International History Lecture 4 PDF

12-09-2024 IR-1010-1 Nayan Chanda Lecture 4 International History The Korean War became the firs...

12-09-2024 IR-1010-1 Nayan Chanda Lecture 4 International History The Korean War became the first international conflict, a "hot war" of the Cold War due to the direct military confrontation between communist and non-communist forces, primarily involving North and South Korea, but also drawing in major powers like the US, Soviet Union, and China. Chinese government’s involvement outside its border just after the end of a bloody and ruinous war was a gamble. Why did China do it? What was Mao Zedong’s responsibility for this involvement? Born in 1893 in a prosperous peasant family, Mao graduated from high school at 25. While working in Beijing University library he became familiar with Marxist thoughts and made acquaintance with early Marxist thinkers. He joined them to found the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. While working at the peasant movement training institute Mao became aware of the revolutionary potential of the Chinese peasantry. The repression against communists launched by their erstwhile ally Kuomintang (KMT) in 1927 forced them to retreat to the rural areas. Mao retreated with a small band of followers to Jinggangshan mountain in Jiangxi province. The rebel army formed there had to escape from the encirclement of the pursuing KMT. This strategic retreat that covered about 6,000 miles is known as the Long March. It began with around 130,000 trekkers. By the end of the trek, only 8,000 had survived the journey. Trudging through mountains, over rivers and across uncharted country they reached the small town of Yan’an in the province of Shanxi – the new revolutionary base where they remained throughout the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45). From their base at Yan’an, the communists grew in strength and eventually defeated the Nationalists in the struggle to control mainland China. 1  12-09-2024 Mao and the Long March 1934-35 Mao consolidated his rule over the Party in the years after the Long March and directed overall strategy during the Sino-Japanese War and the civil war. During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), China was effectively divided into three regions—Nationalist China under control of the government, Communist China, and the areas occupied by Japan. Each was essentially pitted against the other two, although Chinese military forces were ostensibly allied under the banner of the United Front. By the time Japan accepted the surrender terms of the Potsdam Declaration on August 14, 1945, China had endured decades of Japanese occupation and eight years of brutal warfare. Mao formally assumed the post of Party Chairman in 1945. A fresh attempt to build an anti-Japanese united front with KMT soon foundered. After see-saw battle between the communists and KMT for three years Mao declared the PRC on October 1, 1949 and by the end of the year KMT set up their government on Taiwan. 2  12-09-2024 https://www.the-map-as- history.com/Cold-War-western-eastern- bloc/the-korean-war-1950-1953 Viewed from the outside, the roots lay in the policies and Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States which created spheres of influence and divided a single Korea into two. “One should say that without the division of Korea there would have been no Korean War and without the Cold War Korea would not have been divided. “ According Chinese scholars who have studied Russian and Chinese archives, the responsibility for the actual outbreak of the war falls squarely on the shoulders of Stalin who, unlike those in the Truman administration, was willing to unleash his impatient and aggressive Korean client. Stalin became not only the key actor in the initiation of the war, but, more importantly from the Chinese perspective, a silent co-conspirator with Washington in denying the Chinese Communist Party closure in the civil war against the Nationalists. Steven M. Goldstein In the 1950s,Western scholars, strongly influenced by the intensifying Cold War, generally viewed China’s entrance into the Korean War as a reflection of a well-coordinated Communist plot of worldwide expansion, believing that the entire international Communist movement was under the control of Moscow, and that neither Beijing nor Pyongyang had the freedom to make their own foreign policy decisions. The Korean conflict, therefore, was seen as an essential part of a life-and-death confrontation between the Communists on the one hand and the “free world” on the other. Allen Whiting wrote that after the Inchon landing Beijing tried through both public and private channels to prevent UN forces from crossing the 38th parallel. Beijing entered the war only after all warnings had been ignored by Washington and General Douglas MacArthur and, therefore, in the Beijing leadership’s view, the safety of the Chinese-Korean border was severely menaced. Whiting thus concluded that Beijing’s management of the Korean crisis was based primarily on the Chinese Communist perception of America’s threat to China’s national security.. 3  12-09-2024 Lacking a real understanding of the logic, dynamics, goals, and means of Communist China’s foreign policy, they treat Beijing’s management of the Korean crisis simply as a passive reaction to the policy of the United States. They thus imply that American policy is the source of all virtues as well as evils in the world—if something went wrong somewhere, it must have been the result of a mistake committed by the United States. Chen Jian argues that China’s entry into the Korean War was determined by concerns much more complicated than safeguarding the Chinese-Korean border. To comprehend China’s decision to enter the war, one must first examine the CCP leaders’ perception of China’s security interests and their judgment of to what extent and in which ways such interests had been challenged during the Korean crisis. On October 25, 1950 the CPV initiated its first campaign in Korea, suddenly attacking South Korean troops in the Unsan area. In twelve days, South Korean troops were forced to retreat from areas close to the Yalu to the Chongchun River. This suddenly changed the balance of power since the beginning of the UN intervention. It would take three years for the two sides to reach an agreement. Fighting ended on July 27, 1953, with each side holding approximately the same positions as they had three years before. 4  12-09-2024 Three fundamental and interrelated rationales had dominated Beijing’s formulation of foreign policy and security strategy:  the party’s revolutionary nationalism,  its sense of responsibility toward an Asian-wide or worldwide revolution,  its determination to maintain the inner dynamics of the Chinese revolution. Beijing’s management of the Korean crisis cannot be properly comprehended without an understanding of these rationales and the mentality related to them. Chinese people’s commitment to Communist revolution in grew out of the belief that the revolution would revitalize the Chinese nation and lead to the destruction of the “old world,” and that China’s position as a “Central Kingdom” would be resumed in the emergence of the “new world.” With the Communist seizure of power in China the CCP’s revolutionary nationalism became a persistent driving force for changing China’s weak power status and pursuing a prominent position in the world. Mao believed that it was the duty of Chinese Communists to support Communist revolutions and national liberation movements in other countries. Communist China’s foreign policy was in essence revolutionary: Mao and the other CCP leaders made it clear that the “new China” would not tolerate any of the diplomatic legacies of the “old China,” that Communist China would lean to the side of the Soviet Union and other “world revolutionary forces.” p. 214 5  12-09-2024 How to maintain and enhance the inner dynamics of the great Chinese revolution thus became Mao’s central concern. When Mao first encountered this problem as the ruler of the new China in 1949, among other things, his train of thought developed in terms of emphasizing the continuous existence of outside threats to the revolution. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao and the CCP leadership found that the Korean crisis challenged China’s national security while at the same time offering them a possible means to mobilize the Chinese nation under the CCP’s terms. In a sense, it is legitimate to believe that China’s road to the Korean War started long before the outbreak of the war itself. p. 215 In a deeper sense, the CCP’s foreign policy in general and its attitude toward the Korean crisis in particular were shaped by the determination on the part of Mao and the CCP leadership to maintain the inner dynamics of the Chinese Communist revolution. How to maintain its momentum and enhance the inner dynamics of the great Chinese revolution became Mao’s central concern. While identifying the United States as the PRC’s primary enemy, Mao and the CCP leadership did not necessarily perceive Washington as an immediate threat to China’s physical security. But they did continue to emphasize the seriousness of the “American threat” and prepared for a long-range confrontation with the United States. The CCP leadership consistently treated the Untied States as China’s primary enemy and prepared throughout 1949–1950 for the coming of an inevitable confrontation. In fact, in mid-July, in accordance with Mao’s ideas of crisis management, the CCP leadership initiated the “Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea. When the North Koreans’ position began to deteriorate continuously in August, Mao came to the fore of Beijing’s decision-making. P.218 The situation was made more complicated by American policymakers’ superpower mentality. Having achieved a dominating position in the postwar world the leaders believed in their special destiny and assumed that American values held universal significance. The American leaders were also unwilling to understand the environment in which Beijing leaders made decisions. Their attempt to drive a wedge between Soviets and Chinese party only increased Beijing’s hostility toward the United States. It was easy for each side to misperceive the intentions of the other; and it was difficult for both sides to avoid sharp collision in a crisis situation. The decision to send Chinese troops to Korea was certainly the most difficult one that Mao and his fellow CCP leaders had to make in the early years of the PRC. Top Beijing leaders were under intense pressure caused by cruel domestic and international conditions while making the decision. As revealed by this study, the opinion of the party leadership was far from unanimous on the necessity of entering the Korean War. 6  12-09-2024 American military intervention in Korea and the Seventh Fleet’s movement into the Taiwan Strait after the eruption of the Korean conflict endangered the PRC’s security interests. When the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel and marched toward the Yalu in early October 1950 the PRC’s physical security, especially the safety of the strategically and economically important Manchuria, was under immediate threat. Mao and the other leaders could not allow American forces to reach the Yalu River border; nor would they be willing to see a friendly neighboring Communist regime which has been in China’s traditional sphere of influence destroyed by a hostile imperialist power. With hindsight, it can also be seen that Washington’s decision to cross the 38th parallel provided a justification for Beijing’s entrance into the Korean War. Even after severe challenge posed by Moscow’s withdrawal of its promised air support in Korea, Mao persuaded comrades to intervene. p. 218 The chairman regarded the Korean crisis as both a challenge and an opportunity for the new China to achieve greater domestic and international aims: if the PRC could successfully meet the challenge posed by the United States, the world’s number one power, it would not only greatly enhance the CCP’s ruling position at home and push forward Mao’s perceived revolutionary transformation of Chinese society; but it would also signal revolutionary China’s reemergence as a prominent world power. By the late 1940s, Mao had become the CCP’s paramount leader and key decisionmaker. The new China’s external policies became a domain reserved exclusively for the party’s top leadership and, particularly, Mao himself. Despite reluctance of some leaders including Lin Biao Mao pushed ahead with the decision to intervene. Washington, with its eyes fixed its on possible reactions from Moscow and paid little attention to the implications and logic of Beijing’s behavior. Members of the Truman administration consistently underestimated the political-military capacities of Communist China. p. 219 China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited by Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai From the materials now available on the Chinese side, we can see that Chinese participation was neither a long-planned, well-designed operation, nor an action taken as part of the Soviet Union's global expansion. Stalin might have persuaded Mao not to take action if Mao had not reached the conclusion that a Sino-American confrontation was inevitable or if Truman had shown some flexibility in his policy when the CCP took over the mainland. Ideology played an important but not an absolute role in Mao's decision. From what we have discussed, it is fairly clear that the reasons why China entered the Korean War were primarily security concerns. Fearing a growing military threat from the United States, and believing that Sino-American military confrontation was inevitable, CCP leaders maintained that it might be wise for them to select the time and place. The China Quarterly, No. 121 (Mar., 1990), pp. 94-115 7  12-09-2024 Marshall Peng Dehuai and Mao, 1953 The loss of tens of thousands of its soldiers on the battlefield, expenditure of billions of dollars on military purposes at the expense of China’s economic reconstruction, prevented Beijing from recovering Taiwan, made Beijing, at least in the short-run, more dependent upon Moscow than before. During the three years of the war, along with the “Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea,” three other nationwide campaigns swept across China’s countryside and cities: the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries, the land reform movement, and the political movements. It effectively strengthened its organizational control of Chinese society and dramatically increased its authority in the minds of the Chinese people. Never before in modern Chinese history had a regime accomplished so much in so short a period. The Korean War experience made the timing, magnitude, and depth of the CCP’s designs to transform Chinese society more ambitious than they would have been otherwise. p. 221 Mao’s decision to enter the Korean War was widely praised as a “brilliant decision”. The new China’s state building became increasingly entangled with the development of Mao’s personal cult. sonal cult. Enjoying political power with fewer checks and balances, Mao was in a freer position to carry out his utopian plans to transform Chinese society, A Mao with unlimited power would finally lead the country toward such disastrous experiments as the “Great Leap Forward” and the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” p. 221 8  12-09-2024 Three particularly important consequences of Korean intervention were: 1. Mao and his fellow CCP leaders would feel a strong need to reexamine China’s alliance with the Soviet Union and, in They could not forget that as the result of Stalin’s “betrayal” at a crucial juncture, China had to begin military operations in Korea without Soviet air support..As a result, Mao and the other Beijing leaders would put more emphasis on “self-reliance” as the fundamental principle in maintaining China’s security interests. China’s experience during the Korean War thus turned into the prelude of the future Sino-Soviet Split. p.222 The Korean War experience further convinced Mao that mass mobilization was an effective way to maintain and enhance China’s security status. On the Korean battlefield, the Chinese had pushed the Americans back to the 38th parallel from the Chinese-Korean border by outnumbering the UN forces and possessing, in Mao’s belief, a higher morale as the result of successful political mobilization. Mao would thereafter take political mobilization as one of the most important means in pursuing China’s national security interests. p.223 in contemplating the lessons of the Korean War, Mao could not ignore the role played by modern technology and equipment in a modern war. The American technological superiority cost hundreds of thousands of Chinese lives on the battlefield, and consequently, the Chinese did not achieve the total victory that Mao had so Eagerly pursued largely because of their technological backwardness. Mao would still emphasize the importance of the “human factor” in modern warfare, but he would also call for the development of China’s own atomic bomb and other advanced armaments, so that China’s “spiritual atomic bomb” would be reinforced by the real bomb. p 223 9  12-09-2024 The main topic of 'Maoism: A Global History' is the ideology and impact of Maoism on a global scale. It traces its historical development, principles, spread of its influence beyond China, and manifestations in various countries in the world. The main topic of 'Maoism: A Global History' is the ideology and impact of Maoism on a global scale. It traces its historical development, principles, spread of its influence beyond China, and manifestations in various countries in the world. Two original themes in his thoughts are  Mao’s veneration of the peasantry as a revolutionary force  his lifelong tenderness for anarchic rebellion against authority. But three other themes are taken from Lenin and Stalin:  veneration of political violence,  championing of anti-colonial resistance,  use of thought-control techniques to forge a disciplined, increasingly repressive party and society. 10  12-09-2024 Born in 1893 in a prosperous peasant family, Mao graduated from high school at 25. While working in Beijing University library he became familiar with Marxist thoughts and made acquaintance with early Marxist thinkers. He joined them to found the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. While working at the peasant movement training institute Mao became aware of the revolutionary potential of the Chinese peasantry. The repression against communists launched by their erstwhile ally Kuomintang (KMT) in 1927 forced them to retreat to the rural areas. Mao retreated with a small band of followers to Jinggangshan mountain in Jiangxi province. The rebel army formed there had to escape from the encirclement of the pursuing KMT. This strategic retreat covering about 6,000 miles, is known as the Long March. It began with around 130,000 trekkers. By the end of the trek, only 8,000 had survived the journey. Trudging through mountains, over rivers and across uncharted country they reached the small town of Yan’an in the province of Shanxi – the new revolutionary base where they remained throughout the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45). From their base at Yan’an, the communists grew in strength and eventually defeated the Nationalists in the struggle to control mainland China. Mao and the Long March 1934-35 Mao consolidated his rule over the Party in the years after the Long March and directed overall strategy during the Sino-Japanese War and the civil war. During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), China was effectively divided into three regions—Nationalist China under control of the government, Communist China, and the areas occupied by Japan. Each was essentially pitted against the other two, although Chinese military forces were ostensibly allied under the banner of the United Front. By the time Japan accepted the surrender terms of the Potsdam Declaration on August 14, 1945, China had endured decades of Japanese occupation and eight years of brutal warfare.Mao formally assumed the post of Party Chairman in 1945. A fresh attempt to build an anti-Japanese united front with KMT soon foundered. After see-saw nettle between the communists and KMT for three years Mao declared the PRC on October 1, 1949 and by the end of the year KMT set up their government on Taiwan. 11  12-09-2024 Mao consolidated his rule over the Party in the years after the Long March and directed overall strategy during the Sino-Japanese War and the civil war. During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), China was effectively divided into three regions—Nationalist China under control of the government, Communist China, and the areas occupied by Japan. Each was essentially pitted against the other two, although Chinese military forces were ostensibly allied under the banner of the United Front. By the time Japan accepted the surrender terms of the Potsdam Declaration on August 14, 1945, China had endured decades of Japanese occupation and eight years of brutal warfare.Mao formally assumed the post of Party Chairman in 1945. A fresh attempt to build an anti-Japanese united front with KMT soon foundered. After see-saw nettle between the communists and KMT for three years Mao declared the PRC on October 1, 1949 and by the end of the year KMT set up their government on Taiwan. After the overthrow of the Qing dynasty Sun Yat-sen - the republic’s first president had forged an alliance between his Nationalist Party and the Communist Part, which was funded, trained and armed by the Soviet Union. Following Sun’s death in 1925 the uneasy alliance collapsed. The GMD had always relied on the moneyed classes for funds, while the Communists were devoted to organising rebellion by China’s urban workers and poor farmers. Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalists, marched into Shanghai at the end of March 1927 and made a secret deal with Shanghai’s Gang, and launched surprise attack on the city’s Communists. Mao learned his lesson. In the 1940s, war carried him to absolute power. In the 1950s, he imposed military' discipline on Chinese society and agriculture to achieve crash-industrialisation and finance his nuclear programme. He led a revolution in which political violence against ‘counter- revolutionaries’ was perfectly normalised. In 1968, after the first two anarchic years of Cultural Revolution, he turned China into an army dictatorship. A vision of Mao was projected as heroic foot soldiers in a global People's War crossed continents, turning him into the architect of defiant, protracted, guerrilla warfare against the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers with “aspiring insurgents from California to Kolkata worshipped him as the military colossus of the revolution.”. Mao’s native Hunan province registered an increase in membership of peasant associations from 300,000 to 10 million in just one year. They emerged as the main force of the People’s Liberation Army Marx infamously likened peasants to 'potatoes in a sack’ - he believed that the urban, not the rural, proletariat would carry the revolution. Lenin and Stalin adapted this view only to turn the peasantry into the key source of ‘primitive capital accumulation’, the springboard for rapid Lenin and Stalin adapted this view only to turn the peasantry into the key source of ‘primitive capital accumulation’, the springboard for rapid industrialisation and modernisation to catch up with Europe. For over half a century, exploitation of the peasantry was the norm for Soviet Communism. 12  12-09-2024 “A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery. it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle... A revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows the power of another... They, who used to rank below everyone else, now rank above everybody else.” Mao condensed the principles of guerilla warfare in a sixteen-syllable jingle for his illiterate peasant troops: “when the enemy advances, retreat; when the enemy rests, harass; when the enemy grows tired, attack; when the enemy retreats, pursue” “Comrade Mao Zedong's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed nations and peoples... if North America and Western Europe can be called ‘the cities of the world’, then Asia. Africa and Latin America constitute ‘the rural areas of the world'...the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas.” Marshal Lin Biao, chosen successor of Mao 13