Lecture 8 Prosocial Behaviour PDF

Lecture 8 Chapter 13 Prosocial Behaviours Situational determinants of altruism 1 Diffusion of responsibility - Pluralistic ignorance - Cost of helping/not helping 2 Altruistic views - Empathy TBP. 530 Latane and Darley’s cognitive model Key words: Diffusion of responsibility • tendency of an indi...

Lecture 8 Chapter 13 Prosocial Behaviours Situational determinants of altruism 1 Diffusion of responsibility - Pluralistic ignorance - Cost of helping/not helping 2 Altruistic views - Empathy TBP. 530 Latane and Darley’s cognitive model Key words: Diffusion of responsibility • tendency of an individual to assume that others will take responsibility. This is hypothesis cause of the bystander effect. • opportunity to transfer responsibility e.g. a heart-wrenching scene- a homeless woman stands in flood waters in Venice, begging, unsuccessfully, from a crowd of pedestrians hurrying by. Darley and Latane 1968 purpose: must bystanders be physically present to lessen the chanage of helping? procedure: 1. students could communicate through microphones while in a separate cubicles 2. students believed they are in groups of 2/4/6 people 3. the ‘victim’ told the other over the intercom system that he was epileptic 4. students actually hear the ‘victim’ chocking and became quiet result: • the more bystanders an individual thought were present, the less likely they were to help The more An emergency situation: the 1. Involve danger e.g. to a person or property help bystanders probability in 3. Differ widely in nature e.g. a bank on fire 4. not foreseen e.g. prior planning is improbable 4. Require instant action e.g. leisurely consideration is not feasible the greater that someone emergency 2. Unusual event e.g. ordinary person rarely encounter , situation . will TBP. 357 Social Comparison Theory key word: Pluralistic Ignorance Key word: Social Comparison Theory • Comparing our behaviour and opinions with those of others in order to establish the correct or socially approved way of thinking and behaving e . g buying . Two variances of social comparison perspective: 1. The bandwagon effect 跟風= first among equal • a product popularity/ for in because of its the sake of gaining status society learning what attitude pole (extreme position) is socially desirable, people in interactive discussion may complete to appear to be stronger advocates of that pole 2. Pluralistic ignorance • people sometimes behave publicly in ways that do not reflect what they actually think • they can be ignorant of what everyone really thinks e . g don't . a when you speak up friend cheated on the saw exam because you wroughtheHe has believe cheating is ok . TBP. 530 Where there’s smoke there’s fire Darley and Latane 1968 purpose: to discuss some of the problems involved in life at a large university Wonder what ppt would do in such situation to look for a guide Procedure: 1. Ppt were completing a questionnaire, smoke began to pour in from a wall vent (6 minutes until the room was full of smoke) 2. Ppt were alone, with 2 other ppt, or with conferees who completely ignore the smoke result: - ppt who were alone were more likely to report the smoke than those with other strangers - 75% took positive action, only 38% two strangers group intervened - ppt with two confederates were even less likely to report the situation = the more people, the slower the response = people don’t response were persuaded that there was no emergency if others were passive TBP. P522 Calculating whether to help Key word: Bystander-calculus model • In attending to an emergency, the bystander calculates the perceived costs and benefits of providing help compared with those associated with not helping Three stages to calculate before we response: 1. Physiological aroused by another’s distress 2. Label this arousal as an emotion 3. Evaluate the consequences of helping 1. Physiological aroused by another’s distress • the greater the arousal, the greater the chance that we will help • how quickly we react is related to the level of body’s response e.g. the higher heart beat, the quicker we respond • the victim plight 困境 becomes clear and more severe, our physiological arousal increase 2. Label this arousal as an emotion • being aroused does not automatically produce specific emotions • situational cues trigger another set of response -> empathic concern e.g. when bystanders believe they are similar to a victim, they are more likely to experience empathic concern 3. Evaluate the consequences of helping • choosing an action that will reducee their personal distress at the lowest cost • the main cost of helping are time and effort • the greater these costs. The less likely that a bystander will help Example of attribution/ Social Excitation Transfer Theory Cost of helping/ not helping p. 523 1. Empathy cost of not helping • empathy concern is one motive for helping a distressed person - not helping make you feel empathic concern results in empathy costs (anxiety) to other’s plight = the emergency, its severity and the closeness of the bystander to the victim will increase the costs of not helping. ↑E , 4 = ↑H2 2. Personal costs of not helping - certain characteristics of the person in distress affect the costs of not helping e.g. if you believe that a victim might die if you do not help, your personal costs are likely to be high. e.g. if a tramp in the street asked you for money to buy alcohol, the personal costs of refusing might not be high e.g. if the request was for money for food or medicine, the costs of refusing might be quite high = the more the victim similar to the bystander. The more likely the bystander is to help 2A. Norm of social responsibility TBP.547 • an expectation that people will help those dependent upon them • Norm of reciprocity • an attempt to gain compliance by first doing someone a favour, to mutual aggression, or mutual attraction 2B. Social responsibility norm TBP. 548 • help people who dependent and in need • contradicted by other norm that discourages interfering the other people’s lives = depend on how you interpret the situation, affect adults decide whether to help in an emergency TBP. 524 Empathy and Altruism Bystander-calculus model • intervene in a emergency because they find it unpleasantly arousing and they seek relief key word: Altruism 利他主義 • misinform because it is really motivated by self-interest, egoism Witnessing others in distress stimulates two reactions: 1. Distress - unpleasant and motivate to reduce our own distress - ppl seek to help when they will no longer troubled by observing the suffering of another person e.g. turning back to help after passing a standard motorist 2. Empathy • contrast with distress • includes feelings of warmth, being soft-hearted and having compassion for a person in need = Either distress or empathy can motivate helping behaviour Feedback manipulation Egoism: people only help people if they receive feedback with much improvement. Mixed- motive interactions P. 425 The trucking game P. 423 P.427 Mixed-motive interactions Management-labor relatioship key word: Ultimatum game • Given you have $ 26, the task is to give any division to another person • If A has $26, decided to give B $13. • If B reject, both A and B will have $0 • If B accept, B has $13 and A also has $13. Real life application: If labor (teacher) reject the contract, the principle (allocator) lose a staff Key word: Social norm Social Exchange Theory TBP. 570 Key word: social exchange theory • people often use a form of everyday economics when they weigh up costs and rewards before deciding what to do Husband Yield Key word: Battle of sexes Not Yield 0 Wife Yield Yield soccer o I Both go Not to 2 Key word: Game of chicken Both got. I shopping game Both stay 0 houle 2 0 Take turn . Prisoner’s Dilemma TBP. 423 key word: Prisoner’s Dilemma • two-person game in which both parties are torn between competition and cooperation depending on mutual choices, both can win or both can lose. Dilemma 1. One confesses: the confessor will be granted immunity and be used to convict the other of the more serious offence 2. Both confess: each will receive a moderate sentence 3. neither confess: each will receive a very light sentence Summarise as a pay-off matrix key word: Game theory Direction communication • two and n-person prisoner’s dilemma games very reliably reduce conflict and increases cooperation Indirect communication • Interactant’s responses fulfil an indirect communicative function, flexible and responsive behaviour increase cooperations • Describe as ‘two-person, mixed motive, non-zero-sum game’ - Two people are involved, experience a conflict between being motivated to cooperate and motivate to compete -> the outcome can be both parties gain or lose • a Zero-sum game • one’s party’s gain is always the other’s loss e.g. a pie, the larger portion I take, the smaller portion left for you The tit-for-tat strategy is to start with cooperation and not confess, assuming the other agent follows suit Key word: Tit-For-Tat Strategy Assumptions: 1. each participant in an iterated prisoner's dilemma follows a course of action consistent with his opponent's previous turn. 2. For example, if provoked (make angry), a player subsequently responds with retaliation (revenge); if unprovoked (not make angry), the player cooperates. 3. Tit for tat is a game-theory strategy in which each participant mimics the action of their opponent after cooperating in the first round. 4. Tit for tat emphasises that cooperation between participants produces a more favourable outcome than a non-cooperative strategy. 5. based on the concepts of retaliation and altruism. When faced with a dilemma, an individual cooperates when another member has an immediate history of cooperating and defaults when the counterparty previously defaulted. • Be nice: cooperate, never be the first to defect. • Be provocable: return defection for defection, cooperation for cooperation. • Don't be envious: focus on maximizing your own 'score', as opposed to ensuring your score is higher than your 'partner's'. • Don't be too clever: or, don't try to be tricky. Clarity is essential for others to cooperate with you. Social Dilemmas TBP. 426 TBP. 425 key word: Common dilemmas • cooperation by all benefits all, but compeition by all harm all • if everyone cooperates, an optimal solution for all is reached, but if everyone completes, then everyone loses An example of common dilemmas: - A replenish able resources of dilemma: renewable resource that will continually support many people, provided that everyone shows restraint in harvesting the resources e.g. rainforests and the world’s population of ocean fish are renewable resources if harvested appropriately Key word: Common resource pool dilemma • Models the conflicts experienced by a group of self interested individuals who share a finite and limited common desirable good. Two types of social dilemmas: 1. Public good dilemmas - Provide for everyone, people are tempted to use them without contributing to their maintenence e.g. public health, national parks, the national road network 2. Tragedy of the commons: the common renewable resources - failure to cooperate leads to harm for all e.g. fishing, gazing and rainforest and the world’s population of ocean fish are renewable resources Public goods: Two defining characteristics: 1. Jointness of supply 2. Impossibility of exclusion Free-rider problem • people self-interestedly exploit a resource without caring for it e.g. if you alone avoid paying your taxes, it only impacts the provision of a police force, an ambulance service or a functioning road system, but if everyone reasoned similarly, there would be no emergency services. Solving social dilemas TBP. 427 - selfish behaviour prevails in social dilemmas -> structural solutions includes measures such as limiting the number of people accessing the resources (permits), limiting the amount of resources that people can take (quota) -> handing over management of the resources to an individual (a leader) or a single group, -> facilitating free communication among these accessing the resources -> shifting the pay-off to favour cooperation over competition Structural solution needs an enlightened and powerful authority -> to manage resources Leaders are effective in solving social dilemma if : 1. People with prosocial orientation - open to leadership when their group is faced with social dilemma - if they identify strong with the group 2. Leaders are viewed as ‘one of us’ - representative of the group • people with pro-self- orientation are less open to leadership, unless they identify strong with the group and view the leader as group serving and representative of the group -> Charismatic leaders are particularly good at helping pro-self members behave in prosocial and group-serving ways. 3. Group identification • people identify very strongly with a group that accesses a shared resource • act in that benefit the group as a whole • as if a large number of individuals competing for access have been transformed into a single person who carefully tends the resource. = identification with a group actually transform people psychological in this way = identification facilitates constructive communication that build trust Perceived Self-efficacy key word: Simultaneous Protocol • All players make decisions at the same time • No information regarding other players’ decision • All players have identical and symmetric information e.g. everyone has imperfect information, don’t know how much fish other people get, don’t know what other people thinking. key word: Sequential Protocol • According to some pre-determined sequence, players take turns to make decisions • Common knowledge of previous players’ decisions • Knowing own position • knowing amount of resources left sequential common resource pool • A common resource pool can be better maintained (sustain longer) when individuals harvest sequentially (one after another) than simultaneously (all at the same time) • A position effect in sequential Common Resources Pool dilemma • individuals in earlier positions request more than those in later positions • a negative correlation between position and size of request key word: real-time protocol 4 types of Protocol 4 types of Protocol Cooperation in social dilemmas • Discussion on dilemma enhance cooperation and not communication per se Explanations of Discussion Effect