Essentials of International Relations PDF

 Essentials of I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s seventh edition  Essentials of I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s seventh editi...

 Essentials of I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s seventh edition  Essentials of I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s seventh edition Karen A. Mingst University of Kentucky I va n M. A r r e g u í n -T o f t boston university B W. W. NORTON & COMPANY NEW YORK LONDON ESSIR7_CH00_i-xxviii_11P.indd 3 6/14/16 9:54 AM W. W. Norton & Com­pany has been in­de­pen­dent since its founding in 1923, when William Warder Norton and Mary D. Herter Norton first published lectures delivered at the ­People’s Institute, the adult education division of New York City’s Cooper Union. The firm soon expanded its program beyond the Institute, publishing books by celebrated academics from Amer­i­ca and abroad. By midcentury, the two major pillars of Norton’s publishing program—­trade books and college texts—­were firmly established. 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All rights reserved Printed in Canada Editor: Peter Lesser Assistant Editor: Samantha Held Proj­ect Editor: Katie Callahan Managing Editor, College: Marian Johnson Managing Editor, College Digital Media: Kim Yi Associate Director of Production, College: Ben Reynolds Media Editor: Spencer Richardson-­Jones Media Proj­ect Editor: Marcus Van Harpen Media Assistant Editor: Michael Jaoui Marketing Man­ag­er, Po­liti­cal Science: Erin Brown Design Director: Hope Miller Goodell Book design by: Faceout Studio Photo Editor: Catherine Abelman Permissions Clearing: Elizabeth Trammell Permissions Man­ag­er: Megan Schindel Composition: Westchester Publishing Ser­vices Manufacturing: Transcontinental Permission to use copyrighted material is included in the credits section of this book, which begins on p. A27. Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Names: Mingst, Karen A., 1947– author. | Arreguín-­Toft, Ivan M. Title: Essentials of international relations / Karen A. Mingst, University of Kentucky, Ivan M. Arreguín-­Toft, Boston University. Description: Seventh edition. | New York : W. W. Norton & Com­pany, | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016013756 | ISBN 9780393283402 (pbk.) Subjects: LCSH: International relations. Classification: LCC JZ1305.M56 2016 | DDC 327—­dc23 LC rec­ord available at https://­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​ /­2016013756 W. W. Norton & Com­pany, Inc., 500 Fifth Ave­nue, New York, NY 10110 wwnorton​.­com W. W. Norton & Com­pany Ltd., C­ astle House, 75/76 Wells Street, London W1T 3QT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 Contents Figures, ­Tables, and Maps xiii About the Authors xv Preface xvii 01 Approaches to International Relations 2 Thinking Theoretically 5 Developing the Answers 6 History 6 Philosophy 9 The Scientific Method: Behavioralism 11 Is the World Becoming More Peaceful? 14 Alternative Approaches 16 In Sum: Making Sense of International Relations 17 02 The Historical Context of Con­temporary International Relations 20 The Emergence of the Westphalian System 23 Eu­rope in the Nineteenth ­Century 26 The Aftermath of Revolution: Core Princi­ples 26 The Napoleonic Wars 26 Peace at the Core of the Eu­ro­pean System 28 Imperialism and Colonialism in the Eu­ro­pean System before 1870 30 Balance of Power 35 The Breakdown: Solidification of Alliances 36 The Interwar Years and World War II 38 World War II 41 v vi  contents The Cold War 44 Origins of the Cold War 45 The Cold War as a Series of Confrontations 48 The Cold War in Asia and Latin Amer­i­ca 51 Was the Cold War ­Really Cold? 54 The Immediate Post–­Cold War Era 56  xplaining the End of the Cold War: A View From E the Former Soviet Union 58 The New Millennium: The First Two De­cades 60 Why ­Can’t a Power­ful State like Japan Use Armed Force Abroad? 64 In Sum: Learning from History 67 03 International Relations Theories 70 Thinking Theoretically 72 Theory and the Levels of Analy­sis 74 Realism (and Neorealism) 76 The Roots of Realism 77 Realism in the Twentieth and Twenty-­First Centuries 78 Liberalism and Neoliberal Institutionalism 83 The Roots of Liberalism 83 Neoliberal Institutionalism 85 Liberalism ­Today 87 The Radical Perspective 89 Social Constructivism 92 Feminist Critiques of IR Theory 95 Theory in Action: Analyzing the 2003 Iraq War 97 Realist Perspectives 97 The Effectiveness of Female Marines in Combat: A Fair Test? 98  contents   vii Liberal Perspectives 100 Radical Perspectives 101 Canadian Views of Foreign Military Intervention: Af­ghan­i­stan and Beyond 102 Constructivist Perspectives 104 In Sum: Seeing the World through Theoretical Lenses 104 04 The International System 106 Contending Perspectives on the International System 109 The International System According to Realists 109 Realists and International System Change 114 The International System According to Liberals 116 Liberals and International System Change 117 The International System According to Radicals 118 Rus­sia, Syria, and the International System 120 The International System According to Constructivists 123 Advantages and Disadvantages of the International System as a Level of Analy­sis 124 The International System: A View from China 126 In Sum: From the International System to the State 130 05 The State 132 The State and the Nation 134 Contending Conceptualizations of the State 138 The Realist View of the State 139 Seeking Palestinian Statehood 140 The Liberal View of the State 142 The Radical View of the State 143 The Constructivist View of the State 144 The Nature of State Power 145 viii  contents Natu­ral Sources of Power 146 Tangible Sources of Power 148 Intangible Sources of Power 148 The Exercise of State Power 151 The Art of Diplomacy 151 India: A View from a Rising State 152 Economic Statecraft 156 The Use of Force 159 Democracy, Autocracy, and Foreign Policy 161 Models of Foreign Policy Decision Making 162 The Rational Model: The Realist Approach 163 The Bureaucratic/Orga­nizational Model and the Pluralist Model:  The Liberal Approaches 165 An Elite Model: A Radical Alternative 167 A Constructivist Alternative 167 Challenges to the State 169 Globalization 170 Transnational Religious and Ideological Movements 170 Ethnonational Movements 173 Transnational Crime 176 Fragile States 176 In Sum: The State and Challenges Beyond 177 06 The Individual 180 Foreign Policy Elites: Individuals Who ­Matter 182 The Impact of Elites: External Conditions 184 The Impact of Elites: Personality and Personal Interests 186 Individual Decision Making 189 The Pope: A View from the Vatican 190 Information-­Processing Mechanisms 192 Vladimir Putin: The Individual and His Policies 194 Private Individuals 197  contents   ix Track-­Two Diplomacy Use of Individuals 199 Mass Publics 200 Elites and Masses: Common Traits 201 The Impact of Public Opinion on Elites 202 Mass Actions and the Role of Elites 203 In Sum: Contending Perspectives on the Impact of Individuals 205 07 Intergovernmental Organ­izations, International Law, and Nongovernmental Organ­izations 208 Intergovernmental Organ­izations 210 The Creation of IGOs 210 The Roles of IGOs 213 The United Nations 214 The Eu­ro­pean Union—Organ­izing Regionally 228 Who Governs the Arctic? 230 Other Regional Organ­izations: The OAS, the AU, and the League of Arab States 238 International Law 240 International Law and Its Functions 240 The Sources of International Law 241 Compliance and Enforcement of International Law 244 Nongovernmental Organ­izations 246 The Growth of NGO Power and Influence 246 Functions and Roles of NGOs 247 NGOS: A View from ­Kenya 250 The Power of NGOs 252 The Limits of NGOs 253 Analyzing IGOs, International Law, and NGOs 254 The Realist View 254 The Radical View 255 The Constructivist View 257 x  contents In Sum: Do IGOs, International Law, and NGOs Make a Difference? 258 08 War and Strife 260 What Is War? 263 Categorizing Wars 264 The ­Causes of War 270 The Individual: Realist and Liberal Interpretations 271 State and Society: Liberal and Radical Explanations 272 The International System: Realist and Radical Interpretations 275 How Wars Are Fought 277 Conventional War 277 Weapons of Mass Destruction 278 Unconventional Warfare 281 Terrorism 284 The Just War Tradition 291 The Debate over Humanitarian Intervention 293 The Difficult Trade-­offs of Drone Warfare 294 Contending Perspectives on Managing Insecurity 297 Realist Approaches: Balance of Power and Deterrence 297 Conflict in Ukraine, 2014: A View from Rus­sia 298 Liberal Approaches: Collective Security and Arms Control/ Disarmament 305 NATO: Managing Insecurity in a Changing Environment 310 In Sum: A Changing View of International Security 312 09 International Po­liti­cal Economy 316 The Historical Evolution of the International Economy: Clashing Practices and Ideas 318 Post–­World War II Economic Institutions 320  contents   xi How the Globalized Economy Works ­Today 324 International Finance 324 International Trade 327 Economic Regionalization 332 Economic Challenges in the Twenty-­First ­Century 339 International Development 339 Crises of Economic Globalization 345 The Eurozone Crisis: A View from Greece 350 Critics of International Economic Liberalism and  Economic Globalization 353 The Nicaraguan Canal: Good Economics, Bad Politics? 354 10 ­Human Rights 360 Religious, Philosophical, and Historical Foundations 363 ­Human Rights as Emerging International Responsibility 366 States as Protectors of ­Human Rights 367 States as Abusers of ­Human Rights 371 The Role of the International Community—­IGOs and NGOs 372 IGOs in Action 372 NGOs’ Unique Roles 373 Evaluating the Efforts of the International Community 375 Specific ­Human Rights Issues 377 The Prob­lem of Genocide and Mass Atrocities 377 ­Women’s Rights as ­Human Rights: The Globalization of ­Women’s Rights 382 The Victims of War 386 Refugees and IDPs: A ­Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis 388 Refugees: A View from SouthEast Asia 390 Contending Perspectives on Responding to ­Human Rights Abuses 392 xii  contents 11 Transnational Issues: The Environment, Global Health, and Crime 396 The Environment—­Protecting the Global Commons 398 Conceptual Perspectives 399 Pollution and Climate Change 401 The ­Human Cost of Climate Change 406 Natu­ral Resource Issues 408 Population Issues 409 Environmental NGOs in Action 414 A Theoretical Take 415 Health and Communicable Disease—­Protecting Life in the Global Commons 418 Ebola and HIV/AIDS as Transnational Issues 420 A Theoretical Take 424 Transnational Crime 426 Narcotrafficking 426 Cyber Crime or Netcrime 427 A Theoretical Take 429 Cyber Security: A View from the United Kingdom 430 The Impact of Transnational Issues 433 Transnational Issues from Dif­fer­ent Theoretical Perspectives 436 ­Will Transnational Issues Lead to Global Governance? 437 In Sum: Changing You 440 Notes A1 Glossary A17 Credits A27 Index A29 Figures, ­Tables, and Maps FIGURES Figure 3.1 Levels of Analy­sis in International Relations 75 Figure 4.1 Polarity in the International System 110 Figure 4.2 Stratification of the International System 119 Figure 5.1 Ingredients of State Power Potential 148 Figure 5.2 The Rational Model of Decision Making 164 Figure 5.3 The Bureaucratic/Orga­nizational and Pluralist Models of Decision Making 166 Figure 6.1 The Impact of Individual Elites 185 Figure 6.2 Personality Characteristics of Leaders 187 Figure 9.1 The International Economic Institutions 322 Figure 11.1 Adult HIV Prevalence Rate, 2014 421 ­TABLES ­Table 1.1 Contributions of Phi­los­o­phers to International Relations Theory 11 ­Table 1.2 Tools for Studying International Relations 18 ­Table 2.1 Impor­tant Events of the Cold War 49 ­Table 5.1 Instruments of Economic Statecraft 157 ­Table 5.2 Challenges to State Power 169 ­Table 5.3 Ethnonational Challengers, Representative Cases 175 ­Table 6.1 Psychological Mechanisms Used to Pro­cess Information 196 ­Table 7.1 Principal Organs of the United Nations 217 ­Table 7.2 Traditional Peacekeeping Operations, Representative Cases 220 ­Table 7.3 Complex/Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, Representative Cases 222 ­Table 7.4 Representative International and Regional Organ­izations 228 ­Table 7.5 Significant Events in the Development of the Eu­ro­pean Union 234 xiii xiv  Figures, Tables, and Maps ­Table 7.6 Principal Institutions of the Eu­ro­pean Union (2016) 235 ­Table 8.1 ­Causes of War by Level of Analy­sis 277 ­Table 8.2 Selected Terrorist Organ­izations 288 ­Table 8.3 Approaches to Managing Insecurity 300 ­Table 9.1 ­Human Development Index, 2015 340 ­Table 10.1 Selected UN ­Human Rights Conventions 368 ­Table 11.1 World Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region (Million Metric Tons Carbon Dioxide) 403 ­Table 11.2 Population of the World and Major Areas, 2015, 2030, 2050, and 2100, According to the Medium-­Variant Projection (in Millions) 411 MAPS Africa xxi Asia xxii Eu­rope xxiii North Amer­i­ca xxiv Central and South Amer­i­ca xxv The World xxvi–xxvii The ­Middle East xxviii Eu­rope, c. 1648 24 Eu­rope, c. 1815 29 Extent of European control from the 1500s to the 1960s 33 Eu­rope, 1914 38 Eu­rope, showing alliances as of 1939 42 Eu­rope during the Cold War 47 Central ­Middle Eastern Region, 2016 139 Kashmir, 2016 174 Expansion of Eu­ro­pean Union, 1952–2016 232 About the Authors Karen A. Mingst is Professor Emeritus at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. She holds a Ph.D. in po­liti­cal science from the University of Wisconsin. A specialist in international organ­ization, international law, and international po­liti­cal economy, Professor Mingst has conducted research in Western Eu­rope, West Africa, and Yugo­slavia. She is the author or editor of seven books and numerous academic articles. Ivan M. Arreguín-­Toft is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University, where he teaches introductory international relations, among other courses. He holds a Ph.D. in po­liti­cal science from the University of Chicago. Professor Arreguín-­ Toft is a specialist in security studies, asymmetric conflict, and cyber warfare. He is most recently the recipient of a U.S. Fulbright grant to Norway. xv Preface Brief textbooks are now commonplace in International Relations. This text- book was originally written to be not only smart and brief, but also, in the words of Roby Harrington of W. W. Norton, to include “a clear sense of what’s essential and what’s not.” We are pleased that this book’s treatment of the essen- tial concepts and information has stood the test of time. This seventh edition of Essentials of International Relations, published more than fifteen years a­ fter the first, preserves the overall structure of earlier edi- tions. Students need a brief history of international relations to understand why we study the subject and how current scholarship is informed by what has pre- ceded it. This background is provided in Chapters 1 and 2. Theories provide interpretative frameworks for understanding what is happening in the world, and levels of analy­sis—­the international system, the state, and the individual—­ help us further or­ga­nize and conceptualize the material. In Chapters 3–7, we present competing theories and use them to illustrate how each level of analy­sis can be applied and how international organ­izations, international law, and non- governmental organ­izations are viewed. Then the major issues of the twenty-­first ­century—­security, economics, h ­ uman rights, and transnational issues—­are pre- sented and analyzed in Chapters 8–11. This fully revised seventh edition is enhanced by the addition of new mate- rial on terrorism, cybersecurity, and nuclear threats to security; the continuing impact of China, India, and other states on the functioning of finance and trade in the global economy; and the challenges posed by the Eurozone and the refugee crisis to the f­ uture of the Eu­ro­pean Union. Refugees and internally displaced persons are discussed as h ­ uman rights and humanitarian issues. The challenges of climate change and the increasing per­sis­tence of global health threats like Ebola are also new additions. xvii xviii  preface The rich pedagogical program of previous editions has been revised based on suggestions from adopters and reviewers: Each chapter is introduced with a new story “ripped from the head- lines,” selected to help students apply the concepts discussed in the chapter to a con­temporary prob­lem. ­Later in each chapter, ­these head- lines are discussed in the new Behind the Headlines features using the concepts and ideas from the text. Topics include the Palestinian efforts to acquire statehood; the ­human cost of climate change; and Rus­sia, Syria, and the international system. The popu­lar Global Perspectives features have been updated with new perspectives—­including cyber security as viewed from ­Great Britain, the Eurozone crisis viewed from Greece, the view from a rising state like India, and the view from the Vatican. This feature encourages stu- dents to consider a specific issue from the vantage point of a par­tic­u­lar ­state. End-­of-­chapter review materials include discussion questions and a list of key terms from the chapter to help students remember, apply, and synthesize what they have learned. Theory in Brief boxes, In Focus boxes, and numerous maps, figures, and t­ ables appear throughout the text to summarize key ideas. Many of t­hese changes have been made at the suggestion of expert reviewers, primarily faculty who have taught the book in the classroom. While it is impossible to act on ­e very suggestion (not all the critics them- selves agree), we have carefully studied the vari­ous recommendations and thank the reviewers for taking time to offer critiques. We thank the follow- ing reviewers for their input on this new edition: Baktybek Abdrisaev, Utah Valley University; Benjamin Appel, Michigan State University; Dlynn Armstrong-­Williams, University of North Georgia; Mark Baron, Univer- sity of Calgary; Michael Beckley, Tufts University; Celeste Beesley, Brigham Young University; Tabitha Benney, University of Utah; Cynthia A. Botteron, Shippensburg University; John W. Dietrich, Bryant University; Kathryn Fisher, National Defense University; Andrea B. Haupt, Santa Barbara City College; Cynthia Horne, Western Washington University; Paul E. Lenze, Jr., Northern Arizona University; Heather Elko McKibben, University of Califor- nia, Davis; Lyle Stevens, Iowa Central Community College; Kendall Stiles, Brigham Young University; and Bradford Young, Snow College. In this edition, Karen Mingst owes special thanks to her husband, Robert Stauffer. He has always provided both space and encouragement, as well as holding up more than one-­half of the marriage bargain. Yet he keeps asking,  preface   xix just as our adult kids, Ginger and Brett, do—­another book, another edition! Our toddler grand­son, Quintin, has not yet mastered the dimension of time and space! He exemplifies the importance of the “­here and now.” In this edition, Ivan Arreguín-­Toft owes thanks to a number of ­people; especially to my wife Monica Toft, and to my c­ hildren Sam and Ingrid Toft. I also owe g­ reat thanks to Roby Harrington, whose sage advice and unflappable optimism invariably catalyze my best efforts. Fi­nally, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Karen Mingst, whose pedagogical vision, and strength and clarity of intention are matched only by her willingness to critically challenge herself and me in the complicated and rewarding task of continuing to produce the world’s most compact, engaging, and comprehensive international relations textbook. We have been fortunate to have several editors from W. W. Norton who have shepherded vari­ous editions: Ann Shin, editor of the first four editions, knows this book as well as its authors. She has always been a constant foun- tain of ideas and enthusiasm. Lisa Camner McKay made constructive sugges- tions and rather quickly came to understand our individual and collective strengths and weaknesses. Pete Lesser has been the calm point person on this edition, taking a personal interest in developing new features, keeping us on task and time, and offering his own formidable editing skills along the way. And Samantha Held has expertly directed the editorial pro­cess in an expedi- tious fashion. In short, many talented, professional, and delightful ­people contributed to the making of this edition, which we feel is the best so far. And for that, we remain always grateful.  TURKEY TUNISIA CYPRUS SYRIA LEBANON IRAN O IRAQ CC ISRAEL KUWAIT RO JORDAN O M A L G E R I A L I B Y A WESTERN EGYPT SAUDI SAHARA ARABIA MAURITANIA U.A.E. A N M A L I S U D A N OM N I G E R ERITREA YEMEN SENEGAL GAMBIA CHAD BURKINA FASO DJIBOUTI GUINEA BENIN A IVORY NIGERIA N GHAN S O U TH O COAST CENTRAL ETHIOPIA O SIERRA AFRICAN REP. S U D A N A ER LI LEONE M TOGO A CA M GUINEA- LIBERIA DEMOCRATIC UGANDA SO BISSAU EQUATORIAL O REP. OF THE GUINEA KENYA NG GABON CONGO SAO TOME & CO PRINCIPE RWANDA BURUNDI CABINDA TANZANIA (Angola) MALAWI COMOROS ANGOLA ZAMBIA A t l a n t i c UE AR Q ASC BI MAURITIUS ZIMBABWE AM O c e a n NAMIBIA DAG MOZ BOTSWANA MA SWAZILAND SOUTH AFRICA LESOTHO AFRICA WWN23 18 FM1 Africa Second Proof  R U S S I A K A Z A K H S T A N M O N G O L I A UZBE KIS T KYRGYZSTAN TURKME N. KOREA AN NIS TAJIKISTAN TA C H I N A S. KOREA JAPAN N AFGHANISTAN I R A N BHUTAN P a c i f i c PAKISTAN NEP AL O c e a n LAOS I N D I A BURMA TAIWAN (MYANMAR) Philippine South Sea China Arabian BANGLADESH THAILAND Sea PHILIPPINES Sea VIETNAM CAMBODIA BRUNEI SRI LANKA MA LA YS I A PAPUA NEW GUINEA SINGAPORE Borneo I n d i a n Sumatra Celebes SO LO I N D O N E S I A MO O c e a n Java NI E. TIMOR S. ASIAWWN23 19 FM2 Asia Second Proof  SWEDEN ICELAND FINLAND NORWAY ESTONIA R U S S I A LATVIA DENMARK RUSSIA LITHUANIA NETHERLANDS IRELAND BELARUS UNITED POLAND KINGDOM GERMANY BELGIUM CZECH REP. U K R A I N E LUXEMBOURG SLOVAKIA A t l a n t i c F R A N C E MOLDOVA O c e a n SWITZ. AUSTRIA HUNGARY SLOVENIA CROATIA ROMANIA BOSNIA- SERBIA HERZEGOVINA MONTENEGRO KOSOVO ITALY BULGARIA GEORGIA MACEDONIA ALBANIA ARMENIA PORTUGAL S P A I N GREECE T U R K E Y AZER- BAIJAN EUROPE WWN23 20 FM3 Europe Second Proof  Arctic Bering Sea Ocean Greenland Sea ICELAND GREENLAND Alaska Beaufort (Denmark) (U.S.A.) Sea B a f fi n Bay Gulf of Alaska Labrador Sea Hudson Bay CANADA North Pacif ic Ocean North Atlantic Ocean U N I T E D S TAT E S BAHAMAS MEXICO Gulf of Mexico PUERTO RICO VIRGIN IS. (U.S.) (U.K./U.S.) DOM. REP. CUBA JAMAICA BELIZE HAITI HONDURAS GUATEMALA EL SALVADOR NICARAGUA PANAMA COSTA RICA VENEZUELA GUYANA COLOMBIA BRAZIL NORTH WWN23AMERICA 22 FM5 North America Second Proof  A t l a n t i c Gulf of BAHAMAS O c e a n MEXICO Mexico PUERTO RICO (U.S.) VIRGIN IS. (U.K./U.S.) DOM. REP. BARBUDA CUBA GUADELOUPE (FR.) JAMAICA DOMINICA BELIZE HAITI MARTINIQUE (FR.) ST. LUCIA HONDURAS NETHERLANDS ANTILLES ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES GUATEMALA (NETH.) GRENADA NICARAGUA EL SALVADOR TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO PANAMA VENEZUELA GUYANA COSTA RICA SURINAME FRENCH GUIANA COLOMBIA Galapagos Is. (EC.) ECUADOR PERU B R A Z I L BOLIVIA P a c i f i c PA RA G UA O c e a n Y URUGUAY CHILE ARGENTINA A t l a n t i c O c e a n Falkland Islands (U.K.) South Georgia Island (U.K.) CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA WWN23 22 FM4 Latin America Second Proof  North America Europe P a c i f i c A t l a n t i c O c e a n O c e a n Central and South America THE WORLD  Asia Middle East Africa I n d i a n O c e a n Oceania  Black Sea AZERBAIJAN Cas ARMENIA pian Sea TURKEY TURKMENISTAN ISTAN CYPRUS SYRIA Mediterranean Sea LEBANON N IRAN AFGHA ISRAEL IRAQ JORDAN KUWAIT Pe PAKISTAN rsia LIBYA EGYPT nG SAUDI BAHRAIN ulf ARABIA QATAR OMAN UNITED ARAB Red EMIRATES Sea SUDAN ERITREA YEMEN Arabian Sea DJIBOUTI SOMALIA THE MIDDLE EAST WWN23 23 FM6 Middle East First Proof ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 1 6/14/16 9:55 AM  01 Macedonian police clash with mi­grants on the Greek side of the border in August 2015. Eu­rope’s mi­grant crisis and images like this one have dominated global news headlines since mid-2015, as an increasing number of refugees from countries like Syria, Af­ghan­i­stan, and Iraq have come to Eu­rope seeking asylum. ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 2 6/14/16 9:55 AM  Approaches to International Relations M artin Dempsey, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked in 2012 that the world has become “more dangerous than it has ever been.” If we listen to the 24-­hour news cycle and social media, we are flooded with reports of the Islamic State gunning down Pa­ri­sians and blowing up ancient archeological sites; drones hitting unintended Pakistani targets; men, ­women, and ­children cling- ing to rickety boats, fleeing conflict and economic hardship; and thousands in Haiti, the Philippines, and Indonesia fleeing natu­ral disasters. Vivid pictures make ­those events appear to be happening everywhere, perhaps just next door. And Dempsey, responsible for keeping the United States safe, is all too aware of the threats at the door. Yet psychologist Steven Pinker, author of The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Vio­lence Has Declined, concluded in 2011 that “we may be living in the most peace- ful era in our species’ existence.” Dempsey and Pinker agree that the number of interstate wars has declined, as have the number of deaths caused by such wars. Since the end of the Cold War, civil wars, too, have declined. If all this is true, why can one person be optimistic about our ability to live together more peacefully and another be more pessimistic? Are the authors coming at the question from 3 ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 3 6/14/16 9:55 AM  4  CHAPTER One A p p r oac h e s to I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s dif­fer­ent theoretical positions? Are they examining dif­fer­ent data, using dif­fer­ent time periods? Your place in the world is complicated. You are a member of a ­family; your f­ ather or ­mother may work for a multinational corporation; you may be a member of a non- governmental organ­ization (NGO), supporting a par­tic­u­lar cause that you hold dear; you may be member of a church, synagogue, or mosque, or an ethnic group whose members span the globe; your state may be composed of dif­fer­ent local units having responsibilities for issues with transnational significance; your state may have diplo- matic relations and trades with states across the globe, may participate in the activi- ties of international NGOs, and may be a member of numerous intergovernmental organ­izations. The variety of actors in international relations includes not just the 193 states recognized in the world ­today, their leaders, and government bureaucracies, but also municipalities, for-­profit and not-­for-­profit private organ­izations, international organ­izations, and you. International relations, as a subfield of po­liti­cal science, is the study of the inter- actions among the vari­ous actors that participate in international politics. It is the study of the be­hav­iors of ­these actors as they participate individually and together in international po­liti­cal pro­cesses. International relations is also an interdisciplinary field of inquiry, using concepts and substance from history, economics, and anthro- pology, as well as po­liti­cal science. How can we begin to study this multifaceted phenomenon called international relations? How can we begin to think theoretically about what appear to be discon- nected events? How can we begin to answer the foundational questions of inter­ national relations: What are the characteristics of ­human nature and the state? What is the relationship between the individual and society? How is the international system or­ga­nized? In this book, we ­will help you answer ­these questions, and many more. Learning Objectives Understand how international relations affects you in your daily life. Explain why we study international relations theory. Analyze how history and philosophy have been used to study international relations. Describe the contribution of behavioralism in international relations. Explain how and why alternative approaches have challenged traditional approaches in international relations. ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 4 6/14/16 9:55 AM  Thinking Theoretically   5 Non-­governmental organ­izations and their members often respond to issues of international significance. ­Here, volunteers from NGOs operating in Lebanon distribute aid to Syrian refugees in Al-­Masri refugee camp in October 2014. Thinking Theoretically Po­liti­cal scientists develop theories or frameworks both to understand the ­causes of events that occur in international relations ­every day and to answer the foundational questions in the field. Although t­ here are many contending theories, four of the more prominent theories are developed in this book: realism and neorealism, liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism, radical perspectives whose origins lie in Marxism, and constructivism. In brief, realism posits that states exist in an anarchic international system; that is, ­there is no overarching hierarchical authority. Each state bases its policies on an interpretation of its national interest defined in terms of power. The structure of the international system is determined by the distribution of power among states. In con- trast, liberalism is historically rooted in several philosophical traditions that posit that ­human nature is basically good. Individuals form groups and, ­later, states. States gen- erally cooperate and follow international norms and procedures that they have agreed to support. Radical theory is rooted in economics. Actions of individuals are largely determined by economic class; the state is an agent of international capitalism; and the international system is highly stratified, dominated by an international cap­i­tal­ist system. ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 5 6/14/16 9:56 AM  6  CHAPTER One A p p r oac h e s to I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s In Focus Foundational Questions of International Relations How can ­human nature be What are the characteristics and characterized? role of the state? What is the relationship between How is the international system the individual and society? or­ga­nized? And international relations constructivists, in contrast to both realists and liberals, argue that the key structures in the state system are not material but instead are social and dependent on ideas. The interests of states are not fixed but are malleable and ever- changing. All four of ­these theories are subject to dif­fer­ent interpretations by scholars who analyze international relations. Th­ ose theories help us describe, explain, and predict. ­These dif­fer­ent theoretical approaches help us see international relations from dif­fer­ent viewpoints. As po­liti­cal scientist Stephen Walt explains, “No single approach can cap- ture all the complexity of con­temporary world politics. Therefore, we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy. Competi- tion between theories helps reveal their strengths and weaknesses and spurs subsequent refinements, while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom.”1 We ­will explore ­these competing ideas, and their strengths and weaknesses, in the remainder of this book. Developing the Answers How do po­liti­c al scientists find information to assess the accuracy, relevancy, and potency of their theories? The tools they use to answer the foundational questions of their field include history, philosophy, and the scientific method. History Inquiry in international relations often begins with history. Without any historical background, many of ­today’s key issues are incomprehensible. History tells us that the periodic bombings in Israel by Hamas are part of a dispute over territory between Arabs and Jews, a dispute having its origins in biblical times and its mod- ern roots in the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Sudan’s 20-­year civil war between the Muslim north and Christian/animist south and the Darfur crisis ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 6 6/14/16 9:56 AM  Developing the Answers  7 b­ eginning in 2003 are both products of the central government’s long-­standing neglect of marginalized areas, exacerbated by religious differences and magnified by natu­ral disasters. Without that historical background, we cannot debate the appro- priate solution in the Arab-Israeli dispute, nor can we understand why the estab- lishment of the Republic of South Sudan in 2011 did not lead to a solution for the Darfur crisis. Thus, history provides a crucial background for the study of international relations. History has been so fundamental to the study of international relations that ­there was no separate international relations subfield u­ ntil the early twentieth c­ entury. Before that time, especially in Eu­rope and the United States, international relations was stud- ied ­under the umbrella of diplomatic history in most academic institutions. Having knowledge of both diplomatic history and national histories remains critical for stu- dents of international relations. History invites its students to acquire detailed knowledge of specific events, but it also can be used to test generalizations. Having deciphered patterns from the past, students of history can begin to explain the relationships among vari­ous events. For example, having historically documented the cases when wars occur and described the patterns leading up to war, the diplomatic historian can seek explanations for, or ­causes of, war. The ancient Greek historian Thucydides (c. 460–401 bce), in History of the Peloponnesian War, used this approach. Distinguishing between the under­lying and the immediate ­causes of wars, Thucydides found that what made that war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power. As Athens’s power increased, Sparta, Athens’s great- est rival, feared losing its own power. Thus, the changing distribution of power was the under­lying cause of the Peloponnesian War.2 Many scholars following in Thucydides’s footsteps use history in similar ways. But ­those using history must be wary ­because it is not always clear what history attempts to teach us. We often rely on analogies, comparing, for example, the 2003 Iraq War to the Vietnam War. In both cases, the United States fought a lengthy war against a l­ ittle understood, often unidentifiable e­ nemy. In both, the United States a­ dopted the strat- egy of supporting state building so that the central government could continue the fight, a policy labeled Vietnamization and Iraqization in the respective conflicts. The policy led to a quagmire in both places when American domestic support waned and the United States withdrew. Yet differences are also evident; no analogies are perfect. Vietnam has a long history and a strong sense of national identity, forged by wars against both the Chinese and French. Iraq, in contrast, is a relatively new state with signifi- cant ethnic and religious divisions, whose vari­ous groups seek a variety of dif­fer­ent objectives. In Vietnam, the goal was defense of the U.S. ally South Vietnam against the communist north, backed by the Soviet Union. In Iraq, the goal was first to oust Saddam Hussein, who was suspected of building weapons of mass destruction, and second, to create a demo­cratic Iraq that would eventually lead the region to greater ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 7 6/14/16 9:56 AM  8  CHAPTER One A p p r oac h e s to I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s Scholars often draw on history to help understand world politics. When the United States invaded Iraq first in the 1991 Gulf War and then in the 2003 Iraq War, some observers raised comparisons to the Vietnam War, when many Americans protested U.S. involvement. However, ­there ­were also significant differences between ­these events. stability.3 In both, although we cannot ignore history, neither can we draw ­simple “les­ sons” from historical analogies. Analogies are incomplete. Lessons are often drawn that reflect one’s theoretical orien­ tation. Realists might draw the lesson from both Vietnam and Iraq that the United States did not use all of its military might; po­liti­cal actors constrained military actions; other­ wise, the outcome may have been dif­fer­ent. Liberals might conclude that the United States should have never been involved since the homeland was not directly affected and one country’s ability to construct or reconstruct another state is limited. What lessons can we draw from the United States’ acquiescence to the Soviet takeover of Crimea in 2014? Was this another Munich, when the allies appeased Germany at the early stages of World War II? Or was this an affirmation of national self-­determination since the Crimeans, mostly ethnic Rus­sians, voted to secede from Ukraine and rejoin Rus­sia? Was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the 2015 agreement between the western powers and Iran setting limits on Iran’s nuclear program, another Munich or a Helsinki moment? 4 Helsinki refers to the 1975 accord officially ratifying post–­World War II borders and advocating for re­spect of h­ uman rights. History offers no clear-­cut lesson or guidance. ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 8 6/14/16 9:56 AM  Developing the Answers  9 Philosophy Philosophy can help us answer questions in international relations. Much classical philosophy focuses on the state and its leaders—­the basic building blocks of interna- tional relations—as well as on methods of analy­sis. For example, the ancient Greek phi­los­o­pher Plato (c. 427–347 bce), in The Republic, concluded that in the “perfect state,” the ­people who should govern are t­ hose who are superior in the ways of philoso- phy and war. Plato called ­these ideal rulers “philosopher-­k ings.”5 Though not directly discussing international relations, Plato introduced two ideas seminal to the discipline: class analy­sis and dialectical reasoning, both of which ­were bases for ­later Marxist analysts. Radicals like Marxists see economic class as the major divider in domestic and international politics; Chapters 3 and 9 ­w ill explore this viewpoint in depth. Marxists also acknowledge the importance of dialectical reasoning—­that is, reason- ing from a dialogue or conversation that leads to the discovery of contradictions in the original assertions and in po­liti­cal real­ity. In con­temporary Marxist terms, such analy­ sis reveals the contradiction between global and local policies, whereby, for example, local-­level textile workers lose their jobs to foreign competition and are replaced by high-­technology industries. Just as Plato’s contributions to con­temporary thinking ­were both substantive and methodological, the contributions of his student, the phi­los­o­pher Aristotle (384–322 bce), lay both in substance (the search for an ideal domestic po­liti­cal system) and in method. Analyzing 168 constitutions, Aristotle looked at the similarities and differ- ences among states, becoming the first writer to use the comparative method of analy­sis. He concluded that states rise and fall largely b­ ecause of internal ­factors—­a conclusion still debated in the twenty-­first ­century.6 ­A fter the classical era, many of the phi­los­o­phers of relevance to international rela- tions focused on the foundational questions of the discipline. The En­glish phi­los­o­pher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), in Leviathan, ­imagined a state of nature, a world with- out governmental authority or civil order, where men rule by passions, living with the constant uncertainty of their own security. To Hobbes, the life of man is solitary, selfish, and even brutish. Extrapolating to the international level, in the absence of international authority, society is in a “state of nature,” or anarchy. States in this anarchic condition act as man does in the state of nature. For Hobbes, the solution to the dilemma is a unitary state—­a leviathan—­where power is centrally and absolutely controlled.7 The French phi­los­o­pher Jean-­Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) addressed the same set of questions but, having been influenced by the Enlightenment, saw a dif­fer­ent solution. In “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of In­equality among Men,” Rousseau described the state of nature as an egocentric world, with man’s primary concern being self-­preservation—­not unlike Hobbes’s description of the state of nature. ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 9 6/14/16 9:56 AM  10  CHAPTER One A p p r oac h e s to I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s Rousseau posed the dilemma in terms of the story of the stag and the hare. In a hunt- ing society, each individual must keep to his assigned task so the hunters can find and trap the stag for food for the w­ hole group. However, if a hare happens to pass nearby, an individual might well follow the hare, hoping to get his next meal quickly and caring ­little for how his actions w ­ ill affect the group. Rousseau drew an analogy between ­these hunters and states. Do states follow short-­term self-­interest, like the hunter who follows the hare? Or do they recognize the benefits of a common interest?8 Rousseau’s solution to the dilemma posed by the stag and the hare was dif­fer­ent from Hobbes’s leviathan. Rousseau’s preference was for the creation of smaller communities in which the “general w ­ ill” could be attained. Indeed, according to Rousseau, it is “only the general ­will,” not a leviathan, that can “direct the forces of the state according to the purpose for which it was instituted, which is the common good.”9 In Rousseau’s vision, “each of us places his person and all his power in common u ­ nder the supreme direction of the general ­w ill; and as one we receive each member as an indivisible part of the ­whole.” 10 Still another philosophical view of the characteristics of international society was set forth by the German phi­los­o­pher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), in both Idea for a Universal History and Perpetual Peace. Kant envisioned a federation of states as a means to achieve peace, a world order in which man is able to live without fear of war. Sover- eignties would remain intact, but the new federal order would be both preferable to a “super-­leviathan” and more effective and realistic than Rousseau’s small communities. Kant’s analy­sis was based on a vision of ­human beings that was dif­fer­ent from that of ­either Rousseau or Hobbes. In his view, though man is admittedly selfish, he can learn new ways of cosmopolitanism and universalism.11 The tradition laid down by ­these phi­los­o­phers has contributed to the development of international relations by calling attention to fundamental relationships: t­hose between the individual and society, between individuals in society, and between socie­ ties. ­These phi­los­o­phers had varied, often competing, visions of what ­these relation- ships ­were and what they ­ought to be. (See ­Table 1.1.) The early phi­los­o­phers have led con­temporary international relations scholars to the examination of the characteristics of leaders, to the recognition of the importance of the internal dimensions of the state, to the analogy of the state and nature, and to descriptions of an international com- munity. History and philosophy permit us to delve into foundational questions—­the nature of ­people and the broad characteristics of the state and of international society. They allow us to speculate on the normative (or moral) ele­ments in po­liti­cal life: What should be the role of the state? What ­ought to be the norms in international society? How might international society be structured to achieve order? When is war just? Should economic resources be redistributed? Should h ­ uman rights be universalized?12 Philo- sophical methods may not be useful for helping us answer specific questions; they may tell us what should be done, providing the normative guide, but philosophy generally ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 10 6/14/16 9:56 AM  Developing the Answers  11 ­Table  1.1 Contributions of Phi­los­o­phers to International Relations Theory Argued that the life force in man is intelligent. Only a Plato few ­people can have insight into what is good; (427–347 bce) society should submit to the authority of ­these Greek philosopher-­kings. Many of t­ hese ideas are developed in The Republic. Addressed the prob­lem of order in the individual Aristotle Greek city-­state. The first to use the comparative (384–322 bce) method of research, observing multiple points in time Greek and suggesting explanations for the patterns found. In Leviathan described life in a state of nature as Thomas Hobbes solitary, selfish, and brutish. Individuals and society (1588–1679) can escape from the state of nature through a unitary English state, a ­leviathan. In “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Jean-­Jacques In­equality among Men,” described the state of nature Rousseau in both national and international society. Argued (1712–78) that the solution to the state of nature is the social French contract, whereby individuals gather in small communities where the “general ­will” is realized. Associated with the idealist or utopian school of Immanuel Kant thought. In Idea for a Universal History and Perpetual (1724–1804) Peace, advocated a world federation of republics German bound by the rule of law. does not help us make or implement policy. Nevertheless, both history and philoso- phy are key tools for international relations scholars. The Scientific Method: Behavioralism In the 1950s, some scholars began to draw upon one understanding of the nature of ­humans and on history to develop a more scientific approach to the study of international relations. They built upon the philosophical assumption that man tends to act in pre- dictable ways. If individuals act in predictable ways, might not states do the same? Are ­there recurrent patterns to how states behave? Are t­here subtle patterns to diplomatic ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 11 6/14/16 9:56 AM  12  CHAPTER One A p p r oac h e s to I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s history? Are states as power hungry as some phi­los­o­phers would have us believe? How can we explain empirical findings? Can we use ­those findings to predict the ­future? Behavioralism proposes that individuals, both alone and in groups, act in pat- terned ways. The task of the behavioral scientist is to suggest plausible hypotheses regarding ­t hose patterned actions and to systematically and empirically test ­t hose hypotheses. Using the tools of the scientific method to describe and explain ­human be­hav­ior, ­these scholars hope to predict ­f uture be­hav­ior. Many ­will be satisfied, how- ever, with being able to explain patterns, ­because prediction in the social sciences remains an uncertain enterprise. The Correlates of War proj­ect permits us to see the application of behavioralism. Beginning in 1963 at the University of Michigan, the po­liti­c al scientist J. David Singer and his historian colleague Melvin Small investigated one of the fundamental questions in international relations: Why is t­ here war?13 Motivated by the normative philosophical concern with how peace can be achieved, the two scholars chose an empirical methodological approach. Rather than focusing on one “big” war that changed the tide of history, as Thucydides did, they sought to find patterns among a number of dif­fer­ent wars. Believing that generalizable patterns may be found across all wars, Singer and Small turned to statistical data to discover the patterns. The initial task of the Correlates of War proj­ect was to collect data on international wars between 1865 and 1965 in which 1,000 or more deaths had been reported in a 12-­month period. For each of the 93 wars that fit ­these criteria, the researchers found data on its magnitude, severity, and intensity, as well as the frequency of war over time. This data-­collection pro­c ess proved a much larger task than Singer and Small had anticipated, employing a bevy of researchers and gradu­ate students. Once the wars w ­ ere codified, the second task was to generate specific, testable hypotheses that might explain the outbreak of war. Is ­there a relationship between the number of alliance commitments in the international system and the number of wars that are fought? Is ­there a relationship between the number of ­great powers in the international system and the number of wars? Is t­here a relationship between the number of wars over time and the severity of the conflicts? Which f­ actors are most cor- related over time with the outbreak of war? And how are t­ hese f­ actors related to each other? What is the correlation between international system–­level ­factors—­such as the existence of international organ­izations—­a nd the outbreak of war? Although answering ­these questions w ­ ill never prove that a par­tic­u­lar f­ actor is the cause of war, the answers could suggest some high-­level correlations that merit theoretical expla- nation. That is the goal of this research proj­ect and many o­ thers following in the behavioralist scientific tradition. Another example of research in the behavioral tradition can be found in h ­ uman rights lit­er­a­ture. The question many scholars probe is why countries violate h ­ uman rights treaties. Is it b­ ecause states never intended to follow the provisions? Is signing ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 12 6/14/16 9:56 AM  Developing the Answers  13 onto treaties just cheap talk? Is it ­because t­here is no threat of direct international enforcement? Or is it ­because states often lack the capacity to implement new stan- dards? Sociologist Wade M. Cole began with a hypothesis, unlike the Correlates of War proj­ect, which began with data collection, that “noncompliance with international treaty obligations is neither willful or premediated.”14 Rather, it depends on a state’s bureaucratic efficiency. Using data from each in­de­pen­dent variable of state bureau- cratic efficiency and dependent variables of state empowerment and physical integrity rights data found in the Cingranelli-­R ichards (CIRI) ­Human Rights Dataset, Cole uses sophisticated statistical models that confirm his expectations. Improvements in a state’s empowerment and physical-­integrity rights ­after the signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Po­liti­cal Rights depend on state capacity. Yet methodological prob­lems occur in both proj­ects. The Correlates of War data- base looks at all international wars, irrespective of the dif­fer­ent po­liti­cal, military, social, and technological contexts. Can wars of the late 1800s be explained by the same ­factors as the wars of the new millennium? Answering that question has led sub- sequent researchers to expand the data set to include militarized interstate disputes, conflicts that do not involve a full-­scale war. And those data include not only interna- tional and civil wars but also regional internal, intercommunal, and nonstate wars.15 The ­human rights study also involves major prob­lems of mea­sure­ment and operation- alization of key variables. How can one mea­sure concepts like state’s empowerment and state capacity? Many dif­fer­ent indicators need to be combined. And data may not be available for all states across all the time periods studied. In each case, alternative explanations need to be investigated. Such studies are never an end in themselves, only a means to improve explanation and to provide other scholars with hypotheses that warrant further testing. Disillusionment with behavioral approaches has taken several forms. First, data have to be selected and compiled. Dif­fer­ent data may lead to substantially dif­fer­ent conclusions. Witness the contrasting assessments on the question of w ­ hether t­ here has been a decline in global vio­lence, ­whether the world is, in fact, more peaceful. Second, some critics suggest that attention to data and methods has overwhelmed the sub- stance of their research. Few would doubt the importance of Singer and Small’s initial excursion into the c­ auses of war, but even the researchers themselves admitted losing sight of the impor­tant questions in their quest to compile data and hone research methods. Some scholars, still within the behavioral orientation, suggest simplifying esoteric methods to refocus on the substantive questions. Third, to still o­ thers, many of the foundational questions—­the nature of humanity and society—­are neglected by behavioralists ­because they are not easily testable by empirical methods. ­These critics suggest returning to the philosophical roots of international relations. Most scholars remain firmly committed to behavioralism and the scientific method, pointing to the slow incremental pro­gress that has been made in explaining the interactions of states. ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 13 6/14/16 9:56 AM  14  CHAPTER One A p p r oac h e s to I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s ­B ehind The Headlines Is the World Becoming More Peaceful? Headlines such as “The Decline in Global Vio­ con­temporary data, Pinker sees a decline in wars lence: Real­ity or Myth?” or “Is the World Becom­ between ­great powers. World Wars I and II rep­ ing More Peaceful?” pique our interest.a As we resent spikes from what is generally a downward saw at the beginning of the chapter, former chair­ trend. Post 1946, ­there has been a decline in deaths man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey on a per capita basis in all dif­fer­ent kinds of wars: and psychologist Steven Pinker (and no doubt colonial wars, civil wars, internationalized civil wars, many ­others) come to quite dif­fer­ent answers to genocide, as well as interstate conflicts. ­these questions. What explains the differences in their perspectives? Pinker argues that the world was much more violent in the past. Vio­ lence in Pinker’s analy­sis includes all types of vio­lence—­murder, tribal war­ fare, slavery, executions, rape. His “past” is centuries. He cites statistics showing that tribal warfare was nine times as deadly as twentieth-­century warfare and the murder rate in Medi­ eval Eu­rope was 30 times more than it is t­ oday. Slavery, he points out, existed for thousands of years, having declined only in the last 50 years. And, in his view, the numbers affected by the vio­ lence needed to be compared to the relative size of the population at the time. So while the numbers of deaths and violent acts t­oday may be larger, they are much smaller compared to the size of the population: in the seven­ teenth c­ entury, the “wars of religion” killed about 2 ­percent of the popula­ tion in the warring states, while in the twentieth ­ century, the deadliest century in absolute numbers, just ­ 0.7 ­percent of the ­ people died in People argue that our world is more peaceful than it was centuries ­battle. Comparing the past with more ago. Is that true? How do we know? ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 14 6/14/16 9:56 AM  Developing the Answers  15 Dempsey, and certainly many o ­ thers in the Pinker’s explanation for the decline in vio­ policy community, see a dif­fer­ent real­ity. The total lence is that while individuals may still be inclined number of armed conflicts of all types tripled ­toward revenge, sadism, and vio­lence, other from the 1950s to the 1990s. And though most forces—­“ better angels”—­are steering ­people in ­were relatively low-­intensity conflicts with limited another direction. Governments and better edu- fatalities and war­ time fatalities have declined cation implore ­people to control their impulses dramatically—­from 240 ­battle-­related deaths per and negotiate with ­others. Democ­ratization million of the world’s population in 1950 to less helps; demo­cratic states are less likely to fight than 10 per million in 2007—­the numbers are still each other. F ­ ree trade helps; t­ hose who trade are too high if you are responsible for the lives of less likely to fight. International institutions help; ­others. ­Those that see ­today’s world as overly vio- member states are less likely to fight each other. lent question the reliability of the data from earlier Examining past trends should help us predict centuries. Do we ­really know that in hunter-­gather the f­ uture. Dempsey and ­others would more than socie­ties, warfare was responsible for 15 ­percent likely see a bleak ­future. They predict ­future con- of fatalities as Pinker asserts? Many anthropolo- frontations in not only the ­Middle East but also gists claim that no evidence suggests that the East Asia, where nationalism in China, Japan, and earliest ­human socie­ties ­were warlike. And we ­others is coming to a head. Pinker himself makes actually have had no reliable data about murder no predictions about the ­future, although if his rates and rates of or­ga­nized crime in most develop- argument is correct, then despite ­people’s deep- ing countries ­until only very recently, yet Pinker’s est urges, the ­future should become even more argument includes all ­those types of vio­lence. peaceful. For Critical Analy­s is 1. Based on what you know so far, who has the better argument about ­whether our world is more peaceful ­today—­Dempsey or Pinker? What kind of evidence would strengthen each of their arguments? 2. In your opinion, is it impor­tant to debate ­these questions? Why or why not? a. See ­Human Security Report Proj­ect, “The Decline in Global Vio­lence: Real­ity or Myth?” (March 3, 2014) and Car­ne­gie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, “Is the World Becoming More Peaceful?” (Sept. 27, 2012). ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 15 6/14/16 9:56 AM  16  CHAPTER One A p p r oac h e s to I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s Does choosing one method over another make a difference in the research findings? Although ­there are few systematic comparisons, evidence suggests that in ­human rights research, the findings do tend to vary by method.16 Qualitative researchers in the histori- cal and philosophical tradition, often employing case studies of a specific h ­ uman rights issue over a long period, generally find pro­gress in h ­ uman rights rec­ords. And they find that new h ­ uman rights norms have emerged. In contrast, behavioral researchers, in general, find less evidence of changes in state be­hav­ior. Usually drawing on large “N” studies, including many states over de­c ades when data are available, researchers find only marginal improvements in a state’s ­human rights rec­ord. What explains ­these divergent findings? Differences in operationalization, issues, periods, and avail- ability of data are all responsible for the difference in findings. This divergence has led researchers to plead for more mixed-­method research. Multi-­method proj­ects can help us overcome the disturbing finding that dif­fer­ent methods lead to dif­fer­ent sub- stantive conclusions. Alternative Approaches Some international relations scholars are dissatisfied with using history, philosophy, or behavioral tools. Constructivists have turned to discourse analy­sis to answer the foundational questions of international relations. To trace how ideas shape identities, constructivists analyze culture, norms, procedures, and social practices. They probe how identities are s­ haped and change over time. They use texts, interviews, and archi- val material, and they research local practices by riding public transportation and standing in lines. By using multiple sets of data, they create thick description. The case studies found in Peter Katzenstein’s edited volume The Culture of National Secu- rity use this approach. Drawing on analyses of Soviet foreign policy at the end of the Cold War, German and Japa­nese security policy from militarism to antimilitarism, and Arab national identity, the authors search for security interests defined by actors who are responding to changing cultural ­factors. Th ­ ese studies show how social and cultural ­factors shape national security policy in ways that contradict realist or liberal expectations.17 The postmodernists seek to deconstruct the basic concepts of the field, such as the state, the nation, rationality, and realism, by searching texts (or sources) for hidden meanings under­neath the surface, in the subtext. Once ­those hidden meanings are revealed, the postmodernists seek to replace the once-­orderly picture with disorder, to replace the dichotomies with multiple portraits. Cynthia Weber, for example, argues that sovereignty (the in­de­pen­dence of a state) is neither well defined nor consistently grounded. Digging below the surface of sovereignty, ­going beyond evaluations of the traditional phi­los­o­phers, she has discovered that conceptualizations of sovereignty are ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 16 6/14/16 9:56 AM  In Sum: Making Sense of International Relations   17 constantly shifting, depending on the exigencies of the moment and the values of dif­ fer­ent communities. The multiple meanings of sovereignty are conditioned by time, place, and historical circumstances.18 More specifically, Karen T. Litfin shows how norms of sovereignty are shifting to address ecological destruction, although the pro­ cess remains a contested one.19 Th ­ ese analyses have profound implications for the theory and practice of international relations, which are rooted in state sovereignty and accepted practices that reinforce sovereignty. They challenge conventional under­ standings. Postmodernists also seek to find the voices of “the ­others,” ­those individuals who have been disenfranchised and marginalized in international relations. Christine Syl­ vester illustrates her approach with a discussion of the Greenham Common Peace Camp, a group of mostly w ­ omen who in the early 1980s walked more than 100 miles to a British air force base to protest plans to deploy missiles at the base. Although the marchers w ­ ere ignored by the media—­and thus w ­ ere “voiceless”—­they maintained a politics of re­sis­tance, recruiting other po­liti­cal action groups near the camp and engaging members of the military stationed at the base. In 1988, when the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty was signed, dismantling the missiles, the ­women moved to another protest site, drawing public attention to Britain’s role in the nuclear era.20 Scholars in this tradition also probe how the voiceless dalit (or untouchables) have fought for rights in South Asia, how the disabled have found a voice in international forums, and how some, like ­children born of rape, have not found a voice.21 No impor­tant question of international relations t­ oday can be answered with exclu­ sive reliance on any one method. History, w ­ hether in the form of an extended case study (Peloponnesian War) or a study of multiple wars (Correlates of War or milita­ rized interstate disputes), provides useful answers. Philosophical traditions offer both cogent reasoning and the framework for the major discussions of the day. But behav­ ioral methods dominate ­because they are increasingly using mixed methods, combin­ ing the best of social-­science methods and other approaches. And the newer methods of discourse analy­sis, thick description, and postmodernism provide an even richer base from which the international relations scholar can draw. In Sum: Making Sense of International Relations How can we, as students, begin to make sense of international po­liti­cal events in our daily lives? How have scholars of international relations helped us make sense of the world around us? This chapter has introduced the major theories of international rela­ tions, including the realist, liberal, radical, and constructivist approaches. ESSIR7_CH01_001-019_11P.indd 17 6/14/16 9:56 AM  18  CHAPTER One A p p r oac h e s to I n t e r n at i o n a l R e l at i o n s ­Table  1.2 Tools for Studying International Relations Tool Method History Examines individual or multiple cases