Civil Society PDF: Different Interpretations

## II. LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL ### 1. LAS DIVERSAS ACEPCIONES The expression "society" is generally known as one of the terms of the big dichotomy society/State. This means that the meaning and scope of the term "society" can only be determined by referring to and delimiting the term "State" at the same...

## II. LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL ### 1. LAS DIVERSAS ACEPCIONES The expression "society" is generally known as one of the terms of the big dichotomy society/State. This means that the meaning and scope of the term "society" can only be determined by referring to and delimiting the term "State" at the same time. "Society" is understood as the sphere of social relations that are not regulated by the State. This is restrictively and often controversially understood as the set of apparatuses that, in a socially organized system, exert coercive power. This dates back to August Ludwig von Schlözer (1794), a distinction between *societas civilis sine imperio* [society without central power] and *societas civilis cum imperio* [society with central power], where the second expression refers to "State" in the aforementioned great dichotomy. However, in the context in which it was developed, there was not yet a distinction between society and the state; a single term was sufficient to designate the two, although with an intrinsic distinction in kind. The notion of a restrictive State as the instrument of coercive power, which allows for and guarantees the permanence of the great dichotomy, involves the set of ideas that accompany the emergence of the bourgeois world. This involves the affirmation of natural rights that belong to the individual and social groups regardless of the state and that limit and restrict the sphere of political power. This also involves the discovery of a sphere of interpersonal relations, such as economic relations, which do not require a coercive power to regulate them, as these are self-regulating. The notion of the state as the instrument of coercive power that allows for and guarantees the permanence of the great dichotomy is the set of ideas that accompany the emergence of the world that is bourgeois: this means the affirmation of natural rights, which pertain to the person and to social groups, regardless of the state, and which limit and restrict the sphere of political power; this means the discovery of the sphere of interpersonal relations, such as economic relations, which do not require a coercive power to regulate them, as these are self-regulating. The idea, clearly expressed by Thomas Paine—not by chance the author of a famous document regarding human rights—is that society is created by our needs and the state by our evil nature (1776). This is because humans are naturally good. The state is needed, therefore, to ensure the survival and development of the society, in order to limit the use of civil laws to impose, with coercion, the maximum development of natural laws, which do not require coercion to be applied. In short, this expands the scope of private law, through which individuals regulate their relations guided by their practical interests, *iudex in causa sua* in each instance; this takes place at the expense of public or political law where *imperium* is exercised, understood as the command of the superior who, as *iudex super partes*, possesses the right to exercise coercive power. It will be emphasized that the use of "society" as referring to a sphere of social relations, distinct from the sphere of political relations, is due to German writers (notably both Hegel and Marx, as will be demonstrated in the following section), who write in a language where *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* designates at the same time civil and bourgeois society. It is significant that this is the legal language that gained widespread acceptance at the end of the 18th century. The term “civil law” came to designate the area of our term “civil society,” coming to distinguish itself from penal law in Germany during the 18th century. In fact, the broader term “civil law” can be considered to be the same as the German term *bürgerliches Recht*. The expression “civil society” was used, in fact, during the 19th century to the present day. Since it was used against a backdrop of a distinction of the two spheres—the political and the non-political—it was easier to find a negative definition of it than a positive one, also because, in the sphere of public law and of general state theory (the *allgemeine Staatslehre* of the German academic tradition from Georg Jellinek to Felix Ermacora), there was always a positive definition of the state—society as a set of relationships not regulated by the state; and therefore, it is the remainder that is left over when defining the scope of the state. Therefore, within such a broad concept, there are different ways to define civil society depending on whether it is identified with the pre-state, the anti-state, or the post-state. When referencing "civil society" based on the first of these assumptions, one is referring to the idea—whether in accord with or against the doctrine of natural law—that before the state, there are various forms of association that individuals form for the purpose of achieving their diverse interests. The state emerges as a power that oversees this system but doesn’t impede its development or prevent its renewal. However, according to a non-Marxist perspective, one could conceive of civil society in this case as infrastructural and the state as superstructure. When referencing "civil society" based on the first of these assumptions, one is referring to the idea—according to whether or not it is in line with the doctrine of natural law—that before the state, there existed various forms of association that individuals created for the purpose of satisfying their diverse interests. The state stands above this, regulating these associations, but it neither impedes their development nor prevents their renewal. Though, from a non-Marxist perspective, one could potentially speak of civil society in this case as the infrastructure and the state as the superstructure. The second assumption of "civil society" suggests that individuals are not simply part of a pre-state system, but also are part of a system that does not agree with a system of natural law. In this sense, civil society is the opposition to, rather than the prerequisite for, the state. It represents the alternative to the state and its system of political rule, or even its totalitarianism, as a non-Marxist would define it. In summary, it seeks to represent the antithesis of the state. The third assumption of "civil society" indicates a chronological meaning for it—as it does for the first sense of the term—and an axiological meaning—as it does for the second. It represents the ideal of a society without a state. This emerging vision of a stateless society is rooted, fundamentally, in the ideals of Gramsci. Here, the ideal of a society without a state, which is deeply characteristic of Marxist thought, is described as the “absorption of society into civil society” (1930-31). This ideal, in common Marxist thinking, involves the *hegemony* of civil society relative to political society; it's a society without political domination. In all three assumptions of "civil society," the non-state takes on three forms: in the first, that which represents simply the necessary condition for the state (the state itself is not yet fully present); in the second, the antithesis of the state (that which stands in opposition to the state); and in the third, the dissolution of the state. It is much harder to give a positive definition of "civil society." The question, in the end, is akin to compiling an exhaustive catalog of everything *outside* the purview of the state. To illustrate, one can note that the distinction between civil society and political institutions may be a reformulation of the old dichotomy of real/legal country. The question, in the end, is akin to compiling an exhaustive catalog of everything *outside* the purview of the state. To illustrate, one can note that the distinction between civil society and political institutions is a reformulation of the old dichotomy of real/legal country. The old dichotomy of real/legal country is one way of re-framing the civil society vs. political institution distinction. What *is* the legal state, and what is the real state, or the civil society? A basic definition suggests civil society is where economic, social, ideological, and religious conflicts develop. These are all conflicts which a state must, through its institutions, either mediate, prevent, or repress. Those elements of society which exist outside the state, and are therefore part of the "civil sphere," include: social classes, groups, movements, associations, organizations, both those that represent these groups and those that say they represent them. In addition to groups and organizations of class, it's also worth noting: groups of interest, associations of various types, movements for empowering ethnic groups, for defending civil rights, or for advancing women’s liberation. These are all part of civil society as well as political parties—though these parties have a foot in both the civil sphere and the state, as well as a relationship with the state. This relationship is such that, to be more accurate and precise, we can add a third element to the traditional dichotomy of civil society and state. There is also, in this case, such a thing as a "political society." This concept—advanced in 1973—works to encompass aspects of the political sphere, including (but not limited to) political parties, which do not belong either to the civil sphere or to the state. In fact, one of the more common ways to define political parties is to suggest that they have the role of selecting, aggregating, and transmitting demands from the civil sphere. The result of this process is then the implementation of policies. In more recent systematic theories relating to a global society, the role of civil society is defined as *creating* the demands that go towards the political system (an *input*). The political system, then, responds to these demands (an *output*). The civil society versus state dichotomy is then understood to be a dichotomy between the demands on the one hand and the capacity of the political system to respond on the other. One can see how this applies to an important problem in contemporary politics, that of governance. The relationship between civil society and state can be understood through another lens: what is called, in the language of Weberian thought, *legitimate power*. Here, the state has the authority to make decisions which are accepted and acted upon. These decisions are also legitimate as they are seen to emanate from a source with legitimate authority that is recognized by the group as a whole. One could also say, therefore, that civil society is the site where these sources of legitimate authority form (especially during a period of crisis). It's in civil society, therefore, that these institutions gain legitimacy. It would be an overstatement, however, to say that the state, in its legitimacy, *suppresses* civil society's sources of legitimacy. These sources are, in fact, the foundation of *re-legitimizing* the state. This is particularly true during a crisis—such as that which would threaten the very survival of a political system. It's precisely in civil society that we encounter new sources of legitimacy and spaces for establishing a consensus. One can also find, in the sphere of civil society, the phenomenon of public opinion. Public opinion can be understood to be the public expression of a consensus or disagreement with regard to various institutions. It is communicated through media such as press, radio, and television. Public opinion and social movements go hand-in-hand and condition each other. The public expression of opinion becomes public opinion *precisely* because it is communicated to the public. That it is communicated to the public means that civil society's sphere is *always* vulnerable to being absorbed by the state, which represents a threat to its functioning. In the end, the state where civil society is completely absorbed by the state is a totalitarian state, and a totalitarian state has no public opinion. One might say that such a state has only an official opinion. ## 2. LA INTERPRETACIÓN MARXISTA The current usage of the term "civil society" (linked to the state or the political system) is of Marxist origin. It is, in turn, a Hegelian, though a reductive, perspective (as will be clear later on). It is thanks to the influence of Marxist literature in contemporary Italian politics that the term is commonly used. The fact that the expression “civil society” is replaced with “society” in other linguistic contexts is further evidence of this. This is the case in Germany, for example, where the term *Gesellschaft* has taken on more or less a universally accepted meaning in recent years. In this context, there is a robust discussion on the relationship between *Staat* [the State] and *Gesellschaft* [Society] (Böckenförde, 1976). The term *Gesellschaft*, then, comes to encompass the sphere of our term “civil society.” In The introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859)—a canonical text for understanding the modern use of the term "civil society"—Marx writes that, in his study of Hegel, he came to believe that legal and political institutions are founded in material conditions of existence that "Hegel … understood to be" civil society. This analysis suggests that "the anatomy of society must be sought in political economy” (956-957). Though Marx’s interpretation of civil society is here reductive and inaccurate in the sense that it distorts Hegel's meaning (as will be explained further in the following section), the important thing to note is that, for Marx, civil society represents the basis for the real world—that is, the basis for the social and economic relationships—on which, according to Marx, the legal and political superstructure stands. This passage—and the assertion that it is from Hegel that Marx borrowed—is important because it demonstrates that, for Marx, civil society is the “basis” for economic relationships, meaning the social and economic relationships that are external to, or precede, the State. This suggests that civil society encompasses the sphere of the pre-state. The difference between civil society and the state, in turn, marks the difference between the sphere of these pre-state, pre-legal relationships and the sphere of the state. Therefore, from this perspective, civil society represents a broader sphere than that of the pre-state and the pre-legal system. This is the same sphere envisioned by early natural law scholars, as well as by early economists (following a school that includes the Physiocrats), who called this sphere “state of nature” or “natural society.” The notion that the term “natural society” was replaced in Marxist thought by the term “civil society” is rooted in Hegel, though the term’s usage extends far beyond Hegel’s writings. This is illustrated in a work from Marx’s youth, The Holy Family (1845), when Marx and Engels write: “The modern state has its natural basis [take note of the use of the word ‘natural’] in civil society, the man of civil society, that is, the independent man, united to another man only through the bond of private, subjective interest, and of natural, unconscious necessity” (126). It is particularly striking that the specific definition of civil society offered here exactly corresponds to the specific definition of Hobbes’s state of nature. That is, the state of nature, as Hobbes defines it, is a war of all against all. The modern state has as its natural foundation (take note of the word “natural”) in civil society, the man of civil society, that is, the independent man, united to another man only through the bond of private, subjective interest, and of natural, unconscious necessity (126). It is particularly striking that what Marx gives as a definition of civil society aligns perfectly with Hobbes’s definition of the state of nature. That is, the state of nature as Hobbes defines it is *a war of all against all*. Civil society—as defined in Hobbes—is, in short, a war of, by, and for every man against every other man. This is in direct opposition to the traditional concept of the civil sphere, where the term *civil society* is intended to designate the antithesis of the state of nature—that is, to designate that which is in opposition to the state of nature itself. It is all the more surprising that these two coincide, since in the tradition of natural law, or *iusnaturalist* thought (§ 4), the term “civil society” refers to the antithesis of the state of nature. This is because these two ideas, *state of nature* and *civil society, *are usually considered antithetical to each other. It’s worth noting that what is referred to as the *civil sphere* today is also referred to by the term *state*, at least in the tradition of natural law. All of this is surprising since, in the tradition of natural law, or *iusnaturalist* thought, the term “civil society” refers to the antithesis of the *state of nature,* which is what would be referred to as the state today. The reason why these parallel concepts are so confusing is because Marx borrowed the concept of "civil society" from Hegel, and Hegel's *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* represents, in many ways, the *bourgeois* version of “civil society.” By "bourgeois," we mean class-based. This is the same definition of *bourgeois* society that gained wider acceptance, thanks to Hegel and the impact of Hegel’s left-wing followers, after the rise of a left-wing Hegelian school of thought. It emphasizes the concept of civil society as a society *of class*, which is directly opposed to the state. Indeed, Marx uses *civil society* synonymously with the term *bourgeois society*. So, Marx, through Hegel, essentially re-defined the concept of "civil society." He has shown that "the anatomy of society must be sought in political economy" (956-957). This is a reduction of Hegel’s original concept, as will be proven later on. To note, when Marx makes this distinction between the *real basis* of the state (that is, society) and the *superstructure* of the state (law and politics), he, in effect, defines *civil society* as the set of individual relations that are outside of, or precede, the state. This means that, for Marx, civil society encompasses the sphere of the pre-state. This term, *civil society*, has a long history. In the historical context, the replacement of the term “state of nature” with the term “civil society” can be traced back to Hegel. However, this change goes far beyond Hegel’s writings and is exemplified in a work from Marx’s youth, The Holy Family (1845), when Marx and Engels wrote: “The modern state has as its natural basis [take note of the word ‘natural’] in civil society, the man of civil society, that is, the independent man, united to another man only through the bond of private, subjective interest, and of natural, unconscious necessity” (126). It is particularly striking that what Marx gives as a definition of civil society aligns perfectly with Hobbes’s definition of the state of nature. That is, the state of nature as Hobbes defines it is *a war of all against all*. It is particularly striking that what Marx gives as a definition of civil society aligns perfectly with Hobbes’s definition of the state of nature. That is, the state of nature as Hobbes defines it is *a war of all against all*. Civil society—as defined in Hobbes—is, in short, a war of, by, and for every man against every other man. This is in direct opposition to the traditional concept of the civil sphere, where the term *civil society* is intended to designate the antithesis of the state of nature—that is, to designate that which is in opposition to the state of nature itself. It’s worth noting that what is referred to as the *civil sphere* today is also referred to by the term *state*, at least in the tradition of natural law. All of this is surprising since, in the tradition of natural law, or *iusnaturalist* thought, the term “civil society” refers to the antithesis of the *state of nature,* which is what would be referred to as the state today. The reason why these parallel concepts are so confusing is because Marx borrowed the concept of "civil society" from Hegel, and Hegel's *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* represents, in many ways, the *bourgeois* version of “civil society.” By "bourgeois," we mean class-based. This is the same definition of *bourgeois* society that gained wider acceptance, thanks to Hegel and the impact of Hegel’s left-wing followers, after the rise of a left-wing Hegelian school of thought. It emphasizes the concept of civil society as a society *of class*, which is directly opposed to the state. Indeed, Marx uses *civil society* synonymously with the term *bourgeois society*. So, Marx, through Hegel, essentially re-defined the concept of "civil society." He has shown that "the anatomy of society must be sought in political economy" (956-957). This is a reduction of Hegel’s original concept, as will be proven later on. To note, when Marx makes this distinction between the *real basis* of the state (that is, society) and the *superstructure* of the state (law and politics), he, in effect, defines *civil society* as the set of individual relations that are outside of, or precede, the state. This means that, for Marx, civil society encompasses the sphere of the pre-state. The emancipatory process of civil society, from Hegel's perspective, was the same as the process of the bourgeois society (which in this context does not translate as “civil society”): both took place *outside* politics and, with it, the appearance of universality. The feudal society found its dissolution in the individual. However, this man, who represents his society’s foundation, is a selfish, self-interested man (383), which is a key point of divergence from Hegel. The state of nature, as envisioned by the natural law philosophers, and that of Marx’s bourgeois society, share in common the presence of the self-interested man, or the *egoist*. This is why this type of man can only produce anarchy or, in contrast, a despotic state. <start_of_image> It should be noted that, although the Marxist concept of “civil society” is widely influential today, it cannot be said that it has ever been wholly embraced by Marx himself. Hegel, in many instances, recognized the importance of the traditional dichotomy between civil society and the state. This is true in the thought of Gramsci, but one should be careful not to think that his dichotomy is simply reproduced by Marx, even though Gramsci's thought is often framed as a Marxist interpretation. For Gramsci (as we shall see later) the *civil sphere* does not coincide with the material basis of society—as it does for Marx—but with the *superstructure*. The *superstructure*, in Gramsci's view, constitutes ideologies (such as religion) and institutions (such as the state). The *civil sphere*, for Gramsci, represents the ideological sphere, of which institutions are but a part. It's in this sphere that social groups come together and create movements, pushing for a change in the power structure. The groups that come to represent these movements are the *counter-powers* that fight against the dominance of the state. In his writings on intellectuals, Gramsci makes the following distinction: “We can now identify two overarching ‘levels‘ of the superstructure: one that can be called ‘civil society’… and another that can be called ‘political society or the State‘… corresponding to the two functions of *hegemony* exercised by the ruling group within the whole society, and of ‘direct domination’… exercised within the state, in the legal and political government” (1932, 1518-1519). To clarify this concept, one can refer to Gramsci’s use of historical example—that is, the Catholic Church. “The apparatus of *hegemony* of the ruling group… has no apparatus of its own, that is, it does not have its own cultural and intellectual organisation, but it feels itself to be the universal organisation of the Church (1930-31, 763). For Gramsci, then, the Catholic Church, because it is the *hegemon*, represents the *civil sphere*. The second layer of the state’s rule—which is direct domination—is embodied by the state itself. This is seen as a clear distinction between the sphere of “civil society” and the sphere of the “state.” In short, institutions such as the Catholic Church are part of the civil society, while the institutions of the state are part of the state, even though the distinction between these two spheres is not always so clear in practice. In terms of *hegemony*, civil society and the state operate at two levels. If we want to look at it from a more descriptive lens, we can say that civil society represents the sphere of *ethicality*. Civil society establishes moral order with a goal or *end* in mind. This is how a dominant class produces consent. Political society, on the other hand, represents *political ethics*. It is through *political action*, such as the use of force, that one gains legitimacy. The state, as we understand it today, is the locus of political ethics. It represents a necessary but limited application of force. This is one of the reasons that the term *civil society* is sometimes called “a political society"—because it refers to the state. This process occurs until the state is taken over by a restricted class. It’s in these circumstances that the state acts—and only then—on behalf of that restricted class. To take it one step further, Gramsci views *civil society* as a source of *consensus*. Hegemony, in essence, emerges from the consensus of individuals. However, the state is still necessary to consolidate that consensus. It is also the state itself, though, that tends to create the conditions under which individuals (and their ideologies) will eventually reach a consensus. Gramsci’s understanding of the civil sphere is, in a sense, rooted in a *iusnaturalist* tradition. Here, he recovers an idea from the tradition of natural law: consent, as the foundation for a civil society. This is a point that is not present in the thoughts of Marx, who, because he favors the state that is founded in the social contract, believes the *state* is, above all, where consensus is achieved. However, Gramsci believes that the state, though necessary for establishing consensus and maintaining it, is not the source of consensus itself. Rather, *civil society*, for Gramsci, is the source of consensus; civil society, in actuality, creates consent. It is the civil society, through its processes of gaining *hegemony*, that brings about this consensus. Furthermore, the state’s legitimate power as a *political institution* is reliant on the moral authority that stems from the consensus established in the *civil sphere* of society. Both Hegel and Gramsci provide complex and multi-layered frameworks for understanding civil society. While their perspectives share common ground, their conclusions diverge significantly. ## 3. EL SISTEMA HEGELIANO Marx believed that he had discovered the basis of the state by studying Hegel’s writings. In short, Marx believes that Hegel provides a foundation, an essential platform, for understanding political institutions and the relationship between those institutions and the economic sphere. However, this “foundation” can only be understood by looking at the *economics* of civil society. Marx’s interpretation of Hegel is based in the economic lens. It presents a somewhat narrow and simplified version of Hegel’s thought because it does not take into account the complexity of the political and economic spheres. Marx’s views stand in direct opposition to the traditional Hegelian interpretation of civil society. Hegel, in *The Philosophy of Right* (1821), develops the concept of civil society quite explicitly. Hegel, in fact, presents civil society in a nuanced way—as the culmination of his thoughts rather than as a “residual category” (as some have wrongly viewed it as). Hegel’s conception of *civil society* refers to the transition between the family and the state, a transition that allows for the creation of something like *human ethics*. In essence, The Philosophy of Right is structured in the form of a triad. This triad is a rejection of the simpler dichotomy, which is found in the works of Aristotle. Aristotle, in his work *The Politics*, makes a distinction between household management (*societas domestica*) and political society (*societas civilis*). The Hegelian triad is also a rejection of the iusnaturalist dichotomy of the state of nature and civil society. In Hegel’s triad, *civil society* emerges between the family and the state. It’s the *intermediate stage* of *ethicality*, as it precedes the emergence of the state while existing independent of the family. This means that *civil society* is an incomplete version of the state, a *state of intellect*. It isn’t the full realization of the state, which is to say, that doesn’t fully capture the *historical* and *objective* nature of the state. This conception of *civil society* (as an incomplete version of the state) can be seen in the structure of *The Philosophy of Right*, as Hegelians have called it. It, *The Philosophy of Right*, is divided into three distinct stages: * 1) The system of needs (in which economic activity thrives) * 2) Administration of justice * 3) The police (which includes the body politic) The economic sphere of human interaction is found in the first state of Hegel’s *civil society*. It does not expand to the second and third stages. The second and third stages are the traditional features of “The State” in the Hegelian framework, an encompassing theory of the state itself. It is important to note that Marx’s understanding of Hegel’s *civil society* can be considered *partial* and *misinterpretative*. The essence of the *civil society* according to Hegel’s philosophy is a *controversial* topic, and its real meaning is difficult to grasp. Some scholars have suggested that this controversial category is actually the leftover or residual category of Hegel's political thought. Hegel attempted to systematize the traditional political sphere for a period of 20 years but was unable to find a suitable framework to encapsulate the concept of the state as a whole, thereby leading to the inclusion of many categories into his *civil society* framework (such as the family and the state). This is why it’s difficult to interpret. The *Philosophy of Right* primarily focuses on political, social, and economic issues, but there are also sections devoted to the system of justice of the state and the administrative apparatus of the state. It is debatable whether Hegel’s thought on these two topics should be *incorporated* into the broader discussion of civil society. The fact that Hegel spends more time discussing these topics than he spends discussing political economy is a point of significant debate; after all, if these two branches of state policy stand outside the purview of civil society, then how can they be subsumed under such a category? Therefore, it can be argued that Hegel had a *partial* and *misinterpretative* understanding of his own *civil society* category. Hegel's model for *civil society* is a *complex* and *multilayered* concept. Despite its *complexity*, the Hegelian view of *civil society* remains a significant source for subsequent understandings of *civil society* as a distinct sphere of political and social interaction. It is also quite difficult to grasp because of this complexity. However, if one takes the *historical context* into account, it becomes easier to understand Hegel’s work. From the 18th century until relatively recently (and certainly up until the time of Hegel), both the *societas civilis* and *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* were widely viewed to represent the *State* itself. These societies encompassed the traditional features of the State, in opposition to the *family* and the *state of nature*. In Hegelian thought, the *State* is not simply a transition between the *family* and the *state of nature*, but rather a more *complex* and *incomplete* version of the *state*. This *incomplete* state—which Hegel calls the *state of intellect*—is still a state, but one that has yet to fully embody its true *historical* and *objective* nature. The true distinction between *civil society* in Hegel’s work and earlier conceptions is that Hegel understands *civil society* to be a specific *stage* in the development of the state itself. In this sense, *civil society* is the *first* stage of the state’s emergence and encompasses the *legal* and *administrative* functions of the state. This process of development is incomplete—as *civil society* is not yet the *state* itself—but it is a necessary stage in its formation. It is important to remember that, although Hegel’s view of civil society is a departure from the traditional understanding of this concept, it also reflects his broader philosophical project, which sought to understand the development of the human *spirit* and the role it played in shaping the *political* and *social* structures. The notion that *civil society* is only the *first* rather than the entire pre-state sphere has been a point of ongoing debate. Some scholars argue that the *second* stage of *civil society* in Hegel’s work is where we find the legal apparatus of the state and administrative functions. These two branches of political thought are often considered to belong to a distinct sphere than that of *civil society*, which makes Hegel’s classification of them as part of *civil society* a matter of debate. The *Philosophy of Right* can also been seen as a process where Hegel attempts to understand *the State*. Hegel, having spent two decades attempting to develop a clear and encompassing framework for the state, decided to incorporate all other categories into the category of *civil society* (including the *family* and all aspects of *the state*). This means that the term *civil society* is meant to capture all aspects—the family, the legal apparatus of the state, and the administrative nature of the state—of an *incomplete* state. However, Hegel’s view on *civil society* is still significant. It’s not simply a matter of misinterpretation or even residual categories; it's an important part of his philosophical project. His overarching goal is to understand the development of the *human spirit* and its role in shaping political and social structures. It is this broader goal in which *civil society* is so important. The classification of the legal apparatus and the administration of the state as part of the *civil sphere* is not entirely clear, but it remains a critical part of Hegel’s work. This is a source of ongoing debates among scholars, which continues to inform how we understand *civil society* as a sphere of political and social interaction. It is worth remembering that Hegel's concept of *civil society* is highly multifaceted. It is not simply a matter of misinterpretation or a residual category. Rather, Hegel makes a more complicated distinction; he identifies the *State* as a *complex* system of administration and legal order that is distinct from the *family*, which is the foundation of all prior societies, and the *state of nature*, which is a pre-political stage. This system is complex, but also *incomplete*. That means that the family and the state of nature are both necessary prerequisites for the *State*, but the process of the state developing from the state of nature to the state of intellect is a lengthy process. Ultimately, the state emerges as a *complex* system of administration and legal order which cannot simply be subsumed under the *family* or the *state of nature*. This is an important distinction to make because it helps us understand how Hegel’s idea of *civil society* is both a *bridge* between the state of nature and the state of intellect, as well as a *precondition* for the state. It is also a reminder that the development of a political state is not just a matter of transition from one stage to another, but a complex process that involves the development, transformation, and refinement of social and political norms. It is also important to note that Hegel’s idea of *civil society* is not merely a collection of *residual categories*. Rather, it is a crucial element of his conception of *the State*. This means that understanding Hegel’s conception of *civil society* is essential to understanding his broader philosophical project and its impact on modern political thought. ## 4. LA TRADICIÓN IUSNATURALISTA Hegel’s use of “civil society” in place of the term “state” is a striking departure from traditional thought. This departure, however, is not a total rejection of the traditional meaning of *societas civilis*. The traditional understanding of *societas civilis* is rooted in the Greek concept of *polis* or *city*. This concept, which is further elaborated in *The Politics* of Aristotle, captures the specific quality of the city—that is, a community of free, self-sufficient individuals who have achieved a certain degree of political and social order. The traditional understanding of *societas civilis*, then, is a *community* of free, self-sufficient individuals who have achieved a certain degree of political and social order. This is a community that has achieved a greater level of organization than the simple family, and one that has overcome the state of nature. The *state* in the traditional sense is a consequence of *society*. The *state* is the culmination, in the final analysis, of *civil society*. However, the *state* itself is based on the premise that individuals are, in their natural state, inherently social and civic beings. Aristotle believed that the *city*, as a form of organized society, was a natural development, not a product of social contract or