (2005a, p. 333) distinguishes disasters, catastrophes, and crises. Boin, Stallings, and Rosenthal have likewise separated disasters and crises (although using different referents for the latter term). Stallings (1991) and Quarantelli (2005a, p. 336) have proposed that situations involving conflict belong in a category different than “disaster.” Similarly, Quarantelli (2005a, p. 335), as well as the authors of several of the definitions reviewed in this chapter, suggest the elimination of slow developing and diffuse events from the category of “disaster.” Quarantelli (1987a) makes a most convincing case for investing effort in taxonomy to create meaningful classification systems. He points out that the many empirical studies of “disasters” have begun to produce anomalous findings; using only one example, we know that serious mental health consequences, rare in most studies based on floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, and earthquakes, appear to be greater in cases associated with conflict situations (see Perry & Mankin, 2004 for a discussion of terrorist attacks). One explanation for such 14 Ronald W. Perry anomalies is classification error, comparing two things that are similar in phenotype, but are different genotypes. Classification systems are a way of sorting occasions and findings to make appropriate comparisons based on genotype. Quarantelli argues that disaster researchers need a classification system based on general dimensions that not only distinguish among different disaster agents, but also specify differences within one category of agent (1987a, p. 26). Drabek (1986, p. 6) stressed nearly 20 years ago that taxonomy is the “most pressing issue confronting the field at this time.” Certainly many disaster researchers have felt this need. Proposals for dimensions for classification schemes have historically accompanied efforts at definition since the earliest days. Two comprehensive typologies have been devised. Barton (1963, 1969, 2005) created a host of categories in a typology of collective stress situations, and Kreps (1989) devised an intricate system by looking at domains, tasks, resources, and activities (DTRA). There have consequently been many varied attempts to start disaster research down the taxonomic path, but with mediocre success. For the most part, those who conduct and interpret disaster research have neglected existing typological systems and rarely have chosen to qualify their findings in terms of the dimensions that are common in the literature: speed of onset, scope, and duration of impact and the like. The confusion and apparent anomalies that derive from this practice are likely to continue until researchers begin to document such qualifications or to operate within some typology. The explosion of disaster studies described at the beginning of this chapter will only exacerbate the problems. The real challenge and danger is for the growth of disaster research as a field of study. As Hank Fischer indicated, most disaster research is not about the meaning of disaster. Descriptive studies can be (and long have been) generated with little attention to issues of theory or paradigm for that matter. However, as Drabek (1989) has warned, the creation of models and the production of viable explanations, predictions, and efforts at control move well beyond the descriptive task. To assemble a meaningful body of knowledge about disasters (Perry, 2005), it is absolutely critical that disaster researchers pursue Quarantelli’s admonition not just to develop greater consensus regarding the meaning of the term, but also begin scrupulous use of typologies. Failing that, the field will continue to amass a disconnected collection of descriptive research that cannot be linked via existing conceptual tools. AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH The critical issues raised in this chapter do not focus on further research. The call here is for thinking, not for more doing. Research can and will continue, but sociologists must renew and revitalize their focus on conceptual matters. As indicated in the previous section, there are already hundreds of studies of individual, organizational, and institutional behavior in the literature that describe, and in a few cases attempt to explain, actions during times of “disaster.” The problem is that a variety of views co-exist—some differing significantly— of the defining features of disaster. As Quarantelli and others have argued, the research record has accumulated under these varying definitions of disaster and has begun to produce apparently conflicting findings, when there may or may not be real differences. The reports of “looting behavior” in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina (Quarantelli, 2005b) again underscore that more attention needs to be paid to the social context of the behavior (e.g., conflict or abandonment) than just to its characterization as taking place following a “disaster.” Indeed, the problem of “what is a disaster” will never be solved by more fieldwork. What Is a Disaster? 15 The real work to be done with respect to definitions of disaster has to do first with conceptualization; one needs to decide what disaster means. More specifically, each researcher needs to decide. This is not an empirical task. One must decide on fundamentals such as whether disasters are social phenomena or are the events with which they are often associated or even some natural or technological process. The stream of definitions recounted in this chapter seeks a starting point by identifying areas of consensus in what might be seen as a sea of differences. The differences count too. A significant point is that this practice of making explicit our definition of disaster has begun to take hold, although there is much more to be done. The second part of the work to be done focuses on dialog among sociologists and disaster researchers. It is no longer appropriate to expect that a researcher can continue to do studies without specifying what constitutes a disaster. Further, the task of defining disasters should no longer be treated as an unnecessary abstraction that occupies the minds of a few senior (old) disaster researchers. There needs to be a serious engagement on the definition issue. A concern with taxonomy—the reasoning that underlies typologies or classification systems— should logically evolve out of this dialogue or engagement. Clearly, as other disciplines (such as botany and zoology) have found, we need to further specify our subject matter. This work too has seen a modest start. Taxonomic thinking cannot be characterized as the “easy work.” It demands that one carefully understand the growing field of findings, appreciate the meaning of disaster in conceptual terms, and engage in both inductive and some deductive reasoning to support the creation of classification systems. The plural use of systems is an operative and indicative term here. There need not be a single typology; many can coexist. But there must be one or some typologies and they must be widely scrutinized by the disaster community. The more scrutiny, the more likely and quickly consensus at some level will begin to emerge. Perhaps most critical, researchers will need to characterize their ongoing research in terms of one or more typologies. “Where does this study fit in the disaster cornucopia?” should be asked with each piece of research. At the same time, a need arises to consider the disaster findings of days (decades) past. When we cite those findings we must begin to group them into one or more of today’s typologies. In this way, it would be routine to separate findings about looting behavior in situations that do and do not involve conflict. One practical outcome of the use of typologies is that we can reduce the potential ambiguity associated with interpreting our findings across events and at the same time present a clearer and more precise picture to those who may be using our findings to devise social policy. We will never “research” our way out of this problem. Such a tactic will only bury the field further in a kind of intellectual and conceptual muddle that will produce obfuscation and confusion.