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American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 1 March 2001 Governance in a Partially Globalized World Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2000 ROBERT O. KEOHANE Duke University...

American Political Science Review Governance in a Partially Globalized World Presidential Address, American Political Science ROBERT O. KEOHANE F acing globalization, the challenge States: how to design institutions produces discord and requires maintain. Liberal-democratic institutions should foster persuasion rather than rely must rely on self-interest rather than self-interest depend on people’s values outcomes, must therefore be integrated as diverse as game theory, rational-choice can help political scientists understand T alk of globalization is common today in the press and increasingly in political science. Broadly speaking, globalization means the shrinkage of distance on a world scale through the emergence and thickening of networks of connections— environmental and social as well as economic (Held et al. 1999; Keohane and Nye 2001). Forms of limited globalization have existed for centuries, as exemplified by the Silk Road. Globalization took place during the last decades of the nineteenth century, only to be reversed sharply during the thirty years after World War I. It has returned even more strongly recently, although it remains far from complete. We live in a partially globalized world. Globalization depends on effective governance, now as in the past. Effective governance is not inevitable. If it occurs, it is more likely to take place through interstate cooperation and transnational networks than through a world state. But even if national states retain many of their present functions, effective governance of a partially—and increasingly— globalized world will require more extensive international institutions. Gov- ernance arrangements to promote cooperation and help resolve conflict must be developed if globalization is not to stall or go into reverse. Not all patterns of globalization would be beneficial. It is easy to conjure up nightmare scenarios of a globalized world controlled by self-serving elites work- ing to depress wages and suppress local political au- tonomy. So we need to engage in normative as well as positive analysis. To make a partially globalized world benign, we need not just effective governance but the right kind of governance. My analysis begins with two premises. The first is that increased interdependence among human beings produces discord, since self-regarding actions affect the welfare of others. At worst, the effects of international Robert O. Keohane is James B. Duke Professor Duke University, Perkins Library 214, Durham, NC 27708-0204 ([email protected]). we use to evaluate institutions according to those I am grateful to standards? I turn next to what we know about real institutions—why they exist, how they are created and maintained, and what this implies about their actual 1 March 2001 objectives for which liberal democracy, or polyarchy, is designed at the national level. Consequences We can think of outcomes in terms of how global governance affects the life situations of individuals. In outlining these outcome-related objectives, I combine Amartya Sen’s concept of capabilities with Rawls’s conception of justice. Sen (1999, 75) begins with the Aristotelian concept of “human functioning” and de- fines a person’s “capability” as “the alternative combi- nations of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve.” A person’s “capability set represents the freedom to achieve: the alternative functioning combi- nations from which this person can choose” (p. 75). Governance should enhance the capability sets of the people being governed, leading to enhancements in their personal security, freedom to make choices, and welfare as measured by such indices as the UN Human Development Index. And it should do so in a just way, which I think of in the terms made famous by Rawls (1971). Behind the “veil of ignorance,” not knowing one’s future situation, people should regard the ar- rangements for determining the distribution of capa- bilities as just. As a summary set of indicators, J. Roland Pennock’s (1966) list holds up quite well: security, liberty, welfare, and justice. Functions protection The world for which we need to design institutions will be culturally and politically so diverse that most func- tions of governance should be performed at local and national levels, on the principle familiar to students of federalism or of the European Union’s notion of “subsidiarity.” Five key functions, however, should be handled at least to some extent by regional or global institutions. The first of these functions is to limit the use of large-scale violence. Warfare has been endemic in modern world politics, and modern “total warfare” all but obliterates the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, rendering the “hard shell” of the state permeable (Herz 1959). All plans for global gover- nance, from the incremental to the utopian, begin with the determination, in the opening words of the United Nations Charter (1945), “to save succeeding genera- tions from the scourge of war.” The second function is a generalization of the first. Institutions for global governance will need to limit the negative externalities of decentralized action. A major implication of interdependence is that it provides op- portunities for actors to externalize the costs of their actions onto others. Examples include “beggar thy neighbor” monetary policies, air pollution by upwind countries, and the harboring of transnational criminals, terrorists, or former dictators. Much international con- flict and discord can be interpreted as resulting from such negative externalities; much international cooper- ation takes the form of mutual adjustment of policy to reduce these externalities or internalize some of their Vol. 95, No. 1 1865 is an important historical example. Yet, the expansion of concern about human rights during the past two decades has been extraordinary, both in the scope of rights claimed—and frequently codified in UN agreements—and in the breadth of transnational advo- cacy movements and coalitions promoting such rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Concern about poverty, however, has not been matched by effective action to eliminate the source of human misery (World Bank 2000). commu- distributional Procedures Liberal democrats are concerned not only with out- comes but also with procedures. I will put forward three procedural criteria for an acceptable global gov- ernance system. The first is accountability: Publics need to have ways to hold elites accountable for their actions. The second is participation: Democratic prin- ciples require that some level of participation in mak- ing collective decisions be open to all competent adults in the society. The third is persuasion, facilitated by the existence of institutionalized procedures for communi- cation, insulated to a significant extent from the use and threats of force and sanctions, and sufficiently open to hinder manipulation. Our standards of accountability, participation, and persuasion will have to be quite minimal to be realistic in a polity of perhaps ten billion people. Because I assume the maintenance of national societies and state or state-like governance arrangements, I do not pre- sume that global governance will benefit from consen- sus on deep substantive principles. Global governance will have to be limited and somewhat shallow if it is to be sustainable. Overly ambitious attempts at global governance would necessarily rely too much on mate- rial sanctions and coercion. The degree of consensus on principles— even procedural principles, such as those of accountability, participation, and persuasion— would be too weak to support decisions that reach deeply into people’s lives and the meanings that they construct for themselves. The point of presenting ideal criteria is to portray a direction, not a blueprint. Now that these normative cards are on the table, I turn to some of the positive contributions of political science. In the next section I ask how we can use our knowledge as political scientists to design sustainable institutions that would perform the functions I have listed. In the final section I explore how these institu- tions could facilitate the democratic procedural virtues of accountability, participation, and persuasion. These issues are all part of one overriding question: How can we design institutions that would facilitate human functioning, in the sense of Aristotle or Sen? INSTITUTIONAL EXISTENCE AND POWER How can authoritative institutions exist at all? This is a question that Rousseau ( 1978, I, 1) claimed not to know how to answer and that students of interna- tional politics have recently debated. No student of international relations is likely to forget that institu- 3 March 2001 public good (North 1981, 68; 1990, 93). Indeed, rent- seeking coalitions have incentives to resist socially beneficial institutional innovations that would reduce their own advantages (Olson 1982). Functional solutions to the problem of institutional existence are therefore incomplete. There must be political entrepreneurs with both the capacity and the incentives to invest in the creation of institutions and the monitoring and enforcement of rules. Unless the entrepreneurs can capture selective benefits from their activities, they will not create institutions. And these institutions will not be effective unless sufficient com- pliance is induced by a combination of material and normative incentives. To use economic language, prob- lems of supply (Bates 1988; Shepsle and Weingast 1995) as well as demand have to be solved. Mancur Olson’s (1965) analysis of the logic of col- lective action has two major implications for the gov- ernance of a globalized world. First, there is no guar- antee that governance arrangements will be created that will sustain high levels of globalism. As Western history reveals, notably in the collapse of the Roman Empire and in World War I, extensive social and economic relations can be undermined by a collapse of governance. At the global as well as national level, political scientists need to be as concerned with de- grees of governance as with forms of governance (Huntington 1968, 1). The second implication of Olson’s insight is that we cannot understand why institutions vary so much in their degree of effectiveness simply by studying institu- tions. To focus only on existing institutions is to select on the dependent variable, giving us no variance and no leverage on our problem. On the contrary, we need to explore situations in which institutions have not been created, despite a widespread belief that if such insti- tutions were created, they would be beneficial. Or we can compare situations in which institutions exist to earlier ones in which they were absent (cf. Tilly 1975, 1990). to compe- Institutional Theory and Bargaining Equilibria Rational-choice institutionalism in political science in- sists that institutions, to persist, must reflect bargaining equilibria of games in which actors seek to pursue their own interests, as they define them. This perspective, stated elegantly by Kenneth Shepsle (1986), is not new in its essentials. Indeed, in investigating the effects of constitutions, Aristotle held that those vesting author- ity in the middle class will promote rationality and the protection of property rights (Politics IV, xi, 4 –15).1 He sought to explain variations in constitutional forms by referring to variations in social conditions (Politics IV, iii, 1– 6). And he argued that a stable constitution is not only one that a majority seeks to maintain but also one for which “there is no single section in all the state in terms of the innovation 1 All references to Aristotle’s Politics are to Barker’s (1948) transla- tion. Vol. 95, No. 1 why do institutions not simply “inherit” rather than solve Arrow’s paradox (Aldrich 1993)? The general answer seems to be that institutions generate rules that resolve Arrow’s paradox, for exam- ple, by giving agenda-setting power to particular agents (Shepsle 1986) or by requiring supermajorities to change institutional arrangements. These rules ensure that majorities cannot alter them easily when the median voter’s preferences change. First-mover advantages and agenda control provide incentives for institutional innovation and help to stabilize institutions. They operate somewhat differ- ently, however, in coordination and collaboration situ- ations, as described above. In situations of coordina- tion, institutions, once accepted, are in equilibrium. Participants do not have incentives to deviate unilater- ally from widely accepted standards for Internet con- nectivity or airline traffic control. Institutions to solve collaboration problems are much more fragile. After an agreement on institutions to solve collaboration problems is reached, participants typically have incen- tives to defect if they expect to avoid retaliation from others (Martin 1992). Students of international relations have used this distinction to show how much more difficult it is to maintain collaboration institutions: Monitoring and enforcement are essential. Furthermore, during the bargaining process “hold-outs” may be able to negoti- ate better terms for themselves in collaboration than in s, coordination situations, since threats to remain outside collaboration-oriented institutions are more credible entry for than threats to remain outside a widely accepted coordination equilibrium. In international relations, can exist, the side-payments negotiated by China and India to join the ozone regime, and the refusal so far of developing countries to be bound by emissions restric- tions in a climate change regime, illustrate this point. If we keep our normative as well as positive lenses in focus, we will see that this apparent advantage of coordination institutions has a dark side. Initiators of coordination institutions can exercise great influence over the choice of focal points, thereby gaining an enduring first-mover advantage over their rivals (Kras- ner 1991). Collaboration institutions do not offer such first-mover advantages, since participants can defect at lower cost. Collaboration institutions therefore provide fewer opportunities, as compared to coordination in- stitutions, for coercion of latecomers. Real institutions usually combine coordination and collaboration func- tions, and therefore also contain a mixture of destabi- lizing (or liberating) elements and stabilizing (or po- tentially oppressive) ones. Institutions, whether emphasizing coordination or collaboration, necessarily institutionalize bias, in favor of groups that have agenda control or wish to maintain the status quo. It is therefore not surprising that advocates of social equality, such as Thomas Jefferson, and democrats such as Rousseau, are often suspicious of institutions. Barriers to competition confer monop- olistic privileges and therefore create normative prob- lems. Yet, institutions are essential for the good life. Normatively, those of us who believe in Shklar’s 5 March 2001 tially unlimited number of equilibria appear in all interesting games. When the equilibrium rabbit is to be pulled from the hat, we are as likely to get a thousand rabbits as one. Equilibria multiply like rabbits in Aus- tralia and are about as useful. As Elinor Ostrom (1998, 4) commented in her address to this association three years ago, the assumptions of rationality, amoral self- interest, and lack of influence from social norms lead to explanatory chaos: “Everything is predicted: optimal outcomes, the Pareto-inferior Nash equilibria, and everything in between.” In addressing the problems of institutional design, it is a good thing that people are not purely egotistical. It would be difficult to understand the creation of major political institutions—from the U.S. Constitution to UN-sponsored human rights agreements—if we took egotism and the free-rider problem too seriously. We are indeed wise to assume that institutions, to be in long-term equilibrium, must be broadly consistent with the self-interest of powerful actors. But we cannot understand the origins of institutions if we banish principled action from our analytic world. Egoists have a hard time overcoming problems of mistrust, because they know that everyone has an incentive to disguise his or her preferences. Only costly signals will be credible; but the cost of signalling reduces the prospective value of cooperation and limits the agreements that can be reached. Egoists also have difficulty solving bargaining problems, since they do not recognize norms of fairness that can provide focal points for agreement. Cool practitioners of self-inter- est, known to be such, may be less able to cooperate productively than individuals who are governed by emotions that send reliable signals, such as love or reliability (Frank 1988). In Sen’s (1977, 336) phrase, people in purely rational-choice models are “rational fools,” incapable of distinguishing among egoistic pref- erences, sympathy, and commitments. As Sen makes clear, rejecting the premise of egoism does not imply rejecting the assumption of ration- ality—more or less bounded in Herbert Simon’s (1985) sense. Nor does it imply altruism: People can empa- thize with others without being self-sacrificing. What it does is demand that norms and values be brought back into the picture. Committed individuals, seeking policy goals as well as office for its own sake, and constrained by norms of fairness or even by more transcendental values, can nevertheless calculate as rationally as the egoists of economic theory. In thinking about a partially globalized world, one might be tempted to dismiss half the governance dilemma by pointing out that because international institutions are very weak, they are unlikely to be oppressive. For example, contemporary opponents of globalization and associated international institutions have sought to portray the World Trade Organization (WTO) as some sort of bureaucratic monster, although my own university’s budget allocates more money in two weeks than WTO spends in a year.2 2 The budget of the WTO for 2000 is 127,697,010 Swiss francs, or approximately $73.8 million, at September 2000 exchange rates. Vol. 95, No. 1 nants of action. They depend heavily on trust, reputa- tion, and reciprocity, which depend in turn on networks of civic engagement, or social capital. Building such networks is an incremental process. Engagement in a just set of social relations helps create personal integ- rity, which is the basis for consistent principled action (Grant 1997). Networks of civic engagement are not easily divided into “international” and “domestic” but, rather, cross those lines (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Rational strategic action depends on the expectations and incentives that these networks create. Until recently, students of international politics paid too little attention to beliefs. The realists insisted on the dominance of interests and power, which they traced to material factors. Marxist and neoclassical political economists also relied on material forces for their explanations. Students of institutions, such as I, sought to gain credibility by showing that our theories are as realistically based in interests and power as those of our realist adversaries, that we are not tainted by the idealist brush. Ironically enough, however, the theory of strategic interaction on which we all rely has insis- tently argued that beliefs are crucial to understanding any game-theoretic situation (Morrow 1994; Wendt 1999). The fact that strategic action depends on expecta- tions means that understanding historical and cultural context is critical to any analysis of how institutions operate. Peter Katzenstein (1993, 1996) has used the differing responses of Germany and Japan to military defeat and economic revival to make this point in a cogent and forceful way. Historical explorations of institutional phenomena and negotiations may draw effectively on rational-choice theory, but they must go well beyond its premises to describe multidimensional human behavior (Bates et al. 1998). Indeed, political scientists have quite a bit to learn from international law, which studies rational strategic action in the context of rules and rule making, deeply structured by interests and power but also reflecting the influence of ideas on interests and on how power is exercised (Grewe 2000). A major task before our discipline is how to connect rational strategic action with beliefs and values. In her presidential address three years ago, Ostrom (1998) linked rational-choice theory with the laboratory ex- periments of cognitive science to show that institu- tional incentives, fundamental norms of trust, and the practice of reciprocity (Axelrod 1984; Ostrom 1990) all provide crucial foundations of cooperation. “At the core of a behavioral explanation,” Ostrom (1998, 12) said, “are the links between the trust that individuals have in others, the investment others make in trustwor- thy reputations, and the probability that participants will use reciprocity norms.” That is, principled values, “congealed” in institutions, provide the basis for mean- ingful rational actions and direct such actions in ways that we can describe and explain (Riker 1980). Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work exempli- available (1998 –99) million per week. For the fies a productive analysis of the connections among values, social norms, and rational behavior. Putnam argues that “networks of civic engagement” produce 7 March 2001 rights? Probably not, unless they had compelling inter- nal reasons, as tyrants, to do so. Ordinary egoists, governing nontyrannically, would have interests in mimicking the principled leaders whom they succeed. Furthermore, the egoists would face serious collective action problems in overturning norms of human rights: Their counterpart egoists would have an interest in defending those rights in order to enhance their repu- tation as principled agents. As a result, egoistic self- interest would counsel them to uphold the norms established and even to bear some costs in order to send credible signals that they believe in the norms (even though, by assumption, they do not). The effect of former principles would persist for a while, although it would eventually fade. What this thought-experiment illustrates is a simple but fundamental point. Beliefs in norms and princi- ples— even beliefs only held in the past— can pro- foundly affect rational action in the present. Joseph Schumpeter ( 1950, 137) made the famous argu- ment sixty years ago that capitalism requires precapi- talist values: “The stock exchange is a poor substitute for the Holy Grail.” The facile response to his argu- ment at millenium’s end could be: “Yes, but he didn’t take into account NASDAQ.” More seriously, how- ever, the varieties of capitalism in the world today, from Japanese corporatism to American legalism to Russian organized theft, make it clear that what is economically rational in each context varies enor- mously. Schumpeter was wrong about the staying power of capitalism but right about the dependence of institutions, capitalism included, on beliefs. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: BRINGING IDEALS AND REALITY TOGETHER which there I began by sketching an ideal vision—a liberal and democratic vision— of how institutions should work. On the liberal side, it includes what one might call the liberalism of progress, represented by such eighteenth- century thinkers as Smith and Madison. But it also includes Shklar’s liberalism of fear, which emphasizes the potential depravities of human nature and the pathologies of human institutions and is deeply cogni- zant of imperialism, totalitarianism, and the Holocaust (Arendt 1958). The liberalism of fear is horrified by the atrocities of Rwanda and Bosnia, but these atrocities do not shake its liberalism, which was forged in the searing recognition that human action can be horrible. The liberalism of progress and the liberalism of fear are two sides of the same coin. They both seek to understand how otherwise unattractive human pas- sions can nevertheless promote the general good. Madison is the American father of such a realistic liberalism, but it has deep roots both in English utili- tarianism, going back to Hobbes, and in French thought (Hirschman 1977; Keohane 1980). Neither Madison nor Smith indulged in the more utopian dreams of the liberalism of progress. Even though potential gains from trade, combined with advancing technology, make it possible for all economies to Vol. 95, No. 1 of domestic accountability of governments to their publics. Such practices can reinforce accountability insofar as transparency ensures that people within the several states can make judgments about their own governments’ performance. Nonelectoral dimensions of accountability also ex- ist.3 Some international regimes seek to regulate the activities of firms and of governments, although they are weaker than their domestic counterparts, and they do not meet democratic standards as well as the “best practices” domestically. Global governance, combined with modern communications technology (including technologies for linguistic translations), can begin to generate a public space in which some people commu- nicate with one another about public policy without regard to distance. Criticism, heard and responded to in a public space, can help generate accountability. Professional standards comprise another form of non- electoral accountability. Finally, markets provide a third dimension of non- electoral accountability. Since people do not bring equal wealth to the marketplace, markets are not democratic. But they do hold firms and other institu- tions with hard budget constraints accountable to their consumers and investors in ways that are often more rapid and effective than electoral democracy. Advo- cates of principle-based change have learned to use markets on issues as diverse as promotion of infant formula in poor countries, environmental protection, and labor standards. These mechanisms of accountability exist, in frag- mented ways, at the global level, but they are disartic- ulated. They do not come together in a clear pathway by which laws are enacted and implemented. Chains of delegation are long, and some of their links are hidden behind a veil of secrecy. Incentives for politicians to hold leaders of other governments accountable are lacking. Publics, professional groups, and advocacy networks can only punish leaders inconsistently. Gov- ernments, nongovernmental organizations, and firms that do not rely on brand names may be immune from market-based sanctions. In devising acceptable institu- tions for global governance, accountability needs to be built into the mechanisms of rule making and rule implementation. in the Participation Individual participation is essential to democratic gov- ernance. In the past, meaningful participation has only been feasible on a face-to-face basis, as in the New England town meeting, and it has been argued that, “in its deepest and richest sense, community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse” (Dewey 1954, 211). Yet, the costs of communication between any two points of the world no longer depend on distance, and within 50 years we can expect the forms of such communication to change in extraordi- nary ways. Although it is difficult to imagine good insti- 3 For a very sophisticated discussion of different forms of account- ability, see Scharpf 1999, especially chapter 1. 9 March 2001 their own strategies as a result of new information they receive about the strategies of others. That is, they become aware that others will not behave as they had previously expected. In bargaining, a quid pro quo is involved; in signalling, threats and promises may be unilateral. Persuasion, as I will use it, involves changing peo- ple’s choices of alternatives independently of their cal- culations about the strategies of other players. People who are persuaded, in my sense of the word, change their minds for reasons other than a recalculation of advantageous choices in light of new information about others’ behavior. They may do so because they change their preferences about the underlying attributes. They may consider new attributes during processes of choice. Or they may alter their conceptions of how attributes are linked to alternatives. Unlike bargaining on the basis of specific reciprocity, persuasion must appeal to norms, principles, and val- ues that are shared by participants in a conversation. Persuasion requires giving reasons for actions, reasons that go beyond assertions about power, interests, and resolve (Elster 1998; Risse 2000). Karl Deutsch (1953, 52) argued long ago that to be susceptible to persua- sion, people “must already be inwardly divided in their thought,” that there must be “some contradictions, actual or implied, among their habits or values.” These do not have contradictions, sharpened by discussion, may lead to influence reflection and even attitude change. legitimate. Persuasion is a major subject of study in social of political psychology (McGuire 1985; Petty and Wegener 1998). Thousands of experiments later, the essential message from this field is that, even in the laboratory, it is difficult to find strong and consistent relationships that explain attitude change. As William McGuire (1985, 304) puts it, “human motivation is sufficiently complex so that multiple and even contradictory needs may underlie any act.” What we do know about persuasion in politics indicates that it consistently involves various degrees of agenda control and manipulation. Rational or open persuasion, which occurs when people change their choices of alternatives voluntarily under conditions of frank communication, is an interesting ideal type but does not describe many major political processes. Yet, the ideal is important, since it is so central to the liberal-democratic vision of politics. Indeed, thinking about persuasion helps restate the central normative question of this address: How can institutions of gov- ernance be designed so as to increase the scope for reflection, and therefore persuasion, as opposed to force, material incentives, and fraud? If governance were exercised only by those with direct stakes in issues, such a question might have no answer. Actors could be expected to use their resources and their guile to achieve their desired objectives. And the institutions would themselves “inherit” the inequal- ities prevalent in the societies that produced them, as Rousseau and many successors have pointed out (Al- drich 1993; Riker 1980). Indeed, choices of electoral institutions can often be traced to the policy, party, and Vol. 95, No. 1 experiments (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992). Inso- far as the consequences and functions of institutions are not seriously degraded, institutions that encourage reflection and persuasion are normatively desirable and should be fostered. stake CONCLUSION I have asked how we can overcome the governance dilemma on a global scale. That is, how can we gain benefits from institutions without becoming their vic- tims? How can we help design institutions for a par- tially globalized world that perform valuable functions while respecting democratic values? And how can we foster beliefs that maintain benign institutions? My answers are drawn, mostly implicitly, from various schools of work in political science. From rational-choice institutionalism, we learn both the value of institutions and the need for incentives for institutional innovation. These incentives imply privi- leges for the elite, which have troubling implications for popular control. From a variety of perspectives, including game the- ory, the study of political culture, and work on the role that ideas play in politics, we learn how important beliefs are in reaching equilibrium solutions, and how institutionalized beliefs structure situations of political choice. From traditional political theory, we are reminded of the importance of normative beliefs for the practice of politics—and for institutions. It is not sufficient to create institutions that are effective; they must be accompanied by beliefs that respect and foster human freedom. From historical institutionalism and political sociol- ogy, we understand how values and norms operate in society. Without such understanding, we can neither comprehend the varying expectations on which people rationally act nor design institutions based on norma- tive views. We abdicate our responsibility if we simply assume material self-interest, as economists are wont to do. From democratic theory, we discover the crucial roles of accountability, participation, and especially persuasion in creating legitimate political institutions. These lessons are in tension with one another. Institutional stability is often at odds with innovation and may conflict with accountability. Protection against oppression can conflict with energetic governance; a practical reliance on self-interest can conflict with the desire to expand the role of persuasion and reflection. Governance, however, is about reconciling tensions; it is Max Weber’s ( 1946) “boring of hard boards.” As students of political philosophy, our objective should be to help our students, colleagues, and the broader public understand both the necessity for gov- ernance in a partially globalized world and the princi- ples that would make such governance legitimate. 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