Meaning and Definition Chapter-2 PDF

Meaning and Definition Chapter-2 CHAPTER PREVIEW  This chapter considers the role of definition in the description of meaning, through four  main questions:  ◆ What units need to receive definition?  ◆ What forms should the definitions take?  ◆ Can definitions be grounded in a set of semantic p...

Meaning and Definition Chapter-2 CHAPTER PREVIEW  This chapter considers the role of definition in the description of meaning, through four  main questions:  ◆ What units need to receive definition?  ◆ What forms should the definitions take?  ◆ Can definitions be grounded in a set of semantic primitives?  ◆ What is the place of definition in semantics generally?  We begin by contrasting the types of definition that might appear in dictionaries from the types that interest a theoretical semantic analysis.  Before any definition can begin, we have to confront an initial question: what are the meaning-bearing units of the language for which definitions are required? We explore this question by looking at meaning on, above and below the word level in 2.2, paying particular attention to certain problematic cases.  The next section distinguishes definition of things (real definition) from definition of meanings (nominal definition), and cognitive from extensional definitions, and discusses some differences of opinion in linguistics as to what the proper objects of linguistic definition are (2.3.1).  We then distinguish different possible definitional strategies, including  ◆ definition by ostension (2.3.2)  ◆ definition by synonymy (2.3.3)  ◆ definition by context and typical exemplar (2.3.4)  ◆ definition by genus and differentia (2.3.5).  The test of truth preserving substitutability is introduced as a standard criterion of definitional adequacy (2.4), and we discuss the problem of definitional circularity and the question of semantic primitives (2.5).  We then exemplify the extreme difficulty involved in couching successful definitions of words (2.6), before finally devoting some discussion to the relationship between definition and understanding (2.7). 2.1 Meaning and the dictionary  The concept of a word’s meaning is closely linked to the concept of definition.  Definition was first made explicit in Greek philosophy by Aristotle.  Definitions have been particularly important for conceptual theories of meaning, which traditionally assumed a close link between concepts and definitions.  knowing the concept HORSE, for example, is simply the ability to use the word horse in a way that corresponds with or fits its definition.  a. If X is a horse, X is an animal.  b. If X is a horse, it has a mane. (a growth of long hair on the neck)  c. X is a rooster, so X is not a horse.  d. If X is a horse, it is a large four-footed mammal with hooves  and a mane.  As a result, an understanding of definition is necessary for any attempt to develop a conceptual theory of word meaning.  Furthermore, when people think of a word’s meaning, they think of something like its definition in a dictionary.  Since about the sixteenth century, dictionaries have played an extremely important role in the way we think about and use our own language.  As a result, it is important to clarify the similarities and differences between the definitions that might be proposed in theoretical linguistic semantics, and the types that can be found in dictionaries. 2.1.1 Semantics and lexicography  Dictionary-writing, or lexicography, is, in the words of Landau (1984: 121), ‘a craft, a way of doing something useful. It is not a theoretical exercise to increase the sum of human knowledge but practical work to put together a book that people can understand.’  Linguistic semantics, by contrast, while also interested in the meanings of words, is exactly the sort of theoretical exercise with which Landau is drawing a contrast.  Nevertheless, the model of the dictionary or ‘lexicon’ (an older term for the same thing) has been decisive in the way that many linguists conceive of the nature of language:  Language exists in the form of a sum of impressions deposited in the brain of each member of a community, rather like a dictionary of which identical copies have been distributed to each individual. It is, thus, something that is in each of them, while at the same time common to all and existing independently of the will of any of its possessors. (Saussure 1967: 38)  According to a common assumption, our brains holds a ‘store of words in long term memory from which the grammar constructs phrases and sentences’ ( Jackendoff 2002: 130). This stock of words and associated meanings is usually referred to as the mental lexicon. On this view, the primary task of linguistic semantics would be the specification of the stored meaning representation – the ‘entry’ – associated with each lexeme in the mental lexicon:  “For the speaker/writer, accessing ‘words’ is a matter of mapping ideas onto those stored meaning representations in the mental lexicon that are associated with stable word forms, which can then be used to implement a spoken or written output. For the listener/reader, the major task is to map portions of the linguistic signal onto the stored neurosensory traces in the mental lexicon; once activated, these will in turn stimulate their associated meaning representations”. (Garman 1990: 240–241)  Word-based and meaning-based approaches to definition  The definitions found in dictionaries are the result of a wordbased, or semasiological approach to meaning. This sort of approach starts with a language’s individual lexemes, and tries to specify the meaning of each one.  The other approach, the onomasiological one, has the opposite logic: start with a particular meaning, and list the various forms available in the language for its expression.  The difference between the two approaches corresponds to the difference between a dictionary and a thesaurus. As a semasiological tool, a dictionary is a list of words, and one accesses meanings through words. A thesaurus, on the other hand, is a list of concepts: for a particular concept, the thesaurus gives access to the different words through which the concept could be expressed. 2.2 The units of meaning  Any attempt to associate meanings and forms needs to ask what the minimal meaningbearing units of language are.  For this we need to recognize meanings both above and below the word level, and ambiguities about the level of grammatical structure to which meaning is correctly attributed are not infrequent. 2.2.1 Words and morphemes  How can we determine what counts as a lexeme (word) in a language?  Without understanding the principles of wordhood, it will be hard to decide – especially in unfamiliar languages - what units we should be trying to ascribe meanings to.  For European languages with a well-established tradition of literacy, this question usually does not arise: words are the units surrounded by spaces in standard orthography.  This definition of ‘word’ will not take us very far, however, for two reasons:  1)The first is that languages which have only recently been written down often have a very fluid practice of word-division.  A meaning-bearing unit considered by one speaker as only part of a word will not infrequently be written as a separate word by another speaker.  Ex: Speakers of Northern Sotho (Niger-Congo; South Africa) show two ways of writing the sentence meaning - ‘we shall skin it with his knife’.  2) The second reason to be suspicious of writing as an indicator of word hood is that orthographic practice itself is not even stable within longstanding traditions of literacy.  An unbroken tradition of literacy links Modern and Ancient Greek. Yet Ancient Greek was written without any word-division, whereas modern Greek observes the norms familiar from languages like English.  Similarly, the reform of German spelling rules made standard (for a trial period) in German schools since 1998 resulted in strikingly different word divisions, as can be seen from the following list:  Old (pre-1998) spelling Current spelling  eislaufen Eis laufen ‘skate’  Aufsein auf sein ‘to be up’  gefangenhalten gefangen halten ‘keep prisoner’  wieviel wie viel ‘how much’ 2.2.2 Meanings below the morpheme: sound symbolism  The question of what level of grammatical structure a meaning should be attributed to may often be problematic, and boundary cases, where meanings seem to stand on several different grammatical units, occur quite frequently. One such boundary case is sound symbolism, (also known as ideophony or onomatopoeia).  This is the existence of semi-systematic correspondences between certain sounds and certain meanings. 2.2.3 Meanings above the word level: idioms Idioms constitute another boundary case where it is not clear what the correct level is for the characterization of meaning. We defined idioms as non-compositional phrases – whose overall meaning is not the same as the combined meaning of the individual parts. Different ways of defining meanings In this section we will discuss a number of different ways in which a word’s meaning can be defined. 1. Real and nominal definition As already noted, the concept of definition goes back to Aristotle, who discussed it at a number of points in his voluminous works. One of the most important Aristotelian treatments of definition is to be found in the Posterior Analytics, a treatise devoted to the explanation of the structure of scientific knowledge. A definition (horismos) has two quite different interpretations: ‘in defining,’ says Aristotle, ‘one exhibits either what the object is or what its name means’. A definition can therefore be considered either as a sort of summation of the essence or inherent nature of a thing or as a description of the meaning of the word which denotes this thing. Definition by ostension As we saw in Chapter 1, the most obvious way to define many words is, simply, by ostension, or by pointing out the objects which they denote. In spite of the apparent obviousness of this method, it is beset by difficulties. Firstly, as we saw in Chapter 1, verbs, adjectives and prepositions are not open to this definitional method, to name only the lexical categories most familiar from English: if you point at a black cat running along a wall, you are pointing at a cat, not at ‘black’, ‘running’ or ‘along’. Secondly, even in the case of objects, ostensive definition is extremely problematic Definition by synonymy We might try, for example, to define words by providing synonyms, in either the same language as the word being defined or in a different one. Thus, one could give mad and furious as English definitions of angry, and kulu as a Warlpiri one. The problem with this strategy is that it is usually possible to challenge the identity between the defi niens (the metalanguage word proposed as the defi nition; Latin ‘defi ning’) and the definiendum (the object language word for which a defi nition is required; Latin ‘needing to be defined’). Thus, one could object that neither mad nor furious is really synonymous with angry, since mad also means ‘insane’, which angry does not, and since furious actually means something like ‘very angry’ Definition by context or typical exemplar Another way to define a word is to situate it in a system of wider relations through which the specificity of the definiendum (a word, phrase, or symbol which is the subject of a definition, especially in a dictionary entry, or which is introduced into a logical system by being defined) can be seen. Definition by genus and differentia The two preceding types of definition are essentially relational, defining a word’s meaning through its connections with other words. They may often be workable as cognitive definitional strategies, but they are unlikely to be successful as extensional definitions. This is because they leave the essential nature of the definiendum’s meaning to be worked out by the definition’s addressee, and as a result carry the risk that the wrong meaning may be inferred: in the case of bocal, for example, what is it that jars and conserve pots have in common, that makes them a bocal? Smallness? A wide opening? Function? Definition and substitutability How can the accuracy of a definition be checked? For most semantic theories, a minimum requirement on a term’s definition is the following: substitution of the definiens for the definiendum should be truth preserving in all contexts. For example, ‘keep in equilibrium’ can be accepted as the definition of balance if it is possible to substitute this phrase for balance in all the contexts in which balance occurs without rendering any of them false. All the sentences in the following example, remain true if ‘keep in equilibrium’ is substituted: I balanced the plank on my head. She balanced the ball on the end of the bat. Now, children, you have to balance the egg on the spoon. I’ve never managed to balance the demands of work and play. Problems with definitions So far we have been assuming that it is actually possible to formulate successful definitions for words in a significant number of cases. We should not take this for granted. One of the most frequent criticisms of definitional theories of semantics is that no satisfying definition of a word has ever actually been formulated. The scepticism about the existence of definitions is that many researchers in disciplines closely related to linguistics, such as cognitive science and artificial intelligence, have completely abandoned the idea that definitions even exist the emphasis on definition in linguistics strikes many from these other disciplines as misguided. Definition, understanding and use In some domains of human activity, definitions function as the guarantors of the consistency of language. This is particularly so in science and technology If metallurgists, for example, did not have any fixed working definition of terms like iron or copper, it would be impossible to check that two metallurgists talking about iron The law is another obvious domain in which the role of definition is central. Juridical terms like murder, contract or fraud require clear definitions which fix their denotation by designating exactly what does and does not count as an example of each. The case of ordinary uses of natural language is both similar and differ- ent. Mostly, conversation and other examples of language proceed with- out the need for explicit definition: this is only ever required to resolve confusions when we do ask for clarification about the correct use of a word, nominal definitions of words’ meanings are not usually either solicited or provided. I can define the meaning of water extensionally as H2O, but if the addressee of the definition has no knowledge of chemistry this definition will not be effective in bringing about an understanding of the word’s meaning. But definitions do take on a central role in language use if we take concepts to be essentially definitional in nature, and assume that concepts are or enter into the meanings of words. If concepts correspond to word meanings, and word meanings can be captured in definitions, then it is the definition which is in some sense activated during language use. claim that definitions are involved in language use in this way is not to claim that they are so involved consciously. We may be quite able to use a word appropriately, without being able to phrase a satisfactory definition of it: the knowledge enabling correct use of the word is unconscious, and in no way implies an ability to produce an explicit definition.