Comparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and Unconventional Weapons PDF

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20 Comparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and Unconventional Weapons John V. Parachini To cite this article: John V. Parachini...

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20 Comparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and Unconventional Weapons John V. Parachini To cite this article: John V. Parachini (2001) Comparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and Unconventional Weapons, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24:5, 389-406, DOI: 10.1080/105761001750434240 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/105761001750434240 Published online: 06 Aug 2010. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1396 View related articles Citing articles: 1 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=uter20 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24:389–406, 2001 Copyright © 2001 Taylor & Francis 1057-610X /01 $12.00 +.00 Comparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and Unconventional Weapons JOHN V. PARACHINI Executive Director, Washington Office Monterey Institute of International Studies’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies Washington, DC, USA In the 1990s, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Tokyo subway, and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City seemed to signal the emergence of a new trend in terrorism—mass casualty attacks. Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, two former U.S. National Security Council officials, recently argued that the new trend is waged by religious militants “who want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead,” which is a variation on Brian Jenkins’ frequently quoted observation that terrorists want a lot of people watching, but only a few people dead.1 They argue, furthermore, that given the “motivations of groups seeking to produce mass casualties and the lowering of technological and engineering barriers to CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons] manufacture and use over time, there is a strong possibility that such attacks will be attempted.”2 This new breed of terrorists will be drawn to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or CBRN (hereafter referred to as unconventional weapons) because in their quest to maximize casualties such weapons “provide a premium on their investment.”3 This view of the new terrorism has led to a significant shift in U.S. counterterrorism policy with an increasing focus on the prospect of terrorist use of unconventional weapons. Part of the challenge in comparing mass casualty attacks and the motivations of the perpetrators involves sorting out the different incidents and the different perpetrators. The mixing of incidents involving these two different types of weapons material has created an inchoate sense of fear and a policy maelstrom. As a result, American counterterrorism policy may mistakenly focus too much on unconventional weapons attacks rather than mass casualty attacks regardless of the weapons material. Extrapolating from the consequences of incidents involving high explosives to potential incidents involving unconventional weapons leads to an exaggerated sense of the likelihood and consequences of a perceived newly emerging terrorist threat. Received 2 March 2001; accepted 18 April 2001. Address correspondence to John V. Parachini, MIIS–Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 11 Dupont Circle, NW, 9th Floor, Washington, DC 20036. E-mail: [email protected] 389 390 J. V. Parachini Spending billions of dollars to manage the consequences of terrorist attacks with unconventional weapons may inordinately focus on what is found to be most difficult to handle, not necessarily on what is most likely. While government has a responsibility to protect its citizens from even low probability events that may present catastrophic consequences, a critical part of the task for policymakers is to find the right balance of effort between high and low probability attacks. Given the consequences of mass casualty terrorism, this is a difficult, but important challenge to meet as effectively as possible. Three Mass Casualty Incidents Involving Unconventional Weapons Over the course of the last 25 years, there have been only three terrorist mass casualty attacks involving unconventional weapons material. The first of these attacks occurred in 1984 when the Rajneeshee religious cult located in Oregon sought to fraudulently influence a local election in its favor by poisoning local residents with Salmonella typhimurium.4 The group planned to sicken local people to keep them from voting in a local election, while at the same time seeking to increase the totals for their preferred candidate by importing homeless people who they would instruct on how to vote. Using Salmonella bacteria acquired from the Oregon State Health Department, the Rajneeshees conducted a trial poisoning a few months before the actual election. They spread the bacteria over ten salad bars. Sheela, one of the main perpetrators in this experimental poisoning, tried to interest the group leader in approving the use of Salmonella typhi, which might have caused fatalities. Interestingly, the group leader, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, indicated that while a few deaths might be unavoidable, the intent of the effort should be to not hurt too many people, but to decrease voter turnout. Seven-hundred fifty-one people became sick, but fortunately no fatalities occurred. Importantly, the disease outbreak was not recognized as an intentional attack for more than a year. The intent of the attack was merely to incapacitate people, and it resulted in a large-scale and indiscriminate outbreak of disease. After considering a variety of ways to influence a local election (such as voter fraud), the Rajneeshees settled on incapacitating people they viewed as their political opponents. Critical to their choosing incapacitating people with disease was an individual in the group who may have been a serial poisoner. Ma Anand Puja, who was closely aligned with Sheela, one of the Bhagwan’s key lieutenants, worked as a nurse in the group’s health clinic. Sheela and Ma Anand Puja investigated several different agents to use for their poisoning effort. Some group members believed that Ma Anand Puja may have poisoned other members of the group, but the primary leadership of the group was not particularly fascinated with poisoning.5 Shortly after conducting their initial set of experimental attacks, the Rajneeshees discontinued their poisoning effort and instead focused on importing homeless people to increase their vote total. Given how readily the group discontinued the poisoning effort, the fascination with poisoning harbored by Ma Anand Puja was not a characteristic common to the group as a whole. The interest in poison was clearly not a particular fascination of the Bhagwan. Yet, Ma Anand Puja’s extensive work cultivating the appropriate Salmonella strain and investigating other agents suggests that she had a special fascination with poison and disease. Her role in the organization was not so powerful that her poisoning tendencies defined the group beyond the initial set of salad bar poisonings. The second case of a subnational group using unconventional weapons material occurred in Sri Lanka when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) struck a Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism 391 comparatively isolated Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) facility with chlorine.6 This attack marked the beginning of a major offensive and may have been designed as a strategic blow. The LTTE released chlorine fumes as part of a general assault on the facility. There is no confirmation that fatalities resulted from the chlorine release, although more than 60 soldiers were hospitalized for gas exposure. The LTTE eventually captured the fort even though the wind shifted and fumes blew back on them. The LTTE may have resorted to using chlorine because at the time they lacked conventional weapons. Seizing on the ready availability of chlorine at a nearby paper plant owned by an ethnic Tamil, the group improvised with what they could easily acquire. There is no evidence that they have ever again employed chemical agents in what continues to be a bloody ethnic separatist conflict. Unlike the two previous incidents of unconventional weapons use by subnational groups, which remain comparatively obscure, the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Supreme Truth (hereafter “Aum”) succeeded in capturing the attention of the world.7 In the years preceding the subway attack, group members used poison to kill people investigating them and sect members who sought to escape the organization. After a number of failed attempts to test or to use biological agents, Aum concentrated its efforts on producing sarin as the agent of choice to inflict mass casualties.8 The Aum did what many believed terrorist groups would be reluctant to do: use unconventional weapons to inflict mass and indiscriminate casualties. The result of their attack was 13 dead, 200 injured, and more than 4,000 people who believed they had been exposed. The main leaders of the group and the principal perpetrators of the attack were arrested, indicted, and most have or are serving time in prison. Mass Casualty Attacks with Conventional Weapons The most significant conventional attacks that produced mass casualties and mass destruction in the 1990s range in sophistication, but all, unfortunately, demonstrated the ease with which terrorists can procure the necessary materials, fashion them into powerful weapons, and deliver them to targets. Ramzi Yousef and the World Trade Center Bombing The World Trade Center bombing is a revealing case where the mastermind of the attack considered using poison gas, but in the end opted for high explosives instead. Ramzi Yousef told U.S. officials who accompanied him on the plane back to the United States to stand trial that he considered crafting a weapon with sodium cyanide that might have generated a deadly gas that could have killed thousands. 9 Yousef said that while he would have if he could, he did not because it was too difficult, too expensive, and he thought about using sodium cyanide for another attack. Yousef and his co-conspirators resorted to conventional explosives, which proved potent enough for their purposes. They had manuals for building conventional bombs, not unconventional weapons. Nothing in the manual entered as an exhibit in the court record provides any guidance on how to make a chemical weapon. They succeeded in building a 1,500-pound urea nitrate bomb that required considerable expertise and ingredients that were not easy to obtain.10 For Ramzi Yousef, no single motive can explain his action. In an interview with Al-Haya and during his statement before the court prior to sentencing, Yousef’s motives for his attack seem to have been a combination of visceral hatred, revenge, retribution, and an act to affirm his understanding of himself as a “genius” and “bomb expert.”11 Con- 392 J. V. Parachini spicuous by its absence from all of Yousef’s comments is any direct or distinctive religious overtone to his worldview. In the Al-Haya interview Yousef said, “we have not chosen this path voluntarily but have been compelled to take it as a result of the killing and the occupa-tion with which we are living.”12 The other co-conspirators articulated religious themes in their statements before the court, but not Yousef.13 He was defiant in a secular fashion. Yousef wanted to punish Americans for their government’s support of the state of Israel. Once Americans suffered in the way Yousef believed Palestinians had suffered, then they would force their government to stop supporting Israel. Yousef also wanted to kill Americans so they would know the pain Arabs experienced. Moreover, he reasoned, maybe Americans would understand that their lives are no better than Arab lives. And finally, in the letter that Yousef and his co-conspirators sent to New York newspapers, they claimed that they represented a much larger movement, which had never been heard of before and has never been heard from since.14 Ramzi Yousef was not just striking out at the U.S. government, but he was seeking to kill individual American citizens because their death would cause the American people to understand the injustice that he believed Arabs suffered from Israel and the U.S. government. Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing Even with the recent publication of a book for which Timothy McVeigh provided considerable interviews, a complete explanation for the rationale of the most deadly terrorist act ever committed on American soil remains obscure.15 With McVeigh’s execution on June 11, 2001, a definitive explanation remains elusive. However, a picture emerges from McVeigh’s letters, his affinity for historical quotations, and the few interviews he granted before his execution date. McVeigh’s experience in the U.S. military and fascination with the Turner Diaries seem to provide the most clues to how he changed from a model soldier to a mass killer. In letters McVeigh wrote to friends and his sister during his service in the Gulf, he seemed confused by the task of one moment killing Iraqi soldiers and shortly there after sympathizing with the plight of Iraqi children who begged for food. It was as though McVeigh the soldier encountered McVeigh the young man from a small town in upstate New York and could not reify the two personalities in his mind. In a letter to Elizabeth McDermott, a neighbor in Pendleton, New York, McVeigh wrote “we’ve got these starving kids and sometimes adults coming up to us begging for food. Because of the situation, we can’t give them any. It’s really ‘trying,’ emotionally. It’s like the puppy dog at the table; but much worse.”16 In another letter from the Gulf, McVeigh expressed anger at the U.S. government for putting him in a situation where he had to kill Iraqi soldiers in what he did not perceive as a fair fight. We were falsely hyped up and we get there and find out they are normal like me and you. They [presumably U.S. military leaders] hype you to take these people out. They told us we were to defend Kuwait where the people had been raped and slaughtered. War woke me up. War will open your eyes.17 In a letter to another Pendleton neighbor, Vicki Hodge, McVeigh directed his anger at Saddam Hussein. McVeigh wrote that it was because of Saddam Hussein that “I killed a man who didn’t want to fight us but was forced to.”18 McVeigh was struck by the contrast between the violence he was charged to inflict against targets of war and the humanity of the Iraqi people he encountered. Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism 393 McVeigh may have made a link between the violence he inflicted, about which he felt uncomfortable, and the violence he believed his government inflicted on civilians in Waco, Texas. He noted how the tanks used against the Branch Davidians were just like the one he had operated in the Gulf War. McVeigh seemed to feel that the U.S. government ordered him to kill in the Gulf and once again it ordered others to do the same in Waco. Thus, McVeigh took it upon himself to strike out against the “U.S. government” to prevent it from ordering others to kill like he had done in the Gulf and like the operators of the tanks at Waco. There is no evidence indicating that Timothy McVeigh ever considered unconventional weapons to inflict mass casualties. Even though McVeigh donned protective gear during his service in the Gulf War and the Oklahoma City bombing occurred a month after the Tokyo subway attack, he never showed any interest in weapons material that could potentially inflict larger casualties than conventional explosives.19 Explosives were his weapons material of choice. He had extensive knowledge and experience with explosives and that fulfilled the objectives he envisioned for his attack. McVeigh’s deep antipathy toward the government stemmed in part from his feelings about gun control. Starting at an early age, McVeigh was fascinated by guns. As an adult McVeigh slept with a gun. His fascination with guns and his opposition to gun control coalesced into a strong paranoia about the federal government taking his most prized possession, his pistol. This personal paranoia easily translated into a broader paranoia about the role of the federal government in American life. The “community of belief” in which McVeigh traveled was as isolated in many respects as some of the cult groups.20 Much of McVeigh’s time after he left military service was spent as a drifter, traveling from a gun show to the company of friends and acquaintances who harbored his same fascination with guns, antipathy toward the federal government, and sympathy for Branch Davidians. The seminal “myth” for the people McVeigh encountered was the Turner Diaries. In many ways the tragedy of the Oklahoma City bombing stems from McVeigh’s seeking to live out the fictional story told in the book. In McVeigh’s travels he rarely encountered people who might have questioned his views or given him the impression that much of American society did not share his views or ascribe to the worldview depicted in the Turner Diaries. McVeigh’s belief that his attack on the Murrah Federal Building would launch a nation-wide revolt for freedom from federal tyranny resembles the delusional beliefs of other mass casualty terrorists who acted on behalf of imaginary cohorts. In the Murrah Federal Building bombing trial transcript, federal prosecutors noted how McVeigh stated in letters to friends and family that “the government had drawn ‘first blood’ at Waco; and he predicted there would be a violent revolution against the American government.”21 McVeigh is also believed to have chosen April 19 for his attack not only because it was the two-year anniversary of the incident in Waco, Texas, but also because 200 years before the first shots of the American Revolution were fired in Concord and Lexington. Believing that his attack would be the first shot in a new American revolution, McVeigh constructed a scenario in his mind that gave legitimacy to his violent act. Osama bin Laden and the Bombing of American Embassies in Africa The bombings of American embassies in Africa fit the pattern of truck bombings witnessed in earlier strikes on American installations in the Middle East. Like the World Trade Center bombing, the African embassy bombers sought to deliver their weapon 394 J. V. Parachini underneath the building in order to pull it down. The perpetrators of the attack selected their targets because they were symbols of the U.S. government. That thousands of civilians, many of them Muslims and most of them Africans, were injured or killed in this attack does not seem to have been part of the attackers thought pattern or to have restrained them if they thought about it. If the allegations are true that the embassy attacks were masterminded by Osama bin Laden, it would fit the holy war he described in a fatwa, a religious decree, and the interviews he has given to American media outlets.22 American military presence in the Middle East is viewed by bin Laden and his accomplices as an attempt by modern day crusaders to take over Islamic holy sites. Bin Laden has vowed to push the United States out of the region by whatever means necessary. In response to a question about his trying to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, bin Laden responded: Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.23 Bin Laden does not confirm that he has unconventional weapons or that he seeks them. He just explains how he feels justified to arm himself with whatever weapon will protect Muslims. Federal prosecutors alleged in their indictment of bin Laden that he sought both chemical and nuclear weapons in the early 1990s.24 To date, however, bin Laden’s followers have conducted a number of serious terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities in the Middle East and Africa, but all with conventional explosives. Thus, the nature of bin Laden’s quest for unconventional weapons and whether his interest is keen or merely an exploration of opportunities remains a question. The attacks against the U.S. embassies in Africa demonstrated bin Laden’s impressive regional reach, but the combination of his alleged resources, his strident fatwa and interviews, his alleged interest in unconventional weapons, and the use of high explosives by his accomplices, creates the greatest counterterrorism conundrum of our time. Since bin Laden seems to have the motive and the means for using unconventional weapons, why does he keep using conventional explosives? Is it because bin Laden and his accomplices used what they had available and what they knew how to use? Even though their instruments of war are neither chemical nor nuclear weapons, the effect to which they have been able to wield these tools has made Osama bin Laden one of America’s top ten most wanted fugitives.25 Their attacks with conventional weapons killed 212 people and injured almost 5,000, which is more casualties than any other terrorist incident in the last 20 years.26 What might they do in the future? One of the objectives of this article is to analyze factors that shaped the groups and individuals who conducted mass casualty attacks in order to identify concepts that may help understand their trajectories and their choice of weapons material. Comparison of the Motives and Outcomes Factors Shaping Worldviews The data set of mass casualty terrorist attacks is, fortunately, limited. Moreover, the diversity in these cases limits the explanatory power of comparison. Aum and the Rajneeshee Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism 395 were religious cults, not recognized and organized terrorist groups. Similarly, while Ramzi Yousef and Timothy McVeigh were the masterminds of terrorist strikes and they had other accomplices, one would not describe these collections of individuals as established groups beyond these single attacks. The LTTE is an organized insurgency movement involved in an ethnic and territorial civil war. And finally, Osama bin Laden and the network of people associated with him in the form of Al Qaeda is an example of a transnational network of loosely affiliated individuals who conduct violence and ascribe their actions to the defense of Islam as they define it against perceived Western and Zionist challenges. With this qualifier in mind, some conclusions can be drawn that should inform our understanding of the motivations and magnitude of this new trend of mass casualty terrorism. A number of different factors help explain the motives of the primary perpetrators of these six incidents that all involve an intentional attack designed to inflict mass and indiscriminate casualties. These different factors are listed in Figure 1. In four of the cases the perpetrators exhibit a sense of victimization that they draw on to justify their violence. In the introductory section of the official LTTE website it x Figure 1. Comparative table of factors influencing mass casualty terrorist attacks. 396 J. V. Parachini states that the “Tamil people have been subjected to brutal and crude personal psychological and institutional violence by the Sri Lankan government and its agencies.” Therefore, the “armed struggle of the Tamil people is both just and lawful because the rule of law for the Tamil people had ceased to exist; because the Government of Sri Lanka had become a racist government; and because the oppressed people of that racist government were compelled to resort to arms to defend themselves against that oppression.”27 In his statement before sentencing, Ramzi Yousef told the court that the World Trade Center bombing was “what it takes to make you feel the pain which you are causing to other people and this is what it takes to make you understand what you are causing and doing to other people.” 28 In a video produced by the Aum in 1994, Shoko Asahara, Aum’s leader, suggested that he and his group suffered gas attacks. Aum survives these [gas] attacks because it is a mystic religion that transcends the boundaries of life and death. Aum is a mighty obstacle to the evil that rules this world. I am suffering the effects of mustard gas. I am now facing death.29 In Richard A. Serrano’s book on the Oklahoma City bombing, One of Ours, he reports that after McVeigh left the U.S. Army and returned to upstate New York, he told “people that it was not his fault he was back among them with a regular job, and he blamed the army for the step backward he had taken.”30 While bin Laden’s interviews with ABC News and CNN does not reveal a sense of victimization as justification, the fatwa bin Laden issued along with five Muslim clerics does. For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest places, the Arabian peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.31 Two of the six cases involved a controlling leader who exercised enormous power over group members. While the LTTE is not a cult, Prabakaran runs the group in a cultlike fashion. Each day group members swear allegiance to him. He controls their diet, exercise regimen, and personal relationships. Similarly, Shoko Asahara frequently had his followers engage in a variety of bizarre rituals that underscored his intense control over group members. The importance of this leadership trait is that the leaders may be able to command followers to perform acts they might not do voluntarily. These leaders exercised such total control over group members that they could command them to do things that societal or personal restraints might prevent them from doing. In four of the cases the perpetrators of the attacks viewed themselves as warriors in a grand struggle. Mark Juergensmayer argues that some of the individuals examined here view themselves as fighting a “cosmic war,” which helps justify their violence and define their role in the world. Juergensmayer writes “war is not only the context for violence but also the excuse for it.” Juergensmayer argues that the perception of a “war provides a reason to be violent... even if the worldly issues at heart in the dispute do not seem to warrant such a ferocious position.”32 In the letter sent to New York newspapers, Ramzi Yousef claims he wrote it in the name of the Liberation Army Fifth Battalion.33 Similarly, Juergensmayer quotes one of Asahara’s books in which it described the coming Armageddon as “Aum against the world.” 34 The T-shirt Timothy McVeigh wore the day of the Oklahoma City bombing bore a quotation from Thomas Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism 397 Jefferson that read: “The Tree of Liberty Must Be Refreshed From Time To Time With The Blood Of Patriots and Tyrants.” 35 McVeigh reportedly said to Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck that bombing the Murrah Federal Building was “for the larger good.”36 In another excerpt, McVeigh, adapting a theme from the Bad Company song, “Dirty for Dirty,” reportedly said, “What the U.S. government did at Waco and Ruby Ridge was dirty. I gave dirty back to them at Oklahoma City.”37 In bin Laden’s January 1999 interview with CNN, he characterized his war against the United States as religiously sanctioned: Hostility toward America is a religious duty, and we hope to be rewarded for it by God. To call us Enemy Number One or Two does not hurt us. Osama bin Laden is confident that the Islamic nation will carry out its duty. I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the legend of the so-called superpower that is America.38 Bin Laden describes the war he believes he is fighting as a holy war. He also describes his efforts to bring down the preeminent superpower as bound to succeed because of its holy character. It is not just an effort to frustrate America’s global deployments, but a divinely sanctioned struggle, which only adds to the grandeur of the fight. In three of the cases societal alienation was a factor in shaping the worldviews of the perpetrators of these mass casualty incidents. The Rajneeshees’s alienation from the community in which they were located in Oregon resulted largely from their own actions. They set up a self-contained community located primarily in Wasco County, “acted contemptuously toward the local inhabitants and attempted to evade zoning and planning requirements that constrained their activities.”39 Additionally, they were “extremely litigious—they sued people for slander at the slightest provocation.” The alienation of many educated young Japanese from modern society was part of what drew them to the Aum in the first place. The organization, however, became decidedly alienated from the society after the 1990 elections when the organization’s slate of 25 candidates garnered only 1,783 votes in total.40 Timothy McVeigh told Michel and Herbeck, “Truth is, I determined mostly through my travels that this world just doesn’t hold anything for me.”41 Several of the terrorists examined here were not constrained by societal norms against violence due in part to their alienation. Some sought to create a new subsociety of their own, which progressed in ways that led to a clash of cultures and violence. Some of the perpetrators of mass casualty attacks who viewed themselves as in conflict with greater world forces affirmed themselves via acts of violence that they perceived as heroic acts in grand struggles of epic proportion. Juergensmeyer writes that when individuals view themselves in a state of war, they “know who they are, why they have suffered, by whose hand they have been humiliated, and at what expense they have persevered.”42 Ramzi Yousef perceived himself as a genius and an explosive expert who served in an imaginary “Liberation Army.”43 A former Aum member interviewed by Juergensmeyer about the sarin gas attack believed that Shoko Asahara “wanted to control Japan and ‘be like a king.’ Engineering the nerve gas attack gave him a sense of power.”44 Timothy McVeigh, when admitting that he bombed the Murrah Federal Building, said that he liked “the phrase ‘shot heard ‘round the world,’ and I don’t think there’s any doubt the Oklahoma City blast was heard around the world.”45 In the few interviews Osama bin Laden has granted to Westerners, he intertwines his own war against the United States with the wishes of God. But it is bin Laden on earth who is bedeviling the mighty United States: 398 J. V. Parachini The U.S. knows that I have attacked it, by the grace of God, for more than ten years now. The U.S. alleges that I am fully responsible for the killing of its soldiers in Somalia. God knows that we have been pleased at the killing of American soldiers. This was achieved by the grace of God and the efforts of the mujahedin from among the Somali brothers and other Arab mujahedin who had been in Afghanistan before that. America has been trying ever since to tighten its economic blockade against us to arrest me. It has failed. This blockage does not hurt us much.46 Bin Laden describes the struggle in part as a personal one between him and the United States. He equates himself with the Muslim world, which is at war with the United States. Unlike any other group or individual, the Aum exhibited an intense fascination with unconventional weapons material. The fascination extended beyond mere preference of one weapon type over another. Shoko Asahara seems to have not only had a fascination with poisoning, but also a fascination with the full range of unconventional weapons that could bring about an apocalyptic moment. Asahara wrote poetry about sarin and was a great admirer of Adolf Hitler. An Aum manual dated 30 December 1994 contained a song entitled “Song of Sarin, the Magician.”47 Asahara prophesized that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons would bring about Armageddon from which Aum members would be saved and would then take over Japan. Asahara’s prophecy of the apocalypse resulting from sarin gas or nuclear weapons so permeated the culture of the group that when some members of the cult heard that the Tokyo subway had been attacked with sarin, they believed that the guru’s prophesy was coming true.48 While Aum did seek to develop an AK-47 production capability—presumably to supply its own army—and Japanese police did discover large amounts of chemicals that could be used for conventional explosives, the group’s global effort to procure materials and produce unconventional weapons was unprecedented for any subnational group and akin to the level of effort of a nation-state.49 The sarin attack on the subway was the last successful attack in a string of poisoning attacks perpetrated by Aum members. On several occasions Aum members poisoned opponents or defectors from the organization. By the time of the subway attack, killing people with poison had become an acceptable and common practice for Aum. The Aum case may be unique given the leader’s fascination with poison, his intent to create an apocalyptic moment, and the vast resources of the organization. Seeking to determine whether these attacks were tactical or strategic may be a useful distinction in some instances, but not in others. Juergensmeyer describes many of these attacks as “dramatic events intended to impress for their symbolic significance,” and not as strategic or tactical strikes.50 He questions the value of referring to terrorist strategy because it “implies a degree of calculation and an expectation of accomplishing a clear objective that does not jive with such dramatic displays of power as the World Trade Center bombing.” Similarly, he questions describing these attacks as “tactics directed toward an immediate, earthly, or strategic goal.” Juergensmeyer’s observation is insightful for the World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa. The psychological thrill the perpetrators received from the explosion is not part of the experience in the three cases of unconventional weapons use. The three mass casualty attacks involving unconventional weapons are explained in part by their tactical and strategic use. While the Rajneeshees did sicken at least 751 people during their field test, the cult got caught up in other aspects of the scheme to Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism 399 fraudulently win the election. Moreover, they never conducted another attack with diseases or poisons. Not only was the use of agent tactical in the context of the test prior to a local election, but they clandestinely used the biological agent so as to go unnoticed; certainly not a symbolic attack. Due to their clandestine approach, the outbreak was not recognized as intentional for more than a year. The LTTE’s use of chlorine, in contrast, seems to have been a combination of opportunistic use of a weapons material when they were short on other normal conventional weapons and a genuine attempt to strike a strategic blow at the beginning of a major military campaign. Despite the interpretation that the Aum’s attack on the subway was an attempt to provoke Armageddon, the incident was in part an operational attempt to forestall law enforcement authorities from closing in on the organization. While Shoko Asahara prophesized a great deal about Armageddon, Aum generally used poisons in a tactical fashion to thwart the efforts of those pursuing the group. Their assassinations as well as their attack in Matsumoto and the Tokyo subway can all be viewed as “defensive-aggression.”51 One of the first known assassinations by Aum members involved a lawyer who was investigating Aum. In the Matsumoto incident, Aum sought to kill several judges who were slated to rule against them in a court proceeding. Even in the Tokyo subway incident, Aum members believed that Japanese law enforcement authorities were about to apprehend them. Thus, while cases of mass casualty terrorism involving high explosives seem to be good examples of symbolic violence, the explanations for indiscriminate use of unconventional weapons seem more operational and instrumental. Religiously inspired terrorism is frequently described as a prominent feature of the new terrorism. Simon and Benjamin argue that “the old paradigm of predominantly state-sponsored terrorism has been joined by a new, religiously motivated terrorism that neither relies on the support of sovereign states nor is constrained by the limits on violence that state sponsors have observed themselves or placed on their proxies.”52 While there is some evidence that some of the perpetrators of mass casualty violence do mix religion with other motivations, the charge that the new terrorism is predominantly religiously inspired overstates the case. The evidence suggesting that Timothy McVeigh was acting as a member of the Christian Identity movement, no matter how loosely defined, is circumstantial at best. McVeigh did identify with the militia groups (some of whom professed a Christian orientation), the plight of the Branch Davidians, and the story recounted in the Turner Diaries. However, nothing in McVeigh’s background or his statements indicates a connection to or an inspiration for his actions that can be traced to the Christian Identity movement. Mark Juergensmeyer argues that “Christian Identity ideas were most likely part of the thinking of Timothy McVeigh,” but the evidence he provides refers to McVeigh’s “awareness of the Christian Identity encampment, Elohim City.”53 Simon and Benjamin make the same claim, but they do not provide any sources to support the claim. 54 While there is some evidence that McVeigh may have been in touch with people at Elohim City, his attraction was undoubtedly the antigovernment sentiments of some of the individuals involved, not their religious beliefs. McVeigh’s path to the Oklahoma City bombing is shaped by his military experience, his intense antigovernment views, and a delusional desire to perform a symbolic deed to give meaning to his existence beyond wandering from gun show to gun show, and the homes of old army buddies, most of whom had married and tried to settle down. All of his letters prior to arrest and his statements after trial point to secular motives. Shoko Asahara and Osama bin Laden are two perpetrators of mass casualty attacks for which there is clear evidence that religion was a part of their motivation for 400 J. V. Parachini indiscriminate violence. Asahara fashioned himself as a religious leader, led people who perceived him as a spiritual guru, and justified his violence against sect members, people investigating the group, and innocent people around the Matsumoto courthouse and on the Tokyo subway as part of his god-like service on earth. Much of bin Laden’s violence against the United States is wrapped in a religious rationale. Osama bin Laden, along with several radical Islamic clerics, issued a fatwa guiding Muslims to fight in the global conflict he sees between the Muslim world and the infidels. His association with acknowledged clerical figures imbues his statements with religiosity that he could not legitimately claim by himself. Bin Laden used a religious theme to justify the killing of non-Americans and Muslims in the bombings of embassies in Africa. In his CNN interview bin Laden said, “When it becomes apparent that it would be impossible to repel these Americans without assaulting them, even if this involved the killing of Muslims, this is permissible under Islam.”55 Juergensmeyer’s analysis of the role of religion and terrorist violence helps explain a number of factors described thus far. My conclusion is that [religion’s renewed political presence] has much to do with the nature of the religious imagination, which always has had the propensity to absolutize and to project images of cosmic war. It also has much to do with the social tensions, and the sense of personal humiliation experienced by men who long to restore an integrity they perceive as lost in the wake of virtually global social and political shifts.56 Ramzi Yousef and Timothy McVeigh tended to “absolutize” and view themselves as waging a “cosmic war” and yet they do not seem motivated by religion. Similarly, the LTTE was and is engaged in a bitter civil war. The Rajneeshees were a religious cult, but the objective of their attack was to test a tool for thwarting a secular political process. Moreover, they did not draw on any religious cosmology to justify their actions. In one case, the weapon type selected was due to its comparative availability. In the other cases, groups and individuals chose weapon types with which they had experience or in the case of the Rajneeshees and Aum, they chose weapons material with which they had an obsession. The Tamil Tigers seemed to have chosen chlorine because of its availability and their lack of conventional weapons at the time. They used what was readily available in a crude way. When their supply of conventional weapons became more robust, they had no need for resorting to weapons material that worked imperfectly. Yousef, McVeigh, and bin Laden and his accomplices employed conventional explosives because they had experience in making these type of devices, knew their power, and could procure the ingredients. Yousef and McVeigh had received training in how to build and detonate explosives. For both men there was an intense personal dimension to their roles as bombers that goes to the essence of how they saw themselves as people. For people who have experience with explosives, there is a thrill in the detonation of a device and the destruction it produces. Like the thrill an arsonist receives from setting fires, conventional bombers may also derive a psychological charge from explosions. The results of the act are immediate, dramatic, and visible for all to see. Outcomes Actually killing large numbers of people and causing considerable damage is the most significant distinguishing aspect of the attacks with high explosives versus the attacks with unconventional weapons material. More damage and physical casualties were Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism 401 caused in the attacks with conventional high explosives than in the cases involving unconventional weapons material. Figure 2 provides some metrics of the tragic results of these attacks. Those who sought to poison their victims had visions of the efficacy of the weapons that were beyond their capabilities to actually achieve. The Rajneeshees struggled with how to sicken enough people to influence the election, but at the same time avoid being caught by authorities. One of the reasons that they eschewed using a more virulent form of Salmonella was that authorities would get suspicious if there were a significant number of deaths. The Aum, in contrast, sought to inflict a large number of deaths, principally Japanese authorities, but their delivery method was so crude and the purity of their agent was such that they did not achieve what they intended. In the cases of the Rajneeshees and the Aum, their most spectacular attacks eventually led to their downfall. In the case of the Tamil Tigers, while their use of chlorine may have helped in their effort to take a particular fort, it backfired on them and there is no evidence that they have ever reconsidered using chemical agents. In all three of the cases of unconventional weapon use, the attacks proved much more difficult and much less effective than the perpetrators imagined. The attacks with conventional high explosives, in contrast, were spectacularly successful. The World Trade Center bombing killed six, injured over a thousand, and caused $300 million in property damage.57 The Oklahoma City bombing was the most deadly terrorist attack on American soil, killing 168 people.58 The near simultaneous X X X X X X Figure 2. Comparative table of physical outcomes of mass casualty terrorist attacks. 402 J. V. Parachini bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killed 225 people and injured almost 5,000 people, most of whom were Kenyans and Tanzanians.59 The capabilities for killing with high explosives may simply be much more manageable for determined terrorists. In the cases considered in this article, the perpetrators of the unconventional weapons attacks were comparative amateurs at killing and war fighting. Those who used conventional high explosives had experience in combat. Conclusion The most prominent terrorist incidents of recent years, some of which have had great influence on policy and some of which have gone unnoticed, point to a number of conclusions that should inform policymakers and highlight new areas for research. First, there are striking similarities of motives and factors influencing the groups and individuals who perpetrated these attacks. Regardless of the particular type of weapons material, terrorists determined to inflict mass casualties often view themselves as victims whose war against their oppressor justifies their mass killing and helps define who they are and what role they play in the world. In contrast, the terrorist’s adversaries did not perceive themselves as either at war or an oppressor. The perpetrators of these attacks are operating according to their own logic, which may not be evident to people outside their small clique, government authorities, or society at large. A second noteworthy conclusion is that, given the similarities in many of the factors influencing the perpetrators of mass casualty attacks, they did not opt for unconventional weapons, which are believed to pose the greatest security threat. In those cases where the perpetrators did use unconventional weapons material, only the Aum was determined to use it for its power to inflict the most casualties possible. The Rajneesheed and the LTTE did not continue to use exotic weapons in their struggles; only Aum continued to seek ways to inflict casualties with these weapons material. Contrary to the conventional belief that the new terrorism is just a step up an escalatory ladder of violence, some of the cases point to the importance of understanding why groups and individuals do not proceed to higher levels of violence or actually de-escalate their violence.60 This finding calls into question Simon and Benjamin’s charge that “the complementarity between the maximalist objectives of the new terrorists and WMD emerges clearly.”61 To prove their point they cite the Tokyo subway incident and bin Laden’s accomplices’ attempt to acquire radiological and chemical material. While the possibility of someone with both motive and means to use unconventional weapons indiscriminately cannot be ruled out, an examination of a larger set of cases, other than just Aum and bin Laden, suggests that the danger cannot necessarily be considered inevitable. Aum seems to have been unique in its intense fascination with unconventional weapons. Even though bin Laden and his accomplices may have considered unconventional weapons, they have inflicted considerable damage with weapons material he and his accomplices could obtain and knew how to deliver to their targets. If it is understood why this is the case then perhaps measures can be undertaken to cause others to eschew crossing the threshold. Why a group or individual chooses unconventional weapons material rather than high explosives is influenced by many more factors than just perceived potential to achieve mass casualties. A third finding is that the levels of death and destruction achieved with high explosives was consistently higher than that achieved with exotic, unconventional weapons. While they might be tempted to use unconventional weapons, technical and political barriers, combined with the perceived success of their attacks using high explosives, Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism 403 should cause policymakers to be careful not to overemphasize the danger of terrorist use of unconventional weapons. Moreover, policymakers must guard against inordinate attention to unconventional weapons so as not to hamper attention to a clear and present danger: terrorist attacks with conventional explosives. A fourth conclusion from this examination pertains to the role of religion, mass casualty violence, and the weapons terrorists may choose to use. While religion plays a part in the thinking of some of the groups and individuals, the importance of religion has been overstated in recent years. Some terrorists believed to be religiously motivated have not been so. In contrast, some religious groups that have engaged in terrorism did not draw on their religiosity in any way to justify their actions. Even in the case of the Aum, the importance of religion may be overstated. While Osama bin Laden wraps his violence in religious themes, his war with the United States often seems personal and secular as much as a clash of differing religious cultures. Bin Laden’s religiously motivated actions seem to be rooted in a cause for the Muslim people and not just some higher deity with whom only he communes. A better balance between unconventional and conventional weapons threats should be found. Only the Aum seems to have had an obsessive focus on unconventional weapons. Moreover, despite the Aum’s obsession with unconventional weapons, their attacks were less deadly and destructive than several of the most highly publicized attacks involving high explosives. The Tamil Tigers returned to conventional weapons when their conventional weapons supply increased and there is no hard evidence that they have ever used unconventional weapons material since 1990. Similarly, the Rajneeshees never repeated their trial test of poisoning local townspeople. Ramzi Yousef, Timothy McVeigh, and Osama Bin Laden and his accomplices used conventional high explosives because it was the weapon of choice in the world they knew. All three of these individuals were motivated to inflict mass casualties and they chose conventional high explosives rather than more exotic chemical, biological, or radiological means. Unfortunately, what seems to be new about the new terrorism is that it is perpetrated by individuals or small groups of loosely aligned individuals who use high explosives with the intention of causing as many casualties as possible regardless of who they might be. The factors shaping their worldview are often years in the making. The particular motives for their attacks may be extremely difficult to perceive by government authorities or the broader society, [making attacks] difficult to prevent. New research and policy initiatives need to complement existing strategies of weapons material denial, effective law enforcement apprehension, intelligence on potential perpetrators, and incident response. More research is also needed on the importance of situational factors that shape the pretext for mass casualty attacks; the value of reinforcing societal taboos against mass killings and the use of certain weapons material; and better early identification of potential perpetrators and their pathways to indiscriminate violence. While there are no silver bullets to combat mass casualty terrorism, a better understanding of the motivations and behavioral patterns of mass casualty terrorists will help identify means to reduce the operating room for mass casualty terrorists regardless of the weapons material they may choose. Notes 1. Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, “America and the New Terrorism,” Survival 42(1) (Spring 2000), p. 59. Brian Michael Jenkins, The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, P-7119, July 1985), p. 6. 404 J. V. Parachini 2. Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, “America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange,” Survival 42(2) (Summer 2000), p. 171. 3. Simon and Benjamin, “America and the New Terrorism,” p. 71. 4. For a thorough account of the case see W. Seth Carus, “The Rajneeshees (1984),” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, edited by Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 115–137. 5. Ibid., pp. 124–127. 6. Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Analysis of Trends and Motivations (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 1999), pp. 44–50. Presentation by Bruce Hoffman at Monterey Institute of International Studies CBRN Terrorism Case Studies Authors’ Workshop, 20 March 2000. An expanded version of Dr. Hoffman’s research is forthcoming in a Monterey Institute of International Studies volume. 7. See David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London: Hutchinson, 1996) and D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, 1996). 8. For a thorough discussion of Aum’s work with biological agents see Milton Leitenberg, “Aum Shinriky’s Efforts to Produce Biological Weapons: A Case Study in the Serial Propagation of Misinformation,” The Future of Terrorism (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), pp. 149–158. 9. Direct examination of Brian Parr, United States of America v. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Eyad Ismoil, S1293CR.180 (KTD), 22 October 1997, pp. 4734–4735. 10. John V. Parachini, “World Trade Center Bombers,” in Toxic Terror, pp. 189–191. 11. Raghidah Dirgham, “Ramzi Yusuf Discusses WTC Bombing, Other Activities,” Al-Hayah; in FBIS-NES-95-097 (12 April 1995). 12. Ibid. 13. For Ramzi Yousef sentencing statement see United States of America v. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, S1293CR.180 (KTD), 8 January 1998, pp. 6–18. Yousef’s statement greatly contrasts with those of other conspirators such as Mohammad A. Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Mahmud Abouhalima, and Ajhmad Mohammad Ajaj, United States of America v. Muhammad A. Salameh et al., S1293CR 180 (KTD), 24 May 1994, pp. 26–114. 14. United States of America v. Muhammad A. Salameh et al., S1293CR 180 (KTD), Exhibit 196. 15. Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing (New York: ReganBooks, 2001). For an excerpt of this volume see Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, “Live from Death Row,” Newsweek, featured on the MSNBC web page: (http://www.msnbc.com/news/551852.asp) (2 April 2001). 16. Quoted in Richard A. Serrano, One of Ours: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), p. 38. 17. Ibid., pp. 36–37. 18. Ibid., p. 38. 19. In a letter to Elizabeth McDermott, a neighbor in Pendleton, McVeigh wrote that there was “alert yesterday; everyone had to get into their chemical protective gear and wait.” Quoted in Serrano, One of Ours, p. 37. 20. Dr. Jerrold Post uses the term “community of belief” to describe people who associate themselves with the beliefs of an organization, but who are not formally members of it. McVeigh viewed himself as a member of the antigovernment, antigun control, militia community even though he had no formal affiliation with any group. Jerrold M. Post, “Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-Making: Implications for CBW Terrorism,” in Toxic Terror, pp. 285–287. 21. United States of America v. Timothy James McVeigh, United States District Court, District of Colorado, Criminal Action No. 96-CR-68, 24 April 1997. Opening Statement of Prosecutor Joseph Hartzler. 22. For an excellent discussion of Osama bin Laden’s fatwas, which also has appended the February 1998 Fatwa, see Magnus Ranstorp, “Interpreting The Broader Context and Meaning of Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism 405 Bin Laden’s Fatwa,” Studies in Confict & Terrorism 21(4) (October–December 1998). See also “Interview with Bin Laden, ABCNEWS.com, (http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wor... s/transcript_ binladen1_990110.html) (13 March 2000) and “Wrath of God: Usama bin Laden Lashes Out Against the West,” Time, 11 January 1999, 153(1) (http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/time/asia/magazine/1999/990111/Usama1.html) (13 March 1999). 23. Osama bin Laden quoted in, “Wrath of God: Osama bin Laden Lashes Out Against the West,” Time, 11 January 1999, 153(1) (http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/time/asia/magazine/199/990111osama1.htm1) (3 March 2000). 24. United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, 98 Cr., (Indictment), pp. 1–7. In the trial of individuals believed to be responsible for the bombing of American embassies in Africa, one witness who defected from bin Laden’s employ claims that he held negotiations to try to obtain radioactive material. For a transcript of his testimony, see “Daily Trial Transcripts of USA v. Usama Bin Laden et al trial in the Southern District of New York, February 6, 7, 13, 2001 (http://cryptome.org/#usa-ubl) (12 April 2001). For a brief analysis of the relevant court days and links to those particular trial transcripts, see also Kimberly Rersch and Mathew Osborn, “WMD Terrorism and Osama Bin Laden” (http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm) (14 April 2001). 25. Osama bin Laden is listed as one of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “Top Ten Most Wanted Fugitives.” See (http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/topten/fugitives/fugitives.htm) (28 February 2001) 26. FBI summary on U.S. Embassy Bombings (http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/eastafrica/summary.htm) (28 February 2001). 27. “The legitimacy of the armed struggle of the Tamil People” (http://eelam.com/introduction/legitimacy.html) (10 April 2001) 28. United States of America v. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, S1293CR.180 (KTD), 8 January 1998, p. 14. 29. Shoko Asahara, quoted in Brackett, Holy Terror, p. 106. 30. Serrano, One of Ours, p. 48. 31. Appendix in Ranstorp, “Interpreting the Broader Context and Meaning of Bin Laden’s Fatwa,” p. 328. 32. Mark Juergensmayer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), p. 149. 33. United States of America v. Muhammad A. Salameh et al., S1293CR 180 (KTD), Exhibit 196. 34. Juergensmayer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 115. 35. Michael and Herbeck, “Live From Death Row.” 36. Ibid. 37. Lois Romano, “McVeigh Admits Bombing That Killed 168,” The Washington Post, 30 March 2001, p. A2. 38. Osama bin Laden quoted in Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Wrath of God: Osama bin Laden Lashes Out Against the West,” CNN.Com (http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/time/asia/magazine/1999/ 990111/osama1.html) (13 March 2000). 39. Carus, “The Rajneeshees (1984),” Toxic Terror, pp. 118–119. 40. Brackett, Holy Terror, pp. 73–74. 41. Michael and Herbeck, “Live From Death Row.” 42. Juergensmayer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 155. 43. United States of America v. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Abdul Hakim Murad, Wali Khan Amin Shah, S1293CR.180 (KTD), Government Exhibit 527. 44. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 112. 45. Michael and Herbeck, “Live From Death Row.” 46. Osama bin Laden, quoted in “Wrath of God.” 47. Brackett, Holy Terror, p. 119. 48. Juergensmayer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 109. 406 J. V. Parachini 49. Professor Anthony T. Tu provides a list of chemicals confiscated from Aum compounds. Several of the chemicals listed as large quantities suitable for explosives included 50 bags of Magnesium nitrate, 60 tons of Glycerol, and 1.5 tons of Nitric acid. Anthony T. Tu, “Anatomy of Aum Shinrikyo’s Organization and Terrorist Attacks with Chemical and Biological Weapons,” Archives of Toxicology, Kinetics and Xenobiotic Metabolism 7(3) (Autumn 1999), p. 78. 50. Juergensmayer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 123. 51. Tucker, “Lessons from the Case Studies,” Toxic Terror, pp. 260–261. 52. Simon and Benjamin, “ America and the New Terrorism, Survival, p. 59. 53. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 31. 54. Simon and Benjamin, “America and the New Terrorism,” p. 67. 55. Osama bin Laden quoted in, “Wrath of God.” 56. Juergensmayer, Terror in the Mind of God, p. 242. 57. U.S. Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Statement by J. Gilmore Childers, Esq. and Henry J. DePippo, Esq., “Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center,” 25 February 1998 (http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/childers.htm) (7 April 1998). 58. The Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, “After Action Report, Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing,” 19 April 1995 (http://www.onenet.net/~odcem/aar-final_5.htm), (October 18, 1999). 59. Report of the Accountability Review Boards, “Bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,” 7 August 1999 (http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/ accountability_report.html) (18 October 1999). 60. For a thoughtful consideration of terrorist de-escalation, see Louise Richardson, “The De-escalation of Terrorism Campaigns: Lessons from War Termination,” presented at the workshop entitled “Trajectories of Terrorist Violence in Europe,” Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 9–11 March 2001. 61. Simon and Benjamin, “America and the New Terrorism,” p. 71.