Conflict And Consent, 1815-1914 PDF

# Conflict And Consent, 1815-1914 ## The International Order of 1814-15 The international order created in 1814-15 was controversial from the beginning. There were disagreements on: * The elitist structure of the system * The policeman roles undertaken by the great powers * The presumption of dyn...

# Conflict And Consent, 1815-1914 ## The International Order of 1814-15 The international order created in 1814-15 was controversial from the beginning. There were disagreements on: * The elitist structure of the system * The policeman roles undertaken by the great powers * The presumption of dynastic solidarity * The peace had firmly joined domestic and international issues There was an underlying consensus that the peace had joined domestic and international issues. ## The European Order of 1815 The European order of 1815 created a new order for Europe. This order contained: * Territorial and domestic political arrangements * Governors to monitor, regulate, sanction, or prevent change * Certain procedures, rules, norms, or conventions The purpose of the order was to maintain a particular territorial balance of power rather than to prevent wars. Wars would be one of several means to maintain the balance. ## The Decline of Empires and the Rise of Nationalities The nineteenth century featured: * The rise of nationalities * The decline of empires * A fundamental reconstitution of the principles upon which the political units of the European society of states would be based * The creation of popular states, which were not necessarily appropriate for the historic states and empires that existed prior. The Concert was effective in maintaining the order for the first fifty or sixty postwar years but began to unravel by the 1880s. ## War and Intervention in Concert Europe This section discusses wars and significant interventions 1815-1914, excluding those in the peripheries and wars that were essentially self-contained and isolated. The section includes these wars: * **1. Austria-Naples, 1820–1821** * Government Composition * **2. Austria–Piedmont, 1821** * Government Composition * **3. France–Spain, 1822–1823** * Government Composition * **4. Russia (Greece, Great Britain, France)–Turkey, 1828–1829** * National Liberation/State Creation (R., Gr., G.B., F.) * Protect religious confrères (R.) * Commerce/Navigation (R., T.) * Protect ethnic confrères (R.) * Maintain integrity of empire (T.) * **5. Belgium (France)–Holland, 1830–1833** * National Liberation/State Creation (B., F) * Maintain integrity of state (H.) * **6. Turkey–Egypt, 1832–1833** * Territory * Empire Creation (E) * Maintain integrity of empire (T) * **7. Turkey–Egypt, 1839–1847** * Territory * Empire Creation (E) * Maintain integrity of empire (T) * **8. Prussia–Denmark, 1848** * Dynastic/Succession Claims (D) * Territory * Empire Creation (E) * Maintain integrity of empire (T) * **9. Sardinia–Austria, 1848–1849** * Dynastic/Succession Claims (D) * Territory * National unification/consolidation * **10. France–Roman Republic, 1849** * Government Composition * Maintain regional dominance (F) * **11. Russia (Austria)–Hungary, 1849** * National Liberation/State Creation (H) * Maintain integrity of empire (A, R) * **12. Turkey (Great Britain, France, Austria)–Russia, 1853–1856** * Protect religious confrères (R) * National Liberation/State Creation (Wallachia, Moldavia) (R) * Balance of power (G.B., F., A) * Maintain integrity of empire (T., G.B., F., A) * Strategic territory (R) * **13. Sardinia (France)–Austria, 1859** * Territory (F., S.) * National Liberation/State Creation (S.) * Ideological Liberation (S.) * Maintain Integrity of empire (A.) * **14. German Confederation (Prussia)–Denmark, 1863–1864** * Dynastic/succession claims * Protect ethnic confrères (P.) * Strategic territory (D.) * Enforce treaty terms (P.) * National unification/consolidation * Territory * **15. Russia–Poland, 1863** * National liberation/state creation (P) * Maintain integrity of empire (R) * **16. Austria–Prussia (Italy), 1866** * Territory * National unification/consolidation (P, I) * Maintain regional dominance (A) * **17. Italy–Roman Republic, 1870** * National unification/consolidation (I) * Regime/state survival (R.R.) * **18. France–Prussia, 1870** * National honor (F) * Test of strength * National unification/consolidation (P) * **19. Serbia, Montenegro–Turkey, 1876–1878** * Territory * National unification/consolidation (S, M) * Maintain integrity of empire (T) * **20. Russia–Turkey, 1877–1878** * Protect religious confrères (R) * Territory * National liberation/state creation (Wallachia, Moldavia) (R) * Protect ethnic confrères (R) * Commerce/navigation (R) * Maintain integrity of empire (T) * **21. Bulgaria–Turkey, 1885** * Ethnic unification/irredenta (B) * National unification/consolidation (B) * Maintain integrity of empire (T) * **22. Serbia–Bulgaria, 1885** * Territory * **23. Turkey–Greece, 1897** * Protect ethnic confrères (G) * National liberation/state creation (Crete) * Maintain integrity of empire (T) * **24. Spain–United States, 1898** * Ideological liberation (U.S) * Commerce/navigation (U.S) * Maintain integrity of empire (S) * National Liberation/state creation (Cuba, U.S) * **25. Russia, Great Britain, Germany–Chinese rebels, 1898–1900** * Maintain regional dominance * Commerce/navigation * Autonomy (C) * **26. Boer Republics–Great Britain, 1899–1902** * Strategic territory (G.B.) * Autonomy (B) * Protect nationals/commercial interests abroad (G.B.) * **27. Japan–Russia, 1904–1905** * Empire Creation (R) * Colonial competition * Strategic Territory (J) * **28. Italy–Turkey, 1911–1912** * Territory * Maintain integrity of empire (T) * **29. Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia–Turkey, 1912–1913** * Territory * Maintain integrity of empire (T) * **30. Bulgaria–Serbia, Greece, 1913** * Territory * Maintain Integrity of empire (T) * **31. Austria-Hungary-Serbia, 1914** * National Honor (A) * Maintain integrity of empire (A) * Protect ethnic confrères (S) * Regime/state survival (A) It was reasonable to claim that until the First World War, most armed conflicts in non-European areas had only limited effects on the mutual relations of the European-centered system. ## The Nineteenth Century: A Century of Peace? The nineteenth century was often described as a century of peace, but it had a 13% lower occurrence rate of war and armed interventions (one war every \[3.3 years] compared to one every \[2.8 years] for the \[1715-1814 period]). Early in the period there were armed interventions to quell or support constitutionalist/liberal/nationalist revolutions in Italy, Spain, Belgium, and the Ottoman Empire. Toward the late nineteenth century, new, small states became significant war participants, often launching fairly blatant aggressions. ## The European Zone of Peace The center of Europe running from London, through Paris, Berlin, and Vienna constituted a significant zone of peace. The populations of this area were to know only a few months of war during the entire century. The order constructed in 1814-15 was a source of the notably low incidence of intra-great power wars in the nineteenth century. ## The New War-Generating Issues The rise of national liberation/state creation and national unification issues that generated wars in the nineteenth century was accompanied by the significant decline of many of the issues that were the sources of war prior to the French Revolution. The issues that generated wars during the 1815-1914 period are as follows: * **Maintain Integrity of State/Empire** * **Territory** * **National Liberation/State Creation** * **National Unification/Consolidation** * **Protect Ethnic Confrères** * **Government Composition** * **Strategic Territory** * **Commerce/Navigation** * **Dynastic/Succession Claims** * **Ideological Liberation** * **Protect Religious Confrères** * **Maintain Regional Dominance** * **Empire Creation** * **Regime/State Survival** * **Ethnic Unification/Irredenta** * **National/Crown Honor** * **Autonomy** * **Balance of Power** * **Enforce Treaty Terms** * **Test of Strength** * **Colonial Competition** * **Protect Nationals/Commercial Interests Abroad** The nineteenth century witnessed increasing civil strife as a dangerous disturber of peace. This was the case. The principles of liberalism and nationality were major sources of both civil and international wars between 1815 and 1914. The two issues often became joined. While British public opinion may have sympathized with the national aspirations of the Balkan peoples, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire could result in Russian hegemony in the region, a position that would pose a direct strategic threat to Great Britain's growing commercial interests in the Middle East and to its lifeline to India. ## The Nationalization of International Issues The nineteenth century was represented by the "nationalization" of international issues. The international politics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries revolved largely around princely claims, based on law, ancient titles, and more pragmatic concerns of power politics. By the nineteenth century, the rights of princes were increasingly replaced by the "rights of peoples." The process of national liberation did not always result in the fulfillment of the nationality principle. National unification/consolidation issues: * **Maintain integrity of state/empire** * **Territory** * **National Liberation/state creation** * **National unification/consolidation** * **Protect ethnic confrères** * **Government composition** * **Strategic territory** * **Commerce/navigation** * **Dynastic/succession Claims** * **Ideological liberation** * **Protect religious confrères** * **Maintain regional dominance** * **Empire creation** * **Regime/state survival** * **Ethnic unification/irredenta** * **National/crown honor** * **Autonomy** * **Balance of power** * **Enforce treaty terms** * **Test of strength** * **Colonial competition** * **Protect nationals/commercial interests abroad** National unification/consolidation issues constituted 19% of all the issues that generated wars and armed interventions in the 1815-1914 period. ## The Decline of Old War-Generating Issues The decline of old war-generating issues are listed here, with their percentage of war issues in both the \[1815-1914] and \[1715-1814] periods: * **Maintain integrity of state/empire** * 19% in 1815-1914 * 3% in 1715-1814 * **Territory** * 14% in 1815-1914 * 26% in 1715-1814 * **National Liberation/state creation** * 10% in 1815-1914 * 3% in 1715-1814 * **National unification/consolidation** * 9% in 1815-1914 * 1% in 1715-1814 * **Protect ethnic confrères** * 5% in 1815-1914 * 1 % in 1715-1814 * **Government composition** * 4% in 1815-1914 * 5% in 1715-1814 * **Strategic territory** * 4% in 1815-1914 * 7% in 1715-1814 * **Commerce/navigation** * 4% in 1815-1914 * 14% in 1715-1814 * **Dynastic/succession claims** * 3% in 1815-1914 * 9% in 1715-1814 * **Ideological liberation** * 3% in 1815-1914 * 1% in 1715-1814 * **Protect religious confrères** * 3% in 1815-1914 * 4% in 1715-1814 * **Maintain regional dominance** * 3% in 1815-1914 * 1% in 1715-1814 * **Empire creation** * 3% in 1815-1914 * 4% in 1715-1814 * **Regime/state survival** * 2% in 1815-1914 * 7% in 1715-1814 * **Ethnic unification/irredenta** * 2% in 1815-1914 * 1% in 1715-1814 * **National/crown honor** * 2% in 1815-1914 * 3% in 1715-1814 * **Autonomy** * 2% in 1815-1914 * 1% in 1715-1814 * **Balance of power** * 1% in 1815-1914 * 1% in 1715-1814 * **Enforce treaty terms** * 1% in 1815-1914 * 3% in 1715-1814 * **Test of strength** * 1% in 1815-1914 * 1% in 1715-1814 * **Colonial competition** * 1% in 1815-1914 * 4% in 1715-1814 * **Protect Nationals/Commercial Interests Abroad** * 1% in 1815-1914 * 3% in 1715-1814 The rise of national liberation/state creation and national unification issues that generated wars in the nineteenth century was accompanied by the significant decline of many of the issues that were the sources of war prior to the French Revolution. The significant decline of the old issues is perhaps a paradox of the nineteenth century as "while the peoples of Italy and the Balkans were attempting to liberate themselves and to create political structures based on ethnic/language/ and religious bases, France, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and the United States set about to create or expand overseas empires. The two processes were almost simultaneous: empire disintegration and empire creation." ## The Character of War Preparation * The French revolutionary and Napoleonic regimes introduced vast social, organizational, and ideological changes in the arts, organization, and strategies of warfare. * Technological changes were relatively minor. * After the Congress of Vienna, military dispositions tended to revert to pre-revolutionary patterns. * Most governments did not introduce or maintain conscription, and most important, they did not deploy their troops in a threatening manner. * Diplomacy was left to the diplomats and military advisers came into the decision-making process only after war had been declared. * Military planning did not constrain diplomatic action. * Options were left open, although some governments did anticipate the most likely avenues of attack. * Russia had no concentration troops in the south as a permanent threat to Turkey. Austrian and Russian garrisons were posed mostly against Poland, ready to intervene against any revolutionary activity there. * The bulk of the Prussian army was on the Rhine, deployed there on the common assumption of the time that the main threat to Europe remained a French revolutionary onslaught of the 1792 and 1798 models. * Military forces were not of such a size, in any event, as to constitute a significant threat to neighbors and adversaries. * The great powers had only vague notions of each others’ land and naval military resources. * The task of the military was to win wars after they had been declared, and not to direct diplomatic events to accommodate military plans. Policy-making remained firmly in the hands of the civilians. Finally, both military and civilian leaders anticipated short wars. * **The Military Experience** The military experience of the first three quarters of the nineteenth century was characterized by unusually brief contests of arms, usually terminated after one or two decisive battles. The Crimean War and the American Civil War were the only exceptions. * **Military Planning in the Late Nineteenth Century** Military planning in the late nineteenth century became increasingly detailed and based on fixed views about the identity of the enemy. Options became increasingly narrower as railway timetables, mobilization plans, and logistics problems all had to be worked out in detail ahead of the first battle. Efficiency and speed were the values to be maximized, and the plan had to incorporate roles for all sorts of new weapons systems. By the turn of the century, conscription was the rule rather than the exception in Europe. The emphasis on creating mighty and efficient military machines escaped close civilian scrutiny. Particularly in Wilhelm's Germany, civilian control over the military was eroded badly. Between the 1860s and the turn of the century, for example, the Reichstag lost the right even to debate or discuss the military budget except for special occasions usually spaced as far apart as every seven years. The Kaiser made the key decisions, and looked for advice primarily to his own military cabinet and to the general staff. In France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, civilian controls remained more effective. ## The Meaning of War After the Napoleonic Wars, political leaders and diplomats continued to see the military in instrumental terms. War was defined in terms of specific political ends. Clausewitz's view of the military operating in a defined political context was the conventional wisdom of the day. Force was an adjunct to, and not a replacement for, diplomacy. Although the nature of warfare had changed considerably during the Napoleonic period, its functions in international relations had not. The wars of the first half-century after the Congress of Vienna had very clearly understood purposes defined in terms of the issues discussed above. Once the purposes had been achieved, or if a stalemate and/or military exhaustion developed on the battlefield, the war terminated. * **The Transition to Total War** The transition to total war was driven by the following trends: * Increasing significance of the professional military in diplomacy * The growth of jingoism, militarism, and the mechanization of warfare * The increasingly significant role of the professional military in diplomacy * The creation of a new phenomenon in international relations: the war between entire societies for unknown or obscure purposes The nineteenth century witnessed a continuing problem of concern, requiring political action to restrict its use. Wars were seen as the end product of a more fundamental issue than just a dispute between nations. This was a struggle for social, economic, and cultural supremacy and expansion. ## The Old and Declining War-Generating Issues The quest for territory declined as a source of international conflict. Contests over territory appeared in thirteen of the thirty-one wars (42 percent), but that is a significant change from the 67 percent figure for the 1715–1814 period. The value of territory as a basis for national power, status, and prestige did not diminish notably; it is only that the issues generated by constitutional, liberal, and national causes underlay more of the conflicts of the era. Dynastic and succession issues declined notably as sources of international conflict and war. Royal legitimacy was constantly challenged by constitutional, liberal, and national principles, but these involved questions not so much of who would rule as how peoples would be ruled. Colonial competition, the struggle to create exclusive zones of economic activity and settlement, ceased to generate armed conflicts for more than sixty years after the Congress of Vienna. ## The Balance of Power * The general principle of power balancing or a "balance of power" was maintained by means other than force. * The British position on the "Eastern Question" that so frequently upset the repose of Europe was to restrain Russian pressure against the Ottomans. * The Vienna Congress did not include discussion of the Ottoman problem. * The balance of power was understood to refer to alliances or other means. The "destruction of the Ottoman Empire and a corresponding extension of Russian power into the region would be inconsistent with the general balance. Thus Great Britain, and to a lesser extent France and Austria, sought to support the Turks against Russian pressures." * The British and the French supported Turkish armies and navies. * The British often tried to coerce the Sultan into providing greater religious freedom and political autonomy for the Orthodox Christians and Slavic populations * The British fought on the Sultan's side against Russia in 1853-1856. By the late nineteenth century, the balance of power began to refer primarily to the military balance of the two alliances, or of two individual states, such as France and Germany. ## Old and Declining Issues: Other The other old issues were not as significant, but are briefly discussed here: * **Commerce/navigation** * **National/crown honor** * **Balance of power** * **Enforce Treaty Terms** * **Test of Strength** * **Colonial Competition** * **Protect Nationals/Commercial Interests Abroad** The category "test of strength," however, needs a comment. The Franco-Prussian War was in some ways unique, particularly because there were few concrete issues dividing the two nations. ## The Problem of Peace Clemenceau, a veteran of the breakdown of the European system in the early twentieth century, once quipped that war is easier to make than peace. * **The Concert of Europe as a Mechanism of Peace** One of the main mechanisms of peace was the territorial balance of power which was maintained by means other than force. The European powers were committed to the balance, particularly by Great Britain, which helped to ensure the survival of the Ottoman Empire and a few other political entities through the nineteenth century. The other mechanism for maintaining peace was the Concert of Europe, which was an informal association of the powers, to which Turkey was not admitted until 1856. The Concert was based on the idea of a general European interest, of an organic society of states. The unofficial rules of the Concert of Europe were: * The Powers have a common responsibility for maintaining the Vienna settlement, and for monitoring, managing, and sanctioning any deviations from it. * No change should be made unilaterally * No change should be to the significant disadvantage of any power in particular, or to the balance of power in general. * Change can come only through consent; unilateral behavior without consultation and implied or explicit consent is evidence of aggressive intent. * Consent means consensus, but votes are not to be taken European powers acted with restraint until the Crimean War and again during the 1870s and 1880s. They rarely acted arbitrarily or capriciously, and major decisions usually followed only after mutual consultations. The Concert was effective in managing conflict and maintaining European stability. The Concert provided a solution to the following crises: * The Belgian problem * The secession of Greece from the Ottoman Empire * The crises between Belgium and Luxemburg * The war between Russia and Turkey (1853-1856) * The Crimean War * The Russo-Turkish War * The incorporation of Eastern Rumelia into Bulgaria The Concert was also effective because of the particular distribution of power and the impossibility of creating permanent coalitions. ## Nation-State Creation and System Breakdown The architects of the Paris and Vienna settlements ignored the principle of nationality. States were abolished, created, partitioned, and “adjusted" in terms of an overall conception of rough parity and equilibrium, with appropriate territorial defenses against any future French ambitions. Support for the principle of nationality became increasingly important for policy-makers in succeeding years and was applied to Greece and to Belgium within several years. By the 1860s, Napoleon III was not the only one who was concerned about the state of the European order. The habit and practice of collaboration, consent, and limits were being eroded rapidly. The tenor of international relations changed from a reasonable moderation to increased national rivalry and competition * **The Inevitability of War** The loss of Alsace-Lorraine, demanded by Prussia as an afterthought, struck a great blow to the flexibility of the system. It ruled out any prospect of future Franco-German collaboration, and provided the French with a sense of grievance and humiliation that cried out for revenge. The Franco-Russian alliance established in 1892 created the belief that Germany was like a man living among deadly enemies, only able to survive by being sufficiently armed to defeat and to anticipate all attacks. The breakdown of the balance of power system, coupled with the rising militarism of the late nineteenth century, set the stage for the outbreak of World War I. The nineteenth century could not be understood in a model of power based on a single source of power, such as the size of armies, the number of garrisons or forts, or the number of vessels in navies. By the late nineteenth century, however, those who were concerned with the distribution of power were also concerned with the rapid growth of military manpower, railways, and naval vessels. The growth in the number of European non-great power states was not incompatible with a balance of power system, provided that they did not essentially alter the balance between the great powers by coalescing with one of them, or that they were not used by the same powers as Trojan horses for their own aggrandizement. The problem was that the European order, as conceived and developed in the first half of the nineteenth century, was incompatible with the continued existence of two essential actors, the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. The end of the Ottoman Empire in 1914 resulted from the collapse of its European system and the triumph of the principle of nationality. The Ottoman Empire provided a solution to the Russian advance into Europe, and the Austrian Empire served as a check on that advance. The principle of nationality meant that there were many nations who could only be free if the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires were destroyed. The new nationalist fervor in Europe gave rise to new nations who were unwilling to be subjugated. The new states became pawns in the growing rivalry of the two great powers. The growth in the number of lesser powers did not necessarily incompatible with a balance of power system, provided they did not essentially alter the balance between the great powers by coalescing with one of them, or that they were not used by the same powers as Trojan horses for their own aggrandizement. The problem was that the the European order, as conceived and developed in the first half of the nineteenth century, was incompatible with the continued existence of two essential actors, the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was already in rapid decline in the early twentieth century due to a multitude of problems: * The growing military power of Serbia and Italy * The agitation among Austria's Slavic populations * The growing desire for autonomy or independence among the Slovenes, Magyars, Poles, Czechs, and other remaining ethnic minorities in the empire. The combination of tensions and the rise of new empires in the Balkans led to the outbreak of World War I, a war that was ultimately caused by the desire of the great powers to assert themselves, to maintain their honor, and to avoid being sidelined or undermined. The traditional constraints of the 1815 order, such as the balance of power and the Concert of Europe, were no longer effective in preventing or resolving conflicts. ## Conclusion The outbreak of World War I was a direct result of the failure of the European system of 1815. This system sought to maintain peace through a balance of power and through diplomacy, but it was unable to cope with the rise of nationalism and the decline of empires. The great powers ultimately resorted to war to assert their interests, but they did so not in a way that was consistent with the prevailing social order or the norms of international relations. The war was a catastrophe that ended the Concert of Europe and ushered in a new era of global conflict. The period from 1815 to 1914 was a time of unprecedented conflict and upheaval. But it was also a time of great progress in many areas: economic, social, and cultural. The failure of Europe’s leading statesmen to establish a system of international peace and cooperation is a reminder that even amidst the achievements of civilization, humanity's capacity for self-destruction remains.